The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA's Terrorist Pipeline

april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4

The 2008 Belgium Cell and A Europe-Wide Problem of choice for aspiring jihadists from Until recently, the FATA safe haven Belgium and other countries on the FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline troubled British counterterrorism European continent. According to officials significantly more than Grignard, “Not since the year before By Paul Cruickshank their counterparts in other European 9/11 have we seen as many people travel countries. This was a result of the United towards the Afghanistan-Pakistan on december 11, 2008, 14 individuals were Kingdom’s large Pakistani diaspora conflict region.”12 This view is echoed arrested in Belgium and two in France community.6 The British intelligence by U.S. intelligence agencies who have 1 in a major counterterrorism operation. agency MI5 recently estimated that 75% observed an “an influx of new Western The arrests, just hours before an EU of terrorist plots they investigate have recruits into the tribal areas since mid- Summit meeting in Brussels, made ties to Pakistan.7 Those plots included 2006.”13 In February 2009, Director headlines around the world because one a 2006 failed operation to blow up at of National Intelligence Dennis Blair of the six charged by Belgian authorities least seven transatlantic airliners.8 warned that “the primary threat from was “al-Qaìda living legend” Malika Europe-based extremists stems from al- el-Aroud, the widow of the al-Qaìda Governments in continental Europe Qaìda and Sunni affiliates who return operative who assassinated Afghan were more concerned about citizens from training in Pakistan to conduct Northern Alliance Commander Ahmad gaining terrorist knowledge in Iraq and attacks in Europe or the United States.”14 Shah Massoud two days before the North Africa, a function of continental September 11 attacks on the United Europe’s large Arab diaspora. In the Unlike the Iraqi insurgency, fighting 2 States. last year, however, that view has been Americans in Afghanistan does not changing. While travel flows to North seem to have lost its luster for European Belgian authorities accuse her of having Africa still cause serious concern, there militants. It appears that aspiring worked together with her new husband, has been a significant reduction in the recruits have wised up to the notion Moez Garsallaoui, a Tunisian militant, number of European militants traveling that joining AQI means leaping aboard to recruit individuals for training in the to Iraq, a function of al-Qaìda in Iraq’s a rapidly moving conveyor belt for Federally Administered Tribal Areas (AQI) waning fortunes, the extreme suicide bombing.15 3 (FATA) of Pakistan. Police launched barbarism that has tarnished its brand, the arrest operation after three young and a crackdown on cross-border Recruitment Belgian Moroccans allegedly recruited infiltration networks.9 Few plots in The recent Belgian case provides a by el-Aroud and Garsallaoui returned Europe have been tied to returnees from window into how young European 4 from FATA to Belgium. According Iraq.10 Conversely, a growing number of militants are lured to Pakistan’s tribal to Glen Audenaert, the director of the terrorist plots, such as a plot to target areas. Belgian police claim that el-Aroud Belgian Federal Police, “We established the U.S. Ramstein Air Base in Germany and her husband, Moez Garsallaoui, there were contacts between members in September 2007 and a plot to target acted in tandem to encourage individuals of the terrorist organization in Belgium the Barcelona metro in January 2008, to leave Belgium to fight in Afghanistan. and the highest levels of Al Qaeda... have seen operatives train in FATA.11 El-Aroud, they argue, inspired radical- people in direct contact with Mr. Bin leaning youngsters to sign up for 5 Laden.” Alain Grignard, who heads jihad through inflammatory postings counterterrorist operations for the on a website she ran called “Minbar Based on information drawn from Belgian Federal Police, said that the SOS.” Garsallaoui, for his part, toured interviews with senior U.S. and Belgian mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan Brussels’ immigrant neighborhoods to counterterrorism officials, lawyers have replaced Iraq as the destination physically recruit people.16 involved in the case, and some of the suspects themselves, this article sheds 6 It is estimated that there are more than one million During an interview for CNN three new light on the “terror pipeline” people in the United Kingdom of Pakistani ancestry. years ago, el-Aroud explained how she connecting Europe and FATA in the 7 Duncan Gardham, “MI5 Chief Warns of Threat from administered Minbar SOS, her French context of the alleged Belgian cell. Global Recession,” Daily Telegraph, January 8, 2009. language website. The website included 8 Senior U.S. officials stated that several of the airline postings of attacks on U.S. troops in plotters trained in FATA. See Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, “Inside the Terror Plot 12 Robertson and Cruickshank. 