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Home , Ruhollah Khomeini

Did the 1977-1979 Revolution in rid the country of a repressive tyrant?

Viewpoint: Yes. Despite the negative publicity the Revolution received, it was mostly a positive development that set the stage for a democratic society in Iran. Viewpoint: No. The Revolution led to an even more repressive regime com- ing to power that had a negative impact on Iran over the long term.

The culmination of the Iranian Revolution was marked by the return of the to Teheran on 1 , effectively signaling the end of the reign of Reza Pahlavi, otherwise known as the of Iran, and the beginning of the of Iran. Various explanations of the Iranian Revolution draw from the historical experience of Iran dating back to the Safavid empire of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen- turies, when Shiite became the state religion; the Qajar period in the nineteenth century, when Iran encountered Russian and British ; and (1914-1918), which paved the way for the to come to power in 1925 with the ascension to the peacock throne of Muhammad 's father, known simply as Reza Shah. Other explana- tions focus on World War II (1939-1945), when Reza Shah was removed by the British in 1941 because of his perceived pro-German sympathies. His young and untested teenage son was then placed on the throne in 1945, beholden to the British and soon to the Americans, facing a host of chal- lenges, particularly one emanating from an austere intellectual liberal consti- tutionalist named Muhammad Musaddiq, whose overthrow in 1953 was engineered in Washington and London. Virtually all of the explanations for the Iranian Revolution, however, touch at least to some degree on the subject of change resulting from the overly rapid modernization process the Shah had embarked upon in earnest in the early 1960s. This change had economic, political, and social repercussions, accelerating what scholar Nikki R. Keddie called the "dual culture" nature of Iranian society, which had in effect begun when the Shah's father imple- mented his own modernization program in the 1920s and 1930s. Whenever there is change of a significant order brought on by regime policy, there are those who benefit from it, and there are those who do not. The environment for revolutions tends to become much more propitious when the bulk of the population considers itself in the latter category. In the 1960s and especially in the , with the available capital from increased revenues resulting from the oil price hike following the Arab-Israeli War (1973), the Shah implemented an economic program that many other countries, particularly in the developing world, also attempted: import-substituting industrialization (ISI). The idea behind ISI was to move nations that were tra- ditionally dependent upon imports for primary and secondary products to an industrial footing. In essence, ISI, riding the crest of the wave of that had been sweeping across the post-British and post-French colonial world, was supposed to create economically independent countries that 106 would no longer be subject to the economic, and thus political, whims of the developed world. In Iran, ISI was intended to establish a solid economic foundation for the Shah's dream of making his nation a regional power that also, with the growing dependence of the West upon Middle East oil and at the height of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)'s influence, would be a player of global significance. Even though ISI resulted in a growing gross national product (GNP) in the immediate term, internally the economic, political, and social gaps between classes only widened. With ISI's empha- sis on heavy industry, the agricultural sector was typically neglected, which directly affected a signif- icant portion of the population since the vast majority of workers were still farmers. Therefore, incomes in the agricultural sector tended to decrease (or at least not increase at nearly as high a rate as bourgeois and upper-class incomes). The so-called bazaaris (small merchants) also tended to suffer from economic policies designed to the advantage of large-scale manufacturers. In other words, no adequate consumer base was developed that could keep the factories operating at full capacity. As a result, economies of scale subsequently drove up the price of products, which, subse- quently, could only be purchased by the upper classes, exacerbating the separation of classes. It was this disenchantment that Ayatollah Khomeini and others tapped into and that generated the rev- olutionary period of 1977-1979. The Shah also enacted policies and adopted measures of a noneconomic nature that further alienated Iranians from the regime and created more fodder for revolutionary propaganda. The event singled out most often as an indication of the Shah's megalomania and how out of touch he was with the vast majority of his subjects was the $300 million "party" he hosted in 1971 to com- memorate the 2,500th anniversary of the Achmaenid dynasty, held at the ancient site of Persepolis. Not only was the lavishness and prodigality an affront to many Iranians living in poverty, but the cel- ebration of a pre-lslamic entity or event was offensive to the religious classes and to a deeply tradi- tional society as a whole. Other aspects of the Shah's reign that added to the opposition's ranks were the repressive activities of his security apparatus, known by its Persian acronym SAVAK, and his close relationship, especially in terms of military cooperation, with the , as well as his strategic relationship with Israel. A series of events in the 1977-1979 period coalesced elements of the opposition and fueled the revolutionary fervor that bridges the oftentimes large gap between a vocal opposition and actually taking the actions necessary to overthrow the regime. These flash points also brought to the fore various groups or individuals, in this case the Ayatollah, who seized the moment and rose to leader- ship positions within the movement. One particular event in September 1978 became the turning point in the Revolution. An apparent misunderstanding about the timing of a curfew announcement following a peaceful opposition march of more than one million people in Teheran led to the deaths of up to one thousand Iranians killed in a follow-up demonstration. This tragic event, known in Iran as , essentially ended any hope of accommodation between most elements of the oppo- sition and the regime. It was also when many Iranians began to see the value of Khomeini's uncom- promising stand, which he had been enunciating for years: the Shah had to go, and an Islamic republic had to be formed. More-moderate alternative solutions, such as the constitutional monarchy advocated by some opposition groups, had little chance of succeeding because of the virulent anti-Shah hostility that had been building, which was vividly displayed in huge demonstrations and widespread strikes. The Shah effectively abdicated by leaving the country on 16 , weak from the cancer that would take his life shortly thereafter. All that was left was for Khomeini to triumphantly return from his fifteen-year exile on 1 February.

