Yugoslavia and Western European Integration: Research Hypotheses and Questions

PanEur1970s workshop, Florence, 23-25 November 2017 Working paper Benedetto Zaccaria, EUI

Yugoslavia and Western European integration: research hypotheses and questions

Abstract The present paper aims to illustrate the main research hypotheses and questions concerning the Yugoslav case within the framework of the ERC project “Looking West: the European Socialist regimes facing pan-European cooperation and the European Community”. Addressing an early-stage research started in October 2017, it will first assess the existing literature on Yugoslavia’s attitudes towards Western European economic integration. It will then outline the intended research project and offer a preliminary chronology which will be critically discussed in light of a preliminary archival research at the Arhiv Jugoslavije in Belgrade.

Introduction Within the framework of the ERC project under consideration, Yugoslavia stands as a sui generis case study. Famously, after the Tito-Stalin split Yugoslavia did not participate officially in the dynamics of the Soviet bloc and, as a founding member of the non-aligned movement, it aimed at overcoming the rigid bipolar equilibrium. Overall, the country’s isolation from the blocs in which Cold War Europe was divided has resulted in the isolation of the Yugoslav case from the recent literature on the 1970s and the processes of international and European détente. The history of Yugoslavia in the Cold War has been addressed mostly with regard to the early years of the bipolar confrontation. Analysis has considered in particular the origin of the Tito-Stalin split1, the subsequent rapprochement between Tito and Khrushchev2, the origin of the non-

1 See Jeronim Perović, ‘The Tito-Stalin Split: a Reassessment in Light of New Evidence’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 9/2, 2007, 32–63.

1 aligned movement and Belgrade’s role in its setting up and successive evolution3. Analysis of economic reforms has mainly taken into consideration domestic determinants4. Only in recent times have historians started to look in detail at Yugoslavia’s economic and political evolution during the 1960s, addressing in particular the evolution of the self-management system and, first and foremost, the origins of Belgrade’s opening to the world market in the mid-1960s after the 8th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in December 1964. As suggested by Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, this was a major watershed in Yugoslavia’s history which involved the difficult search for a compromise between liberal and conservative wings within the LCY5. As noted by Ivan Obadić, the “liberal” turn of the Yugoslav leadership was also linked to the opening to the European Community (EC), which was considered to be a major partner to support the country’s industrial modernisation6. Although the above-mentioned studies have the merit to identify the mid-1960s as a turning point in Yugoslavia’s road to a modernisation path, they have not addressed the consequences of the country’s opening to international trade during the 1970s, and the role of Yugoslav élites in it. So far, Yugoslavia’s attitude towards the process of European integration during the 1970s has indeed received scant attention by historians of the Cold War. Belgrade’s international posture towards the Community during this decade has been only indirectly addressed within the framework of my recent analysis on the EC’s Yugoslav policy in Cold War Europe7. However, the availability of primary sources covering the 1970s – mostly from the Arhiv Jugoslavije – together with the above-mentioned recent historiography on the 1960s, which has highlighted the political significance of the country’s opening to the West, indicate that the way is now paved to start

2 Svetozar Rajak, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union In the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953–1957 (London and New York: Routledge, 2010). 3 Svetozar Rajak, “From Regional Role to Global Undertakings: Yugoslavia in the Early Cold War”, in Svetozar Rajak et al. (eds.), The Balkans in the Cold War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2917), 56-86; Rinna Kullaa, Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012); Tvrtko Jakovina, Treća Strana Hladnog Rata (Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2011) 4 See Susan Woodward, Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 5 Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, The Economic Struggle for Power in Tito’s Yugoslavia. From World War II to Non-Alignment (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016). 6 Ivan Obadić, ‘A troubled relationship: Yugoslavia and the European Economic Community in détente’, European Review of History, 21/2, 2014, 337–339. 7 Benedetto Zaccaria, The EEC’s Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe, 1968-1980 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

2 investigation on Yugoslav elites’ views of the processes of economic integration in Western Europe during the 1970s. Documents from the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat of Foreign Trade suggest that relations with the EC was present in the agenda of the Federal government throughout the 1970s. They also show that Western European economic integration had a twofold meaning which will be discussed in the present working paper. The first concerned the economic dimension, as the EC accounted for about 40 % of Yugoslavia’s foreign trade during the decade under consideration8. The second concerned the political domain, as during the 1970s the enlarged EC emerged as a veritable actor in the international arena, promoting a process of East-West détente which was to “untie” Cold War knots9.

