A Case of Injustice? The Trial of John Bellingham

by KATHLEEN s. GODDARD*

The names Spencer Perceval and John Bellingham are not famous Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 names. They do not feature prominently in history lessons. Few people, if asked, can accurately state any factual information about either man. However, their story is an interesting one, in that Spencer Perceval is the only British Prime Minister to have been assassinated whilst in office. In 1812, he was assassinated by John Bellingham, who was tried and execut• ed for the murder. This article is a consideration of the circumstances sur• rounding the assassination, and an assessment of the fairness of the subse• quent trial and execution of John Bellingham.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1812, the year in which the assassination took place, George III was King of England; however, due to the King's mental condition, the Prince of Wales had been appointed as Regent.' Spencer Perceval, a Tory, was Prime Minister, having been appointed to this office in 1809, follow• ing the death of the Duke of Portland.2 On the international front, Britain had been at war with France since 1793, although there had been a short break in hostilities following the Treaty of Amiens in 1802. Commencing in 1806, in an attempt to weaken Britain, Napoleon had imposed a blockade on Britain by means of a series of Decrees) The measures involved the confiscation of British goods, wherever seized, and also a prohibition on ships which had used British ports from entering French ports.s In essence, French citizens, allies of the French and also neutral countries were prohibited from trading with Britain or her colonies.> Commencing in 1807, Britain had adopted

*Visiting Research Scholar, Institute of Maritime Law, Faculty of Law, University of Southampton, England. LL.B., University of Birmingham; LL.M., University of London; Solicitor. I. Joanna Richardson, George IV: A Portrait, Sidgewick and Jackson, London, 1966, at 105-107,112. 2. Haydn's Dictionary of Dates, 18th Edn., by Benjamin Vincent, Ward, Lock and Co., London, 1885, at 632. 3. The principal Decrees were the Berlin Decree of 1806, and the Milan Decree of 1807. G.M. Trevelyan, British History in the Nineteenth Century and After (1792-1919), (hereafter 'Trevelyan'), Longmans, Green and Co, London, New York, Toronto, New Impression 1944, at 128. 4. The Life and Times ofHenry Lord Brougham, written by himself(hereafter 'Brougham, Life and Times'), 3 vols., William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1871, vol. 2 at 3. 5. Trevelyan at 128. 2 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XLVI retaliatory measures by means of Orders in Council,« and imposed a simi• lar blockade on the French." The latter involved a British blockade of the French coast, and a prohibition on ships which had used French ports from entering British ports.e The blockade extended to all countries which enforced the Napoleonic decrees, and neutral ships were stopped and

searched to prevent them trading with the enemy.? Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 The blockade imposed by the Orders in Council had severe effects on both the manufacturing industry and the working classes in England. 10 America, which was neutral, had responded, following the Chesapeake incident.t! by instituting a trade embargo on foreign countries which vio• lated her rights.R Inevitably, as a result of the trade situation, British industry had been severely compromised by the inability to import raw materials,I3 and the closure of foreign markets.r- Moreover, as a result of these issues, Britain and America were heading towards war.l> In April 1812, it was agreed that an enquiry should take place into the effects of the Orders in Council on trade and manufacturing in England before a Committee of the whole House of Commons.Ie That Committee was in session on 11 May 1812, when the assassination of the Prime Minister, Spencer Perceval, occurred in the lobby of the House of Commons. Perceval, a staunch supporter of the Orders in Council.!? was late for the Committee session, and Henry Brougham, an implacable opponent of the Orders in Council, had refused to wait for him and had proceeded with the examination of one of the witnesses.tf Brougham

6. The initial Orders in Council had been imposed by the Whig administration in 1807, but were subsequently continued and extended by the Tories. Brougham Life and Times at 2,4. 7. Brougham, Life and Times at 4,5. 8. Brougham, Life and Times at 4. 9. Trevelyan at 128. 10. Arthur Aspinall. Lord Brougham and The Whig Party, Manchester University Press, 1927 at 24 -25. 11. The British frigate the Leopard opened fire on the Chesapeake, an American frigate, in 1807 because the American vessel was suspected of having British naval deserters on board. Hugh Brogan, The Pelican History of the United States of America, (hereafter 'Brogan'), Pelican, 1986 at 259. 12. Ibid. The embargo was repealed in 1809 and replaced by a Non-Intercourse Act. 13. Brogan at 259. 14. Trevelyan at 128 15. War was declared by America in June 1812, in ignorance of the fact that the Orders in Council were being repealed. Allan Nevins and Henry Steele Commager, A Pocket History of The United States, Pocket Books, New York, 7th Edn., 1981 at 140. The Orders in Council were actually withdrawn on 23 June, five days after America declared war. G.T. Garratt, Lord Brougham, Macmillan and Co, London, 1935 at 45. 16. Brougham, Life and Times at 13. 17. Chester W. New, The Life ofHenry Brougham to 1830, (hereafter 'New'), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961 at 63. 18. Ibid. Brougham was irked by Perceval's lateness, and a messenger had been sent to Downing Street. The messenger had intercepted Perceval, who was en route for the House of Commons with his friend, James Stephen, the latter being the author of the Orders in 2004 THE TRIAL OF JOHN OF BELLINGHAM 3 heard the shot and continued with his examination, thinking it was "a pis• tol which had gone off in some one's pocket in the gallery, the sound being deadened." 19 In fact, the situation was far from the accidental dis• charge of a pistol: the Prime Minister had been shot dead.

THE ASSASSINATION Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021

The facts relating to the actual assassination appear to be well docu• mented, and the accounts of the murder are consistent. It appears that on Monday, 11 May 1812, Spencer Perceval was proceeding through the Lobby of the House of Commons on his way to the Chamber, when he was shot by John Bellingham at close range. The bullet entered Perceval's chest. He was carried to the office of the Speaker's secretary, and a doctor was called. However, his death was almost instantaneous, as the bullet had entered his heart.2o After firing the fatal shot, Bellingham admitted that he had commit• ted the murder,21 and did not attempt to escape.22 After being initially taken to the bar of the House of Commons, he was conducted to the prison room of the Serjeant-at-Arms23 in the Palace of Westminster, and was committed by Michael Angelo Taylor, a Middlesex magistrate.24 Later that night he was transferred to Newgate Gao1.25 He was tried for

Council. Perceval consequently left his friend and hurried towards the House of Commons, and on entering the lobby became the victim of the assassin's bullet. Brougham, Life and Times at 15; Henry Lord Brougham, Historical Sketches of Who Flourished in the Time of George Ill, (Hereafter 'Brougham, Historical Sketches'), Charles Knight, London, 1840 at 251-252. 19. Brougham, Life and Times at 15. 20. R v Bellingham. Session Papers, Justice Hall, Old Bailey, 1811-1813. Fifth Session, 1812., 263-274, evidence of William Smith, William Lynn and Henry Burgess at 263-264. See also The Rev. George Croly, The Life and Times of His Late Majesty, George The Fourth: with Anecdotes ofDistinguished Persons ofthe Last Fifty Years, (hereafter 'Croly'), James Duncan, London, 1830 at 383; Brougham, Life and Times at 15-16; Mollie Gillen, Assassination of the Prime Minister The Shocking Death of Spencer Perceval, (hereafter 'Gillen'), Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1972 at 3-5; Memoirs of The Life of Sir Samuel Romilly, Written By Himself With A Selection From His Correspondence. Edited By His Sons. (hereafter 'Romilly'), John Murray. London. (3 Vols), 1840, vol. III at 34. John C. Woodiwiss and Christine Campbell Thomson, Murder and Sudden Death, (hereafter 'Woodiwiss and Thomson'), Quality Press Ltd., London, 1939 at 175-6. 21. R v Bellingham at 265. Evidence of Lieutenant Isaac Gascoyne. See also Romilly, vol. III at 35. 22. According to the evidence of Henry Burgess, Bellingham was seated on a bench in the lobby after the shot was fired; R v Bellingham at 264. Lieutenant Isaac Gascoyne testi• fied that when he entered the lobby after hearing the shot, Bellingham was seated on a bench. He seized him, but Bellingham 'said that he had submitted'. Ibid at 265. See also Brougham, Life and Times at 16; Romilly, vol. III at 35. 23. Gillen at 8,9. 24. Brougham, Life and Times at 16. 25. R v Bellingham at 267, Evidence of John Newman, keeper of Newgate. See also Gillen at 15-17. 4 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XLVI the murder at the Old Bailey four days later on Friday 15 May 1812.26

