Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA
RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE
Research Response Number: CHN35420 Country: China Date: 30 September 2009
Keywords: China – Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region – Uighurs – July 2009 riots – State protection – Women – Children – Employment – Separatist movements – Freedom of religion – Returnees – Rebiyeh Kadeer
This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein.
Questions
1. After the events of 5-7 July 2009 in Urumqi in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), how are Uighurs in XUAR being treated by Han Chinese residents and by the authorities? Are all Uighurs at risk of harm, or only those with certain profiles? 2. If Uighurs are being mistreated and discriminated against by Han Chinese because of their ethnicity, are the authorities taking measures to protect them? 3. Would a Uighur woman whose family members have a political profile relating to East Turkestan separatist movements and the 1962 demonstrations in Ghulja be at greater risk of harm? 4. How would the authorities treat an unemployed woman or girls if they were discovered praying at home or observing any other Muslim religious practice in private at home? 5. How would an unemployed woman or girls be treated if they were discovered going to the mosque or observing any other religious practice (eg celebrating Ramadan or Eid) in public? 6. What is the likelihood of a Uighur woman being arrested, detained and tortured upon return to China if the Chinese authorities were aware of her attending meetings with Rebiyeh Kadeer in Australia?
RESPONSE
1. After the events of 5 -7 July 2009 in Urumqi in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), how are Uighurs in XUAR being treated by Han Chinese residents and by the authorities? Are all Uighurs at risk of harm, or only those with certain profiles?
The information provided in response to this question is presented under the following four headings:
Summary of violence and demonstrations in July and September 2009; Profile of those detained/arrested in the aftermath of the 5-7 July demonstrations; Reports of harm against Uighurs by Han Chinese residents; Reports on protests and events in Ghulja City (Yining), Ili (Yili) Prefecture.
Summary of violence and demonstrations in July and September 2009:
The violent demonstrations beginning Sunday 5 July 2009 in Urumqi developed from a protest by Uighurs against the government for its perceived failure to protect two Uighur factory workers reportedly killed by Han workers in Guangdong in late June 2009. Uighur sources state that the protest was peaceful and became violent only after police fired on the crowd; the government described the demonstration as a riot in which property and innocent people were attacked. There is evidence that the demonstration included and was closely associated with college and university students, and may have been initially organised through the Internet. Estimates of the number of protestors vary from 1,000 to 10,000; with approximately 20,000 Chinese security forces present by late Sunday evening. The violence involved Uighurs attacking Han, Han attacking Uighur, as well as the actions of security forces. The Chinese government publicly blamed the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), led by Rebiya Kadeer, for orchestrating the violence and demonstration; and initially announced that 156 people had died and 1,000 were injured. The exact number remains unknown. Later government figures indicated that 137 Han, 46 Uighur and 1 Hui died. Smaller protests were also reported in other cities in Xinjiang, including Kashgar and Hoten. Two days later on 7 July 2009, Han protestors marched in the streets of Urumqi with clubs, knives, axes, hammers and other weapons but were reportedly dispersed by the police. On 7 July 2009 the government announced that 1,379 men and 55 women had been detained following the 5-7 July events; that checkpoints had been set up in the city and neighbouring areas to prevent suspects from fleeing. Tight security measures had been implemented in cities throughout XUAR, including armed vehicles in Ghulja and house-by-house searches in Kashgar. Authorities believed that those behind the demonstrations may have also come from Kashgar and Hoten districts. By 7 July 2009, the government had begun to introduce restrictions on internet and telephone access to the area; and restricted the work of journalists in fully covering the initial and subsequent events. Reporters were expelled from Kashgar on 10 July 2009. On Friday 10 July 2009 the government attempted to close some mosques in Urumqi but others remained open there and in other cities. By mid-September 2009, government news agencies had reported the criminal detention of approximately 825 people and approval by the procuratorate to formally arrest an initial 237 people. Government officials stated that those ―not deeply‖ involved in the demonstrations, and who did not cause physical injury to property or persons, would be detained, reeducated and required to repent, with possible further surveillance or supervision. Some of those detained reportedly appeared to have no involvement in the events of 5 July (this information is given in three summaries of events compiled by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) reports: Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009, ‗Xinjiang Authorities Forcefully Suppress Demonstration, Restrict Free Flow of Information‘, 6 August http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=125582 – Accessed 21 September 2009 – Attachment 1; Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009, ‗Authorities Pledge Crackdown Following Xinjiang Demonstration and Clashes‘, 6 August http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=125931 – Accessed 21 September 2009 – Attachment 2; Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009, ‗Xinjiang Authorities Continue Detentions, Announce Arrests Connected to July 5 Incident‘, 14 September http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=128326 – Accessed 21 September 2009 – Attachment 3).
The Congressional-Executive Commission on China report of 6 August 2009 gives the following summary of the official accounts of Guangdong Factory attacks against Uighurs on 26 June 2009 which triggered the July events. Two main official versions of the events appear to have been presented: one that the attack was caused by ―a fake rumor on the Internet claiming six men from the XUAR had raped two women at the factory‖, and that those spreading the rumour had been detained; the other that a female factory worker entered a dormitory for workers from the XUAR, was teased, reported the incident to her co-workers, who then ―went to the Xinjiang workers‘ dorm, where ―emotions became agitated‖ and a ―fight broke out‖:
Uyghurs demonstrating in Urumchi were protesting government handling of a reported attack on Uyghur workers in late June by Han workers at a factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong province, also described in Chinese sources as a brawl among the workers. According to a June 29 report from Xinhua (via china.org.cn), a ―mass brawl‖ broke out on June 26 after a factory worker upset over not being rehired for a job posted what Xinhua described as a fake rumor on the Internet claiming six men from the XUAR had raped two women at the factory. Police took the factory worker into detention for posting the rumor, Xinhua reported. ―Police found no rape cases at the Xuri Toy Factory,‖ according to the article, which also reported that two workers from Xinjiang had died and 118 were injured in the brawl. A Uyghur factory worker who was an eyewitness to the event reported than Han factory workers instigated the attack when they entered a dormitory for Uyghur workers, according to a July 5 RFA report. Following the attack, authorities sequestered Uyghur factory workers, according to the report. (See also a June 29 RFA report for additional information.) A June 30 China Daily article said that roughly ―600 Uygur workers were sent from the factory to temporary accommodations after the incident.‖ A Guangdong provincial official pledged to pursue the people who had murdered the two Uyghur workers, according to a June 26 report on Nanfang Net, though no information was immediately available on the investigation. Overseas Uyghur rights organizations have criticized the government for failing to take steps to stop the attack and for its lack of transparency in handling the matter. See, e.g., a June 29 press release from the Uyghur American Association and July 1 press release from the World Uyghur Congress. A public security official from Shaoguan reported on July 7 that authorities detained 13 people-- including ―three natives of Xinjiang‖--for their role in the ―massive fight,‖ according to a Xinhua report from that day. In addition, authorities detained two people for ―spreading rumors on the Web that Xinjiang employees had raped two female workers,‖ according to the report.
Following the July 5 Urumchi demonstration, Xinhua reported that XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri attributed the July 26 Shaoguan incident to a Uyghur worker‘s attack of a Han Chinese worker. ―The fight was triggered by the sexual assault of a female Han worker by a Uygur coworker, [Nur Bekri] said,‖ according to a July 6 Xinhua report. In a July 6 Chinese-language Xinhua report (via Ta Kung Pao), Nur Bekri said a female factory worker entered a dormitory for workers from the XUAR and was teased by the residents. After she reported the incident to her co-workers, the workers went to the Xinjiang workers‘ dorm, where ―emotions became agitated‖ and a ―fight broke out,‖ according to the report.
…Details of the demonstration and the incident in Guangdong also shed light on ongoing labor rights abuses in the region. The Uyghur factory workers in Guangdong were part of government-organized programs to send laborers in the XUAR to factory jobs in the interior of China, as reported in the June 30 China Daily article. As noted in the CECC 2008 Annual Report, government authorities maintain programs that send young ethnic minorities to work in factories in China‘s interior, where some workers have reported abusive labor conditions. Overseas sources have reported cases of local authorities coercing participation and of factories mistreating workers. In a series of reports from Radio Free Asia in Spring 2009, some girls and women in the program continued to report on abusive labor practices including the use of coercion by local officials to gain their participation and abusive working conditions (‗Xinjiang Authorities Forcefully Suppress Demonstration, Restrict Free Flow of Information‘ 2009, Congressional-Executive Commission on China website, 6 August http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=125582 – Accessed 21 September 2009 – Attachment 1).
Tensions between the Uighur and Han communities in XUAR and the Chinese government further escalated two months later (in early September) as a result of street protests by Han Chinese lasting several days. These protests by Han were against the government‘s inaction in the face of allegedly Uighur ―hit-and-run‖ attacks involving syringes and other sharp objects. These reportedly started on 17 August 2009. These syringe attacks were also linked by the government to Rebiya Kadeer. Security was further tightened as a result; dozens of perpetrators detained and eight charged. On 14 September 2009 three people were sentenced with up to 15 years jail over the attacks (Bezlova, A. 2009, ‗Han Chinese Blame Regional Chief for Xinjiang Unrest‘, Inter Press Service, 8 September 2009 – Attachment 4; ‗The party under siege in Urumqi‘ 2009, The Economist,12 September – Attachment 5; ‗China needle attacks: victims cleared‘, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, source: AFP, 14 September http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/09/14/2685809.htm – Accessed 21 September 2009 – Attachment 6).
Profile of those detained/arrested in the aftermath of the 5-7 July demonstrations:
The initial targets of the authorities in the days following the demonstrations were mainly men and youths. BBC News reported on 7 July 2009 that ―mass arrests have been going on since Sunday‘s clashes. Reports are surfacing that police have been going from house to house, rounding up young men for questioning.‖ Two weeks later, on 20 July 2009, The New York Times indicated that ―in the two weeks since [the] ethnic riots…security forces have been combing the city and detaining hundreds of people, many of them Uighur men whom the authorities blame for much of the slaughter…police response has been indiscriminate‖; and that ―Residents of Xiangyang Po [where some Han were killed] say police officers made two morning sweeps through the neighborhood after the rioting began, randomly grabbing boys as young as 16. That spurred a crowd of anguished women to march to the center of Urumqi to demand the men‘s release. But none of the detainees has come home, the residents say, and the authorities have refused to provide information about their whereabouts‖ (Jacobs, A. 2009, ‗Countering Riots, China Rounds Up Hundreds‘ The New York Times, 20 July http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/world/asia/20xinjiang.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all – Accessed 17 September 2009 – Attachment 7; ‗Angry Uighurs defy Chinese police‘ 2009, BBC News, 7 July http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8137512.stm#map – Accessed 18 September 2009 – Attachment 8; ‗Tight Security in Xinjiang‘ 2009, Radio Free Asia, 7 July http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/security_in_xinjiang-07062009174105.html – Accessed 18 September 2009 – Attachment 9).
Part of the government‘s immediate response to the July events focused on college and university students. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China report of 6 August 2009 states the following on this:
Nur Bekri [XUAR government chairperson] Calls for Heightened Political Consciousness at Colleges, Students Reported To Be Locked Within Campus
Reports indicate that college students were involved in the demonstration that began on July 5 and that had been organized earlier through the Internet. (See, e.g., a July 5 press release by the Uyghur American Association.) Some reports also have indicated that authorities prevented students on some campuses from leaving school grounds on July 5 to prevent their participation in the demonstration. (See, e.g., a July 5 Radio Free Asia article and a July 12 report from Xinhua, discussed below.) The government has reported that some of the people detained in connection to events on July 5 are students, according to a July 8 New York Times article.
The South China Morning Post reported on July 9 (subscription required) that students at the Kashgar Teachers College had been held on campus since early July 5, in an effort to stop the students from participating in protests. (The article noted that many of the Uyghur factory workers in Shaoguan had come from Kashgar district and protestors in Urumchi included people who traveled to the capital city from Kashgar.) Radio Free Asia‘s Uyghur service earlier reported in a July 5 article on the Urumchi demonstration that sources said not many students had participated in the Urumchi demonstration because they had been confined to school campuses for the past three days.
Xinjiang Medical University reported that students and teachers acting under direction from the school effectively had guarded the campus following the July 5 incident, according to a July 12 report from Xinhua. No one from the university participated in the July 5 incident, according to the report. The report said the school learned on July 5 that ―extreme speech‖ was circulating on the Internet about events on June 26 in Shaoguan, Guangdong province, and that a call was circulating on the Internet for ethnic minority students to gather and demonstrate at 8pm on July 5. The school‘s Party committee decided to take ―timely measures,‖ apparently to curb students‘ participation. The article also described beating back an attack by ―thugs‖ on July 7 and said armed riot troops secured the campus‘s safety. A source reported to Radio Free Asia on strife between Han and Uyghur students at the university, according to a July 9 report.
XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri, speaking July 6 at Xinjiang University in Urumchi, called on students and teachers at colleges throughout the region to ―further raise their political consciousness,‖ according to a July 7 Xinhua article. He stressed five points: mobilizing Communist Party committees within colleges for tasks such as ―understanding students‘ ideological situation‖ and ―correctly‖ guiding them; strengthening supervision of students‘ education and implementing ―political and ideological work‖; strengthening propaganda education to increase students‘ and teachers‘ ―conviction in upholding social harmony and stability‖; mobilizing ―model‖ ethnic minority cadres and teachers; and ―mastering the bounds of policy and isolating and attacking enemies to the largest degree‖ (Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009,‗Authorities Pledge Crackdown Following Xinjiang Demonstration and Clashes‘, 6 August http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=125931 – Accessed 21 September 2009 – Attachment 2).
Women were also detained during what one report refers to as ―indiscriminate sweeps of Uighur areas‖. On 7 July 2009, The Times Online referred to ―brothers as well as a sister among the suspects taken into police custody for questioning over the riots‖:
Following news that 1,434 people had been arrested for Sunday‘s riots, some 300 Muslim ethnic Uighurs confronted heavily-armed riot police in the city of Urumqi demanding the release of family members they said had been arbitrarily arrested in the crackdown following the weekend bloodshed, which left 156 dead and more than 800 wounded.
One woman, Maliya, said: ―My husband was taken away yesterday by police. They didn‘t say why. They just took him away.‖ Another girl described how her teenage brother was grabbed from his bed in a midnight police raid.
Abdul Ali, a Uighur man in his twenties who had taken off his shirt, held up his clenched fist. ―They‘ve been arresting us for no reason and it‘s time for us to fight back.‖ He said three of his brothers as well as a sister had been among the suspects taken into police custody for questioning over the riots. Local residents complained police were making indiscriminate sweeps of Uighur areas (Macartney, J. 2009, ‗Riot police battle protesters as China‘s Uighur crisis escalates‘, The Times Online, 7 July http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6655225.ece – Accessed 21 September 2009 – Attachment 10)
On 20 July 2009, Rebiya Kadeer issued a statement on the events in Urumchi in an attempt to counter the version presented by the Chinese government. At the time she stated that ―mostly young men and women‖ had attended the initial demonstration; that fleeing protestors were indiscriminately shot by police and others were arrested; that Uighurs at Xinjiang University were fired upon and arrested; and that the ―Chinese government‘s crackdown…on ordinary Uyghurs in East Turkestan is in full swing‖:
The actual events in Urumchi according to eyewitness reports are as follows.
In the days leading up to July 5, an unknown person or persons posted on the forums of China-based websites an appeal to Uyghurs in Urumchi to peacefully protest the Chinese government‘s mishandling of multiple killings of Uyghurs by Han Chinese at a toy factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong province. The forum post surprisingly remained online, which is contrary to the known behavior of Chinese government censors.
On July 5, Uyghurs, mostly young men and women, some of whom carried the flag of the People‘s Republic of China, assembled and marched peacefully in Urumchi toward People‘s Square. They asked for justice for the victims in Shaoguan and expressed sympathy with the families of those killed and injured. They also demanded to meet with government officials but none came out to meet with them.
As the protest was public knowledge, the protestors were met en route by a show of force, including four kinds of Chinese police- regular police; anti-riot police; special police and People‘s Armed Police. The police surrounded the protestors and tensions between police and protestors grew. According to an eyewitness caller to our offices, the protestors were incited by plain clothes agents to respond to the police presence. As tensions became heated, police started beating, kicking, and arresting protestors. Then, under the cover of darkness, Chinese security forces began to fire upon Uyghur protestors.
Protestors fled to other points of the city, where they were forced into several closed areas from which they could not escape. The protestors were indiscriminately shot and killed in these locations, and those remaining were arrested. Reports indicate that Chinese authorities turned off the street lighting in the areas where protestors were present. These reports also describe the possible killing of Han Chinese bystanders in the shootings by Chinese police, which may explain the high numbers of Han Chinese fatalities. That Han Chinese civilians may have been killed by Chinese police must be investigated by independent journalists.
In another phone call to our offices, a protestor at Xinjiang University reported that Uyghurs were being fired upon by Chinese police ―right now‖, and in the background we could hear the screams of people in the vicinity. The caller stated that they could see approximately 50 Uyghurs lying dead from Chinese police shooting in an area around the stop for the number 1 city bus.
On July 11, Reuters quoted a Uyghur resident of Urumchi who said that the official death toll is ―the Han people‘s number. We have our own number…Maybe many, many more Uighurs died. The police were scared and lost control.‖ In that same report, Reuters also stated that ―a spray of bullet holes could be seen on the glass front of a Bank of China office…Many Uighur residents say they heard or saw gunfire.‖ That Chinese security forces used live ammunition in suppressing the protest was confirmed in several calls to our office received on Sunday night from protest participants.
Some Uyghurs reacted to the intimidation of Chinese policing. Uyghurs killed and injured Han Chinese in violent attacks. Here, I would like to say that I strongly condemn the violence which took place in Urumchi.
In the immediate aftermath of the violence, Chinese security forces conducted mass- arrests of Uyghurs, according to sources quoted by Radio Free Asia in a July 9 report. A caller to our offices stated that the dormitories at Xinjiang University were broken into by Chinese police in a bid to arrest Uyghurs deemed to have been involved in the unrest. In a Xinhua report dated July 7, Urumchi Communist Party secretary, Li Zhi, was quoted as saying that authorities had detained 1,434 people for their role in the Urumchi unrest. The World Uyghur Congress contests that number, as it has not been independently verified. A July 19 Financial Times report [ix] states that more than 4,000 Uyghurs have been arrested and that Urumchi‘s prisons are so full that detainees are being held in People‘s Liberation Army warehouses. We fear that these detainees face execution in non- transparent judicial procedures.
In further communications with our offices, Uyghurs reported that some of the Uyghur wounded from July 5 did not go to the hospital for fear of arrest. Those who did go to the hospital reported that they were either turned away or charged for treatment, while Han Chinese victims received assistance free of charge.
…The Chinese government‘s crackdown on ordinary Uyghurs in East Turkestan is in full swing. The July 19 Financial Times report states that Chinese armed police have established checkpoints on all roads in and out of Urumchi and that ―[p]rivate cars without Uighur passengers were waved through after a quick document check for the drivers. Vehicles with Uighur drivers or with Uighur passengers were being searched at gunpoint.‖ The report added that numbers of armed police in the region would be raised to 130,000 by October 1, 2009, the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the People‘s Republic of China (Kadeer, R. 2009, ‗Unrest in East Turkestan: What China is Not Telling the Media‘, World Uyghur Congress website, 20 July http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/news.asp?ItemID=- 946385842&rcid=803688565&pcid=1110134820&cid=803688565&mid=-2139923529 – Accessed 18 September 2009 – Attachment 11).
There are also reports that security forces continued to physically harm protesting Uighurs in the following days. For example, following prayers at a mosque in Urumqi on Friday 10 July 2009 immediately after the initial demonstrations, BBC News reported that ―riot police punched and kicked a small group of Uighurs protesters, who demanded the release of men detained after last Sunday‘s violence‖ (‗China reimposes curfew in Urumqi‘ 2009, BBC News, 10 July http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8144146.stm – Accessed 18 September 2009 – Attachment 12).
Reports of harm against Uighurs by Han Chinese residents:
Random retaliatory attacks against Uighurs occurred in the days following the initial demonstration and violence on 5 July. On 7 July 2009, Radio Free Asia provided the following report on attacks perpetrated by Han. This report also details that the police did take actions to protect Uighurs from Han attackers and disperse the Han crowds:
An angry crowd of several thousand ethnic majority Han Chinese has gathered in Urumqi following weekend riots, amid a welter of rumors surrounding deadly clashes between Muslim Uyghurs and police, according to initial reports from foreign journalists and exiled Uyghur groups overseas.
―Chinese civilians, using clubs, bars, knives, and machetes, are killing the Uyghurs,‖ the Munich-based World Uyghur Congress said in a statement.
―They are storming the university dormitories, Uyghur residential homes, workplaces, and organizations,‖ it said, accusing the mob of killing unprotected Uyghur civilians.
Foreign correspondents on the ground in Urumqi said they saw armed crowds of thousands of Han Chinese running through the capital of the northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).
―Two police officers just escorted a Uyghur woman with a baby through a Han crowd with clubs by the People‘s Theater,‖ Time correspondent Austin Ramzy wrote via the real-time micro-blogging platform Twitter.
Telegraph correspondent Peter Foster reported via Twitter from Urumqi that thousands of armed Han Chinese had gathered near a mosque in Shanxi Alley in downtown Urumqi.
Police tried to calm the crowd, which was armed with ―snooker cues, axes, machetes, baseball bats, metal scaffolding poles, cattle prods, and a plastic mop handle,‖ according to Foster‘s updates.
Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera correspondent Melissa K. Chan tweeted, also from Urumqi, ―A Han Chinese man with a stick just tore open our car door to beat our producer. Averted just in time.‖
Chan said Urumqi was now under martial law. Official media also reported further unrest. Two separate estimates by foreign journalists at the scene put the crowd at around 10,000.
…Chaos and vigilantes
Police fired tear gas repeatedly at the protesters, who refused to disperse. Police were blocking them from getting through to an area of Urumqi populated by Uyghurs, who authorities have blamed for riots on Sunday that left 156 people dead and more than 1,000 injured.
…Back in Urumqi, al-Jazeera‘s Chan tweeted: ―There is no right or wrong anymore. Just vigilantes, Han and [Uyghur]. Mostly men but some women and even children.‖
―I asked a Han Chinese girl if she was scared. ‗Yes, but this is to defend my country,‘ she says with stick in hand.‖
…The Congress statement said: ―[A] Uyghur young man was mutilated on [Urumqi‘s] Dongbeilu. A Uyghur woman who was carrying a baby in her arms was mutilated along with her infant baby on Huanghelu.‖
Witnesses on the ground said the mood of the crowd was ugly, with a group of Han Chinese protesters attacking Telegraph correspondent Foster and his assistant, who were protected by police.
The Uyghur Congress said Chinese security forces were ―not taking any action‖ against the attackers, and that it had received telephone threats from ―ethnic Han Chinese‖ at its headquarters in Munich (‗Armed Mobs Throng Urumqi‘ 2009, Radio Free Asia, 7 July http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/xinjiang-07072009054344.html – Accessed 25 September 2009 – Attachment 13).
In her statement made on 20 July 2009, Kadeer provided the following details on attacks by Han against the Uighur population on 6-7 July:
On July 6-7, 3,000 to 4,000 armed Han Chinese took to the streets attacking and killing Uyghurs. Radio Free Asia reports an eyewitness as seeing 150 to 200 dead Uyghurs in the Hualin district. There have been no reported arrests of Han Chinese from these two days of violence against the Uyghur community in Urumchi. Radio Free Asia reported a Uyghur man as saying that ―[w]hen the Chinese came out with batons and clubs, there is no one to stop them. They are pretending to stop them, but they are not really strict… If the Uyghurs had come out with batons and clubs, they would immediately be fired upon.‖
In a further act of heavy handed policing, on July 13 reports detailed the fatal shooting by Chinese armed police of two unarmed Uyghurs (Kadeer, R. 2009, ‗Unrest in East Turkestan: What China is Not Telling the Media‘, World Uyghur Congress website, 20 July http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/news.asp?ItemID=- 946385842&rcid=803688565&pcid=1110134820&cid=803688565&mid=-2139923529 – Accessed 18 September 2009 – Attachment 11).
On 11 July 2009, The Washington Post also described seemingly random retaliatory attacks against two Uighurs by large groups of Han residents:
In a retaliatory attack against Uighurs on Tuesday, Ali, a 21-year-old Uighur laborer was on his way to his company to collect his salary at 4 p.m. when he was jumped by about 50 people. His fingers were broken, and he suffer a concussion and gashes on this back and legs. The same afternoon, Nuryeraly, 25, was running errands with his brother when someone yell that Uighurs were nearby. Several hundred people then began to beat the brothers. The last thing he heard before he passed out was his brother calling for his mother, who was not there. ―I don‘t know where he is now -- if he is alive or not,‖ he said.