A sui generis case study? Despite its sui generis status, Yugoslavia features prominently within the study of Eastern European Socialist regimes perceptions and reactions to pan-European cooperation and the European Community. First, Yugoslavia was a socialist regime, although with several elements which distinguished itself from the other Soviet bloc countries, let alone the Soviet Union. According to the typical dichotomy of socialist states, Yugoslavia’s internal and international posture was based on the dialectic relationship between the ruling party, i.e. the LCY, and the state apparatus – namely the Federal Executive Council (FEC, Savezno Izvršno Veće) and the Federal ministries. Second, its international posture was inextricably linked to the dynamics of the Soviet bloc, given the continuous Yugoslavia’s search for a balance with Moscow after the Tito-Stalin split. This difficult search characterised the period under consideration, as demonstrated for example by Yugoslav reactions to the Czechoslovak events in 1968 and Belgrade’s fears about Soviet influence over the non-aligned movement in the late 1970s. Third, Yugoslavia participated in the activities of COMECON as an associated member of this organisation since 1964. Yugoslavia had its representative within the organisation, was a member of the Council of COMECON and was interested in relations with the Socialist market as a counter-weight to the Common Market. Fourth, Yugoslavia was the first socialist country to

8 Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Arhiv Predsednika Republike, KPR II-b-2-a, Informacija o EEZ I saradji Jugosalvije sa ovom multilateralnom organizacijom, Beograd, 3.10.1970. 9 Angela Romano, ‘Untying Cold War knots: the EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s’, Cold War History, 14/2, 2012, 153–173.

3 enter into official relations with the EC in 1968 and to conclude a trade agreement with it in 1970. From a historical viewpoint, this represents and important case study concerning the opening of a communist state to the Community, according to a rationale which was to be followed – although without official recognition – by several Soviet bloc countries in the late 1970s. Yugoslavia was also the first communist country to allow private foreign investments by adopting a legislation on joint ventures between domestic and foreign enterprises (1967)10. Finally, relations with the Community were not immune from internal criticism within the Yugoslav leadership, showing a division between “Westernisers” and “conservatives” which seems to be identifiable in most socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. And yet, beside Yugoslavia’s special international status, another element makes Yugoslavia a rather peculiar case study: its federal status. Indeed, the long 1970s were characterised by a number of constitutional amendments and reforms which favoured centrifugal tendencies in the country, exacerbating the relationship between the centre – i.e., Belgrade as the federal capital – and the republics.

Addressing Yugoslav élites A preliminary analysis of primary sources from the Arhiv Jugoslavije seem to suggest that the issue of Yugoslavia’s relations with economic organisations in Western Europe, in primis the EC, but also EFTA and OECD, was primarily managed by the Federal Executive Council. This was the executive body of the federation which included representatives of the country’s six republics and the two autonomous provinces. The latter adopted the main policy orientation with regard to international economic matters11. Its president was the counterpart of the European Commission and was regarded in Brussels and Western European capitals as Yugoslavia’s “Prime Minister”. The Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (Državni Sekretariat za Inostrane Poslove) and the Secretariat for External Trade (Saveznog Sekretarijat za Spoljnu Trgovinu) implemented resolution adopted at federal level while, in turn, they also shaped the stance of the FEC. The

10 Patrick Artisien and Peter J. Buckley, “Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia: Opportunities and Constraints”, Journal of International Business Law, 16/1, 1985, 111–135. 11 See for example AJ, Arhiv Predsednika Republike, KPR II-b-2-a, Informacija o diskusiji Saveznog izvršnog veća po pitanju naših odnosa sa EEZ i stava Francuske, 29.12.1969; AJ, Arhiv Predsednika Republike, KPR II-b-2-a, Pregovori SFRJ-Evropska Zajednica Za Zakljućenje novog sporazuma o ekonomskoj saradnji, 29.6.1978.