THE MOTIVE

There was initial uncertainty as to whether the assassination was politically motivated. This was not surprising, given the international Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 political situation, unrest in England as a result of the deprivations caused by the economic situation,27 and also the political stature of the victim. However, Bellingham assured those present following the murder that his motives were personal and not political; he asserted that his motivation was due to a "want of redress of grievance, and refusal by government,"28 and it soon became clear that he had acted alone.29 Since it was a "private injury" and "a want of redress" which had caused Bellingham to shoot Spencer Perceval, it is relevant to consider the circumstances leading up to the assassination. It appears that Bellingham's grievance resulted from his trading activities. Comparatively little has been written about Bellingham's early life, although he probably spent much of it in London.w Substantiated details of his life are sparse, but he appears to have joined a merchant's counting• house in London before going to Archangel in Russia, where he spent several years in the service of a Russian merchant)! He subsequently appears to have become a merchant in Liverpool,32 before leaving the city in 1804 to return to Archangel with his wife and son)3 During the later visit to Archangel problems arose in relation to two matters. Firstly, following the sinking of a ship34 in the White Sea, Bellingham was suspected of being the author of an anonymous letter to the vessel's insurers alleging fraud in relation to the insurance. This result-

26. Romilly, vol. III at 36; The Pictorial History ofEngland, 10vols., W&R Chambers, London, 1855, vol. VI, 1858, at 598. 27. Gillen at 7,8. Pictorial History ofEngland, vol. VI at 597. 28. R v Bellingham at 264; evidence of Henry Burgess, who said 'it was to that effect; I do not say that these were the exact words.' Gillen at 6-7 says that Bellingham's words were 'remembered variously and in varying sequences by the different hearers afterwards.' She quotes Bellingham as saying 'it is a private injury-I know what I have done. It was a denial of justice on the part of Government.' See also Stanley Jackson, The Old Bailey, (hereafter 'Jackson'), W.H. Allen, London, 1978 at 41. 29. Romilly, vol. III at 35; Pictorial History of England, vol. VI at 597. After the trial, Bellingham confirmed that he had acted alone; Sylvanus Urban, The Gentleman's Magazine: and Historical Chronicle (hereafter 'Gentleman's Magazine'), London, 1812, Vol. 82, Pt. I, at 663. 30. Gillen at 42-44. 31. Gillen at 48; Woodiwiss and Thomson at 178. 32. R v Bellingham at 268. Prisoner's Defence. 33. Gillen at 48,51. 34. The name of the ship is unclear. In the report of the trial (R v Bellingham at 268), the vessel is referred to as the Soleure. Gillen (at 53), gives the name of the ship as the Sojus or Soyuz. She appears to base this on Lloyds List 1803. However, according to Bellingham's evidence, the ship was lost in 1804. 2004 THE TRIAL OF JOHN OF BELLINGHAM 5

ed in the Lloyds underwriters refusing to pay the claim to the owners of the ship. The accusation that Bellingham had written the letter remained unsubstantiated)5 Secondly, Bellingham was alleged to be substantially in debt to Conrad Dorbecker,36 a merchant involved in the timber trade. Bellingham attempted to leave Archangel before the claims against

him were settled. However, he was prevented from doing so, and was Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 detained and subsequently imprisoned there.t? The question of the debt initially went to arbitration, where four arbitrators, two selected by each side, found unanimously against Bellingham, and decided that he was indebted to Dorbecker)8 Whilst Bellingham was in prison, the Duma con• firmed the arbitrators decision.J? Bellingham took the view that he had been unjustly treated, and denied that he owed the debt.4o Obviously, almost two centuries later, it is impossible to determine the truth as to whether he owed the money or not. The decision by the arbitrators found against him, and was confirmed by the Duma. However, at one point the Procureur of Archangel appears to have considered that Bellingham was the victim of injustice.s! If any evi• dence still exists in relation to the matter, it would probably be in Russia. As Gillen points out: For what happened in Archangel and subsequently in St Petersburg we have only Bellingham's side of the story, except for the statements of Lord Granville Leveson Gower, the British Ambassador, and Sir Stephen Shairp, the Consul• General, who accepted the word of the Russian authorities without, it seems, much investigation into the case.42 Woodiwiss and Thomson suggest that Bellingham probably did owe the

35. At his trial, Bellingham denied any involvement in the matter: R v Bellingham at 268. Lord Gower, in his letter to Lord Castlereagh (quoted in Gillen at 135-138), which was writ• ten after Bellingham's trial, states that the owners of the ship preferred criminal charges against Bellingham, but he was eventually acquitted as 'no satisfactory proof was adduced. See also Woodiwiss and Thomson at 179. c.f. Gillen at 53, who says the accusation was 'proved false' . 36. Gillen (at 53, 55,) is of the opinion that that the two incidents were linked in that Van Brieman, who partly owned the ship which sank, was an assignee of Dorbecker's debts fol• lowing Dorbecker's bankruptcy. 37. R v Bellingham at 268. Prisoner's Defence. See also letter from Lord Gower to Lord Castlereagh, (quoted in Gillen at 135-138); Gillen at 53-56; Woodiwiss and Thomson at 179. 38. Letter from Lord Gower to Lord Castlereagh, (quoted in Gillen at 135-138). See also Woodiwiss and Thomson at 178-179. The amount of the debt found to be due is uncertain. Gillen (at 59), quoting a petition by Bellingham, puts the sum at 4,890 roubles. The letter from Lord Gower to Lord Castlereagh, puts the amount at 2000 roubles. See also Woodiwiss and Thomson at 179. 39. Gillen at 58; Woodiwiss and Thomson at 179. 40. R v Bellingham at 268. Prisoner's Defence. 41. In his Defence Bellingham stated: 'I was afterwards enabled to make my case known through the Procureur-it was investigated, and he obtained a judgment against the military govemour and the senate'; R v Bellingham at 268. See also Gillen at 58: 'The Procureur of Archangel, one Ivan Fedorisch Makcemove, reported to Prince Lapuchin, the Minister of Justice, that Bellingham was "extremely ill used and illegally detained," and though no action resulted, it helped to improve his morale.' 42. Gillen at 52. 6 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XLVI debt, since his own arbitrators found that the debt was due.43 However, according to Bellingham, the amount originally claimed had been 38,000 roubles, but this was subsequently reduced to 4,890 roubles, and was finally reduced to 2000 roubles.44 If Bellingham's account is true, the dra• matic reduction in the debt may indicate that he was, at least initially, pur•

sued for a considerable amount of money which he did not owe. Equally, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 it could indicate that a genuine claim was made against him, but that on investigation of the position, a smaller amount than that originally claimed was actually found to be due. However, whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter, Bellingham was convinced that he did not owe any money, and that he had been unfairly and unjustly treated. In October 1805, Bellingham was permitted to leave Archangel and travel to St. Petersburg, where he apparently attempted to obtain redress from Russian officials. 45 Not only did he fail to obtain redress, he was imprisoned in St. Petersburg in appalling conditions for non-payment of the debt, before eventually being placed in the custody of the College of Commerce. 46 The latter body dealt with commercial disputes involving British subjects, and had been set up by a Treaty between England and Russia.s? The College decided that Bellingham should remain in custody until the debt was settled; he was however permitted to go out accompa• nied by an official.48 In 1807 Lord Granville Leveson Gower. the British Ambassador, suggested to the Russian authorities that, since it was unlikely that any money would be forthcoming from Bellingham, he should be released and sent back to England.49 However, despite this request from the Ambassador, and a subsequent petition from Bellingham to Tsar Alexander 1,50 the matter remained unresolved until 1809, when Bellingham was finally released by the Russian authorities and permitted to leave the country.51

43. Woodiwiss and Thomson at 179. 44. Gillen at 55, 63-64. At his trial, Bellingham only referred to the amount of 2000 rou• bles; R v Bellingham at 268. 45. According to Gillen (at 63), he 'impeached his Excellency the Governor-General to the Imperial Senate "for having publicly sanctioned an improper oath knowing it to be so", for having lied to British consular officials, and for the illegal detention he had suffered. He also demanded remuneration for the losses incurred while he had been prevented from trans• acting business.' 46. R v Bellingham at 268; Prisoner's Defence. See also Gillen at 63,64. 47. Gillen at 64; Woodiwiss and Thomson at 179-180. 48. Gillen at 65; Woodiwiss and Thomson at 180. 49. Letter from Lord Gower to Lord Castlereagh, quoted in Gillen at 135-138. See also Gillen at 66. 50. The international situation existing at the time can have done little to assist Bellingham in that in 1807, after the defeat of the Russian army at Friedland, Tsar Alexander I became an ally of Napoleon. In secret articles to the Tilsit Treaty, the Tsar agreed that if England remained at war, Russia would join and enforce the blockade against British goods, and also force Denmark, Sweden, Portugal and Austria to enforce the blockade. Treveyan at 118, 120; H.A.L. Fisher, A History ofEurope, Edward Arnold Ltd, 1936, repro 1961, at 848. 51. R v Bellingham at 268. Prisoner's Defence. See also Gillen at 66-68. 2004 THE TRIAL OF JOHN OF BELLINGHAM 7

Bellingham had therefore been detained in Russia for five years in relation to the debt, and for much of that time he had been subject to some form of confinement. Since he took the view, rightly or wrongly, that he did not owe the money, it is hardly surprising that he also took the view that he had been extremely ill-used in relation to the matter.