But there were signs of kindness across ethnic lines that has triggered soul-searching.
Ali said that before he was beaten, a Han man begged others in his group not to hit him even as the crowd turned on him and cursed him (Eunjung Cha, A. 2009, ‗Death Toll Debated in China‘s Rioting‘, The Washington Post, 11 July http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/July/11/china11.html – Accessed 21 September 2009 – Attachment 14).
On the 9 September 2009, following the unrest surrounding the syringe attacks in Urumqi, the Radio Free Asia website reported on several attacks by Han residents which appear to target Uighurs with specific profiles. The report describes the beating by a Han Chinese mob of well-known calligrapher and journalist Kaynam Jappar on 3 September 2009 in Urumqi; the death of singer Mirzat Alimon on 2 September 2009 also in Urumqi; and deaths of fourteen other unidentified Uighurs, including two children. The source of these reports states that the deaths of Uyghurs have not been reported on ―anywhere inside China‖:
Two prominent voices on China‘s Internet have called for balance in reporting on recent ethnic violence in the northwestern city of Urumqi.
―I think there are some things which should be made open, and I don‘t think that the news should all be one-sided,‖ UyghurBiz.com Web site manager and ethnic Uyghur economist Ilham Tohti said. ―It needs to be a bit more even-handed,‖ said Tohti, who was himself detained briefly after writing about the reasons behind deadly ethnic strife that erupted in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in July.
…In a bid to publicize non government accounts of the violence, Tohti‘s Web site posted a report from Urumqi detailing the beating by a Han Chinese mob of well-known calligrapher and journalist Kaynam Jappar as he left his home in the regional capital.
The Web site said the incident occurred between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. Sept. 3 outside the Sun, Moon, and Starlight Restaurant near his home. ―He was set upon by six or seven Han Chinese men, and shouted for help,‖ the report said.
―Two security guards from the restaurant saved him ... He had two black eyes and impaired vision and seven stitches in his forehead. He had a fractured kneecap,‖ it added.
Singer‘s death reported
Also in Beijing, Tibetan writer and blogger Woeser said she had posted an account in Chinese of the beating death of Uyghur singer Mirzat Alim. Woeser reported that Alim, 43, died Sept. 2 after being set upon by an armed mob of Han Chinese near his Urumqi home.
―I think that any death of any person from any race, be it Han Chinese or Uyghur, is very sad,‖ said Woeser, whose post also mentioned the beating of Kaynam Jappar in an attempt to bring more balance to coverage online in China. ―I called for interracial understanding on my blog. We haven‘t seen the deaths of ... Uyghurs reported anywhere inside China.‖
Commenters to the blog post said it was being circulated among some prominent Chinese bloggers via the micro-blogging service Twitter. ―I have also explained that we are unable to hear Uyghur voices in China because of a huge amount of suppression and fear,‖ she added.
―That is why I tried to report the news [of Alim‘s death] on my blog.‖
Ilham Tohti said that Alim was a friend of his, but that he had been unable to contact his family for news and that friends had said the singer‘s body was discovered with both eyes gouged out.
Little sympathy
In the report on Kaynam Jappar‘s beating, UyghurBiz.com said the journalist had also seen 14 other Uyghurs in the Autonomous Region No. 2 Hospital who had been injured by Han Chinese mobs, including two children. One person had died of injuries (‗Bloggers Report Beatings, Death‘ 2009, Radio Free Asia, 9 September http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/online-09082009133813.html – Accessed 18 September 2009 – Attachment 15).
Amnesty International also made reference to the detention of the editor of the Uyghur Online website and economics professor at Central Nationalities University in Beijing, Ilham Tohti, stating that:
―A crackdown that extends beyond the XUAR and to people not involved in any protests, much less violence, is not the answer to the unrest,‖ said Rife. ―We urge the authorities to immediately account for Ilham Tohti‘s whereabouts, and ensure that he has not been detained merely for peacefully expressing his opinions.‖
Amnesty International recognizes the duty of the Chinese authorities to ensure the safety of everyone at risk from violence, and their duty to bring to justice those responsible for crimes of violence in the context of the current unrest in Xinjiang.
However, Amnesty International has documented instances where the authorities initiated heavy-handed crackdowns following protests in the region, including in Barren (Chinese: Baren) township in 1990 and in Gulja (Chinese: Yining) city in 1997, resulting in deaths of protestors and thousands of detentions. The organization urges the authorities not to repeat the patterns of past responses and to avoid the use of unnecessary or excessive force in restoring order, allow independent and impartial investigation into the events, and ensure that any trials be conducted fairly, in line with international standards, and without recourse to the death penalty (Amnesty International 2009, ‗China: Authorities widen crackdown after Xinjiang riots‘, 10 July http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/china-authorities-widen- crackdown-after-xinjiang-riots-20090710 – Accessed 21 September 2009 – Attachment 16).
On 8 September 2009, Lucy Hornby posted a blog on the Reuters news website which included information on the rumours then circulating on the streets of Urumqi on the profile of the persons perpetrating the syringe attacks. These were said to include the following categories of people: ―Uighur women, in their distinctive headscarves‖; ―men [who] were targeting Han women and children‖; and ―Uighurs wearing suits‖:
Urumqi was swept by talk of syringe attacks, which the government blamed on separatists, and gripped by a resurgence of racial hatred, two months after 197 people were killed during a riot by Uighurs. Terrified of the mysterious syringe stalkers, Han Chinese took to the streets in disgust and fear to demand more security from the government. Troops were stationed at the entrance to Uighur neighborhoods, to prevent bloodshed by the angry crowds.
The rumors varied with each group clustered on the sidewalks — some versions claimed Uighur women, in their distinctive headscarves, were sticking people with syringes. Others said men were targeting Han women and children. Still another blamed ―Uighurs wearing suits.‖
On Saturday morning, about 20 men huddled around a Chinese man who was busy conveying the story of how a boy had been pricked with a needle, and how troops had prevented the crowd from beating up a nearby Uighur. Then an older man began a litany of complaints about mistreatment by the police and paramilitary. The others nodded in agreement.
The syringe scare was started by a police department text message last Monday, warning residents against attackers with syringes. Based on the indictments so far, some drug addicts had robbed a cab driver by threatening him with a syringe; another tried to fend off police who were trying to rescue them. And then there was a teenager who stuck a needle in a fruit seller‘s buttock.
The government warned of a coordinated separatist attack. The effect of the text message, especially in buses crowded with Urumqi residents who are fearful and suspicious of each other, was panic. Over 500 people have gone to the police saying they were attacked; only 106 of them had a clear mark, bump or rash on their skin, official figures show.
But it‘s not all hysteria. Those 106 people were pricked with something. Xinhua, the state news agency, said some were mosquito bites. But others were indeed injured, albeit slightly. Doctors, who reassured reporters that it was unlikely the attacks could spread AIDS, said that at least some of the verifiable injuries could be pin or sewing needle pricks.
So who is sticking needles into people? Angry copycats who got an idea from that text message? People who want to enjoy the fuss? People who want to arouse tension and strife in Urumqi, the divided city? (Hornby, L. 2009, ‗Reuters Blogs – Changing China: Misinformation age in Urumqi‘, Reuters, 8 September http://blogs.reuters.com/china/2009/09/08/misinformation-age-in-urumqi/ – Accessed 17 September 2009 – Attachment 17).
Reports on protests and events in Ghulja City (Yining), Ili (Yili) Prefecture:
There was unrest and protests in cities other than Urumqi. Hundreds of Uighurs protested outside a mosque in Kashgar on Monday 7 July 2009, and government sources also referred to unrest in the city of Aksu and Yili prefecture (‗Mass arrests over China violence‘ 2009, BBC News, 7 July http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8137432.stm – Accessed 22 September 2009 – Attachment 18).
On 6 and 9 July 2009, Radio Free Asia provided specific information on the situation in Gulja, indicating that armoured and police vehicles patrolled the streets and that armed police blocked the entrance to Ili Teachers‘ College:
Residents of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) report a heavy police and paramilitary presence inside and outside the regional capital, Urumqi, where deadly clashes erupted at the weekend following a protest by ethnic minority Uyghurs.
―The situation in Gulja is so intense right now. I saw armed police everywhere when I went out to buy oil this morning. I saw five armored vehicles patrolling the streets. There are many police cars, patrolling on every street,‖ one man told RFA‘s Uyghur service.
―Military police are stationed in front of every government building and other work units. Since armed police blocked the main entrance to Ili Teachers‘ College, I went home through the back door,‖ he said, adding that officials in the north western XUAR city of Gulja had imposed a curfew.
―They said they are going check every vehicle from other towns. They said it‘s better for us to remain inside,‖ the man said.
…―The information we are getting is that this is sort of spreading,‖ World Uyghur Congress and Uyghur American Association leader Rebiya Kadeer told a news conference at the National Press Club in Washington late Monday.
―We have heard news that in Hotan, in Aksu, in cities like Karamai, there were protests. And because of the tragic event, many people were killed and a lot of families and friends were killed.‖
―So others may have joined in other towns as well to protest,‖ said Kadeer, whom Chinese authorities have blamed for instigating the clashes (‗Tight Security in Xinjiang‘ 2009, Radio Free Asia, 6 July http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/security_in_xinjiang- 07062009174105.html – Accessed 18 September 2009 – Attachment 19).
A 9 July 2009 Radio Free Asia referred to the detention of residents in Yili and that ―police in Gulja recently detained a number of Uyghur youths in an anti-separatism campaign ahead of the sensitive 60th anniversary of communist rule‖:
Chinese security forces imposed an uneasy peace on several major cities in the restive Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Thursday, with residents reporting a heavy security presence in Kashgar and Ili prefectures.
Police and armored vehicles were patrolling the streets of Gulja (in Chinese, Yining), capital of the Ili Kazakh Prefecture, residents said.
…Protests spread
Demonstrations spread out to other Uyghur cities in the region following Sunday‘s deadly riots in Urumqi in which at least 156 people died and 1,080 were injured.
One Uyghur man who called a listener hotline said more than 300 people gathered around Kashgar‘s Id Kah Mosque, Guze district, and People‘s Square to demonstrate, but were quickly dispersed by security forces.
He said police were currently conducting house-to-house searches in the city. Detentions have been reported by residents in Yili, Dawan, and Tianshan.
Official media reported that tourism had been hit by the recent unrest, saying some travel agencies had canceled trips to Ili and Kashgar.
Police in Gulja recently detained a number of Uyghur youths in an anti-separatism campaign ahead of the sensitive 60th anniversary of communist rule, sources in the region said.
Overseas rights groups say untold numbers of people were killed in anti-China protests in Gulja in February 1997, in a crackdown that went largely unnoticed by the outside world (‗Clampdown on Uyghur Cities‘ 2009, Radio Free Asia, 9 July http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/clampdown-07092009101424.html – Accessed 18 September 2009 – Attachment 20).
Tension between authorities and Uighurs in the Qorghas [in Chinese, Huocheng] county of Ili prefecture was reported on several weeks later by Radio Free Asia on 19 September 2009. Villagers were protesting against police seeking the early burial of a man who was among some forty men from Qorghas detained around the time of the 5 July protests, and who had been transferred from Urumqi to Qorghas county jail:
In China‘s tense Xinjiang region, could a suspicious death spark more ethnic violence?
Relatives of a man who died in police custody in China‘s remote Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region are in a tense standoff with authorities over their demand for an inquiry into how he died, villagers and the local police chief said. One villager, contacted by telephone, said eight trucks of soldiers and two other armed vehicles had surrounded the man‘s family home in Lengger [in Chinese, Langan] village in Qorghas [in Chinese, Huocheng] county, Ili prefecture.
Surrounding streets were blockaded, and another witness said police told him to remain inside when he tried to walk several blocks to Tursun‘s family home. ―The police are asking us to bury the body early in the morning, otherwise they said they will bury him themselves,‖ Haji Memet, a relative of Shohret Tursun, 31, said. ―We want to find out how he was killed.‖
―We are asking the authorities to investigate—we want photos taken of his bruised body, we want justice, we want whoever killed our son to be punished,‖ he said. Police returned Tursun‘s body to his family at 2 p.m. Saturday, relatives said.
Deadly violence
Tursun, a member of the Uyghur ethnic minority, was among some 40 men from Qorghas detained around the time of deadly protests July 5 in the regional capital, Urumqi.
…Badly disfigured
The Langer police chief, who identified himself as Enver, said police were trying to convince the family to bury Tursun early Sunday. The village imam, Alim Kari, described Tursun‘s body as badly disfigured but said he was required to urge the family to bury Tursun.