4 Foreign Ministry had privileged access to representatives of economic organisations in Western Europe – first and foremost through the Yugoslav representation at the EC in Brussels. The Foreign Trade Secretariat was the negotiator of trade agreements and managed actual economic questions with its Western European counterparts. The Foreign Trade Secretariat also represented Yugoslavia within the EC-Yugoslavia Mixed Committee which was established by the first EC-Yugoslavia Trade agreement (1970) and which was to act as a negotiating chamber between the parties throughout the 1970s. Although the FEC expressed Yugoslavia’s official posture in relations with other international organisations, such a posture was the outcome of an intricate internal web of relationship which this research aims at highlighting. The first bodies to be addressed will be the State Presidency, the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the republican branches of the LCY. The goal of archival research will be to identify to what extent republican debates within the LCY were able to influence Yugoslavia’s opening to the West. A particular focus will be devoted to the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy (Privredna Komora Jugoslavije) and its republican branches. The Yugoslav Chamber of Economy was indeed an active exponent of Yugoslav enterprises’ interests, both domestic and international, since the 1950s. Its international section was the chief point of contact and organiser of promotion efforts undertaken from the 1960s onwards12. Archival documents show that before the FEC took any decision with regard to the EC, the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy was consulted13. Furthermore, within the framework of the EC-Yugoslavia Mixed Committee, a representative of the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy was represented along with personnel of the Secretariat for External Trade. All in all, in archival records economic organisations are often mentioned as a driving force to foster Yugoslavia’s links with Western Europe. This question is also linked to the self-management system regulating economic and social relations within the country, which attributed broad competences to economic realities at republican level and was intended, especially after the adoption of the 1974 constitution, to downplay the planning role of the federal government. Lastly, this research will focus on federal economic and financial centres focusing on international economic matters, in order to assess their participation and influence on debates

12 See John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Ljubiša S. Adamović (eds.), Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990), 144. 13 See AJ, Savezno Izvršno Veće, Br. Fonda 130, Medjunarodni Odnosi, Informacija situaciji u odnosima SFRJ-EEZ, 3.6.1969.

5 about Yugoslavia’s stance vi-à-vis cooperation with Western Europe. They include the Institut za Spoljnu Trgovinu, the Institut za Medjunarodnu Politiku i Privredu, and the Jugoslovenska Banka za Medjunarodnu Ekonomsku Saradnju. Analysis of archival records concerning these actors – all stored at the Arhiv Jugoslavije – will allow the identification of extra-party and extra- state apparatus (to be identified in the management of foreign trade enterprises) which was involved in such a debate, being able to shape it.

A tentative chronology Drawing on a preliminary research at the Arhiv Jugoslavije and the Archives of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry in Belgrade, the present research will be initially structured along the following, tentative chronology. The latter highlights the main internal and international events shaping the Yugoslav attitude towards processes of European integration and, more particularly, the European Community. This chronology aims to match the main events of Yugoslavia’s internal history, the evolution of the European integration process and the Cold War, and the main steps of Yugoslav-EC relations.

I. 1968-1970 1968 seems to be an appropriate starting point for this research project for a number of reasons. As highlighted by recent historiography, the Czechoslovak events paved the way to the start of negotiations – which lasted from October 1968 to March 1970 – for the conclusion of the first agreement between Yugoslavia and the EC. September 1968 also marks the opening of diplomatic relations between the parties. Needless to say, 1968 was not the only watershed in Yugoslav élites’ opening to the Community. As noted above, Yugoslavia’s perceptions towards the EC had evolved particularly after the December 1964 “liberal” turn of the LCY and the consequent economic reforms launched by the Communist leadership. However, 1968 seems to mark the definitive shift of Yugoslav-EC relations from an economic to a political dimension. My hypothesis is that the opening to the Community was indeed promoted as a reaction to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and as an attempt of the liberal wing of the LCY, and particularly of Foreign Minister Marko Nikezić – apparently supported by the President of the

6 FEC Mika Špiljak – to draw the country closer to Western Europe because of the fears of Soviet pressures against Belgrade. Archival evidence from the FEC archives seems to show that the opening to the EC was in fact connected to the Czechoslovak events, although further analysis needs to be carried out in order to investigate internal debate within the LCY and the role of republican élites.