Bellingham considered that the British Ambassador, Lord Granville Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 Leveson Gower, and the British Consul, had failed adequately to protect his interests52 during the period in Russia.53 Therefore, following his return to England in December 1809, Bellingham set about seeking redress and compensation in relation to his grievances.54 Over a period of two and a half years, he wrote to the then Foreign Secretary (the Marquis of Wellesley), the Privy Council, the Treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, (who at that stage was Spencer Perceval),55 and the Home Office. 56 He also saw the Member of Parliament for Liverpool,57 and peti• tioned the Prince Regent. The latter referred Bellingham's petition to the Treasury.58 At each stage Bellingham received a negative response, to the effect that no assistance or compensation would be forthcoming.59 After exhausting what he considered to be the normal channels to obtain redress for the wrongs that he considered he had suffered, on 23 March 1812 Bellingham wrote to the Bow Street Magistrates in the following terms:

52. R v Bellingham at 268, Prisoner's Defence. See also Brougham, Historical Sketches at 252. 53. Lord Granville was recalled in 1807 when England and Russia severed diplomatic relations, and he was therefore not present in Russia for the last two years of the dispute involving Bellingham. Croly at 384; Gillen at 65-66; Woodiwiss and Thomson at 181. Woodiwiss and Thomson suggest (at 180), that the Ambassador in fact tried to help Bellingham. They state that he 'treated him with the greatest kindness and courtesy, and fre• quently sent him small sums of money, which enabled the unfortunate man to meet the costs of bare existence.' See also letter from Lord Gower to Lord Castlereagh (quoted in Gillen at 135-138), 'He came frequently to my house, and at various times received from my private secretary small sums of money to support him during his confinement.' 54. R v Bellingham at 268. Prisoner's Defence. Bellingham appears to have sought either compensation for his losses from the Government, (Romilly, vol. III, at 35; Pictorial History of England, vol. VI at 597-598), or assistance from the Government in pursuing his griev• ances against the Russian Government (Jackson at 42). 55. R v Bellingham at 268-269, Prisoner's Defence; Gillen at 70-71; Woodiwiss and Thomson at 181-182. Spencer Perceval in fact combined the office of Prime Minister with that of Chancellor of the Exchequer. 56. Gillen at 76. 57. Lieutenant General Isaac Gascoyne, Member of Parliament for Liverpool, was in a committee room of the House of Commons when the assassination occurred, and heard the fatal pistol shot. In evidence at Bellingham's trial, he said that Bellingham had come to see him in Liverpool in April 1812. R v Bellingham at 265. After his return to England Bellingham had resumed business as a ship-broker in Liverpool. Gascoyne was therefore his Member of Parliament. Gillen at 74; Woodiwiss and Thomson at 181,182. 58. R v Bellingham at 269, Prisoner's Defence; See also Woodiwiss and Thomson at 182. 59. R v Bellingham at 269, Prisoner's Defence. See also Gillen at 70, 76-77; Woodiwiss and Thomson at 181-182. Pictorial History ofEngland, vol. VI at 597-598. 8 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XLVI

...1consider His Majesty's Government to have completely endeavoured to close the door of justice, in declining to have, or even permit, my grievances to be brought before Parliament for redress, which privilege is the birthright of every individual. He asked for their assistance in obtaining redress from Government Ministers, and concluded his letter as follows: Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 Should this reasonable request be finally denied, I shall then feel justified in exe• cuting justice myself-in which case I shall be ready to argue the merits of so reluctant a measure with His Majesty's Attorney-General, wherever and whenev• er I may be called upon to do so; in the hopes of averting so abhorrent but com• pulsive an alternative, I have the honour to be, Sirs Your very humble and obedient Servant, John Bellingham.60 The letter was passed by the Chief Magistrate to the appropriate Government officials. Bellingham addressed further letters to the Treasury. When he sought a response in person, he again received a nega• tive reply. The official who saw him, a Mr. Hill, on being informed by Bellingham that he would take justice into his own hands, told him that he could take such measures as he thought appropriate.61 Bellingham did so. On 11 May 1812, he shot the Prime Minister, Spencer Perceval.

THE TRIAL

The assassination of Spencer Perceval occurred on Monday, 11 May 1812. The trial of John Bellingham for the murder took place at the Old Bailey only four days later, on Friday 15 May,62 before Sir James Mansfield (Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas), Mr. Justice Grose, Baron Graham, the Lord Mayor of the City of London, and the Recorder of the City. Bellingham pleaded "Not Guilty", and, after the prosecution witnesses had given evidence, he presented his own defence. Indeed, he had no alternative but to present his own defence, for the com• mon law rule at that time was that, in the case of capital crimes, except for treason, prisoners could not be represented by counsel unless a point of law was in issue; judges also allowed counsel to assist in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. 63 In setting out his defence in rela-

60. The full text of the letter is quoted in R v Bellingham at 269, Prisoner's Defence. 61. Gillen at 78-80; Woodiwiss and Thomson at 184. 62. Pictorial History ofEngland, vol. VI at 598. 63. A.H. Manchester, A Modem Legal History ofEngland and Wales 1750-1950, (here• after 'Manchester'), Butterworths, London, 1980 at 168. See also David Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, (hereafter 'Bentley'), Hambledon Press, London and Rio Grande, 1998 at 105: 'It had since as early as the fifteenth century been customary in capital cases to allow prisoners to have counsel to argue law. In the course of the eigh• teenth century a further exception had been added: judges began to permit prisoners in felony cases to have counsel to examine and cross-examine witnesses.' See further John H. Langbein The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, (hereafter 'Langbein'), Oxford University Press, 2003 at 171: 'The judges permitted counsel to assist the defendant in 2004 THE TRIAL OF JOHN OF BELLINGHAM 9 tion to the issues, Bellingham addressed the court about the wrongs which he considered he had suffered, and his attempts to obtain redress from various Government departments. He took the view that, under the cir• cumstances, his action was completely justified.64 Bellingham did have legal representation,65 and his counsel took a 66 point of law on his behalf. The legal issue involved was the question of Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 Bellingham's sanity, and his counsel applied for an adjournment of the trial so that witnesses could be brought from Liverpool, where Bellingham had been living, and elsewhere, to attest to the fact that Bellingham was insane.67 However, the Attorney General argued that Bellingham had been in London for some time prior to the assassination, and had not shown signs of insanity during that period.68 The application for a postponement was refused, on the basis that the affidavits produced by the defence did not relate to Bellingham's recent mental condition, and it was only his mental condition at the time the crime was committed which was rele• vant.69 In the circumstances, the only witnesses that his counsel produced as to Bellingham's mental condition were his cousin Ann Billett, a Mrs. Mary Clarke, and the housemaid from his London lodgings.70 The plea of insanity was unsuccessful. Bellingham was found guilty of the murder of Spencer Perceval and sentenced to death. He was hanged on Monday, 18 May 1812, and his body handed over for dissection."! The assassination, and the trial and execution of the perpetrator, had all taken place in the space of one week.

