Turks of Kosovo: What to Expect?*

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Turks of Kosovo: What to Expect?* TURKS OF KOSOVO: WHAT TO EXPECT?* ŞULE KUT Dr. Şule Kut is Associate Professor of International Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University. * This article is partly based on the author's paper, 'Between Ethnic and Civic Identity: Turks of Macedonia and Kosovo', presented at the 5th Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN) in New York City, 14 April 2000. INTRODUCTION The ethnic Turks in the post-communist Balkans were faced with one of two diametrically opposed experiences in the 1990s. They were either caught between the nationalism of the majority and that of the major minority, as in Kosovo and Macedonia, or they were relieved of ethnic tension and benefited from the overall democratisation of the country as in Bulgaria and Romania. In both situations, however, they were able to form ethnic parties and participate in political processes. In the meantime, again in both cases, especially due to Turkey's position in the region as a major power, more often than not they have gained confidence as citizens of their respective states. In this new environment, while some Turks have become more aware of their ethnic identity in a political context where ethnic identity has become particularly fashionable, others in the same countries moved away from their previous stress on ethnicity. In any case, it is striking that when most nationalities became nationalist, the Turks, by and large, remained remarkably distant from ethnic and, especially, separatist nationalism. The Turks of the Balkans not only did not turn separatists, but they also openly resented others' separatist calls. In general, they have been strongly in favour of the territorial integrity of their new states in former Yugoslavia or elsewhere in the Balkans during the turbulent 1990s. In case of former Yugoslavia, Turks have long been squeezed not only between the conflicting majority nationalism (Macedonian in Macedonia and Albanian in Kosovo) and the larger minority nationalism (Albanian in Macedonia and Serbian in Kosovo), but also between their own ethnic, religious and civic identities. Hence, the break-up of Yugoslavia significantly affected former Yugoslav citizens of Turkish nationality as they entered a new process of qualitative and quantitative marginalisation in the newly independent Republic of Macedonia and in Kosovo. Despite the periodic immigrations to Turkey since the nineteenth century and assimilation by larger Muslim minorities, particularly Albanian, Turks have traditionally constituted one of the major nationalities in former Yugoslavia, where they have historically concentrated in Macedonia and Kosovo. On the eve of the break-up of former Yugoslavia, the total number of Turks was around 150,000.1 Today, according to the 1994 census, about 77,000 Turks live in the Republic of Macedonia. In Kosovo, their number is estimated to be around 60,000,2 although the 1981 census put their number at around 11,000.3 TURKS OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND THEIR IMMIGRATION TO TURKEY Around 200,000 Turks become citizens of the Serb-Croat-Sloven Kingdom in 1919.4 However, in 30 years their number was down by half. Nevertheless, Turks were a recognised nationality in Socialist Yugoslavia from its onset, like the other major ethno-national groups with their own mother-states outside the borders of Yugoslavia. They constituted a major branch of Balkan Turks, by and large, with extensive minority rights in comparison with the Turks of Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. Only 95,940 persons were registered as Turks in the 1948 census of the Socialist Yugoslav Federation after the Second World War. The dramatic decrease in their number from 1919 to 1948 was mainly due to their emigration from Yugoslavia between 1923-1933 when over 100,000 Turks (among them other Muslim populations such as Albanians, Macedonian Muslims and Bosniacs) immigrated to Turkey.5 In 1938, an Emigration Agreement between Turkey and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was signed, but the available data suggests that the 1923-1933 migrations were far greater than the one that followed the 1938 agreement.6 Under the emigration agreement signed on 11 July 1938, Turkey agreed to accept 40,000 families from Yugoslavia in six years. This, like the one in 1953, was a voluntary immigration agreement, so the Turkish government was not obliged to take care of their settlement. The Yugoslav government was to pay TL500 for each family as compensation.7 The number of Turks in Yugoslavia jumped to 203,908 in 1953.8 The drastic increase in the number of Turks in just five years, between 1948 and 1953, is indeed striking, too. This increase cannot be explained by any reverse population movement because there was none, nor was it due to natural factors. It had political reasons. First, the Turks who had not left Yugoslavia in the