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ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2020 Hiring and Retention of Minorities, Women, and Persons with Disabilities in the United States Intelligence Community

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ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2020 Hiring and Retention of Minorities, Women, and Persons with Disabilities in the United States Intelligence Community OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2020 Hiring and Retention of Minorities, Women, and Persons with Disabilities in the United States Intelligence Community This report was prepared by the Office of Intelligence Community Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (IC DEI) in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Please direct inquiries regarding this report to the ODNI Office of Legislative Affairs at (703) 275-2474. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC REPORT OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2020 Hiring and Retention of Minorities, Women, and Persons with Disabilities in the United States Intelligence Community iv OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PURPOSE This report was prepared in response to the National Security Act of 1947, Section 114 [50 U.S.C. 3050] as amended, and Congressional directive under Public Law 116-92, section 5704,1 which requires the Director of National Intelligence to submit an annual demographic report on the employment of minorities, women, and persons with disabilities (PWD). This report summarizes the aggregate representation of individuals employed in the Intelligence Community (IC), pay grade representation, hiring, promotion, and attrition of minorities, women and PWD within the IC during Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 (October 1, 2019 to September 30, 2020). The IC’s Annual Demographic Report has been published publicly since 2016 to provide transparency into the IC’s progress and ongoing efforts to increase demographic diversity. THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) leads the IC in intelligence integration. The following agencies are considered the “Big Six” and comprise the majority of the total IC workforce: • Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) • National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) • Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) • National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) • Federal Bureau of Investigation • National Security Agency (NSA) Intelligence Branch (FBI/IB) 1 The IC’s mission is described in a number of foundational documents including the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended. Key intelligence consumers include the President of the United States, the National Security Council, members of Congress, the military, policymakers, federal law enforcement agencies, and their partners. FY 2020 ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC REPORT v The remaining IC elements are all subcomponents of larger organizations whose missions are broader than conducting intelligence activities: Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Office of United States Air Force (USAF), Intelligence Surveillance National Security Intelligence (ONSI) Reconnaissance (ISR) Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Intelligence and United States Army (USA), U.S. Army Intelligence Counterintelligence (IN) United States Coast Guard (USCG), Coast Guard Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Intelligence (CGI) (part of DHS) Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) United States Marine Corps (USMC), Marine Corps Department of State (DoS), Bureau of Intelligence and Intelligence Activity (MCIA) Research (INR) United States Navy (USN), Naval Intelligence Activity Department of Treasury (USDT), Office of Intelligence and (NIA) Analysis (OIA) • United States Space Force (USSF)2 Figure 1: Intelligence Community Elements The 2019 National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America defines the IC Mission as: “Provide timely, insightful, objective, and relevant intelligence and support to inform national security decisions and to protect our Nation and its interests.”1 INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION Office of the Director of National Intelligence PROGRAM MANAGERS Central Intelligence Defense FBI, National National Geospatial- National National Agency Intelligence Security Intelligence Agency Reconnaissance Security Agency Branch Office Agency DEPARTMENTAL DEA, National Security DOE, Office DHS, Office of DoS, Bureau of USDT, Office of Intelligence of Intelligence Intelligence & Intelligence and Intelligence and Counterintelligence Analysis Research Analysis SERVICES USA, Intelligence and USAF, Intelligence USCG, Coast USMC, Marine USN, United States Security Command Surveillance Guard Intelligence Corps Intelligence Naval Intelligence Space Force Reconnaissance Activity Activity 2 The United States Space Force became a member of the Intelligence Community on January 8, 2021. The agency’s data will not be included in this FY 2020 report. vi OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ODNI is charged with leading a coalition of agencies and organizations (elements) by providing intelligence integration for the Intelligence Community (IC). The elements fall within the Executive Branch of the United States government and work both independently and collectively to gather and analyze the intelligence necessary to conduct foreign relations and national security activities. The IC’s mission is to provide timely, insightful, objective, and relevant intelligence to inform decisions on national security issues and events.3 Members of the IC provide the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers and warfighters need to protect American lives and interests anywhere in the world.4 Global threats are projected to expand and diversify, to include cyber threats, election threats, weapons of mass destruction and proliferation, terrorism, counterintelligence, and emerging and disruptive technologies. Artificial intelligence, biotechnology, space and counterspace, environment and climate change, global health, and human displacement are among the topics vital to U.S. intelligence interests. The IC’s workforce must have the skills to understand these threats, including the relevant cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise relevant to country and regional threats from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran; and regions such as South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, North Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. The skills required in the IC’s workforce vary greatly and are aligned to IC elements’ focus areas — science, technology, engineering, the arts, mathematics, law, computer science, human resources, business, cybersecurity, accounting, acquisition, communications, public affairs, language, regional expertise, finance, and liberal arts. 3 The IC’s mission is described in several foundational documents including the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, the National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America (2019), and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended. 4 “Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community”, January 29, 2019. FY 2020 ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC REPORT vii OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CONTENTS Purpose ....................................................................................................................................................................................v The United States Intelligence Community .............................................................................................................................v Executive Summary .................................................................................................................................................................1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................................................................................3 Demographic Diversity in the IC ..............................................................................................................................................5 Minorities ...........................................................................................................................................................................6 Women ............................................................................................................................................................................10 Persons with Disabilities .................................................................................................................................................14 Diversity in Leadership ...........................................................................................................................................................17 Comparing the Six Largest Elements to the Remaining IC Elements ...................................................................................18 Minorities .........................................................................................................................................................................18 Women ............................................................................................................................................................................18 Persons with Disabilities .................................................................................................................................................19 Joint IC Initiatives ...................................................................................................................................................................20 IC Workforce Development Activities ....................................................................................................................................23
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