―I saw the dead body—it was bruised and dark all over,‖ Kari said. ―All the family was crying…his mother was slapping herself. The whole neighborhood is in chaos.‖
―I don‘t know how the body was injured, how it has so many bruises. The authorities are asking the imam, the elders, relatives, and neighbors to persuade the family to bury him. I am a peasant and I don‘t know much about the law.‖
―I have to do what the government asks me to do…and I have to believe them. We are working hard to persuade the family to bury Shohret Tursun early Sunday morning,‖ Kari said. ―After the family‘s strong opposition, the authorities agreed to bury him Sunday morning. This has been confirmed and the funeral attendants have been selected and invited,‖ he said.
Earlier death alleged
About 10 days ago, relatives said, Tursun—along with Pazilat Akbar, Rabigul, Eli Hesenjan, and more than 35 others—were transferred from Urumqi to the Qorghas county jail.
Another villager, also contacted by telephone, said another man, 22-year-old Dilshat Ismayil, was beaten to death by police July 29 after he ran away from police trying to detain him. That account couldn‘t immediately be confirmed.
Uyghurs say they have long suffered ethnic discrimination, oppressive religious controls, and continued poverty and joblessness despite China‘s ambitious plans to develop its vast northwestern frontier (‗Standoff over Death in Custody‘ 2009, Radio Free Asia, 19 September http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/death-incustody-09192009144227.html – Accessed 21 September 2009 – Attachment 21).
2. If Uighurs are being mistreated and discriminated against by Han Chinese because of their ethnicity, are the authorities taking measures to protect them?
Information in response to this question is provided under the following two headings:
Measures taken by authorities to protect Uighurs against mistreatment by Han Chinese during recent unrest; Measures taken by authorities to protect Uighurs against discrimination by Han Chinese.
Measures taken by authorities to protect Uighurs against mistreatment by Han Chinese during recent unrest:
In relation to the unrest from 5 July to early September 2009, there are conflicting reports on the extent to which police and security forces protected Uighurs from being physically attacked and mistreated by Han Chinese. For example on 7 July 2009, The Times reported that when Han were seeking to perpetrate revenge attacks on two Uighurs being held by police, the police stopped the mob from reaching the men:
The streets of Urumqi, a city closer to Tehran than to Beijing, were almost deserted except for mobs of Han Chinese carrying wooden sticks or iron staves who swaggered past shuttered shop fronts. At one point the ethnic tensions spilled over with Han eager to take revenge for the dozens of deaths – mainly of Han stabbed by marauding gangs of Uighurs – at the weekend.
In front of one bank on a street near the city‘s main People‘s Square, paramilitary police in bulletproof vests had forced two Uighurs face down on the ground, their hands behind their necks.
Angry crowds of Han men shouted and tried to reach the two men. The police bundled them into a small van. At once, several Han attacked the bus with their sticks, trying to beat the two men with their staves through the open windows. They were pulled back by the police who then drove the two Uighur men to safety.
―We will stand united. We Han are together in this,‖ the crowd chanted (Macartney, J. 2009, ‗Riot police battle protesters as China‘s Uighur crisis escalates‘, The Times Online, 7 July http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6655225.ece – Accessed 21 September 2009 – Attachment 10).
Several reports quoted in response to question one above also refer to actions taken by police to protect Uighurs from mob attacks (‗Armed Mobs Throng Urumqi‘ 2009, Radio Free Asia, 7 July http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/xinjiang-07072009054344.html – Accessed 25 September 2009 – Attachment 13; and Hornby, L. 2009, ‗Reuters Blogs – Changing China: Misinformation age in Urumqi‘, Reuters, 8 September http://blogs.reuters.com/china/2009/09/08/misinformation-age-in-urumqi/ – Accessed 17 September 2009 – Attachment 17).
In contrast, Radio Free Asia reported on 9 July 2009 that, in the opinion of a Uighur resident, police were ―pretending to stop them [the Han mob], but they are not really strict‖; and that police did not question those perpetrating attacks against them. Official media reports indicated that authorities did transport Uighur college students to their hometowns ―for their own safety‖, a measure which others saw as removing potential protestors:
Uyghur residents said however that armed majority Han Chinese were still visible on the streets of the city Wednesday. ―The Chinese are on the streets, holding batons and clubs. They are attacking some shops. But I have not personally seen anyone injured or killed,‖ one Uyghur man said. ―When the Chinese came out with batons and clubs, there is no one to stop them. They are pretending to stop them, but they are not really strict,‖ he said.
―If the Uyghurs had come out with batons and clubs, they would immediately be fired upon.‖
Urumqi violence
Interviews in Urumqi on Thursday painted a grim picture of explosive tensions and resentments in the region, and of the violent outbursts they prompted. One Uyghur man said he would remain at Xinjiang Medicine University No. 1 Hospital after being struck on the head and stabbed in the buttocks on July 7.
―My friend and I were on the way home Tuesday afternoon and encountered more than 200 Han Chinese holding axes and knives. Several dozen of them attacked us—my head was hit and injured. Then someone stabbed me in the buttocks and I lost consciousness,‖ he said.
He said his friend was injured less seriously, and police haven‘t yet questioned them about the incident. A few police armed with rifles are guarding the hospital, he said. Another Uyghur youth, a student at Xinjiang Normal University, said he and a friend were both also hospitalized.
―Several hundred Han Chinese were protesting near Xinjiang Medicine University No. 1 Hospital and someone hit me with an iron club,‖ he said in Uyghur through a Chinese translator. ―Two [Uyghur] workers in a restaurant were beaten to death,‖ he said.
―Another Uyghur passerby was attacked and is in critical condition‖ at the same hospital, he said.A Han Chinese man who lives near the Uyghur area of Kelamayi Xilu said, ―The Hans are so angry at what the Uyghurs did earlier—that‘s why they protested on July 7.‖
According to local residents near Xinfu Lu, also in Urumqi, roughly 100 riot police were out in force Thursday to discourage further protests, following a demonstration by Han Chinese demanding police inquiries into clashes in which they or their relatives were injured.
Official media meanwhile reported that 108 government buses had been pressed into service to return Uyghur college students to their hometowns for their own safety.
But Dilshat Rashit, spokesman for the Munich-based World Uyghur Congress, said the move was aimed at removing young potential protesters from XUAR (‗Clampdown on Uyghur Cities‘ 2009, Radio Free Asia, 9 July http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/clampdown- 07092009101424.html – Accessed 18 September 2009 – Attachment 20).
On 14 July 2009, The Washington Times reported that Rebiyah Kadeer believed that ―police have allowed Han Chinese mobs to roam the streets to beat up Uighurs and go house to house to arrest Uighur men in Urumqi. She said arrests have spread to several other cities in the region, including Kashgar, Aksu, Ghulja, Shayar, Kijcha, Karamay and Atush‖ and that authorities are ―forcing women who lost sons to go into the streets and say the situation is back to normal. They are forcing them to hug and kiss Chinese‖ (Kumar Sen, A. & Fleming, C., 2009, ‗Uighur leader wants U.S. to pressure China‘, The Washington Times, 14 July http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/14/uighur-leader-in-us-appeals-for-pressure- against-c/print/ – Accessed 23 September 2009 – Attachment 22).
In the September 2009 protests of Han residents against police inaction in the face of syringe attacks, reports indicated that ―Armed police prevented the crowd from going to Uyghurs areas, but five people were killed and more than a dozen injured‖; and that ―crowds were trying to break through police lines to storm districts where many ethnic Uighurs live‖ (Zhong, W. 2009, ‗Greater China‘, Asia Times, 9 September http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KI09Ad01.html – Accessed 23 September 2009 – Attachment 23; and Hille, K. 2009 ‗Five dead as thousands take to streets in Urumqi protests‘, Financial Times, 5 September http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ba3979e8-99b2-11de- ab8c-00144feabdc0.html – Accessed 23 September 2009 – Attachment 24).
Measures taken by authorities to protect Uighurs against discrimination by Han Chinese:
Little information was found on the measures taken by the authorities to protect Uighurs from discrimination, including employment discrimination. The US State Department highlighted that the ―government‘s policy to encourage Han Chinese migration into minority areas has significantly increased the population of Han in the XUAR…Discriminatory hiring practices gave preference to Han and discouraged job prospects for ethnic minorities‖ (US Department of State 2009, 2008 Human Rights Report: China, 25 February, ‗National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities‘ – Attachment 25).
In a 14 July 2009 Time article on the causes of the July unrest, several experts on China refer to the role that Uighur discontent over issues like job discrimination played in instigating the violence. The article points out that the Uighurs at the toy factory in the Guangdong city of Shaoguan, where the attacks by Han against several Uighur workers occurred, were part of a government program to send minority workers to the coast, a program made necessary by lack of employment opportunities in XUAR. Dru Gladney, an expert on Islam in China and president of the Pacific Basin Institute at Pomona College, is quoted as explaining that Uighurs ―are recruited by the government, and then they feel like government doesn‘t defend and protect them. They feel discriminated against. They can‘t win at home and they can‘t win far afield.‖ The article also points out that the privatisation of industry has worsened discrimination, and that China does not have ―a fair-hiring law, meaning that those with sufficient skills and experience still have no recourse if they face discrimination in the job market‖:
On the streets of the cities and towns of China‘s northwestern region of Xinjiang you can hear complaints from the Uighur minority group about restrictions on the Islamic religion they practice, their Turkic language or their culture, which is most closely linked to the lands of Central Asia. But in interviews in Urumqi, the regional capital that exploded with ethnic rioting last week that left 184 dead, the single most common complaint of Uighur residents is that they feel excluded from economic opportunity.
Xinjiang, which makes up one-sixth of China‘s landmass but is home to less than 2% of its population, is an area of vast oil, mineral and agricultural wealth. Under a decade-old ―develop the West‖ policy, the GDP of the region climbed from $20 billion in 2000 to $44.5 billion in 2006. Many Uighurs feel, however, that the boom has benefited majority Han Chinese, while they‘ve been left out. ―If you‘re Han, there are opportunities. But if you‘re from my group, there‘s nothing you can do,‖ says a Uighur man in Urumqi who declined to give his name. ―We‘re all hungry. We go all over looking for work, but they say they don‘t want Uighurs.‖
The immediate cause of the rioting was a protest in Urumqi on July 5 spurred by the death of two Uighurs thousands of miles away at a toy factory in coastal Guangdong province. A disgruntled former worker falsely accused the Uighur workers of raping Han women, which touched off a riot. When the police moved to end the demonstration in Urumqi‘s People‘s Square, they clashed with the Uighur demonstrators. Witnesses say bands of Uighur young men then rampaged through the city for hours, attacking Han residents, smashing vehicles and torching Han-owned shops. On July 11 authorities announced that 137 Han, 46 Uighurs and one member of the Hui, a Chinese Muslim group, had been killed. Despite a massive security presence, Urumqi remains tense. On July 13 police shot and killed two Uighur men and injured a third Monday afternoon near the Xinjiang People‘s Hospital in the city‘s main Uighur district.
The nature of the original unrest, over an incident of workplace violence, offers clues to the depth of the Uighurs‘ feeling of economic discontent. The 800 Uighurs at the toy factory in the Guangdong city of Shaoguan were part of a government program to send minority workers to the coast. ―They can‘t get work in their own province, so they go to the far corner of the country to seek jobs,‖ says Dru Gladney, an expert on Islam in China and president of the Pacific Basin Institute at Pomona College. ―They are recruited by the government, and then they feel like government doesn‘t defend and protect them. They feel discriminated against. They can‘t win at home and they can‘t win far afield.‖
Uighurs were once offered a measure of economic sanctuary in state-owned enterprises with minority-hiring quotas. But as Xinjiang‘s economy has become increasingly privatized, those opportunities have eroded, says Barry Sautman, an associate professor of social science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. ―Years ago everything in Xinjiang, like the rest of China was state-owned. It was relatively easy for Uighurs with some qualifications to get jobs in state enterprises, based of course on preferential policies,‖ he says. ―Now, with a substantial part of the economy privatized, it‘s much more difficult. It‘s up to individual employers as to who they want to hire.‖
Like other minorities, Uighurs are given additional points in China‘s college entrance exam, but as a group they don‘t have the same educational level as Han Chinese. Many can‘t speak fluent Mandarin. Company managers with roots outside of Xinjiang often make hiring decisions based on connections or regional origin, leaving Uighurs at a disadvantage. China doesn‘t have a fair-hiring law, meaning that those with sufficient skills and experience still have no recourse if they face discrimination in the job market.