1 Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “Belgian ‘Al Qae- that Rivaled 9/11,” NBC, September 15, 2008. 13 J. Michael McConnell, “Annual Threat Assessment of da Cell’ Linked to 2006 Airline plot,” CNN, February 13, 9 Elaine Sciolino, “Fears of Iraq Becoming a Terror- the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select 2009; “Terrorisme: un Franco-Tunisien mis en examen ist Incubator Seem Overblown French Say,” New York Committee on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate Select Commit- pour ses liens présumés avec une filière afghane,” Agence Times, April 8, 2008; Karen DeYoung, “Fewer Foreign- tee on Intelligence, February 5, 2008. France-Presse, December 15, 2008. ers Crossing Into Iraq from Syria to Fight,” Washington 14 Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the 2 The six individuals were charged with “participation Post, September 16, 2007. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee in a terrorist group.” For an in-depth profile of Malika el- 10 Ibid. on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intel- Aroud, see Paul Cruickshank, “Love in the Time of Ter- 11 Souad Mekhennet and Michael Moss, “Europeans Get ligence, February 12, 2009. ror,” Marie Claire, March 2009. Terror Training Inside Pakistan,” New York Times, Sep- 15 Personal interview, Alain Grignard, head of counter- 3 Robertson and Cruickshank. tember 10, 2007; Elaine Sciolino, “Terror Threat from terrorist operations for the Belgian Federal Police, Au- 4 Ibid. Pakistan said to Expand,” New York Times, February 10, gust 2008. 5 Ibid. 2008. 16 Robertson and Cruickshank. april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4

Iraq, along with a section dedicated to Garsallaoui’s recruiting was not North Waziristan.29 Beyayo later told the speeches of top al-Qaìda leaders.17 restricted to Belgium. He also recruited his lawyer that he was amazed at the By the end of 2008, the site had more two French subscribers to Minbar lack of controls and how easy it was to than 1,400 subscribers.18 Authorities SOS who for legal reasons can only be enter the area.30 in Belgium, however, could do little to identified by their initials H.A. and prevent el-Aroud from administering W.O.24 W.O. claimed he was arrested by Beyayo’s and W.O.’s accounts of their the site due to strong freedom of speech Turkish police in the summer of 2008 time in FATA, where they stayed for protections under Belgian law.19 after he tried to return to Europe from much of 2008, provide a rare glimpse into FATA. When he was later interrogated the terrorist safe haven. Their accounts According to Grignard, websites such by French authorities, he provided suggest that jihadist networks in FATA as Minbar SOS function as recruiting an extremely detailed account of his have relatively loose organizational grounds for terrorist operatives who journey to the tribal areas of Pakistan. structures, a view shared by American use them to identify individuals willing During the interrogation, W.O. stated and Belgian counterterrorism officials.31 to fight jihad. “It’s a good way to get that “calls to jihad” on Minbar SOS were In the 1980s and 1990s, several jihadist people together and then establish a “incessant” and the video propaganda groups, including al-Qaìda, had more secret dialogue with people that he viewed on the site made him want to organizational structures in place, are interesting to the organization,” he volunteer. mainly centered around Peshawar, to explained.20 Belgian counterterrorism process arriving volunteers. Yet when officials said that monitoring her Travel to FATA the Belgian and French recruits crossed website helped identify the presence of In December 2007, Garsallaoui’s into the tribal areas in early 2008, they a recruiting network for Afghanistan.21 recruits gathered in Istanbul, Turkey. received no such greeting. Nobody There were six in total. Two from France knew who they were.32 Although their El-Aroud’s iconic status appears to have and four from Belgium,25 including smuggler introduced them to individuals attracted Hicham Beyayo, 23, one of Beyayo and two friends who lived linked to the “Arab camp” in FATA, they the young Belgian Moroccans arrested on his square in Anderlecht, Ali el- were initially met with open suspicion.33 in the case, who became a Minbar SOS Ghanouti and Y. Harrizi.26 Garsallaoui’s Eventually, however, they were able to site administrator before traveling plan was to bribe smugglers to take persuade their interlocutors of their to Pakistan.22 Beyayo claims that them illegally across the Iranian and jihadist bona fides. The fact that they Garsallaoui recruited him to fight jihad Pakistani borders to FATA. Garsallaoui were reunited with Garsallaoui, their in Afghanistan. Christophe