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Home The P-38 Lightning in Europe

By Jonathan Lupton

With one engine out and a propeller feathered, a P-38 flies home protected by heavily-armed B-17s.

Background

he P-38 Lightning was short, it’s almost always described as assumption—that could one of the world’s fastest having been overshadowed by the protect themselves against enemy T aircraft when it first flew P-51 Mustang, a fighter that proved fighter interceptors—wasn’t working. early in 1939. Its eccentric design was to be an ideal long-range escort. immediately seen as exciting rather It would be wrong, though, to Strategic Dilemma than off-putting: its airframe featured simply downplay the P-38. They twin “booms” and a cockpit “pod” provided the bulk of long-range escort Prior to the war the US Army Air Air Corps doctrine further boxes,” could defeat German intercep- P-47 Thunderbolt fighters helped, but in place of a traditional fuselage. fighters during the critical operations Corps (the USAAF’s prewar organi- mandated bombers alone would tor attacks. By the late summer of 1943, they couldn’t escort the bombers all The Lightning was, in fact, one of of January through March 1944, the zational predecessor) had developed dominate future air war. Its leaders that view was clearly out of date. the way to targets deep in Germany. the US Army Air Force’s (USAAF) most decisive period during which the the strategic doctrine of “daylight shared the view of most air com- In fact, as early as 1940 the Battle The USAAF therefore began experi- important aircraft during the war. USAAF gained full ascendancy over precision bombing.” Air Corps thinkers mands at the time: fighters would of Britain had shown that fighters, menting with “drop tanks’” to extend Its combination of speed, fast rate of the . For example, during believed the long-range heavy be secondary, serving mainly the assisted by radar and ground intel- the range of its P-47 fighter escorts. climb, heavy armament, long range “Big Week” (20-26 February 1944) to be the supreme weapon of future political necessity of providing ligence and control networks, could By the second Schweinfurt Raid in and good cockpit visibility made it two of four long-range fighter groups war. The B-17, first flown in 1935, was token protection for the homeland dependably generate unacceptable October 1943, P-47s could accompany at least somewhat successful in all serving Eighth Air Force, based in developed to operationalize that idea. against enemy bombers, while the losses to bombers attacking in day- the bombers slightly past the German its roles. There was one campaign, England, and all three long-range Heavily armed, structurally robust, true path to victory via airpower lay light. Even with limited fighter escort, border. That helped, but German however, in which—according to fighter groups with Fifteenth Air faster than most of its contemporaries, only in sending your bomber fleet to the Luftwaffe had been unable to over- fighters just hung back until the escorts the conventional narrative—the Force, based in Italy, were P-38 units. and bombing from altitudes in excess annihilate the opposition’s homeland come the ’s (RAF) coor- turned away. The USAAF therefore P-38 failed: escorting US bombers in To understand the P-38’s true of 30,000 feet, the B-17 would indeed before he could do so to yours. dinated defense system. Similarly, by still needed long-range fighters to Operation Pointblank, the daylight significance during that crucial period, prove an effective instrument for As the air war developed, the the summer of 1943, even the USAAF’s accompany the bombers the whole campaign against it’s therefore necessary to understand daylight bombing. The newer B-24, USAAF high command stubbornly most doctrinaire strategic bombing distance to targets deep in Germany. Germany. Many historical accounts the overall strategic bombing with the same heavy armament, longer adhered to the view its bombers’ fire- advocates understood Luftwaffe In a series of raids deep into are dismissive of the Lightning and campaign. Lightnings were brought range and even heavier bomb load, power, when combined with massed fighters were bringing down too many Germany from 4 through 14 October its service in that costly effort. In in because the campaign’s founding was also built for the same mission. formation flying in tight “combat bombers. Short-range Spitfire and 1943, Eighth Air Force lost 160 bomb-