The government‘s explanation of last week‘s violence is that it was inspired by overseas agitators; Uighur discontent over issues like job discrimination isn‘t included in the official version of events. The dilemma for Chinese policymakers is that the country‘s rapid economic growth has helped legitimize the government to the majority of citizens. But for Uighurs who feel left out, the growing prosperity of the Han leaves them more alienated. As China continues to get rich, it is pushing them further toward the fringe (Ramzy, A. 2009, ‗Why the Uighurs Feel Left out of China‘s Boom‘, Time, 14 July http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1910302,00.html – Accessed 23 September 2009 – Attachment 26).
On 15 September 2009, Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in her opening address to the 12th session of the UN Human Rights Council, ―urged the authorities there [in China] to respect human rights in their efforts to uphold the law, and to ―reflect on the underlying causes‖ of incidents such as the recent disturbances in the Xinjiang and Tibetan Autonomous Regions which include discrimination and the failure to protect minority rights‖ (Pillay, N. 2009, ‗Tackling impunity and discrimination among top priorities for UN rights chief‘, UN News Centre website, 15 September http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32049&Cr=pillay&Cr1= – Accessed 23 September 2009 – Attachment 27).
As recently as April 2009, Amnesty International indicated that ―the Chinese state has failed to protect Uighurs from employment discrimination‖:
The Chinese state has failed to protect Uighurs from employment discrimination which has resulted in extremely high rates of unemployment among Uighurs in the XUAR and fuelled discontent. Many Uighurs report seeing ‗Uighurs need not apply‘ signs posted by employers at job fairs demonstrating the state‘s inaction in enforcing anti-discrimination laws. Even university graduates who speak fluent Chinese have difficulty finding employment (Amnesty International 2009, Uighur Ethnic Identity under threat in China, April – Attachment 28).
3. Would a Uighur woman whose family members have a political profile relating to East Turkestan separatist movements and the 1962 demonstrations in Ghulja be at greater risk of harm?
Information provided in response to this question is given under the following two headings:
May 1962 incident in Ghulja – ―Three District Revolution‖; Risk of harm associated with political profile.
May 1962 incident in Ghulja – ―Three District Revolution‖:
Some information was found on the May 1962 incident in Ghulja and the ―3 District Revolution‖.
A 2004 paper by James Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, refers briefly to violent anti-government demonstrations around 1962 in Ghulja:
But the radical collectivization and industrialization drive known as the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) was accompanied by a more assimilationist cultural thrust, political attacks on Xinjiang natives associated with the former ETR [East Turkistan Republic] and Soviet Union, and an upsurge in Han in-migration and settlement in northern Xinjiang. These factors, together with the famine caused by the Great Leap, led to an exodus of some 60,000 people (Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and others) and 30,000 head of cattle to the Soviet Union in April-May 1962. This exodus was followed by violent demonstrations in central Yining (Ghulja) city involving 2,000 people, during which the crowd called for the overthrow of the Communist Party and ―elimination of the problem of the Chinese.‖ Regular PLA [People‘s Liberation Army] troops and Xinjiang bingtuan (production-construction corps) militia sealed the border and quashed the riot. Chinese sources blame the exodus and Yining incident on Soviet machinations (Millward, J. 2004, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment, East-West Center Washington website, p.6 www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/PS006.pdf – Accessed 12 January 2006 – Attachment 29).
Detailed information on the 1962 events is given in a 2003 paper by Zhang Yumo, made available on the Independent Media Centre website. The website provides, however, only an at times rudimentary translation from the original Mandarin to English:
Both the illegal border crossing incidents occurred in Ghulja and Chochek between early April to late May of 1962, in which many people live in the border area illegally crossed the border to Soviet Union, and the Ghulja counter-revolutionary riot of May 29 were long planned subverting acts of Soviet Union. After the 22nd Meeting of Soviet Communist Party, Soviet authorities used its historical influence and complex ethnic and social relationship in Chochek and Ghulja district to develop illegal Soviet residency and establish intelligence nets through the consulate and its subordinate organization the Russian Chinese Union. They carried out ideological infiltration using printed materials, radio, letters, mailed food and clothes to spread their propaganda about a happy life in Soviet Union. At the same time, they actively played on the ethnic relationship, creating ethnic conflict and setting anti-Chinese trend. Around April 10th, several counts of illegal border crossings by small number of peoples to Soviet Union occurred in some collective farms of Chochek county along the Sino- Soviet border. After that, the situation developed rapidly, and spilled over to other regions, reaching its peak at the end of May.
On May 29, the people who were waiting for the Bus to Korghas in the Ghulja Bus station damaged the station office under the instigation of counter-revolutionary individual Abdukadir, and forcefully entered the prefecture congress building and prefecture party committee office, damaged office equipments, and took away some government documents and records from the Ghulja division of foreign affairs office. They took away some weapons from the People‘s Armed Police, and injured several party officials and armed police. During the riot, the rioters loudly chanted the reactionary slogans: ―Xinjiang belongs to us, Chinese occupied our land, down with the Communist Party, down with Chinese‖. After the suppression of the riot, the small number of reactionaries could not admit their failure, they proclaim: ―Chinese killed our people, we have to take revenge!‖. Over a period of time, reactionary organizations, posters and leaflets that aimed at the destruction of ethnic unity and motherland‘s integrity continuously emerged in an attempt to establish ―Uyghuristan‖ (Yumo, Z. 2003, ‗The Anti-Separatism Struggle And Its Historical Lessons Since The Liberation Of Xinjiang‘, Independent Media Centre website, 19 August http://india.indymedia.org/en/2003/08/6665.shtml – Accessed 23 September 2009 – Attachment 30).
Reference is also made in this paper to the relationship between the Eastern Turkestan People‘s Party and the Three District Revolution. Although the precise meaning of the ―Three District Revolution‖ term is not made clear, it appears to be a slogan/title used by various separatist groups in Xinjiang, and derives from similar terminology used by the early Chinese revolutionaries from the 1940s-1960s and associated with Mao Ze-Dong:
East Turkestan People‘s Party (short form ETPP) was established during the Cultural Revolution with the help of Soviet spies. The ETPP took advantage of the chaos to encourage ethnic separatism, destroy ethnic unity, promote the independence of Xinjiang and instigate armed riots. It was the biggest counter-revolutionary organization that have ever been formed since the liberation of Xinjiang.
The Eastern Turkestan People‘s Party was secretly established in February 1968. Initially, it was called ―Uyghurstan People‘s Party.‖ But in order to mislead the public, its name was changed to the same name (Eastern Turkestan People‘s Party) that was used during the Three District Revolution. In addition, the time of its establishment was falsely alleged to be November 11, 1960 (November 11th of 1944 was the date the temporary Three District government was established). This example clearly indicates that the organizers already gave it much premeditated thought. The so-called ―ETPP‖ set up ―Central Chairmen Committee‖ with a few committee members and alternate members. After the Eastern Turkestan People‘s Party was established, it swiftly developed by taking advantage of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. In addition to its three direct organizations known as ―Youth Organization,‖ ―Tengritakh Revengers,‖ and ―Tengritakh Ular,‖ it also established subdivisions in Ghulja, Akhsu, Chochek, Borutala, and Urumchi, one after another from January to April of 1969. They set about 78 counter-revolutionary grass-root organizations altogether, covering Xinjiang‘s 12 prefectures and cities, 22 province level government organizations with over three hundred members.
…In Xinjiang, a small number of ethnic separatists and capitalist liberals have created wrong separatist opinions and carried out separatist activities. Moreover, they have made big issue over the ―Three District Revolution‖. In the fall of 1944, the minority people of Ili, Quqek and Altay regions of Xinjiang, broke out in an armed struggle against the Chinese Nationalist government‘s reactionary rule and the imperialist invading forces to obtain ethnic freedon and democracy, because they could not endure the cruel ethnic oppression and brutal rule of the Nationalist reactionaries. This struggle erupted under the influence of the Chinese Communist Party and the inspiration of the whole country‘s people‘s revolutionary struggle and the leadership of Xinjiang‘s progressive individuals of every nationality. It lasted altogether more than five years, and converged into the powerful torrent of our national democratic revolution in 1949. Mao Ze-Dong‘s judgment: ―Three Region Revolution is a part of Chinese national democratic revolution‖ is correct. The revolution gave a heavy blow to Chinese Nationalist rule in Xinjiang and tied up its army, contributing greatly to Xinjiang‘s peaceful liberation. However, during the early stage of the revolution, because a few feudalistic religious high class individuals took partial control of power, mistakes of ethnic separatism and blind opposition to the Chinese people had occurred. The progressive forces represented by Ahmetjan and others fought firmly against this erroneous separatist tendency and gradually corrected that mistake. The ethnic separatist forces at home and abroad often distort the historical truth and claim that the ―Three Region revolution‖ was ―an independence movement‖, and place it on a par with the Khara Han dynasty of the ninth century, the Yakhup Beg‘s invasion of Kashker in 1865 and the ―Eastern Turkestan Islamic Republic‖ in Kashker which was manipulated by the English imperialists in 1933, and claim that there were four ―independence movements.‖ During the Ghulja riot in 1962, some people chanted ―The second Three District Revolution Started!‖. The proposal of redoing the Three District Revolution after the establishment of People‘s Republic of China is a matter of different nature, it is not revolutionary, but anti-revolutionary, its purpose is to split the mother land, sabotage the ethnic unity and cause ethnic hatred. The above mentioned Eastern Turkistan Party during the Cultural revolution purposely used the same name and foundation day with the Peopl‘s Revolution Party of the Three District Revolution period.
That act was obviously provocative in nature. During the December 12,1982 incident, small number of students demamded to establish a Three District Revolution Army Foundation memorial day. These all explains the same problem. At the same time, they viciously attacked the representatives of the right path, said: where did their goal go, where did the fruit of the struggle for independence of Eastern Turkistan go?‖. The leaflets of the June 15,1988 Event, also read: ―Remember, Ahmadjan feeded them (Chinese).‖ In order to instigate independence and separatism, the separatists at home and abroad viciously attack the right side of the Three District Revolution, at the same time, they strongly praise the wrong side in the early phase. This is the charecteristic of the Xinjiang Separatist powers in making public opinion in idealogical field (Yumo, Z. 2003, ‗The Anti-Separatism Struggle And Its Historical Lessons Since The Liberation Of Xinjiang‘, Independent Media Centre website, 19 August http://india.indymedia.org/en/2003/08/6665.shtml – Accessed 23 September 2009 – Attachment 30).
No specific information was found on the meaning of the titles ―4 type of anti revolutionary‖, the relationship of the ―National Revolution/3 District Revolution‖ to the East Turkistan Army, or the ―4th Division Military Hospital‖. For general information on the use of the term ―counter-revolutionary‖ in China, and a discussion of the various groups associated with the liberation of East Turkistan, see respectively the following two responses (question two of RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response CHN33210, 16 April – Attachment 31; RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response CHN33951, 4 November – Attachment 32).
Risk of harm associated with political profile:
The extent to which family links to historically significant East Turkestan separatist movements and/or events would imply greater risk of harm would depend on the authorities‘ current knowledge of those historical family connections and the family‘s current association with these or other separatist groups. Information does indicate that family members of those suspected of involvement in current separatist/terrorist or political suspect activities are at greater risk. For example, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China‘s Annual Report 2008 states that, according to the Uygur Human Rights Project, authorities have detained ―family members or associates of people suspected to be involved in terrorist activities‖ (US Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2008, Annual Report 2008, 31 October, p.142 – Attachment 33). The US Department of State‘s 2008 Human Rights Report: China, indicates more generally that in China ―family members…of former political prisoners‖ continue to be targeted for arbitrary arrest, detention, and harassment in China:
During the year human rights activists, journalists, unregistered religious figures, and former political prisoners and their family members were among those targeted for arbitrary detention or arrest.
The government continued to use house arrest as a nonjudicial punishment and control measure against dissidents, former political prisoners, family members of political prisoners, petitioners, underground religious figures, and others it deemed politically sensitive. House arrest encompassed varying degrees of stringency but sometimes included complete isolation in one‘s own home or another location under lock and guard. In some cases house arrest involved constant monitoring, but the target of house arrest was occasionally permitted to leave the home to work or run errands. Sometimes those under house arrest were required to ride in the vehicles of their police monitors when venturing outside. When outside the home, the subject of house arrest was usually, but not always, under surveillance. In some instances security officials assumed invasive positions within the family home, rather than monitoring from the outside.