II. 1970-1972 The conclusion of the first agreement with the EC coincided with Yugoslavia’s entry in a period of internal turmoil. Economic recession in the country seemed to herald the failure of the country’s liberal turn. Furthermore, the liberal turn matched with the emergence of the national question within the federation, particularly in Kosovo (1968) and Croatia (1970). The purges of the “liberals” in Croatia and Serbia between 1971 and 1972 marked the exit from the political scene of some of the leading figures behind Yugoslavia’s rapprochement of the EC during the mid and late 1960s. At the same time, this period was characterised by a major turn in the European integration process after the European re-launch at The Hague in December 1969, which Belgrade followed attentively14. While enlargement was an economic challenge for Yugoslavia, the strengthening of the Community’s international identity after the launch of the European Political Cooperation and the Global Mediterranean Strategy was an element which could not be neglected by Belgrade15. Within this framework, analysis will have to address whether, and to what extent, the question of Yugoslavia’s relations with Western Europe featured in the political debate within the ruling party after the repression of the liberal élites in Croatia and Serbia. Research will also have to identify if any clear-cut change in Yugoslav élite perceptions of the EC took place in this critical historical juncture, or whether Yugoslavia’s foreign and trade relations continued to follow the course which had characterised the previous years. The renewal of the 1970 agreement in June 1973 – which also envisaged the expansion of cooperation in the industrial and agricultural fields – seems to suggest that continuity rather than change symbolised the attitude of the Yugoslav leadership during this

14 AJ, Arhiv Predsednika Republike, KPR II-b-2-a, Sekretarijat Predsednika Republike, Grupa za ekonomska pitanja, Informacija o ekonomskim programima saradnje zemalja EEZ, 17.7.1970. 15 AMIP—Arhiv Ministarstva za inostrane poslove Republike Srbije, Belgrade, PA, R, 1976, f181:b 494114, 21.6.1976.

7 period. One of the main features of the 1973 agreement was the inclusion of new forms of cooperation in the industrial field: the economic rationale behind this decision, strongly advocated by the Yugoslav leadership, was linked to the fact that in 1972, 194 out of 300 joint- ventures contracts with foreign firms had been concluded with Community firms16.

III. 1973-1976 This historical juncture is marked by a major constitutional reform in Yugoslavia (1974) which, following the mounting importance of the national question within the federation, attributed wider competences to the Federal republics. This period was also characterised by economic recession in Western Europe due to the oil shock and consequent stagnation in terms of trade flows between Yugoslavia and the EC. Analysis will have to investigate the Yugoslav leadership’s strategy to respond to the economic crisis in Western Europe and if/how this question interacted with the process of constitutional reform. First documentary evidence suggests that economic crisis spurred the Yugoslav leadership to further enhance relations with the EC. From the FEC papers it seems that its president, the Bosnian Muslim Džemal Bijedić, was the real promoter behind the making of a Joint Declaration between the EC and Yugoslavia in December 1976 at the end of a period of intense negotiations aiming at enlarging the spheres of bilateral cooperation, including transport, tourism and finance through cooperation with the European Investment Bank. The declaration set the political foundations of bilateral relations, as Yugoslavia was defined as a European, Mediterranean, Non-aligned and developing country. In this way, Yugoslavia distinguished itself from its socialist partners but at the same time it sanctified its detachment from the European integration process. The question to be investigated concerns the political drivers and domestic jockeying for power behind Bijedić’s open attitude towards the EC.