examining and cross-examining witnesses, but they forbade him to "address the court" that is, to comment on the evidence or to narrate the accused's version of events.' The rule was not changed until 1836, when An Act for enabling Persons indicted of Felony to make their Defence by Counselor Attorney ( 6&7 William IV, Ch. 114), was passed. 64. R v Bellingham at 267-270. Prisoner's Defence; See also Pictorial History of England, vol. VI at 598. 65. Bellingham was represented by Peter Alley and Henry Revell Reynolds. Gentleman's Magazine, London, 1812, Vol. 82, Pt. I. at 660; Gillen at 90. 66. Although the report in the Old Bailey Session Papers is not specific in relation to this matter, in addition to taking a point of law, Bellingham's counsel also appear to have exam• ined the defence witnesses. See ante n. 63. 67. The application for an adjournment does not appear in the report in the Old Bailey Session Papers. However, a brief account of this part of the trial appears in the Gentleman's Magazine, 1812, Vol. 82, Pt. I. at 660. The Old Bailey Session Papers compressed reports of the trials, and therefore did not necessarily report all aspects of the case. For a history of the Sessions Papers, see Langbein at 182-190. 68. Gentleman's Magazine, 1812, Vol. 82, Pt. I. at 660. 69. Ibid. 70. R v Bellingham at 270-272. According to Gillen (Chapter 11), Mary Stevens had arrived in London on 6 May and was still in London at the time of the assassination. Miss Stevens apparently lived with the Bellingham family in Liverpool, and ran a millinery busi• ness in partnership with Bellingham's wife (ibid. at 73,74). However, although she visited Bellingham in prison the day before the trial, she appears to have returned to Liverpool (ibid. at 40) and did not appear as a witness in relation to Bellingham's state of mind. 71. Pictorial History ofEngland, vol. VI at 598. 10 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XLVI

THE LAW RELATING TO INSANITY IN 1812

It must be borne in mind that Bellingham's case was tried before the M'Naghten Rules relating to insanity were laid down.72 It is therefore necessary to establish the law relating to insanity in 1812, before any analysis can be made relating to the justice or injustice of Bellingham's Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 conviction for murder. Holdsworth, in considering the law relating to insanity, refers to the question of intention, and says: "No felony or murder," says Coke, "can be committed without a felonious intent and purpose ..." For this reason, insanity was a bar either to the institution or the continuance of criminal proceedings.73 Holdsworth goes on to explain74 that the question of what the law has considered to be insanity which exonerates the accused from criminallia• bility, has differed at different periods of history. He continues: Professor Kenny says, "At one time the view prevailed that no lunatic ought to escape punishment unless he was so totally deprived of understanding and mem• ory as to be as ignorant of what he was doing as a wild beast."> But ever since the epoch-making speech of Erskine in defence of Hadfield (in the year 1800), a view at once more rational and humane has prevailed, which bases the test upon the presence or absence of the faculty of distinguishing right from wrong."76 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen considered the historical authorities in rela• tion to insanity, and took the view that in the cases up to, including, and beyond Hadfield there had not been an opportunity for a solemn argument and judgment, laying down the principles of law by which the relation of insanity to crime may be determined.Z?

72. The M'Naghten Rules were laid down in 1843: M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 Cl. and Fin. 200. 73. W.S. Holdsworth. A History ofEnglish Law, 17 Vols., Methuen, London, 1903-1972, (hereafter 'Holdsworth'), vol. VIII, 1925 at 439. 74. Ibid. at 440. 75. See Tracy 1. in Arnold's Case (1724) 16 St. Tr. 695 at 764-765. 'If he was under the visitation of God, and could not distinguish between good and evil, and did not know what he did, though he committed the greatest offence, yet he could not be guilty of any offence against any law whatsoever; for guilt arises from the mind, and the wicked will and intention of the man. If a man be deprived of his reason, and consequently of his intention, he cannot be guilty; ...it is not every kind of frantic humour or something unaccountable in a man's actions, that points him out to be such a madman as to be exempted from punishment: it must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the subject of punishment. ' 76. Holdsworth, vol. VIII at 440. 77. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, 3 vols. London, 1883, vol. 2, at 151. He points out that, although the question of insanity was dis• cussed in each of these cases, in Arnold's Case, it was a direction given to the jury by a sin• gle judge; in R v Lord Ferrers, (1760) 19 St. Tr. 886, Lord Ferrers was tried by his peers, who gave no reasons; in Hadfield's Case, (1800) 27 St. Tr. 1281, Lord Kenyon stopped the trial. Ibid, at 151-2. 2004 THE TRIAL OF JOHN OF BELLINGHAM 11

Consequently, the judges in charging the juries repeated each other with variations of language required by the particular circumstances of the different cases.78 Brett and Waller also suggest that a specific test for insanity had not been laid down for use in all cases that raised the issue of insanity, but that the test most commonly used in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 was the ability to distinguish between good and evil, or right and wrong."? Holdsworth pointed out that a more difficult question was the ques• tion of partial insanity, where a person 'is clearly not sane, and yet not wholly bereft of reason.'80 and adds that this part of the law was "fluid" because the law was susceptible to change as a result of progress made by medical science and changes in medical theory.81 Holdsworth took the view that this aspect of the law was not clarified until the M'Naghten Rules were laid down in 1843.82 In relation to the period prior to 1843, he cites Hale's view that partial insanity would not absolve the accused in the case of a capital crime, although each case had to be treated on its sep• arate merits. 83 On this view, before 1843, a totally insane person would not be held criminally responsible for their actions; however, a partially insane person who could use their reason in relation to some matters, or who suffered 'from excessive griefs or fears' in relation to certain matters, would remain criminally responsible.84 Apparently, a distinction had to be drawn between an eccentric person, and a person who was truly insane.85 In summing up for the jury in Bellingham's case, the Lord Chief Justice, Sir James Mansfield, set out the law relating to insanity in accor• dance with the above principles. He said: With respect to this the law was extremely clear, if a man was deprived of all power of reasoning, so as not to be able to distinguish whether it was right or wrong to commit the most wicked, or the most innocent transaction, he could not

78. Ibid. at 152. See also Sir Leon Radzinowicz and Roger Hood, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administrationfrom 1750, Vol. 5., 1986, London, Stevens and Sons, at 682, where the authors express the view that prior to the M'Naughten Rules, 'the insanity issue had been decided from case to case.' 79. Peter Brett and Peter L. Waller, Cases and Materials in Criminal Law, (hereafter 'Brett and Waller'), Butterworths, Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, 1962 at 597. The authors also point out (at 596), that Hawkins and Blackstone dealt with insanity, but not in detail. Hawkins took the view that a person must be able to understand the law and be capable of conforming to it; a person of unsound mind who could not distinguish between good and evil was therefore not culpable. Blackstone also took the view that a lunatic could not be guilty of a crime in that his understanding was defective, and therefore he lacked the neces• sary mental element. 80. Holdsworth, vol. VIII at 439. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid at 441. 83. Ibid. However, if a person had 'recurrent intervals of madness' which rendered them completely insane during those intervals, the person was regarded as insane in relation to crimes committed during the periods of insanity. Ibid. at 440-441. 84. Brett and Waller at 596. 85. Ibid. 12 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XLVI

certainly commit an act against the law; such a man, so destitute of all power of judgment could have no intention at all. In order to support this defence, it ought to be proved by the most distinct and unquestionable evidence, that the criminal was incapable of judging between right and wrong. 86 There was no other proof of insanity which would excuse murder, or any other crime. There are various species of insanity. Some human creatures are void of all power of reasoning

from their birth, such could not be guilty of any crime. There is another species Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 of madness in which Persons were subject to temporary paroxysms, in which they were guilty of acts of extravagance, this was called lunacy, if these persons com• mitted a crime when they were not affected with the malady, they were to all intents and purposes ameniable to justice: so long as they can distinguish good from evil, so long are they answerable for their conduct. There is a third species of insanity, in which the patient fancied the existence of injury, and sought an opportunity of gratifying revenge, by some hostile act; if such a person was capa• ble, in other respects, of distinguishing right from wrong, there is no excuse for any act of atrocity which he might commit under this description of derangement.87 He continued: The single question is, whether at the time this act was committed, he [Bellingham] possessed a sufficient degree of understanding to distinguish good from evil, right from wrong, and whether murder was a crime not only against the law of God, but against the law of his country.88

WAS BELLINGHAM INSANE?