ulema (Muslim clerics) had envisioned. The take- over of the state ideology and apparatus by the Viewpoint: ulema and their allies, however, has led to the cre- Yes. Despite the negative ation of an expanded network of personalities publicity the Revolution and institutions, united by their common "Islamic" ideology and privileged economic and received, it was mostly a positive political positions in society. Society in Iran in development that set the stage the meantime has gone through drastic socio- for a democratic society in Iran. economic and cultural changes, much of it Almost twenty-five years after the Iranian because of the ideology and policies of the state Revolution (1977-1979), Iran is still struggling itself Iranian society today is dynamic and bur- to build the just and prosperous "Islamic" society geoning, with an energetic young generation that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the Shiite is more concerned with sociopolitical freedom

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES 107 and tangible material gains than spiritual fulfill- hold on society and coexisted with, and some- ment through living an "Islamic" life. State-society times rivaled, the state as a major source of social relations in Iran, although currently stigmatized power, culminating in their taking over the state with persistent economic problems, political in 1979. The landed elite continued, however, to polarization, and state repressiveness, is heading resist reforms, and by 1946 peasants still consti- toward a more balanced position. Iran for the tuted 75 percent of the labor force. first time in its long history is on the verge of Reza Shah's patrimonial of leadership political democracy and possibly a more mature did not attempt political institutionalization and and prosperous economy, something that would reform. Political opposition remained either not have emerged as such without the Revolu- nonexistent or oppressed; political parties, orga- tion. The removal of the monarchy and the nized labor, and agents of civil society were not entrance of the ulema to the center stage of poli- allowed to function, and the state's overwhelm- tics have drastically changed the historical and ing presence left no public space for ordinary modern forces of Iranian society, setting the stage people to have a voice in the affairs of the state. for a democratic Iran. The harsh years following Intellectual and professional opposition were the Revolution are the price millions of Iranians similarly suffocated. are paying in the realization of a free society. The reign of Muhammad Reza Shah began The history of modern Iran coincides with with his ascension to power in 1941 and Iran's the rise of the Reza Shah Pahlavi to the throne in occupation by the Soviet and British "allied" 1925, itself the consequence of years of the persis- powers. The young Shah continued his father's tent political ineptitude of the last monarchs of mission of modernization, but he remained the , constitutional revolution, for- heavily dependent on American power and lar- eign occupation and control, and overall political gesse for his survival and continued rule. At the instability in the first quarter of the twentieth conclusion of World War II, the Shah relied on century. Reza Shah's ascendance to power was the United States to force Soviet troops out of facilitated by the British colonial influence inter- northern Iran, but he also had to tolerate politi- ested in a new oil-rich, united, and stable Persia cal opposition from Iranian nationalists and the under strong leadership to counter the Soviets' Left. The post-World War II relative political ambitions in expanding southward toward the freedom led to the coming to power in 1951 of Persian Gulf. Reza Shah proved himself to be Prime Minister Muhammad Mussadiq, whose much like his admired counterpart in neighbor- nationalist fervor put the young insecure Shah ing Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a secular on the defensive on the issue of nationalist. Reza Shah's drive for modernization of Iran's oil industry. Mussadiq's drive for in Iran resulted in a strong centralized govern- nationalization challenged British control of the ment and somewhat successful attempts at build- Iranian oil industry and made the Eisenhower ing the foundation of a modern economy and administration in the United States nervous society. Reza Shah, although a dictator, created, about the seeming rise of popularity of the leftist inter alia, Iran's first modern army, a more cohe- Tudeh Party. Mussadiq successfully challenged sive tax system, an education system, an expanded the young Shah, forcing him to leave the country network of roads, and a railroad system. Reza for exile, but the oil-dependent Iranian economy Shah's attempt at laying the industrial foundation after months of boycotts by the Anglo-Iranian of Iran through close cooperation with Germany Oil Company (later called British Petroleum) was for building Iran's first steel mill was, however, in trouble by 1953, resulting in scattered demon- interrupted by European colonial rivalry vying strations against Mussadiq's administration. It for influence in Iran, the advent of World War II took the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) rela- (1939-1945), and his eventual abdication from tively little finance and effort to convince the Ira- power in September 1941 when invading Soviet nian