…Family members of activists and rights defenders, Falun Gong practitioners, journalists, unregistered religious figures, and former political prisoners were targeted for arbitrary arrest, detention, and harassment (US Department of State 2009, 2008 Human Rights Report: China, 25 February, Section 1d & 1f – Attachment 25).
The September 2008 report by the Uyghur Human Rights Project in Washington, A “Life or Death Struggle” in East Turkestan: Uyghurs face unprecedented persecution in post-Olympic period, provides several examples where family members of those suspected of current separatist/terrorist activities have been arrested and detained. This report also states in relation to the 1997 events in Ghulja, that at the time, family members of those who participated in the demonstration were also detained (Uyghur Human Rights Project 2008, A “Life or Death Struggle” in East Turkestan: Uyghurs face unprecedented persecution in post-Olympic period, pp.3,5,9 http://uhrp.org/docs/A-Life-or-Death-Struggle-in-East- Turkestan.pdf – Accessed 29 September 2009 – Attachment 35).
It is possible that the Chinese authorities may retain information on the political history of a family in their personal dossiers; though whether this in it itself would put a person at greater risk is unknown. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) have pointed out on a number of occasions that Chinese authorities maintain a dossier (dang an) on PRC citizens (DIAC Country Information Service 2007, Country Information Report No. CHN8980 – CIS Request CHN8980: China: Publication of client details, (sourced from DFAT advice of 20 March 2007), 22 March – Attachment 36; DIMIA Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No. 06/53 – China: Return of failed asylum seekers, (sourced from DFAT advice of 14 September 2006), 15 September – Attachment 37; DIAC Country Information Service 2003, Country Information Report 82/03 Personal Files, (sourced from DFAT advice 10 June 2003), 17 June – Attachment 38).
In June 2003, DFAT described the contents of the dang an in detail and referred to its diminishing use by authorities with regard to those who are not party members or cadres. It does state that ―neighbourhood committees retain dossiers for the unemployed‖; and that the ―dossier is chiefly a record of official merits or demerits, qualifications, and evaluations by employers, including political evaluation‖:
The Chinese government maintains different records for rural and urban residents. It does not keep personal files or dossiers on all citizens. The political significance of personal dossiers for those who are neither party members nor cadres has diminished in recent years. With greater freedom of movement between provinces and employers and the growth in the non-state sector, it is becoming easier to find employers who do not require a continuous personal dossier from a previous employer or work unit.
…Beginning from primary school, a Chinese may also possess a personal dossier (dang‘an). This is a collection of papers containing personal comments by teachers, records of marks, official commendations or records of disciplinary offences. It is passed through high school and on to university authorities. The dossier takes on real significance after university, when it can be used by potential employers in place of a personal resume or references to determine employment opportunities and promotion prospects.
Some large state-run employers, including government ministries and party organs, physically retain individuals‘ dossiers, which are maintained by the personnel section. Smaller, private sector or foreign-owned work units can contract centralised ―human resource centres‖ or employment agencies to retain the dossiers. Neighbourhood committees retain dossiers for the unemployed. Rural Chinese employed in agriculture do not require dossiers after leaving school. Village or county-level personnel departments may keep records of rural households.
We have no specific information on how the dossier system works in particular provinces. But it would be reasonable to assume that the system would be used more strictly in relation to individuals in certain occupations (such as the military and cadres in government and party employment), rather than in relation to individuals‘ geographic location per se. We have no evidence suggesting the dossier system is imposed more strictly on members of ethnic minorities.
The dossier is chiefly a record of official merits or demerits, qualifications, and evaluations by employers, including political evaluations, party membership and party standing. It may also record social welfare or insurance contributions. The system is clearly open to abuse, as individuals do not generally have access to their own dossier and work units can use retention of a dossier to pressure individuals contemplating changing their work unit. The personnel section which maintains the dossier may pass on incriminating comments (including information from third parties) directly to public security or state security authorities.
Local public security authorities maintain separate records of individuals, based on unique identity numbers recorded on identity cards and linked to hukou records. Individuals must carry their identity cards (shenfenzheng) at all times. Local public security authorities also maintain individual criminal records (DIAC Country Information Service 2003, Country Information Report 82/03 Personal Files, (sourced from DFAT advice 10 June 2003), 17 June – Attachment 38).
A 1989 book by Suzanne Ogden titled China’s Unresolved Issues – Politics, Development and Culture, states that a ―dossier will also contain information about a person‘s class background, education, friends and relations (especially if they have bad class backgrounds or have lived abroad), and participation in political organizations. If a person has a bad class origin or has ever been labelled as one of the ―five bad elements,‖ that fact can haunt him for the rest of his life‖ (Ogden, Suzanne 1989, China’s Unresolved Issues – Politics, Development and Culture, ‗Dossiers (Dang‘an)‘ from Chap.6 ‗Socialist Legality and Social Control‘ – Attachment 39).
An August 2009 Radio Free Asia article on the strong role that women play in Uighur society, points out that they ―are viewed as the principal educators in Uyghur society, responsible for educating children and passing on traditions through the family‖:
Uyghur women are viewed as the principal educators in Uyghur society, responsible for educating children and passing on traditions through the family, experts say.
―Women have a strong position in Uyghur society,‖ one Uyghur woman living in U.S. exile said.
…And the Uyghur figure best known around the world is Rebiya Kadeer, leader of the World Uyghur Congress, which Beijing accused of inciting violence in July.
Kadeer was a successful self-made businesswoman held up as a model by the Chinese government until she was accused of ―endangering national security‖ in 2000. ―It was Rebiya Kadeer‘s founding of a women‘s movement in Xinjiang and her support to the mothers and wives of those arrested during the 1987 Ghulja [in Chinese, Yining] protests that first turned authorities against her,‖ Roberts says.
―In Xinjiang, women have been active in [political protests] over the last several decades‖ (‗Strong Women in Uyghur History‘ 2009, Radio Free Asia, 24 August http://www.rfa.org/english/women/uyghur-women-08202009140517.html/in-history- 08202009141230.html?textonly=1 – Accessed 17 September 2009 – Attachment 40).
4. How would the authorities treat an unemployed woman or girls if they were discovered praying at home or observing any other Muslim religious practice in private at home?
The treatment in this case would depend on whether the authorities regarded the religious practice as in any way encouraging ethnic separatism, in which case authorities could conceivably instigate penalties ranging from a short interrogation to detention. In June 2009 Radio Free Asia provided detailed information on a police raid on a private gathering of thirty Uighur women in Gulja, as well as the treatment the women received from the authorities. Although the gathering did not involve prayer or other religious practices and the authorities were vague on the reason for the raid and charges against the women, participants stated that the event was regarded as ―an illegal gathering‖ or ―religious gathering‖ by the authorities. The article points out more generally that ―authorities in the northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have banned private gatherings that involve the practice of Islam on suspicion that these could promote ethnic separatism‖. Another of the women detained declared that during her interrogation, ―the police said we can have gatherings for prayer only at the mosque, and we absolutely cannot gather to pray anywhere else, and only the government-appointed imam can teach religion—no one else‖. Penalties applied to the women in this instance were the following: (a) eighteen of the women were freed after eight hours of interrogation; (b) seven were sent for forced labour for 10 days to Chapchal county to pick pumpkins; (c) five were sentenced to a month in prison, according to two of the jailed women; (d) a pregnant woman in the last group was released after 13 days; (e) while the remaining four served their sentences and were allowed to return home after a month. The article is here provided in full:
On April 24, police in Tashkowrok village in Gulja city, broke up a party of 30 women belonging to the mostly Muslim Uyghur ethnic group at a family home, according to several of the women who were present. Some wore traditional Muslim headscarves, discouraged in some areas because they denote a separate, non-Chinese ethnic identity.
While police didn‘t indicate what crime they were suspected of committing, authorities in the northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have banned private gatherings that involve the practice of Islam on suspicion that these could promote ethnic separatism. Authorities may have anticipated unrest as the gathering followed the sentencing—also in Gulja—of 12 Uyghur men convicted of ―splitting the country,‖ or separatism, in November 2008.
Eighteen of the women were freed after eight hours of interrogation, seven were sent for forced labor for 10 days, and five were sentenced to a month in jail, according to two of the jailed women. A pregnant woman in the last group was released after 13 days, while the remaining four served their sentences and were allowed to return home May 25.
Officials at the Tashkowrok village and Gulja city police stations, contacted by telephone, declined to comment on the case. Rahile Semet hosted the gathering. Excerpts of her interview follow:
Q: How many days were you in jail? A: A whole 31 days.
Q: How many people were sentenced? A: Five of us were sentenced to a month-long jail term. One of us is pregnant, and her health deteriorated in the jail—she kept vomiting in jail, and after 13 days she was set free because of her health problem. Four of us had to stay behind to complete our sentences.
Q: Seven of you were sentenced to forced labor? A: Yes, that‘s true. They were sent to Chapchal county to pick pumpkins.
Q: On what charges did they arrest you? A: I don‘t know, personally—I know nothing.
Q: Could you explain to me what happened? A: We had a traditional friendly gathering in my home. When all the guests had arrived, police cars were suddenly flooding the front of my home. I was stunned at what was happening and didn‘t know what I should do. The police rammed their way into my home. First they took video of everything in my home, and then they took all of us to Tashkowrok police station, and then they sent us to Gulja city police headquarters for interrogation. After that they sent us to Ili city‘s New Life jail.
Q: What did they ask you during the interrogation? A: The police were asking what was the purpose of our gathering. We said we were holding our traditional party. They asked how much money I had collected from this party and what did I want to do with this money? I answered, I will buy flour, cooking oil, and meat for one to two weeks‘ cooking. We are all peasants—we are housewives and our husbands are farmers … All I collected from the party in total was 820 yuan (about U.S. $120). After the interrogation, we were put in jail. For the first three days we slept on bare concrete floors without anything under us or any covers. And we were not allowed to meet with anyone for 31 days … We were separated from each other. Each room in the jail housed 13 prisoners, some political prisoners, and some criminals.
Q: Didn‘t you ask the police why you were arrested? A: No, I was just so happy to be released—I missed my children so much! I didn‘t even think to ask those questions … For the first two days I was back home, I was totally lost. Today I regained some sort of feeling.
Henipe Sultan was a guest at the gathering. Excerpts of her interview follow:
Q: When were you arrested and released? Did the police give you some kind of legal document to sign? A: Other ladies got the document stating that they would be imprisoned for a month. The police didn‘t tell me exactly for how long I would be imprisoned … The police sent the document through the bars of the cell and asked me to sign it—they pushed me to sign it without reading it. I didn‘t even know how long my term would be until I was released.
Q: What was your crime? A: Holding an illegal gathering.
Q: Why it is illegal? A: What I heard from the people who came to visit me after I was released is that it‘s illegal to have gatherings at home—we can have them only at restaurants. During my interrogation, the police said we can have gatherings for prayer only at the mosque, and we absolutely cannot gather to pray anywhere else, and only the government-appointed imam can teach religion—no one else.
Q: Did you pray at the party? A: No, we just got together. It was to help each other and have some fun. We are all housewives—instead of bringing some gifts, each guest brings the host some cash and the host collects some money. Each of us gets a turn to host a party, once a month, to help us improve our lives. This is our tradition. Everyone knows this. We don‘t know how it was regarded as a religious gathering.
Q: Is it because you were wearing headscarves? A: Yes, we had headscarves. During the interrogation, and in the jail, the police threatened me by saying, ‗You are a political prisoner—you should obey.‘ I never had a chance to learn about politics, and now I am more confused. We don‘t want to hurt society. We just want to raise our children nicely. We are women who want to live a harmonious life.
Q: Were you all wearing headscarves? A: Some of us. All who were sentenced for a month-long jail term had scarves, and the police confiscated our scarves, our outfits, in jail.
Q: Did the police remove your scarf or did you hand it over to them? A: The prison guard ordered me to take it off, and then I tossed it to them.
Q: When you were released, did the police return your scarf? A: No, they didn‘t. I went home without it (‗Women Held over Party‘ 2009, Radio Free Asia, 5 June http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/party-06052009144059.html – Accessed 24 September 2009 – Attachment 41).
In April 2009 Amnesty International indicated that ―children under the age of 18 are not allowed to enter mosques or to receive any sort of religious education. Many young Uighurs are afraid that if they do enter a mosque, or are found to be praying at home, they will be expelled from school‖:
Religion:
The authorities maintain tight control over mosques and religious clergy, intervening in the appointment of local imams, stationing police within and outside mosques, and closely monitoring all religious activities. Government employees in the XUAR, including teachers, police officers, state enterprise workers and civil servants risk losing their jobs if they engage in religious activity. The Chinese authorities have also put many obstacles in the way of Uighurs attempting to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, known as the Hajj, which is a requirement for all practising Muslims.