It logically follows that if Bellingham was suffering from a form of insanity at the time he committed the murder, as a result of which he was not criminally responsible for his actions, he should not have been con• victed of murder, and should not have been executed. The question which therefore requires examination is whether, according to the law as it stood in 1812, Bellingham was insane. Some writers have clearly taken the view that Bellingham was insane. Lord Brougham commented: 'Now, that he was deranged there can be no manner of doubt.'89 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica refers to Bellingham as 'a deranged man,'90 New describes Bellingham as 'a mad assassin and 'clearly insane' ,91 and Croly describes him as a 'reason-

86. In a note to R. v Offord (1831) 5 Car & P 168 which sets out the doctrine used in Bellingham's case, the following words are added: 'that, in fact, it must be proved beyond all doubt, that, at the time he committed the atrocious act with which he stood charged, he did not consider that murder was a crime against the laws of God and nature;' Other differ• ences exist between the wording in the two reports. The statement of law in the note to R. v Offord is taken from Russell on Crimes and Misdemeanors, and had been extracted from Collinson on Lunacy, and is not a verbatim quotation from the report in the Old Bailey Session Papers. 87. R v Bellingham at 273. 88. Ibid. 89. Brougham, Life and Times at 17. 90. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 32 vols., 15th Edn. Chicago, 1994 Impression, Vol. 9 at 280. 91. New at 64. 2004 THE TRIAL OF JOHN OF BELLINGHAM 13

ing madman'.92 Jackson describes him as suffering from 'acute paranoia' and says that his actions were those of a 'homicidal maniac'93 Not every• one, however, has taken this view. Pike made the following assessment: The assassination ...may perhaps be regarded as an ordinary instance of murder caused by disappointment and a desire for revenge.94

Bellingham himself was of the opinion that he was not insane, and at his Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 trial expressed his gratitude to the Attorney General for objecting to the defence of insanity which had been put forward on his behalf.95 Bellingham, however, is unlikely to have been the best judge of the mat• ter. The question, therefore, still remains: was Bellingham legally insane at the time of the murder? In attempting to form some conclusion as to Bellingham's state of mind, it is necessary to consider the circumstances of the case. Firstly, it is clear from the facts that Bellingham planned the attack which resulted in the death of Spencer Perceval with some care. When he went to the House of Commons on 11 May 1812 he was carrying two loaded pistols, one of which was used to shoot Spencer Perceval.96 On 25th April, just over two weeks before the assassination, Bellingham engaged a tailor to construct a pocket on the inside of his coat. He asked the tailor to make the pocket about nine inches deep, on the left hand side of the coat, so that he could reach it conveniently.v? The pocket was obviously intended to conceal a pistol. Bellingham had also been to the House of Commons, and visited the galleries during debates prior to 11 May,98 apparently in order to acquaint himself with the procedures of the House and to become familiar with the appearance of various Ministers.v? On the day of the murder he positioned himself in the lobby at a time when ministers would be entering the House of Commons, and shot the Prime Minister. These facts suggest a carefully planned murder. Secondly, although Bellingham had carefully planned the shooting, it is also clear that he did not necessarily set out to shoot Spencer Perceval. Bellingham explained at his trial that he had "no personal or premeditated malice" against Spencer Perceval; Bellingham viewed him merely as the leader of a Government which had refused him redress for the injustice to which he had been subjected in Russia.lOO Bellingham

92. Croly at 385. 93. Jackson at 42. 94. Luke Owen Pike. A History of Crime in England, 2 vols. Smith, Elder & Co., London, 1876, Vol. II, at 375-376. 95. R v Bellingham at 267. 96. R v Bellingham at 264 and 265. Evidence given by Henry Burgess and Lieutenant General Isaac Gascoyne. 97. R v Bellingham at 266. Evidence given by James Taylor. 98. R v Bellingham at 266 and 267. Evidence given by John Norris and Vincent George Dowling. 99. Gillen at 84; Woodiwiss and Thomson at 185. 100. R v Bellingham at 267. Prisoner's Defence. 'till this fatal time of this catastrophe ... I had no personal or premeditated malice towards that gentleman; the unfortunate lot has 14 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XLVI informed the court that if he had encountered Lord Granville Leveson Gower before he encountered Spencer Perceval, he would have shot Lord Gower instead. 101 It would therefore appear that Bellingham's act was not the carefully planned and calculated murder of Spencer Perceval. He sim• ply shot the first government minister who came his way on that fateful

afternoon. As Brougham put it almost sixty years later, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 He [Bellingham] confessed that his primary intention had been to kill Lord Grenville [Leveson Gower], who had refused to support some claim of his at St. Petersburg (where he was ambassador), but that Perceval came in his way, and he must kill somebody. 102 Thirdly, it is also clear that Bellingham was obsessed by the fact that he considered that he had been unjustly treated by the Government. As he put the matter at his trial: Gentlemen, A refusal of justice was the sole cause of this fatal catastrophe; 103 When he was apprehended in the lobby of the House of Commons he told Henry Burgess104 that the reason for his action was 'want of redress of grievance, and refusal by government.' 105 Bellingham had spent two and a half years, following his return from Russia, seeking redress from Government officials in relation to what he considered, rightly or wrongly, to be his inappropriate treatment in Russia, and always received a negative response. His defence, which is lucidlyl06 set out, consisted firstly of an account of his experiences in Russia, and his complaints that Lord Gower and the British consul had failed adequately to protect his interests.u'? Secondly he went into the failure of the British Government to provide redress for the injuries which he considered he had suffered as a result. 108 He continued: If they had listened to my case this court would not have been engaged in this case, but Mr. Perceval obstinately refusing to sanction my claim in Parliament I was driven to despair, and under these agonizing feelings I was impelled to that desperate alternative which I unfortunately adopted. 109

fallen upon him as the leading member of that administration which had repeatedly refused me any reparation for the unparalled injuries I had sustained in Russia for eight years with the cognizance and sanction of the minister of the country at the Court of St. Petersburg.' 101. R v Bellingham at 270. Prisoner's Defence. 102. Brougham, Life and Times at 17-18. Cf. Gillen at 102. 'It seems clear from his com• ments that his intended victim had never been Lord Gower, once he had made his choice. It had been the Prime Minister as head of the Administration.' 103. R v Bellingham at 270. Prisoner's Defence. 104. A solicitor who was present in the lobby of the House of Commons when the fatal shot was fired. 105. See ante n.28. 106. According to the Gentleman's Magazine, 1812, Vol. 82, Pt. I. at 661 Bellingham spent almost two hours presenting his defence "in a collected and fluent manner". 107. R v Bellingham at 268. 108. R v Bellingham at 268-270. 109. R v Bellingham at 270. 2004 THE TRIAL OF JOHN OF BELLINGHAM 15

He concluded his defence by saying: ...what is my crime to the crime of government itself? It is no more than a mite to a mountain, unless it was proved that I had malice propense towards the unfortu• nate gentleman for whose death I am now upon my trial. I disclaim all personal or intentional malice against Mr. Perceval. 110

The picture of Bellingham which emerges is of a man obsessed by Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 what he considered, rightly or wrongly, to be his mistreatment in Russia, and the failure of the British Government to listen to his case and provide him with the redress to which he considered he was entitled. Finally, after years of brooding over the matter and being rebuffed by government offi• cials, in desperation he took the law into his own hands, and shot a gov• ernment minister. But was he insane under the law as it stood in 1812? If one looks at the definition of the 'third species of insanity', as set out by Sir James Mansfield, it is possible that Bellingham might be consid• ered to have been sane when he committed the murder. The 'third species' is where 'the patient fancied the existence of injury, and sought an opportu• nity of gratifying revenge, by some hostile act; if such a person was capa• ble, in other respects, of distinguishing right from wrong, there is no excuse for any act of atrocity which he might commit under this description of derangement.'lll One possible explanation of Bellingham's conduct is that he was obsessed by the fact that he considered that he had been wronged by the Government, and sought revenge by shooting a Government minister, but that in other respects he was capable of distinguishing right from wrong. On this analysis, he could not be judged to have been insane. 112 On the other hand, Bellingham does not appear to have been driven by a desire for revenge. He appears to have been a man who was obsessed by the wrongs he believed that he had suffered, and after exhausting all the normal channels which he perceived as open to him to obtain redress, shot a member of the administration. Indeed, Sir James Mansfield does not appear to have applied the test for the "third species" of insanity. Instead, in his summing up, he directed the jury that the single question was whether, at the time Bellingham committed the murder, 'he possessed a sufficient degree of understanding to distinguish good from evil, right from wrong, and whether murder was a crime.' 113

no. Ibid. III. Supra. 112. Sir Samuel Romilly appears to have considered that Bellingham remained culpable, although not for reasons of revenge. He said 'No person could have heard what the conduct and demeanour of this man has been since he committed the crime, or can have read his defence, without being satisfied that he is mad, but it is a species of madness which, proba• bly, for the security of mankind, ought not to exempt a man from being answerable for his actions.' Romilly, vol. III at 36. See also Gillen at 112. It is also arguable that Bellingham might have been considered criminally responsible on the basis of partial insanity, in that a person remained culpable if they could use their reason in relation to some matters, but suffered from 'excessive griefs and fears' in relation to other matters. See ante. 113. Supra. However, the distinction between right and wrong does form part of the defi• nition of Lord Mansfield's 'third species' of insanity. 16 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XLVI

