Royal United Services Institution. Journal

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The Collapse of the Defence of the Chemin Des Dames, 27TH May, 1918

Major T. E. Compton

To cite this article: Major T. E. Compton (1922) The Collapse of the Defence of the Chemin Des Dames, 27TH May, 1918, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 67:467, 483-492, DOI: 10.1080/03071842209434666

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071842209434666

Published online: 11 Sep 2009.

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Download by: [Wilfrid Laurier University] Date: 23 June 2016, At: 20:38 THE COLLAPSE OF THE DEFENCE OF THE CHEMIN DES DAMES, 27th MAY, 1918. By MAJOR T. E. COMPTON. From recent FrerrcJr Sources.

THE position known as the Clzemin des Dames, formed by the watershed between the Aisnc and the rivers from Craoniic westwards to the - road, has been at intervals the scene of momentous mili- tary action from the time of Casar to that of Marshal Foch. In 1814, exactly a hundred years before the outbreak of the recent world war, Napoleon and Bliichcr manaeuvred against each other over this very ground. Meisonnier's picture " 1814 " in all probability represents the great emperor's march towards Laon along the Chemin des Dames on 8th March, after the battle of . There had been a heavy fall of snow during the night of the 7th-8th. THE CHEMIN 00oAMES Downloaded by [Wilfrid Laurier University] at 20:38 23 June 2016

That part of the plateau lying to the cast of Hurtebise Farm (where there is a monument to Marshal Ney), known during the war as the plateau of the Casemates and CaZiJoonrie, is not actually traversed by the Chemin des Dames. It is nevertheless part and parcel of the position, which from Craonne to the Soissons-%on road measures over 15 miles. The Chcmin des Dames, that is to say the road, dates from about the middle 484 THE COLLAPSE OF THE. DEFENCE OF THE CIiEMIN DES DAMES of the 18th century. It branches westwards at Hurtebise Farm from the road leading from the Ailette and the Chiiteau dc la Bove (Marshal Ney's headquarters sth, 6th and 7th March, 18x4)~where the daughters of Louis XV. were in the habit of passing a part of the summer. It was for them that the road along the watershed was made. The Chemin des Dames position' had been wrested from the Germans during the spring and summer of 1917: Hurtcbisc on the 16th April (as part of the Nivcllc offensive), Craonne on May qth, and the Chemin dcs Dames soon after. French valour and tenacity held the ground gained against desperate countcr-attacks, and the position was solidly organised. But elsewhere, as a consequence of the non-success of General Nivclle's ambitious plans, the morale of the French Army became depressed, and when llarshal PCtain took over the command in chief he was faced with a hard task. Discipline had to be restored and the rank and file inspired with fresh confidence in their generals. Fortunately, the French soldier soon recovers his spirits and General Pktain was popular as a unifornily successful leader. Had he not saved the situation once before at Verdun ? The absence of any serious German offensive till the spring of 1918 gave him the necessary time to organisc and prepare the French Army for the impending supreme struggle of 1918. In ahis Dircctive No. 4 of the 2znd December, 1917,he laid down thc defensive tactics that were to bc cmploycd. An oficer of the French general staff, writing in t!ie Revile de of April and May, 1921,~describes in broad outline the working of the French Grad Qitavtier Gblkral during the eventful period which culmin- ated on the 15th Jdy, 1918,with the defeat of Ludcndorff's third and last great offensive at the hands of General Gouraud (French 4th Army), whose defensive tncfics ZUEYC Iliose iricitlcntcd by Gciicrd Pe'ldin's Diveciive No. 4. Iight is also thrown by this writer on the heavy reverse cxpcricnced by the French 6th Army (Ducli6ne) on the 27th May, which is the subject of this article, on the Chcniin des Dames, whcn, for reasons which will be discussed later on, Dircctivc No. 4 was in no scnsc. complied with. In May, IS, the French Gth Army (to which were attached three British divisions sent there for repose) had some tcn divisions in front line Downloaded by [Wilfrid Laurier University] at 20:38 23 June 2016 from about Soissons to Rhcinis. Of these, the French 11th Corps Iield the Clietiiin dcs Dames, having on its right, at Craonne, the British 50th Division. Tlie Frcnch aznd Division had its right at , and, as was thc case with the other divisions of the 11th Corps (21st and Gznd) on the Chcmin des Dames, its units were sprcad out on a very estendcd front, from Craonnelle to Vaumairas spur, north-west of Braye. Ifany of its battalions being under establishment, its total strength in the

