for study and research

The Chinese Revolution

Pierre Rousset

Part II: The Maoist Project Tested in the Struggle for Power

Folk artist, Scenes of struggle and victory

International Institute for Research and Education Number 3 Chapter 4 1932-1936 Victory in defeat: revolution and protracted warfare

Between 1934 and 1936, the But the Long March was not just various Red Army groups left their bases a physical, military and moral trial; it in southern and central China, heading was also a tough political test for the for the Shaanxi Soviet Area, where they Communist Party. Its apparatus was arrived one by one.1 The perilous, heroic weakened by violent factional conflicts. and truly epic journey became known as The very existence of the CCP was at the Long March. The price of this survival stake in several ways. operation was high. On the eve of the "The Long March," Harrison great trek, total Red Army forces were Salisbury notes in a paraphrase of estimated at 300 000; only 30 000 general Qin Xinghan, "was not just guns ultimately came together in and bullets; it was three battles in one - northwestern China. the battle with Chiang and his regional The 86 000-strong First Front warlords, the battle against nature and Army left the Ji-angxi base area on the elements, and key of keys, the October 16, 1934, together with the CCP battle within the Communist Party, the central leadership. It was to travel 10 battle of leader against leader and policy 000 kilometers and overcome many against policy."3 trying moments: repeated engagements Mao emerged from it all at the with the Guomindang troops, the head of the CCP. Before 1935, one could hostility of non-Chinese peoples, refer to a Maoist faction inside the CCP, fearsome natural obstacles and the much as people had talked about the eroding morale of its own fighters. In "Zhu-Mao Army"4 in the days of the fact, one of the most difficult tests for Jingganshan and Jiangxi in the late the Red Army was dealing with the 1920s. After 1935, one is compelled to demoralization of soldiers who had been recog-nize the existence of a Maoist hounded from their native province, cut party leadership, a team that is still off from their family and village, thrust challenged by some but whose scope into provinces whose language and cus- goes far beyond that of a mere regional toms were alien, and set on what faction. seemed, for a long time, a haphazard quest for a more sheltered base area. 1932-1935: Mao's demise and comeback Only 4000 of them, including Mao Zedong, reached Wuqi, North Shaanxi2, Mao Zedong's comeback is one of the last stops on the way to particularly noticeable because he had Yan'an, the new "red capital," on October lost most of his power by the eve of the 19, 1935. great exodus, in 1934. His downhill slide had begun in 1932, when first Zhou Enlai, then Bo Gu and Luo Fu (Zhang 1 See map of the Long March in Volume l,NSR Wentian), two of the "28 Bolsheviks" n°2,p. 15. faction's main representatives, arrived in 2 The figures above are those of Harrison E. his Soviet Republic, with the backing of Salisbury, The Long March, London/Sydney: Pan 5 Books, 1986, p. 23. For propaganda reasons, the Otto Braun , the "military adviser" sent Communist Party had inflated the figures of the First Front Army, dubbed "The Army of 100 000." 3 Salisbury, p. 91. General Qin Xinghan, when But the rolls of the Red Army give the following interviewed by Salisbury, was assigned to the figures, including enrollment in progress: 19 880 Military History Museum. for the First Army Group, 17 805 for the Third, 12 4 Zhu De was one of the main leaders of the Red 168 for the Fifth, 10922 for the Eighth, 11 538 for Army Group since the early heroic days of the the Ninth, 4695 for the Military Commission Jingganshan. The two men were so closely Column, 9853 for the Central Column. See associated in popular imagery that some believed Salisbury p. 31 and footnote 7, p. 353. they were a single person: Zhu Mao. When comparing the figures on departure and 5 Otto Braun, probably a German, used the party arrival, account must be taken of the fact that name of Li De and the pen name of Hua Fu. He thousands of recruits were added during the Long arrived in Jiangxi in spring 1933 and became in March itself. Losses include those killed, wounded practice the main leader of the region. He and not transportable, deserters, etc. participated in the Long March, even after losing by Moscow. enabled Mao to reassert his leadership. Mao's formal position remained In December 1934, during the quite high during that period. He had conference of Tong-dao (a town near the lost his post as an alternate member of border of Hunan and Guizhou), he was the Political Bureau (PB) in 1927 after reinstated into the central military the failure of the Autumn Harvest commission, from which he had been Uprising. But he regained it in 1931 and expelled in 1932. A week later, on became a full member of the PB in 1934. December 18, Mao bolstered his position Nevertheless, his authority was during an enlarged meeting of the undermined and his associates Political Bureau held in Liping, the threatened; he was becoming thriving seat of a county in southeastern increasingly isolated. Maoist conceptions Guizhou.6 By mid-January 1935, Mao on strategy were subjected to syste- asserted his preeminence over Otto matic criticism during a violent Braun and Bo Gu at another enlarged controversy over military affairs. meeting of the PB, held in Zunyi, an Leadership was in the hands of the urban center of the same province. troika of Otto Braun, Bo Gu and Zhou Mao succeeded in consolidating Enlai. his political power throughout 1935, By 1934, Mao's position seemed despite a grave military setback suffered as desperate as it had seemed strong in under his newly-acquired command, 1932. Most of the red generals sided immediately after the Zunyi conference. with Zhou Enlai or Otto Braun. When the The incident occurred in late January, as Long March began, the PB assigned the Red Army attempted to cross the cadres of the Maoist faction to take Yangtze river at Qinggangpo, and came charge of the rear; few of them survived close to total disaster. In the event, Mao the "mop-up" operations launched by the seems to have committed one of the white armies in the red zone now very mistakes against which he had emptied of its main defenses. often warned: engaging in battle without To break out of the enemy ring, sufficient information on enemy forces.7 the Red Army had to smash through four Maoist historiography has piously lines of bunkers. It managed to cross forgotten this nearly fatal blunder. This the first three with relative ease, thanks defeat, and the subsequent retreat and to secret compromises with local many exhausting forced marches, warlords. But it paid very dearly its fostered disquieting complaints among passage through the fourth line, on the the commanders of the Red Army: even river Xiang. The Communists were Lin Biao, then a young general who had slowed down by long columns of porters supported Mao during the dog days of and could not escape beyond the reach 1932 to 1934, gave voice to this of the white armies. Their losses (both discontent.8 casualties and desertions) soon rose to Despite this failure, the quality of 50 000; by January 1935, the First Army Mao's command at a time when the only numbered 30 000. relationship of forces was particularly These events undermined the unfavorable, compelled recognition. The authority of Otto Braun—in title a mere Red Army, now numbering only 20 000, "adviser," in fact the party's main was forced to face a new encircling politico-military leader— among the maneuver. Chiang Kai-shek had cadres of the Red Army. This context assembled between 500 00 and 750 000 troops and blockaded all escape routes. But Mao took advantage of the the proconsular powers he wielded for a time, and contradictions among the various remained in China until 1939, at which point he left warlords, used the extraordinary speed of for the Soviet Union. It seems that friends advised his own troops, and carried out a not to return to base too fast: this is how he escaped multiplicity of diversionary maneuvers to the fiercest period of the purges, in which many Stalinists who knew too much lost their lives. He retired in East-Berlin and wrote his memoirs, "Von 6 See Salisbury, pp. 109-113 Schanghai bis Janan", Horizont (East-Berlin), 7 Idem, pp. 145-153 n°23-38,1969. He died in 1974. 8 Idem, pp. 188-192 deceive his enemies, break out of their Army: north, as advocated by Mao, into net and achieve the reputedly impossible Han country10, to be able to regain the feat of seizing the Luding bridge: in late initiative when the opportunity would May 1935, with only 12 000 to 13 000 arise (the war with Japan...); or ever people left, he again escaped extermi- further west, into Tibetan lands, as nation by successfully crossing the Dadu argued by Zhang Guotao, to get closer river. to the Soviet borders, at the risk of Mao's Red Army was now isolation from "useful" China? sheltered from White attacks for a while. The political clash was becoming But Mao then had to lead his exhausted quite bitter—or worse for Mao, who was troops, natives of the tropical South, up surrounded by Zhang's supporters. But and across the Great Snowy Mountains the adversaries simply broke off: the and through the Grassland, a vast Fourth Army withdrew into Xikang while steppe of desert swamps in which the the First Army maneuvered to regain a Red fighters, accustomed to densely foothold in Han country. Mao Zedong populated areas, marched for days was apprised of the existence of a red without meeting a soul. This was the far- base in North Shaanxi. After a few more end of the world, a psychological as well engagements with the whites, Mao and as a physical trial. 4000 followers finally arrived intact in Having overcome this obstacle, their new haven. Mao had to face a new political Meanwhile, the Fourth Army challenge. In June 1935, his First Front faced hostile Tibetan populations and Army, now down to 7000 or 8000 was driven further and further into the troops, joined forces at Maogong, Northwest. In the end, it was cut to Sichuan, with the Fourth Front Army, pieces in the far reaches of Gansu and which comprised 70 000 troops and was Xinjiang by the Moslem horsemen of Ma led Zhang Guotao, one of the leading Pufang. When Zhang Guotao and the members of the PB.9 Zhang's forces survivors joined Mao's now substantially were not only ten times stronger than restored forces, in 1936, they did so as Mao's but far fresher. vanquished. The junction of the two Communist task forces triggered a new The new Maoist leadership faction fight. Zhang Guotao laid claim to leadership. The showdown focused on Mao Zedong thus emerged for the route to be followed by the Red the first time as the central figure of the Chinese Communist Party in 1935-

1936.But he had achieved more than 9 Zhang Guotao was bom in 1897 in Jishui simply asserting his own preeminence: (Jiangxi) and died in 1979 in Canada. He was one by rallying around him, or neutralizing, of Ihe founders and first leaders of the CCP. key cadres of the rival factions, by Opposed to the CCP's entry into the Guomindang, attracting independents, and by he lost his seat on the Central Committee in 1923. progressively his scattered former He was reinstated in 1925. During the Second Chinese Revolution, he was invested with major comrades who had survived the purges responsibilities in the Peking labor movement. and warfare, he had succeeded in Removed from the leadership once again after the building a new and real leadership team fiasco of 1927, he was compelled to make a self- for the party. criticism in the USSR. Sent back to China by The composition of this new Moscow to fight the Li Lisan leadership, he settled Maoist leadership team shows that his first in Shanghai, then, in 1931, in the red base area take-over went far beyond the mere of Eyuwan, on the border of Hunan, Hubei and victory of one faction over the others; Anhui. The base had to be evacuated in 1932. indeed, what actually took place was a Zhang Guotao and the Fourth Front Army set out complete realignment of the apparatus on their Long March, in early 1935, from reflecting a deep process of political northwestern Sichuan. Zhang Guotao broke with recomposition inside the CCP. the CCP in 1938. He took refuge in white territory, then, in 1949, in Hong Kong, and finally, in Cana- da. 10 The Han are the main ethnic group inhabiting China. In the early stages of the Long ning in 1942. Only in the 1960s, when March, Mao, who, being ill, was Mao proved in-capable of defining a transported in a litter, developed viable orientation, was the relation of relations with Luo Fu and Wang Jiaxiang, personal loyalty broken and did the crisis two of the main leaders of the Moscow- of the Maoist leadership become acute, trained "28 Bolsheviks" faction. Luo Fu leading to the Cultural Revolution. Thus had actively contributed to the anti- Mao's political death preceded his Maoist purges carried out in 1933 during physical death in 1976, and marked the the campaign against the Luo Ming end of an epoch for the CCP and the "deviation."11 In 1932, he is even People's Republic. reported to have asked that Mao be Mao Zedong held a particular, expelled from CCP membership. As for preeminent position within the Political Wang Jiaxiang, he had replaced Mao in Bureau. It seems that from 1935, the the leadership of the Army's General former members of the "28 Bolsheviks" Political Department. Nevertheless, Mao faction, elements who had "returned was able to form a factional bloc with from Moscow" and joined the new them, known alternately as the Central leadership, no longer played a truly Team (in the Maoist version) or the central role.12 But the national leaders of Central Triad (in Otto Braun's version). the CCP included many others, with At the Zunyi conference, Zhou strong personalities. They were by no Enlai agreed to a full-scale self-criticism means simple stooges of the Great of the military orientation pursued under Helmsman! his leadership. He was then integrated The leadership team put together into the new leadership team. On the in 1935-1937 was impressive in many other hand, the other two members of ways. It included the talented Zhou the old governing troika, Bo Gu and Otto Enlai, known for his sense of party—and Braun, refused to make amends. They later state— discipline, yet quite were isolated: the generals supported prepared to assume responsibility when Mao. the need arose, as he had in the past The new Maoist leadership was when he gave the signal for the shaped at this time. Still fragile, it was Nanchang insurrection against Stalin's to consolidate over the next fifteen years formal order, as transmitted by of revolutionary struggle and to Lominadze, on the eve of the uprising.13 withstand the stresses of victory for a It included Liu Shaoqi, who entire decade. Only in the late 1950s probably participated in the beginning of (with the failure of the Great Leap the Long March, then took his Forward) and 1960s (during the Cultural assignment in North China, and became Revolution) would this team finally the regime's Number Two before shatter. perishing in the Cultural Revolution; The new leadership was built Chen Yi, one of the Maoists left behind in around Mao: he had been right before Jiang-xi, who only managed to resume others; he had pursued a difficult fight contact with the CCP leadership in 1937; on several fronts almost single- Deng Xiaoping, who had already then handedly; he had known how to listen to survived one purge (for Maoism that former adversaries and even turn them time!), and was to become one of the into his collaborators. Intimately main political commissars of the Red involved in all the activities of the leadership he demanded allegiance from 12 Luo Fu became general secretary of the party his followers: a relation of personal after the Zunyi conference; the position, however, loyalty emerged which paved the way was far less important than the title may imply. As for the rise of a personality cult, begin- for Wang Jiaxiang, he was to head up Kangda University, in Yan'an, during the Sino-Japanese war. After the 1949 victory, Wang became the first 11 Luo Ming was interim secretary of the Fujian ambassador of the People's Republic of China in provincial committee in 1932-33. He had opposed Moscow (Luo Fu succeeded him in that position). the conclusions of the August 1932 Ningdu Central Both collaborated with Zhou Enlai in the Committee dominated by Zhou Enlai. Foreign Affairs Ministry. 13 According to Salisbury, op.cit.,p.21 Army; generals and future marshals who Moscow were materially interrupted. The had supported Mao in the 1932-1934 center in Shanghai, in charge of military controversy, such as Lin Biao, international links, had fallen under the famous for his flanking attacks, or who blows of repression; the Red Army's had criticized him in no uncertain terms, transmission equipment was not such as Liu Bocheng, the One-Eyed powerful enough to keep in touch with Dragon, and the very professional Peng receivers beyond the borders of China. Dehuai, famous for his frontal attacks, During the Long March, a crucial or who had stood half-way, such as the formative period, no one could appeal to popular Zhu De, the comrade in arms of the Comintern to intervene directly or the early days... influence the party's internal struggles. How could Mao, after being Moscow was presented with ac- stripped of his power on the eve of the complished facts. The faction fight was Long March, rally around him such a far from over; the new leadership team powerful team of veterans from such was still politically unstable. But the diverse factional backgrounds? relationship of forces had tipped to the Mao had not been completely other side. More importantly, the nature defeated between 1932 and 1934; he of the factions at hand had changed. retained the —discrete— support of a Before 1935, the Maoist faction section of the army around Lin Biao. He only encompassed a minority of the truly was protected by the prestige he still representative cadres of the CCP. The enjoyed, the friendship of Zhu De, the Comintern was still able to impose cautiousness of Zhou Enlai, and even discipline and obtain the support of Moscow's calculations that it was best to central figures of the party despite the keep more than one egg in its basket defeat of 1927: a Li Lisan or a Qu Qiubai and therefore rejected Bo Gu's and Otto lent their services to the Stalinist effort Braun's injunctions that Mao be purged. to bend the CCP to its norm. They applied Mao was thus able to hold on to a the line without drawing any of the lessons few positions in 1932-1934. But his of the defeat. Nevertheless, they were not extraordinary political recovery cannot simple creatures of the apparatus that be explained by the protection he Moscow was building on an international received, his strong character, ambition, scale. Each represented an aspect of the factional know-how and military qualities history of Chinese communism: Li had alone. He was able to bring together assumed major tasks in workers' struggles cadres that were too different, through a in the 1925-1927 period and Qu played an series of trials that were too fierce, too outstanding role on the cultural front. varied and too numerous, for his success Paul Pickowicz has noted the in 1935 to be attributed to chance alone, ambivalent history of Stalin's chosen a simple rebound of the CCP's internal leaders, with respect to the case of Qu power struggles. The causes of the Qiubai: "The most characteristic feature of Maoist faction's defeat in 1932-1934 and Ch'u's [Qu's] political behavior in the 1924- of its victory in 1934-1935 must be 1930 period was unquestionably his investigated in greater depth. unwavering support of the various strategies for revolution in China mapped out by the The formation of a Chinese leadership Comintern in Moscow. No Chinese Communist worked more closely with At the Zunyi conference, the CCP Comintern representatives than Ch'u cadres had regrouped in opposition to during the United Front with the Otto Braun and the main representative Guomindang, the May Thirtieth Movement, of the "28 Bolsheviks" on the spot, Bo the Northern Expedition, and the Wuhan per- Gu— the secretary and nominal leader of iod.... But Ch'u's views began to change in the CPP who, probably because of his the spring of 1928...." own political inadequacy, had surren- Made into a scapegoat, summoned dered his tasks to the Comintern envoy. to Moscow, Qu remained in the USSR for The new leadership was formed against two years; there, he ran up against the the Stalinist faction properly speaking. It reality of Stalinism. "Ch'u's worst experience emerged at a time when relations with was his attempt to prevent Pavel Mif, Stalin's leading China hand, from installing his own fashion, but more radically and Wang Ming and his followers as the new earlier than many others. For until late leaders of the Chinese Communist Party."14 1934, most CCP leaders refused or failed to Although he and his wife were persecuted, do so; their reaction to the debacle and Qu managed to get back to China where he confusion had been to pin their hopes once stood by his opposition to the "28 again on the instructions of the parent- Bolsheviks" faction. He was expelled from party, the Russian party. One can only be the Political Bureau. astonished by the ease with which Otto Politically exhausted and isolated, Braun, who failed to learn the Chinese lan- Qu Qubai withdrew into the cultural arena guage, did not know the country and did where he was to emerge as a radical figure not respect the Red Army's customs, was searching for an identity that was at once able to impose his authority on already proletarian and national-Chinese— in the quite experienced political and military literary movement of the 1930s. In cadres. Pickowitz's opinion, Qu should be In 1935, the nature of the relations considered as the foremost non-European between Moscow and the Chinese Marxist literary thinker. leadership changed. Mao Zedong did not The "coup" engineered in 1931 by break with Stalin, the USSR and the Pavel Mif in the CCP signaled the seizure of Comintern. Rather, he asserted the political power by cadres cast in a new mould, the and organizational autonomy of the prototype of which was Wang Ming: they Chinese leadership within the international had been trained by and in the international Stalinist movement. He ended the relation Stalinist apparatus; their homeland was the of direct, bureaucratic subordination which Kremlin. Henceforth, Moscow's emissaries Pavel Mif had tried to foster by thrusting began replacing national leaders, instead of Wang Ming and his "28 Bolsheviks" onto supplementing them as they had the party. But Mao preserved the CCP's previously. Even then, Moscow still retained alliance with Stalin, both because he the loyalty of valuable cadres, products of continued to identify with the socialist camp the history of Chinese communism, such as and the advances of the Soviet Union and Zhou Enlai. The PB was thus still able to for reasons of realism. Nevertheless, the keep the Maoist faction's representation naive trust of the first years was dead. It down. had given way to cynicism and maneuver. The year 1935 marked a decisive The deeper meaning and considerable turning point in this respect: legitimacy impact of this shift was not understood by changed sides. Previously, with the blessing the Trotskyist movement at the time. of Moscow it had laid with the anti-Maoist Although Trotsky urged caution on a few bloc. Now, with the test of events, it occasions,15 the Trotskyist movement, both switched to Mao's side. The Wang Ming through lack of information and political wing was reduced to a particular faction whose influence derived mainly from its 15 In a January 8,1931 letter to the Chinese Left Stalinist backers. The change-over began at Opposition, Trotsky urged his Chinese comrades to the Zunyi conference. The cadres in send a few of their members into the main attendance recognized that Mao was the detachments of the Red Army: "..., it is very leader who was building an adult, Chinese desirable to have our people, Oppositionists, at leadership, free from the financial, least in the larger divisions of the 'Red Army,' to psychological and political tutelage of share the fate of these detachments, to observe Moscow, and determined, not to break with attentively the relations between these detachments the "great Soviet rear," but to maneuver to and the peasantry, and to keep the Left Opposition preserve the CCP's autonomy in action. informed." ("To the Chinese Left Opposition," Therein lay one of the sources of Leon Trotsky on China, p. 494. One should note Mao's preeminence. He had drawn one of however, that Trotsky does not display the same the key lessons of the 1927-1930 defeat, in concern with respect to the CCP as such, as he does with respect to the peasant movement and the Red Army. Moreover, he considered the "peasant 14 Paul G. Pickowicz, Marxist Literary Thought in degeneration" of the proletarian Red Army as China, The Influence of Ch’ü Ch'iu-pai, Berkeley: inevitable short of a rapid resurgence of urban University of California Press, 1981, pp. 95-96. workers struggles. short-sightedness,16 considered the CCP end. after 1927 as a mere docile instrument in Wang Fanxi also describes the the hands of Stalinist diplomacy, much like Maoist leadership as Stalinist, but in the what other Communist parties in other ideological sense of the term.20 In his parts of the world had become. This was memoirs written in 1957, he presents the perhaps one of the errors of the Trotsky-ist deeper meaning of the faction fight that movement in China with the gravest erupted at the Zunyi conference: "Mao consequences, for it prevented it from Zedong won against Wang Ming as the understanding in time the revolutionary genuine leader of the Party. This dynamics of the CCP-led struggles of 1937- represented a victory of the 'indigenous' 1945 and 1946-1949. Communists over Stalin's representatives in Only after 1949 did the Fourth China."21 International begin to reevaluate the The significance of Mao's victory at history of the CCP and Maoism17 through a Zunyi is par-ticularly clear because it came long and many-sided discussion, never as the conclusion of a sharp struggle over finally concluded. The Chinese Trotskyist politico-military orientation. militants themselves drew divergent lessons from the victory of 1949. The debate over military policy: Peng Shuzi continued to uphold his protracted warfare earlier analyses. In 1974, in his "Introduction" to the writings of Leon From 1932 to 1935, the debates in Trotsky on China, he presented a the CCP over what orientation should be periodization of the Chinese CCP's history adopted, took the form of a long from its foundation to the Sino-Japanese controversy over military affairs. The war, noting: "It is especially worthwhile to political and organizational survival of the point out: from the sixth period on (after Communist forces was being determined the defeat of the revolution18), the Chinese very directly in the field of armed resistance Communist Party became Stalinist, both to the annihilation campaigns launched by politically and organizationally. Its lead- the Guomindang. Underlying the tactical or ership by then had become a tool for the conjunctural differences, quite distinct blind carrying out of Stalin's policies."19 For overall approaches began to emerge. The Peng, then, the CCP had become Stalinist in military debate was at root a deep political the precise sense of the term in 1927: that debate. is, subordinated politically and organization- The written polemics were ally to the Soviet bureaucracy. In his conducted in veiled terms, often using opinion, it was to remain so to the very allusions rather a frank and open statement of the problems. But the stakes were no