The difficulty in Bellingham's case is that little evidence was adduced at his trial in relation to his mental state, particularly as the appli• cation for a delay to enable additional evidence to be brought from Liverpool and elsewhere had been refused. As a result, it is almost impos• sible to say with any accuracy whether he knew the difference between

right and wrong, and whether murder was a crime. Since Bellingham's Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 counsel had only been appointed on the day preceding the trial,114 they had little time to prepare the defence, and assemble the necessary evi• dence in relation to his mental condition. Consequently, no medical evi• dence was produced by his counsel in relation to Bellingham's state of mind. Although his counsel had sought medical opinions from two doc• tors who had attended George III, one could not appear at the trial, and the other did not reply to the request for an opinion.u> The only evidence given in relation to Bellingham's mental condition came from Ann Billett, Mary Clark, and the housemaid. Ann Billett, his cousin from Southampton, arrived in London the night before the triall 16 to give evidence on Bellingham's behalf. She tes• tified that Bellingham's father had died 'in a state of insanity', and that within this last three or four years it is known to myself and Mr. Bellingham's friends that he has been in a state of perfect derangement with respect to this business he has been pursuing. I I? However, under cross-examination, she admitted that she had not seen him for over a year. She also agreed that Bellingham had never been 'restrained', and that, although his friends regarded him as deranged in relation to the fact that he considered he was entitled to compensation from the Government, Bellingham was left to go about his normal business. I 18 Mary Clark testified that she considered that Bellingham had been in a 'disordered' state of mind since his return from Russia. However, her evidence was weak, in that she had apparently only seen Bellingham six or seven times following his return from Russia, the last time being about four months before the murder.u? Under cross-examination, she admitted that she did not know of any 'control' over Bellingham, and did not know whether any medical advice had been sought in relation to him. 120 Catherine Figgins,121 the servant from Bellingham's London lodg• ings, also gave evidence. She explained that her mistress, Mrs. Roberts, was unwell, and could not attend the trial despite the fact that she had

114. Gillen at 91. 115. Ibid. at 92-93. 116. R v Bellingham at 270. Ann Billett's evidence. 117. R v Bellingham at 270. 118. Ibid. at 271. 119. Ibid. 120. Ibid. 121. The name of the housemaid is given as Catherine Figgins in R v Bellingham at 271, but as Mary Figgins at 273 In the Gentleman's Magazine, 1812, Vol. 82, Pt. I., at 662, her name is given as Mary Fidges. 2004 THE TRIAL OF JOHN OF BELLINGHAM 17 been served with a subpoena. 122 The maidservant testified that Bellingham had seemed confused on the day preceding the murder. She also said that on the day of the murder she 'thought he was not so well as he had been for some time past' .123 However, she admitted under cross• examination that he was a man of regular habits, respected by the family

with whom he lodged, and that she did not know of anyone in the medical Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 profession attending him. 124 Immediately before the summing up by Sir James Mansfield, Bellingham's counsel, Mr. Alley, asked the door-keeper to find out whether any witnesses had arrived from Liverpool to testify in relation to Bellingham's mental condition. Apparently two people had just arrived in a post chaise and four 'to give evidence in favour of the prisoner'. However on seeing Bellingham, they 'declared he was not the person they supposed him to be.' 125 Thus, no evidence as to his state of mind, was given by people in Liverpool who knew Bellingham. In his summing up, which was heavily biased against Bellingham, Sir James Mansfield made it clear that he considered there was no sub• stance in the defence of insanity. He referred to it as an 'extraordinary defence' .126 He stated that the state of mind of the prisoner prior to the murder was irrelevant, and that the question was whether, at the time he committed the act, he could 'distinguish good from evil, right from wrong, and whether murder was a crime not only against the law of God, but against the law of his country.' The Lord Chief Justice took the view that, on the evidence, Bellingham had not received any medical treatment for mental illness, he had not been under any form of restraint, and he had been free to come and go, and conduct his affairs in the same way as any• one else. He concluded: ...in short, there was no proof adduced to shew that his understanding was so deranged, as not to enable him to know that murder was a crime. On the contrary, the testimony adduced in his defence, has most distinctly proved, from a descrip• tion of his general demeanour, that he was in every respect a full and competent judge of all his actions. 127 This analysis appears to be flawed. Two of the three witnesses for the defence, Ann Billett and Mary Clark, had not seen Bellingham for some time. However, their evidence appears to have been rejected in the context of proving Bellingham's insanity at the time he committed the act, but accepted to prove that his general demeanour rendered him capable of understanding his actions at the time of the murder. Thus it would seem that Bellingham's state of mind was judged on flimsy evidence. No medical evidence was given. The application by his

122. R v Bellingham at 271. 123. Ibid. at 272. 124. Ibid. 125. Ibid. 126. Ibid. at 273. 127. Ibid. 18 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XLVI counsel to delay the trial so that evidence regarding his mental condition could be brought from Liverpool, (where Bellingham had been living until his return to London to pursue his grievances against the govern• ment, and where his wife and family still lived), and elsewhere, was refused)28 His sanity was judged on the evidence of his cousin, a friend

and a housemaid. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 On the basis of the evidence produced, and in the light of the sum• ming up, it is hardly surprising that, although Sir James Mansfield instructed the jury that if they had any doubt, the benefit of that doubt must be given to the prisoner,129 the jury took only fourteen minutes 130 to find Bellingham guilty, and that the defence of insanity was unsuccessful. However, doubt still remains as to Bellingham's state of mind. It is impossible, on the scanty evidence produced at the trial, to determine whether, at the time he shot Spencer Perceval, John Bellingham knew the difference between right and wrong, and whether murder was a crime, and whether Bellingham was therefore legally insane. However, even on the limited evidence available, there is clearly some doubt as to whether he was legally sane. He was obviously a man obsessed by his treatment in Russia, and by the refusal of the British Government to provide him with the redress to which he considered he was entitled. As a result, he appears to have considered himself fully justified in shooting the Prime Minister. As Sir James Mansfield put the matter in his summing up: and from what I could collect from the prisoner's defence, it seems to amount to a conclusion, that he conceived himself justified in what he had done, by his Majesty's government having refused to redress some supposed grievances.u! The fact that Bellingham apparently considered there was nothing wrong in taking this course of action, suggests that he did not necessarily know the difference between right and wrong, and that he was therefore proba• bly legally insane. However, since the application for an adjournment to permit further evidence to be brought as to his state of mind was refused, and no medical evidence was available at the trial, the matter can never be definitively determined.

WAS BELLINGHAM TREATED FAIRLY BY THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM?

In the 21st century, anyone would be appalled by the refusal to adjourn Bellingham's trial to permit further evidence to be brought as to

128. Ante. 129. R v Bellingham at 273. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid. See also Rornilly, vol. III, at 36. 'There certainly has been no acting in that calmness and steadiness of opinion uniformly manifested by him, that what he has done was perfectly justifiable, and that he has set an example which will be highly useful to mankind...This extraordinary infatuation continued unaltered to the last moment of his exis• tence; and he seems to have died in the firm conviction that he had done nothing wrong.' 2004 THE TRIAL OF JOHN OF BELLINGHAM 19 his sanity. Also, the related aspect of the speed with which Bellingham's trial and execution took place is repugnant to the modem mind. However, the fairness or unfairness of Bellingham's treatment has to be judged, not by the standards of today, but by the standards of 1812. In the 1800s, speed was a hallmark of the criminal law. As

Manchester put the matter, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 The nineteenth-century judiciary placed considerable emphasis upon the speed and certainty of criminal justice. Summary justice was especially speedy. Inevitably, there would often be some delay between a preliminary hearing and trial at quarter sessions or the assizes, simply because the defendant had to wait for the next sessions or the next assizes. However, the trial itself might then be conducted at one sitting, even well into the night. In capital cases execution took place on the day next but one after that on which sentence was pronounced, unless that happened to be a Sunday.I32 In Bellingham's case, there was no interval before the next sessions, which commenced on Wednesday 13th May 1812. Bellingham himself did not expect his trial to occur at those sessions, as this would not give enough time to prepare his defence and produce the necessary witness• es.I 33 However, the trial took place on Friday 15th May, and was con• cluded in one day. Henry Brougham, who was subsequently to become Lord Chancellor,134 and who was examining a witness in the enquiry relating to the Orders in Council at the time of the assassination, and heard the fatal shot,135 was convinced of the unfairness of Bellingham's treatment. He took the view that The trial was the greatest disgrace to English justice. 136 The substance of his argument was twofold. Firstly, he considered the court had wrongly refused an application for a few days delay to allow evidence to be brought from Liverpool in relation to Bellingham's mental condition. Secondly, Brougham considered it inappropriate that the trial had taken place within a matter of days of the murder. As a result, the jury had been required to return a verdict before the panic, which had been caused by the assassination of the Prime Minister, had subsided. 137 He said: to defend the refusal of the application for delay by technical objections of the want of an affidavit, was grossly absurd; because nothing could disarm the Court of its discretionary power to grant the delay of a few days, when the application would certainly have been backed by affidavits, if indeed evidence of his insanity had not been produced. 138