IV. 1977-1980

16 AJ, Arhiv Predsednika Republike, KPR II-b-2-a, Predsedništvo SFRJ, Grupa za ekonomske pitanje, Informacija o drugom zasedanju Mešovite komisije izmedju SFRJ i EEZ, 12.5.1972.

8 After the accidental death of Bijedić in February 1977, the Presidency of the FEC was held by another Bosnian Muslim, Veselin Djuranović. When compared with his predecessor, Djuranović promoted a policy of continuity which much probably was the result of clear indication by the LCY that relations with the EC stood as a political imperative for the regime. The 1976 Joint Declaration was indeed used by the Yugoslav government as a political platform to negotiate a new, more comprehensive agreement with the EC. Bilateral negotiations came to an end in 1980, when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the collapse of Tito’s health (the Yugoslav leader would die on 4 May 1980) spurred the parties to conclude the first EC-Yugoslavia Cooperation agreement. This period was marked by internal bargaining within the Yugoslav leadership with regard to the succession to Tito. A crucial element in this research will be to spot out what was the place of Western economic integration in Yugoslavia’s elites reasoning about the post-Tito era. Archival evidence from the Foreign Ministry and FEC archives seems to suggest that, as in 1968, the 1980 internal and external events led the country’s leadership to question itself about its future alignment. My research hypothesis is that 1980 was a decisive turning point for Yugoslavia’s relations with the Community. While the Cooperation Agreement was a qualitative step-ahead in terms of relations with the EC – indeed, it broadened the spheres of bilateral cooperation and included several trade concessions to Yugoslavia in the agricultural, industrial and financial domains – at the same time it anchored Yugoslavia to its own past. By founding the agreement on the 1976 Joint Declaration, the Cooperation agreement implicitly excluded Yugoslavia from the European integration process which at that time was involving several Southern European countries, including Greece, Spain and Portugal. 1980 therefore seems to be an important watershed to describe the evolution of Yugoslavia’s stance towards the process of European integration. Analysis of the records of the EC- Yugoslavia Cooperation Council – which was established by the 1980 Agreement – seems to show that no major turning point took place in later years, at least until 1989 when the Yugoslav leadership called, for the first time, for an Association agreement with the EC after the fall of the Berlin Wall17.

Research questions

17 See Benedetto Zaccaria, “The European Community and Yugoslavia in the Late Cold War Years, 1976– 1989”, in Wilfried Loth and Nicolae Paun (eds.), Disintegration and Integration in East-Central Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 275–277.

9 The main goal of this research – in line with the overall approach of the project – is to identify the élites which shaped Yugoslavia’s expectations and predicaments towards the process of Western European economic integration. Such an identification will have to take into consideration the following research questions.

The first question stemming up from the chronology outlined above concerns the question: continuity Vs discontinuity. How did the evolution of the internal balance of power in Yugoslavia – especially in the domain of relations between the federal government and the republics – impinge upon the country’s opening to the West? Had the so-called purges of “liberals” in 1971-72, the re-shuffling of inter-republican relations after the adoption of the 1974 constitution and the jockeying for power within the LCY in view of the transition to the post-Tito era any direct effect in the evolution of Yugoslavia’s posture vis-à-vis Western European economic integration? My hypothesis is that the perceptions of the Yugoslav élites towards the European integration process after 1971-72 did not change substantially. Under the leadership of the Serbian Miloš Minić – who was Yugoslavia’s Foreign Minister from 1972 to 1978 after he replaced Mirko Tepavac in the wake of the repression of the Croatian Spring – Yugoslavia signed the 1973 trade agreement with the EC and the 1976 Joint Declaration. Until 1976 Džemal Bijedić made the FEC the primary counterpart of the EC and urged for the enlargement of cooperation between his country and the Community. His successor, Veselin Djuranović, followed Bijedić’s path. Interestingly enough, Josip Broz Tito seemed to be one of the main guarantees of continuity in terms of relations with the Community. Although one has to assess the effective influence of Tito over the LCY and the FEC in the late 1970s, the record of meetings between Tito and the representatives of the EC (Jean Rey in 1970; Sicco Mansholt in 1972; François-Xavier Ortoli in 1975; Finn-Olav Gundelach in 1976) show that the Yugoslav leader did not change its overall attitude towards European integration, insisting on the economic importance of enhancing trade and industrial cooperation with the EC and Yugoslavia’s concern to be isolated between the two European blocs. All in all, its seems that the Yugoslav leadership elaborated a view of the EC as a needed and unavoidable partner.

