SPRING 2012 Number 1
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NumberSPRING 1 201- 20132 Quarterly YEAR XI - NUMBER 1 - 2013 CeMiSS Quarterly is a review supervised by CeMiSS director, Major General Eduardo Centore. It provides a forum to promote the knowledge and understanding of international security affairs, military strategy and other topics of significant interest. The opinions and conclusions expressed in the articles are those of the contributors and do not necessa- rily reflect the position of the Italian Ministry of Defence. SommarioSummary South Eastern Europe Ten years after the Thessaloniki Declaration. For the Balkans the worst is not over yet. Enza Roberta Petrillo 5 Middle East and North Africa Hassan Rowhani elected as President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Nicola Pedde 13 Sahel – Sub-Saharan Africa The War of Mali Marco Massoni 19 Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia The air base at Manas (Kyrgyzstan): legal status and surroundings Lorena Di Placido 25 China Neo-traditionalists and neo-constitutionalists Nunziante Mastrolia 31 3 India – Indian Ocean Indian SEZs and the Global Financial Crisis Claudia Astarita 37 Pacific (Japan, Korea, ASEAN and Australia) Nuclear Korea: the reasons behind the bomb and the difficult way ahead Stefano Felician Beccari 43 Latin America Pope Francis: vision and geo-political implications of an election Alessandro Politi 49 Europeans Defence Initiatives More Italy in Europe, more europe in the european Defence industry Claudio Catalano 57 NATO – Transatlantic Relations Reasons for, and perspectives on, the cancellation of the Fourth Phase of the Euro- pean Phased Adaptive Approach Lucio Martino 63 Focus War ends: new military Mission to afghanistan. Between negotiate and strategic interests Claudio Bertolotti 69 Building competences in a real world context V. Adm (res) Mario Rino Me 73 Quarterly Military Center for Strategic Studies Department of International Relations Palazzo Salviati Piazza della Rovere, 83 00165 – ROME - ITALY tel. 00 39 06 4691 3204 fax 00 39 06 6879779 e-mail [email protected] Editing grafico a cura di Massimo Bilotta Year XI - Number I - 2013 South Eastern Europe TEN YEARS AFTER THE THESSALONIKI DECLARATION. FOR THE BALKANS THE WORST IS NOT OVER YET. Enza Roberta Petrillo In June 2003, the member states of the European Union together with the leaders of the Western Balkan countries reached an agreement on the Thessaloniki Declaration1. In this joint statement, the EU established the “European Perspective” of the Western Balkan countries making a solid commitment to accept the countries ready for the EU membership, judging each on its own value. The Thessaloniki Summit also marked the shift of the EU’s approach from the “security-focused” post-conflict stabilization, to the “enlargement-focused” European integration. Ten years after, the Western Balkans remains the only area of Europe’s geographical core yet to be incorporated into the EU. For these countries, it is mostly a question of how rapidly they can achieve the Copenhagen Criteria2. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Thessaloniki Declara- tion, looking at the accomplishments so far and the challenges encountered by EU and Balkans countries in facing the Thessaloniki Agenda, this analysis assesses the current state of play of the enlargement process, examining ways to revitalize it, and discussing the foreseeable scenarios resulting from the slowing down of the expansion process. What point is the enlargement process at? Till 2003 the EU experienced deep disagreement over its foreign policy in the Western Balkans- Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (FYROM), Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo-. To secure a common path, at the end of 2003 it converged on the “European Security Strategy”3, the first attempt at defining a common set of guidelines for foreign policy based on the combination of democracy and security. Its emphasis on supporting democratic change in the EU’s peripheries as the best means to guarantee Europe’s security, was influenced by the EU’s experience in the previous decade with enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and in dealing with conflicts in the Balkans. 1 Eu-Western Balkans Summit Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm. 2 European Council in Copenaghen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC- 93-3_en.htm?locale=en . 