Children under the age of 18 are not allowed to enter mosques or to receive any sort of religious education. Many young Uighurs are afraid that if they do enter a mosque, or are found to be praying at home, they will be expelled from school (Amnesty International 2009, Uighur Ethnic Identity under threat in China, April, p.3 – Attachment 28).
In 2006, the Uyghur Human Rights Project website, sourcing a Reuters article, quotes Uighur residents stating that ―their children are not allowed to receive religious education even at home‖:
Uighur residents complain that their children are not allowed to receive religious education even at home, and students, government officials and employees of some companies say they cannot show any visible signs of religious affiliation, such as beards or headscarves (‗China defends control over religion in Uighur region‘ 2006, Uyghur Human Rights Project website, source: Reuters, 17 October http://www.uhrp.org/articles/317/1/China-defends-control-over- religion-in-Uighur-region/China-defends-control-over-religion-in-Uighur-region.html – Accessed 23 September 2009 – Attachment 42).
In 2006, Rebiya Kadeer stated in an interview that Uighurs who teach their children about religion are imprisoned by the Chinese government:
You and others have also complained about China‘s strictures against the practice of Islam.
The government sees Islam as a threat. So they are strictly restricting the practice of the religion in order to make our people faithless. The government imprisons Uighurs who teach their children about religion. Minors and people who work for the government are forbidden from going to the mosque and are expected to follow atheism. This is not just Communist ideology. It singles us Muslims out, as the government does not forbid Chinese officials from going to Buddhist or Taoist temples (Pocha, R. 2006, ‗Rebiya Kadeer: The Uighur Dalai Lama‘, In These Times, 7 December http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2952/rebiya_kadeer_the_uighur_dalai_lama/ – Accessed 23 September 2009 – Attachment 43).
The banning of any private teaching of religion to children in XUAR is also attested in a 2006 Forum18 report, which also quotes an imam who stated that, ―Children may receive a religious education only after the age of 15 in the medresseh in every district of Xinjiang or in the Islamic university in Urumqi‖ and that ―the private teaching of religion to children is banned‖. The article points out that the ban on children not attending the mosque varies across XUAR:
Every Friday morning Xinjiang‘s imams are obliged to go to their local state Religious Affairs Bureau, to discuss the text of their Friday sermon with officials, Forum 18 learnt. At these Friday meetings, imams receive only ―general instructions and may improvise‖ in their sermons. During the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan, the authorities force Muslim schoolchildren to have lunch. State employees are under similar pressure. ―I am a deeply believing Muslim, but I have to hide this from my colleagues,‖ one local Muslim teacher who preferred not to be named told Forum 18. ―As a school teacher I cannot wear a beard and perform the namaz [Muslim prayers] at work. During Ramadan I have to eat with the other teachers in order to hide my faith.‖ The teacher added that praying at home, without revealing this to others, would not cause problems.
One medresseh [Islamic religious school] teacher told Forum 18 that the private teaching of religion to children is banned. ―Children may receive a religious education only after the age of 15 in the medresseh in every district of Xinjiang or in the Islamic university in Urumqi,‖ the teacher, who asked not to be named, told Forum 18 in Kashgar in late July 2006. ―When students are admitted their political views are investigated. During their studies, alongside religious subjects the students also study the policy of the Chinese Communist Party.‖ This ban on the Islamic religious teaching of children is not applied rigorously outside Xinjiang. In response, Uighur parents often take their children to other parts of China, where they can study freely at a medresseh.
…The strictness of the authorities‘ control over Muslims also depends directly on the level of religiosity of Uighurs in different districts of Xinjiang. For example, in Hotan and Kashgar there is a notice at all mosques to the effect that state employees and children are not allowed to attend the mosque. In the yard of the mosque, detailed instructions are posted about what one is not allowed to do in the mosque. And in Hotan, where the population is more religious than in Kashgar, the number of instructions is greater.
However in Urumqi, Ghulja (the capital of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, bordering Kazakhstan) and in Turpan (Eastern Xinjiang), as well as in the Altai, – all regions in the north of Xinjiang – there are no such notices. The reason for this appears to be that the local Uighurs are less religious than those in the south. In Urumqi, Forum 18 observed children present at the mosque. ―In principle the ban on children attending the mosque is not applied too strictly and children sometimes attend the mosque with their parents,‖ the imam of the Usman mosque in Kashgar, Emed haji Yusuf, told Forum 18 on 30 July.
By contrast, in Hotan the ban on children attending the mosque is applied very strictly. For example, during the Friday prayers police guard the mosques to ensure that children do not attend (Rotar, I. 2006, ‗XINJIANG: Strict control of China‘s Uighur Muslims continues‘, Forum 18, 15 August http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=829&pdf=Y – Accessed 23 September 2009 – Attachment 44).
The 2005 Human Rights Watch report, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, looks in some detail at the restrictions placed on the teaching of religion to Uighur children. The report indicated at the time that, while prohibitions on teaching minors without prior approval did not seem to apply to a parent, parents had told HRW that ―they feared instructing their own children because they worried that their children might inadvertently display signs of religious awareness and attract the suspicion of authorities‖ (p.38); and quoted people in Kashgar complaining that speaking with their children was fraught with risks: ―…neither at home nor at work are you supposed to talk to the children about religion. You just talk about it and it is illegal. Even with my own son, I am not supposed to tell him about Islam‖ (p.59) (Human Rights Watch 2005, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, vol. 12, no. 2(C), April http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/china0405.pdf – Accessed 31 October 2008 – Attachment 45).
5. How would an unemployed woman or girls be treated if they were discovered going to the mosque or observing any other religious practice (eg celebrating Ramadan or Eid) in public?
In February 2006, Radio Free Asia reported that some areas in XUAR started to prohibit women from entering mosques and conducting religious activities, ―the first time such gender restrictions have been alluded to‖:
Chinese authorities have tightened curbs on minority Muslims in the northwestern region of Xinjiang, banning any government officials, state employees, Party members, and in some cases women from entering mosques.
A photo sent to Radio Free Asia (RFA)‘s Uyghur service shows a sign above the gate of a mosque in the poorer southern part of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, forbidding Muslims to attend for worship—as they are supposed to do five times a day.
―The following people are prohibited from entering the mosque and conducting religious activities,‖ reads the sign, written in the language of the main Muslim ethnic group, Uyghur, which uses the Arabic alphabet. The following people are prohibited from entering the mosque and conducting religious activities:
―1) Communist Party members and Communist Youth members. 2) State employees, workers, and retirees. 3) Youths under the age of 18,‖ it says. Categories four and five are local government employees and women, the first time such gender restrictions have been alluded to.
An imam, or religious teacher, at the Heitkar Mosque in Kashgar, the biggest mosque in the region, confirmed some of the restrictions, although his initial reply seemed aimed at avoiding direct criticism of Chinese Communist Party policy.
Imam‘s awkward responses
Asked who was allowed to worship in Xinjiang‘s mosques, the imam replied:
―Everybody. Every Islamic believer is allowed.‖ But confronted with restrictions in other mosques, he confirmed that such rules did exist at Heitkar, too.
―Same. It is same here in our Heitkar mosque too. Our policies are all same,‖ the imam said.
Several Uyghur Muslims confirmed to RFA that those who fell under certain categories were unable to attend mosque for daily prayers, or even for major festivals such as Eid al-Fitr at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan, or Eid al-Adha at which sheep and goats are sacrificed to recall the sparing of Abraham‘s son Ismail (‗East Turkestan: China Bans Officials, State Employees, Children from Mosques‘ 2006, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) website, 7 February http://www.unpo.org/content/view/3699/236/ – Accessed 24 September 2009 – Attachment 46).
The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom report for 2009 states that the government ―continues to limit access to mosques, including the participation of women, children‖, and that in 2005 local government officials confirmed to the Commission that ―minors were prohibited from participating in any religious activity or instruction before finishing nine years of compulsory public education‖:
The government continues to limit access to mosques, including the participation of women, children, communist party members, and government employees. All imams in Xinjiang are required to undergo annual political training seminars to retain their licenses, and local security forces monitor imams and other religious leaders. Imams at Uighur mosques are reportedly required to meet monthly with officials from the Religious Affairs Bureau and the Public Security Bureau to receive ―advice on the content of their sermons. Failure to report to such meetings can result in the imam‘s expulsion or detention. Over the past year, XUAR officials have issued new orders to extend governmental control over religion. For example, in August 2008, authorities in Kashgar called for increased surveillance and management of religious activity. In June 2008, officials in Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture called for increased inspections of mosques and religious venues to prevent ―illegal reading of scriptures and for the ―infiltration of religious groups. In June 2008, a mosque near Aksu city was demolished reportedly for ―illegal renovations, for having ―illegal copies of the Koran, and for engaging in ―illegal religious activities. In February 2009, officials in Hotan started a campaign to halt ―illegal religious schools. According to reports, armed security personnel conducted nighttime searches, closing seven schools and detaining 39 people. In March 2009, according to a Radio Free Asia report, Hotan officials stated that anyone engaged in ―cross-village worship will be charged with a ―social crime and subject to detention or fines.
Officials in the XUAR prohibit teaching Islam outside the home to minors, and police have stepped up attempts to halt private religious education programs in some parts of Xinjiang province. Teachers and organizers can be charged with conducting an ―illegal religious gathering, a criminal offense. During the Commission‘s 2005 visit to China, local government officials confirmed that minors were prohibited from participating in any religious activity or instruction before finishing nine years of compulsory public education. This policy contradicts statements made by officials in the central government who claim that there are no restrictions prohibiting the religious activities of minors. Furthermore, in several localities in Xinjiang, plainclothes police are reportedly stationed outside mosques to enforce rules forbidding children and government employees from attending services. There are also reports that in some areas, individuals under the age of 30 are prohibited from attending a mosque. Throughout Xinjiang, teachers, professors, university students, and other government employees are prohibited from engaging in religious activities, such as reciting daily prayers, distributing religious materials, observing Ramadan, and wearing head coverings; they are reportedly subject to fines if they attempt to do so. These standards are enforced more strictly in southern Xinjiang and other areas where Uighurs account for a higher percentage of the population. In March 2009, 600 protestors, mostly women, marched in Hotan to protest a proposed ban on headscarves and other religious freedom restrictions (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2009, Annual Report 2008 – People’s Republic of China, May, p. 76 – Attachment 47).
The US State Department has emphasised that ―because authorities often did not distinguish carefully among those involved in peaceful activities in support of independence, ―illegal‖ religious activities, and violent terrorism, it was often difficult to determine whether particular raids, detentions, arrests, or judicial punishments targeted those peacefully seeking political goals, those seeking to worship, or those engaged in violence‖:
XUAR authorities continued to restrict Muslim religious activity, sometimes citing counterterrorism as the basis for taking repressive action. In recent years XUAR authorities detained and formally arrested persons engaged in unauthorized religious activities and charged them with a range of offenses, including state security crimes. They often charged religious believers with committing the ―three evils‖ of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Because authorities often did not distinguish carefully among those involved in peaceful activities in support of independence, ―illegal‖ religious activities, and violent terrorism, it was often difficult to determine whether particular raids, detentions, arrests, or judicial punishments targeted those peacefully seeking political goals, those seeking to worship, or those engaged in violence.
The Government reportedly continued to detain Uighur Muslim citizens for possession of unauthorized religious texts, imprison them for religious activities determined to be ―extremist,‖ and prevent them from observing certain sacred religious traditions. Compared to other provinces and autonomous regions, the XUAR government maintained the severest legal restrictions on a child‘s right to practice religion, and XUAR authorities in a few areas prohibited women, children, CCP members, and government workers from entering mosques.
The Government of the XUAR often prohibited public expressions of faith by teachers, professors, and university students, including during Ramadan. Some local officials reportedly called on schools to strengthen propaganda education during Ramadan and put a stop to activities including fasting and professing a religion (US Department of State 2008, International Religious Freedom Report 2008 – China, 19 September, ‗Restrictions on Religious Freedom‘ – Attachment 48).
A July 2009 Guardian article indicates that ―In accordance with the law, none of the people who demanded to be let into their mosques on Friday were under the age of 18. Nor, by law, were any of them women, traditionally in charge of early Islamic education in the home‖ (Schluessel, E.T. 2009, ‗Islam in Xinjiang: an ancient rival for a young China‘, The Guardian, 14 July http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/14/uighur- china-islam – Accessed 24 September 2009 – Attachment 49).