50 World at War 30 | JUN–JUL 2013 World at War 30 | JUN–JUL 2013 51 Lockheed P38-J Lightning

Strengths & Weaknesses of an Unorthodox Fighter

Nothing was average about the P-38 Lightning. It was a successful twin-engine in a war in which single-engine fighters predominated. It introduced tricycle landing gear, clear-glass “bubble” canopies, and could outrange any single-engine fighter during the early war years. Its twin-boom layout was unusual though not unique. When the Lightning first flew in 1939, its 400 mph maximum speed seemed like something out of science fiction. Its performance dropped off with altitude, though it remained one of the fastest fighters through the mid-war period. Other US fighters had wing-mounted machineguns that had to be synchronized to converge their fire at specific ranges. The Lightning was more heavily armed, with a 20mm cannon and four machineguns, all mounted in the nose for straight shooting. With a 52-foot wingspan and its twin-engine configuration, the P-38 wasn’t B-17s flying in formations for mutual protection. as nimble in as some single-engine fighters. Its ability to roll was particularly inferior to that of single-engine planes. Yet it held advantages beyond ers. The most memorable raid of that good speed and rate of climb. For instance, because its counter-rotating propellers period, a strike at the Schweinfurt ball neutralized torque, the P-38 had good turning ability, especially at low speed. bearing works, beyond the range of War Emergency Power & For those reasons, the Lightning could be a dangerous opponent. P-47 protection, cost 60 bombers—20 Allison Time-Bombs Luftwaffe fighter pilots who flew against it in the winter of 1943-44, includ- percent of the attack force. Those ing aces Gunther Rall and Heinz Knoke, never disparaged the P-38. disastrous losses generated a more When P-38s began escorting bombers over northern Europe, seri- The Lightning’s most crucial limitation was in high-speed dives. The problem was determined push toward finding an ous problems cropped up. Engines would give out, sometimes deto- not a lack of speed, but rather an excess of it. That is, when pushed into a dive over escort fighter solution. Two already nating or throwing piston rods in flight. Pilots were understandably 375 mph, the Lightning tended to quickly gain great speed, pushing the airflow over existing aircraft types showed potential enraged when their engines went dead, sometimes in the middle of parts of its frame to near supersonic velocity. That caused a form of turbulence known for the role: the Lockheed P-38 combat. The P-38 engines acquired the unflattering nickname “Allison as “compressibility,” which could lock the controls and then shake apart the plane. Lightning and the North American time­-bombs.” (Allison being the company that manufactured them.) In air combat that meant P-38 pilots had to avoid extreme dives. One of the German P-51B Mustang. Accordingly, on 29 There were several contributing factors. The high altitude required fighters’ favorite tactics was to make head-on attacks against the bombers, followed by October, Gen. Henry Harley “Hap” to escort the bombers—up to 35,000 feet—combined with the tight rolls and high-speed dive aways. The Lightnings couldn’t follow. The diving problem Arnold, head of the USAAF, ordered all extremely cold skies of northern European winter, put stress on the also deprived Lightning pilots of their own otherwise useful escape maneuver. The problem production of those two planes sent engines not previously encountered. Inexperienced pilots and ground was eventually solved in later models, but the versions available in 1943 and early 1944, to Eighth Air Force, despite pressing crews knew little of the procedures necessary to get reliable perfor- the P-38H and early versions of the P-38J, simply had to avoid high-speed dives. needs for them in other theaters. mance from them under such conditions. In turn, some of the informa- A P-38 engine. Note the tight fit. One of the Lightning’s most serious limitations is little mentioned in most Neither of those planes had been tion officially provided for dealing with the situation proved wrong. accounts: cost. The Lightning was a high-tech aircraft that didn’t lend itself well designed to serve as long-range Much of the problem stemmed from the P-38’s still rigorous maintenance after each use of WEP, the mechani- to mass production. Despite efforts to improve production efficiency, Lightnings bomber escorts. The P-38 was ongoing development process. During the winter of 1943-44 cal lifetime of the plane wasn’t drastically reduced. cost more and took longer to make than Mustangs and Thunderbolts. ★ originally developed as an interceptor, the G and H models were supplanted by the more powerful J. The J and later versions could be distinguished from while the P-51 had an even more That was a change for the better, but it created vexing new earlier Lightnings by their deeper nacelles, which housed a off-center history: it had initially problems. For one, the J model was the first version designed larger “intercooler” beneath the engines. They replaced weaker been intended for use by the RAF to use War Emergency Power (WEP or “overboost”). intercoolers in the leading edges of the outer wings. By more as a low-altitude fighter-bomber The advent of WEP had marked a turnaround for the USAAF. effectively cooling the air entering the engine from the Lightning’s and . Prior to the war, American engine-makers and the Army Air turbo-supercharger, the new nacelle intercoolers allowed the Js Of the two, the P-38 was more Corps had been conservative about engine operations. A full to run their engines to 1,600 hp, compared with 1,425 in previous readily available. Already in service year after Pearl Harbor, the USAAF still required all engines models. With WEP, a J could reach 422 mph at 25,000 feet, a five at the war’s start, it had been steadily pass a 150-hour test regime at maximum power. To meet percent increase over the 400 mph maximum for the earlier G. developed through a series of models, that rigorous reliability standard, manufacturers like Allison Of course, the use of WEP in the air required higher maintenance from the F through G, H and J rated their maximum settings below their true potential. standards on the ground. The Lightning was already a demanding versions by the winter of 1943-44. In comparison, the British had years earlier recognized aircraft for ground crews, with dense internal piping and wiring, Noted for its long range and heavy the need for WEP, which meant running an engine at higher and little open space in its tightly streamlined engine cowlings. armament, the P-38 had a good, power settings than recommended by the manufacturer in order Investigations showed the ground crews didn’t always change though not stellar, record in air-to-air to squeeze out extra speed during combat. As an RAF document all the exhaust plugs after pilots had used WEP, often creating combat against the Luftwaffe’s put it: “In view of the risks pilots have to take, manufactur- trouble on the next flight. The maintenance problems were FW-190 and Me-109 fighters. ers should be prepared to risk their engines as well.” eventually worked out, but only after the crucial late-winter In practice, while WEP stressed engines, if pilots limited it air battles of 1943-44. Many Lightnings and their pilots were to bursts under 10 minutes, and if ground crews performed lost during that costly climb up the learning curve. ★ Attrition warfare up close: the end for a B-24. continued on page 54 »

