The Economist 1858-08-07: Vol 16 Iss
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
be Econowst, VEEKLY COMMERCIAL TIMES, ’ Bankers’ Gasette, and Railway Monitor: A POLITICAL, LITERARY, AND GENERAL NEWSPAPER. Vol. XVI SATU R DAY, “AU G UST ‘ 1858. No. 780 ————— CO'NTENTS. between France and England,—that os at once convince THE ECONOMIST, us that no efforts to keep up the appearance of confidential French Reflections on the Cherbourg AGRICULTURE :— sympathy can overcome, though they may greatly aggravate, ete TEEN TEAC nn. crcccrccrccscccccscoccesecsesces 865 AT iets oi dial deletes 872 Savings Ranks and Government STARS FROG... ce cccercnsteveccssonvecence 873 the inherent antagonism between the opposite principles em Responsibility ...........s0s00 +++» 866 | LITERATURE :— bodied in the political organisation of the two countries. Aristooratie Views of Trade ............ 867 The Private Journal of the Mar- Submariwe Pelegraphs.............-...0-++ 868 quess of Hastings, K.G. ..........+. 873 There is no occasion for—and we should be the first to de Lord Ellenborough oa Education in Personal Adventure during the In- plore—anything but friendliness between England and IAL. cacgcuakseegmactia eabuateedbosstsee 869 dian Rebellion, in Rochilcund, Lord Malmesbury's Concession to the | Futtehghur, and Oude France, but with political systems so rootedly opposed, IEE CIDIOD . 00x scnseneovcesveccecsivocese 870 | Foreign Correspondence ..............00++ Prorogation of Parliament ... 872 | Commercial and Miscellaneous ......... 876 the chance of actual quarrel becomes greater instead of less with every increase in the confidential and personal THE BANKERS’ GAZETTE AND COMMERCIAL TIMES. th intimacy of their relations. What now were the grounds on Bank Returns and Money Market ... 878 | LonpDoN MARKETS:— Bankers’ Price Current .«.........+ oreee 880 State of Corn Trade for the Week... 883 which the peace of Amiens was broken ? The very first +» 880 Colonial & Foreign Produce Market 883 Mails eeeeeereeeeereese seeeeees demand made by Buonaparte on England after the peace of Commercia! nahin wees «» 881 Additional Notices .......sscccrsesereee S84 Cotton ..... scecccececeoncenecececscccscscoscesce 882 | Gazette ....ccccoresseee gouces eave 885 Amiens was, “ that His Majesty's Government will adopt | Markets of Manufactaring Districts... 882 | Price Current........s.secesseeees eevee 886 COrtrccercvvecorccecccceerccesccesesececccsseeee 883 | Imports and EXports ceccrecccoserserseere 887 ** the most effectual measures to put a stop to the unbecom- THE RAILWAY MONITOR. ‘ing and seditious publications with which the newspapers Railway and Mining Share Market ... 887 | Share List and Traffic Returns ......... 888 “ and writings printed in England are filled” ;—and that certain individuals specified “ should be sent out of the island — “of Jersey.” Now are these complaints of a kind which Che Political Economist. the possession of a powerful navy by the French is in any way likely to cure? Or are they rather so deeply rooted in FRENCH REFLECTIONS ON THE CHERBOURG the opposite constitutional systems of the two Governments, that they have been this very year, and are likely to be as MEETING. long as that constitutional antagonism lasts, perpetually We have already intimated why we look with little satisfac- recurring, to the great discomfort of confidential allies ? tion on those renewed efforts at confidential personal relations Again, the first counter-complaint urged by England through between the Governments of England and France which her Ambassador (Lord Whitworth), against France imme- seo cA a BD have ended in the Royal meeting at Cherbourg. We believe diately after the peace of Amiens, was to the effect that, that they tend to diplomatic relations between the two contrary to the treaty, the First Consul had interfered Governments quite artificially close and intimate, not arbitrarily in some of the free States of the Continent, to warranted by the real relation between the two countries, which Buonaparte replied, “‘ I suppose you mean Piedmont which is friendly but not cemented by political sympathy, “and Switzerland. Ce sontdesbagatelles.” Here, again, look- and liable, therefore, to such sudden and unpleasant rupture ingtothearbitrary and most menacing French note addressed as we saw in the early part of the present year; conse- to Switzerland in January last on the subject of the refugees quently, we are quite unable to see in the C herbourg festi- harboured there,—have we not some reason for saying that vity, and are still further from seeing in the practic: ul ocea- the grounds which caused the rupture of the peace of Amiens sion for it, that guarantee for permanent peace on which the had “nothing whatever to do with the preponderating naval official and semi-oflicia) French organs dilate with so much influence of England, but, so far as they had any cause enthusiasm. The Patrie, in a recent article on the subject, beyond the personal ambition of the First Consul, were rooted gives some reasons for congratulation which, when examined, in that