Czechoslovakia's Fortifications

Home , Czechoslovak Army, Egerland, Maginot Line, North Bohemia

Jonathan Zorach

Their Development and Role in the 1938 Munich Crisis

Although the issue of Czechoslovakia's defensive capability vis-ä-vis Germany influenced military experts and statesmen in Britain, France and Germany during the 1938 Munich crisis, most studies of 1938 concentrate on diplomatic rather than military events1. Critics and defenders of the appeasers of Hitler nonetheless frequently relate their arguments to military matters. In his memoirs, Czechoslovak President Edvard Benes bitterly denounced the policies of Britain and France and argued that Czechoslovakia had fortifications which were "at least as efficient as the Maginot Line and in some respects surpassed it"2. Sir Winston Churchill accused Chamberlain and Daladier of abandoning Czechoslovakia's excellent army and "Maginot Line"; and Keith Eubank, expressing a contrary viewpoint, has argued that the Czechs could easily have been overrun3. Benes, Churchill, Eubank and other writers base many of their conclusions on assumptions regarding the Czechoslovak military position; but none has presented detailed evidence on Czechoslovak defenses, even though a description of the defenses could demonstrate whether British and French inaction in 1938 was justified and whether, as has been asserted by some critics of the appeasers, the German capture of the Czechoslovak fortifications helped reveal the "secrets" of the Maginot Line4. Many aspects of Czechoslovak defenses could be studied in detail, but at the heart of the strategic plans of the Czechoslovak General Staff was the role envisaged for the Czechoslovak system of fortifications. Czechoslovakia's air force was badly out- numbered by the Luftwaffe, and the nation had an inadequate number of anti-aircraft guns5. The Czechs had only four motorized infantry divisions, and their motorized forces were far inferior to the German6. Even the theoretical strength of the Czecho- slovak Army - 1,250,000 men after the September 23 mobilization - may not be taken at face value. Czechs made up only 51% of the troop strength, and a Communist historian has admitted that many German reservists failed to report for duty in Sep- tember and that many units with Germans were badly understaffed7. The strength of the fortifications would therefore have been crucial in affecting the immediate success or partial failure of German attacks in the event of an outbreak of war. Indeed, a great proportion of Czechoslovak military expenditures was concentrated in the fortifications program8. A survey of historical literature on the 1938 Munich crisis quickly reveals that since 1938, the Czechoslovak fortifications have been the object of continuing speculation. In 1938, for example, Basil Liddell Hart conjectured that German progress in the Czech frontier zone would be "slow" 9. While writers like Churchill upheld this view, the appeasers and their apologists denied that the Czech defenses were especially formidable. The French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet wrote that the Anschluss left a huge gap in Czechoslovakia's southern defenses10. Bonnet was correct in this as- sessment; but differing views of the fortifications stubbornly persist: Joseph Roth- schild, the author of a recent history of interwar Eastern Europe, claims that the Czechs had time to work on their southern defense after March; and Rothschild goes on to assert that the Czechs should have fought from their strong defensive position11. A few scholars, notably Keith Eubank, have questioned whether the Czechoslovak 81 MGM 2/76 Army could have held out for long; but generally historians incline to the view that a German conquest of the Czech lands would not have been easy12. Czech historians, who have access to information not available in the West, have usually issued rather sweeping statements about the efficacy of the fortifications13. For example, utilizing evidence produced at the Nuremberg trials, two Czech historians wrote that the fortifications "etaient d'une grande profondeur apte a contenir de grandes forces pendant un certain temps", adding that the Germans would have been forced to use 210 mm mortars, of which there were only a handful in the German Army in 193814. A different view may be found in the Czech general Libor Vitez's Slava a pad maginotovy linie a Verdunu (The glory and fall of the Maginot Line and Verdun), published in 1941. Vitez pointed out that the Czechoslovak fortifications were much weaker than their French counterparts and that the Germans captured several important positions in the Maginot Line in 19401S. The view that Czechoslovakia's defenses were formidable originated largely in the writings of critics of appeasement. After the Second World War, the Nuremberg trials appeared to support the argument that the Czechs could have held off the German attacker long enough to permit Britain, France and the Soviet Union to come to the Czechs' assistance. Authors still rely on the Nuremberg testimony as an important source for evaluating Czechoslovak military strength in 1938, but as no additional evidence has been utilized by critics of appeasement, one wonders whether the Nuremberg testimony was completely accurate16. Careful consideration of evidence regarding the fortifications found in Nuremberg trial testimony and in German memoirs rapidly leads one to the conclusion that authors citing Nuremberg testimony have used evidence selectively. In a pre-trial in- terrogation, Colonel-General Alfred Jodl commented that the Czechoslovak fortifications did not offer a serious obstacle to German forces and that comparing them with the Maginot Line, as some people did, was like comparing a rowboat with a battleship17! Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel wrote in his memoirs that German 88 mm flak easily broke through Czech bunkers, and General Heinz Guderian wrote that the first line of fortifications was "nicht so stark wie wir gedacht hatten"18. Yet at Nuremberg, Keitel stated that the Germans never could have broken through the fortifications; Erich von Manstein, who helped plan the operations against Czecho- slovakia, testified that Germany "didn't have the means" to break through the forti- fications19. Obviously, memoirs and trial testimony provide inadequate information about what German generals really thought in 1938. Since trial statements and memoirs were composed for public consumption, information was frequently given selectively to influence the reader or listener. Extant German military reports from 1938 can furnish a much more accurate basis for studying Czechoslovak defenses. Studies of the dis- position and strength of the Czechoslovak fortifications made by German experts before September, 1938, may be supplemented by studies made after the occupation of the Sudetenland in October, 1938 and of the remainder of the Czech lands in March, 1939. In order to understand how Czechoslovakia intended to utilize her fortifications, one must examine both the state of the fortifications in 1938 and the role of the fortifications in Czechoslovak strategic thinking. Of all the states in Eastern Europe created after the First World War, Czechoslovakia faced the most difficult geographic problems relative to her population and size. With a population of approximately 15,000,000 and an area of 140,000 square kilometers, Czechoslovakia had a total frontier length of 4,114 kilometers: 1,539 km with Ger- many, 984 km with Poland, 832 km with Hungary, 558 km with Austria and 201 km with Romania (the only neighboring power that could have been considered truly friendly towards Prague). To contrast this frontier with that of France, which was also famed for border fortifications, one might note that France had a land frontier of 2,774 km and a seacoast frontier of 2,850 km. France's frontier with Germany was only 389 km and that with Italy 455 km (with Belgium, Luxembourg and Swit- zerland, France's entire eastern frontier was 2,105 km long)20. Although Czecho- slovakia possessed a strategically advantageous range of the Carpathians, several geographic features weakened the nation's position, notably the north-south river system in Slovakia and depressions such as the County of Glatz, the Landeshut depression and the Moravian gate, which jutted into the Czech lands. In 1918 there were few fortifications in the Czech lands and Slovakia suitable for use in modern warfare. A fortress in Komarno was later partially rebuilt by Czech engineers, but fortresses in Theresienstadt, Josefstadt and Olmütz were completely obsolete21. In the 1920's the Czechoslovak Government lacked funds for materiel, and the construction of new border fortifications was completely out of the question. Nonetheless, the French Military Mission, which commanded the Czechoslovak Army until 1926, and the Czechoslovak General Staff paid close attention to the problem of border defenses. The French Mission and the General Staff made extensive studies of the frontier leading to the building of roads deemed necessary for defense and to measures such as the nationalization of the Aussig-Teplitz railway22. In the 1930's, when the international situation became increasingly unstable, Czechoslovakia decided to construct permanent border defenses. In France, the Maginot Line had been begun as the result of a series of government decisions in 1925, 1926 and 192 7 23. In Czechoslovakia, the decision to build fortifications followed a meeting called in the Prague Castle in July, 1932, by Foreign Minister Benes, who had returned home from the Disarmament Conference in Geneva with an extremely pessimistic view of disarmament prospects and with the conviction that Czechoslo- vakia must strengthen her defenses24. The question of building fortifications became widely discussed in Czechoslovakia, though as yet little public enthusiasm for military spending had arisen25. In 1934, however, the signing of the German-Polish de- claration, the assassinations of Barthou and King Alexander and, above all, the murder of Dollfuss helped the Czechoslovak Government arouse interest in the army and in a fortifications program. Accordingly, in 1934, the General Staff began its planning for the fortifications. Fol- lowing preliminary discussions of a fortifications program, a special office for the Direction of Fortifications was created in March, 1935 under the leadership of the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Otakar Husarek (1892-1972). In a meeting of the Czechoslovak Supreme Defense Council in 1936, General Ludvik Krejci, the Chief of the General Staff, outlined an expanded construction program for ten to fifteen years, costing over 10 milliards of Czech crowns (1 Kc = 0,04 $ = 0,10 RM)26. While the events of 193 7 demonstrated the necessity of completing certain strategic fortresses as quickly as possible, the full fortifications program would have taken nearly a decade to complete. Preliminary studies of the Czechoslovak frontier were carried out from 1934 through 1936; and the first fortifications were constructed from 1934 on. The French Chief of General Staff, General Maurice Gamelin, visited Czechoslovakia for the fall army maneuvers in September, 1934, held in honor of the "founding" of the Czechoslovak Army in 1914. Gamelin toured the northern frontier and expressed his opinion on plans that had been devised by the Czechoslovak General Staff27. In 1936, after an extended tour of the Bohemian and Moravian frontier, the American Military Attache noted little in the way of completed fortified works, observing that the Czechs still had "ample time" to complete their fortifications 28. By the following year, work was being carried out at a furious pace which continued right up through September, 1938. In addition to constructing fixed positions for frontier defense, the Czechs augmented their policing of the frontier area. Czechoslovakia had ten battalions of border guards performing tasks similar to other border (Jäger) guards in Central and Eastern Europe; an eleventh battalion was added in 1934 29. In the mid-1930's these battalions were increased in strength and reinforced by customs (finance) guards, state police, gendarmery and paramilitary organizations such as the Sokol. Special units of these groups made up a state defense guard, called in Czech the S. O. S. (Straz-obrany-statu or guard for the defense of the state)30. Expenditures for the gendarmery escalated enormously from 1937 to 1938, as the gendarmery were used for protection against infiltrators from Germany. In 1936 the state also created a special "frontier zone" in which severe restrictions were placed on construction, land ownership and residency permits for foreigners. Despite the huge expanse of the Czechoslovak frontier, the Czechoslovak Government felt that border fortifications facilitated the nation's defense plans. Strategically, the fortifications were constructed to guard against a German pincer movement from the North and South - the main fear of General Krejci in the event of a war with Germany. The projected system, if completed, would have forced Germany to invade along an East-West axis rather than on a North-West axis31. If the Czechs could have protected their flanks, they could have withdrawn eastwards while awaiting aid from France. For this reason, the fortifications were to be much stronger in the North and the South than in the West. Priority was first given to especially vulnerable areas such as the