less important. The "Russian orthodoxy" of 16 The magnitude and nature of the faction fights the national leadership was counterposed taking place within the leadership was one of the best kept secrets of the CCP. Nevertheless, over the to the "Chinese archaism" of Maoism. years, it was possible to detect the existence of this General Liu Bocheng, the One-Eyed Drag- conflict and to realize the political determination of on, opened fire on Mao in 1932, with an the Maoist leadership. article analyzing tactics and strategy from 17 See, for instance, Ernest Mandel 's 1950 articles feudal to modern times: "Liu stressed," Hu on the Third Chinese Revolution reprinted in La Chi-hsi notes, "the limits and archaic nature Longue Marche de la Révolution, Paris: Editions of the military art of Sun Zi, the famous Galilee, 1976, pp. 125-201, and the resolution of military theoretician of the fifth century BC. the Eleventh Plenum of the International Executive By contrast, he emphasizes the importance Committee of the Fourth International of June 1952 of the experience acquired by the Soviet (Quatrième Internationale, volume 11, number 1, Union's Red Army and criticizes sharply the pp. 52-57). It is impossible to summarize this Chinese Red Army's insufficient knowledge complex debate here of modern strategy and tactics. His attacks 18 That is, from 1927 onwards. 19 against Communist leaders who persist in Peng Shu-tse "Introduction," Leon Trotsky on trying to apply, in ossified fashion, Sun Zi's China, p. 96. Peng's judgement applied to ail the leaderships of the CCP after 1927, including the Maoist leadership. 20 We shall return to this question. 21 Wang Fanxi, op.cit., p. 180. military art and the war ruses described in broader debate over "the Chinese road." It the Novel of the Three Kingdoms were had in fact begun as early as 1927. It was aimed particularly at Mao."22 opened again in the Jiangxi Soviet Republic Four years later, Mao, having won the in 1932, when the Central Committee argument, denounced the "incorrect view" conference held at Ningdu put the military which we "refuted long ago" that "it is policy advocated by Mao on trial. And it enough to study Russia's experience of the concluded in 1935, at the Zunyi conference revolutionary war or, specifically, that it is when Mao, in turn, was able to level a enough to follow the laws that guided the severe indictment of his adversaries' Civil War in the Soviet Union and the military conceptions. military directives published there. They do Mao Zedong drew a balance sheet not see that these laws and directives in the of the military leadership of the party in Soviet Union embody the special 1933-1934 in a resolution written in the characteristics of the Civil War and the Red heat of action, at a key turning point of the Army of the Soviet Union; if we copy them CCP's internal political struggle; his and apply them mechanically, allowing no resolution was endorsed by the Zunyi change whatsoever, it will also be like Enlarged Political Bureau meeting.24 Some whittling down our feet to fit the shoes and historians consider this resolution as a mere we shall be defeated.... They do not see factional exercise in which Mao attempted that although we must value Soviet experi- after the fact to claim that he had been ence, and even value it somewhat more correct, whereas he had, in reality, been no than experiences in other countries more clearsighted than the others. But Hu throughout history, because it is the most Chi-hsi has uncovered an article by Lin recent experience of revolutionary war, we Biao, dating back to July 1934, which must value even more the experience of confirms that the Maoist faction had already China's revolutionary war, because there then developed a judgment on the situation are a great number of conditions special to similar to that endorsed at Zunyi.25 the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red The military debate that began Army...."23 with the experience of 1927 was It is clear that the debate over substantive, even though somewhat military policy was one of the facets of the confused initially. At the risk of oversimplifying the various sides in the controversy, one can summarize the 22 Hu Chi-hsi, L'Armee rouge et Vascension de thread of the argument as follows: what Mao, Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes were the conclusions to be drawn from en Sciences Sociales, 1982, p. 68. The article by the fact that the struggle for revolution Liu Bocheng summarized by Hu was originally would henceforth be part of a process of published in August 1932 Sun Tzu's (Sun Zi's) The protracted warfare? In China, a long Art of War, is published in English:, in London, by period of civil war seemed unavoidable Oxford University Press, 1963 and 1971. In an enthusiastic foreword to the book, B. H. Lid-dell before the conquest of state power, Hart writes that "Sun Tzu's essays on The Art of whereas in Russia, the civil war of 1918- War' form the earliest of known treatises on the 1921 unfolded after the victory of a subject, but have never been surpassed in brief insurrection and the establishment comprehensiveness and depth of understanding. ... of a new state power. Among all the military thinkers of the past, only This was the context in which Clausewitz is comparable, and even he is more other essential differences between 'dated' than Sun Tzu, and in part antiquated, China and Russia (concerning notably although he was writing more than two thousand years later. Sun Tzu has clearer vision, more profound insight, and eternal freshness.” 24 "Resolution de la Conference de Zunyi" (Op.cit.,p.5) (complete title: Resolution du Centre du Parti 23 Mao Zedong, "Strategic Problems of China's communiste chinois sur le bilan de la lutte contre le Revolutionary War," 1936, in Schram, The cinquierne en-cerclement de l'ennemi) reproduced Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p. 276. Mao in French in Hu Chi-hsi, op. cit., pp. 230-250. modified the end of this paragraph in the 1951 25 Lin Biao, "Sur la tactique des attaques breves et edition to give greater weight to the Russian soudaines," July 5, 1934, in Hu Chi-hsi, op. cit., pp. experience. 218-229. their social formation, conjuncture and Zhimin, are undeniably correct. These international context) acquired an measures foresee, in particular, the immediate significance: the situation of formation of support bases, the protracted warfare became an "over systematic creation of organs of power, determining" factor which partially the organization of close collaboration modified the relationship to other funda- between the Red guerrilla units and the mental factors-economic, social, political broad peasant masses formed in and cultural data. struggle, the deepening of the land re- The Red Army was involved in form, the development of armed forces partisan warfare. This implied that the through the creation of insurrectional Communist forces had to adopt a detachments at the level of the county, specific mode of organization to deal red guards at the level of the division, with two distinct sets of tasks: the then of the district, and territorial forces conduct of military operations against a of the Red Army, up to the creation of a more numerous and better armed non-territorial Red Army, and finally the enemy, and the continuation of in-depth extension of political power through mass work. This consideration was the successive waves."28 basis for one of the canons of Maoist Mao polemicized against "certain military conceptions, ably summarized in comrades" who simply reduced the 1929 by Chen Yi in his report on the Chinese revolutionary process to two "Army of Zhu-Mao", submitted to the stages: first, the conquest of the masses CCP leadership26: "in periods of partisan throughout the nation; then the warfare ..., the Red Army is conquest of political power. Mao put characterized ... by its mobility. Its forward a different perspective: the organization must therefore be different creation of a territorial dual power and from that of other armies. The principle "the extension through successive which governs the tactics of the Red waves" of the scattered parcels of this Army can be summarized in two political power. This was the perspective sentences: 'Concentrate to face the within which he stressed the importance enemy, and disperse to win over the of an articulated combination of politico- masses to our cause.' The troops must military forces, ranging from partisan be organized in such a way that the Red units to the "non-territorial" (that is, Army can both concentrate and geographically mobile) Red Army, later disperse."27 called regular armed forces. Mao Zedong imparted a Mao's letter to Lin Biao appears strategic dimension to partisan to be an answer to another letter, dated warfare, a form of struggle usually September 28, 1929, sent by the Central considered a conjunctural tactic, by Committee to the Army Group he integrating it into an original commanded.29 This text reveals a latent combination of politico-military instruments designed for waging a 28 Mao Zedong, "Une etincelle peut mettre le feu a protracted people's war. As early as toute la plaine" [A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie January 1930, he described this complex Fire], January 5, 1930, quoted in Hu Chi-hsi, p. 47. organism in a letter to Lin Biao: "It In the present version of the Selected Works, the appears that the policy of roving names of He Long and Li Wenlin have been erased, guerrilla actions alone cannot hasten the idem, p. 130. On the other hand, the name of Peng high tide of the revolution in the entire Dehuai ap-pears neither in the original version or country and that the political measures the Selected Works, which would seem to indicate adopted by Zhu De and Mao Zedong, as that he was one of the "certain comrades" targeted well as by He Long, Li Wenlin and Fang by Mao. An English translation of this letter, slightly different from that of Hu Chi-hsi, will be found in "Letter to Lin Biao," New Left Review, 26 Chen Yi (Dong Li), "Rapport sur l'Histoire et la number 65, January-February 1971, pp. 60-61 situation actuelle de l'Armee rouge de Zhu-Mao," (with an introduction by Bill Jenner). September 1, 1929, Bulletin militaire du Comite 29 "Lettre d'instructions du Comite central du Parti central, number 1, January 15, 1930. Reprinted in communiste chinois au Comite du Front du 4e French in Hu Chi-hsi, op. cit., p. 149-178. corps de l'Armee rouge," (Euvres Choisies de Zhou 27 Idem, p.159. Enlai, Peking 1981, pp. 41-59. According to the polemic against Mao's conceptions, unprecedentedly large forces into the which allegedly attributed too much Fifth Annihilation Campaign. Advised by importance to the conflicts between the the German Hans von Seeckt, he settled various warlords (whose existence was into a fierce bunker warfare, applying a one of the factors allowing for a genuine stranglehold on the Soviet zone. stabilization of territorial dual power) The measures devised by Mao earlier— and assigned too central a role to the and already amended by Zhou during Red Army. The Central Committee the Fourth Annihilation Campaign— no document recognizes the importance of longer sufficed. The leadership had to the Red Army, of course, but appears to choose: either move further along the have been written in line with the line of Mao's tactics, or radically change perspective which Mao had criticized as the mode of operation. The realism of spontaneist: a Red Army and rural the Maoist conceptions on the one hand, guerrillas whose temporary role would and of the Zhou-Otto Braun bloc on the soon give way to the uprising of the other, were to be harshly tested in masses led by the party and to the reality. direct struggle for political power Zhou Enlai's article published in centered on the cities. For the CCP March 1934, displays a surprising spirit leadership, the situation that arose after of triumphant optimism. "The the defeat of 1927 was a sort of Guomindang is attempting to gain unexpected "detour". It would later victory through a protracted political, return to being "normal"; the old economic and geographical war." The strategic conceptions therefore had to be Fifth Annihilation Campaign launched by maintained. For Mao, what had emerged Chiang some five and half months was the lasting features of the Chinese earlier, left the Red Army no time for revolutionary process, and strategic resting. It "...is permanently engaged at conceptions therefore had to be the front and fighting continuously.... reviewed and brought into line with [Nevertheless] not only have we not these features: the peasantry would been weakened by the war, but it has constitute the main force of the enabled us to develop and strengthen it. revolution, an idea considered as These facts give the lie to all the heretical as any in the international opportunists" sounding alarm bells in Communist movement in those days. Jiangxi. It is possible, even necessary, to In the early 1930s, the reality of "develop the fighting on all fronts," protracted war became obvious to all. It simultaneously, and "to settle the was recognized to the point of becoming outcome of the battle in the main sector the title of an article by Zhou Enlai, without therefore abandoning the fight written in March 1934.30 Yet the in the other sectors."31 One should discussion grew more bitter. The political accept the terrain chosen by the turn carried out in the Jiangxi Republic adversary and not give up a single inch (the eviction of the Maoist faction from of territory while wreaking havoc in the the centers of power) was combined enemy rear. with a major turn in the military Otto Braun was more sober. situation: Chiang Kai-shek threw Between April and August 1934, he published eight articles under the signa- editorial note, "certain passages of this letter were ture of Hua Fu. The Guomindang, he not retained when it was included in the present noted, has engaged in a genuine war of edition." I was not able to compare it with the attrition and partisan operations are no original version. This text was written by Chen Yi, longer sufficient. We must develop an after a discussion of his aforementioned "active defense," bolstered by "a zone of informational report, under the dictation of Zhou bunkers," units of a "long but Enlai. 30 discontinuous frontal defense line" Zhou Enlai, "Nos victoires dans la cinquieme designed to "pin down" enemy forces. campagne: sur la guerre prolongee," published in We should wage "a moving war under L'etoile rouge, March 13, 1934, and reprinted in French under the title "Sur la guerre prolongee," in Hu Chi-hsi, pp. 178-196. 31Zhou Enlai, "Sur la guerre prolongee," op.cit.,pp. 186-187, 190. the conditions of bunker warfare" and mistakes he had committed. On the transform "tactical victories into other side, the Maoist leadership campaign victories" by multiplying "short accused Bo Gu, Otto Braun and, to a and sudden attacks" (Otto Braun's key lesser extent, Zhou Enlai, with having formula).32 allowed a possible victory to escape, and Mao's conceptions were scary. then having prepared the retreat in The population of the Jiangxi Soviet precipitous fashion. Republic included three million people. I am not in a position to judge The peasants wanted to defend their the real opportunities which might have revolutionary gains (the land reform) existed at the time. But the Maoist and protect themselves against criticism of the CCP leadership's repression. Under these circumstances, conceptions ring true. Zhou's compulsive the Maoist tactics lost their popularity optimism forbade any cold-headed because the price to be paid was high. examination of the real relationship of Mao Zedong stressed the need for forces. Otto Braun fell back on tactical flexibility; without it, the Red Army could considerations, lacking in strategic not keep the initiative: one should allow depth. Both allowed themselves to be the enemy to penetrate deeply in order locked into a defensive and ever more to get a chance to trap him; choices static posture, both on the military and must be made and forces concentrated political planes. By contrast, the Maoist on a few selected axes; the alliance conceptions made it possible to test the between Chiang Kai-shek and the possibilities that still existed to their various warlords had to be broken at all ultimate limit, and quickly decide to cost, using, if need be, the flag of anti- withdraw should the need arise. Japanese resistance; the Red Army had Some of these possibilities do not to find a way to fight far away from the seem to have been fully exploited by the Guomindang bunker lines and, if CCP. Chiang Kai-shek's authority was by eveything else failed, to be ready to no means unchallenged. The camp of leave Jiangxi to escape annihilation. the counter-revolution divided several What was essential was to preserve both times, in 1933-1934, as witnessed by military and political mobility. the revolt of the Nineteenth Route According to Hu Chi-hsi, "Zhou Army.34 The Communist leadership, Enlai's protracted war was, in essence, a which was divided, had long criticized war of attrition, whereas the Maoist Mao for the importance he gave to strategy presented in January 1935 in conflicts among the warlords, and relied the Zunyi Resolution, all of whose main on the ultra-left directives emanating points already appeared in Lin Biao's from Shanghai and Moscow, was unable July 1934 article, was a strategy for a to take full advantage of these fractures. war of movement. As for Otto Braun's short and sudden attacks tactic, it was in The Maoist road and the people's reality, despite its name, a half-way war model strategy...."33 Many historians believe the Between 1932 and 1935, the defeat of the Jiangxi Soviets was Maoist faction asserted its originality in inevitable. This was, incidentally, Bo Gu's main argument in Zunyi, as he 34In November 1933, the commanders of the sought to minimize the scope of the Nineteenth Route Army rebelled against Chiang Kai-shek. Contacts were established with the 32 Otto Braun, La revolution et la guerre, "Un Communist forces, but failed to lead to any probleme urgent de la guerre revolutionnaire" agreement. The rebellion was isolated and (number 2, April 1934), "Sur la tactique de l'Armee smashed. It could have triggered the outbreak of rouge dans la guerre de blockhaus" (number 3, other contradictions in the camp of the April 20, 1934), "Opposons-nous a une interpre- Guomindang and paralyzed Chiang Kai-shek's tation erronee de notre tactique" (number 4, May ability to strike out. If the Communist forces had 18, 1934). In French translation in Hu Chi-hsi, op. been able to hold out just a bit longer, they might cit., pp. 197-213. Hu reproduced three of the eight have won a decisive battle: the war with Japan was articles by Otto Braun. beginning and the entire national political situation 33 Hu Chi-his, op.cit.,p.26. would soon be completely altered. the field of CCP-Comintern relations as of the revolution. He reinvested Chinese well as in that of politico-military military thought and experience into a orientation. The reason that Mao was new class perspective, imparting it with temporarily isolated is probably the a content extraordinarily relevant to our same reason that he was able to times. reassert his political authority so Mao's military thought was suddenly: he had drawn certain political formed during a fierce civil war. Only lessons of the defeat of 1927 earlier and later would he adapt it to a new frame- more clearly than most other CCP work, that of national defense against leaders. imperialist invasion. Protracted In the 1932-1934 period, most revolutionary war is a people's war, a other politico-military leaders of the CCP class war. still recoiled before the gravity of the Mao analyzed the relationship choices they had to make. The defeat of between war and revolution in China, an 1927 had resulted in a strengthening of immense, backward, semicolonial Stalinist power in the party. Opposing country. In this field, he was a pioneer the orientation of the "Center" and as- and the Chinese experience contains a serting the national autonomy of the wealth of lessons. The Maoist conception CCP meant accepting a showdown with of revolutionary war has found many those who wielded power and held the disciples. But frozen in a new "orthodox purse strings. Implementing the Maoist model," it has sometimes been so strategy meant accepting new inroads impoverished as to betray its original by the White armies into the Soviet intent. zone, and even accepting the idea that, The "Chinese road" includes the at some point in the near future, it idea of the "mass line", a point which might have to be abandoned altogether. differentiates authentic Maoist currents Nevertheless, it was Mao, the from organizations with an ultra- heterodox one, who proved the greatest militarist tradition. Nevertheless, realist. On the short run: Moscow's through the theme that "a single spark instructions were inapplicable because can start a prairie fire," it has fostered a they emanated from abroad and semi-"focoist"35 perspective which corresponded to the concerns of the believes that guerrilla bases (focos or Russian bureaucracy. The static defense hearths) established in the mountains of the Jiangxi zone got bogged down. It can act as a revolutionary detonator. became necessary to resort once again Advocates of this perspective forget that to the Maoist tactics so fiercely decried. the Red Army was not born in such focos On the long run too: it is enough to but in a revolution and mass uprisings, compare the theses put forward by Mao and that it never durably established between 1928 and 1935 to the Chinese itself in scarcely inhabited forest areas.36 revolutionary process of the 1935-1949 The theme of "the encirclement period, to understand that. of the cities by the country" summarizes Thus, Mao Zedong emerged at vividly Mao's view, a heterodox audacity the head of the CCP thanks to his at the time.37 It is an important insight tactical and strategic realism. He was not content to rediscover the potential 35 The word "focoist (or foquista, in Spanish, from role of rural guerrilla warfare, already foco, a health), has been used to designate certain noted by many "classics", from Marx and Latin American guerrilla warfare currents that Engels to Lenin. He innovated, in depth. emerged in the 1960s, following the victory of the As a thinker of protracted revolutionary Cuban revolution. The focoist outlook was war, he opened a new field of reflection systematized in particular by Regis Debray, in his that went far beyond military questions. book, Revolution in the revolution. But the He reversed the traditional Communist experience of the Cuban revolution is also much approach to the peasantry: where it had richer and dialectical than the focoist "model" been considered an auxiliary force claims. 36 See the chapter 2, part I, NSR number 2. (though one whose support could be 37 At the time, the Trotskyist current believed that decisive), it was now elevated to the the only conceivable road to revolution was an rank of main (though not leading) force urban insurrection that won over a peasant uprising but the formula must not be reduced to nor inevitable: they were the product of a sociological determinism that would defeats and constituted a heavy claim the "Russian road" is the "model" handicap for the revolutionary struggle. for urban capitalist countries, and the Despite that, the urban work conducted "Chinese road" that of all "semicolonial by the CCP represented an important semifeudal" countries the majority of political factor from 1937 to 1949. The whose population is rural. striking formula of encircling the cities Russia at the turn of the century from the country also tends to hide the was not a semi-colony. But the Russian considerable role played by rural towns41 social formation nevertheless displayed in the Chinese social formation. The many features resembling those of reality is that these towns served as today's dependent countries, and the anchorage points for the Red Army and lessons of this experience remain were often far more vital than the interesting for Third World mountain rear: as local centers of revolutionaries on more than one politics and the economy, they enabled count.38 The Chinese revolution of 1925- the CCP to consolidate its social base 1927 shows that colonial and and offered big opportunities for semicolonial countries can experience recruitment, supplies and financial revolutionary processes other than the support. encirclement of the cities by the Many have used the Chinese country.39 The "Chinese road" was not revolution, erected into a "model," as an determined only by the social structure argument to elevate war into a par- of the country, but also by the outcome ticularly worthwhile instrument for of previous struggles and the revolutionary mobilization and international context.40 "consciousness-raising." There is some The destruction of Communist truth in this view. The masses learn work in the trade unions and the lasting through struggle; the party, the teacher, passivity of the proletariat in the main is itself taught through trials and listen- coastal centers were neither desirable ing to masses (an old Marxist theme reinvested in the Maoist tradition). to its camp. But war is not just one form of 38 For a discussion of this topic, see Teodor Shanin, struggle among others. It can be used The Roots of Otherness: Russia's Turn of Century, by the revolution, but it, in turn, 2 vols., London: Macmillan, 1985. 39 imposes its own laws on the latter. It is Many other revolutionary episodes of the Third a tough school of cadre-training but it is World confirm this , beginning with the August not the best school of democracy. It Revolution in Vietnam in 1945. The course turns secrecy into a cult, a certain form followed by revolutionary struggles in a given of hierarchical discipline into a vital country depends in part on the nature of the period. necessity; it hardens human beings. War Changes in the period are themselves determined by a whole set of national, regional and requires that the party develop and international factors. They can either close off or maintain social roots lest it become open up prospects for a victorious mass unable to continue the fight. But it also insurrection. They change the way the national bolsters authoritarian structures. The factor and the class factor combine. There can best, most representative local cadres therefore be a shift of the axis of revolutionary are often called upon to join the mobile, struggles in a particular country in light of these conventional forces, and can no longer changes. On this topic, see Pierre Rousset, play their earlier role, in a symbiosis Nationalisms et Communisme vietnamiens. Le with the direct mobilization of the Vietnam entre deux guerres mondiales, Paris: people. The Maoist "mass line" reflects Galilee, 1978. this two-fold process of sinking roots 40 One can say that the sort of determinism at work and identifying with the people on the in this arena is historical and not narrowly one hand, and becoming autonomous sociological (or economic and political), meaning and rising above the masses on the that it is the result of the concrete interaction of other. many factors and the way in which past history (both recent and more distant) influences the conjuncture and the period. 41 Moreover, this role is diversified depending on the region at hand. The Red Army was a democratic of its lack of flexibility.43 Here too, the army in the sense that it was a people's Chinese experience does not correspond army in its goals, its politiciza-tion, its to this reductionist outlook. The CCP was internal rules and its relations with the compelled to change its orientation more population. But factional secrets in the than once in light of political rather than party leadership, along with military military considerations; it was able to secrets, meant that the major decisions gain the initiative on the political plane were made by a narrow circle of to avoid losing it on the military field. initiates. The feeling of insecurity very People's war, from China to El quickly threatens free political discus- Salvador, has demonstrated its sion. Internal security was drastic in all importance in contemporary national the Red Armies. "As Peng Dehuai wrote and social liberation struggles. But in his memoirs from prison: 'Everybody protracted people's war remains a costly in the Army worried about his safety' (he war, one that can exhaust the popula- was speaking of conditions as early as tion on the long run. Its dangers must 1931 and 1932). There was not much be understood in order that they be democracy. The Section for Eliminating contained more effectively; its limita- Traitors, which had originally been under tions too, that all forms of struggle be the Political Department, now became a combined more successfully. The Security Bureau at the same level as the primacy of politics over the military also Political Department."42 helps to develop international solidarity The functioning of the party and and to establish the general conditions revolutionary army had already been for a victory which is won as fast as severely affected by the factional and possible and in which the people bureaucratic climate initiated in Moscow. participate as massively as possible. To that was added the deep imprint of The revolutionary experiences of the permanent state of war. the last forty years have considerably Protracted warfare is not a free enriched the theory of people's war. choice, but a choice imposed by People's war has had to adapt to other circumstances. After 1927, the CCP had national circumstances and to the new to answer a vital question: how could it weapons and approaches of imperialist regain the initiative when class struggles counter-insurgency. But the Chinese had already reached a level of armed revolution opened a historical breach in confrontation but the situation appeared this field. The CCP demonstrated, in its durably unfavorable on the military time, a real creativity and a great plane? Mao Zedong had an answer for capacity for adaptation. This flexibility of the long term; planning an accumulation the Chinese Communist Party can be of political, social and military forces explained, among other factors, by the that could lead to a gradual reversal of fact that it had lived through other the relationship of forces: the transition periods and other forms of struggle from "a strategic defensive approach" to before engaging in protracted warfare. the equilibrium of forces, and the Its cadres knew how to operate in more general counter-offensive. than one situation. The CCP's multi-faceted *************** experience, acquired at considerable