military, in the absence of religious and British forces ignored Iran's neutrality. leadership support for the Mussadiq govern- The landed elite and the religious nlema ment, to overthrow the regime. challenged Reza Shah's attempts at socio-economic The return of His Majesty to the throne in reforms. The ulema continued losing their hold 1953 was the beginning of a long and close rela- on society in the areas of education, administra- tionship between the Shah and the United tion of justice, and control of religious or Waqf States. The CIA took the responsibility for train- land that was also a source of income. The Uni- ing Iran's notorious SAVAK as well as training form Dress Law of December 1928 introduced and arming the Iranian armed forces. American Iranians to Western dress and the so-called Pah- support for the Shah remained strong: Iran lavi cap, followed later by a ban on the wearing became a regional ally to the United States, of the chador, the long head-to-toe cloth that cov- received the latest weaponry in the U.S. arsenals, ers women's bodies. The ulema, although weak- and, upon the departure of the British naval ened by Reza Shah's reforms, maintained their forces from the Persian Gulf in 1971, was

108 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES entrusted by the United States to safeguard the death penalties in the world, no valid system of security of the Persian Gulf region. The Shah civilian courts and a history of torture which is served his purpose by taking a pro-Israeli posture beyond belief." Moreover, "Ninety-five percent in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He supplied Israel of all the available press in Iran was in the hands with its fuel needs and, when asked, sent Iranian of two families, the Mesbahzadeh and Mas'udi troops to Oman and successfully defended the families who ran and Etteleat publica- conservative monarch, Sultan Qaboos, against tions, who took their orders from the Shah and leftist insurgents. Iran under the Shah, along the police." The Shah's intolerance for minori- with Saudi Arabia and other conservative Persian ties also was evident in his policy of "Persianiza- Gulf states, also had an overall moderate tion" of Iran, practically trying to assimilate, but approach toward setting oil-export quotas in the not integrate, the Turkish, Kurdish, Arab, and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- other minorities into the dominant Persian cul- tries (OPEC). ture. Baraheni in 1977 wrote: The Shah embarked upon some crucial Shah also pursued racist policies to socio-economic reforms, but his rush for West- Persianize the Azerbaijanis and the Kurds and ernization left most Iranian people deprived of the Arabs and the Baluchis. For example, the real economic benefits and confused with the 3,000 American children brought to Iran by speed of change and the assault on traditional their parents working for Grumman can go to Islamic values. The Shah, like his father, had lit- an English-speaking school. Yet millions of native Iranian children born to Azerbaijani, tle respect for the ulema and their role in society Kurdish and Arab parents do not have even in maintaining social cohesion. The Shah's insis- one school in which they can study everything tence on secularization of Iranian society, com- in their native languages. This is only one bined with imbalanced and uneven economic aspect of the Shah's . development, favor shown urban centers at the expense of the rural population, and almost total The Iranian society's experiences in the negligence of political development, set Iran on post-Revolution era have also been intense, vio- its path toward revolution. The impressive eco- lent, and widespread. The revolutionary nomic growth in the 1960s later accelerated in upheaval, antigovernment armed insurgencies by the 1970s with the rise in oil prices, but it still opposition groups, eight-year-long war with left the bulk of the population deprived of basic (1980-1988), rapid population growth and necessities such as fresh water, electricity, access urbanization, flood of Afghani and Iraqi refu- to public baths, and decent roads. The rising gees, U.S. economic sanctions, and most of all, middle class, professionals, and intellectuals also the persistent economic crisis have had an endur- had to contend with His Majesty's absolutist ing impact. These events, along with the deliber- rule, not having any avenues— such as legitimate ate state policy of "" and populist political parties, labor unions, and civic associa- economic policies to give priority to rural develop- tions—to participate in politics. For example, as ment and an overall more balanced approach to recalled in The Crowned Canni- development, have reshaped Iran's socio-economic bals: Writings on Repression in Iran (1977), "in and political structure. Despite all the shortcom- Quri-Chai, the northern slums of , there is ings of the Revolution, Iranian society's outlook only one school for 100,000 schoolchildren. In on the state and its own self-image has funda- most of the cities of Baluchestan, there is only mentally changed. one bath for the entire population (in the city of The power distribution in state-society rela- Bampour, for instance), but since people are so tions until the Revolution had been structured poor that they cannot afford to pay the nickel by a complex relationship among the monarchy required to go to the bath, it has fallen in ruins. and