132. Manchester at 270. See also Bentley at 42. Cases of high treason were an exception, in that the trial could not commence until ten days had elapsed after service of specified doc• uments on the accused: 7 Anne c. 21. s.ll. 133. Gillen at 25. 134. Brougham was Lord Chancellor from 1830-1834. 135. Supra. 136. Brougham, Life and Times at 18. 137. Ibid. 138. Ibid. In Brougham, Historical Sketches at 251, he had put the matter more succinct• ly. He said: 'So great an outrage on justice never was witnessed in modern times; for the 20 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XLVI

There is much in Brougham's analysis. With regard to his first point, no-one knows what evidence would have been brought in relation to Bellingham's mental condition had the court exercised its discretion in his favour, and granted a delay to permit the evidence to be produced. However, there are pointers in the available material to indicate that some

evidence of insanity may well have been forthcoming. Bellingham Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 himself refers, in his defence at his trial, to his mental condition in Russia. He stated: I am not apprised of a single instance in Russia where my insanity was made public except in one single instance, where the pressure of my sufferings had exposed me to that imputation. 139 Although Bellingham in fact regarded himself as sane, evidence may have been available in due course as to his mental condition during the Russian period. 140 There also appears to be some evidence of insanity in the fami• ly: Ann Billett referred in her evidence to the fact that Bellingham's father had died "in a state of insanity" 141 and there are also other suggestions of insanity in the family.l42 Bellingham's counsel wished to bring evidence from Liverpool as to his state of mind. 143 Given the slowness of both trav• el and communications in 1812, time was needed to produce that evi• dence. l44 His counsel had attempted to obtain medical evidence before application to delay the trial until evidence of his insanity could be brought from Liverpool, was refused, and the trial proceeded, while both the court, the witnesses, the jury, and the people, were under the influence of the feelings naturally excited by the deplorable slaughter of one of the most eminent and virtuous men in any rank of the community.' 139. R v Bellingham at 267. 140. Pictorial History of England, vol. VI at 598, refers to Bellingham's insanity whilst in Russia. 'Sir James Mackintosh, who had just returned from India, and who had received a very friendly communication from Perceval the very day on which he was shot, describes Bellingham as 'a bankrupt ship-broker in Liverpool, who had formerly been confined for lunacy in Russia '-Private Diary, in Life by his Son. ' Jackson, (at 43), states that Bellingham's counsel had informed the court that witnesses were on their way from Russia with evidence of Bellingham's mental instability. 141. R v Bellingham at 270. 142. Pictorial History of England, vol. VI at 598. Although this would not have been apparent until many years after the trial, it appears that Bellingham's son, who changed his name and became a doctor, became insane at a similar age to that of his father at the time of the murder. Ibid. 143. Romilly, vol. III at 36. See also Pictorial History of England, vol. VI at 598, 'We have been assured by Persons well acquainted with Liverpool, and with Bellingham's family, that positive proofs could have been procured in that city, of the wretched man's madness.' 144. Romilly vol. III, at 36-37, 'The application, however, to put off the trial was surely very reasonable, and it might well have been postponed, though but for a few days. It was not possible that a letter giving information of his crime and his apprehension could have reached Liverpool, where his family and all his friends reside, and an answer to it have been received by the day of his trial.' The two gentlemen who arrived from Liverpool in a post chaise and four at the end of the trial appear to have made a mercy dash to give evidence 'having heard of the apprehension of the prisoner, and knowing something of a person bearing his description, in whose conduct they had seen frequent marks of derangement', only to discover 'he was not the person they supposed him to be.' R v Bellingham at 272. See ante. It also seems that other 2004 THE TRIAL OF JOHN OF BELLINGHAM 21

the trial regarding Bellingham's mental condition; a delay might have enabled such evidence to be obtained. Also, his landlady, Mrs. Roberts, might have been available to give evidence if a delay had been granted. Bellingham had apparently accompanied Mrs. Roberts and her son to the European Museum during the afternoon of the day on which the murder

occurred,145 and she had therefore been with him immediately prior to the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 shooting. Mrs. Roberts had been served with a subpoena to appear at the trial, but was unable to attend because she was unwell. 146 If an appropriate amount of time had been given to enable the evi• dence to be brought, it is unknown whether or not it would have shown that Bellingham was insane. It is possible that, had Mrs. Roberts given evidence, it might have counted against Bellingham, in that he had appar• ently not behaved in a deranged way that aftemoon.t-? Indeed, the wit• nesses subpoenaed by Bellingham, namely the Marquis of Wellesley, Lord Gower, the Earl of Uxbridge, and Sir F. Burdett,148 were not called by Bellingham's solicitor and counsel at his trial, because Bellingham's legal advisors thought that these witnesses could only testify that Bellingham had made claims against the Government, and that in cross• examination they would assert that they believed Bellingham to be sane.t-? Equally, evidence brought from Liverpool or Russia about Bellingham's mental condition might have been rejected on the same basis as the evidence given at the trial, namely that the state of Bellingham's mind some time previously was immaterial; it was only his mental condi• tion at the time when he committed the act which was relevant. On the other hand, if the additional evidence had been produced, it might well have shown that Bellingham had a history of mental instability, and was insane at the time of the murder. However, the court would not exercise its discretion in Bellingham's favour to enable a sufficient delay to occur to enable the additional evidence to be brought, so that the question of whether Bellingham was sane or not could be properly decided. Brougham was clearly of the opinion that the court should have granted the application for a delay to enable the additional evidence to be obtained. However, it is by no means clear that the refusal to grant an

witnesses arrived, but were too late. See Gillen at 112-113: "'Mr Statham of Liverpool came up express with 3 Witnesses and the enclosed papers which the Mayor of L thought would be material in the trial of Bellingham," wrote T.B.(?) to an unnamed correspondent the next morning. "He arrived at the Old Bailey as the Jury retired from the Box-and finding he was too late to be of service did not notify that he was there.'" Gillen also points out that it is unknown whether these additional witnesses would have given evidence for or against Bellingham. 145. R v Bellingham at 272. Evidence given by Catherine Figgins; See also Gillen at 87. 146. R v Bellingham at 271. Evidence given by Catherine Figgins. Ante. 147. When his landlady was informed of Bellingham's actions on the evening of the mur• der, she 'could not believe what they had to tell her. The deed was impossible, she said in stu• pefaction. Hadn't they all just spent a quiet afternoon looking at pictures? When he had left her, Mr. Bellingham had told her that he had just been to buy a prayer book': Gillen at 87. 148. Gentleman's Magazine, 1812, Vol. 82, Pt. I. at 662. 149. Ibid at 663. 22 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XLVI adjournment was necessarily harsh by early nineteenth century standards. According to Bentley, at the beginning of the nineteenth century judges were extremely unsympathetic to applications for the postponement of a trial, and it was not until the mid-1800s that the courts became more will• ing to grant applications for a delay.I 50 Thus, Bellingham's treatment in relation to the request for a delay was apparently not unusual. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 However, there is considerable substance in Brougham's second argument, namely that the trial took place immediately after the assassina• tion, when emotions occasioned by the murder had not subsided. One only has to read the following passage from Sir James Mansfield's sum• ming up to see that this was indeed the case. Gentlemen of the jury, you are now to try an indictment which charges the pris• oner at the bar with the wilful murder (here the learned judge was so hurt by his feelings, that he could not proceed for several seconds) of Mr. Spencer Perceval, (in a faint voice) who was murdered with a pistol loaded with a bullet; when he mentioned the name of (here again his lordship was sincerely affected, and burst into tears, in which he was joined by the greatest portion of the persons in court) a man so dear, and so revered as that of Mr. Spencer Perceval, I find it difficult to suppress my feelings.I>! The fact that he subsequently told the jury to try Bellingham in the same way as for the murder of any other man, does not alter the obviously emotional atmosphere in court following the assassination of the Prime Minister. When these factors are taken into account, it appears that although a correct definition of insanity was used at Bellingham's trial, and there was nothing improper about the speed with which his trial took place, Bellingham was none the less treated harshly. Although it was not unusu• al for such applications to be refused, discretion could have been exer• cised to permit a delay to occur, so that further evidence of his mental condition could be obtained. He was tried in an emotional atmosphere, in a court where the Lord Chief Justice was unable to suppress his grief over the death of the victim. Moreover, the summing up was biased against him. Even judged by 1812 standards, this hardly seems to be something which could be called justice.