In the circumstances of China at 43 To avoid this danger, the Vietnamese that time, this was an effective answer. Communists have reintegrated into their theory of But applied elsewhere, it has sometimes protracted people's war the idea of a "favorable given rise to a sort of "military moment," a political crisis, a revolutionary crisis. gradualism" that was dangerous because This is of the points (along with the ability to combine various forms of struggle, the importance given to activity in the international arena, etc) 42 Salisbury, p. 247. The quotation is taken from Vietnamese politico-military thought, which is Peng Dehuai's Memoirs of a Chinese Marshall, particularly dialectical, prolongs and surpasses the written while he was in jail, during the cultural level of its Chinese counterpart. revolution and published in Peking in 1984. cost, was to be of great use as the Long Central Committee in October 1938 (the March drew to a close. For the Japanese golden year of the united front policy), invasion, in 1937, was changing the gone so far as to salute "the glorious configuration of national politics. It put history" of the Guomindang? Had he not the united front with the Guomindang, called Chiang Kai-shek "a great leader"? even though it was now a mortal enemy, Had he not asserted that in the national on the agenda again, and rekindled the anti-Japanese front agreement struck by factional struggles inside the CCP. the CCP and Guomindang, the latter "occupied the position of leader and framework...?" "Under the single great Chapter 5 condition that it support to the end the 1937-1945 war of resistance and the United Front, The Sino-Japanese war: revolution one can foresee a brilliant future for the and the united front Guomindang."44 "Under the single great Japanese pressure on China grew condition...," a small phrase that steadily stronger throughout the 1930s. overlaid a violent conflict over leadership In 1931, the Japanese army occupied of the anti-Japanese resistance. In the Northeast. In January 1932, it reality, the CCP's 1937-1945 united attacked Shanghai. In 1933, it infiltrated front policy was different, in fact the North China plain and occupied profoundly different from that of the Jehol. In 1935, it enlarged its influence 1925-1927 period; this is why it did not in Cha-har and Hebei. Tensions rose end up with a new bloody massacre of steadily until July 1937 when the actual the people's forces. Quite the contrary. general invasion of the country began. Over the nine years of the front, the The Sino-Japanese war lasted Communist forces were able to expand until the defeat of the Japanese Empire in spectacular fashion. The Red Army in 1945. During these eight years of jumped from 30 000 troops to nearly war, a united front existed between the one million. The zone controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and the Communists, from about two million to Guomindang. At first sight, it appears 95 million inhabitants. By 1945, the CCP similar to that which existed from 1923 was in a strong position to win the civil to 1927. If one were to go by its war that smoldered under the embers of diplomatic statements alone, the CCP the united front: four years were enough once again formally renounced its for it to conquer power in this immense independence and agreed to follow the country/continent. Guomindang. The Red Army was The CCP's united front policy did nominally dissolved. From 1934 onward, not concern only its relations with the Moscow operated a major political turn, Guomindang; far from it. It included endorsed and formalized by the Seventh many facets designed first and foremost Congress of the Communist to create a social bloc capable of winning International, in July-August 1935. It a majority to the revolution. One can proclaimed that the time had come to say that it was a permanent feature of create "popular fronts" with bourgeois the Chinese CP's orientation, a strategic parties against fascism, and put together factor: according to the Maoist formula, an international bloc with the the party, the army and the united front "democratic" imperialist powers. In constituted the three indispensable many countries Communist Parties were placed in tow of their temporary allies. 44 See Mao, "On the new stage - Report to the Sixth The question arises: was not the CCP Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese simply applying Comintern policy in Communist Party" (October 1938), in Stuart China? Schram, The Political Thought..., pp. 228-229. Indeed, did not the Communist These passages were not published in the Selected leaders sometimes sing the praise of Works which, however, do contain the next section of this report (though not without some Chiang, the butcher of Shanghai, and of alterations) which emphasizes the CCP's own role the party of the counter-revolution? Had in the anti-Japanese resistance. not Mao Zedong, in a report to the elements for victory. The alliance involved and the reactions of Chinese between the CCP and Guomindang was public opinion. Tokyo was actually intent of a more conjunctural nature. From on turning China from a semi-colony into 1927 to 1937 and later, from 1945 to a direct colony, that is, to complete the 1949, there was no such united front, process begun a century earlier by but an open civil war. Nevertheless that Britain. China, already an oppressed alliance lasted a long time and nation threatened with the loss of its last represents one of the most few elements of independence, controversial aspects of Maoist policy. mobilized. Every party would henceforth For this reason,it may be useful to be judged by its commitment to the review its actual history before returning nation's resistance effort. to Mao's overall conception of the united Japan was trying to create its front. own vast zone of influence in East Asia and the Pacific. China was therefore Imperialist aggression, wars of national thrust into the march towards World War defense and the united front Two long before many other countries. Inter-imperialist competition was the The Soviet Republic had background of this planetary symbolically declared war on Japan in conflagration, the struggle for hegemony 1932 and the CCP had proposed the was joined by the United States, Japan formation of an anti-Japanese united and Britain, with France and Italy in the front long before 1936, but against secondary roles. Chiang Kai-shek, whose capitulationist But World War Two was not just tendencies it denounced. The main an inter-imperialist conflict. It was purpose of this policy was to play on the prepared by an enterprise of counter- Guomindang's internal contradictions revolution aimed mainly at stopping the and blow it apart. Strong opposition dynamic unleashed by the Russian emerged inside the CCP when the revolution in Europe, and by the desire leadership first decided to change its or- of the Great Powers to consolidate their ientation and propose the united front to rule in the Third World. Much as was the the Guomindang as such. case between 1914 and 1918, except on As for Chiang Kai-shek, he made far vaster scale this time, the world war no secret of his intention to do away of 1939 to 1945 demonstrated "the close with the Communists once and for all. relationship between imperialist war and He had had time to stabilize his grip on wars of national liberation and the country from 1928 to 1937, the revolution."46 "Nankin decade"—as it was known, after World War Two, particularly in the city Chiang had made his capital. the East, cannot be analyzed simply as a The last rebel Warlords had been conflict between democracies and brought to heel between 1934 and 1936. dictatorships. The traditional colonial The legitimacy of his government was powers (like Britain and France) were recognized in the country, particularly by not democratic as far as the people they the middle classes, as well as in the had subjected were concerned!47 The West. For Chiang, a definitive victory Japanese regime, although extremely over the CCP was necessary before he militaristic and repressive, was not the could make a real commitment to the equivalent of German Nazism. As a new war of national resistance. Chiang was imperialist power, Tokyo used terror to fond of saying that "the Japanese are an impose its rule. But that was nothing ailment of the skin, the Communists an exceptional as the history of European ailment of the heart."45 What compelled the two parties to enter willy-nilly into a fragile alliance 46 Ernest Mandel, The Meaning of the Second was the magnitude of the stakes World War, London: Verso, 1986, p.21. 47 Japan was able for a time to attract and ally with nationalist elements in certain Southeast Asian 45 Quoted by Roland Lew, Mao prend le pouvoir, countries, by promising them Asian solidarity and p.98. independence. colonization will readily demonstrate.48 those who refused to listen to any talk of Finally, the Asian regimes allied to the united front with the class enemy, who Western powers were at times far closer claimed that Chinese revolutionaries to fascism than liberalism. should advocate defeatism, as they did This was precisely the case in in the imperialist countries, and China. According to Christopher Thome, simultaneously fight against both the "indeed, if the term 'fascist' is to be Japanese and Guomindang. "To speak of employed in a non-European context for 'revolutionary defeatism' in general, the 1930s, to no regime is it more without distinguishing between exploiter appropriate to attach it than that of the and exploited countries, is to make a Kuomintang in China. 'Fascism,' declared miserable caricature of Bolshevism and Chiang Kai-shek to a gathering of his to put that caricature at the service of Blue Shirts in 1935, 'is a stimulant for a the imperialists. [.,.] China is a declining society.... Can fascism save semicolonial country which Japan is China? We answer: yes.'"49 In terms of transforming, under our very eyes, into authoritarianism, the Generalissimo, as a colonial country. Japan's struggle is he modestly asked to be called, did not imperialist and reactionary. China's mince his words: "the people must obey struggle is emancipatory and the orders of the government and the progressive."52 Leader absolutely,"50 Chiang blocked Advocating a united front had every move towards democratic reform nothing to do with fostering illusions with relentless constancy, thereby about Chiang Kai-shek: "We know destroying the attempts to establish a Chiang Kai-shek well enough as the "third force" between the Guomindang hangman of the workers. But this same and CCP. "One Doctrine, One Party, One Chiang Kai-shek is now obliged to lead a Leader" was the watchword of the war which is our war. In this war, our dictatorship. Within the Guomindang, comrades should be the best fighters. the pro-Japanese lobby was powerful Politically they should criticize Chiang and many of the party's officials would Kai-shek not for making war but for later collaborate with the Japanese making it in an ineffective manner, authorities. without high taxation of the bourgeois What justified the alliance class, without sufficient arming of between the CCP and Guomindang, was workers and peasants, etc."53 therefore not the latter's membership in The standard of national the "worldwide camp of the democracy," resistance therefore had to be wrested but the duty to wage the "just" war, the from Guomindang hands, thereby war of national defense and liberation in preparing for future class confrontations: a dependent country faced with "In participating in the military struggle imperialist occupation. This was the under the orders of Chiang Kai-shek, opinion of Trotsky at the time and he since unfortunately it is he who has the launched a very sharp polemic51 against command in the war for independence— to prepare politically the overthrow of 48 It is enough to recall that the Christian West can Chiang Kai-shek... that is the only 54 claim as its own the revival of slavery and the slave revolutionary policy." trade. These letters from Trotsky show 49 Christopher Thorne, The Far Eastern War, States that he had correctly understood the and Societies 1941-1945, London: Counterpoint- nature of the Chinese conflict and the Unwin Paperbacks, 1986, p. 60. stakes involved. But the Communist 50 Quoted by Roland Lew, Mao..., p. 73. Party was absent from the political 51 Referring to the ultra-lefts who denounced, from their countries in the West, any possibility of a united front between the Chinese revolutionaries 52 Idem, pp. 568-569. and the Guomindang, Trotsky wrote: "We are 53 Leon Trotsky, "Concerning the Resolution on the concerned here with either real traitors or complete War" (Letter to the International Secretariat, imbeciles. But imbecility, raised to this degree, is October 27, 1937), op. cit., p. 574. equal to treason." "On the Sino-Japanese War" 54 Trotsky, "On the Sino-Japanese War," op. cit., p. (Letter to D. Rivera, September 23, 1937), On 571. China, p. 568. equation which he set up. He seems to Chinese Communist Party and Mao, have considered the CCP as a when it was, in fact, drafted in Russia subordinate entity incapable of any with the participation of Wang Ming. In independent role. But the CCP was it, Moscow, worried by pressure from precisely to play a major role in the Japan in the Far East, proposed a united Sino-Japanese war. front to the Guomindang. The incident is quite revealing of the way in which the 1935-1939: the beginnings of the Soviet bureaucracy looked upon the united front and the lessons of 1927 various national organizations of the Comintern as docile instruments of its By 1935-1936, the Red Army had policy. been steeled by its trials and Pressure from Moscow had a role tribulations; it had become a cadre in changing CCP policy. But it would be army, the backbone of the revolutionary wrong to analyze the party's evolution movement. The survivors fleeing exclusively from that angle. Rather a southern and central China could now complex of factors must be taken into build new roots in the North Shaanxi account. In the mid-1930s, "barely base area.55 But the situation remained settled in after the Long March, the very difficult. The Maoist leadership still Party was forced to carry out a difficult had to consolidate itself and emerge on change of course while under strong a truly national scale. North Shaanxi was pressure from competing directions. not just a peripheral region, far away Moscow was forcefully pushing its new from the political and economic centers popular front line. In China the growth of the country, but also a socially of the anti-Japanese feeling was posing backward area. the question of national unity. The Party The CCP leadership was forced to rank-and-file and the land-hungry take a series of crucially important peasants were exerting their pressure to political decisions under these precarious the Left. Each of these lobbies circumstances in all haste. The national clamoured for the ear of a leadership situation was in flux. Contact had been threatened by KMT encirclement and reestablished with Moscow and the CCP material shortages, and in which there had to deal with Soviet demands. On was as yet no single absolutely August 1, 1935, a solemn declaration dominating figure or group."57 had been published in Moscow, in the The CCP's orientation shifted name of the CCP, although contact had gradually. At the Wayaobu Political been lost for several months. This Bureau meeting, in late December 1935, statement known as "The Appeal of the Chinese leadership had already been Maoergai,"56 has been attributed to the apprised of the new orientation decided by the Comintern. Nevertheless, the