1 The avcragc liciglit of the position above sea level is over Goo fcct, and above thc valley of the Ailcttc 350 feet. Ahvc Craonnclle it rises to 650 feet ahvcsea level. At and about thek3oissons-Laon road it is Goo. * "Au 30 Bureau du 3e G.Q.G. (1917-1918),"par XXX. Reuite de Paris, 15th April, 15th &y, 1921. TIIE COLLAPSE OF TIIE DEFENCE OF THE CIIEMIN DES DAMES 485 trenches, all ranks, did not cxcced 5,400, or, the front measuring 8 miles, 675 (all ranks) to tlic mile-too strong for outposts, but too weak as tlic garrison of a line of resistance. 31. Gabriel Bounourc, an cycwitncss, serving in tlic 22nd Division, has given to thc world a detailed and very moving account of the state of affairs on the Clicmin dcs Dames both immediately before and diiring the great Gcnrian assault of the 27th Nay.’ I-Ic is, naturally, not a little indignant that gallant troops should have hen placcd in a position which, lie declares, no one present who had considcrcd it at all believcd could, in tlie circumstances, withstand a German offensive should it bc delivcrcd on a scale similar to that wliicli, on 21st hlarch, had broken the front of the British 5th Army. General von Blumcnthal, who had becn the Crown Prince’s Chief of Staff in thc war of 1870-71, was once askcd his opinion of the Hog’s Ihck, ncar Guildford, as a dcfensivc position. He said it would be bad to dcfcnd as having no depth. The same fault may be found with tlic Chemin des Dames. hloreovcr, facing north, the heights on tlic right bank of the Ailette-La Bovc and Scuville-form csccllent cnemy observatorics at only about two and a half miles distance. Ncverthclcss, gcncrally, an imperfectly-informed opinion rcgardcd this position as an iniprcgnablc fortress. 31. Bounoum’s first article would sceni to haw becn written before the appearance of XXX’s article of 15th May, or he woultl have undcr- stood morc clearly that not only liis own devotcd division, but the othcrs on its lcft and the British 50th Division on its riglit, had becn ordered to defend (to tlic last) the Clieniin des Danies as thc morc tolerable of two unsatisfactory altcmativcs. General Pktain was on the horns of a dilemma. Against an attack in grand style, tlie Chemin des Danies was not only a bad position,ns too narrow, but it was in the front line, and, therefore, as a position of resistance, directly under the ban of Direcfivc No. 4. Purely tactical considcrations pointed to its occupation by a line of outposts, strong only in machine-guns, the first real position of resistance bcing organised on the heights on tlic Icft, or soiith, bank of the Aisnc. But the strategical effect of its abandonment would have been felt Downloaded by [Wilfrid Laurier University] at 20:38 23 June 2016 from Conipiegne to Rheims, necessitating ;I rcadjustnicnt of the front between thcse points : besides which, morally, the abandonment of the Chemin dcs Dames, it was feared, would Iiavc been misunderstood both in the army and in the country. Consequently, after serious dcliberation, General PCtain had felt him- self obliged to approve of tlic retcntion of thc Clieniin des Dnnies as a position of resistance, with this proviso, liowcvcr, flint rioric qf !lie divisiorts of the GtIr .4rtrty filmed irr resemc (of this Army) ~PCYCto bc broirglil iiorflr of the Aisnc. These, according to SXX, comprised the 157th, the 74ti1, the 39th, the 1st (posted 26th May) and the 25t!i British. In case of nn