6. What is the likelihood of a Uighur woman being arrested, detained and tortured upon return to China if the Chinese authorities were aware of her attending meetings with Rebiyeh Kadeer in Australia?
Summary:
Reports presented below indicate that officials in Dadamtu village in Gulja view negatively persons associated with overseas separatist groups including those associated with Rabiyeh Kadeer. DFAT advice on the treatment upon return of failed Uighur asylum seekers involved with Uighur groups in Australia considered by the Chinese authorities to be advocating for separatism states that they would likely face penalties ranging from surveillance, detention, to re-education through labour. Amnesty International has indicated that the likely treatment may be more severe: in the case of a history of involvement in either political opposition movements or in the religious activities that are currently being repressed in the XUAR, then there is a strong risk of serious harm including arbitrary detention and torture or ill treatment. In November 2008, Radio Free Asia provided a report on the treatment of a woman – accused of breaching family planning regulations – and her family by local officials in Dadamtu village in Gulja. The report provides evidence that local officials in the village look unfavourably on those with suspected connections with ―separatists in America‘, a probable reference to Rebiya Kadeer:
A Uyghur father describes his pregnant daughter‘s capture by family planning officials in China‘s Xinjiang Autonomous Region.
RFA‘s Uyghur service recently interviewed the father of Arzigul, an ethnic Uyghur woman in China‘s northwestern Xinjiang region who was scheduled to undergo a second-term abortion against her will. After her case drew international attention, Arzigul was released to her family and allowed to continue her pregnancy.
Here, her father, Hasan Tursunjan, talks about how, after escaping from guards where she was being held, local authorities found Arzigul and forced her to return to the hospital that was to perform her abortion.
―Monday the police came to our home with more than 20 cars and took all of us—me, Arzigul‘s husband, and our family members—to our relatives‘ and friends‘ homes to search for Arzigul.‖
―It was a big operation—and they treated us very rudely. They confiscated all our cellphones, but I hid one. One of them, the Dadamtu town communist party secretary, was pushing my forehead and saying, ‗You have connections with the separatists in America—see if they can come and rescue your daughter or not.‘‖
―I was very upset at what he did to me and said, ‗I believe they will rescue us, if not today then tomorrow, and if not tomorrow then the day after tomorrow—they will eventually rescue us.‘‖
―My youngest son was upset and rushed to us and shouted… ‗Don‘t touch my father!‘ The [official] immediately called a few police over and they arrested him. They took him away with a car.‖
I tried to lead them away
―When the car I was in came close to the Gulja electrical power station, I saw many police cars were next to a residential neighborhood. I heard from police that they learned my daughter Arzigul was in this neighborhood but they didn‘t know where,‖ he said.
―I was very scared when I heard this from the police. I tried to lead them away from the area. I told them, ‗Let‘s go to my relative‘s house in the city. I will take you all there.‘ They agreed to follow me, but not all of them came with us. Most stayed around that neighborhood.‖
―After they searched a house in the city, they took me back to the suspected neighborhood. I saw many police cars. Many people from the neighborhood were watching. My daughter was leaning against the wall of one the buildings and crying. I was very sad…I rushed to her and embraced her. I told her not to cry and wiped her tears.‖
―One of the police told me, ‗your daughter didn‘t want to get into the police car—you tell her to get into the car. We don‘t want to touch her because she is pregnant.‘ I said, ‗why I should do that? I don‘t want her get into the car of a killer.‘‖
Won‘t anyone listen to justice?
―They started to threaten me. I was very upset. I started to shout at the crowd very loudly. ‗Look everyone, these killers want to abort my daughter‘s 7-month-old unborn baby! Listen to me! Won‘t anyone listen to justice? I can‘t ask the government or these killers! That is why I have to ask you!‘ I could see the anger in the eyes of the people, and especially in the eyes of the youngsters. But no one could do anything. If anyone got involved they would be arrested or killed.‖
―After a while, I noticed that my daughter was shaking. She had only a few clothes on. The police were telling us to get into the car. We demanded that they release my son and bring him to us. My daughter said, ‗It was I who escaped. My father and siblings have nothing to do with this. Release my brother first and then I will get into the car and go with you.‘‖
―The police brought my son, Heytem, back and released him to us. Then we got into the car and they took us directly to the Ghulja Women and Children‘s Hospital.‖
Studying Islam is illegal
―Arzigul had been hiding at her friend‘s house. They met each other when they were studying clothing design in school. She was a ‗Talip Kiz‘ [a woman who is studying religion]. The government hates these people and says that studying Islam is illegal...‖
―When the police were searching for Arzigul they threatened her friend saying her house would be destroyed. They searched the house and turned everything upside down. When they finally found my daughter they took her outside and told her to get into the car. I arrived right at that moment.‖
―They didn‘t have a chance to interrogate Arzigul‘s friend at that moment, as far as I know, but after the authorities finish working on my daughter‘s case I believe they will eventually get to her‖ (‗Won‘t Anyone Listen to Justice?‘ 2008, Radio Free Asia, 19 November http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghur-justice-11192008165957.html – Accessed 17 September 2009 – Attachment 50).
In March 2006, DFAT advised on the treatment upon return of Uighurs involved in Uighur groups in Australia. Based on this report, such people would likely face penalties ranging from surveillance, detention, to re-education through labour.
A.1. It is not possible to say definitively how Chinese authorities would treat a particular individual who returned to China after being involved in a Uighur group in Australia. It is likely that the Chinese authorities seek to monitor Uighur groups in Australia and obtain information on their membership and supporters. On return to China, it is likely that the authorities would at least put such people under surveillance and might detain them for interview.
Whether the person would face more serious consequences could be influenced by whether China perceived the person‘s activities outside of China as amounting to criminal activities. China regards separatist activities (eg calling for Xinjiang‘s independence from China) as criminal, regardless of whether the person was in China or in another country when he or she carried out such activities. In determining what constitutes separatist activity, China does not make a significant distinction between non-violent political calls for Xinjiang independence and advocacy of violence (although the latter would likely attract more severe punishment).
If the Chinese authorities establish that the person has been in contact with any of the four East Turkistan organisations which China considers to be terrorist organisations (the East Turkistan Liberation Organisation, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, the World Uighur Youth Congress and the East Turkistan Information Centre), it is likely that the Chinese authorities would consider that the individual has been involved in criminal activities. The use of ―East Turkistan‖ in naming an organisation would be perceived by China as indicating that an organisation has separatist intentions.
Depending on the level of the individual‘s involvement in Uighur organisations, if on return to China the individual renounced his or her previous political sentiment and promised to cease any political activity, the Chinese authorities might act more leniently – for example, the authorities might interview the person and possibly put him or her in administrative detention (re-education through labour) for a period. On the other hand, if the individual continued to be politically active, he or she would likely face more serious consequences.
A.2. As noted above, the consequences for the individual on return to China would be related to his or her level of involvement with the organisation outside of China, as well as the individual‘s behaviour on return to China. The more involved the individual had been in a Uighur organisation outside of China, the more likely that China became aware of the individual‘s activities (with repercussions as outlined above) (DIMIA Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No. 06/18 – China: Return of Australian Uighur Association Members, (sourced from DFAT advice of 26 May 2006), 26 May – Attachment 51).
Amnesty International-Canada stated in June 2005 that if the Chinese government suspects that a Uighur asylum seeker has a history of involvement in political opposition movements currently being repressed in the XUAR, ―there is a strong risk of serious human rights violations, including arbitrary detention and torture or ill treatment‖:
Uighurs who are suspected by the Chinese authorities to have claimed asylum will, at the very least, be questioned upon their return to China. Due to their ethnic minority status, Uighur asylum seekers who are forcibly returned are likely to be viewed by the Chinese authorities as political suspects and face arbitrary detention or imprisonment. A returnee would raise suspicion due to their expired passport, or lack of passport, and due to their lengthy absence from China without any legal travel documentation. In this context, it is important to note that Article 322 of the Chinese Criminal Law makes ―illegally crossing a national boundary‖ an offence punishable by up to one year in prison.
In addition, if the authorities suspect a Uighur of seeking asylum abroad, and/or if they suspect a history of involvement in either political opposition movements or in the religious activities that are currently being repressed in the XUAR, then this person would come under further scrutiny. Under these circumstances, there is a strong risk of serious human rights violations, including arbitrary detention and torture or ill treatment. If a Uighur is suspected of playing a leading role in organizing ―separatist‖, ―terrorist‖ or ―illegal religious‖ activities, they would face a long period of imprisonment, or possibly the death sentence and execution (Amnesty International-Canada 2005, Amnesty International concerns on Uighur asylum seekers and refugees, June http://www.amnesty.ca/Refugee/Concerns_Uighur_June2005.pdf – Accessed 17 January 2006 – Attachment 53).
In May 2002 Amnesty International-Canada stated that ―members of the Uighur community will, at the very least, be questioned by the authorities upon their return to China‖:
Amnesty International is concerned about the forcible return of Uighurs to China. The China research desk at Amnesty International‘s International Secretariat reports that an ethnic Uighur returned to China would likely face harsher treatment than a non-Uighur returned under the same conditions. Due to their visible minority status, Uighur asylum seekers who are returned to China are likely to be viewed by the Chinese authorities as political suspects and face imprisonment. This concern has been heightened by a new political crackdown against suspected Uighur opponents and religious leaders in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), launched by the Chinese authorities after the 2001 September 11 attacks in the USA.
Members of the Uighur community will, at the very least, be questioned by the authorities upon their return to China. Those who departed illegally from China will raise suspicions about their absence from China. Those who authorities believe have sought political asylum are likely to be detained and tortured.
Amnesty International has documented various cases in which Uighur asylum seekers who were forcibly returned to China, were detained, reportedly tortured and in some cases sentenced to death after their return. These include the case of Yasim Kari, aged 35, and Abla Karim, who have been detained in Kashgar, China, since September 1998, when they were forcibly returned to the XUAR from Kazakhstan:
They are reported to be still detained but it is not known whether they have been charged. Amnesty International is concerned that they are reported to be detained for seeking political asylum abroad (ASA 17/18/99, p.31) (Amnesty International-Canada 2002, Amnesty International concerns regarding Uighurs in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), China, May http://amnesty.ca/Refugee/Concerns_Uighur.htm – Accessed 14 April 2003 – Attachment 34).
For information on the monitoring of dissident groups, including Uighur groups, in Australia by the Chinese government, see Research Response CHN32643 (RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response CH32643, 21 November – Attachment 54).
List of Sources Consulted
Internet Sources:
Government Information & Reports Congressional-Executive Commission on China website http://www.cecc.gov/ United Nations (UN) UN News Centre website http://www.un.org/ Non-Government Organisations World Uyghur Congress website http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/ Uyghur Human Rights Project website http://uhrp.org/ International News & Politics The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/ BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/ Radio Free Asia website http://www.rfa.org/english/ The Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/ Asia Timesr http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ Time http://www.time.com/ Search Engines Google search engine http://www.google.com.au/ Databases:
FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIAC Country Information database) REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Research & Information database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) RRT Library Catalogue
List of Attachments
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3. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009, ‗Xinjiang Authorities Continue Detentions, Announce Arrests Connected to July 5 Incident‘, 14 September http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=128326 – Accessed 21 September 2009.
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8. ‗Angry Uighurs defy Chinese police‘ 2009, BBC News, 7 July http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8137512.stm#map – Accessed 18 September 2009.
9. ‗Tight Security in Xinjiang‘ 2009, Radio Free Asia, 7 July http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/security_in_xinjiang-07062009174105.html – Accessed 18 September 2009.
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31. RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response CHN33210, 16 April.
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48. US Department of State 2008, International Religious Freedom Report 2008 – China, 19 September.
49. Schluessel, E.T. 2009, ‗Islam in Xinjiang: an ancient rival for a young China‘, The Guardian, 14 July http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/14/uighur- china-islam – Accessed 24 September 2009.
50. ‗Won‘t Anyone Listen to Justice?‘ 2008, Radio Free Asia, 19 November http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghur-justice-11192008165957.html – Accessed 17 September 2009.
51. DIMIA Country Information Service 2006, Country Information Report No. 06/18 – China: Return of Australian Uighur Association Members, (sourced from DFAT advice of 26 May 2006), 26 May. (Cisnet China – CX154325).
52. Deleted. 53. Amnesty International-Canada 2005, Amnesty International concerns on Uighur asylum seekers and refugees, June http://www.amnesty.ca/Refugee/Concerns_Uighur_June2005.pdf – Accessed 17 January 2006.
54. RRT Research & Information 2007, Research Response CH32643, 21 November.