55 Mao only stopped in Wuqi for three days, in resolution it adopted was by no means a October 1935. He then removed to Wayaobu where carbon copy. Of course, the CCP now he remained until early 1936; he stayed next in the advocated unity with the Chinese city of Bao'an, a more secure area, until January 10, bourgeoisie, as against the supporters of 1937. He finally settled in Yan'an which was to a "closed door" policy. The "broadest become the "war capital" of the Communist forces. national united front" was henceforth the 56 It is now certain that this appeal was written "general tactical line."58 But on the without the Chinese leadership being informed of question of the war, the PB resolution it. According to the testimony gathered by Harrison emphasized that "a basic principle of the Salisbury, the Political Bureau of the CCP, back in Party's revolutionary struggle is the Maoergai (Sichuan), was completely absorbed by unification of the Chinese civil war and an attempt to cope with the conflict with Zhang Guotao in the best possible way and the question of a possible united front between the CCP and 57 Benton, ibid. Guomindang was not even mentioned (Salisbury, 58 Resolution of Wayaobu, quoted by Lyman P. The Long March, pp. 260-261). See also Gregor Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, The United Front Benton, The "Second Wang Ming Line' (1935- in Chinese Communist History, Stanford, 1938)", The China Quarterly, n°61, March 1975, California: Stanford University Press, 1967, p. 59. pp. 62-65. national war."59 The implicit goal of the government will immediately order the resolution therefore remained to isolate Red Army to stop military action against Chiang Kai-shek. The land reform him or the army concerned." On the program, though more moderate than crucial question of who should control the one implemented in Jiangxi, the Red Army, "it goes without saying remained radical enough to meet that we shall never allow Chiang Kai- Moscow's disapproval. The CCP's Shek to lay a finger on it." This struggle to win hegemony inside the combination of military offensives and united front was reaffirmed.60 political overtures is a good illustration The caution of the Maoist of the two-level policy then followed by leadership is easy to explain. It had not the CCP.63 forgotten the terrible lessons of 1927. Following the failure of that Mao recalled these during the Wayaobu military offensive and the rise of anti- conference: "The revolution failed in Japanese feelings in Chinese public opin- 1927 chiefly because (...) no effort was ion, the CCP decided to open its unitary made to expand our own ranks (the policy wider and to moderate its social workers' and peasants' movement and program further. But the determination the armed forces led by the Communist of the Maoist leaders not to concede on Party), and exclusive reliance was placed the essential point, the control of their on a temporary ally, the Kuomintang. own independent forces and their long- (...) In those days, the revolutionary range goals, was confirmed. In his 1936 united front had no mainstay, no strong interviews with Edgar Snow, Mao revolutionary armed forces. (...) The explained his position on the lesson we paid for with our blood was "dissolution" of the Red Army and that the lack of a hard core of independent Yan'an government, in revolutionary forces brings the advance. The American journalist revolution to defeat. Today things are recounts that outside "the formal quite different."61 interview, Mao indicated that the By late 1935 and early 1936, the Communists would be prepared to make Maoist leadership was involved in a two- such changes in nomenclature as would sided political battle: against a current it facilitate 'cooperation', without denounced as sectarian because it fundamentally affecting the independent wanted to keep the "door closed" role of the Red Army and the Communist against the Guomindang, and against an Party. Thus, if it were necessary, the opportunist current which wanted to Red Army would change its name (...), open the door to Chiang Kai-shek too the name 'Soviets' would be abandoned, fast and too wide. and the agrarian policy would be In February 1936, the Red Army modified during the period of launched a major military offensive in preparation for war against Japan."64 62 Shanxi , causing great displeasure in Moscow. In March, Mao offered the 63 Benton, p. 67. Generalissimo a possibility to form a 64 Mao as quoted by Edgar Snow, Red Star Over united front: "If Chiang Kai-shek or any China, London: Penguin Books, First Revised and other army ceases hostilities against the Enlarged Edition, p. 418. This actually was the way Red Army, then the Chinese Soviet things happened. A part of the Trotskyist movement did not understand this, and later, 59 Quoted by Benton, op. cit., p. 67. refused to admit it, making the debates inside the 60 See Benton, pp. 66-67, and Lyman Van Slyke, Fourth International on the causes of the victory of op. cit., pp. 59-60. 1949 particularly confused. In a report on 61 Mao Zedong, "On Tactics Against Japanese November 8, 1951, Peng Shuzhi, asserted for Imperialism" (December 27, 1935), Selected example that the CCP had "even capitulated to Works, volume I, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, Chiang's government by cancelling its agrarian 1975, pp. 166-167. policy and dissolving the 'Red Army' and the 62 Shanxi (with a single "a") is a province north of Soviets." This did not prevent Peng from also Shaanxi (with two "a"s). Sometimes transcribed noting the considerable growth of the Communist respectively Shenxi (or Shensi) and Shanxi (or armed forces during the Sino-Japanese war. See Shansi). "Report on the Chinese Situation," The Chinese Revolution, Part I, Education/or Socialists, New In December 1936, the "Xian concessions were possible: maintenance incident" signaled a major turn in CCP- of the Communist Party's independence Guomindang relations. Chiang Kai-Shek and exclusive control over the liberated had made a trip to Xian (Shaanxi) to zones and Red Army. In the "theses" he urge a revival of operations against the presented in November 193767, Mao Communists; once there, though, he Zedong referred back to a previous draft was arrested by the local Guomindang resolution of the Central Committee leaders who felt the top priority was whose conclusion had been resistance against Japan. Moscow unambiguous: "It is most essential to vigorously denounced the action, calling maintain absolutely independent it a "kidnapping" whereas Yan'an saluted Communist Party leadership in what was the rebel generals for their patriotism. originally the Red Army and in all the Finally, after a period of hesitation65, the guerrilla units, and Communists must CCP intervened to get Chiang Kai-shek not show any vacillation on this matter released. The rebellion of the Northwest of principle."68 An internal CCP resolution had failed. specified that: "Even after the On February 19, 1937, the establishment of the democratic Guomindang Central Committee officially republic, the Communists should not requested that cooperation with the give up absolute leadership over the Soviet Union and Communists be people and the existing armed forces in restored. A united front was formally soviet areas. On the contrary, the party concluded in the following months. should resolutely lead the Chinese During its first year, the year of "the masses' anti-Japanese struggle and day- honeymoon," political prisoners were to-day economic and political struggle freed by the Guomindang, and the and persist in enlarging and Communist Party was able to open consolidating its own political and headquarters in white areas (it would, in military forces to assure a thorough fact, keep its permanent delegation open victory of the anti-Japanese war and the in Chongqing until the bitter end).66 democratic republic, so as to fight for Soon though, the tension rose between the realization of a socialist future."69 the two parties and elements of civil Zhou Enlai spelled out clearly the war periodically surfaced within the long-range goals of the united front in a camp of the national resistance. talk with Edgar Snow in 1936 but then Mao was a driving force in the asked the journalist not to publish this development of the united front policy in interview because its particular clarity 1936-1937. He polemicized sharply might jeopardize the negotiations with against those who tried to create Chiang then under way. Snow recounts obstacles to its implementation. But he the interview as follows: the plans of the was clear on the limits beyond which no CCP, as explained by Zhou, "aimed chiefly at bringing an end to the civil war York: Socialist Workers Party (USA), June 1972, and forming a 'united front' with other p. 23. armies to resist Japan. 'Then you're 65 It is still difficult today to judge the precise giving up revolution?' I asked. 'Not at reasons that led the CCP leadership to come to the all. We are advancing revolution, not rescue of their sworn enemy: was it the pressures giving it up. The revolution will probably from Moscow, internal differences, and/or an come to power by way of anti-Japanese analysis of the political situation in the country and war.' As for Chiang Kai-shek? 'The first the relationship of forces inside the Guomindang? According to Van Slyke, the last of these factors 67 Mao Zedong, "The Situation and Tasks in the was decisive. In this view, the Communists feared Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and that the elimination of Chiang would benefit Taiyuan" (November 12, 1937), SW, vol. II, mainly the pro-Japanese lobby inside the Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975, pp. 61-74. Guomindang, rather than the elements favorable to 68 "Draft Resolution of the Central Committee of national resistance (Enemies and Friends. . . the Communist Party of China Concerning the chapter 5). Communist Party's Participation in the 66 Chongqing, Sichuan (also Chungking, Government" (September 25, 1937, point 8, SW, Szechwan), became the capital of Chiang vol. II, p. 72 (footnote 5). Kai-shek's war government after the fall of Wuhan. 69 Quoted by Benton, p. 70.

day of the anti-Japanese war,' he the implementation of the diplomatic prophesied,' will mean the beginning of options of the Soviet bureaucracy which the end for Chiang Kai-shek.' The now wished to take the initiative in the Communists would win, Chou said, Far-East: Chiang Kai-shek was the main because they know how to organize and focus of this policy, the ally it sought. arm the peasants in patriotic war. The Maoist leadership was concerned Chiang did not."70 about the conditions under which it could wage its struggle: Chiang Kai-shek The Maoist leadership and the "Second remained a fearsome enemy. It directed Wang Ming line" its attention first to the national situation and then negotiated with Moscow. Moscow and Yan'an now finally These two different approaches seemed to be converging after being out were not accidental. That is why they of step. Nevertheless, the differences surfaced repeatedly throughout the en- which emerged between 1935 and 1937 tire Sino-Japanese war. Within the CCP, showed that the two capitals did not they were expressed in the conflict over approach the question of the united line between the Maoist leadership and front from the same angle. The major the Wang Ming faction, Moscow's faithful concern of the Comintern leadership was follower.71 The debate over orientation

