Yugoslavia and Western European Integration: Research Hypotheses and Questions
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PanEur1970s workshop, Florence, 23-25 November 2017 Working paper Benedetto Zaccaria, EUI Yugoslavia and Western European integration: research hypotheses and questions Abstract The present paper aims to illustrate the main research hypotheses and questions concerning the Yugoslav case within the framework of the ERC project “Looking West: the European Socialist regimes facing pan-European cooperation and the European Community”. Addressing an early-stage research started in October 2017, it will first assess the existing literature on Yugoslavia’s attitudes towards Western European economic integration. It will then outline the intended research project and offer a preliminary chronology which will be critically discussed in light of a preliminary archival research at the Arhiv Jugoslavije in Belgrade. Introduction Within the framework of the ERC project under consideration, Yugoslavia stands as a sui generis case study. Famously, after the Tito-Stalin split Yugoslavia did not participate officially in the dynamics of the Soviet bloc and, as a founding member of the non-aligned movement, it aimed at overcoming the rigid bipolar equilibrium. Overall, the country’s isolation from the blocs in which Cold War Europe was divided has resulted in the isolation of the Yugoslav case from the recent literature on the 1970s and the processes of international and European détente. The history of Yugoslavia in the Cold War has been addressed mostly with regard to the early years of the bipolar confrontation. Analysis has considered in particular the origin of the Tito-Stalin split1, the subsequent rapprochement between Tito and Khrushchev2, the origin of the non- 1 See Jeronim Perović, ‘The Tito-Stalin Split: a Reassessment in Light of New Evidence’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 9/2, 2007, 32–63. 1 aligned movement and Belgrade’s role in its setting up and successive evolution3. Analysis of economic reforms has mainly taken into consideration domestic determinants4. Only in recent times have historians started to look in detail at Yugoslavia’s economic and political evolution during the 1960s, addressing in particular the evolution of the self-management system and, first and foremost, the origins of Belgrade’s opening to the world market in the mid-1960s after the 8th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in December 1964. As suggested by Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, this was a major watershed in Yugoslavia’s history which involved the difficult search for a compromise between liberal and conservative wings within the LCY5. As noted by Ivan Obadić, the “liberal” turn of the Yugoslav leadership was also linked to the opening to the European Community (EC), which was considered to be a major partner to support the country’s industrial modernisation6. Although the above-mentioned studies have the merit to identify the mid-1960s as a turning point in Yugoslavia’s road to a modernisation path, they have not addressed the consequences of the country’s opening to international trade during the 1970s, and the role of Yugoslav élites in it. So far, Yugoslavia’s attitude towards the process of European integration during the 1970s has indeed received scant attention by historians of the Cold War. Belgrade’s international posture towards the Community during this decade has been only indirectly addressed within the framework of my recent analysis on the EC’s Yugoslav policy in Cold War Europe7. However, the availability of primary sources covering the 1970s – mostly from the Arhiv Jugoslavije – together with the above-mentioned recent historiography on the 1960s, which has highlighted the political significance of the country’s opening to the West, indicate that the way is now paved to start 2 Svetozar Rajak, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union In the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953–1957 (London and New York: Routledge, 2010). 3 Svetozar Rajak, “From Regional Role to Global Undertakings: Yugoslavia in the Early Cold War”, in Svetozar Rajak et al. (eds.), The Balkans in the Cold War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2917), 56-86; Rinna Kullaa, Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012); Tvrtko Jakovina, Treća Strana Hladnog Rata (Zaprešić: Fraktura, 2011) 4 See Susan Woodward, Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 5 Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, The Economic Struggle for Power in Tito’s Yugoslavia. From World War II to Non-Alignment (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016). 6 Ivan Obadić, ‘A troubled relationship: Yugoslavia and the European Economic Community in détente’, European Review of History, 21/2, 2014, 337–339. 7 Benedetto Zaccaria, The EEC’s Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe, 1968-1980 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 2 investigation on Yugoslav elites’ views of the processes of economic integration in Western Europe during the 1970s. Documents from the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat of Foreign Trade suggest that relations with the EC was present in the agenda of the Federal government throughout the 1970s. They also show that Western European economic integration had a twofold meaning which will be discussed in the present working paper. The first concerned the economic dimension, as the EC accounted for about 40 % of Yugoslavia’s foreign trade during the decade under consideration8. The second concerned the political domain, as during the 1970s the enlarged EC emerged as a veritable actor in the international arena, promoting a process of East-West détente which was to “untie” Cold War knots9. A sui generis case study? Despite its sui generis status, Yugoslavia features prominently within the study of Eastern European Socialist regimes perceptions and reactions to pan-European cooperation and the European Community. First, Yugoslavia was a socialist regime, although with several elements which distinguished itself from the other Soviet bloc countries, let alone the Soviet Union. According to the typical dichotomy of socialist states, Yugoslavia’s internal and international posture was based on the dialectic relationship between the ruling party, i.e. the LCY, and the state apparatus – namely the Federal Executive Council (FEC, Savezno Izvršno Veće) and the Federal ministries. Second, its international posture was inextricably linked to the dynamics of the Soviet bloc, given the continuous Yugoslavia’s search for a balance with Moscow after the Tito-Stalin split. This difficult search characterised the period under consideration, as demonstrated for example by Yugoslav reactions to the Czechoslovak events in 1968 and Belgrade’s fears about Soviet influence over the non-aligned movement in the late 1970s. Third, Yugoslavia participated in the activities of COMECON as an associated member of this organisation since 1964. Yugoslavia had its representative within the organisation, was a member of the Council of COMECON and was interested in relations with the Socialist market as a counter-weight to the Common Market. Fourth, Yugoslavia was the first socialist country to 8 Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Arhiv Predsednika Republike, KPR II-b-2-a, Informacija o EEZ I saradji Jugosalvije sa ovom multilateralnom organizacijom, Beograd, 3.10.1970. 9 Angela Romano, ‘Untying Cold War knots: the EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s’, Cold War History, 14/2, 2012, 153–173. 3 enter into official relations with the EC in 1968 and to conclude a trade agreement with it in 1970. From a historical viewpoint, this represents and important case study concerning the opening of a communist state to the Community, according to a rationale which was to be followed – although without official recognition – by several Soviet bloc countries in the late 1970s. Yugoslavia was also the first communist country to allow private foreign investments by adopting a legislation on joint ventures between domestic and foreign enterprises (1967)10. Finally, relations with the Community were not immune from internal criticism within the Yugoslav leadership, showing a division between “Westernisers” and “conservatives” which seems to be identifiable in most socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. And yet, beside Yugoslavia’s special international status, another element makes Yugoslavia a rather peculiar case study: its federal status. Indeed, the long 1970s were characterised by a number of constitutional amendments and reforms which favoured centrifugal tendencies in the country, exacerbating the relationship between the centre – i.e., Belgrade as the federal capital – and the republics. Addressing Yugoslav élites A preliminary analysis of primary sources from the Arhiv Jugoslavije seem to suggest that the issue of Yugoslavia’s relations with economic organisations in Western Europe, in primis the EC, but also EFTA and OECD, was primarily managed by the Federal Executive Council. This was the executive body of the federation which included representatives of the country’s six republics and the two autonomous provinces. The latter adopted the main policy orientation with regard to international economic matters11. Its president was the counterpart of the European Commission and was regarded in Brussels and Western European capitals as Yugoslavia’s “Prime Minister”. The Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (Državni Sekretariat za Inostrane Poslove) and the Secretariat for External Trade (Saveznog Sekretarijat za Spoljnu Trgovinu) implemented resolution adopted