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Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns: on the Seventieth Anniversary of the Founding of Czechoslovakia Author(S): PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol

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Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns: on the Seventieth Anniversary of the Founding of Czechoslovakia Author(S): PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol The President and Fellows of Harvard College Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns: On the Seventieth Anniversary of the Founding of Czechoslovakia Author(s): PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3/4 (December 1990), pp. 427-460 Published by: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036397 . Accessed: 30/09/2014 09:12 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and The President and Fellows of Harvard College are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Harvard Ukrainian Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 120.150.92.11 on Tue, 30 Sep 2014 09:12:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Magyarsand Carpatho-Rusyns: On theSeventieth Anniversary of the Founding of Czechoslovakia PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI Almostat the momentthat Czechoslovakia came into existenceseventy yearsago, politicalobservers were quick to pointout thatthe new country was, in a sense,the former multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire rewrit small. Indeed,with the exception perhaps of Yugoslavia,Czechoslovakia was the mostethnically complex country of Europe. The subjectof this studyis twoof thosepeoples, the Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns,in partic- ular theirinternal development and theirrelationship to Czechoslovakia fromits establishment in 1918 to thepresent. Of Czechoslovakia's 13,600,000 inhabitantsrecorded in 1921, the Czechs, who numbered6,747,000, made up barelyhalf of the population (50.4 percent),the other half being divided into several nationalities: Ger- mans (23.4 percent), Slovaks (15 percent),Magyars (5.6 percent), Carpatho-Rusyns(3.5 percent),and others(Jews, Poles, Gypsies,together 2.1 percent).1The Magyarsand Carpatho-Rusynswere to be foundalmost exclusivelyin theeastern provinces of therepublic - in Slovakiaand Sub- carpathianRus'.2 1 Vaclav L. Bene§,"Czechoslovak Democracy and its Problems,1918-1920," in VictorS. Mamateyand RadomírLuza, eds. A Historyof the CzechoslovakRepublic, 1918-1948 (Princeton,N.J., 1973), p. 40. Here and elsewherein thetext, the figures have been rounded offto thenearest thousand and half percentage point. It shouldbe notedthat Czechoslovakia's official statistics before World War II did notdis- tinguishbetween Czechs and Slovaks,but provided only the rubric "Czechoslovak." The cal- culationfor Czechs indicatedhere is based on thetotal number of "Czechoslovaks"living in Bohemia,Moravia, Silesia, and SubcarpathianRus' (Ruthenia);the calculationfor Slovaks reflectsthe total number of "Czechoslovaks"in Slovakia. As forCarpatho-Rusyns, the official rubricsused to describethem have varied: podkarpatorusky(Subcarpathian Rusyn), rusky (Russian/Rusyn),and since 1945 ukrajinsky(Ukrainian), rusky (Russian), rusinsky (Rusyn). The figuresappearing here and elsewherein thisstudy reflect all of theabove terms(two or moreof whichare sometimesindicated separately in one statisticalsource), although the group will be describedthroughout using the name Carpatho-Rusyn, which in othersources is some- timesrendered as Ruthenian,Rusyn, Carpatho-Russian, or Carpatho-Ukrainian. 1 As forother parts of the republic,the 1921 census recordedin Bohemia,Moravia, and Silesia only 6,100 Magyarsand 3,300 Carpatho-Rusyns;the 1931 census recorded11,600 Magyarsand 11,100 Carpatho-Rusyns. Bene§, "Czechoslovak Democracy," p. 40. This content downloaded from 120.150.92.11 on Tue, 30 Sep 2014 09:12:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 428 PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI The 1921 percentagesof Magyars and Carpatho-Rusynswere obviously largerin these easternprovinces thanthroughout the countryas a whole. In Slovakia, Magyars numbered 637,000 and Carpatho-Rusyns 86,000- respectively21.5 percentand 2.9 percentof the population in thatprovince. In SubcarpathianRus', the analogous figureswere 373,000 (62.1 percent) Carpatho-Rusynsand 192,000 (17 percent) Magyars.3 In termsof geogra- phy, the two groups inhabitedethnically compact areas; the Magyars were foundalong the southernlowlands of Slovakia and SubcarpathianRus', and the Carpatho-Rusynsin the foothills and mountainous terrainof Subcar- pathianRus' and farnortheastern Slovakia. At the outset of the period, these two groups numberedtogether nearly 1,200,000 people (in 1921), or 8.9 percent of the total