its supporters, the ulema and the religious People have frozen to death in winter in this establishment, and the traditional bazaaris (small great oil-producing country." merchants). The politically powerless middle and In the political arena, the Shah became working classes did not play central roles in set- increasingly authoritarian, and by 1975 he ting the national agenda. Similarly, the intellectu- declared Iran a one-party system, although the als' influence over the masses in the national struggle for freedom—which since the Constitu- two existing (mostly ceremonial) parties in Iran tional Revolution (1906) had focused against were merely legitimating tools for the regime anticolonialism and foreign domination and not and had no real power. According to Amnesty democracy per se—remained marginal for the International's Annual Report 1974/1975, "the most part. total number of political prisoners was in 1975 between 25,000 to 100,000." The Secretary Gen- Intellectuals, professionals, the media, film- eral of Amnesty International, Martin Ennals, makers, and artists are now among the forerun- wrote in the report, "The Shah of Iran retains his ners in the national struggle for democracy and benevolent image despite the highest rate of freedom. It is only in the past twenty years that

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES 109 DELIBERATE AND DREADFUL SLAUGHTER Sattareh Farman Farmaian describes some of the revolu- tionary events that occurred in Iran in 1979: This horrible event shattered any hope of gradual political progress, or even of a return On September 4, in observance of a reli- to normal life.... gious holiday, a series of peaceful demon- strations began In , larger than any Ohn November fourth, the worst violence in the past. The crowds were gigantic, com- had seen yet began when the army posed of men and women from every class fired into a crowd of students at the University and political viewpoint, with tens of thou- who, to mark the fourteenth anniversary of sands of people chanting in unison the best- Ayatollah Khomeini's exile to Iraq, were trying known slogan of the opposition movement: to pull down a statue of the Shah. The next "Allahu akbar, Khomeini ratoar"; "God is day, hundreds of thousands of people dem- Great, Khomeini is our leader." Over the next onstrated in the center of the city, and smoke three days, despite the calls of the National rose from the European shops on the Avenue Front and the moderate religious opposition Lalezar and every other business associated for restraint, these peaceful demonstrations with the West, luxury, and imperialism. For- became larger and more radical-sounding, eign banks and the British Embassy were set until over half a million people were shouting ablaze and barricades of tires, rubble from slogans calling for the downfall of the Shah, construction sites, and abandoned cars were an end to America's presence in our country, erected to block the way of the tanks that the return of Ayatollah Khomeini from exile— ground along the streets, and from which sol- and, for the first time, an Islamic republic. diers fired on unarmed demonstrators. Scrawled messages appeared on walls, in Late that afternoon, the Shah flew over doorways, and on banners that the crowds the city in his helicopter to view the charred waved: *Death to the Shah and the Imperial- husks of high-rise hotels, cinemas, stores, ists," "Bring back Ayatollah Khomeini," "We and the Embassy building. He was reported want an Islamic republic," to be distraught, close to a nervous break- down, because the Americans would not tell On Friday, September 8, unaware that him what to do about the demonstrators. The on the previous evening the Shah had forced next day, however, the government the cabinet to declare martial law, an enor- announced that the Shah would take decisive mous crowd estimated to be somewhere measures to deal with the crisis. Once again, between five and twenty thousand people people felt relieved, expecting that at last the staged a sit-down in Jaleh Square in Shah understood that he must relinquish South Tehran. Ordered to leave by the troops power. of the general who had just been appointed governor of the capital—the same man who That evening, November sixth, the king had ordered the shooting of protestors in went on television. Weeping and in a break- —they refused, and with that the ing voice, he declared that the wave of strikes soldiers began pumping round after round was justified. The people, he said, had risen Into the defenseless crowd. Soon Jaleh against oppression and corruption, and he, Square looked like a slaughterhouse, with their king—before he had always referred to blood running on the pavement and prone himself as Iran's "emperor"—had heard their bodies piled up one on top of the other, wher- "revolutionary message" and supported it. ever they had been sitting or standing. The The monarchy was "a gift entrusted to him by killing went on all day. Army helicopter gun- the constitution and the people," and he, our ships hunted down demonstrators who fled. king, would rectify "past mistakes." Not even the riots of 1963 had seen such Source: Sattareh Farman Farmaian, with Dona deliberate and dreadful slaughter. Septem- Munker, Daughter of Persia: A Woman's Journey ber 8 became known to Iranians as "Black From Her Father's Harem Through the Islamic Rev- olution (New York: Crown, 1992), pp. 296-297, 303- Friday/'... 304.

