Royal United Services Institution. Journal ISSN: 0035-9289 (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi19 The Collapse of the Defence of the Chemin Des Dames, 27TH May, 1918 Major T. E. Compton To cite this article: Major T. E. Compton (1922) The Collapse of the Defence of the Chemin Des Dames, 27TH May, 1918, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 67:467, 483-492, DOI: 10.1080/03071842209434666 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071842209434666 Published online: 11 Sep 2009. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 5 View related articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rusi19 Download by: [Wilfrid Laurier University] Date: 23 June 2016, At: 20:38 THE COLLAPSE OF THE DEFENCE OF THE CHEMIN DES DAMES, 27th MAY, 1918. By MAJOR T. E. COMPTON. From recent FrerrcJr Sources. THE position known as the Clzemin des Dames, formed by the watershed between the Aisnc and the Ailette rivers from Craoniic westwards to the Soissons-Laon road, has been at intervals the scene of momentous mili- tary action from the time of Casar to that of Marshal Foch. In 1814, exactly a hundred years before the outbreak of the recent world war, Napoleon and Bliichcr manaeuvred against each other over this very ground. Meisonnier's picture " 1814 " in all probability represents the great emperor's march towards Laon along the Chemin des Dames on 8th March, after the battle of Craonne. There had been a heavy fall of snow during the night of the 7th-8th. THE CHEMIN 00oAMES Downloaded by [Wilfrid Laurier University] at 20:38 23 June 2016 That part of the plateau lying to the cast of Hurtebise Farm (where there is a monument to Marshal Ney), known during the war as the plateau of the Casemates and CaZiJoonrie, is not actually traversed by the Chemin des Dames. It is nevertheless part and parcel of the position, which from Craonne to the Soissons-%on road measures over 15 miles. The Chcmin des Dames, that is to say the road, dates from about the middle 484 THE COLLAPSE OF THE. DEFENCE OF THE CIiEMIN DES DAMES of the 18th century. It branches westwards at Hurtebise Farm from the road leading from the Ailette and the Chiiteau dc la Bove (Marshal Ney's headquarters sth, 6th and 7th March, 18x4)~where the daughters of Louis XV. were in the habit of passing a part of the summer. It was for them that the road along the watershed was made. The Chemin des Dames position' had been wrested from the Germans during the spring and summer of 1917: Hurtcbisc on the 16th April (as part of the Nivcllc offensive), Craonne on May qth, and the Chemin dcs Dames soon after. French valour and tenacity held the ground gained against desperate countcr-attacks, and the position was solidly organised. But elsewhere, as a consequence of the non-success of General Nivclle's ambitious plans, the morale of the French Army became depressed, and when llarshal PCtain took over the command in chief he was faced with a hard task. Discipline had to be restored and the rank and file inspired with fresh confidence in their generals. Fortunately, the French soldier soon recovers his spirits and General Pktain was popular as a unifornily successful leader. Had he not saved the situation once before at Verdun ? The absence of any serious German offensive till the spring of 1918 gave him the necessary time to organisc and prepare the French Army for the impending supreme struggle of 1918. In ahis Dircctive No. 4 of the 2znd December, 1917,he laid down thc defensive tactics that were to bc cmploycd. An oficer of the French general staff, writing in t!ie Revile de Paris of April and May, 1921,~describes in broad outline the working of the French Grad Qitavtier Gblkral during the eventful period which culmin- ated on the 15th Jdy, 1918,with the defeat of Ludcndorff's third and last great offensive at the hands of General Gouraud (French 4th Army), whose defensive tncfics ZUEYC Iliose iricitlcntcd by Gciicrd Pe'ldin's Diveciive No. 4. Iight is also thrown by this writer on the heavy reverse cxpcricnced by the French 6th Army (Ducli6ne) on the 27th May, which is the subject of this article, on the Chcniin des Dames, whcn, for reasons which will be discussed later on, Dircctivc No. 4 was in no scnsc. complied with. In May, IS, the French Gth Army (to which were attached three British divisions sent there for repose) had some tcn divisions in front line Downloaded by [Wilfrid Laurier University] at 20:38 23 June 2016 from about Soissons to Rhcinis. Of these, the French 11th Corps Iield the Clietiiin dcs Dames, having on its right, at Craonne, the