MENCIUS AND XUNZI: ON MORAL AGENCY AND THE CONCEPT OF NENG BY VOO TECK CHUAN (B.A. (Hons.), NUS) A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 2005 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There is something out there in the darkness…. something terrifying…. something that will not stop until it gets…. submitted. For three years, I worked relentlessly to overcome this “Bane” of a thesis. Three years…. one short, sincere one page to thank all those who have helped me one way or another to finish the task. To Prof Chan, my supervisor, “In learning, there is nothing more expedient than to draw near to the right person.” I am very grateful for your patience, guidance, and rectification. To Prof Ten and the rest of the lecturers, thank you for all the kind words and care, and for being my models of humanity and relationship. Also, to Mrs Devi and Belle, you render the bettest of administrative support. To Kim, Xunming, Raphael, Ola, Eric Lim, and Chris, your valuable friendship and concern for my work will never be forgotten. To my parents, grandfather, and brothers, you are my living motivation. Finally to Jacq…. my Alfred and my Catwoman. i TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i TABLE OF CONTENTS ii SUMMARY iv INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: Mencius: Moral Orientation and the Four Xins 20 1.1 Introduction 20 1.2 Qi, the Heart-mind and Zhia 21 1.3 The Issue of Moral Directedness: Internal versus External 25 1.4 Budongxin and the Nourishment of Qi 32 CHAPTER 2: Mencius: Motivation and Agency 42 2.1 Introduction 42 2.2 Van Norden on Mencian Moral Agency 42 2.3 Moral Desires and Proper Motivation 44 2.4 The Function of Si 51 2.5 Si and the Concentration of Zhia 57 2.6 The Congeniality of Qing for Ethical Growth 61 CHAPTER 3: Xunzi: On Qing, Moral Agency, and the Confucian Rites 66 3.1 Introduction 66 3.2 Qing, Yu, and Xing in the Xunzi 66 3.3 The “Evilness” of Xing 69 3.4 Xunzian Moral Agency 72 3.5 The Genesis of the Confucian Rites and their Functions 76 3.6 Learning and Practicing the Confucian Rites 84 CHAPTER 4: Xunzi: Restructuring our Emotional Predispositions 91 4.1 Introduction 91 4.2 The Concept of “Wei” in the Xunzi 91 4.3 Qi and “Acquiring” a Moral Taste 93 4.4 Deficiencies of our Other-regarding Emotions and Desires 106 4.5 The Cultivating Process towards Xunzian Ethical Ideal 116 4.6 Summary 121 CHAPTER 5: Xunzi’s Disagreement with Mencius: On the Distinction between 123 Keyi and Neng 5.1 Introduction 123 5.2 Xunzian Moral Agency and the Capacity for Sageliness 123 5.3 Xunzi: The Neng for Sageliness 128 5.4 Xunzi’s Distinction between Keyi and Neng 134 5.5 Xunzi’s Criticism of Mencius 138 ii CHAPTER 6: Managing Qing and Directing Awareness: More on Mencian Si 140 and Tui 6.1 Introduction 140 6.2 The Importance of the Environment in Mencian Thought 142 6.3 More on the Concept of Si 153 6.4 Nivison on the Concept of “Tui” 157 6.5 Im on the Concept of “Tui” 170 6.6 Xunzi and Mencius: A Brief Comparative Discussion on Active Emotional Control 183 and Management of Agency CHAPTER 7: Conclusion: The Mencian Concept of Neng 186 7.1 Introduction 186 7.2 The Importance of the Sage 188 7.3 Sage as Guide to Control of Environmental Influences 190 7.4 Sage as Guide to Forms of Expressions and Activities 194 7.5 The Development of Wisdom 197 7.6 Respect for the Way and Authority of the Sage 207 Character List 211 Bibliography 214 iii Summary This thesis aims to examine Xunzi’s thesis “Human nature is evil (Xing e 性惡),” which is meant as a critique of Mencius’ thesis “Human nature is good (Xing shan 性善),” by building on the works of Shun Kwong-Loi, Chong Kim Chong, and Bryan Van Norden. Shun and Chong give a meticulous analysis of Xunzi’s distinction between having the capacity (keyi 可以) and having the ability (neng 能) in the context of self-cultivation, which attacks Mencius’ conflation of the two concepts, and contend that their disagreement centers significantly on whether our natural emotional dispositions are already structured in a congenial way for practicing and attaining the ethical ideal. In a separate line of examination, Bryan Van Norden suggests that Xunzi’s opposition to Mencius stems from his outlook on moral agency, and argues that the semantics of their conflicting labels on xing will be filled with essentially different flavors if we explore their disparate views on moral agency. While others may have commented on these three writers’ views separately, no one has systematized or appreciated fully the connection between Xunzi’s criticism of Mencius based on the distinction between keyi and neng and his views on moral agency. By