110 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES the monarchy disappeared as a central contender should be combined to create a powerful elected for power, and the ulema was weakened as the leader or the president should be given more legitimate heir to Allah's rule on earth in the powers and the spiritual leader should just fill an absence of a Mahdi (Messiah). The rise of the advisory role." Montazeri subsequently sent a ulema to political power, moreover, exposed written message to the legislature in which he their vulnerabilities to trappings of power, stated his support for legislation that would thereby raising doubt about their ability and sin- limit Council's power. Montazeri cerity to act simultaneously as political and reli- wrote, "The has denied peo- gious leaders. The ulema, now contenders for ple's rights and restricted their freedom in vet- power, are no longer perceived as sincere men of ting hopefuls standing for elections." Montazeri God and immune from corruption. When said the council has deviated from its mandate Reporters Without Borders published its first and abused its authority in the vetting process. worldwide press-freedom index on 23 October Given the socio-economic and political 2002, Iran was ranked 122 out of 139. The index problems of Iran, it is hard to conceive of a bet- measures how much freedom journalists and the ter Iran anytime soon. There are still severe eco- media have and what efforts the government nomic and social problems in Iran, and the makes to ensure press freedom. Overall, accord- polarization of politics in the past twenty-four ing to Naser Momayesi, "the clergy's direct years is likely to continue for some time to involvement in state affairs has made it the main come. However, the cultural, social, and politi- target of blame for the ills of society and the cal fabric of Iran has fundamentally changed, state. The cleric's mismanagement of the econ- and with the eventual resolution of political omy, totalitarian control over the country's cul- stagnation the path to renewed economic, tural life, and above all, abuse of power, have social, and political vibrancy will occur. For the severely undermined their once untarnished moment, the biggest challenge is to find the moral authority." appropriate place of Islam in society and poli- Nevertheless, Iran is making progress tics, where it will remain a dominant social force toward its Millennium Development Goals. It is but without overwhelming all social, political, "on track" in the following areas: halving the and economic activities. The removal of the proportion of people suffering from hunger and institution of monarchy, the rise and now seem- undernourishment, eliminating gender disparity ing decline of the "absolutist version of Shiite in education, reducing by two-thirds the clerical rule," and the overall social and eco- under-five and infant mortality rates, and halving nomic changes have left Iran a place totally dif- the proportion of people without access to ferent from its past under the Shah and indeed improved water resources. It is slipping back, since the early 1500s when Shiite Islam became however, in ensuring that all children complete the state ideology that united Persia under the primary education, in terms of the net primary- Safavid dynasty. True, the human-rights record school enrollment ratio. Iranians remain con- of the Islamic Republic as well as its economic cerned with their future, and like people else- performance leaves one wondering about the future of Iranian society and politics, but the where they mostly care about their families and turbulent years of the postrevolutionary period their economic well-being. A poll has found that is the price Iranians are paying for a more civil the greatest public concerns are inflation and society and polity and hopefully a more prosper- unemployment. Of the people surveyed, 74.6 ous economy in the future. percent said that economic issues are the biggest societal problem. Almost 50 percent said that - ABOOTALEBI, inflation is their biggest concern; 18 percent UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-EAU CLAIRE complained about unemployment; and 10 per- cent mentioned corruption. When asked to pri- oritize their concerns, unemployment came out ahead of inflation and high prices. The polarization of politics has intensified and must come to a resolution, since the survival Viewpoint: of the Islamic Republic depends on it. Ayatollah No. The Revolution led to an even Hussein Ali Montazeri, the most prominent more repressive regime coming critic of Ayatollah Khamenei (the Supreme to power that had a negative Guide in Iran and ultimate authority), with mil- impact on Iran over lions of supporters has called for changes to the the long term. Iranian constitution so that the concentration of power in the hands of a single person does not The Iranian Revolution (1977-1979), continue. Montazeri also has suggested that which replaced the monarchical regime with a "either the post of president and spiritual leader millenarian Islamist tradition in Iran, was a sig-