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A Numbers Game the workshops in England that performed minor yet radar bombing was still primitive and analysis showed bomber losses dropped by miracles turning mangled, bullet-pitted B-17s after-action reconnaissance flights showed two-thirds to a half when all-the-way escorts Home The Anglo-American combined bomber and B-24s back into flyable fighting machines. those early winter missions did little damage. were on hand. For example, during Big Week, offensive was a campaign of attrition: the grim By October 1943 the deep penetration At the same time, USAAF raids continued Fifteenth Air Force bombers attacked the arithmetic of aircraft and crew losses weighed raids into Germany had become unacceptably growing in size. While the Luftwaffe was Messerschmitt plant at Regensburg, beyond against damage done to the enemy. To win, the costly. While not always in the Schweinfurt able to build up its home defense fighter force the range of its P-38s, on 25 February 1944. Allies had to keep their losses within accept- 20 percent range, mission losses of 10 to 15 somewhat, it couldn’t match the growing The Luftwaffe savaged the bombers while they able limits. In turn, there were two dimensions percent were still too high to maintain strength avalanche of fighter and bomber groups were outside escort range: losses were 19 to that: morale and rate of replacement. levels, let alone expand the bomber force to regularly arriving from the United States. percent. When Lightnings arrived to provide Morale was essential. Though the 41 groups as was planned for July 1944. Accounts from Luftwaffe fighter pilots withdrawal support, they tangled with the topic was seldom discussed openly, those From November 1943, bomber losses describe massive streams of aircraft German fighters, claiming two Me-109s in command knew a lot depended on the began to drop. That correlated with the arrival constantly heading into Germany on the and six twin-engine Zerstorer for the loss willingness of bomber crews to continue of the first long-ranged P-38s for escort duty, “bomber autobahn.” Those pilots felt they of two of their own. Just as important, the playing airborne Russian roulette with German but that correlation must be used with care. were fighting a war against impossible odds. bombers’ ordeal was immediately ended. fighters and flak. While most mission aborts Part of the explanation for the lower losses The magnitude of USAAF growth is shown The per-sortie loss rates of escorting were called for mechanical reasons, there was weather. During December 1943 and by the costly Oschersleben raid of 11 January P-38s and P-51s were roughly equal was a morale factor involved in many January 1944, overcast skies became nearly 1944. Despite all-the-way escort from P-47s, during the critical period from November of them. Similarly, not every US bomber constant above northern Europe while Eighth P-38s and P-51s, the Luftwaffe fighters and 1943 through March 1944. The difference that strayed into neutral Switzerland, and Air Force began using new H2X radar to bomb flak brought down 60 bombers—as many as was their kill rates. Mustangs accounted was then shepherded to a landing by the through clouds. Those conditions also made during the Schweinfurt raid of 14 October 1943. for substantially more shoot-downs, but Swiss Air Force, did so by accident. it harder for the Germans to intercept. The Yet such losses by then represented only nine bomber pilots knew they were safer with “little Yet morale remained strong enough, mak- climbing Luftwaffe fighters had to contend with percent of the 663 bombers dispatched. That friends” along on their missions, whether The willingess of men such as these simply to keep flying was crucial. ing the second factor—rate of replacement— icing and visibility problems as they ascended loss rate was still painful, but it represented they were Mustangs or Lightnings. ★ ultimately the more important. Losses had to be through the murk, having to depend heavily on half the rate of the fateful October mission. low enough to be replaced, both by newly made radar to find the approaching bombers. Fewer Even so, despite those other factors, escort bombers and newly trained crews, as well as by interceptions meant lower bomber losses, fighters made the biggest difference. Statistical