The second research question concerns the cleavages among Yugoslav élites. This research should indeed highlight whether differences within Yugoslav elites followed any clear-cut

10 ideological or regional pattern. In other words, the question is open whether the “Westernizers” within the Yugoslav leadership are identifiable within the so-called Western Republics, i.e., Slovenia and Croatia or whether a cross-republican division took place between “conservatives” within the LCY, more prone to a centralised and state-driven approach, and “modernisers”, more open to trade and cooperation with Western Europe. Linked to this question lays the issue of the relationship between the LCY and the state apparatus. Recent historiography has highlighted that during the 1950s and 1960s the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed an increasingly autonomous role which often contrasted with the “ideological” attitude of the party18. Analysis will have to highlight if this was true also during the 1970s and if this phenomenon also affected the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Trade.

The third question concerns the place of the EC’s in Yugoslavia’s broader foreign policy considerations. In other words, how the Community featured within Yugoslavia’s relations with the Soviet bloc and the non-aligned movement. Was the relationship with the EC mainly a matter of economic relations or was there any broader political significance which concerned the country’s relations with Moscow and Soviet influence in the third world? Linked to this question, one cannot neglect the growing international role of the EC during the 1970. Was Western Europe seen as some kind of third force which could suit Yugoslavia’s foreign policy during a period marked by divisions within the Non-Aligned Movement – as it became patent during the Colombo and Havana Summits (1976 and 1979) – and apparently rising Soviet influence in the third world?

The fourth question concerns the evolution of social-democracy in Western Europe. Analysis has to identify whether Yugoslavia’s attitude towards processes of European integration at party level depended on the centre-left turn which characterised Western Europe in the early 1970s and, first and foremost, on the rise of Euro-communism as a new political conception in the mid-1970s. The historiography has emphasised the close relationship between the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the LCY after the election of Enrico Berlinguer as party secretary of

18 See Kullaa, Non-alignment and its origins.

11 the PCI in 197219. Tito welcomed the basic foundations of Eurocommunism as a legitimisation of national roads to socialism and a challenge to USSR ideological hegemony. The Euro- Communist turn did not materialise without a substantial change in the Western European Communist parties’ overall attitude to the European integration process. Was this change observed and analysed in Belgrade? And how did it affect the LCY’s internal debates concerning economic integration in Western Europe? Preliminary analysis on documents related to relations between the League of Yugoslavia’s Trade Unions (Savez sindikata Jugoslavije) and the CGIL – Italy’s leading left-wing trade union – bears witness to increasing attention of the Yugoslav trade unions towards the Community’s social policy measures and, in particular the role of trade unions at European level. Interestingly enough, the head of Yugoslavia’s trade unions in this historical juncture was Mika Špiljak, the President of the FEC when Yugoslavia concluded its first agreement with the EC in 1970.

The final question concerns the actual economic and social impact of Yugoslavia’s opening to the EC. One of the common features of the relationship between Belgrade and its Community partners – which, however, concerns the broader domain of Community’s relations with its socialist partners in Eastern Europe – is the strained compatibility between state and market. In its dealings with the EC, Yugoslavia often asked the Community the enhancement of industrial cooperation and the promotion of joint ventures. This request, however, was often rebuffed by Community representatives who claimed that the European institutions and the national governments could not intervene in the foreign orientation of private enterprises in order to foster their interest in the Yugoslav market. What the Community repeatedly suggested was that Yugoslavia should promote internal reforms in order to improve the conditions for Western firms to operate in the Yugoslav market, and vice versa20. The question calls for a reassessment of Yugoslavia’s legislation on foreign investments – which started to develop in 1967 in the wake of the country’s economic reforms – in order to analyse how it was linked to the need to integrate Yugoslavia in the Western European market and the role of the Yugoslav