70 Zhou Enlai quoted by Edgar Snow, Journey to 71 . Wang Ming, incidentally, also wrote an "Ode to the Beginning, A personal View of Contemporary Moscow" in five stanzas. Quite significantly, it is History, New York: Vintage Books, 1972, p. 158. explained that he wrote the lyrics of this Ode in late provides researchers with the means to regions would then integrate this assess the relationship of forces inside republic as component parts. As Greg the Communist Party and the latter's Benton notes, this was a proposal that relations with the Kremlin. Political provided "both a flexible framework for discussion was reserved to a small maneuver and for putting political coterie of top leaders. Nevertheless, pressure on Chiang, and a tactic to thanks to Gre-gor Benton's work, it is guarantee the integrity of the Red areas, now possible to discern the contours of since the KMT could never meet such the debate.72 conditions."74 It is therefore not Let us briefly review how the surprising that Wang Ming was still struggle over orientation unfolded. The criticizing CCP policy in September 1936. disagreements between Mao and Wang On the other hand, Mao privately made Ming that emerged in late 1935 fun of Wang Ming's writings.75 He was continued into the next year. Wang careful not to do so in public though, to repeatedly complained that "serious avoid a direct clash with Moscow. weaknesses" in party policy were In the period that followed the jeopardizing the achievement of national "Xian incident," Mao and Wang Ming unity. In the USSR, George Dimitrov, answered the Guomindang in different who had delivered the report on the terms. In their general tone, on the united front to the Seventh Congress of question of the social rights of the the Communist International, criticized masses, of the independence of the the "political immaturity" of the CCP Communist forces, of democracy and the before the Comintern Secretariat. The National Assembly, Greg Benton notes, problem was that the Party continued to "Wang's formula was angled to a call for the overthrow of the Chiang Kai- compromise. Mao's at exposing the shek clique.73 reactionary nature of the Kuomintang."76 On July 22nd, the party In June 1937, Zhou Enlai drew a leadership finally agreed to approve the demarcation line between the European land policy advocated by Wang Ming. popular fronts and the situation then This time, Dimitrov approved the move. prevailing in China, emphasizing the The CCP took a stand in favor of the opposition between the nature of the unification of both political and military Guomindang, which was reactionary, forces. But it stated that such a and that of the CCP, which was unification could only be implemented revolutionary. after "a Chinese democratic republic had As the negotiations advanced, the been established," and that the soviet question of a united government was posed. Most cadres based in Yan'an

considered the existing regime October 1941, in Yan'an, after Mao refused to represented "the dictatorship of a single modify his military plans to adjust them to the Russian situation. According to Meng Ching-shu, party, the Guomindang". The CCP could Wang Ming had wanted an offensive to be not enter the Nankin government. The launched "to prevent the Japanese from opening a National Assembly and Constitution had second front against the Soviet Union" (Wang to be changed, and a new government Ming, Mao's Betrayal, Moscow: Progress elected on that basis. Wang Ming, by Publishers, 1979, p. 48). The point is important contrast, believed the Nankin since Stalinists were often quite willing to set the government could become a genuine all- pace of military operations in their own country China government of national defense, according to the needs of the war in the USSR, provided that it changed its policy in while the others preferred to set it according to several fields, purged its pro-Japanese their own national situation. members, and integrated militant anti- 72 I relied mainly on Gregor Benton's already cited Japanese figures, etc. This reformed and study, "The 'Second...'", for this section. For a strengthened government should be the discussion of his article, see the debate between one that summoned a new National Shum Kui Kwong and Benton in China Quarterly, n°69, March 1977. 73Faced with the blockade of the white armies, Mao 74 Idem, p. 70. and Zhu De launched another appeal along the 75 Snow, Red Star…,p. 580. same lines on April 5,1936. 76 Benton, p. 73. Assembly. military activities."78 The Political Bureau held a conference in August 1937. Three ●Perspectives after victory positions emerged: Mao's, Wang Ming's and an intermediate group's, the In a document dated December "conciliators", among whom stood Zhu 27, 1938, Wang Ming criticized those De. Wang Ming returned from a trip to CCP members who did not understand Moscow in October 1937. A fight for the foundations of the policy of alliance control over the majority of the Political with the Guomindang. Subordinate Bureau broke out; it was settled by a everything to resistance against Japan, compromise. Although Mao was forced he explained; avoid struggling for to retreat, he was able to keep control of hegemony inside the united front; assert the Army and stay in a position to firmly that collaboration with the strengthen his faction in Yan'an (while Guomindang will continue after the Wang Ming removed to Wuhan). victory over Japan. He predicted that the In 1937 and 1938, a series of more leadership of a liberated China would long-range differences emerged: pass to Chiang Kai-shek, whom the war would have transformed into a national ● "Defeat for all" or "victory for all" hero. We have already noted that Mao According to a number of too spoke of Chiang as a "national hero". authors77, this is how Mao encapsulated But he left open the question of the the conflict over line. He advocated relationship of forces inside the united "defeat for all" (that is, the Japanese front and its possible subsequent and the Guomin-dang) while the evolution. He recalled that the Chinese "conciliators" put forward the formula of bourgeoisie could not implement the "victory for all" (meaning the CCP and democratic tasks of the revolution. He Guomindang). explained that, insofar as the united front was composed of several groups, ● Military orientation "it is the struggle among them which will determine the future." In a war waged Mao characterized the by a workers party, "the outcome (of the Guomindang's policy as "partial struggle) cannot be reduced to simple resistance" to the Japanese, thereby reforms. The leadership of the earning sharp criticism from Wang Ming. proletariat created the possibility to Mao advocated a military strategy transform the war into a socialist independent of the Guomindang and revolution." These views, reported by based on mobility and guerrilla. Wang Bisson, were meant to lay the ground for Ming advocated close cooperation with the publication of Mao's theses of May 3, the Guomindang and the waging of a 1937, under the title "The Tasks of the more conventional war. The Chinese Communist Party in the Period "conciliators" strove to combine the two of Resistance to Japan." According to orientations. Most cadres in Yan'an be- these theses, the future democratic lieved the Communist forces' name republic "may move in a capitalist change (from Red Army to Eighth Route direction. The possibility also exists that Army) should remain a mere "question it will turn towards socialism, and the of form." For Wang Ming, though, their party of the Chinese proletariat should unification under a single command struggle hard for the latter prospect."79 should be the first step towards building a single genuine all-Chinese army. For 78 him, the goal was "a unified command, Idem, p. 85. 79 unified organization, unified arms, For the statements reported by Bisson in his unified discipline, unified treatment, Yenan in June 1937, and for the quotation from unified military commands and unified Mao's report in May 1947, see Benton, p. 76. See also Mao Zedong, ""The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan" (May 3,1937), SW, vol. I, pp. 263-283. 77 Idem, p. 76. All this does not mean that Wang Ming to October 1938, the Japanese army consciously hoped for a Guomindang advanced rapidly and occupied the five victory over the CCP. As noted by Greg provinces of North China. The Chinese Benton, it is probable that "both Mao armies defended the main urban centers and Wang Ming shared the same goal of and were smashed by the Japanese seizing power from the KMT and troops after a tough war of position. overthrowing the old society. Where Mao Wang Ming committed himself personally differed from Wang, even at the height to fight the battle of Wuhan, the capital, of the united front, was in his ability to along with the Guomindang. But Wuhan integrate this revolutionary aspect into fell in October 1938. This was a grave day-to-day Party work, instead of failure, both militarily and politically, for relegating it to some distant future."80 the Guomindang as well as for those "But whereas Wang's analysis led him inside the CCP who had wagered on a in practice to abandon any preparations united and "conventional" defense for a later showdown, Mao devoted strategy. himself to accumulating enough Mao advocated another, very independent military and political audacious, policy: spreading the strength to decide the issues as they Communist network nationwide, but with posed themselves."81 the bulk of its regular forces sent into "Mao's own achievement in this period North China, behind the Japanese lines. was to withstand exceptional pressures He took as his point of departure from several directions and keep course considerations of a military (the need to between the twin dangers of capitulation resort to guerrilla warfare against a to the KMT and barren sectarianism."82 highly armed enemy) as well as of a political nature. The war of national The transfer of Communist troops defense should be a "people's war". behind Japanese lines and the It should be based on a mobilization of "South Anhui Incident" the population, on the organization of the masses. Behind the Japanese lines, In 1937-1938, Mao's position in it was possible to carry out this work the leadership of the CCP was not yet without finding oneself involved in fully consolidated. The climate of the permanent clashes with the united front was propitious to the Guomindang. The Communist Party emergence of an intermediate current could constitute new liberated zones. inside the party apparatus, which in turn This conception was crucial in several gave more room to maneuver to Wang respects. It made it possible to conduct Ming. In one of his talks with Anna the resistance against foreign occupation Louise Strong, Mao noted that when the in more active and efficient ways than Long March ended, political clarification conventional warfare. It made it possible had not yet been achieved. "After we to turn the war of national defense reached Yenan, we spent three and a into a link between yesterday's half years on a rectification campaign to revolutionary war and tomorrow's. solve this problem [of line] thoroughly. Chiang Kai-shek used the It takes time."83 immensity of China's territory to carry As in 1934-1935, it was again the out a long retreat; his plan was to wait test of events that enabled Mao to for Japan to exhaust its forces in the reassert and consolidate his personal Pacific war before launching a counter- and political leadership. From July 1937 offensive; this left vast stretches of land open to CCP action. Chiang sought to weaken the Communist forces by every 80 Benton, p. 92. possible means. Incidents between the 81 Idem, p. 85. two forces would grow more frequent 82 Idem, p. 94. 83 until 1941, when they would lead to the "Anna Louise Strong: Three Interviews with liquidation of the General Staff of the Chairman Mao Zedong," Tracy B. Strong and New Fourth Army, an event known as Helene Keyssar, China Quarterly, n° 103, the "South Anhui Incident." September 1985, p. 501. The forces of the Eighth Route Army had infiltrated the provinces of the But Benton does not cast Xiang North. Advance units of the New Fourth Ying as a Wang Ming "agent". He held to Army had crossed the Yangzi river. The that line for his own reasons: he Communist forces were trying to clear believed in the united front with the out the terrain for action behind the Guomindang; he probably found it Japanese lines by reducing the power of difficult to adapt to the conditions of the the local warlord, that is the power of war, so different from those of the mid- the Guomindang. A violent battle had 1930s; and above all, he reportedly pitted the Communist troops against the wished to preserve his independence white forces at Hungqiao; the latter, against the Maoist Political Bureau. although enjoying great numerical When Yan'an asked him to transfer his superiority, were defeated. Chiang Kai- forces to the North, he refused. It was shek then decided to do away with the Chen Yi, officially his subordinate, who New Fourth Army, whose headquarters led many units of the New Fourth Army were still south of the Yangzi river, in a across the Yangzi, thereby saving the region he controlled, once and for all. bulk of this Army Group. According to In January 1941, a Communist Benton, "Hungqiao was the victorious column of 10 000 troops, under the culmination of a line decided on in 1938, command of Ye Ting and Xiang Ying, whereas the Incident in south Anhui was was surrounded and decimated by the the last step in a false start."85 Guomindang aided by the Japanese who Gregor Benton's study used their air force against the demonstrates that the national Communists. These events had a deep leadership in Yan'an also committed impact on public opinion. Already the mistakes during these crucial events, by battle of Hungqiao had backfired to hesitating on the schedule and itinerary Chiang's political disadvantage: he had that the Communist forces were to tried to prevent Chinese armies from follow in order to break through the moving to a position where they could mesh in which the Guomindang forces fight the Japanese! His victory in South had trapped the General Staff of the Anhui also turned to his disadvantage: New Fourth Army. Nevertheless, the he had smashed nationalist forces with political implications of the defeat were the help of the Japanese invader! quite clear. The Maoist leadership (Mao, The "incident" also had a big Liu Shaoqi86, Chen Yi) had a basic impact on the CCP membership. It difference with Xiang Ying. The failure of marked the end of the long fight over Xiang was also the failure of the Wang orientation between Yan'an and Xiang Ming line. It became obvious that a joint Ying. The latter belonged to the "28 defense with the Guomindang was Bolsheviks" faction. He had been left impossible. There remained the Maoist behind when the Long March began, and road. held out for three years in Jiangxi, with the Maoist Chen Yi. The forces that The Maoist conception of survived that epic battle were to form the united front the hard core of the New Fourth Army. They created a new red area in South It is now necessary to review Anhui, but this time, under the flag of Mao's overall conception of the united the united front. According to Greg front. Benton, "everything through the united During the war of national front' was the slogan that best typified Xiang's policy. This was no ordinary 85 Idem, p. 713. 86 slogan, but one closely associated with Liu Shaoqi was in charge of the North. There are Wang Ming and criticized by Mao and Liu several texts dated 1936 or 1937 in the Selected Shaoqi as opportunist."84 Works of Liu Shaoqi, volume I, Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1984, which polemicize against the "closed door" policy and "right opportunism," 84 . Gregor Benton, "The South Anhui Incident," which defend the principle of the leading role of The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XLV, n°4, the CCP in the united front, and which analyze the August 1986, p. 683. I relied on this study for this war against Japan as a partisan war. section. Anhui is also transcribed Anwhei. defense, the Maoist conception of the enemy at a given moment, united front with the Guomindang com- concentrating blows against this enemy, bined two poles: proposing the broadest adapting tactics to each stage of the unity against imperialist occupation and struggle so as to eliminate one by one accepting to moderate considerably the the forces of the counter-revolution, party program in order to achieve that thereby insuring the final victory. unity; while conquering the leadership of These goals are not particularly the national resistance by preserving the original. But they were systematized and independence of the Communist forces, adapted to the framework of China's and strengthening them, through the protracted people's war. Mao's united implementation of a enough democratic front policy ran up against particular activities (both of a political and social obstacles and therefore developed its nature) to guarantee the existence of a own particular features: mass base. The revolutionary army was the keystone of this policy; without it, ●the ability to adapt the CCP could not have successfully coped with the contradictory aspects of A united front policy must be fleshed its orientation. out in local reality. The difficulty arises The policy of broadest alliance did because it must be a solution to not exclude struggle; to the contrary, it demands that are partly complementary integrated it as one of its foundations. In partly contradictory. Those in charge of the Maoist conception, the alliance with concretizing and implementing it need a the Guomindang implied a conflict over lot of talent to find the right combination leadership and over line. The slogan of in practice. "Unity and Struggle" was counterposed A glimpse of the scope of this to those who advocated Unity alone, or problem can be gained from William Struggle alone. Moreover the alliance Hinton's Fanshen, an exciting account of policy was adjustable. For a while, the the ups and downs of Communist work civil war was to be subsumed in the in a village of North China during the united front and converted into a Third Civil War.88 Land was scarce and struggle for influence within the national very poor. The first measures of the land movement; this fight was to sharpen reform were implemented but the most until it led to a new civil war. The united deprived peasants were still not front was then turned against the satisfied. If the land redistribution policy Guomindang. was made more radical to fully In its most general formulation, correspond to their actual need for land, the Maoist alliance policy aims to unite it would have to make inroads into the and broaden the camp under revolu- land of middle peasants; this threatened tionary leadership, and to divide and to push a significant part of the village reduce the camp under counter- population over to the side of the revolutionary leadership. It operates on counter-revolution. The CCP's goal was both the political and social planes. It at once to consolidate its following pursues both short-term and long-term among the lower classes and avoid goals.87 It can be summarized as fol- creating a new political base for the lows: asserting the leadership of the Guomindang in the village. There is no party (in the name of the proletariat), universal solution to such dilemmas. The consolidating the fundamental alliance answer could only be concrete. (that of the workers and peasants), Another study, by Elizabeth winning over the intermediate forces Perry89, shows the fluctuating nature of (including those representing the middle the alliances struck by the Chinese classes), neutralizing the hesitating elements, dividing the adversary's 88 following, isolating the most dangerous William H. Hinton, Fanshen, London: Penguin Books.. 89 Elizabeth Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries in 87Tactical and strategic goals are laid out North China, 1845-1945, Stanford California: simultaneously in Chinese texts; this sometimes Stanford University Press, 1980. creates confusion for the reader. Communists with traditional peasant line" takes this problem into account associations in the northern region of when it advocates "ideological Hua-pei, well-known for its peasant centralization," for issues of national revolts and the Red Spears movement, a relevance, and "operational large secret society that had earlier decentralization", for issues in the evoked an enthusiastic response from Li purview of the cadres out in the field. Lisan and Chen Duxiu.90 Reality turned out more complex than the Communists had expected. ●the social base of the resistance Several dissident movements with a and the rightist danger substantial following among the people existed in that region; they were social In 1948, Mao wrote that "the bandits who recruited uprooted history of our Party shows that Right peasants, like the Bare Egg Society, and deviations are likely to occur in periods sometimes opposed the Red Spears. The when our Party has formed a united Red Spears were a village defense front with the Kuomintang and that movement, but they were also controlled "Left" deviations are likely to occur in by the local notables, the gentry. The periods when our Party has broken with Communists had to deal with a complex the Kuo-mintang."92 During the Sino- web of social relations inside the village: Japanese war, this rightist danger was the power of clan ties and need for evident not only with respect to the collective protection against outside extent and form of the united front with threats often created a solidarity the Guomindang, but also on the terrain between the different classes that was of classes, in the very social base of the difficult to break save in exceptional CP. periods.91 To preserve the possibility of an Political cadres like Chen Yi, Liu alliance with "patriotic landowners," the Shaoqi and Peng Dehuai were called Communist Party suspended its land upon to contribute ideas to this inter- distribution policy. The leadership esting debate. In the end, policy simply specified the measures that were to be fluctuated depending on the period: for taken in the red base areas located instance, the alliance with the Bare Egg behind the Japanese lines in a resolution Society gave way to a new policy of of January 28, 1942: on the one hand, it "reorganization" of the Red Spears ordered a reduction of the level of rents during the anti-Japanese resistance. In and the interest rates on loans (a this case too, the only answer had to be measure favorable to the peasants); on concrete and based on progressive the other hand, it guaranteed the adjustments. payment of these obligations (a measure Alliance and united front work protecting landowners). It warned included many facets and had to be against leftist errors and, more adapted to many different milieus and strenuously, against rightist errors. It changing circumstances. The role of summarized the three principles that local cadres was as important as that of were the basis of its orientation at that the central leadership. The Maoist "mass time as follows: the peasants were the "basic strength" of the anti-Japanese 90 It is interesting to note how the "urban" Chen war and, the fact was, they could not be Duxiu got so enthusiastic about the Red Spears mobilized durably without a reduction of peasant rebellion, and noted that the " present time rents and interest rates; the rights of had produced a revolutionary party and army that patriotic landowners and the gentry had could unite with peasant power to supersede the to be acknowledged for the sake of the shortcomings of traditional rebellions." Perry, op. anti-Japanese united front; and the rich cit., pp. 214-215. 91 peasantry and rural capitalists Maoist "speak bitterness" meetings, during which represented an "indispensable force in poor peasants recounted their miserable life, were precisely designed to create a collective class consciousness and break down the solidarity of 92 Mao Zedong, "A Circular on the Situation" peasants and notables inside the clans. (March 20, 1948), SW, vol. TV, 1975, p. 219. the anti-Japanese war and in the battle active social and economic mobilization for production" since "the capitalist designed to establish the production mode of production is the more necessary for war and change social progressive method in present-day behavior and power relations inside the China."93 village: taxation of the rich; seizure of Severe problems were posed by the land of collaborators; development the suspension of the land distribution of rural industry, mutual aid teams, policy. In his interesting book covering cooperatives, peasant associations; the period, China Shakes the World, educational campaigns; establishment of reporter Jack Belden noted that "this a new administration under Communist national war, in itself, was revolutionary control....95 Nationalism alone could not and often agitated the minds of the account for the support which the people more and quicker than the land peasantry gave to the CCP.96 reform might have done. (...) During the Sino-Japanese war, Nevertheless, the Communist program the party had to broaden the resistance did alienate some of the poor peasants, movement and therefore make con- the tenants and the long-term workers. cessions and mobilize the masses by From bitter experience the peasant had answering their needs. It had to learned to distrust any intellectual who combine partially contradictory came to his village with fine promises. measures in a single orientation. The Only if you gave him land did the poor dangerous gap which developed peasant think you meant business. between its "diplomatic" positions (which When the Communists abandoned land were drafted in a spirit of grand confiscation and told the tenantry and "unanimity") and its actual policy the rural workers that they must forget (designed to strengthen its own about the landlords and fight the leadership) was therefore bound to Japanese, these dispossessed men saw foster rightist pressures. behind such fine promises nothing but Nevertheless, the lesson of the the ancient double cross. 'Fang kuo pi' Chinese resistance to Japanese ('dog -wind-blowing'), they muttered occupation is clear. Its effectiveness- as under their breath and went on their well as the continuity of the way." revolutionary struggle-were due to the "Outwardly, this identified the mobilization of the masses and to the Communists with the Kuomintang" CCP's ability to organize that whose program also officially advocated mobilization. Without the actual a reduction of rents on land. "The implementation of the reduction of land difference, however, between the rents and interest rates, the national Kuomintang official and the Communist defense war could not have remained a cadre was that the cadre tried to enforce people's war. Without the subsequent rent-reduction regulations. When the resumption of the land reform, as we peasant saw this, he stopped and turned shall see, the forces accumulated in around. Here was a different kind of 1937 and 1938 could not have been 94 official." Despite its moderation, the 95 This revolutionary administration either openly Communist Party program hit on some replaced the old structures, or paralleled them due issues that were very important for the to a situation of partial or total clandestinity. The peasant such as the cost of land and the way in which the CCP program was implemented crucial problem of usury and the depended on the areas and the relationship of forces peasants' debt. It was part of a policy of (stable or threatened bases, etc.). 96 On this topic, see among others Elinor Lerner, "The Chinese Peasantry and Imperialism: A 93 "Decision of the CC on Land Policy in the Anti- Critique of Chalmers Johnson's Peasant Japanese Base Areas" (January 28,1942), A Nationalism and Communist Power," Bulletin of Documentary History..., Brandt, Schwartz and Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 6, nc2, April- Fairbank, eds., pp. 276-279. August 1974, and Chalmers Johnson, "Peasant 94 Jack Belden, China Shakes the World, London: Nationalism Revisited: The Biography of a Book," Penguin, pp. 221-222. China Quarterly, n°72, December 1977. reinvested in the revolutionary struggle The Maoist theory of the united for power. While the revolutionary army front contains the presupposition that was the keystone of the policy of united there is now and will always be only one front with the Guomindang, mass work "proletarian" party" worthy of the name was the keystone of the social alliance in any given country. For the policy. "concentric" schema leaves no room The social alliance of the popular anywhere for a second revolutionary classes formed the fundamental alliance, party. Other political forces must either the stable bedrock of the revolutionary represent intermediate (petty-bourgeois) united front policy. The broader or enemy social layers. They must be alliances, of a political nature, often placed either in a relation of played a quite important role but had to subordination or in one of antagonism. fit within the lasting framework of the This outlook was shared by many strategic alliances. Communist currents at that time (not just the Stalinist current). The plurality ● the approach to power within the of Marxism was still a very marginal united front and the sectarian fact, embodied for instance in the danger existence of the Trotskyist current, which it was easy to ignore, decry or Despite the remarks we have just repress. Since then, things have made and contrary to certain widespread changed quite substantially. The inter- notions, I believe that the main danger national communist movement is now embedded in the Maoist conception of beset by lasting divisions. In most the united front is not in the direction of countries, several revolutionary or- opportunism, but of sectarianism.97 ganizations exist side by side, and The Maoist conception of alliances finding the means to unite them, both can be set out graphically in a pattern of nationally and internationally, has be- concentric circles (see next page). At the come a problem of first-rate center stands the Communist Party. The importance.98 The "concentric circles" first thickly drawn ring represents the conception of the united front offers no bedrock alliance or fundamental class means to deal with this problem alliance; the second, the broad alliance whatsoever, for any solution implies the (whether national or anti-fascist) with its recognition of several organizations that potential for conflict; the third, the identify with the working class, the poor enemy forces that one is striving to peasantry, the revolution. isolate. Any number of a additional The division of the communist intermediate circles can be introduced movement has been made worse by into the figure to make it more complex. Soviet Stalinism, but it also ex presses This fundamental approach is alien to deeper realities: the heterogeneity of any conception of alliances in which the social classes and national experiences, Communist Party would be given a the complexity of the process of political subordinate place. It places the party, clarification within the political vanguard its leadership activity and its control (the uneven ability to compare theory mechanisms at the very center of the with actual experiences), the weight of united front. It is far more likely to give an already quite long history of rise to a sectarian and manipulative socialism.... Marxist pluralism is a major conception of alliances, in an ultra-left political fact. If the national and direction. international fragmentation of