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES 111 nificant event in the twentieth century. After the of the population were sacrificed and any hope departure of Muhammad Reza Shah, the Shiite for democracy was destroyed. clergy gathered around Ayatollah Ruhollah The Islamic character of the Iranian state Khomeini, who emerged as the new power and was already specified in the constitution's pream- achieved his aim: the establishment of an Islamic ble: "In the view of Islam, government does not government. In order to accomplish this goal, derive from the interests of a class, nor does it the clergy did not hesitate to use every means serve the domination of an individual or a available. , repression, purges, and group. Rather, it represents the fulfilment of the mass demonstrations were used by the religious political ideal of a people who bear a common leaders to silence or exile those liberals, national- faith and common outlook, taking an organized ists, progressives, and other Left-wingers who form in order to initiate the process of intellec- had formed part of their coalition that opposed tual and ideological evolution towards the final the Shah's regime. The clergy, however, claimed goal, i.e., movement towards Allah." Actually, the exclusive responsibility for the Revolution. writing of the Iranian constitution was a com- According to Khomeini, "it was the clergy that plex and tricky process, above all the introduc- carried out the uprising," and the monopoly of tion of the concept of velayat-e . It was a power rested with it. The new leadership gave process that was always completely controlled by birth to a despotic and authoritarian regime, Khomeini. In fact, the Iranian clergy as a whole bringing the Persian country as much repression was not in favor of the introduction of this con- as that which had existed under the Shah, as well cept into the constitution, believing it would as international isolation. Khomeini's aim was to lead to a religious dictatorship and a clerical tyr- replace the Pahlavi monarchy with a , anny. The foundation of the new Islamic Repub- where absolute authority was supposed to be in lic had to be built on an "exemplary society" religious faqih (jurist) hands, but in reality it was with the assistance of "Islamic ideals," the real- in his own hands. In fact, his state theory was ization of the "movement's religious principles," implemented in Iran soon after the Revolution, not only for the Iranians but for all based solely on the concept ofvelayat-efaqih (reli- over the world, in other words, for any gious jurists' government), upon which is based mostaz'afin (those deprived of rights). The pre- amble of the constitution states: the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The modernization program imposed by the With due attention to the Islamic content Shah, which, according to the clergy, had poisoned of the Iranian Revolution, which has been a Iranian society through materialism and cultural movement aimed at the triumph of all the mostaz'fin over the mostakbirun [oppressors], influence from abroad, had been superficial and the Constitution provides the necessary basis had not benefited the population. The Shah for ensuring the continuation of the Revolu- seemed committed to destroying Islam, the source tion at home and abroad. In particular, in the of national spirituality. He had exiled Khomeini, development of international relations, the Constitution will strive with other Islamic reduced the power ofulema (Muslim clergy), killed and popular movements to prepare the way theology students, and introduced Western-based for the formation of a single world commu- reforms, such as women's emancipation. nity. Khomeini's goal was to create a just society, In order to create an Islamic community, it was ruled according to skarm (Islamic law). In necessary to fight against the heathen. November 1978, Khomeini declared that the Khomeini regarded war as "an essential ele- purpose of the Revolution was to found an ment in the Islamic Revolution" and as "its phi- Islamic Republic and protect the independence losophy of human experience." The decision to and democracy of the Iranian state, but the prob- continue the war (1980-1988) against Iraq (even lem of uniting popular sovereignty (democracy) after the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Iranian with the religious jurists' government proved to territory) was taken by Khomeini, the only politi- be an impossible task. Resorting to the concept cal figure in Iran with the power to decide in of democracy, however, was useful for the Ayatol- favor of war or peace. According to Khomeini, lah to attract as wide a coalition as possible "our war is not aimed solely against Saddam, but against the Shah's regime. His political skill was against all unbelief." The war against evil, against utilized to unify the different factions of a move- Satan's followers, according to Khomeinist ideol- ment: the clergy, Marxists, nationalists, and ogy, represented the exclusive task of Allah's par- socialist Shiites. Actually, Khomeini was not tisans. To fight against Satan meant fighting interested in democratic developments in the against the world powers, first of all the United Revolution, as was shown in the process that led States (), considered as "devils of vary- to the constitution of the Islamic Republic and ing degrees of evil." In this context, it is necessary by the wave of purges following his seizure of to analyze the famous slogans "Neither West Nor power. In fact, in the name of religion, the rights East," "Export the Revolution and the Islamic