» continued from page 52 Much was expected of the P-38s more apt than he knew, given the icy assigned to the bomber offensive, conditions in those P-38s’ cockpits. Airborne Ice Wagons yet problems developed. To escort P-38s also tended to develop engine bombers in northwestern Europe, problems. That was due to multiple The first P-38 unit tasked to take the Lightnings had to fly for several factors, and was therefore difficult to part in the bombing offensive, 55th hours at a stretch at high altitudes, fully remedy. Severe cold stressed the Fighter Group, became operational sometimes above 30,000 feet, where air engines, often by freezing the cooling on 15 October 1943—the day after the temperatures averaged -50° Fahrenheit system, ironically making the engines climactic Schweinfurt raid. The 55th’s in winter. Those low temperatures, overheat in the frigid high altitude air. P-38s flew their first escort mission on not encountered by the P-38s in There were also problems caused by 20 October. In December they were the Mediterranean or Pacific, were improper maintenance, undependable joined by P-38s from 20th Fighter Group. hard on both aircraft and crews. fuel quality and technical changeovers By late 1943, P-38s were escorting The P-38 was a particularly cold involved with the new J model. bombers on long-range missions aircraft, because the pilot sat in a whenever northern Europe’s overcast pod separated from the engines. Operation Argument skies permitted bombing. On 3 With no conductive warming effect, & Big Week February, in what became known as The P-38J had a deeper under-nose scoop, with a stronger intercooler that November, 55th Fighter Group scored and only an inadequate heating “Big Week,” Eighth Air Force bombers allowed higher engine settings for a small but important boost in speed. a notable success during an escort system to channel warmth from Allied plans called for an invasion from England, and Fifteenth Air Force mission, shooting down a total of the nacelles, pilots suffered in of in the late spring of 1944. bombers from Italy, launched daily seven German fighters over Holland. their aptly dubbed “airborne ice To guarantee its success, the USAAF attacks. The bombers sustained heavy The Germans had been surprised to wagons.” No matter how thickly they needed to take control of the skies losses some days and light losses on find escorts that far from England. dressed, Lightning pilots eventu- from the Luftwaffe. As soon as the others, but they struck targets relent- The P-38 groups were joined ally got numb extremities. Worse, the worst of the winter weather abated, lessly and heavily. Many bombers in December by the 354th Fighter extreme cold dulled their senses. Eighth Air Force therefore had to were lost—247 destroyed outright Group, which brought the first P-51B One German account related launch a renewed and sustained attack plus many more badly damaged—but Mustangs to Europe. Together those how, on 7 January 1944, a group of on Germany. Codenamed Operation by then that number represented three fighter groups, mustering Me-109s jumped some P-38s of Argument, it was to be a campaign just 6.5 percent of the entire force, between 90 and 110 fighters on a Fifteenth Air Force’s 1st Fighter Group aimed at the factories turning out and it was a rate the USAAF could typical day, offered Eighth Air Force over Yugoslavia as they were returning aircraft—especially fighters—and sustain. Escort fighter losses were its first all-the-way escort into the from an escort mission. The 109s shot associated equipment like engines, just 28, around three percent. skies over Germany. Fifteenth Air down six Lightnings without a loss of ball bearings and aluminum. There’s no way to count how many Force, based in Italy, meanwhile had their own. In his after action report, A ridge of high pressure developed bombers would’ve been lost had there to rely on three understrength P-38 the German flight leader noted the over the Baltic and Germany in late been no P-38s providing escort, but groups for its total escort force. Lightning pilots had flown “stiffly,” February 1944, temporarily clearing those extra losses—and the resulting Earlier P-38 models, including the P-38G and P-38H, had a smoother, like “cave men.” That assessment was the north European sky. From 20 to 26 loss in the bombing’s effect—would more aerodynamic nose, but had to use lower engine settings.

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