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The Downfall of Beria the June Uprising of East

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THE DOWNFALL OF BERIA By Abe Stein • THE JUNE UPRISING OF EAST GERMAN WORKERS By H. F. Stille • STALIN'S PLACE IN HISTORY By Albert 6tltes • INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE as. By 1. N. V"nte 351 THE NEW INTERNATIONAL How Available in English A Marxist Review THE NEW INTERNATIONAL A Marxist Review Rosa Luxemburg's Yol. XIX. No. 3 Whole No. 159 MAY-JUNE 1953 Yol. XIX. No.3 MAY-JUNE Whole No. 159 "Accumulation of Capital" TABLE OF CONTENTS Notes of tlte Montlt: The Downfall of Beria Introduction by Joan Robinson THE DOWNFALL OF BERIA ................ 111 Exploding the Myth of Kremlin Democratization Yale University Preis. 475 pagel. $5 by Abe Stein Order from Surely amidst the many ironies Motorized units of the army rolled Arflcles: of history, there is none greater than through Moscow's streets on the after­ LABOR ACTION BOOK SERYICE THE JUNE UPRISING OF the reason assigned by many observ­ noon of June 27th, and just as swiftly EAST GERMAN WORKERs ........ 130 ers for Beria's downfall. The liquida­ withdrew. That evening Beria was 114 W. 14th St•• New York 11. N. Y. by H. F. Stille tor of the Bolshevik Party in the not among the group of top party Transcaucasian Republics, the perpe­ leaders who attended an opera at the STALIN's PLACE IN HISTORy ............ 144 trator of genocide against five minori­ Bolshoi theater. The next day this Published bi-monthly by the New Inter­ national Publishing Co. at 114 West 14th by A lbert Gates ties during the last world war, and the news item was flashed to newspapers Street, New York 11, N. Y. Re-entered as overlord of a many-millioned slave in every part of Russia-an unusual second-class matter March 8, 1950, at the post office at New York, N. Y., under the Booles In Review: empire is now being presented in his procedure in Russia for so minor an Act of March 3, 1879. Subscription rates: last hours as the defender of civil lib­ item but obviously intended as a sig­ $2.00 per year; bundles, 25c each for five lNCOME DISTRIBUTION IN U. S......... I67 copies and up. Foreign, $2.50 per year; erties and the rights of oppressed nal to party and government officials bundles, 30c each for five and up. by T. H. Vanr.e minorities in Russia. Beria, we are of what was soon to come. Address all editorial and business com­ munications to 'rhe New International. told, fell because he was the chief On July 7th or 8th, a hastily sum­ 114 West 14th Street, New York 11, N. Y. author of the new policy of conces­ moned meeting of the party Central SUBSCRIBE TO sions. If this is so,· then like Cawdor Committee took place in Moscow with in Shakespeare's Macbeth, nothing in Malenkov as the main reporter. MAX SHACHTMAN, Editor LABOR ACTION his life became him like his leaving it. Beria's crimes (he was apparently al­ JULIUS FALK, Managing Editor Two Dollars a Year In what sense Beria became the ready under house arrest) were de­ champion of the oppressed national­ nounced and his ouster in the name ities we shall see. Suffice it to say here of the party and the "collective leader­ that in the complex swordplay that ship." The Central Commjttee gave accompanied the struggle for power its "enthusiastic support" to the col­ Subscribe now to THE nEW InTERnATionAL inside the Kremlin after Stalin's death, lective leadership, now more unified each side sought to force the issue and monolithic than ever, and on 114 West 14th St., New York 11. N. Y. on ground where it felt strongest. The J ul y 9th, Pravda carried the official general policy of large promises and communique of the Central Commit­ Rates: 52.00 per year. 51.00 for six months small real concessions, was not and is tee dismissing the Minister of Internal not even now, the exclusive property Affairs from his post as a "traitor and of any particular element in the re­ capitalist agent" and ordering his case Hame........................................................................................................... gime. The visible proof is that the be turned over for disposition to the Kremlin propaganda line has not al­ Soviet Supreme Court. tered in this respect ~ince Beria was Address ........................................................................................................ On June 26th, the day before Beria purged. was presumably put under house ar­ rest, he seemed to be the first or sec­ THE EXTERNAL MECHANICS of Beria's City.............................................................. Zone .......... State.................. ond most powerful figure in the Krem­ catastrophic downfall are meager. lin hierarchy. As late as July 9th, foreign observers were still drawing tors' plot" of