Marchand, instructed each of the recruits to bring recruiter, on January 13, presumably Beyayo’s lawyer, said that his client 2,000 euros for this purpose; he himself helped in this regard. For the next was approached by Garsallaoui in a was carrying a significantly larger sum several months, a Syrian operative by mosque near his home in Anderlecht, in cash.27 Garsallaoui set off first and the name of “Driss” was their principle a tough immigrant neighborhood, and the others followed two weeks later. handler.34 that el-Aroud’s husband persuaded him They eventually arrived in Zahedan in to travel to Afghanistan to fight against eastern Iran, a border town described A senior counterterrorism source with Americans to restore the Taliban to by the French recruit W.O. as a key detailed knowledge of the investigation power. Garsallaoui allegedly emphasized staging point for militants traveling to told the author that during Garsallaoui’s that jihad in Afghanistan was a religious fight in the Afghan-Pakistan war zone.28 time in the Afghan-Pakistan border duty and also cast the fighting in heroic From there, smugglers took them across region, he developed close connections and glamorous tones.23 the Pakistani border into the tribal with a senior al-Qaìda operative who areas, which they entered on January orchestrated the 2006 airline plot in the 10, 2008, transiting through Bannu, United Kingdom. The source could not a district that borders both South and reveal the al-Qaìda operative’s name 17 Personal interviews, Malika el-Aroud and Moez because of the ongoing investigation. Garsallaoui, Guin, Switzerland, February 2006. For the Separately, Belgian counterterrorism video of Malika el-Aroud demonstrating her website, see 24 Details of W.O.’s interrogation by French authorities officials believe that Garsallaoui was Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “One Woman’s in January and February 2009 were made available to the main link between the Belgian cell 35 War,” CNN, February 10, 2009. the author by Christophe Marchand, Hicham Beyayo’s and al-Qaìda. 18 This figure is based on the author’s own monitoring of lawyer. Under Belgian law, defense attorneys can make el-Aroud’s website, Minbar SOS. Many more individuals public details of the legal case against their clients in the 29 Ibid. presumably regularly accessed the site. interests of their defense. 30 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, 19 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism offi- 25 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga- February 2009. cials, Brussels, January and February 2009. tion. 31 Personal interview, Belgian intelligence official, -De 20 Personal interview, Alain Grignard, head of counter- 26 Gilbert Dupont, “Les six du réseau kamikaze,” La cember 2008; Personal interview, U.S. counterterrorism terrorist operations for the Belgian Federal Police, Feb- Dernière Heure, December 13, 2008; Personal interviews, official, March 2009. ruary 2009. Belgian counterterrorism officials, Brussels, January and 32 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, 21 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism offi- February 2009. Ali el-Ghanouti and Y. Harrizi were also February 2009. cials, Brussels, January and February 2009. charged in the case. 33 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga- 22 Robertson and Cruickshank. 27 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interrogation. 23 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, lawyer for tion. 34 Ibid. Hicham Beyayo, Brussels, February 2009. 28 Ibid. 35 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism offi- april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4

W.O., the French recruit, stated that it inside a residence. They received suspected jihadists to the Americans.46 “the Arab camp” was for all intents both religious instruction and military The accounts corroborate a recent and purposes run by al-Qaìda. He said training from Egyptian and Syrian judgment by U.S. intelligence agencies that the Arab camp was the smallest instructors. Their military trainer that the strikes, intensified in the grouping of foreign fighters in FATA taught them how to assemble weapons, second half of 2008, have put significant with about 300 to 400 recruits, mostly fire rocket launchers, and how to handle pressure on al-Qaìda in FATA.47 from Saudi Arabia but some from explosives. He even set off a small charge other parts of the Middle East and of TNT in demonstration, telling them Communications with Europe North Africa.36 According to W.O., al- that the explosive was used to attack The case reveals that terrorist operatives Qaìda’s fighters and zones where they U.S. convoys in Afghanistan and in in the Afghan-Pakistan border region conducted training were spread out suicide vests. They each had to pay 400 can maintain contact with the outside across North and South Waziristan for euros for the