CRESC Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 48 Corporate governance and impossibilism Ismail Erturk, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal. Adam Leaver, David Shammai, Karel Williams CRESC, The University of Manchester January 2008 For further information: Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change (CRESC) Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK Tel: +44 (0)1908 654458 Fax: +44 (0)1908 654488 Email:
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[email protected] Web: www.cresc.ac.uk The authors acknowledge the support of the ESRC under a Business Engagement Scheme award where CRESC and KPMG are partners. David Shammai works for KPMG and Karel Williams is co- director of CRESC. Ismail Erturk, Julie Froud and Adam Leaver teach at Manchester Business School while Sukhdev Johal teaches at Royal Holloway Management School. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not the organizations they work for . CRESC Working Papers Corporate Governance and Impossibilism Corresponding Author: Karel Williams ESRC Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change (CRESC) 178 Waterloo Place The University of Manchester Oxford Road Manchester M13 9PL United Kingdom Fax: +44 (0)161 275 8986 Tel: (mobile UK) 0777 55 14173
[email protected] Abstract This paper presents a mixed methods analysis of proceduralised corporate governance as a technical practice which is “ impossibilist” because it not only inflates expectations but sets fundamentally unattainable objectives. An initial review of the systematic empiricist literature shows how disappointment with corporate governance is justified empirically because changes in procedure and new mechanisms (such as the insistence on more independent NEDS) have little ascertainable positive effect on shareholder value and firm performance.