1 ‘I Lc 22e Division 811 Clicrriin dcs Dames, 27~hi. 1cp8.” Revice de.PmI’s, 15 AoQt et I Septembrc, xgzr. I< k VOL LXVII. 486 TIIE COLLAP3E OF TIIE DEFEKCE OF TIE CHEAIIS DES DAMES at tack tlicy were intcndcd, apparently, by the Comniander-in-Cliicf to occupy thc heights on thc south bank of thc Aisnc. It would appcar that tlic great mistake of tlic French Gtli Arniy on tlic 27th May, 1918, was f hc disregard of this order. " Dnris Iri violwcc dc l'crigngeriiciit," says XXX, " In doriiiE;:foridn- irieri!nlc tiit filtrrr hitperdtic de vile par ccrlnirts m?cihiils." Without doing the least good, certain elements, at least, of tlic divis- ions in reserve wcrcL, in fact, scnt across the Aisnc in direct reinforcement of the troops of tlic first linc and becamc involvcd in their dcfcat. Directive No. 4 had laid down that the second position should bc the first linc of rcsistancc; but owing to rcprcscntations from the coniman- dcrs of certain sectors early in 1918, an Iirstriictioir issued by thc Frcncli Grand @artier GCnCral annoiingd that the Commander-in-Chief himself would in future choosc the positions of resistance in each sector. It was to be understood, Ilowcvcr, that " wit11 rarc csccptions, rcinforccments will not increase tlie density of thc first line." Thus it was, according to XXX,' that General PCtain after conferring with Generals Duchbnc and Franchet d'Esperey, who were respectively tlic Army and Army-group Cornrnandcrs, admitted the argument of l'ordrr .rrzornZ. Thc country would not Iiave understood that from the exper- icnce gathered froni the British front alone, a position so rich in French blood and tliouglit to bc imprcgnablc had bccn given up. A certain prcsurnption, this wvritcr thinks, may liavc asserted itsclf in French minds : " Thc English had fallen away hforc the encmy's great assault, but thc Frcncli would stand ! " The Comrnandcr-in-Chicf also, no doubt, took into consideration thc gcncral form of thc fronts bordering on thc Chcmin des Damcs. These explanations offered by thc G.Q.G. in thc Revue de Paris wcre, no doubt, poor consolation to 11. Bounourc. The late AI. Abcl Ferry, dcputy and author of La Gucrre vue d'eii Iiaut et d'cn bus, had been very hard on thc r~thCorps. " Aftcr four years of war in such positions," Iic had said, " with such troops, such an cvent (as the almost immcdiatc loss of a large part of thc position on the encmy advancing) poses the most painful of enigmas to the French Army. In the cycs of tlic Italians wc havc had our Caporctto, in tlie eyes of tlic Downloaded by [Wilfrid Laurier University] at 20:38 23 June 2016 Englisli our 21st March." 11. Gabriel Bounourds articles have been written to dispel this idea. Tlic only enigmas in BI. Bounourc's opinion is why thc position was held in thc strength allotted. It-may bc mentioned, as regards thc zand Division, that rightly (or wrongly as M. Bounourc thinks) 'its commander ms retired as a result of the defeat. Thc Chcmin dcs Damcs heights would appcar to havc hcn organiscd by the Frcnch for dcfcncc as follows :- The 1st Line, or Parallel of resistance, was a trench on thc face of tlic northern slope. 1 Gonsidtratiolrs de I'ordrc moral sotrf vetrim se grefler stirles r,?gles posies par k nirrclivc No. 4. el ria parlictrlier cclle-ci : Ie Clrenriti des Dntiies, trop c&bre, ,re pc;it itrz abattdotitit? dr pwfipris. Retwr de Paris, 15 Blni, rgzr. THE COLLAPSE OF T€!E DEFEXCE OF THE CHEMIS DES DAMES 487 The 2nd Parallel \vas on the crEfc tnililnire. Two-thirds of tlic infantry (active) occupied thcsc two trenclics. In the zznd Division, G battalions, each battalion having a front of 13 nliles, were therc. The 3rd Line, or Parallel, was on thc crElc ge'ogrnphiqm and consisted of a line of rcduits occupied by 6 battalions of tcrritoiials. Varying with the angle of the slopc, the distance between the 1st Parallel and the Line of Reduits was from about 1,000 to 400 yards. On thc plateau, at a distance from the Line of Reduits varying with the breadth of the plateau, was the 4th Line, or Posifioir latcrnie'diuire, occupied by 3 battalions Territorials with machine gun detachment, for u frorit of 8 miles.' \\liere the plateau narrows, as at Troyon and west of Hurtchisc, thc distance between the 3rd and 4th lines was not more than Goo yards, practically, as regards' the latter, a part of the 1st Position. The average distancc was about five furlongs. In thc nond Division, 3 battalions (active) formed the Divisional Reserve. General DuchCnc (now commanding the 3rd Corps d'Armec, H.Q., Roucn) in his orders of 20th May gave the 1st Position of the 6th Army as its principal line of resistance, to be defended ci oufrmce and retaken if necessary, the Po- sition Inicrnridiuire constituting thc rear of the line of battle. Tiicrc does not appear to haw ken any reference to anotlicr position of resistance south of tlic Aisnc. The nznd Division, holding the iniportant sub-scctor Craonncllc Braye, it may be repeated and summarisccl, had nine battalions of regular infantry, six of which, we have seen, occupied the 1st and 2nd parallels; and three, as divisional reserve, were posted in rear of the posiliorr itilermc'diuirr. Their total strength is given as 5,272, including officers. The division had in addition nine battalions of territorial infantry, six posted in the Line of Rcduits (3rd Parallel) and three in the fJosifion iriiermidiuire. Their total strength is given as 3,920, plus 400 in machine gun detachments. Crud fold, 9,592 infantry, on a front of 8 miles (including all divisional reserves) and with an organiscd fighting depth of from 500 to 2,500 yards. The Command Post of the G.O.C. Division was at (Iluilly, on the Aisnc. about 33 miles almost due south of Ccrny. Tlie General Officers com- Downloaded by [Wilfrid Laurier University] at 20:38 23 June 2016 Inanding the artillery and the infantry of the Division had tlicir command posts at Paissy, just on the revcrsc slopc of the plateau, nearly two miles south by west of Aillcs.