combining their analyses as a whole, with the intent of drawing out the linkages between their arguments and claims, I shall provide a detailed diagnosis of the background of Xunzi’s critique of Mencius, and make better sense of its texture and design by revealing some particular concerns Xunzi has with Mencian self-cultivation. This will set the ground for the central aim of my thesis, which is to defend Mencius from Xunzi’s critique by resolving these concerns. iv The thrust of my defense lies in showing Xunzi’s confusion with Mencius’ view of the “congeniality” of our natural emotional dispositions for practicing and attaining the ethical ideal with their being “sufficient,” and his misconception of Mencius’ view of moral agency as a matter of passively following our spontaneously occurrent desires. A large part of this portion of my thesis concerns itself with reviewing, analyzing, and synthesizing modern commentarial work on Mencius and Xunzi, such as Alan Chan, D.C. Lau, James Behuniak, David Nivison, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Janghee Lee, Manyul Im, Franklin Perkins and others, which is geared towards an explication of Mencius’ idea of the cultivating act in relation to his usage of the term “neng.” The progression and culmination of this defense shall better our understanding of the substantive differences between Mencius and Xunzi’s views on moral development and achievement, particularly as regards how they think the heart-mind in terms of its directedness (zhia 志) is set on comporting with shan ways so as to be nourished towards the ethical ideal. v Introduction It is well-known that Xunzi’s thesis “Human nature is evil” (Xing e” 性惡) is meant as a critique of Mencius’ position “Human nature is good”(Xing shan” 性善)and his concomitant views on moral development and achievement. Much interpretative and investigative work has been done on both eminent philosophers to illuminate different Confucian approaches to thinking about the ethical life in relation to the human condition. Nevertheless, the nature of Xunzi’s disagreement with Mencius has never been established incontrovertibly, making the locus and degree of the distinction between their claims on xing somewhat equivocal. Some writers contend that Xunzi’s issue with Mencius is largely terminological in nature,1 and that his thesis against Mencius invariably assumes an aspect of xing that is good.2 Others have highlighted many points 1 By pointing out that Xunzi and Mencius mean different things by “xing” (I am using hanyu pinyin throughout this thesis), D. C. Lau has argued that the differences between the two thinkers lie largely in the arena of definition. See D.C Lau, “Introduction” in Mencius (New York: Penguin Books, 1970), 21. A.C Graham writes that even though Xunzi’s theory is “as coherent in terms of its definitions as Mencius in terms of his,” but because there is a “shift” in the sense of xing in Xunzi’s “Xing e” chapter, they are really speaking at cross purposes. As such, Xunzi’s critique never really engages with Mencius’ theory in a substantive way. See A.C Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature” in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Singapore: The Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986), 56. Henceforth, referred to as “Background.” Paul Rakita Goldin agrees with Graham and states that Xunzi’s disagreement with Mencius comes about because of his heavy emphasis on human artifice (wei 僞). Paul Rakita Goldin, Rituals of the Way: The Philosophy of Xunzi (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), 11 & 13. David Nivison argues that Xunzi resorts to “linguistic legislation” in his attack on Mencius by enforcing a strict lexical divide between “xing” and “wei.” See David Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy, ed. Bryan Van Norden (La Salle: Open Court, 1996), 212. We must however take note that these distinguished scholars do think that there are some points of difference between Xunzi and Mencius. For such discussions, see especially Lau, Mencius, 21-22; A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), 246 & 250-51. Hereafter, referred to as Disputers of the Tao. For a good account of other commentators who share this perspective of looking at Xunzi’s issue with Mencius, see Kwong-Loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 226-29. 2 Nivison writes that by acknowledging that human beings have the capacity for moral education, and that we have feelings and desires for bettering ourselves morally, Xunzi exposes himself to a plausible Mencian retort that these amount to admitting the goodness of our xing.