Liberal Democracy in Japan : the Role of Intellectuals*

Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies 20 (1988) 23-34, C rhe Hitotsubashi Academy LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN : THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS* HIROSHI TANAKA I. Introduction : Three Ideologies The political role intellectuals play in society is open to analysis from a number of direc- tions, ranging from a case study of the role one intellectual played in a particular time and place, on the one hand, to a statistical correlation of intellectuals across time and space, on the other. Although models or theories of intellectual behaviour derived from such statistical correlations can open up new lines of research on the political role intellectuals do play, their direct application to the study of Japanese intellectuals is not particularly fruitful, because these models are mainly based upon data and analyses of European or North Ameri- can intellectuals. Japan's history and political development are entirely different from the West; so, too, the role of the intellectual. This will become clear as we examine the influ- ence of "Liberal intellectuals" in Japanese politics (A. Gagnon, 1987). There are two reasons for focussing on liberal intellectuals. The first relates to the central role liberal intellectuals and liberalism have played in postwar Japan. The second relates to the paucity of information on the subject. In regard to the first point: from the Meiji Restoration of 1868 to the present day, the bearers of three ideological perspectives have dominated the Japanese intellectual scene: right-wing conservatives or traditionalists; Iiberal intellectuals; and left-wing or socialist intellectuals. From the beginning of the Meiji Era onwards the right-wing conservatives or traditionalists have devoted themselves to preserving Japanese tradition and culture, staunchly opposing the introduction of western values. The pre-war Emperor system, as the pinnacle of Japan's indigenous religious, cultural and political system, crystallized this ideological perspective (S. Matsumoto, 1969; S. Fujita, 1947). In this system the Emperor became the father, and the masses the children (sekishi), of the Japanese nation. The people were re- quired to behave as the loyal subjects of the Emperor until the defeat of 1945. The mystification of the Emperor system was further symbolized by Articles I and 4 of the 1 889 Constitution : The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal. (Article 1) * This paper was prepared for an international conference on "The Role of Intellectuals in Liberal De- mocracies," held at Carleton University, October 4-5, 1985. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. I would like to thank Professor Glenn D. Hook. Director. Centre for Japanese Studies, The University of Sheffield, for his assist- ance in preparing the English version of this article. 24 HrroTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF SOCIAL STUDIES [April The Emperor is sacred and inviolable. (Article 4) The unassailable position' of the Emperor meant right-~ing conservative ideology could enjoy virtual hegemony in the authoritarian Japan of pre-war and war-time days, despite occasional restrictions by the government. This can be seen in the government's reaction to the Young Turks who, with the backing of right-wing intellectuals, attempted a military Putsch on 15 May 1932. The one time national socialist Kita lkki, now turned radical right- wing intellectual, met his death by hanging in 1937 because of his political commitment as evidenced in the 26 February 1936 revolt (G. Wilson, 1969). The government's occasional outbursts against the excesses of the Right are in marked contrast to the relentless oppression of those few intellectuals and labor leaders who cham- pioned socialist and communist ideas. Above all else, this reaction was directed against socialist ideology as such, for socialism denied the Emperor's sovereignty. This automati- cally meant the denial of Japanese identity, which in turn meant high treason. Such being the case, Ieft-wing intellectuals either remained silent in prison, or accepted right-wing ideology through "thought conversion" (tenko). It was not until 1945, when the occupation forces ordered the re]ease of political prisoners, that left-wing intellectuals were able to freely discuss their ideas in Japan (N. Bamba and J. Howes, 1978; G. Beckman and G. Okubo, 1969). Liberalism fell between these two poles : it was denied the authoritarian regime's pat- ronage, yet was not so severely suppressed as socialism, except at the height of fascism, when the two were regarded as equally dangerous (R. Mitchell, 1976). The Japanese masses, too, were unreceptive to the ideas of liberal or left-wing'intellectuals. For the struggle for every- day existence in the 1930s and 1940s made the people a source