Srcxs OF THE APPROACIIISGATTACK. If we consider the attack of the 27th Nay as a stratcgical surprise for the French G.Q.G. and for the Allied High Command, wc ought not to lose sight of the fact that thc Chcinin des Dames was only a very small part of the immense front that stretched frorii Xicuport on the North Sca to Bclfort and the Swiss frontier; and up to the middle of May, 19x8

1, In thc battle, the divisional reserve-3 battalions (active)-rciiiforced the territorials. IC k 2 488 TIIE COLLAPSE OF THE DEFENCE OF TIiE CIIEMIN DES UAblES thcrc seemed to bc little rcaion wliy it should bc attackcd more than any othcr scctor. The Frcncli Staff, in fact, and vcry possibly that of tlic Generalissimo also, cspcctcd thc Germans to continue thcir cffoits against thc British. It iniglit cvcn liavc bccn thought an unlikely sector for the cncmy to choose, bccausc of its prcsumcd strcngtli. It was certainly considcrcd to bc at least a qtiict sector, or British divisions would hardly havc bccn scnt at this time to thc Frcnch 6th Army fpr vcposc. \Vitli woods in full lcaf, indccd, and with the prccaiitions takcn by the attacker, esccpt the Gcrman offcnsivc of Ijth July, as to which former csperiencc no doubt assisted t he defender’s obscrvation-no attack from either side could be forcsccn;’ least of all Marshal Foch’s peat counter-attack by the French xoth and 6th Armics, which, on 18th Jiily, marked definitely tlic turn of the tide. Fcr thc abovc rcasonc, the only intcrvcntion of tlic High Coininand possiblr bcforc tlic 27th 3Iay was the posting of one division (the 1st) to the Gth Amy on the nGth, which, of course, had no cffrct whatever on tlie action of the following day. Tactically, on tlic othcr hand, thcrc was no surprise, and on the niglit of nGtli-z7tli Nay the dcfcndcrs wcre cvcrywhcrc rcady to rcccivc the assault. By thc middlc of May suspicions had bccn aroused; but tlic dclay in making prisoncrs at this critical time, from whom something dcfinitc might havc kcn asccrtained, was, to say the least of it, vcry unfor- tunate. As carly as 15th May, much activity was iioticcd in tlic cncmy’s lincs; strong detachments from thc rcar arriving about sunset. A system of tclcgraph lincs sccmcd to havc bccn dcvcloped on the La Bovc hcights and to tlic north of Ncuville. On tlic 14th and 19th coup-dc-mains wcrc attcmptcd, and on the 20th tcn hostile aeroplancs wcrc obscrvcd ovcr tho French lincs. In tlic cncmy’s lines smokc scrccns wcrc frcqucnt. The enemy withdrcw his sentrics south of the Ailcttc, so that the Frcnch patrols wcrc ablc to cross thc river unmolested ; but they then came in contact with stronger bodies of infantry who rctired, dcclining combat, as if tlicir orders wcrc on no account to allow men to bc takcn prisoncrs. Such being tlic state of affairs, on thc 25tl1, Gcncral Duchenc (whom tlie poilus callcd the ligrciiiififniic),in passing along tlic front, called Gen- Downloaded by [Wilfrid Laurier University] at 20:38 23 June 2016 cral Braquct (commanding the infantry of the nznd Division) and said to him, “ Braquct, I must absolutely haw some prisoncrs.” Gcncral Braquct was proceeding to csplain that tlicy had bccn trying cvcry day

