IRANIAN REVOLUTION Did the 1977-1979 Revolution in Iran Rid the Country of a Repressive Tyrant?
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IRANIAN REVOLUTION Did the 1977-1979 Revolution in Iran rid the country of a repressive tyrant? Viewpoint: Yes. Despite the negative publicity the Revolution received, it was mostly a positive development that set the stage for a democratic society in Iran. Viewpoint: No. The Revolution led to an even more repressive regime com- ing to power that had a negative impact on Iran over the long term. The culmination of the Iranian Revolution was marked by the return of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to Teheran on 1 February 1979, effectively signaling the end of the reign of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, otherwise known as the Shah of Iran, and the beginning of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Various explanations of the Iranian Revolution draw from the historical experience of Iran dating back to the Safavid empire of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen- turies, when Shiite Islam became the state religion; the Qajar period in the nineteenth century, when Iran encountered Russian and British imperialism; and World War I (1914-1918), which paved the way for the Pahlavi dynasty to come to power in 1925 with the ascension to the peacock throne of Muhammad Reza Shah's father, known simply as Reza Shah. Other explana- tions focus on World War II (1939-1945), when Reza Shah was removed by the British in 1941 because of his perceived pro-German sympathies. His young and untested teenage son was then placed on the throne in 1945, beholden to the British and soon to the Americans, facing a host of chal- lenges, particularly one emanating from an austere intellectual liberal consti- tutionalist named Muhammad Musaddiq, whose overthrow in 1953 was engineered in Washington and London. Virtually all of the explanations for the Iranian Revolution, however, touch at least to some degree on the subject of change resulting from the overly rapid modernization process the Shah had embarked upon in earnest in the early 1960s. This change had economic, political, and social repercussions, accelerating what scholar Nikki R. Keddie called the "dual culture" nature of Iranian society, which had in effect begun when the Shah's father imple- mented his own modernization program in the 1920s and 1930s. Whenever there is change of a significant order brought on by regime policy, there are those who benefit from it, and there are those who do not. The environment for revolutions tends to become much more propitious when the bulk of the population considers itself in the latter category. In the 1960s and especially in the 1970s, with the available capital from increased revenues resulting from the oil price hike following the Arab-Israeli War (1973), the Shah implemented an economic program that many other countries, particularly in the developing world, also attempted: import-substituting industrialization (ISI). The idea behind ISI was to move nations that were tra- ditionally dependent upon imports for primary and secondary products to an industrial footing. In essence, ISI, riding the crest of the wave of nationalism that had been sweeping across the post-British and post-French colonial world, was supposed to create economically independent countries that 106 would no longer be subject to the economic, and thus political, whims of the developed world. In Iran, ISI was intended to establish a solid economic foundation for the Shah's dream of making his nation a regional power that also, with the growing dependence of the West upon Middle East oil and at the height of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)'s influence, would be a player of global significance. Even though ISI resulted in a growing gross national product (GNP) in the immediate term, internally the economic, political, and social gaps between classes only widened. With ISI's empha- sis on heavy industry, the agricultural sector was typically neglected, which directly affected a signif- icant portion of the population since the vast majority of workers were still farmers. Therefore, incomes in the agricultural sector tended to decrease (or at least not increase at nearly as high a rate as bourgeois and upper-class incomes). The so-called bazaaris (small merchants) also tended to suffer from economic policies designed to the advantage of large-scale manufacturers. In other words, no adequate consumer base was developed that could keep the factories operating at full capacity. As a result, economies of scale subsequently drove up the price of products, which, subse- quently, could only be purchased by the upper classes, exacerbating the separation of classes. It was this disenchantment that Ayatollah Khomeini and others tapped into and that generated the rev- olutionary period of 1977-1979. The Shah also enacted policies and adopted measures of a noneconomic nature that further alienated Iranians from the regime and created more fodder for revolutionary propaganda. The event singled out most often as an indication of the Shah's megalomania and how out of touch he was with the vast majority of his subjects was the $300 million "party" he hosted in 1971 to com- memorate the 2,500th anniversary of the Achmaenid dynasty, held at the ancient site of Persepolis. Not only was the lavishness and prodigality an affront to many Iranians living in poverty, but the cel- ebration of a pre-lslamic entity or event was offensive to the religious classes and to a deeply tradi- tional society as a whole. Other aspects of the Shah's reign that added to the opposition's ranks were the repressive activities of his security apparatus, known by its Persian acronym SAVAK, and his close relationship, especially in terms of military cooperation, with the United States, as well as his strategic relationship with Israel. A series of events in the 1977-1979 period coalesced elements of the opposition and fueled the revolutionary fervor that bridges the oftentimes large gap between a vocal opposition and actually taking the actions necessary to overthrow the regime. These flash points also brought to the fore various groups or individuals, in this case the Ayatollah, who seized the moment and rose to leader- ship positions within the movement. One particular event in September 1978 became the turning point in the Revolution. An apparent misunderstanding about the timing of a curfew announcement following a peaceful opposition march of more than one million people in Teheran led to the deaths of up to one thousand Iranians killed in a follow-up demonstration. This tragic event, known in Iran as Black Friday, essentially ended any hope of accommodation between most elements of the oppo- sition and the regime. It was also when many Iranians began to see the value of Khomeini's uncom- promising stand, which he had been enunciating for years: the Shah had to go, and an Islamic republic had to be formed. More-moderate alternative solutions, such as the constitutional monarchy advocated by some opposition groups, had little chance of succeeding because of the virulent anti-Shah hostility that had been building, which was vividly displayed in huge demonstrations and widespread strikes. The Shah effectively abdicated by leaving the country on 16 January 1979, weak from the cancer that would take his life shortly thereafter. All that was left was for Khomeini to triumphantly return from his fifteen-year exile on 1 February. ulema (Muslim clerics) had envisioned. The take- over of the state ideology and apparatus by the Viewpoint: ulema and their allies, however, has led to the cre- Yes. Despite the negative ation of an expanded network of personalities publicity the Revolution and institutions, united by their common "Islamic" ideology and privileged economic and received, it was mostly a positive political positions in society. Society in Iran in development that set the stage the meantime has gone through drastic socio- for a democratic society in Iran. economic and cultural changes, much of it Almost twenty-five years after the Iranian because of the ideology and policies of the state Revolution (1977-1979), Iran is still struggling itself Iranian society today is dynamic and bur- to build the just and prosperous "Islamic" society geoning, with an energetic young generation that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the Shiite is more concerned with sociopolitical freedom HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 15: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, SECOND SERIES 107 and tangible material gains than spiritual fulfill- hold on society and coexisted with, and some- ment through living an "Islamic" life. State-society times rivaled, the state as a major source of social relations in Iran, although currently stigmatized power, culminating in their taking over the state with persistent economic problems, political in 1979. The landed elite continued, however, to polarization, and state repressiveness, is heading resist reforms, and by 1946 peasants still consti- toward a more balanced position. Iran for the tuted 75 percent of the labor force. first time in its long history is on the verge of Reza Shah's patrimonial style of leadership political democracy and possibly a more mature did not attempt political institutionalization and and prosperous economy, something that would reform. Political opposition remained either not have emerged as such without the Revolu- nonexistent or oppressed; political parties, orga- tion. The removal of the monarchy and the nized labor, and agents of civil society were not entrance of the ulema to the center stage of poli- allowed to function, and the state's overwhelm- tics have drastically changed the historical and ing presence left no public space for ordinary modern forces of Iranian society, setting the stage people to have a voice in the affairs of the state. for a democratic Iran. The harsh years following Intellectual and professional opposition were the Revolution are the price millions of Iranians similarly suffocated.