Glatz depression, and later the Czechs hoped to complete two parallel lines of fortresses in northwest and northern Bohemia in order to channel and weaken German attacks. A projected defense line near Prague would have utilized the geographic features of the Elbe; such a line would have been effective against an attacker from the West but not from the North or South. Salients of Sudeten German territory such as the Egerland and the Rumburg salient would have been impossible to defend due to geography and the hostile local population; but where the terrain was more advantageous to the defender, works were constructed very close to the frontier32. With the exception of several strong fortresses built in the Danube bridgehead at Engerau starting in 1934, work on the fortification of the Czech-Austrian frontier began only in 1937. Engerau was fortified in violation of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon, but the Czechs evidently felt that Bratislava must be protected by strongly fortified positions. Elsewhere along the Austrian frontier, Czech defenses were rather weak. A dam on the Dyje river could have been blown up to protect the region south of Brno, but the Czechoslovak General Staff hoped that Austrian independence would limit the scope of German military operations in the South. The Czechs were quite unpre- pared for the Anschluss, and in the summer of 1938 they had to try to complete works along the Nikolsburg-Znaim-Neuhaus line33. Along the Hungarian frontier, efforts were made to fortify communications centers and Danube crossing points which might invite Hungarian attacks. The Little Entente strategic planners allotted the main offensive role to Romania, so the Czechs were only concerned with the need for holding actions against the Hungarians. Unlike in the 1920's, in the 1930's the Czechs did not consider the Hungarian Army a major threat. Finally one might note that the Czechs also projected a fairly extensive system of fortifications along the Czechoslovak-Polish frontier. General Gamelin visited Poland in 1936 with the hopes of improving both Franco-Polish and Czechoslovak-Polish relations, but the Polish Inspector-General, Edward Smigh-Rydz, told Gamelin than an extension of the Czechoslovak works against Poland would be "inutile"34. The Czechs went ahead with plans to fortify the Polish frontier, though by 1938 only a few works were completed, such as works intended to block the mountain passes in Slovakia. A string of pill-boxes near Teschen was erected to hinder a German rather than a Polish advance, as the Czechs counted on Polish neutrality in the event of a war with Germany35. Czechoslovakia's fortifications bore the distinct imprint of General Husarek, who was a former Russian legionary educated at the Czech technical high school in Brno. As Director of Fortifications, Husarek supervised a staff of over 400 military and civilian personnel seeking to develop the technical and military plans for the Czech fortifications system. Husarek felt than in a frontal assault on fortified positions, the enemy could always find some weakness. He therefore insisted that the physically strongest part of an individual pill-box should face the enemy directly, while protection was provided by flanking fire from two or more neighboring pill-boxes36. Husarek thus developed a fortifications system which was basically linear in concep- tion. His staff made extensive geographic surveys of potentially defensible areas and then exercised great care in constructing individual pill-boxes. By making optimum use of terrain, the Czechs gave their works the maximum value. The process took immense time and effort, requiring, for example, dozens of different kinds of concrete for the many different designs at individual sites. After observing a group of pill-boxes, the American Military Attache noted: They are designed apparently to delay the enemy with a strong field of fire from admirably strong and protected field fortifications. They are always located where there is an excellent field of fire for long distances37. The "fortifications" were actually of three main types. The smallest fortified positions were light works containing machine-guns. The second category consisted of pill-boxes built to withstand the fire of field guns and medium artillery up to 10 cm. The third category was composed of heavy fortresses built to withstand heavy artillery and bombs. German engineers classified these as Speerausbau, stellungsmässiger Ausbau and festungsmässiger Ausbau, depending on whether the works were built to withstand small arms fire, shrapnel or bombs38. While the smallest works held machine- guns, the medium ones contained artillery, including 47 mm anti-tank casemate guns and 10 cm howitzers. The medium works held about twenty men and supplies (food and ammunition) for about two to three weeks. Even with additional protection provided by road demolitions, mines and anti-tank obstacles, such works could not have resisted a prolonged enemy attack without the assistance of a strong field army. The strongest fortresses, on the other hand, were intended to withstand major assaults. The defenses around Glatz, for example, were comparable to the petits ouvrages of the Maginot Line. Although on published maps of the Czechoslovak fortifications, a proper distinction is not made among these three categories, it may be emphasized that the smaller works had only tactical purposes, while the largest ones served both tactical and strategic purposes. The time needed for the construction of these works varied according to the works' size. Individual works (Einzelwerke) required three months for preparation and study of the terrain and twelve months for construction and equipping. The larger groups of works (Werkgruppe) required one year for preparation and three to four years for construction and equipping39. By the fall of 1938, there were only six heavy fortresses in southern Moravia, while 250 such fortresses stretched from the right bank of the Oder to the Giant Mountains (Riesengebirge). The smaller pill-boxes and fortified positions were distributed as follows: 3,993 in Army Corps I area (approximately West and South Bohemia); 1,852 in Army Corps II area (North Bohemia); 1,000 in III (South Moravia); and 1,195 in IV (North Moravia). Slovakia contained 11 heavy and 1,942 smaller fortified works40. From a technological point of view, the Czechoslovak fortifications were pain- stakingly constructed, though one must not be misled by the false analogy used by writers comparing the Czechoslovak system to the Maginot Line. One must remem- ber that the Czechs had five times more frontier with Germany than did France; even the entire Basel-Dunkirch line comprised only 776 km compared with the 