19 See Archivio Partito Comunista (APC), Estero, mf 240, 260–263, Note by A. Rubbi, 15.5.1976; APC, Estero, mf 240, 266–269, Note by A. Rubbi, 26 May 76. See also Silvio Pons, Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo (Torino: Einaudi, 2006). 20 AJ, Arhiv Predsednika Republike, KPR II-b-2-a, Kabinet Predsednika Republike, Služba za Spoljnopolitička Pitanja, Pregovori SFRJ-Evropska Zajednica za zaključenje novog sporazuma ekonomskoj saradnj, 29.6.1978.

12 Chamber of Economy in this process. This question is crucial to understand how the European integration question challenged the country’s normative configuration and, accordingly, the ideological self-legitimisation of the ruling élites.

Case study: Yugoslavia, Italy and European integration In order to offer a detailed analysis of Yugoslav elites’ perceptions of the Western European economic integration this research intends to devote a considerable space to the case of relations between Belgrade and Rome. During the period under consideration, Italy represented Yugoslavia’s main political and, together with the Federal Republic of Germany, economic partner. As revealed by recent historiography, thanks to the political opening promoted by Aldo Moro since the mid-1960s, Yugoslavia and Italy started a process of political rapprochement which was based on mutual interests. Belgrade aimed to use Italy as its porte- parole within the Common Market – there is archival evidence that Rome echoed Yugoslavia’s desiderata within the framework of Coreper, the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the EC. Italy, on the other hand, regarded Yugoslavia as a pivotal political partner to expand its influence in the Balkans and promote the stability of its borders21. While the story of Yugoslav- Italian relations so far has focused on the settlement of the border issue according to a traditional diplomatic perspective, the present research may add new insight on the actual motivations behind Belgrade’s rapprochement to Rome. A first survey of diplomatic records from the Arhiv Jugoslavije on this issue reveals that Yugoslavia’s opening to Italy was inextricably linked the European integration question. Throughout the 1970s – before and after the conclusion of the Osimo agreements of November 1975 which solved the Trieste question – foreign policy considerations concerning Italy did not neglect the development of Yugoslavia’s relations with the Common Market. With regard to Italy, Belgrade’s economic aim was twofold. First, to expand its exports in order to fix the disequilibrium of the balance of payments. Second, to enhance industrial cooperation through the setting up of joint ventures with Italian firms. Two industrial cooperation enterprises were particular relevant throughout the 1970s: the FIAT-ZASTAVA car industry and the ENI – INA joint venture on oil and natural gas

21 See Karlo Ruzicic-Kessler, “Italy and Yugoslavia: from distrust to friendship in Cold War Europe”, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 19/5, 2014, 641–664;

13 extraction22. Archival records suggest that such cooperation was a driving force which steered relations between the two countries. By enhancing cooperation with Italy, Yugoslavia aimed to foster its integration within the Common Market, empowering its economic competitiveness and making its presence felt within the Council of Ministers of the EC thanks to the Italian mediation. It is not by chance that the opening of negotiations for the first trade agreement took place during the Italian presidency of the Council of Ministers, when the Italian government strongly advocated the Community’s assistance to Yugoslavia after the Czechoslovak events. Within this framework a prominent role was played by Toma Granfil, a member of the FEC in charge of relations with the EC and, at the same time, president of the Yugoslav-Italian Economics Commission between 1967 and 1971. The same happened during the first semester of 1980, when Yugoslavia relied on the Italian presidency to conclude negotiations for the Cooperation agreement. Research will therefore aim to reconstruct the role of political and economic elites shaping Yugoslavia’s Italian policy: the role of the “Western” republics bordering Italy and the bargaining for power within the LCY about relations with Italy within the broader framework of Western European economic integration.

22 AJ, Arhiv Predsednika Republike, KPR II-b-2-a, Informacija o ekonomskih odnosima Jugoslavije sa nekim zemljama ZET, 28.12.1967.