97 This opinion stands in contrast to the 98 This is particularly true in a country like El conventional wisdom of a large part of the Salvador, but the problem has now become the Trotskyist movement which identifies the Maoist norm and not the exception. On the international united front with a "Menshevik-Stalinist" plane, it is equally obvious: most activities of conception of the "popular front" which accepts the internationalist solidarity bring together leading role of the national bourgeoisie in the revolutionary organizations with different political democratic revolution. and ideological histories. revolutionary forces is to be overcome authority of the Chiang regime reached and prevented, it must become a its apex. But it began to decline in 1939, conscious part of the contemporary with each new advance of the Japanese approach to the united front; this troops. Little by little, the CCP emerged requires a supersession of the Maoist as the party of national resistance. Its tradition (and of many other traditions). following grew in the universities; many More substantially, the students flocked to Yan'an. The political "concentric" schema of the united front battle then joined in the cities was to turns the party into the real center of bear fruit somewhat later, but these political and social power. The developments were decisive. For the administrative system of the Three showdown which was to take place from Thirds established during the Sino- 1946 to 1949 was not exclusively Japanese war, enabled the CCP to military and rural. It was also political associate representatives of "national and urban: the CCP, after years of war, salvation organizations" to the manage- was able to appear as the alternative, ment of day-to-day business and to when the Chiang regime, undermined by isolate potential adversaries.99 its gross inefficiency and negligence, It was not designed to share real began to lose its own social base. decision making power. There is an Urban work therefore played a obvious link between this conception of more important role than the military the united front in society and the nature of the Chinese con-flict could lead position which the CCP assumed in the one to believe. The CCP conducted this state after victory.100 work under very difficult circumstances and this was no mean achievement. ● Urban work Nevertheless, the reorganization of communist work in the workplaces did During the Sino-Japanese war, not match up to this effort and the urban the CCP deployed major efforts in the front, a "political" front, acquired an cities. The Maoist leadership gradually essentially "democratic" character: the took over this area of party work where continuity of the mobilization on class many cadres of the Wang Ming faction issues was not as clear as in the had been active. It assigned some of its countryside. own top cadres to work in the white The alliance with the areas, both to open work, as in "intermediate forces" (intellectuals, Chungqing, where Zhou Enlai was sent, students, democratic and nationalist and more often to underground work, elements) was achieved under for which Liu Shaoqi was put in charge. conditions of war, repression and This work was conducted within the clandestinity. Secretiveness enhanced framework of the united front policy. It manipulation, which was further fostered enabled the CCP to influence urban by the "concentric" approach to the nationally-minded sectors, to conduct united front. Thus, an instrumental propaganda against the Guomindang relationship developed between the and win over more people. party that would later become the leader As the years went by, the CCP of the state, and its current allies. The was able to renew its alliance with role of these "intermediate" forces, student milieus, the intellectuals, sectors however, would not end at the moment of the petty-bourgeoisie. In 1938, the of victory. They have a place in the reconstruction of society. After 1949, this manipulative and instrumental rela- 99 The various administrative organs in charge of tionship caused bitterness and chronic government were supposed to be dissidence; this broke out with great composed of one third party members, one third force and suddenness in 1956 during the representatives of mass organizations, and Hundred Flowers campaign. While the one third members of other parties. In practice, instrumentalization of intellectual milieus though, the dosage and composition of paid off on the short run, on the longer these organs varied depending on the period and run it nurtured a crisis which was very the location. 100 See the concluding chapter of this study. difficult to overcome. "Representation of the CCP's concept of the

United Front as part of the theory of contradictions

The numeral 1 indicates the boundary of the basic worker- peasant alliance, led by the CCP; 2 indicates the outer limit of "the people," i.e., the outer limit of the united front and the limit within which contradictions are non-antagonistic. The arrows indicate pressures or influences acting upon the middle group; notice that the middle group can either stay on the side of "the people" or go over to "the enemy." The identity of those in the outer two circle (middle and enemy) will change according to circumstances; all parts of this structure are always present; the enemy should not comprise more than 10 per cent of the population, preferably less." (Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends-The United Front in Chinese Communist History, p. 250.)

* A radical negation of the "bloc of four classes" theory

Stalinist tradition has frozen the (whether U.S. or British, and front policy to be followed by Communist sometimes even Japanese) and formed Parties of dependent countries during precisely what the Maoists rightly called the entire period of the democratic the bureaucratic bourgeoisie: a revolution into a rigid formula: the "bloc bourgeoisie that systematically used its of four classes" encompassing the control over the state apparatus to proletariat, the peasantry, the urban extend its economic power and wealth. petty-bourgeoisie and the national The Guomindang need not be bourgeoisie. The CCP used that formula prettified and painted nationalist in order more than once. Nevertheless, the to justify a united front. The alliance was Chinese experience of the anti-Japanese necessary not for structural reasons, but united front constitutes a radical denial for political reasons (the invasion of of the relevance of this theory, a fact China); that is why it was so unstable which is confirmed by the Maoists' own and wracked by conflict, why class analysis. contradictions kept on surfacing in the The period of democratic midst of the war of national defense, revolution (before the seizure of power why the Japanese defeat signaled the in 1949) includes a civil war and not resumption of civil war. only an alliance with the Guomindang. In Mao Zedong says nothing else in fact, tensions were so strong, that it his 1956 talks. "The Chinese comprador never gave rise to harmonious relations bourgeoisie consisted of pro-British, pro- between the two parties, nor even to a U.S. and pro-Japanese groups. During stable united front organization. the War of Resistance Against Japan we During the Sino-Japanese war, exploited the contradiction between the CCP opened its alliance policy to Britain and the United States on the one sectors that are not included in any of hand and Japan on the other, first the categories of the "bloc of four striking down the Japanese aggressors classes" and all of which were also and the comprador group depending on present inside the Guomindang: the them. Then we turned round to deal landowning class (described as feudal or blows at the U.S. and British aggressor semi-feudal), the comprador and forces and bring down the pro-U.S. and bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The great pro-British comprador groups." families who led Chiang Kai-shek's party "The national bourgeoisie is an (already a party quite different from Sun opponent of ours. (...) While it is Yatsen's) did not deserve the label of opposed to the working class, it is also "national bourgeoisie" in any shape or opposed to imperialism. (...) We must form. They were linked to imperialism by all means win the national bourgeoisie over to the fight against the Maoist outlook. In this respect as in imperialism. The national bourgeoisie is others, Mao's warning to his Latin not interested in fighting feudalism American visitors must not be forgotten: because it has close ties with the "The Chinese experience, which consists landlord class. What is more, it in establishing rural bases of support oppresses and exploits the workers. We and to encircle the cities from the must therefore struggle against it. But in countryside and finally to seize the order to win it over to join us in the fight cities, is not necessarily valid for a against imperialism, we must know number of countries, but it can serve as when to stop in the struggle. (...) In a reference for you. Be careful, I dare other words, we must have just grounds advise you, not to transplant it ready for waging the struggle, be sure of made. Every experience from abroad victory, and use restraint when a proper can be taken as a reference, not as a measure of victory is gained. (...) To- dogma. You must therefore unite the wards the national bourgeoisie a policy universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with of 'both unity and struggle' should be the concrete conditions of each coun- adopted."101 try."103 It seems to me that the very concept of national bourgeoisie is quite debatable, particularly in the dependent countries today. The interpenetration of the various economic sectors leaves little room for such a category which presupposes some sort of structural independence from the imperialist market. Even in the China of the 1930s and 1940s, the national bourgeoisie did not appear as a well-defined, dynamic and independent political force. I believe that it is better to speak of a middle bourgeoisie that may have some links with the imperialist market as well as with the landowning class, but which, because of its economic weakness can make more lasting compromises with the revolution than the big bourgeoisie, the bastion of counter-revolution.102

* * *

The Chinese experience with the united front is interesting. It makes it possible to distinguish fundamental class alliances for the overall revolutionary struggle, from temporary and conflict- ridden political alliances. It sheds light both on the strengths and dangers of

101 Mao Zedong, "Some Experiences in Our Party's History," SW, vol. 5,pp. 327-329. 102 The revolutionary camp can have an interest in reaching some compromises with it, even after victory, for the economic reconstruction of the country. From the standpoint of the middle bourgeoisie, such compromises are then more a result of a relationship of forces favorable to the revolution than of its nationalism. 103 Ibid. Chapter 6 region, had already been around a long The Maoism of Yan’an: revolution time (since 1931). It was not located and historical constraint behind the Japanese lines and opened onto Guomindang China. It served as Mao the Teacher, warning his the shelter for the national party audience against transforming the leadership and the University of the Chinese experience into a universal Resistance (Kangda). Democratic model, stands in contrast to Mao, the personalities and foreign journalists Infallible Guide, the Red Sun of the were invited to come and visit. Yan'an Peoples of the World, developed by the was to become the CCP's war capital and cult of personality. The dichotomy was a symbol. Twenty years the birth of the already becoming apparent in 1939- Communist movement, ten years after 1940 when Maoism emerged as a full- the upheaval of the Second Chinese fledged doctrine and Yan'an became the revolution, this was where Mao symbol of the new society. expounded his strategic conceptions and Mao Zedong used the years 1938 broached theoretical and cultural and 1939 to consolidate his authority. A questions, where Marxism was "sinified", network of Communist territorial bases where a vast "rectification campaign" was reconstituted. The bulk of the Eighth was undertaken, where a certain model Route Army, with Peng Dehuai and Zhu of social practice was systematized and De, operated in Shanxi.104 The New the personality cult began. Fourth Army was based in the Lower Yangzi basin, west of Shanghai, and Uninterrupted revolution began infiltrating the north shore of the river under Chen Yi.105 Other Communist The history of Mao Zedong is the units regrouped in Shandong (half-way history of a fight for the revolutionary between Shanghai and Peking) and conquest of state power. That is the axis southern China (north of Canton). In all of his political positions, the horizon of about fifteen red bases were formed his tactical choices, the issue that led around the country.106 him to oppose Stalin and the key to his The Shaan-Gan-Ning base107, theory of uninterrupted revolution. established in a hilly and impoverished In February 1940, Mao published On New Democracy. "The historical