2,097 km German-Czech frontier. Although exact figures for the cost of the Maginot Line are difficult to obtain, German experts calculated that France spent approximately eight milliard RM on her fortifications41. The Czechs, in contrast, spent about two and one-half milliard Kc (1 Kc = 0,10 RM) on their fortifications42. The Czechs thus spent about one-thirtieth of what the French spent; the per-kilometer expenditure was, of course, a much smaller fraction than this. In other words, Jodl's caustic comparison of the Czechoslovak fortifications to a rowboat was not far from the truth. Considering that France had three times the population of Czechoslovakia and that France had started her fortifications program seven years before Czechoslovakia, the difference in expenditures was not surprising. By the mid-1930's,the French had constructed most of the Maginot Line, which they were able to equip in full after the occupation of the Rhineland by Hitler. The Czechs, in contrast, had not even finished pouring all the concrete for the bunkers in their system by September 30, 1938. A comparison of the depths of the Czechoslovak and French fortifications easily demonstrates the vast difference between the two fortifications systems. In the Metz sector of the Maginot Line, there were one large group or grand ouvrage, 38 ouvrages andpetits ouvrages and approximately 140 casemates orZwischenwerke. This amoun- ted to an average of an ouvrage every 3.5 km and a casemate every kilometer, not even counting smaller positions such as machine-gun nests. The entire frontier in the Metz region was built up with field works and smaller fortified positions to an average depth of 2-3 km43. In some portions of the French frontier, the fortifications had a depth of 11 km44. In Czechoslovakia, the defenders' strongest positions had a depth of 2-5 km; but in weaker areas, especially in the South, there were portions of the frontier where the "fortifications" had a depth of only 100-150 m4S! In the sector Hult- schin-Troppau, there were 120 armored turrets (Panzertürme) in the fortifications; 173 in Grülich-Mückenberg; 45 in Nächod; and 9 inTrautenau. Of 45 projected heavy fortresses in the South, only six were completed; there was not a single armored turret in the entire Znaim-Lundenburg sector (150 uninstalled turrets were in Czechoslovak factories in March, 193 9)46. German engineers frequently described the Czech works as mere imitations of the French, but certainly this view (which is found in scattered references in the detailed German study, Denkschrift über die tschecho-slowakische Landesbefestigung) is exaggerated47. The Czech lands possessed a highly-developed armaments industry, and the Czechs certainly had no need to import French technology. Czech products such as the Bren gun, Skoda artillery and Ceskomoravskä-Kolben-Danek light tanks compared favorably with contemporary weaponry in other European nations. The Czech lands also had produced many of the highest-ranking engineers in the k.u. k. Army; the last k.u. k. Inspector-General of pioneers and engineers, General Frantisek (Franz) Skvor, was a Czech wholater served for over a decade in the post-war Czecho- slovak Army. As many Czechs studied in France after the First World War, the Czechs were influenced by French military thought; but it would be pointless to depict the Czechoslovak works as mere imitations of the French. Despite Czechoslovakia's inability to fortify her frontier on a scale approaching that of France, the Czechs enjoyed a certain advantage of having made their decision to fortify their frontier after the French. Whereas France had taken nearly a decade to work out the details of the Maginot Line, Czechoslovakia was able to build her fortifications by utilizing the most modern French plans. Czechoslovakia's fortifications were built by Czech engineers who used French plans as technical models. Several Czech officers went to France to study the French fortifications, and two French officers were sent to Czechoslovakia to show the Czechoslovak General Staff French technical plans. The Chief of the French Military Mission to Prague from 1926 to 1938, General Louis Eugene Faucher, himself an engineer, correctly noted that French assistance was "purely technical"48. Virtually all the engineering and construction was carried out by the Czechs themselves, although individual French officers consulted the Czechs during the construction. The Czechs modified technical details whenever they felt necessary. The embrasures for machine-guns in pill-boxes, for example, were redesigned because Czech engineers found in tests that armorpiercing shells froze the bearings on the machine-gun mounts in the French model embrasures. For night shooting, the Czech also replaced the French system of numbered squares with individual maps of terrain for prearranged fires49. Before occupying the Sudetenland, many Germans hoped that the Czechoslovak fortifications would contain the secrets of the Maginot Lineso. Indeed, after October, 1938, German engineers studied the Czech works with great care. However, the Germans certainly did not learn as much about the Maginot Line as they had originally hoped. By the summer of 1938, German engineers and pioneers had already made extensive studies of the problems involved in fortifications fighting, and the German directives for tactical assaults on fortified positions did not need to be modified after October51. It was additionally true that many of the tests carried out on the Czech fortifications were conducted under ideal conditions that could not be duplicated in combat, as we shall note later on. Certain similarities between the Maginot Line and Czechoslovak fortifications did exist; the armored turrets in the Czech fortifications closely resembled those in the French, and the Germans found that the turrets were easily visible to air or ground observers52. However, the difference in the dispositions of the fortifications in France and Czechoslovakia severely limited the value of what German engineers learned in the Sudetenland. When the Czechoslovak fortifications were surrendered in October, 1938, as most fortifications were located in the frontier zone, the works lost their military value as they were stripped of military equipment by the retreating Czechoslovak Army and then further dismantled by the Wehrmacht. Nonetheless, the Germans did conduct extensive tests in order to determine the efficacy of German artillery and to study var- ious technical and tactical problems involved in fortifications fighting. As German in- spection tours were undertaken not only by high-ranking officers in most branches of the army but also by Hitler himself, it was understandable that the fortifications became the object of