without success, but his superior interrupted him with, I‘ I must liavc them ai. once, this night,” and tlic cxtraordinary thing is that on the vcry same night, 2 5th-zGtli May, they werc forthcoming. Such is sometimcs the effect on subordinates of a rcsolutc will. 11 patrol of the Gand Rcgimcnt cnpturcd one German soldier, while a patrol of the 19th Rcgimcnt took an aspirant (officer-cadet).’ Early

1 Tlic nspirnrrf of Frcricli mid Ccrman armics \vas in any case a soldier to wlioni a commission had becn promised wlicn Iic should be qualificcl aiid tlicrc was a v.lca11cy. TIIB COLLAPSE OF TIlE DEFENCE Or: THE CIIEIIIN DES DABIBS 489 on the 26th thcsc two prisoners \vcre conducted to the 11th Corps Hcad- quarters, and soon after noon to those of General DuchSne. It was thcn known that an offensive by scveral Army Corps would be delivered at daybreak on tllc following morning along the wholc of the Aisnc front, and by 4 p.m. all the di\risions, both Frcncli and British, in the front linc had hen notified. Tactically, thereforc, the 6th Army was prepared. But there was evidently no time bcfore thc blow would fall for General retain and Marslial Foch to intcrvcne.

Tire ASSAULT. At 8 p.m. on thc 26th May thc dcfcndcrs gcncrally \vcw rcady to resist the attack. In the 22nd Division the units of tlic divisional rcscirvc (3 battalions) were posted just bchind the +osifioir iiilcvrriidinivc, each bchind the regimental zonc, as follows :--rrSth at Vassognc, Gznd at Bourg-et-Coniin and 19th at Iloussy-sur-Aisnc. During the evening, the divisional artillcry conducted a firc of cguntcr-prcpar at ion.' The late 31. hbcl Ferry1 in his book dcclnrcs that only thc artillcry of the 45th Division, wcst of Rhcims, cnrricd out in thc most vigorous way possiblc this plan of prcvcnting, or at least hindcring, the encmy from making the ncccssary irnmcdiatc preparations for the advance of his infantry. 11. Bounoure insists, on the contrary, that in thc zznd Division at least this firc was carried out with thc grcatcst intensity until the enemy opened his artillery preparation for the assault. But the guns cmployed wvcre not powwrful cnough. Sonic Frcncli officers taken prisoners in the battle had an opportunity of secing what damage their own artillcry had done in thc Gcrman lines. They noticed a good inany eneniy corps, cspccially at crossways ; but nowhcrc suficicnt destruction to paralyze, in any way, tlic attack. At midnight the 1st Parallel reported all calm. Suddcnly, at I a.m., bcgan the espcctcd cataract of firc, which went on for thrcc hours. Almost at oncc, thc position was filled with blinding gas and dust. Fire was chiefly concentrated on thc topographical salients,

Downloaded by [Wilfrid Laurier University] at 20:38 23 June 2016 which were to bc the lines of advance, the linc of reduits (crkfe ge'ogru- phiqfic) and posifioii iiifcrrrie'dinirc rccciving attention from tlic enemy's heaviest guns. Tlic rc\*ersc of the position was also swept. It was here that tlic present writer's medical adviser was taken prisoner. He was attached to a battalion of territorials and was attending to thcir wounded on the rcvcrsc slopes whcn he fcll into thc cncniy's hands. Several very unplcas- ant months spcnt at Strasburg in East Prussia reduced him very considcr- ably in wight bcfore the next opportunity occurred of consulting him. At ~IOUSS~,tlic rcscrvc battalion of thc 19th Reginicnt lost an