104 particularity of the Chinese revolution is The Guomindang had evacuated this province that it is divided into two phases: the which lies north of Shaanxi (with two "a"s), after democratic phase and the socialist its defeat at the battle of Taiyuan (the provincial phase, and that the first phase is already capital). no longer that of democracy in general 105 See the previous chapter. 106 but that of a democracy of a new, The Communist forces regrouped, partly in line Chinese, type, that of new democ- with a central plan, and partly as a result of the 108 evolution of local situations. In addition, there racy...." existed a variety of independent guerrilla groups. "If you consider their social 107 It straddled the border of three provinces: nature, the many forms of political rule Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia. Red bases were generally existing in the world today essentially located in these geographical outlands for military come down to the three following types: reasons (difficult access), economic reasons (the 1/ a republic of bourgeois dictatorship; prevailing autarky enabled the Communists to 2/ a republic of proletarian dictatorship; develop an independent resistance economy), and and 3/ a republic of the dictatorship of political-administrative reasons (the possibility of several revolutionary classes. (...) The playing one provincial government against the third type is a transitional form that other). The base of Jin-Cha-Ji, by contrast, was exists in certain revolutionary colonies located in a plain. The resistance fighters were forced to dig a staggering network of tunnels to protect themselves. Headed by Lin Biao and Nie 108 Mao, "La nouvelle démocratic," extracts of the Rongshen, it was one of the most important base original version published in Carrère d'Encausse areas. It spread across Shanxi, Chahar and Hebei, and Schram, Le Marxisme et l'Asie, p. 351. not far from Peking. and semi-colonies. (...) They will be revolutionary process: "Chinese society states of new democracy in which is still a colonial, semi-colonial, and several anti-imperialist classes will unite semi-feudal society, (...) the task of the to exercise their dictatorship jointly."109 Chinese revolution consists in a national "This revolution is already no longer the revolution and a democratic revolution old revolution, entirely led by the (...), the character of the Chinese bourgeoisie (...), it is a new revolution, revolution at the present stage is not led by the proletariat or including the proletarian-socialist but bourgeois- participation of the proletariat in its democratic." leadership, whose first goal is the "However, the bourgeois- creation of a new democratic society and democratic revolution in present-day a state characterized by the common China is no longer of the general, old dictatorship of all the revolutionary type, which is now obsolete, but of the classes [including the bourgeoisie].. ."110 special, new type (...), we call it the Was Mao defending the Stalinist new-democratic revolution. (...) [It] is perspective of "revolution by stages" in part of the world proletarian-socialist advocating "new democracy?" Did the revolution; it resolutely opposes "joint dictatorship" mean putting the imperialism, i.e. international capitalism. proletariat in the tow of the bourgeoisie Politically, it means the joint and abandoning the socialist struggle in revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of practice? As a public text, New several revolutionary classes over the Democracy was addressed to the imperialists and reactionary traitors, and "intermediate forces." Mao noted opposition to the transformation of nevertheless that the new democratic Chinese society into a society under revolution "was no longer part of the old bourgeois dictatorship. Economically, it bourgeois and capitalist world rev- means nationalization of all big capital olution, but part of the new world and big enterprises of the imperialists revolution, part of the proletarian and reactionary traitors, distribution of socialist world revolution...."111 large landed property among the In a major work of 1939, The peasants, and at the same time Chinese Revolution and the Chinese assistance to private middle and small Communist Party112, Mao Zedong lays enterprises113 without the elimination of out his analysis of the Chinese the rich-peasant economy. Hence, while clearing the way for capitalism, this

109 democratic revolution of a new type Idem, pp. 335-356. In 1951, when this text was creates the precondition for socialism. republished, Mao replaced "social nature" (at the The present stage of the Chinese rev- beginning of the quotation) with "class nature of olution is a transitional stage between the political power". The official version of "On putting an end to the colonial, semi- New Democracy" is published in SW, vol. 2, pp. 339-384. colonial, and semi-feudal society and 110 Idem, p. 352. Mao added: "This is why such a establishing a socialist society—a new revolution also opens the road—incidentally a still revolutionary process (...) This process broader road— to the development of socialism." began only after World War I and the Schram indicates in italic the passages which were Russian October Revolution; it started in eliminated or revised by Mao in 1951. Remarks China with the May 4th Movement of about the changes introduced in 1951 are, as usual, 1919. A new-democratic revolution is a those of Stuart Schram. The remarks apply to all revolution of the broad masses of the quotations in this chapter. people led by the proletariat and 111 Idem, pp. 351-352. directed against imperialism and 112 Mao, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese feudalism; it is a revolution of the united Communist Party" (December 1939), in Schram, front of several revolutionary classes The Political Thought..., pp. 229-233. The (...).114 complete text printed in SW, vol. II, pp. 305-334, follows rather closely the original version of this class written by Mao and a few others during the 113 The 1951 version says here: "while maintaining winter 1939. The passages quoted here are from the private capitalist enterprises in general..." Mao's pen. 10.114 In the 1951 version, the last phrase of the sentence ("it is the revolution of the united front of "This kind of new-democratic bourgeois-democratic revolution (the revolution differs greatly from the new-democratic revolution) and its democratic revolutions in the history of transformation into a socialist revolution European and American countries in that once all the necessary conditions are it results in the dictatorship of the united present, that is the sum total of the front of all revolutionary classes, not in great and glorious revolutionary task of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.115 the Chinese Communist Party. All (...) This kind of new-democratic members of the Party (...) should never revolution differs also from a socialist stop half-way. (...) Every Communist revolution in that it aims only at must know that the Chinese Communist overthrowing the rule of the imperialists movement117 as a whole is a complete and reactionary traitors, but not at revolutionary movement embracing the overthrowing any capitalist elements still two revolutionary stages, democratic able to take part in the anti-imperialist and socialist, which are the two and anti-feudal struggles revolutionary processes differing in (...)." character, and that the socialist stage "There can be no doubt whatever can be reached only after the democratic that the ultimate perspective of the stage is completed. The democratic Chinese revolution is not capitalism but revolution is the necessary preparation socialism.116 (...) It is an inevitable for the socialist revolution, and the result of the victory of the democratic socialist revolution is the inevitable trend revolution in economically backward of the democratic revolution. (...) We China that capitalism will develop to a can give correct leadership to the certain degree. (...) This will be merely Chinese revolution only on the basis of a one aspect of the result of the Chinese clear understanding of both the revolution, not its whole outcome. The differences between the democratic and whole outcome of the Chinese revolution socialist revolutions and their will be the development of the capitalist interconnections." factors on the one hand and of the "Except for the Communist Party, socialist factors on the other. What are none of the political parties, bourgeois or the socialist factors? They are the petty-bourgeois, is equal to the task of growing political weight of the proletariat leading China's two great revolutions, and the Communist Party in the whole democratic and socialist."118 country and the actual or possible This text is based on four key recognition of the leadership of the ideas concerning the trajectory of the proletariat and the Communist Party by revolution in Chinese-type countries: the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the ¾ The two stages (democratic and petty bourgeoisie. (...) Together with the socialist) of the revolutionary favourable international situation, they struggle are part of one and the are bound to make it highly possible that same overall process. The point the Chinese bourgeois-democratic of strategy is to guarantee the revolution will finally steer of a capitalist transition119 from the first to the future and head towards the realization second revolution. of socialism...." ¾ The greatest attention must be "The Chinese revolution as a whole involves a twofold task. (...) The 117 In 1951: "the revolutionary movement led by the leadership in this twofold revolutionary Chinese Communist Party." task rests on the shoulders of the party 118 In another part of this text, Mao analyzes the of the Chinese proletariat, the Chinese relations between the Chinese peasantry and Communist Party, for without its proletariat and states that "the Chinese proletariat leadership no revolution can succeed." has many particularly outstanding qualities, which "The completion of China's permit it to become the leading force in the Chinese revolution" Schram, The political..., p. 263. 119 Or transformation, or growing over: translations all classes") is eliminated. vary. Likewise, specialists note that the Chinese 115 In 1951, Mao added; "under the leadership of word for uninterrupted revolution should in fact be the proletariat." translated by the formula "permanent revolution." 116 In 1951, Mao added here: “and to communism.” devoted to the stages of this say that the distinction and the link transitional process from between these two stages constitutes democratic to socialist the starting point of the theory. For revolution, because they call for Trotsky, permanent revolution concrete tasks of a different "embraces [first] the problem of the type. transition from the democratic revolution ¾ The Communist Party must to the socialist. This is in essence the secure its leadership over the historical origin of the theory."122 "This entire revolutionary process was precisely the idea that was (including its first democratic expressed by the very designation of the stage). revolution as a 'permanent,' that is, an ¾ With the completion of the uninterrupted one, a revolution passing democratic revolution, China can over directly from the bourgeois stage avoid the road of capitalist into the socialist. To express the same development and take the road idea Lenin later used the excellent ex- of socialist development. pression of the bourgeois revolution growing over into the socialist."123 In connection with the second "The permanent revolution is not point, Mao launched a fierce polemic a 'leap' by the proletariat, but the against ideas he attributed to Trotsky: reconstruction of the nation under the "We advocate the theory of the leadership of the proletariat."124 While it transition of the revolution, not the is possible to leap over the stage of Trotskyite theory of permanent capitalist development, it is nevertheless revolution [pu-tuan ko-ming lung] nor indispensable to take into account the semi-Trotskyite Li Lisan-ism. We stand progression of mass consciousness and for going through all the necessary tasks, the tactical requirements of the stages of a democratic republic in order fight125: "Every attempt to skip over to arrive at socialism. We are opposed to real, that is, objectively conditioned tailism but also to adventurism and stages in the development of the precipitation."120 masses, is political adventurism."126 The theory of permanent "I never denied the bourgeois revolution does not deny the existence character of the revolution in the sense of democratic and socialist stages in the of its immediate historical tasks, but revolutionary process.121 One could even

thereby losing sight of the essential link in this 120 "Let US Strive to Draw the Broad Masses into combination, the process of transition/growing the Anti-Japanese United Front," (Speech given on over. May 7, 1937), idem, p. 227. In another text dated 122 Leon Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution and 1935, Mao asserts that: "only the Results and Prospects, New York: Pathfinder, p. counterrevolutionary Trotskyites will talk such 131. nonsense as that China has already completed her 123 Idem, p. 136. One sees the extent to which bourgeois-democratic revolution and that any Stuart Schram, who seems to have read Mao with further revolution can only be a socialist one. The greater attention than Trotsky, can go wrong when revolution of 1924-1927 was a bourgeois- he coun-terposes the Leninist conception of democratic revolution that was not completed and growing over, to the Trotskyist conception of failed." ("On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese permanent revolution (see note 1, p. 227, of Imperialism," Report of December 27, 1935 to a Schram's introduction to The Political.) conference of party members, idem, p. 265.) 124 Trotsky, op.cit.,p. 178. Trotsky did not hold the views Mao attributes to 125 The theory of permanent revolution does not him. Quite the contrary, what he advocated was present a universal and rigid system on the growing organizing a defensive struggle around democratic over of the revolutionary process in backward slogans. countries. Indeed, the way in which the process 121 It is unfortunately true that Trotskyists, unfolds, in which democratic and socialist tasks thoroughly absorbed by the polemic against the follow each other or combine, depends on various Stalinist conception of "revolution by stages," have concrete factors such as the nature of the social sometimes forgotten this, and seen in the formation, the historical context, the outcome of permanent revolution only an instant combination previous struggles... of democratic revolution and socialist revolution, 126 Idem, pp. 241-242. only in the sense of its driving forces of the state (which is proletarian). and its perspectives."127 Lenin's original formula, "the democratic What Trotsky rejected with his dictatorship of the proletariat and theory of permanent revolution, was the peasantry," mixed these two levels.131 notion that a historical stage of de- The experience of the Russian revolution velopment was necessary between the led the Bolsheviks, beginning with Lenin, victory of the democratic revolution and to characterize the political power born the beginning of the socialist revolution in the October revolution as the in the imperialist epoch, in backward dictatorship of the proletariat, and its countries. The proletariat therefore had social alliance as working-class and to assume the leadership of the peasant. bourgeois democratic revolution128 The Maoist formula of leading to the establishment of its "dictatorship of all the revolutionary dictatorship in alliance with the classes" again mixes these two levels peasantry. which must be distinguished for a clear The dictatorship of the proletariat analysis of the overall revolutionary was the decisive lever by means of process. But Maoist writings as well as which the process of the democratic practice show that the struggle for revolution growing over into a socialist Communist hegemony was at the very revolution could actually take place. This heart of Mao's conceptions: "The essential thesis of the theory of democratic revolution will undergo permanent revolution is neither ultra-left several stages of development (...) It is nor sectarian. For the leverage which a long struggle from the hegemony of control of the state apparatus provides, the bourgeoisie132 to the hegemony of is precisely what enables the proletariat the proletariat, a process of striving for to conclude alliances with the peasantry leadership that depends on the condition and, if necessary, with sectors of the that the Communist Party raise the level bourgeoisie. The class alliance of the of awareness and organization of the peasantry and proletariat remains at the peasantry as well as the petty core of the revolutionary process.129 bourgeoisie." The formula "a dictatorship of the "The peasantry is the staunch ally proletariat that leads the peasant of the proletariat; after it comes the masses behind it"130 distinguishes two petty bourgeoisie. It is the bourgeoisie questions: that of social alliances that will contend with us for hegemony." (between the working class and "We depend on the strength of peasantry) and that of the class nature the masses and on our correct policies to overcome the vacillation and the

lack of thoroughness of the bourgeoisie; 127 Idem, p. 180. 128 otherwise, the bourgeoisie will turn As far as I am concerned, I prefer to use the 133 term of national democratic rather than bourgeois round and overcome the proletariat." democratic revolution and demands because it One should note a certain emphasizes the change in the historical context and indeterminateness and lack of social dynamic. theoretical precision in the Maoist 129 Trotsky notes in thesis 3 on the permanent formulas of that time. The revolution that: "Not only the agrarian, but also the indeterminateness (concerning the pace national question assigns to the peasantry—the and form of future relations with the overwhelming majority of the population in backward countries—an exceptional place in the 131 Lenin was already struggling to insure a democratic revolution. Without an alliance of the proletarian leadership of the democratic revolution proletariat with the peasantry the tasks of the and of the democratic dictatorship of the peasantry democratic revolution cannot be solved, nor even and proletariat. seriously posed. But the alliance of these two 132 Note that this hegemony was a fact, a given in classes can be realized in no other way than China in the 1930s. through an irreconcilable struggle against the 133 "Let Us Strive to Draw ..." (May 7, 1937), influence of the national-liberal bourgeoisie." Op, Schram, The Political.., p. 227. See also the cit., p. 276-277. previous chapter on the Maoist conception of the 130 Thesis 5 on permanent revolution, op.cit., p. united front. 277. middle bourgeoisie) can be explained movement of 1941-1944.137 The party easily. The experience of 1927 was a had to be united around the "mass line;" negative experience; a positive dogmatism and elitism, defeated. Along experience was still necessary to fully with Mao, Liu138 was one of the main clarify class relations in the Chinese rev- movers of this campaign, a genuine olution. Moreover, reality itself remained "internal struggle" designed to eradicate partially undetermined: what it would the "three errors" of subjectivism, become depended on the outcome of sectarianism and formalism. struggles.134 Mao declared in October 1938: The lack of precision of the "The Chinese Party has already made theoretical formulas concerned the great progress in its Marxist-Leninist question of the state and reminds one of training as compared with the previous Lenin's formula of 1905.135 It shows in situation, but this training cannot yet be particular to what extent Stalinism had said to be universal and profound. From acted as a screen between the various this standpoint, we are more or less national Communist Parties and the inferior to some of our fraternal parties living experience of the Russian in other countries. And yet our task is to revolution. By deifying Lenin and lead a great people of 450 million in an excommunicating the other Russian unprecedented historic struggle. leaders and theoreticians (such as Consequently, widespread and thorough Trotsky and Bukharin), the Soviet bu- study of theory is of decisive importance reaucracy excluded any critical for us and can only be carried through assimilation of the history of by the utmost effort. Let us work hard at Bolshevism.136 Mao studied the works of it. (...) Comrades, we must definitely Lenin, but his theoretical thinking study Marxism." remained hemmed in by the leaden "Another task of our study is to shield clamped on the movement by understand our historic inheritance and Stalinism. to evaluate it critically by the use of the Marxist method. The history of our great The "sinification" of Marxism people over several thousands of years exhibits national particularities and The process of sinification of many precious qualities. (...) We are Marxism was begun in the late 1930s. It Marxist historians; we must not mutilate was foreshadowed by the "rectification" history. From Confucius to Sun Yatsen we must sum it up critically, we must constitute ourselves the heirs of all that