considerable speculation. The fact that the Czechoslovak Army was not used in 1938 and that the fortifications were abandoned without fighting lent itself to popular comparisons of the Czechoslovak fortifications and the Maginot Line. German and Hungarian engineers published technical accounts of the fortifications stating that they had important weaknesses, but these studies were ignored by the critics of appeasement. However, used in conjunction with printed and unprinted Ger- man sources, published materials help provide a detailed picture of the ultimate strengths and weaknesses of the Czechoslovak fortifications system53. In 1938 German engineers were concerned about the efficacy their artillery would have against Czech bunkers. The Germans made extensive studies for attacking fortifications and studied the appearance and location of works across the Czech fron- tier54. The major German worry was that medium and heavy artillery might prove inadequate for the task of breaking through the fortifications. In particular, it was not known what effect 10.5 cm guns would have on Czech works55. Tests conducted on the Czechoslovak fortifications revealed that only some of the original German fears were justified56. A detailed report of one German trial firing shows that 10.5 cm guns were not entirely effective against Czech pill-boxes, even though major damage was achieved with 88 mm flak at 1,000 m and with a hand- grenade thrown in the airvent of a pill-box. 3.7 cm anti-tank guns destroyed the pill- box embrasure with armorpiercing shells at a distance of 450 m. In another test, 15 cm howitzers were effective in breaking through the front of the bunkersS7. Though conducted under ideal conditions, these tests indicated that the medium-sized pill- boxes were very vulnerable to artillery fire, while the larger fortresses, like the petits ouvrages of the Maginot Line, would have been difficult to capture. The German experience in attacking the Maginot Line in 1939 sheds light on the value of the earlier tests conducted in Czechoslovakia. It should be noted, for example, that the devastating 88 mm flak could frequently not be successfully deployed in France owing to difficulties of terrainse. Of course, the more mobile 3.7 cm anti- tank guns were much more suitable for attack at close rangeS9. The use of Stukas was also common in the attacks on the Maginot Line; in Czechoslovakia, the smaller size of the fortifications would have made dive bombing difficult, though the Luftwaffe planned to use Stukas and paratroopers in assaulting Czech positions. The Maginot Line also included a much greater variety of types of fortified works than the Czechoslovak system; and the Maginot Line was, for all intents and purposes, completed by the time of the German invasion. An examination of German successes and failures in France does not lead one to the conclusion that knowledge of the Czechoslovak fortifications was decisive in German victories in France. In the case of the famous work 505, "la Ferte" in the Montmedy sector, the Germans'attrib- uted their success to three main factors (1) inadequate fire support from neighboring works (2) inadequate coverage of the roof area, permitting the penetration of pioneers and (3) excessive damage to the interior of the fortress as the result of charges thrown in one of the embrasures. In addition, the Germans noted that inadequate exits were partially responsible for the deaths of the 200 defenders60. However, in other cases in the Maginot Line, the Germans found fortresses that were suprisingly inde- structible. At Schönenberg, neither 42 cm mortars nor bombing effectively incapa- citated the defenders61. Nonetheless, the German evaluation ot combat reports and tests of artillery fire confirmed the effectiveness of heavy mortars, howitzers and flak in most cases where works were captured62. Published studies of the Czechoslovak fortifications system pointed to a number of weaknesses and faults, though one must emphasize that such studies are usually writ- ten from a critical viewpoint. Generalmajor d. R. Ing. von Brosch-Aarenau, an Austrian officer writing in Wehrwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, noted that the Czechs ignored several lessons learned by the k.u.k. Army in World War One. Among these were (1) The problem of defense of terrain between the bunkers at night. (2) The lack of interconnected bunkers such as proved effective in the Tyrol in 1915 and 1916. In many portions of the Czechoslovak system, the bunkers were connected only by cables which could have been cut by the attacker. It was important for the defenders to be able to keep in touch with one another directly. (3) The absence of comfortable living facilities and adequate exits. By cutting off the electricity and sealing off the exits, the attacker could have made the defender's life intolerable within a matter of days. (4) The extensive use of reinforced rather than solid concrete. This contradicted experiences of World War One in Belgium and the Tyrol showing that iron transmits shock more rapidly than solid concrete, which is also easier to repair63. In this latter case, the Czechs modeled their construction practice on French plans64. Such criticism nonetheless raises the question of whether the Czechs, by denying important posts in their army to former k.u.k. officers, ignored the military engineering experience of World War One and thereby constructed their fortifications system on faulty principles. General Husärek was an able officer, but one wonders whether his views on fortifications would have been identical with those of officers like General Skvor, who retired from the Czechoslovak Army in 1932. Only research in the Czechoslovak archives could adequately answer this question. While some of the criticism of writers like Colonel Biermann and Brosch-Aarenau may be debated, published reports on the Czechoslovak fortifications did note that the Czech defenses were far from complete in September, 1938. This latter assertion is accurately confirmed by field reports of German units which marched into the Sudetenland. One of the most complete records extant is that of the 10th Division of Regensburg. The officers of the division, which occupied territory adjoining Bavaria, felt that the fortifications could have been broken through "in verhältnismässig kurzer Zeit" by utilizing blind corners, by fogging neighboring pill-boxes, or by attacking at night. Indeed a vorläufiger Erfahrungsbericht belies the famous Nuremberg testimony of Keitel and von Manstein: Es kann jedoch schon jetzt festgestellt werden, dass überall da, wo nur eine Linie an Ständen vorhanden war und weil die feindl. Kräfte zum Ausbau und Besetzung des Zwischenfeldes nicht ausreichten, diese Linie schnell