of anti-intellectualism (R. Smethurst, 1974; B.A. Shillony, 1981). With the defeat in war, however, Iiberalism replaced conservatism at the center of the ideological spectrum. Such a drastic change was made possible by external intervention in Japanese politics : the defeat of the authoritarian regime by the Allied Powers (M. Maruyama, 1963). Thus, in the postwar period, not only most of the intellectuals but the people, too, came to regard "liberal democracy" as the most desirable political option. Government leaders have had to respect this fact (K. Tsurumi, 1970). Obviously, such popular and intellectual orientation does not spell the death of conservatism for under the new 1947 constitution freedom of speech is guaranteed. However, the center of the political spectrum is now occupied by liberalism. The second reason for taking up liberal intellectuals is simply the paucity of research. True, some attention has been paid to the role of liberals in the last decade (T. Takemoto, 1979; S. Tsurumi, 1982), but this hardly matches the years of work on the right-wing (eg. R. Storry, 1957; M. Peattie, 1975; W. Fletcher, 1982), or on the left-wing (eg. G. Bernstein, 1978). In other words, in spite of the hegemony of liberalism in the postwar era, students of Japanese politics have not paid sufficient attention to the role liberal intellectuals have played in the development of politics in the postwar era. Of course, from an analytical- point of view, in order to identify the role of intellectuals in Japan's political development the conservative, Iiberal, or socialist perspective can be adopted, but here'we~will c.oncetrttate, solelyThus, the important_ on roleth~ played by liberal.liberal intellectuals in 'postwar ' Japan, the ideological_ hegemony of liberalism since 1945, and the dearth of scholarly analyses of this phenomenon 1988] LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN : THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS 25 justify the choice of liberal intellectuals as the subject of this paper. II. Japanese Politics and the Intellectual Climate In what way does Japan's political development differ from other industrially advanced countries? Two historical factors are particularly important. First, Japan's modern political development has been non-incremental, unlike that of the west. In the face of overwhelming external pressure, the Japanese have twice been forced to change the ruling ideology and political system: the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the collapse ofmilitarism in 1945. These changes were akin to a political Copernican revolution: up to 1868, power was distributed according to feudal tradition; from 1868 to 1945, authoritarian rule was instituted; and from 1945 to the present, democracy has slowly taken root. True. Japan's political culture has been forced to accommodate these radical changes, but it would be wrong to think this occurred incrementally. Rather, each new regime has tried to create new ideologies and institutions, thereby legitimizing the new regime at the same time as it denies the old. What made these Copernican changes possible was thus not incremental changes in the nature of Japanese political culture, but "external pressures." In this sense, the transformations in political structure to occur in the course of Japan's political development are entirely different from those of most western nations. Second, depending upon the nature of the political regime-feudal, authoritarian, de- mocratic-the intellectual climate has differed, too. Thus, under Tokugawa rule (1603-1867) the study of western ideas or technologies was formally prohibited. The only opportunity for Japanese scholars to study western learning was through the Dutch, who were allowed to keep a commercial mission on Dejima island, Nagasaki. Accordingly, the main intellectual framework in the Tokugawa period was dominated by indigenous traditions and Confu- cianism (R. Bellah, 1957). On abandoning the Sakoku policy of isolationism and exclusionism in 1868, the new Meiji government placed priority on two national goals: the establishment of a modern society and the protection of Ja.panese territory from western imperialism, as symbolized by the slogan "Fukoku Kyohel" (nch country strong army). It is not surprising that Japanese elites feared colonization by the western powers, for two powerful Asian nations. India and China, were about to lose their national pride and sovereignty. This meant the task of modernizing Japan was both urgent and essential. The strategy pursued was two-pronged: retention of the traditional value system, on the one hand, and the introduction of western technology, on the other, as in the phrase "Wakon Yosai" (Japanese spirit, western learning). In contrast to the Tokugawa period, therefore, foreign experts were welcomed to Japan, and the

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