inter-war period and during the war were subject to political persecution immediately after World War II under the Socialist regime. In January 1948, 17 Macedonian Turks were founded guilty of treason in the so-called Yücelciler case.9 Yücel was a Turkish organisation founded in the aftermath of the war. The Yugoslav authorities claimed it was an underground, anticommunist terrorist organisation. Members of Yücel were tried as Turkish spies while the members of the Turkish nationality in general were treated as a Turkish fifth column. Turkey's position as a member of the Western Alliance as well as local Turks' generally anticommunist dispositions led the Yugoslav authorities to take an openly anti- Turkish stance in the post-war period. General antipathy towards the Turks as the symbol of Ottoman domination may as well be cited among the factors behind the anti-Turkish attitude in the then new state of Yugoslavia. Hence, most of the ethnic Turks registered themselves as Albanians or Gypsies in the 1948 census to escape the unwanted consequences of being Turks. In contrast, most of the Turks, Albanians and Gypsies, who registered themselves as Albanians or Gypsies in 1948, chose to declare themselves Turks in 1953.10 This was again for political reasons because 1953 was the year when Turkey and Yugoslavia concluded yet another 'voluntary migration' arrangement. The two governments included in the Balkan Alliance a clause on voluntary emigration of Turks from Yugoslavia. Between 1953 and 1960, 151,812 people immigrated to Turkey from Yugoslavia.11 This group of immigrants included Albanians as well. In 1960, the number of Turks in the Yugoslav federation was 131,481.12 About 30,000 of them left Yugoslav territories during the 1960s.13 In sum, between the years 1923 and 1933, 108,179 Turks, and between 1934 and 1960, 160,922 Turks emigrated from Yugoslavia to Turkey.14 It is important to note that, out of the latter figure, 56.4 per cent arrived in Turkey between the years 1953 and 1960.15 On the other hand, post-1923 immigration from Yugoslavia up to 1960, constitutes 22.4 percent of all immigration to the Republic of Turkey in that period.16 Post World War II immigration from Socialist Yugoslavia, on the other hand, totalled to around 200,000. In other words, about two-thirds of all immigrants from Yugoslavia, in fact, migrated during the Socialist regime. It must be noted here that most immigrants of Turkish or Albanian origin question these figures, which roughly total 310,000 since 1923 until the break-up of the second Yugoslavia. Their estimates range between half a million and one million. According to the 1971 census, 108,552 Turks were living in Yugoslavia. In 1981, their number was down to 86,690.17 Since the Turks were not known for their low birth rate and the 1970s were not among the years of significant migration to Turkey,18 one possible explanation can again be found in the recurring process of shifting identities. After the 1974 Constitution, both the value of turning Albanian and the cost of remaining Turkish were high, especially in Kosovo, a region that became a heaven for the Albanians but not for the others. Therefore, although some Turkish families immigrated to Turkey, quite a few seem to have preferred to register themselves as Albanians in the next census. It must be noted here that the practice of shifting identities seems to have stopped in the 1990s. Unlike the earlier practice, neither the Bosniacs nor the Albanians in the 1990s shifted their identity when faced with ethnic cleansing and persecution. This is despite the fact that they were labelled Turks and attacked as such by aggressive leaders who did not refrain from various forms of hate-speech against the Turks.19 On the contrary, they clung increasingly to their ethnic identity as events unfolded. Since 1992, they have sought refuge again in Turkey20 and in other countries, as victims of ethnic cleansing and war, together with their fellow countrymen of various ethnic backgrounds. Aggressive Serbian nationalism was responsible not only for the Balkan wars of the 1990s and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, but also for the intensification of radical nationalism of others in former Yugoslavia since 1980s. A new Bosniac nationalism was born almost afresh in the midst of the war in Bosnia- Herzegovina in 1992-1995. Radical Albanian nationalism has reached its peak - indiscriminately to the detriment of the Serbs, Turks, Bosniacs and Gypsies - in Kosovo in the aftermath of the NATO operations against Serbia in 1999. TURKS IN KOSOVO Turks did not officially exist in Kosovo until the 1951 census. However, despite the mass migration from Kosovo to Turkey after 1953, the number of Turks in Kosovo was registered at 33,000 in the 1961 census.21 Their official number had dropped to 12,500 in 1971 and to 11,000 in 1981.22 However, the true number of Turks has long been the subject of dispute and distortion in Kosovo.
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