hätte durchstossen werden können... Hervorzuheben ist allerdings, dass der direkte Schartenbeschuss bei der Lage der Stände fast nirgends hatte durchgeführt werden können, es sei denn durch Kampf- wagen, die zwischen die Stände hätten fahren müssen. Wo, wie ζ. B. südl. Schättenhof bereits eine Tiefe der ständigen Anlagen erreicht war, wäre wesentliche grössere Zeit und artilleristischer Kräftebedarf eingetreten. Ein tiefgegliedertes Netz solcher Stände mit ausgebautem und besetztem Zwischen- feld stellt jedenfalls eine erhebliche Abwehrkraft sicher65. Completed fortified lines generally made a favorable impression on German engi- neers66. In this sense, some of the speculation found in historical literature referring to the fortifications may be seen as being correct in that the completed fortifications were admirably constructed. However, nowhere, with the possible exception of Glatz, did the Germans consider that the Czechoslovak Army's defenses were strong enough to prevent breakthroughs. In the Glatz region, only the works in and around Adamsberg were largely incomplete67. German engineers and pioneers estimated that at least another year would have been required to make the system really effi- cient68. Even then, the frontier fortifications would have had weak sectors. Attacking from Glatz would have been inadvisable, so the Germans chose weaker points along the German-Czech frontier. In addition to projected attacks from Saxony, Austria and Silesia (where Colonel Beck obliged Hitler and his generals by mobilizing Polish forces against the Czechs), Hitler favored a plan of attacking from Bavaria across a broad and weakly-defended sector69. The 10th Division later felt that this plan would have succeeded: Der Befund der feindl. Befestigungen und die Nachrichten über die feindliche Kräfte- verteilung haben ergeben, dass der Ansatz einer starken Armee durch Bayerischen Wald richtig war. Es wäre hier eine ausgesprochen schwache Stelle des Gegners ge- troffen worden. Der Tscheche hat offenbar diese Front als die am wenigsten gefähr- dete angesehen, weil er wohl glaubte dass die Geländeschwierigkeiten und die Rückenbedrohung durch eine etwaige französische Offensive uns vom Einsatz star- ker Kräfte abschrecken würden70. Actually, Czech defenses in the West were not weak because the Czechs did not see the front as dangerous; rather, they were compelled to concentrate greater forces in the North and the South. ·Ιη 1938 the Czechoslovak General Staff left only 25% of all its forces in Bohemia, while 60% were left in Moravia and only 15% in Slovakia. The strongest army was in southern Moravia, where the fortifications were the weak- est71. The length of the German-Czech frontier facilitated the Germans' discovery of weakly-defended sectors, but the German task was made easier by two additional factors - the German population in the Sudetenland and Czechoslovak tactical doctrine. Of course, the vast length of the German-Czech frontier put an impossible strain upon the Czechs' resources. If the Czechs distributed 1,000,000 men on their frontiers with Germany, Poland and Hungary, they would have only had 250 men per kilometer72. Like the Pöles, the Czechs faced the problem of defending an expanse of territory in which there were major population and industrial centers near potential points of German attack. Although from a purely military point of view, withdrawal from the exposed territory appeared desirable, this was psychologically unacceptable73. After studying the Czechoslovak dispositions of September, 1938, the Germans concluded that the Czechs had been forced to use most of their reserves as tactical rather than strategic reserves. A suitable response to German attacks would thus have been extremely difficult74. In fairness to the Czechoslovak General Staff, however, one must note that the frontier by itself made reserves an almost insur- mountable problem75. The location of the fortifications in the German-inhabited frontier zone also weakened the value of Czech works. Many pill-boxes could be observed either directly across the German frontier or from German air space76. Dissident Sudeten Germans, who were often taken on as guides by the Wehrmacht, were also glad to point out the location of fortified positions near their homes. In July, 1938, two British observers in the Sudetenland gave a ride to a young Sudeten German boy, who surprised them by pointing out the location of nearly every important work in his district77. Large fortified zones were blocked off to local inhabitants, but many sectors of the frontier were weakly-fortified. Advanced knowledge of the weak sectors was extremely advantageous to the German attacker, who possessed detailed maps of Czechoslovak positions78. The Poles, in contrast, had only a general knowledge of Czech defenses before they marched into Teschen Silesia79. The Czechoslovak situation thus differed considerably from that in France, where the population was hostile to Germany. In obtaining information about the Maginot Line, the Wehrmacht usually relied only on air and ground observation. In some cases, such as in the fortifications facing the Saar and at the Breisach crossing, camouflage was excellent80. In Czechoslovakia, camouflage would have been effective only if the government had won greater loyalty among the Sudeten Germans. A third factor which would have worked to the attacker's advantage was Czecho- slovak tactical doctrine, which advocated the defense of a broad front. It is probable that tactical doctrine in France was less responsible for the French defeat in 1940 than were strategic errors of the French High Command, but the Czechoslovak Army lacked the materiel possessed by France, and the Czechs suffered an additional disadvantage of lacking a military tradition81. In 1937 the American Military Attache observed Czechoslovak maneuvers and noted that the soldiers, while excellently concealed, were dispersed over an extremely broad front82. The Czechs were well aware that Germany possessed superior mechanized forces, but their frontier compelled them to disperse their forces and thus lighten the task of the Germans considerably. Unfortunately, little information is available concerning the Czech willingness to accept casualties in local actions. The fortifications, of course, were designed to reduce the nation's manpower needs; but in view of the ambiguous attitude of min- orities towards a war with Germany, the General Staff could never compensate for the lack of an inadequate reserve of manpower. A suitable response to German attacks could have compelled the Czechs to entail heavy losses. As the fortifications troops, the air force, and certain key infantry divisions were overwhelmingly Czech, heavy casualties could have created