course, which included world relatively easily. Garsallaoui, for security reasons. W.O. stated that al- rent for the dwelling. This illustrates example, was in regular e-mail contact Qaìda’s military commander at the time the degree of self-motivation and self- with his wife, Malika el-Aroud, from of their arrival was Abu Laith al-Libi. organization that can be required in the Afghan-Pakistan border region, Abu Laith was killed by a U.S. missile recruits traveling to FATA. and sometimes even by Skype.48 He also strike in the tribal areas in late January periodically tuned in to the forums on 2008.37 As for Bin Ladin, the “overall W.O. described the training as “an his wife’s website Minbar SOS, even commander,” W.O. was told by their enrollment amongst the Taliban and sending an e-mail from Afghanistan handler Driss that it was “impossible to Al Qaeda.” According to his account, explaining why he was fighting jihad.49 approach” him.38 Pakistani Taliban fighters mixed freely with al-Qaìda operatives in FATA, One of the e-mails Garsallaoui sent According to W.O., the Belgian and illustrating the close connections to his wife, intercepted by U.S. French recruits were asked to fill out a between the two groups. According counterterrorism agencies in the first contract by their handlers, illustrating to both W.O. and Beyayo, most of half of 2008, contained a photograph that al-Qaìda’s penchant for paperwork the Belgian and French jihadists of himself firing a rocket launcher has remained intact over the years.39 never received “approval” to fight somewhere in the Afghanistan- The three page form, which they signed, in Afghanistan. During the next few Pakistan border region.50 The picture, included questions on their marriage months, they moved from dwelling to later posted on el-Aroud’s website, was status, health, criminal convictions, and dwelling in the mountains of North and clearly useful for propaganda purposes. whether or not they wanted to become South Waziristan, frustrated at being Garsallaoui, posing in a “Rambo” like suicide bombers.40 It also set out precise kept away from the fighting over the stance, was glamorizing the fighting. rules for their conduct in FATA such border. Garsallaoui, according to both In June, Garsallaoui sent el-Aroud as the need to unquestioningly obey accounts, eventually received approval an e-mail claiming to have killed five orders. They were told that they would to fight in Afghanistan.42 W.O. stated Americans in Afghanistan.51 According be punished if they failed to adhere to that he was surprised by the lack of to W.O., Garsallaoui told him when they the contract.41 large groupings of fighters in the tribal met in July in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, areas. Al-Qaìda propaganda led him to that he had killed the Americans by According to the interrogation report, believe that fighters lived in groupings firing a bazooka on a U.S. camp near the W.O. stated that early on in their stay, of more than 50 in an area; the reality Pakistani border.52 their group, with the exception of was that fighters were grouped together Beyayo who had fallen ill, completed in units of 10 or less.43 a two week training course, much of During his time in FATA, Beyayo claims 46 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga- cials, Brussels, January and February 2009. he had to move frequently to avoid tion. 36 W.O. stated that the largest group of foreign fighters being targeted by U.S. Predator drones. 47 Director of National Intelligence Blair testified in Feb- in FATA was from East Turkestan in northwest China. The strikes had a reputation in jihadist ruary 2009 that “in the FATA Al Qaeda lost significant 44 He also stated that there were two Uzbek groups operat- circles of being “very effective.” parts of its command structure since 2008 in a succes- ing in FATA numbering a total of around 3,000 fighters, Garsallaoui was almost hit by such sion of blows as damaging to the group as any since the and two Kurdish groups. a strike, according to an intercepted fall of the Taliban in late 2001.” 45 37 “U.S. Officials: CIA Kills Top Al Qaeda Terrorist in e-mail he sent his wife. The French 48 Skype is an online communication website widely Pakistan,” CNN, January 31, 2008. and Belgian recruits were told not to used around the world to make telephone calls by using 38 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga- venture outside their dwellings because Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology. tion. spies would pass on the coordinates of 49 This information is based on the author’s own moni- 39 In the years before 9/11, al-Qaìda required recruits to toring of el-Aroud’s website, Minbar SOS. According to fill out copious amounts of paperwork. See Peter Bergen, private Belgian counterterrorism sources, his e-mail was The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral history of Al Qaeda’s 42 Ibid.; Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, intercepted by U.S. counterterrorism agencies. Leader (Washington, D.C.: Free Press, 2006). Brussels, February 2009. 50 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism offi- 40 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga- 43 Ibid. cials, Brussels, January and February 2009. tion. The contract did not have the insignia of any par- 44 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, 51 Robertson and Cruickshank. ticular militant group. February 2009. 52 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga- 41 Ibid. 45 Ibid. tion. april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4