131. I7erry lost his life from the enemy's fire in tlic coursc of anotlier inspcction of thc front as a dclcgatc of tlic Frcncli Par1i;in:ent. 490 TIIE COLLAPSE OF TIIE DEFESCE OF THE CIIEbIIN DES DAMES entire section which had taken cover in a cellar that was subsequently penetrated by a lieavy shcll. As would appear to have been frequently the case elsewherc on siinilar occasions, telephonic communicationssuffercd. By a p.m. bat talions had to fight their battle practically isolated. Thc wirclcss apparatus at General Braquct’s command post was damaged five times, and while it was being mended for tlic sisth time, thc operator \vas killed. Visual signalling ivas impossible owing to the dust and smoke. In the course of the bombardment the Germans seized an advanced post known as tlic Te‘fou. It was part of the tactics of the assault to scizc all advanced posts which otherwise might bring flanking fire on the columns of attack. Many of the French guns werc destroyed or damaged, and some, having been in action for several hours bcforc I am., appear to have been short of ammunition. In any case, according to 11. Bouiiourc, when at 4 am., rockets from the 1st Parallel announced tlie enemy’s advance, few guns of the aand Division could rcply to this signalled demand for a defensive firc barrage. The German advance was preceded by a double barrage, or firc- curtain: one of 77,and IOj mm. shells, without gas, hmcdiately in front of the advancing infantry, and the other about 300 yards ahead of it, searching the position with 150 and 210 mm. shells. Tlic distance between the two lessened as the attack advanced, these barrages becoming one and the same as soon as thc plateau had bccn traversed. The assault- ing columns rcachcd the plateau by the salicnts with such rapidity that the defenders of thc trenches in the re-entrants were taken in reverse and flank by showers of grenades, when thcy were still expecting to bc attacked in front. The German success, in fact, appears to have ken clue in great measure to thcsc tactics : concentrated artillery preparation on the exposed trenches of the salients, follo\wxl by a concentrated infantry assault, the re-entrants being neglected till tlic salients had been carried. Wlicrc the heights narrow to a few yards, between the platcauxof the Casemates and Craonnc, the British left, according to 31. Bounoure. \vas overwhelmed and the right of the zznd Division uncovered. The Tdfon advanced post (to thc left front of Hurtcbise Farm) had been takcn at 2 a.m., as already mentioned, by a Gernian reconnaissance in force. The Downloaded by [Wilfrid Laurier University] at 20:38 23 June 2016 Frcncli right flank was thus menaced carly in the battle; but twvo batta- lions of the 118th Regiment, under the Commandants Rio and Bontz, put up an obstinate and gallant resistance. The latter held Aillcs till j a.m., and the Rio battalion defended Hurtcbisc Farm till much latcr. Tlicse twvo battalions, in fact, maintained a sort of nucleus of resist- ance on this flank till s) a.m., when they were apparently surrounded and the two commandants taken prisoners. The enemy are said to havc hen in the kitclicns of the French 118th Rcgimcnt at Craonncllc as early as 6 am., in which case; no doubt, the British left had bccn withdrawn from Craonnc, an esposcd position certain to be Surrounded with the enemy at Craonnellc. It was in thc centre of the zznd Division, however, that thc battle THE COLLAPSE OF THE DEFESCE OF TIIE cmmN DES DAMES 491 went worsc for thc defcnders ; for Courtccon and Bovcllc having bccn lost thc cncmy was ablc to invadc thc plateau of tlic Chemin dcs Dames, cspccially by tlic hollow road lcading from Bovcllc. Tlic colonel coni- manding tlic rcgimcnt holding this part of thc position (thc Gmd) was madC prisoner in his command post hforc lie had lcarnt anything of tlic course of thc fight, all his mcsscngers ha\ping bccomc casualties. The ~gih Rcgimcnt on thc Icft, having its right flank uncovcrcd by thc dcfcat of thc Gznd, suffcrcd much thc snmc fatc, its’coloncl (an csccptionally gallant officcr, formerly in thc cavalry, and poscssing thc Anglo-Sason namc of Taylor) being shot down on rcfusing to surrcndcr. By 6 a.m., thc battle, csccpt on tlic cxtrcnlc right, had driftcd to the posifiorr infcrir&inire, held as rcgards the zznd Division by thrcc battalions of