population of Czechoslovakia. Since 1945, as a resultof borderchanges and assimilatory processes, the numberof Magyars and Carpatho-Rusynshas been reduced by half (in 1980, 560,000 and 37,000, respectively), and together they comprise a mere 4.1 percentof the population of the country.4Despite their relatively small numbers, both Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns have, because of theirstrategic geographic location and theirrelationship to peo- ples of neighboringstates, remained an issue of serious political concern throughoutmost of the seven decades of Czechoslovakia's existence. How and why did the Magyars and Carpatho-Rusynscome to be a part of the new state of Czechoslovakia? Since this is not the place to elaborate on the formationof the new Czechoslovak state, sufficeit to say that its final form was justified by using historic and ethnographic arguments, despite the fact thatthese at times mightseem contradictory.While the eth- nographic argumentwas used to justify the inclusion of Slovak-inhabited areas with Czech lands fartherwest, the solid Magyar-inhabitedregions of what was to become southernSlovakia were demanded neitheron historic nor ethnographicgrounds but for strategic purposes: the Czechoslovak delegation to the Paris Peace Conference was convinced that a "border along the Danube was of utmostimportance to the Czechoslovak republic," which, "to be more precise, must be a Danubian state."5 As for Carptho- Rusyn territory,this unexpected "gift to Czechoslovakia" came as a result of a request by immigrantsfrom that area living in the United States, althoughCzech leaders were quick to pointout thatwhat was to become the 3 Bene§,"Czechoslovak Democracy," p. 40. 4 IvanBajcura, Cesta k internacionálnejjednote (Bratislava, 1982), p. 27. 5 Fromthe memorandum to theParis Peace Conferencesubmitted by Czechoslovakia'smin- isterof foreignaffairs, Edvard Bene§, cited in FerdinandPeroutka, Budování státu, pt. 2: Rok 1919 (Prague,1934), pp. 1103-5. This content downloaded from 120.150.92.11 on Tue, 30 Sep 2014 09:12:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MAGYARS AND CARPATHO-RUSYNS 429 province of SubcarpathianRus' (and was eventuallyto borderon Romania) had strategicvalue as well. The historyof the Magyars and Carpatho-Rusynswithin Czechoslovakia can be said to fall into threeperiods: 1918-1938; 1938-1944; and 1945 to the present. Given the limitationsof space, it is not possible to describe except in the most general termsthe evolution of these two groups and to compare and contrast their development and status during these three periods. THE INTERWAR YEARS (1918-1938) During the firstperiod, 1918-1938, therewas in effecta basic differencein the legal status of the Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns. The Magyars, for instance,were a national minority,in contrastto both the Czechs and Slo- vaks (more precisely "Czechoslovaks"), who were considered the state or dominantpeople of the country,and to the Carpatho-Rusynswho had a spe- cial statusat least in the fareastern part of the republic. The minoritystatus of the Magyars was made even more dubious because in the early years of the new republic their status as citizens of Czechoslovakia remained uncertain.6Whereas the Treaty of Saint Germain (10 September 1919) granted "without the requirementof any formality" Czechoslovak citizenship to former Hungarian citizens of Slovakia and SubcarpathianRus' who had possessed legal residence in a given commune (Heimatsrecht), a subsequent Czechoslovak constitutionallaw (9 April 1920) specifiedthat to obtain citizenshipautomatically, persons had to have had legal residence before 1910. As for those who did not have legal residence before thatyear, the Czechoslovak governmentreserved for itself the rightto decide whetherthey were worthyof receiving citizenship. The practical result of this law was to encourage between 56,000 and 106,000 Magyars (mostly formerofficials if the firstfigure is accepted; officialsas well as laborers if the second is accepted) to emigratesouthward to postwar Hungary. This leftstateless for varyingperiods of time duringthe interwar years anywherefrom 15,000 to 100,000 Magyars in the southernregion of Slovakia and SubcarpathianRus'.7 In sharp contrastwas the situationof the Carpatho-Rusyns. While they were not a state people like the "Czechoslovaks," theyheld a special status, spelled out as part of the postwar internationalpeace agreements(Treaty of 6 The complicatedquestion of thestatus of theMagyars and thedevastating effect stateless- ness had on individualsis discussedin C. A. Macartney,Hungary and Her Successors:The Treatyof Trianon and Its Consequences,1919-1937 (Oxford,1937), pp. 160-65. ' Macartney,Hungary and Her Successors,pp. 158 and 164. This content downloaded from 120.150.92.11
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