January 13th had been the doctors must have had Beria as party apparatus as party secretary, but detailed graphs showing a rising curve a frame-up. The doctors were declared one of its intended victims. Those ob­ of the secret police through Ignatiev. for Beria and a rapidly descending innocent and Beria's wrath turned servers who speculated that this was Moreover, this group must have been line for Malenkov. The next day the against the former Minister of State the meaning of the many editorials in terrified at the possibility of an open illusion of Beria's power was uncere­ Security, Ignatiev and his deputy and Pravda attacking the "intelligence or­ clash immediately following Stalin's moniously punctured before the Rus­ head of the Investigation Section, gans" (Beria) for neglect, have been death. The possibility that such a sian people and the outside world. R yumin, who had personally fabri­ proven right. And behind the under­ struggle might lead to the collapse What immediately leaps to the eye cated the case against the doctors. lings, Ignatiev-R yumin, stood more of the regime must have been very is the swift and seemingly painless Ryumin, Beria's statement declared, powerful forces, Stalin-Malenkov. real in their panic-stricken minds. It manner in which this piece of poten­ had been arrested for violating the \Vhat, however, is of importance explains the very first words of the tially dangerous surgery was executed rights of Soviet citizens and obtaining to us here, is the fact that on the day regime, exhorting the Russian people at each stage of the operation. It im­ confessions by impermissible means. of Stalin's death Beria did not con­ to stand firm and avoid "disorder and mediately raises a question: why was The former Minister, Ignatiev, was trol the state security police. And the panic." We know now where the Beria unable to defend himself, if censured for "political blindness and events that have occurred since Beria's panic and disorder prevailed. he was the victim of a conspiracy? Or inattentiveness." On April 7th, an downfall reveal that neither did he The decisive role the "Old Stalin­ if it was he who was conspiring against even harder blow was struck at Igna­ control what had been the Ministry ist Guard" played in the struggle, ex­ the rest of the Kremlin gang, how did tiev. He was dismissed from his post of In ternal Affairs. Kruglov, the head plains the changes which took place he fall so easily into the counter-trap as secretary of the Party's Central of the MVD until March 6th, and in the party and governmental struc­ that was set for him without putting Committee. then named Beria's deputy, imme­ ture during March. The Presidium up any considerable resistance? Why was Beria so interested in de­ diately became Beria's successor on of 25 members was reduced to 10, giv­ The answer lies in the social nature stroying Ignatiev? Ignatiev had sud­ July 9th. Since such prizes are re­ ing it the decisive voice in any cru­ and function of the secret police. By denly come into prominence when he warded only for disloyalty and be­ cial dispute. The strength of the itself it only has the illusion of power. was elected to the Presidium at the trayal, Kruglov must have had a hand group was also reflected in the inner Separated from the party, it is like a 19th Party Congress in October, 1952. in bringing about Beria's downfall. cabinet of the new Council of Min­ sword without an arm to wield it-it At the time it was noted that Beria's Had he remained faithful to Beria, he isters. Malenkov was Premier, but is powerless to strike and lacks direc­ deputy, Abakumov, formally Minister would have suffered the same fate. surrounding him as his four First tion. Stalin purged Yagoda and re­ of State Security since 1946, had not If Beria did not control the secret Deputy Ministers were Beria, Bul­ placed him with Yezhov. Yezhov car­ even been elected to the Central Com­ police on the day Stalin died, then he ganin, Kaganovich and Molotov, with ried out the bloody purges which have mittee. That Ignatiev had taken had no real power. Malenkov, whom Mikoyan added as a plain Deputy entered history under his name-the Abakumov's place was not known we can assume was Beria's chief an­ Minister. In late March this group Yezhovchina-and was then replaced publicI ytill February, 1953, when he tagonist, had every advantage, Beria compelled Malenkov to make a fur­ by Beria. Now Beria has been re­ was nominated by the employees of none. What brought about the sudden ther retreat. He "voluntarily" yielded placed by Kruglov. To continue, to the Ministry of State Security to the change for the better in the latter's the key post of first party secretary speak, as some observers do, of the Moscow City Soviet.
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