a serious ethnic imbalance within the army. Unlike Austria-Hungary, Czechoslovakia had no wartime experience by which the General Staff could have judged its manpower problems. The eventual capitulation of the Czechs without a fight in September, 1938 may be traced in part to the uncertainty of how the army could be utilized in a wartime situation. Despite certain gaps in our knowledge about Czechoslovak defenses, there is certainly evidence available which may permit us to draw conclusions about the Czecho- slovak position in September, 1938. German engineers did evince a high regard for Czech technology, and the Germans admitted that if finished, the Czechoslovak system could have been quite effective. German reports nonetheless indicated that the Czechs lacked both the time and resources to complete their fortifications by the time of the Munich crisis. As the conclusion of the German Denkschrift über die tschecho-slowakische Landesbefestigung noted: "Wer alles decken will, deckt nichts"83. The Czechs themselves realized their predicament on September 30, when the results of the Munich Conference became known in Prague. President Benes asked General Krejci what would happen if the Czechs fought alone. When General Krejci was drafting his reply to telegraph Benes, General Husarek insisted that Krejci add a phrase to the telegraph to the effect that the Czechs could resist only "if Poland does not come against us"84. Faced with probable attacks from both Germany and Poland, the Czech generals felt that armed resistance would result in a futile blood- bath; they thus supported President Benes's decision not to fightes. By studying the fortifications, of course, we are studying but one aspect of the 1938 crisis. Our task is undoubtedly made more difficult by inadequate documentation of the crisis as British, French, Czechoslovak and Soviet military archives remain closed for research. Nonetheless, a few conclusions may be drawn from available data: Despite the assertions of several German generals at Nuremberg that Germany was in no position to wage war against Czechoslovakia and that, in particular, the Wehrmacht found the Czechoslovak fortifications a formidable obstacle, German military reports from 1938 clearly argued that Czechoslovak defenses were inadequate and that Czechoslovak resistance would have been short-lived, a few weeks at most86. Published accounts of the fortifications may contain a few political references of questionable validity, but the military data in the published reports may be supported by unpublished documents of German field units. Of course, more vigorous intervention in the Munich crisis by Britain and France could have affected the nature of German military operations against Czechoslovakia; but the weakness shown by Czechoslovakia and her allies in 1938 derived to a great extent from the deficiencies of the Czechoslovak defenses, in which the incomplete state of the fortifications played a vital role. Notes

1 For studies of Munich, see B. Celovsky: Das Münchener Abkommen von 1938. München 1958; Sir J. Wheeler-Bennett: Munich. Prologue to Tragedy. London 1948 (cit. Wheeler-Bennett). 2 E. Benes: From Munich to New War and New Victory. Boston 1953, p. 28 (cit. Benes). 3 Sir W. S. Churchill: The Gathering Storm. Boston 1948, p. 316; K. Eubank: Munich, 1938. Norman 1963, p. 281. 4 See, for example, the Charge in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, October 6, 1938, Foreign Relations of the United States 1938, I. Washington 1955, p. 820; Wheeler-Bennett, p. 33. 5 MNO. Ceskoslovensky vojensky atlas [The Czechoslovak military atlas]. Prague 1965 (cit. Vojensky atlas), p. 316 gives air force figures without mentioning the inferiority of Czech models. Czechoslovakia only had 500 anti-aircraft guns. See Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945. Ed.: Μ. Domarus. Neustadt a.d. Aisch 1963, II, p. 1156. 6 Z. Sada, ed.: Umlcene zbrane [The silent weapons]. Prague 1966, pp. 85, 136 (cit. Sada). 7 M. Lvovä: Lid chtel bojovat [The people wanted to fight]. In: Prispevky k dejinäm KSC, III, 1963, p. 545; V. Hyndräk: Κ otazce vojenske hodnoty es. armady ν druhe polovine tricatych let. In: Historie a vojenstvi, 1964, p. 86 (cit. Hyndrak). β For rough estimates of Czechoslovak military spending, see the League of Nations Armaments Year- book. Geneva 1938, pp. 283-284 (cit. LNAY). 9 B. Liddell Hart: The Liddell Hart Memoirs. New York 1964, II, p. 161. 10 G. Bonnet: De Munich ä la Guerre. Paris 1967, p. 133. 11 J. Rothschild: East Central Europe between the Wars. Seattle 1974, p. 131 (cit. Rothschild). 12 Cf. G. Craig: Europe since 1815. New York 1966, p. 718; Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 333-334. 13 For a typical Communist interpretation of Czechoslovakia's prospects in September, 1938, see Vojensky atlas, p. 316. 14 M. Hajek and J. Novotny: Munich. Politique et armee tchecoslovaques. In: Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale. 13 (1963) no. 52, p. 17. Also see F. Ryzner: Obrana Ceskoslovenske republiky ν obdobi Mnichova. In: Historie a vojenstvi. 1956, p. 473. These historians based their assertions about the 210 mm mortars on a brief, uninformative statement of Hitler's quoted in the notes of Schmundt. See Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. Nuremberg 1946-47, Document 388-PS, p. 429 (cit. TMWC). 15 L. Vitez: Slava a päd maginotovy linie a Verdunu [The glory and fall of the Maginot Line and Verdun]. Prague 1941, p. 129. 16 Cf. Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 333-334; Rothschild, loc. cit.; F. Moravec: Master of Spies. New York 1975, pp. 121-122. 17 Jodl. Interview of 28 August 1945, 14:50-17: 15, p. 18, RG 238, Modern Military Branch, U.S. National Archives, Washington. 18 W. Keitel: The Memoirs of Field Marshal Keitel. New York 1966, p. 74; H. Guderian: Erinnerungen eines Soldaten. Heidelberg 1951, p. 51. 19 TMWC, X, p. 509, XX, p. 606. 20 LNAY, 1937, p. 369; ibid., 1924-25, p. 403. 21 Oberkommando des Heeres, Gen. St. d. Η., Gen. d. Pi. u. Fest. b. Ob. d. H., Abt. Auswertung fremder Landesbefestigungen: Denkschrift über die tschecho-slowakische Landesbefestigung. Berlin 1941,p. 21 (cit. DTL). This is the most detailed study of the Czechoslovak fortifications undertaken by German engineers and pioneers. Though its circulation was restricted, the study is available in libraries in Washington, D. C. and in Freiburg i.Br. 22 Jedlicka (Military Attache in Prague) to War Department, January 10, 1920, Records of the U. S. War Department (cit. USWD), National Archives, Washington, D. C., 2667-II-2. 23 OKH, Abt. Auswertung fremder Landesbefestigungen: Denkschrift über die französische Landesbefe- stigung. Berlin 1941, pp. 40—43 (cit. DFL). A more detailed study from the same series as DTL. 24 Benes, p. 32. 