On September 26, 2008, Garsallaoui conditions, and bouts of sickness.62 urged attacks in Europe in an online W.O., for his part, claimed that he statement on Minbar SOS. “The solution grew frustrated with his handlers’ my brothers and sisters is not fatwas repeated demands of payment.63 Belgian but boooooooms,” the posting stated. authorities, however, insist that the His communication demonstrated al- alleged cell was a potential national Qaìda’s ability to instigate violence security threat. All those charged deny in the West from the Afghan-Pakistan the allegations against them and are border region.53 set to face trial within the next year.64 Garsallaoui is still at large and believed Return to Belgium to be operating around the tribal areas In the fall of 2008, Belgian security of Pakistan, which is of great concern to services were placed on alert after Belgian counterterrorism officials.65 el-Ghanouti and Harrizi, Beyayo’s friends from Anderlecht, returned Conclusion from FATA.54 On December 4, Beyayo The Belgian case illustrates the returned to Belgium.55 The trigger continuing danger posed by al-Qaìda’s for the arrests was an e-mail sent by safe haven in FATA and the urgent Beyayo three days later,56 intercepted need to tackle it. Accounts by those who by U.S. counterterrorism agencies,57 traveled there do, however, suggest suggesting he had received the go- that the CIA’s increased use of Predator ahead for an operation in Belgium.58 “It strikes have put pressure on the was impossible for Belgian authorities Taliban and al-Qaìda in FATA. While at this stage to take any risk,” said the Belgian and U.S. intelligence agencies director of Belgian intelligence.59 successfully tracked the Belgian cell, the increased numbers of Europeans On December 11, a week after Beyayo’s traveling to FATA will require intensified return, police rounded up the alleged efforts by Western intelligence agencies cell, including Malika el-Aroud. Yet to track recruiting networks. “The when police raided 16 properties in big task for secret services,” stressed Brussels and Liège, they found little Winants, is to “identify the network by evidence of an imminent attack.60 which these people leave, where they Beyayo’s lawyer, Marchand, said that got the logistical support to go there, the e-mail that triggered the arrests and what they intend to do when they was just “tough” talk sent to an impress come back.”66 an ex-girlfriend and disputed the notion that the group may have been Paul Cruickshank is a Fellow at the NYU a “sleeper cell” sent back to Europe Center on Law and Security and the after deliberately being held back from Author of Al Qaeda: The Current Threat. the front lines.61 Beyayo told him he His reporting on al-Qaìda has appeared returned to Belgium because he was in The New Republic, the Washington frustrated at not being able to fight in Post and on NBC and CNN. In February Afghanistan, the uncomfortable living 2009, CNN aired “One Woman’s War,” a documentary Mr. Cruickshank produced 53 This information is based on the author’s own moni- on the alleged Belgian terrorist cell, toring of Minbar SOS. reported by CNN Senior International 54 Dupont. Correspondent Nic Robertson. 55 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, February 2009. 56 Ibid. 57 Jean-Pierre Stroobants, “La cible visée par le groupe belge démantelé n’a pas été identifiée,”Le Monde, Decem- 62 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, New York, ber 18, 2008. April 2009. 58 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism offi- 63 During his interrogation, W.O. said his handlers cials, Brussels, January and February 2009. behaved like “hustlers.” He claimed that in addition to 59 Personal interview, Alain Winants, director of Bel- charging 400 euros for training, they charged 900 euros gium’s State Security Service, Brussels, February 2009. per person for equipment and weapons. 60 According to Belgian counterterrorism sources, no 64 Robertson and Cruickshank. explosives, firearms, or attack blueprints were recov- 65 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism offi- ered. cials, Brussels, January and February 2009. 61 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, 66 Personal interview, Alain Winants, director of Bel- February 2009. gium’s State Security Service, Brussels, February 2009.