natural opposition which existed then and still exists only seem to us to demonstrate still more strongly the arti- between the constitution of a free and of a despotic Govern- ficial character of these enthusiastic international rejoicings. ment ? “England,” says the Patrie, “is justly proud of her naval In a word, it is a mere chimera that the naval prepon- derance of England has ever been a cause of war between ‘power. For a long time there was none to counterbalance a r “it. We do not hesitate to say that it was a misfortune to England and France. ‘The causes which were so productive “the whole of Europe, and perhaps, also, a danger for Great of mutual irritation under the first and under the third « Britain itself. Ambition without a curb is alws ays attended Napoleon, have ever been the same, sympathy of “ with danger..........lf Napoleon I. had possessed a navy England with the free Governments of the Continent, and | “ equal to his army, the peace of Amiens would not have the protection her constitution affords to the dangerous “been broken so suddenly, and we should have been spared exiles from foreign despotisms. We certainly do not see Saniiataen. caerccaghitedikea a “ fifteen years of terrible warfare. The struggle he had to that these causes of irritation can be removed by any naval TT * maintain, and for which so much blood was shed, is to be equality between the two kingdoms, and therefore we see waar ae ‘ attributed to the fact that the naval force of Lrance was not nothing in the ultimate results of the formidable works at a proportion to her military force. Napoleon saw this with Cherbourg calculated to counteract the very unpleasant “his prompt and sure glance when he visited Cherbourg, associations with their origin, caused by the expressed pur- “ and ordered by a decree, signed with hisown hand (April 15, poses of the great man who planned them. ‘There is little rea- 1803), the construction of the works which have been just son to fear evil results, and still less to anticipate good re- ‘completed.” This is a strange assertion, and unfortu- sults. The motive for English congratulations must, there- ae “aisles aa nately draws attention to the real grounds of mutual com- fore, be limited to a desire to conciliate the i eemeh plaint which caused the e rupture of the peace of Amiens,— Ixmperor, and to render an alliance, already too close, more grounds so obviously originating in the political repulsions confidential still. And we believe this to be a mistake | arising from the essential character of the two Governments which our Government will one day see good reason to re- | } } —and grounds so closely resembling the recent differences gret. } } ————>== 866 THE ECONOMIST. [Aug. 7, , 1858. ~~ the Government must have seen the management from the SAVINGS BANKS AND GOVERNMEN beginning; and must in great measure have superseded the RESPONSIBILITY. local trustees, and certs inly the local actuaries and m: nagers, WE must own to a grievous disappointment upon a perusal Every plan, however, that involved these consequences of the Report of the Select Committee on Savings Banks. found itself opposed by such a host of vested interests as to | We all know the circumstances under which that Committee be easily defeated ; and no pl: in that did not do so, would be was appointed, and the object which it was expected that it compatible with the real object to be gained. It was to would attain. The imperfections of the system upon which solve this difficulty that the Committee was appointed, these institutions are at present conduc ted, in the frauds of But we own the report throws no light upon it, but leayes managers and the losses sustained by masses of poor but us just where we were. No practical solution, nor even a thrifty people, who had persuaded themselves that they feasible compromise, is suggested. were enjoying the security of the Government for every But while the Committee seem to have missed the shilling they invested, have been painfully brought to light. main point for which they were appointe ‘d, they have given As compared with all other banks or institutions, the much attention to another point, viz., the mode in which the Government Savings Bank has been regarded as affording a Commissioners of the National Debt employ the funds when security not only superior to all others, but as unimpeachable | they do reach them. In the remarks which the C ommittee | as that of the public debt itself. Every one knew that the make upon this subject they seem to have adopted in its ful] | great bulk of the monies so deposited were actually in the hands extent the popul: w fallacy which has led to such erroneous | | | of the Government . and under charge of » the Commissioners ‘ Bn ch conclusions in respect to ‘the employment of these funds. It | of the National Debt, and that by Act of Parliament a is common, even in Parliament, with Sir H. W illoughby and security was given for a certain fixed rate of interest, what- others, to represent Savings Bank money in the light” of a| | ever might be the fluctuations of the public funds.