112 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES Republic," and "War, War until Victory," from even more absolute. He had to fulfill the func- which the Khomeinist conception of the Islamic tion of a guardian of law, a protector, and a liber- state and its role in global politics emerged. ator. People were not active subjects of the state, Asserting the universality of Islam, the new but rather they were its object. From 1979 to was obliged to pursue its aims, such when Khomeini died in 1989 a period of autoc- as spreading the faith. This goal is represented in racy existed. The absolute power of the velnyat-e a desire not only to be independent from the two faqih, theorized by Khomeini, had to be similar superpower blocs but also to achieve an even to the total authority the Prophet wielded in his more ambitious aim—to establish an Islamic soci- role as God's deputy on earth. The introduction ety all over the globe. It was an Islamic, not just of this concept into the constitution allowed the an Iranian, revolution. The state was employed Ayatollah to wield an unlimited amount of for this purpose. The ideologically oriented army power in every aspect of public administration. of Revolutionary Guards was not only responsi- On the basis of this concept, Khomeini wielded ble for the defense of the state, but it could also dictatorial power in every political field, imposed take on "the burden of the ideological mission, his will in all government bodies, and made i.e., the holy war () to spread the rule of important decisions without consulting anyone. God's law throughout the world." In fact, soon It was the restoration of a dictatorship, but this after the Revolution, several agencies were estab- time under the Ayatollah's turban. The Utopian lished with the task of spreading the revolution- ideals of the Revolution were acted on by an ary message to Muslims all over the world. exclusive group of revolutionaries, who soon adopted intolerant positions toward every kind The founding of the Hizbollah (Party of of criticism or dissent. Political parties were God) movement in Lebanon represents the most banned; freedom was denied; and certain man- important and successful example of the Iranian nerisms were regarded as immoral. intent to export the Revolution beyond its bor- ders. Khomeini's Iran turned the Lebanese move- Khomeini often acted in violation of estab- ment into a viable terrorist organization, sending lished procedures. Much of his power was to Lebanon not only weapons and ammunition derived from his qualities as a charismatic leader. but also Revolutionary Guard officers in order to His absolute powers, sanctioned by the constitu- instruct Shiite volunteers. Iranian foreign policy tion, nullified popular sovereignty, which was has tried to unite state interests and the ideal of constitutionally recognized (articles 56-61). In exporting the Revolution. Khomeini's Iran fact, the powers of the institutions representing became a leader of the Islamic radical movement, the people (the parliament, the president of the culturally, economically, and politically support- republic, and the Assembly of Leadership ing those groups engaged in the struggle against Experts) are extremely limited. The (parlia- the United States. The consequences of Iran's ment) is elected by the people and empowered to foreign policy have been striking: the long and make laws, but it is not the only source of law in exhausting war against Iraq resulted in more than Iran. It shares its decision-making power with one million casualties and economically destroyed eleven members of the Council of Guardians the two countries, and the support for Islamic rad- who, according to the constitution, have the ical groups brought on international isolation and right to review and therefore to reject those laws economic sanctions promoted by the United produced by the parliament that they do not States that further crushed the already deteriorat- regard as compatible with the principles of ing Iranian economy. Islam. The Council of Guardians can also inter- fere with the Council of Ministers' , stat- The preamble to the Iranian constitution utes, and treaties. The president of the republic is states that, while founding the political struc- the highest-ranking public official in the country. tures at the heart of this new society, "the righ- It is his responsibility to implement the constitu- teous will assume the responsibility of governing tion and act as the head of the executive, "except and administering the country (in accordance in matters directly concerned with the office of with the Koranic verse 'Verily My righteous ser- the Leadership" (Article 113). In a republican vants shall inherit the earth' [21:105]). Legisla- regime, the most powerful official of the state tion setting forth regulations for the should be the head of government. In Iran the administration of society will revolve around the president is not the highest authority of the Koran and the Sunnah. Accordingly, the exercise state. According to Article 112 of the constitu- of meticulous and earnest supervision by just, tion, the religious figure of the velayat-e faqih, pious, and committed scholars of Islam is an guardian of religious law and leader of the revo- absolute necessity." lution, is the supreme source of authority and According to Khomeini's state theory, power. Article 110 describes his "power to deter- described in his writings ten years before the mine the general policies of the system of the Revolution, the religious jurists' powers had to Islamic Republic of Iran, supervise the good per- be absolute and the leader's power had to be formance of the regime's general policies, hold