3 European Union, 12 December 2013, European Security Strategy, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf 5 Year XI - Number I - 2013 South Eastern Europe On these bases, the Thessaloniki Agenda sets in detail the EU approach in preparing the countries of the region for EU accession, confirming the Stabilization and Association Process launched at the EU-Western Balkans summit in 2000 as the framework for the “European course of the West- ern Balkan countries, all the way to their future accession” 4. This statement cleared the way for a wide range of tangible initiatives aiming at integrating the Western Balkans in the EU. A decade later, the EU is dealing with three different categories of countries in the region. Where- as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are still considered as “potential” candidates for EU membership, the former Yugoslav Republic of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FY- ROM), Montenegro and Serbia have made a step forward in the enlargement process and have been officially granted candidate status by the European Council. As an acceding country, Croatia is going to be the 28th member of the EU in July 2013, becoming the latest example of the EU’s transformative power in the region5. Are -as observed- “these developments an additional confirmation of the continued attraction of EU accession, despite the current adverse economic climate in the EU”6? Look at the facts. With Croatia joining the Union on July 1st, the membership perspective that was given to the states of the region, a decade earlier finally becomes effective for one of them. On the other hand the pre-accession process with the other countries is struggling, also due to the unsatisfactory performances of Romania and Bulgaria, whose accession in 2007 is widely per- ceived as having been carried out too quickly and without an adequate preparation especially con- cerning the rule of law and anti-corruption reforms. With these premises not surprising that five years after their membership, both countries are still subject to the “Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM)”, an instrument expressly designed to ensure the progress with judicial re- form, and the fight against corruption and organized crime. These structural problems, together with the sudden increase of the euro-zone’s economic crisis, have led to a significant review of the means and tools of EU policy in the Western Balkans7. Even though it is quite obvious that with the future of the euro – and definitely of the Union – hanging in the balance, new enlargement rounds are not on the top of the EU members’ agenda, it is undeniable that the EU action towards the Balkans has never completely stopped. Rather, as wittily pointed out by the Central European Policy Institute8, the EU enlargement in 2013 might set aside some news: a good and a bad one. If the good news is that the euro crisis has not killed the enlargement process, the bad news is that the first EU enlargement since the euro crisis will be also the last in this decade. Croatia, the first EU country with a recent inheritance of war and extensive ethnic violence, is an 4 See Eu-Western Balkans Summit Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm. 5 For an exhaustive analysis see E. Prifti (ed.), 2013, The European Future of Western Balkans, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris . 6 E. Fouèrè, 16 May 2013, Thessaloniki ten years on: Injecting momentum into the enlargement process for the Western Balkans, CEPS Commentary. 7 The increasing mistrust among member states is well described by the recent choice to link Bulgaria and Romania’s entry into the Schengen area to their progress on the CVM. 8 M. Nič, 17 April 2013, The EU’s role in the Western Balkans after Croatian accession, CEPI, http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/ eus-role-western-balkans-after-croatian-accession . 6 Year XI - Number I - 2013 South Eastern Europe exceptional case. To gain the membership, Zagreb not only massively reformed its rule of law but also drastically subverted its political overture: it stopped perturbing Bosnian state building, allowed the return of Croatian Serb refugees, engaged the Serb minority party into the govern- ment coalition and completed the extradition of the war criminals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). If it is true that these turns would not have been possible without the European perspective, it is also evident that only the acceleration for the membership negotiations is not enough to push the resting applicant countries on the path of the reforms needed . Taking into account this, the question is how the EU’s transformative power can be used for the other Balkans countries, and how this unfinished task can be kept on the EU’s political and geo- political agenda at a time when the economic crisis and the euro-skepticism among the member states hit daily the perspective of the enlarged Europe. What for now is sure, is that after the last enlargement round, the EU will not accept any states with a weak rule of law and problems on the side of judicial system, corruption and organized crime. The lessons learnt from Romanian and Bulgarian memberships have underlined the importance of placing the rule of law at the heart of the enlargement policy. On these bases a new approach to negotiations in the area of judiciary and fundamental rights and on justice, freedom and security was proposed in last year’s strategy paper9 and endorsed by the Council.