THE CRIMINAL LUNATICS ACT 1800

Even if the defence of insanity had succeeded, Bellingham would not have been set free, In Hadfield's Case 152 the defendant attempted to assassinate George III, and was tried for high treason. Hadfield had been a soldier who suffered a brain injury during battle, and as a result, suffered from delusions. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity at the time he

150. Bentley at 42. The author comments that 'In Bellingham's case an application by counsel for a postponement to allow evidence to be called as to the accused's sanity was brushed contemptuously aside.' 151. R v Bellingham at 272. 152. 27 St. Tr. 1282 (K.B., 1800). 2004 THE TRIAL OF JOHN OF BELLINGHAM 23 committed the act. However, Lord Kenyon took the view that Hadfield was a most dangerous enemy to society; and it is impossible, with safety, to suffer such a man to be let loose upon the publick, and to permit him to range at large. 153 Hadfield was therefore returned to prison until a suitable place of confine• ment could be found for him.154 At the time, there was no legal authority to detain Hadfield following a verdict of not guilty.155 However, the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 Criminal Lunatics Act 1800 156 was subsequently passed; section 1 had retrospective effect, and permitted Hadfield's continued confinement.t>? Section 1 of the Criminal Lunatics Act applied to persons who were charged with treason, murder or felony. In such cases, if the jury decided to acquit the person on the grounds of insanity, they were required to make a finding to that effect. The person could then be ordered to be detained during his Majesty's pleasure 'in such place and in such manner as His Majesty shall deem fit' ,158 if they constituted a danger to the pub• lic. Consequently, if Bellingham had been found not guilty by reason of insanity, he would not have been released, but would have been detained during His Majesty's pleasure.

LIEUTENANT DAVID DAVIES

In considering whether Bellingham was harshly treated, it is instruc• tive to consider the case of Lt. David Davies, which bears considerable similarities to Bellingham' s case. On 8th April 1818 Lt. David Davies attempted to murder Viscount Palmerston, in circumstances reminiscent of Bellingham's assassination of Spencer Perceval. In fact an account of Bellingham's trial was found in Davies's possession.159 Davies was a former army officer, who had been removed from his regiment in 1816 and placed on half-pay because of his strange behaviour.160 He was clearly mentally unstable; he had been in a military hospital, where he mutilated himself and then claimed an army pension as a maimed officer,161 and he was subsequently confined in an asylum. 162 He sent a "stream of petitions and complaints" to Palmerston, who was then Secretary of State for War, apparently about the pension.

153. Gentleman's Magazine, 1800, Vol. 70, Pt. II. at 688. 154. Ibid. See also R v Sullivan [1983] 1 AER 577 at 581. 155. Brett and Waller at 597. Until 1800, a verdict of not guilty was given in cases of insanity: Rupert Cross and Philip Asterley Jones, An Introduction to Criminal Law, 5th edn., Butterworths, London, 1964 at 59. 156. 39 & 40 Geo. III, c.94. 157. Ibid. s. 1; R v Sullivan at 581. 158. 39 & 40 Geo. III. c.94. s. I; Brett and Waller at 597. 159. Kenneth Bourne, Palmerston The Early Years 1784-1841, (hereafter 'Bourne') Allen Lane, 1982, at 160. 160. Ibid. 161. Ibid. at 159, 160. 162. Ibid, at 160. 24 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY Vol. XLVI

Palmerston rejected his complaints.163 Davies wrote to Palmerston requesting an interview, which Palmerston refused. Davies then escaped from confinement and went to the War Office carrying a pistol. l 64 Since Palmerston was out, Davies waited in the lobby, and tried to shoot Palmerston on his return. Palmerston escaped with bruising, because he

had a habit of 'springing up stairs', which caused the shot to go wide.165 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 Davies's case can be distinguished from Bellingham's case, in that firstly, Palmerston, the intended victim, survived the attack. Secondly the perpetrator had a clear history of mental disorder: he had previously been confined in an asylum, and he had also previously even been charged with 'riotous behaviour and assaults'. But his disturbed condi• tion was so clear that he was not allowed to go free. 166 Equally, however, there are also very obvious similarities between the two cases. The outcomes in the two cases were entirely different: at his trial, only six years after Bellingham's case, Davies was found to be 'in a state of derangement' at the time of his attempt and so acquitted of the charge but ordered to be detained as a dangerous lunatic during His Majesty's pleasure. 167 Palmerston even sent money to the prison chaplain to enable Davies to have a defence counsel, as otherwise his would-be assassin would have been undefended. 168 Although the cases occurred only six years apart, Davies appears to have been treated more humanely than Bellingham. In 1803, wilfully, maliciously and unlawfully shooting at one of his Majesty's subjects, with intent to murder or cause grievous bodily harm, had been made a capital felony.l69 However, Davies was found to be insane, and sent to an asy• lum. 170 In contrast, in Bellingham's case, the application for a delay to permit further evidence of Bellingham's mental condition to be brought was refused, and the defence of insanity was dismissed as an 'extraordi• nary defence'.

163. Ibid. 164. Ibid, at 160. 156. 165. Ibid., at 156. See also Gentleman's Magazine, 1818, Vol. 88, Pt. I. at 365, which gives a short account of the incident. 166. Bourne at 160. 167. Ibid. 168. Ibid; See also D. Englefield, J. Seaton and I. White, Facts About The British Prime Ministers, (hereafter 'Englefied, Seaton and White') Mansell Publishing Limited, London, 1995, at 181; E. Ashley, The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple Viscount Palmerston, (hereafter 'Ashley'), 2 vols, London, 1879, Vol. 1 at 82. 169. 43 Geo III, c. 58, s. I. 170. Englefield, Seaton and White at 181; Ashley at 82. 2004 THE TRIAL OF JOHN OF BELLINGHAM 25

CONCLUSION

Bellingham shot the Prime Minister, Spencer Perceval, because the Government refused him the redress to which he considered he was enti• tled. No reasonable person could take the view that it is acceptable for a citizen with a grievance, or a supposed grievance, against the government, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajlh/article/46/1/1/1806398 by guest on 30 September 2021 to shoot a member of the administration if their complaints are not addressed to their satisfaction. Yet Bellingham appears to have considered that his action was justified. This suggests that he was probably insane at the time he committed the murder, in that, since he considered his actions acceptable, he probably did not know the difference between right and wrong. However, it is impossible to say with certainty whether this was the case, since the request by his counsel to delay the trial to enable fur• ther evidence as to his mental condition to be brought was refused. It is also clear that Bellingham did not receive a fair trial. He was tried in an emotional atmosphere, the summing up was biased against him, and the application for a delay to allow further evidence relating to his state of mind to be brought from Liverpool and elsewhere, which might have established the defence of insanity, was refused. On the latter point, it seems it was not unusual for applications for a delay to be refused in the early 1800s, although the court had a discretion in the matter. However, the emotional atmosphere in court so soon after the assassina• tion, and the summing up, which was strongly biased against Bellingham, compounded by the fact that only limited evidence was available as to Bellingham's mental condition, meant that the verdict was almost a fore• gone conclusion. When Bellingham's counsel requested a delay to enable evidence to be brought as to Bellingham's mental condition, he appealed to the "humanity and justice of the court"1?1 It seems that on 15 May, 1812, the court was not minded to provide the assassin of the Prime Minister with either humanity or justice. It is unsurprising that Henry Brougham, who was a staunch advocate of law reform, should be so critical of Bellingham's treatment. In due course, reforms would occur in this area of law, in that in 1843, the M'Naghten Rules would clarify the law relating to insanity. Also in the mid-1800s the courts would become more willing to grant applications for a delay in trials where the accused was charged with a felony. Moreover, nearly a century later, in 1907, the Court of Criminal Appeal was estab• lished, whereas in 1812 Bellingham had no right of appeal. However, even on the law as it stood in 1812, Brougham was undoubtedly correct when he said that Bellingham's trial was a disgrace to English justice.

171. Gentleman's Magazine 1812, Vol. 82, Pt. I. at 660.