25 German Military Attache in Prague to Reichswehrministerium, den 6. November 1933, Microcopy T-120, Records of the German Foreign Ministry, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D. C., roll 2758, frames 431524-31. 26 DTL, p. 22; O. Holub: A veze mlci. Prague 1973, p. 35 (cit. Holub). 27 M. Gamelin: Servir. Paris 1950, II, pp. 134-135 (cit. Gamelin). Gilmor (U.S. Military Attache in Prague and Warsaw) to War Department, June 7, 1935, USWD 2667-II-3/2. 28 Gilmor to War Department, September 27, 1936, USWD 2494-195/7. 29 Cf. Changes in Combat Estimate for Czechoslovakia, November 15, 1932, USWD 10641-309/15; LNAY, 1924, p. 339. 30 Mr. Newton to Mr. Eden, 31 May 1937, Records of the British Foreign Office, Series 371, Public Record Office, London, R 4018/154/12 (cit. F. O.). 31 L. Krejci: Obranyschopnost CSR 1938 [The defensive readiness of Czechoslovakia in 1938]. In: Odboj a revoluce, 1968, 6, p. 29 (cit. Krejci); Colonel Biermann: The Czech System of Fortification. In: The Royal Engineers Journal (translated from Vierteljahrshefte für Pioniere). 33 (1939) 213. (cit. Biermann). 32 Cf. Riley (U.S. Military Attache in Prague) to War Department, July 7, 1938, USWD 2667-II-3/8. 33 See Microcopy T-78, records of the German Army High Command (OKH), roll 356, Einzelheiten, p. 3 frame 6316400; Schallenberger (U. S. Military Attache in Vienna) to War Department, April 17,1938, USWD 2667-II-5; Riley to War Department, September 7, 1938, USWD 2667-II-6/1; E. Moravec: Das Ende der Benesch-Republik. Prague 1941, p. 361 (cit. Moravec). 34 Gamelin, p. 233. 35 DTL, pp. 41-42. 36 For the comments on General Husarek, the writer is grateful to Ing. Karel J. Staller, former Technical Director of the Zbrojovka armament works, Brno, in several interviews in 1972 and 1973. Also see Holub, p. 55. 37 Riley to War Department, July 7, 1938, USWD 2667-II-3/8. 38 Die tschechische Befestigungsanlage, den 2. Dezember 1938, T-78, roll 298, frame 248382; T-79, Records of the German Army Areas (WK), roll 94, frames 000030-7; DTL, pp. 75-79. The Czechs also completed approximately 3,800 machine-gun nests, which I have omitted from this discussion. See DTL, p. 49. 39 DTL, p. 36. 40 Ibid., p. 31. 41 The money was spent over a period of a decade and funds were dispensed through several different ministries; the problem of calculating relative prices, the gold franc vs. the devalued franc, makes matters more difficult. See DFL, pp. 47-48. 42 For estimates on equipment and expenditures in the territory ceeded to Germany in October, 1938, see Lt.-Col. Kalla to J. T. Godfrey, 4 October 1938, F. O. C 11880/11169/18. See also Holub, p. 91 and C. Chvojka: Poznämky k hospodarske problematice es. pevnostniho systemu ν tncätych letech. In: Hi- storie a vojenstvi. 1964. 43 DFL, p. 65. 44 Ibid, p. 201. 45 Erfahrungen über das Verhalten der Armeen Osteuropas in der Spannungszeit 1938, T-78, roll 301, frame 6252022ff., pp. 11-12 (cit. Erfahrungen). 46 DTL, pp. 42-43. 47 For example, see DTL, pp. 15-16. 48 Testimony of General Faucher before a French parliamentary commission Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargee d'enqueter sur les evenements survenus en France de 1933 ä 1945. Paris η. d., p. 1195. 49 DTL, pp. 124-143; Sada, p. 64. Interview with Ing. Staller. 50 Brauer (German Charge in Paris) to Foreign Minister, September 29, 1938, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Washington 1949, D, II, no. 673; Notes on a Conversation with an Austrian Gentleman in the Sudetenland, December, 1938, F. O. C 15770/62/18. 51 Jodl interview, loc. cit. See also Merkblatt für das Angriffsverfahren gegen Grenzbefestigung, den 19.9.38, 10. Division, Regensberg, T-79, roll 129, frames 604-610; and especially Waffenwerkung gegen M.G.-Stände und Werke, gez. Halder, Berlin den 12. Juli 1938, Abschrift Betr. Angriffsmittel gegen armierte Betonbauten und Hindernisse, T-79, roll 181, frames 000082-91. 52 DTL, pp. 192-201. 53 In addition to Biermann, op. cit., see Colonel Emö Koppany et al.: Ipolysagi Cseh kiserödök [The Czech bunker in Ipolysag], In: Magyar katonai szemle. VIII, no. 12, pp. 12-26; Generalmajor d. R. Ing. Theodor von Brosch-Aarenau: Wie war die Tschechoslowakei befestigt? In: Militärwissenschaft- liche Mitteilungen. 70 (1939) 356-376 (cit. von Brosch-Aarenau). 54 General Gehlen began his career in intelligence work by photographing the Czechoslovak fortifications from the German side of the frontier. 55 TMWC, document PS-388, nos. 15, 38.

56 The results of all the German tests no longer exist, but extant German reports still contain considerable information about the strength of the Czech bunkers.

57 Versuchsschiessen gegen Tschechenbunker, T-77, roll 737, frames 965475-8; T-79, roll 16, frame 000426.

58 At Work 505, it could only be deployed from distances of 1.8 and 2.6 km. See DFL, pp. 190, 192. Ibid., pp. 186, 190. 59 Ibid., pp. 196-197. 60 Ibid., pp. 198-199. 61

62 Ibid., pp. 185-186, 196, 200, 209-219, etc. Von Brosch-Aarenau, pp. 362-367. 63 DTL, p. 118. 64 65 T-79, roll 16, frames 00041-42. 66 Ibid., frame 000340. 67 T-79, roll 94, frames 000030-37. 68 DTL, pp. 211-212; Biermann, p. 222. 69 TMWC, PS-388, nos. 37, 38. 70 T-79, roll 16, frame 000441. 71 Moravec, p. 361; Vaclav Krai: Zarijove dny [The September days], Prague 1968. 120-121. 72 Krejci, p. 17, noted that he would have needed 200 divisions if he had a division for each 10 km of frontier. 73 Cf. G. Blumentritt: Von Rundstedt. London 1952, pp. 43-44. 74 Erfahrungen, p. 6. 75 Lt. Col. Stronge to Mr. Newton, 30 August 1937, enclosure in Mr. Newton to Mr. Eden, 14 September 1937, F. O. R 6191/6191/12. 76 DTL, p. 192. 77 Memorandum Regarding a Tour of the Czech-Silesian Frontier, Ian Henderson and Major Sutton- Pratt, 2 July 1938, F. O. C 7690/4786/18. 78 Cf. T-79, roll 16, frame 000003. 79 See the maps accompanying the report Samodzielna grupa operacyjna slask: sprawozdanie ζ dziaania grupy [The Independent Operational Group Silesia. The account of action of the group], 1938. The Jozef Pifeudski Institute, New York. 80 DFL, pp. 63-64, 181-183, 375-382. 81 D. W. Alexander: Repercussions of the Brada Variant. In: French Historical Studies. 8 (1974) 459-488. 82 Winslow to War Department, September 12, 1937, USWD 2494-207/1. 83 DTL, p. 213. Cf. T-78, roll 298, frame 248382. 84 Krejci to Benes, 29 September 1938, Za armadu lidu [Toward an army of the people]. Prague 1960, document 77. Svaz es. düstojnikü ν exilu [The Union of Czech officers in exile]: General Ingr. Washing- ton 1957, p. 15; interview with Ing. Staller. 85 Moravec, pp. 369, 374; Krejci, p. 27; Radomir Luza: The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans. New York 1964, p. 149, note 183. 86 Erfahrungen, pp. 14-16.