British 50th Division. Tlie Frcnch aznd Division had its right at Craonnelle, and, as was thc case with the other divisions of the 11th Corps (21st and Gznd) on the Chcmin des Dames, its units were sprcad out on a very estendcd front, from Craonnelle to Vaumairas spur, north-west of Braye. Ifany of its battalions being under establishment, its total strength in the 1 The avcragc liciglit of the position above sea level is over Goo fcct, and above thc valley of the Ailcttc 350 feet. Ahvc Craonnclle it rises to 650 feet ahvcsea level. At and about thek3oissons-Laon road it is Goo. * "Au 30 Bureau du 3e G.Q.G. (1917-1918),"par XXX. Reuite de Paris, 15th April, 15th &y, 1921. TIIE COLLAPSE OF TIIE DEFENCE OF THE CIIEMIN DES DAMES 485 trenches, all ranks, did not cxcced 5,400, or, the front measuring 8 miles, 675 (all ranks) to tlic mile-too strong for outposts, but too weak as tlic garrison of a line of resistance. 31. Gabriel Bounourc, an cycwitncss, serving in tlic 22nd Division, has given to thc world a detailed and very moving account of the state of affairs on the Clicmin dcs Dames both immediately before and diiring the great Gcnrian assault of the 27th Nay.’ I-Ic is, naturally, not a little indignant that gallant troops should have hen placcd in a position which, lie declares, no one present who had considcrcd it at all believcd could, in tlie circumstances, withstand a German offensive should it bc delivcrcd on a scale similar to that wliicli, on 21st hlarch, had broken the front of the British 5th Army. General von Blumcnthal, who had becn the Crown Prince’s Chief of Staff in thc war of 1870-71, was once askcd his opinion of the Hog’s Ihck, ncar Guildford, as a dcfensivc position. He said it would be bad to dcfcnd as having no depth. The same fault may be found with tlic Chemin des Dames. hloreovcr, facing north, the heights on tlic right bank of the Ailette-La Bovc and Scuville-form csccllent cnemy observatorics at only about two and a half miles distance. Ncverthclcss, gcncrally, an imperfectly-informed opinion rcgardcd this position as an iniprcgnablc fortress. 31. Bounoum’s first article would sceni to haw becn written before the appearance of XXX’s article of 15th May, or he woultl have undcr- stood morc clearly that not only liis own devotcd division, but the othcrs on its lcft and the British 50th Division on its riglit, had becn ordered to defend (to tlic last) the Clieniin des Danies as thc morc tolerable of two unsatisfactory altcmativcs. General Pktain was on the horns of a dilemma. Against an attack in grand style, tlie Chemin des Danies was not only a bad position,ns too narrow, but it was in the front line, and, therefore, as a position of resistance, directly under the ban of Direcfivc No. 4. Purely tactical considcrations pointed to its occupation by a line of outposts, strong only in machine-guns, the first real position of resistance bcing organised on the heights on tlic Icft, or soiith, bank of the Aisnc. But the strategical effect of its abandonment would have been felt Downloaded by [Wilfrid Laurier University] at 20:38 23 June 2016 from Conipiegne to Rheims, necessitating ;I rcadjustnicnt of the front between thcse points : besides which, morally, the abandonment of the Chemin dcs Dames, it was feared, would Iiavc been misunderstood both in the army and in the country. Consequently, after serious dcliberation, General PCtain had felt him- self obliged to approve of tlic retcntion of thc Clieniin des Dnnies as a position of resistance, with this proviso, liowcvcr, flint rioric qf !lie divisiorts of the GtIr .4rtrty filmed irr resemc (of this Army) ~PCYCto bc broirglil iiorflr of the Aisnc. These, according to SXX, comprised the 157th, the 74ti1, the 39th, the 1st (posted 26th May) and the 25t!i British. In case of nn 1 ‘I Lc 22e Division 811 Clicrriin dcs Dames, 27~hi. 1cp8.” Revice de.PmI’s, 15 AoQt et I Septembrc, xgzr. I< k VOL LXVII. 486 TIIE COLLAP3E OF TIIE DEFEKCE OF TIE CHEAIIS DES DAMES at tack tlicy were intcndcd, apparently, by the Comniander-in-Cliicf to occupy thc heights on thc south bank of thc Aisnc. It would appcar that tlic great mistake of tlic French Gtli Arniy on tlic 27th May, 1918, was f hc disregard of this order. " Dnris Iri violwcc dc l'crigngeriiciit," says XXX, " In doriiiE;:foridn- irieri!nlc tiit filtrrr hitperdtic de vile par ccrlnirts m?cihiils." Without doing the least good, certain elements, at least, of tlic divis- ions in reserve wcrcL, in fact, scnt across the Aisnc in direct reinforcement of the troops of tlic first linc and becamc involvcd in their dcfcat.