tcrritorials on a front of 8 milcs. supportcd by the thrcc regular battalions forniing tlic Divisional licscrvc. On thc cstrcnic right, t!ic rcgular battalion of thc Ix8tli Rcgiment in rescrvc about Vassognc appcars to havc aidcd the cffcrts of Commandant Rio to stcm the tidc of invasion for scvcral hours ; but clscwhcrc onc disastcr folloivcd anothcr. North of Bourg-ct-Cotnin, the commander of thc reserve battalion of the Gznd Regiment was takcn prisoncr, togcthcr with his escort, while rcconnoitring. His succcssor had to rctirc what rcmaincd of thc battalion on Bourg-ct-Comin to prcvcnt it being surrounded. It crossed the Aisnc subscqucntly with heavy loss, a most gallant rcarguard detachment sacri- ficing itsclf for the safety of thc rest. Licutcnant Cren, commanding a company, ordered his sub-lieutenant, to rctire it, saying, “ I shall rcmain licre to protect your movcmcnt.” Hi5 company thus crosscd the ilisnc at tlic cost of the life of its commander. At hloussy, thc battalion of tlic 19th Rcgimcnt in divisional rcscrvc, through somc misundcrstanding, waited until 7 a.m. beforc marching to occupy tlic position iizfcmzidiuirc. The village was undcr artillcry firc and thc battalion lost hcavily in forming up, tlic commander bcing among thc killcd. Upon approaching thc position it was found that the cncmy wsalready tlierc. The battalion was thereupon rctircd over thc by Vcr, Courtonnc and Bourg-ct- Comin, its rearguard crossing, aftcr an action, at Pont Arcy. On thc Icft of thc zznd Division, thc 216th IZcgimcnt of thc 21st Division performed distinguishcd service and a notable feat, as it actually Downloaded by [Wilfrid Laurier University] at 20:38 23 June 2016 held a part of thc lincof Itcduits for twenty hours. As no support was forthcoming, howcvcr, thc moral result was countcrbalanccd by thc loss of nicn and iiinfirid. What became of the divisions in rcscrve (of tlic Gtli Army) is not at all clear; but one at least, tlic 157t11, would appear to have crossed tlie Aisnc and to ham beconic involvcd in the general de‘bfclc. Possibly it was rccallcd in time. General Renouard (at one tirnc on AIarshal Joffre’s staff), who \\‘as in command of thc zznd Division, spcaking on the tclephone to Gcncral Braquct, commanding the infantry, at 10.40 p.m. on thc zGth, statcd that onc division of tiiqrcscrvc of thc Gtli Army had its lca&ng clcmcnts thcn north of thc Aisne, and that behind it was coming another division. As 492 THE COLLAPSE OF TIIE DEFENCE OF TIIE CIIEIIIN DES DAMES to this, 31. Bounourc declarcs that at no timc and no point did rc,wrvcs give thc least assistancc to thc 22nd Division, and tlicy ccrtainly do not appear to liavc hcn in position south of the rivcr. Tlic rcsult of this confusion is well known; tlic cncmp’s advance continued unchecked up to and evcn to thc south of thc AIarnc. But on this very account thc cncmy creatcd the immcnscly dccp pocltc wliich was one at Icast, if not the principal, cause of his undoing. Another contributory cause was thc rcpulsc of Yon Bclow’s Army, on Ijth July, by thc French 4th Army, IGhich success was directly due to the 2nd position king niadc the line of rcsistnncc, in accordance with Gcncral PCtain’s instructions. The 1st Position in this instance was manned mcrcly by outposts and machine-gun dctachmcnts, posted, how- ever, so as to deccivc thc cncmy and forbid too closc rcconnaissancc. Tlic complctc success of thcsc tactics on 15th July owed somcthing, it is thought, to the revcrsc on the Chemin dcs Dames sis n.ecks earlier ; for tlic German Staff, it may be assumed, rcasoned from rccent cspericncc and thus fcll thc niorc easily into the trap laid for them by General Gouraud. Although thc organisation of a false position in front of thc main position was not altogcthcr new in war, tlic issuc of General PCtain’s Direclive No. .I would scem to Iiavc been thc first timc that this defcnsivc tactic was organiscd as a systcni, the Chcmin des Dames being, as already dcscribcd, an cxccption to tlic rule-unfortunatc iridecd for the troops holding it, but, as wc have sccn, indirectly contributing to the final victory. In this undoubted fact, 11. J3ounoure and his comrades in arnis, who survivcd ila terriblc ordcal of 27th May, 1918, may find consolation. Their forlorn cffort was not in vain. Downloaded by [Wilfrid Laurier University] at 20:38 23 June 2016