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES 113 Ayatollah Ruhollah the supreme command of the armed forces, violate the principles of independence, freedom, Khomeini, Supreme declare war or peace, dismiss the President of the Leader of the Islamic national unity, the criteria of Islam, or the basis Republic of Iran (center Republic." Therefore the final decision on of the Islamic Republic." Thus, in the name of with hand raised), in 1979 important domestic or foreign policy questions the Revolution such freedom is suppressed. (©AP/Wide World Photos) rests exclusively with the Supreme Guide of the Every opposition party was banned officially Revolution. Power is distributed in a hierarchical because an Islamic society was moving together and inequitable way among the institutions of toward a common goal, led by only one leader, the state. Religious bodies constitutionally hold who was God's representative on earth; there- the power to portray the public policies of the fore, no reason to divide it into opposite political Islamic republic as infallible. forces existed. No kind of opposition was toler- The Islamic community prevails over the ated. During a speech in , Iranian nation; Islamic principles and rules limit Khomeini announced the suppression of free- the rights of people; the Council of Guardians dom of the press, too. Less than half of the 444 deprives the parliament of its power and ulti- newspapers and magazines remained open. In mately controls the president of the republic. 1988 only 121 were still active and all of them The concept of velayat-e faqih contradicts the were controlled, although in different ways, by very idea of republicanism. Although rights are the . sanctioned by the constitution, they are immedi- Despite the existence of democratic ele- ately limited in the name of Islamic principles. ments and the role Iranians want to play in polit- For example, if Article 26 says that the "forma- ical life, voting for parliamentary candidates and tion of parties, societies, political or professional the president of the republic remains signifi- associations, as well as religious societies, cantly restricted. Candidates must be judged suit- whether Islamic or pertaining to one of the rec- able by Islamic jurists, and there are no ognized religious minorities, is permitted," this institutions safeguarding the political and civil right is recognized provided that "they do not rights of citizens. A man, a clergyman, or a politi-

114 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES cal personality may be elected president but only Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: after declaring himself loyal to the principles of The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: the Islamic Republic and the state religion (this , 1988). excludes, for example, Sunni Muslims and those Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the who belong to other religions). He must be sub- West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism ject to the Supreme Guide's will. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, This repressive policy and the atrocities 1996). committed in the name of the Revolution have had devastating effects on Iranian society. Dis- Eric Hooglund, ed., Twenty Tears of Islamic Revo- crimination and violations of the people's rights lution: Political and Social Transition in Iran have severely affected Iranians' lives. Religious since 1979 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse Univer- leaders have preferred to continue using vio- sity Press, 2002). lence and terror in order to wield every political Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy of Mod- and economic lever of power. Nevertheless, ern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, their inability to create a dynamic economy, to 1926-1979 (London: Macmillan, 1981). guarantee the well-being of the population, and to encourage freedom has not only caused a Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpre- crisis for the Revolution, but it has tive History of Modern Iran (New Haven: also ironically produced a revolutionary atmo- Yale University Press, 1981). sphere against it. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Islam and Revolu- -VALENTINA VANTAGGIO, tion: Writings and Declarations of UNIVERSITY OF LECCE Khomeini, translated and annotated by (London: KPI, 1981). George Lenczowski, ed., Iran under the Pahlavis (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, References 1979). Mohammed Amjad, Iran: From Royal Dictator- David Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in ship to Theocracy (New York & London: Iran: Religion, Society and Power (London & Greenwood Press, 1989). Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001).

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