is precious in this past. (...) There is no 134 It is enough to compare the situation of alliances such thing as abstract Marxism, but only at the moment of victory in the Chinese, concrete Marxism. What we call concrete Vietnamese, Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions, to become convinced of this fact. Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a 135 For Denise Avenas, Mao's approach"'stuck' to national form, that is, Marxism applied Chinese reality with the same margin of uncertainty to the concrete struggle in the concrete as the Leninist theory of the revolution before 1917 conditions prevailing in China, and not 'stuck' to the reality of Tsarist Russia; these Marxism abstractly used. (...) uncertainties were linked to the uneven and Consequently, the Sinification of combined nature of the social and economic Marxism (...) becomes a problem that formation of backward countries; this is what made must be understood and solved by the it possible for Lenin to state in 1917, not that his whole Party without delay... We must formula had been erroneous, but that it had been put an end to writing eight-legged realized under a form other than the expected one." (Maoisme et communisme, Paris: Galilee, 1976, pp. 132-133.) 137 Zengfeng, to rectify the wind, or style. 136 Indeed, to do so, one has to study the formation 138 Liu Shaoqi wrote his most famous work in and evolution of the concepts of Russian social- 1939: "How to Be a Good Communist," Selected democracy and each Russian Marxist leader's own Works of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 1, pp. 107-160. See also, contribution, and compare them to the actual "On Inner-Party Struggle" (July 2, 1941 -revised experience of the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. June 1943), pp. 180-216. essays on foreign models; there must be Mao Zedong did not make the less repeating of empty and abstract term "sinification of Marxism" a key refrains; we must discard our dog- point of his doctrine for any considerable matism and replace it by a new and vital length of time. Nevertheless, the process Chinese style and manner, pleasing to of sinification of Marxism illustrates the eye and ear of the Chinese common certain essential features of Maoism.141 people."139 The requirement that Marxism be In 1942, Mao noted as he opened applied to Chinese reality, be used to the Party school in Yan'an that "if we understand China, but also be adapted, (...) have not created a theory in "dewesternized," was at the core of accordance with China's real necessities, Maoist concerns. a theory that is our own and of a specific Mao's intellectual background is nature, then it would be irresponsible to complex. One should not forget that the call ourselves Marxist theoreticians. apostle of the "precious things" in (...)If we see only the complete works of Chinese national history was also a child Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin on the of the May Fourth Movement, deeply shelf, then our achievements on the iconoclastic, a violent critic of Confucius theoretical front cannot but be poor. (...) and tradition. Mao never traveled abroad We need theoreticians who base their until 1949 and did not know Western thinking on the standpoints, concepts, languages; this radically limited his and methods of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and horizons. On the other hand though, he Stalin, who are able to explain correctly was in great part self-taught and had the actual problems issuing from history read every translation available in China and revolution, who are able to give a in the 1920s; thus, he was subject to a scientific interpretation and theoretical diverse set of ideological influences.142 explanation of the various problems of He was widely read but nevertheless fell Chinese economics, politics, military back on the days of his youth to retrieve affairs, and culture." the popular language of villages. (...) Mao Zedong reclaimed Chinese "Marxism-Leninism has no history, but from a modern standpoint— beauty, nor has it any mystical value. It the revolutionary Communist per- is only extremely useful. It seems that spective. He retrieved many "Chinese right up to the present quite a few have things" that enabled him to a impart a regarded Marx-ism-Leninism as a ready- "national form" to his Marxism: original made panacea. (...) Those who regard military conceptions, the potential and Marxism-Leninism as religious dogma limitations of the peasants, the place of show this type of blind ignorance. We the dissident intellectual among the must tell them openly, 'Your dogma is of people, the breakdown and regional no use,' or, to use an impolite formu- devolution of central powers, political lation, Your dogma is less useful than struggle understood as a struggle for shit.' We see that dog shit can fertilize the fields and man's can feed the dog. 141 Schram's already cited works are quite And dogmas? They can't fertilize the interesting in this respect. For a study of the fields, nor can they feed a dog. Of what process of "sinification'' and the role of Chen Boda, use are they?"140 Mao's secretary for many years, see Raymond Wylie, "Mao Tse-tung, Ch'en Po-ta and the 139 Mao, "On the New Stage," (1939) Report to the 'sinification of Marxism, 1936-1938," The China Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee of Quarterly, n° 79, September 1979. October 1938, in Schram, The Political..., p. 171- 142 They include socialist and anarchist influences. 173. In the version of the SW the passages in italic Anarchism underwent notable expansion in the in Schram were eliminated or substantially 1900s among East Asian revolutionaries. Li revamped. Among other things, the formula Dachao and. to a certain extent. Mao were "sinification of Marxism" has disappeared from the influenced by it. For a recent book about anarchism text. in China, see Jean-Jacques Gandini. Aux sources de 140 Mao, "Reform in Learning, the Party and la revolution chinoise, Les an-archisles. Literature" (April 27, 1942), idem, pp. 174-179. contribution historique de 1902 a 1927. Lyons: Same remark as above concerning the passages in Atelier de Creation li-bertaire. 1986. italic in Schram. state power, the sociological thought of reopen the debate on the Asian mode of Confucianism and the dialectical thought production and was content to give "a of Daoism. Chinese form" to European concepts Chinese history is specific, rich.143 such as feudalism, transcribed into the Mao's creativity owes a lot to the way in terminology designating imperial China, which he reclaimed that history. In an fengjian.145 interview with Anna Louise Strong, in To be fair, one should remember June 1947, Liu Shaoqi explained that that it is only recently that Marxist Mao's main contribution was "to theoreticians have resumed the study of transform Marxism from a European this very important question in form to an Asian form. Marx and Lenin," systematic fashion.146 Nevertheless, this he said, "were Europeans; they wrote in area displays Mao's limits. Mao was a European languages about European radical innovator in the field of histories and problems, seldom Asia or orientation, not when it came to China. The basic principles of Marxism conceptualizing: the generalization of are undoubtedly adaptable to all the term "semi-feudal" testifies to the countries, but to apply their general existence of a major problem of truth to concrete revolutionary practices substance (the reciprocal originality of in China is a difficult task. Mao Tse-tung European and Chinese history), but does is Chinese; he analyzes Chinese not resolve it. problems and guides the Chinese people Mao's status as a philosopher or in their struggle to victory. He uses theoretician is a subject of heated Marxist-Leninist principles to explain Chinese history and the practical 145 This point is very important. Fengjian was problems of China. He is the first that translated by feudalism, and vice-versa. This has succeeded in doing so. (...) Mao not fostered a permanent misunderstanding between only applied Marxism to new conditions, Westerners (who filled the term with its European but gave it a new development. He content) and Chinese (who filled it with a different created a Chinese or Asian form of reality). The theme of the Asian mode of Marxism."144 production is now being reintroduced into Marxist Mao counterposed these national research in China; see Wu Dakun. "The Asiatic roots to the universalist claims of many Mode of Production in History as Viewed by European ideologues. He took this Political Economy in Its Broad Sense." in Su argument very far: the only concrete Shaozi et al.. Marxism in China, Nottingham: Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a Spokesman. 1983. pp. 53-77. This little book national form. Although its method is includes four contemporary Chinese texts on Marxist research, the Asian mode of production, universal, living Marxism is always humanism and Rosa Luxemburg, and gives an idea original. Later, with the rise of the cult of of the recent redevelopment of theory in People's personality, Maoism, in turn, would be China. defined as sinified Marxism and the 146 See chapter 3. volume 1. of this study. When Marxism of our times: there was the Mao called for the sinifica-tion of Marxism, the founding father, Marx, then Lenin and late writings of Marx on the question were the beginnings of the imperialist epoch, forgotten, along with the original contribution of and now, for the contemporary epoch, the Russian populist theoreticians. Trotsky's was Mao. obliterated by Stalinism. This contribution While Mao incorporated many concerns mainly the way in which he integrates the elements taken from national history to dialectic of uneven and combined development in his political thought, he did not evolve the imperialist epoch and in which he uses this an original conceptual interpretation of method to approach the Russian social formation the Chinese social formation. He did not and revolutionary process as a whole. However, he does not innovate in the analysis of social classes in backward countries, particularly not with respect to 143 The specificity of Chinese history springs in part the peasantry. Lenin's contribution in this respect is from the role of the tradition of a centralized state, considerable but incomplete: Lenin only discovered perhaps unique from the standpoint of its duration. a new promising approach at the end of his life (see 144 Anna Louise Strong. "The Thought of Mao Tse- his article "On Cooperation" (January 4,1923). tung." Amerasia. June 1947. pp. 161-162. Collected Works, vol. 33. pp.467-475. controversy.147 During the period consid- the authority that Knowledge acquired in ered, he produced some important the USSR previously conferred. Faction methodological works: On Practice and members kept their seats on the Central On Contradiction.148 In my opinion, Committee but were officially these documents, although not condemned. In a resolution of April 20, exceptional, display genuine dialectical 1945, the CC criticized "a group of party qualities, particularly if one takes into members who did not have the account the context.149 At the time, experience of practical revolutionary mechanical materialism was dominant in struggle and who had committed ultra- the circles of the Communist Interna- left errors of a dogmatic type" and "who tional. Mao used Lenin's Philosophical were led by Comrade Chen Shaoyu Notebooks, part of which had been (Wang Ming)." They had "committed translated into Chinese, but he was cut errors of a dogmatic type and draped off from later developments such as themselves in the toga of 'theoreticians' Gramsci and Lu-kacs. He drew on the of Marxism-Leninism..." This erroneous Chinese dialectical tradition.150 But the line "had the deepest influence on our status of philosophy in Chinese culture, Party and, for that reason, was most more concerned with immediate deadly."152 usefulness, is not the same as its status The attack on Wang Ming implied in Western culture, which is more a criticism of Stalin.153 But this did not conceptual; this has led Francis Soo to state that Mao does not deserve the title 152 Mao. "Décision sur certaines questions de of Philosopher for westerners, but does l'histoire de notre Parti (Adoptée le 20 avril 1945 for the Chinese (although, even there, par la 7e assemblée plénière élargie du Comité they would consider him a quite peculiar central du PCC élu au VIe Congrès)," (Euvres philosopher since he was not content Choisies, vol. 4.1941-1945. Paris: Editions merely to comment on the Classics).151 sociales. 1959. pp. 215 and 224. This resolution The movement for the sinification was not reproduced in subsequent editions of the of Marxism thus corresponded to an EC. It presents a very factional history of the CCP. actual need: to adapt ideological refer- It criticizes by name those who "noisily called ences to a practice and orientation that themselves 'one hundred per cent Bolsheviks'" and broke with the "canons" of official continued to be official members of the CC. such international orthodoxy. The campaigns as Bo Gu (Po Kéou). As for Wang Ming (Tchen against dogmatism and for "sinification" Chao-yuêi or Ouang Ming in the transcription of followed by the rectification movement the Editions sociales). he was denounced several stood in the continuity of the factional times. Liu Shaoqi appeared as the party's Number Two in this resolution. struggle launched ten years earlier 153 Mao linked the "28 Bolsheviks" to Moscow against the carrier of the Dogma, Wang explicitly on more than one occasion. In April Ming. The "28 Bolsheviks" were ridiculed 1956. for instance. Mao recounted what had not on the ideological plane after being been written into the 1945 resolution. He noted the defeated on the political plane. They lost faction was tied to the Communist International. "The resolutions of the Fourth Plenum [that of 147 Most Western Marxist theoreticians consider 1931. when the "28 Bolsheviks" seized power] him a poor philosopher, but there are some were written by Russians and were imposed on us. exceptions (notably the Frenchman Althusser). particularly the Wang Ming line." Later, "during 148 Both are published in SW, vol. 1. the anti-Japanese resistance, there were also rightist 149 See Roland Lew. "Maoism. Stalinism and the tendencies." once again connected in part to Wang Chinese Revolution." Tariq Ali. ed., The Stalinist Ming (the "second Wang Ming line") Legacy, London: Penguin. 1984. pp. 287-294. ("Intervention lors de la Conférence élargie du 150 See for instance J.W.Freiberg, “The Dialectic in Bureau politique du Comité central." April 1956. China: Maoist and Daoist,” Bulletin of Concerned Paris: Editions du Cerf. 1975. p. 163). In his "Talks Asian Scholars, vol. 9, n˚1, January-March 1977. at the Chengtu Conference." in March 1958. Mao 151 Francis Y. K. Soo. Mao Tse-tung's Theory of recalled that: "The Chinese 'left' opportunists had Dialectic, D. Reidel Pub.. "Sovietica," 1981. pp. nearly all been influenced while in the Soviet 134-136. See also Joseph Needham. Within the Union," and "what is more." at a time when Four Seas. The Dialogue of East and West. "Stalin's rule was beginning to be consolidated." London: Allen&Unwin. 1969. Dogmatism developed when "Mif's influence was the greater." (Mao. "Talks at the Cheng-tu stop Mao from singing the praises of the strengthen [the CP] in order that it gain Kremlin master. In December 1939, he in each country a greater national delivered an oration for Stalin's sixtieth reality."156 birthday in which one can detect a touch The resolution adopted on this of irony under the exaggerated homage. topic by the Central Committee of the "Comrade Stalin is the leader of the CCP declared unambiguously that world revolution. (...) As you know, "beginning today, the Chinese Marx is dead, and Engels and Lenin too Communist Party is released from the are dead. If we did not have a Stalin, obligations imposed by the statutes of who would give the orders? This is the Communist International and by the indeed a fortunate circumstance."154 resolutions of its different congresses." "If we did not have a Stalin, who Indeed, "the national liberation war (...) would give the orders?" Here is a requires that the Communist Parties of sentence that speaks volumes about all countries be independent to settle all what the Comintern had become. Gone problems, taking into account the were the days when the Comintern had national particularities and historical a life of its own, when a Henk Sneevliet conditions of each country... "157 could argue fiercely against the decisions The movement for the sinification of of Soviet diplomacy.155 The Comintern Marxism therefore had more than one had become a mere instrument of the function: asserting the legitimacy of a Kremlin. And when it became a bother, "Chinese-style" Marxism, emphasizing Moscow just decided to dissolve it, on the need for a creative application of the May 13, 1943. Mao greeted this Marxist method, consolidating the dissolution with obvious relief. He political victory over the Wang Ming stated: "the task of the hour is to faction on the ideological plane, reducing strengthen the na tional Communist Stalin's authority, giving the CCP the Parties in each country; we therefore no possibility to guarantee its autonomy longer need this international leading from Moscow on all terrains... But nucleus." The situation had become so "sinification" was also the assertion of a complex and fluid that "the Communist rising nationalism that of the Han, this International, so far removed from the "great people of 450 million" with its real struggles of each country," was no multi-millenial history) and the longer suitable. "The leading cadres of beginning of the Mao personality cult. the Communist Parties of each country The Mao cult had roots of its own, had grown up and therefore reached but one is dealing here with one of the political maturity." The Chinese CP in most pernicious aspects of Stalinist particular had demonstrated its influence over the world Communist capacities since 1935 (the Zunyi movement. The bureaucratic power of conference...). "The dissolution of the the Moscow Center had created the Communist International [aims to] Stalin cult to better impose its authority. Its factional practices and conceptions Conference" (March 1958). SW. vol. 4. p. 97. were implanted into every subordinate 154 Mao. "Stalin is our commander" (December 21. party. Resistance to the Stalinist take- 1939). in Schram, The Political....p. 427. 155 Although he was the first to advocate the CCP's 156 "Rapport détaillé du camarade Mao Tse-toung entry in the Guomindang. Sneevliet violently sur les questions posées par la dissolution de opposed the Soviet decision, beginning in 1923. to l'Internationale communiste." May 23. 1943, in send massive material (and especially military) aid Alain Roux. "Le Parti communiste chinois et la to Sun Yatsen's party. He was worried by the dissolution de l'IC." Cahiers d'Histoire de l’Institut militaristic tendencies already evident in the Maurice Thorez. n°22. third quarter 1977. pp. 58- Guomindang. See the interesting article by Tony 60. For Stalin, as subsequent events would soon Saich and Fritjof Tichelman, "Henk Sneevliet: A demonstrate, the dissolution of the Comintern Dutch Revolutionary on the World Stage," The implied in no way the recognition of the Journal of Communist Studies, vol. 1. n°2. June independence of the national parties. 1985. p. 183. A biography of Henk Sneevliet by F. 157 Idem. pp. 64-65. Both texts were published at Tichelman is due to be published shortly by La the time in the newspaper Liberation. Roux Brèche. Paris. provides a complete translation. over had to adapt to these methods. An also its greatest theoretician and alternative charismatic figure was scientist..."159 created to assert and embody national The campaign of denunciation of legitimacy. The personality cult, an dogmas gave birth to a new Dogma. The incredible degradation of Communist CCP rejected Moscow's authority, ideals, although not universal, became asserted its profoundly national the norm. character and began to postulate to the The Mao cult was made official at role of Guide of the East. Mao had said the Seventh Congress of the CCP, in May that the "principles" of Marxism "can all 1945: Stalin's name was removed from be summed up in one sentence: 'To the statutes, and Mao Zedong Thought rebel is justified.'"160 But it was not a introduced.158 Liu Shaoqi, the party's good idea to try and rebel against his Number Two, was the high priest of this cult... new cult whose liturgy he intoned mixing The peasant question substantive remarks (about the modes The balance sheet of the CCP's rural of penetration of Marxism in China) and work is remarkable. It was the first adulation: "Mao Zedong Thought is a Communist Party, closely followed by its new development of Marxism in the Vietnamese cousin, to sink massive national-democratic revolution of the roots in the rural world and organize the present epoch in the colonial, semi- peasant movement so successfully. For colonial and semi-feudal countries. It is this massive organization of the an admirable model for the peasantry, the CCP had to be armed. nationalization of Marxism. (...) As a The "mass line" prepared activists of disciple of Marx, Engels, Lenin and urban origin to adopt a way of life that Stalin, what Mao Zedong did was was rudimentary and crude and precisely to unite Marxist theory with the culturally alien to the world of the practice of the Chinese revolution to give coastal metropolises. One had to learn birth to Chinese Communism: Mao to speak the language of the village, to Zedong Thought (...) which will respect its customs, to recognize its constitute in addition a great and useful symbols. One had to adapt to a new contribution to the liberation of the mental universe. people in all the nations of the East. (...) The Chinese penetrated the Mao Zedong Thought, from his village community and succeeded where conception of the Universe to his system the Russians had failed. Lenin gave of work, is (...) the systematic great importance to the land question sinification of Marxism, the and performed some genuinely transformation of Marxism from its pioneering political work. The Bolsheviks European form to its Chinese form. (...) supported the rural uprising of 1917 on This constitutes one of the great exploits the basis of the peasants' own demands, in the history of the world Marxist changing their own program against the movement, it is an unprecedented advice of more "orthodox" Marxists like extension of Marxism, the best of truths, Rosa Luxemburg. They forged a worker- to a nation of 450 million people. This soldier-peasant alliance that was deserves our very special recognition. essential to victory. But they were not Our comrade Mao Zedong is not just the able to build a widespread, solid greatest revolutionary and the greatest statesman in the history of China, he is 159 Liu, "Sur le parti" in Carrère d'Encausse and Schram, pp. 362-364. A part of this report was 158 In French, I chose the term "Thought of Mao published as "On the Party" (May 14, 1945), Zedong" which is the translation used by Schram Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution and in the (Euvres choisies of Liu Shaoqi published delivered at the Seventh National Congress, SW, in Peking. Various Maoists have explained that one pp. 314-364. Also published separately by Foreign should read the formula as "Mao Zedong Thought" Languages Press, Peking, 1950. (not "of Mao Zedong) in the collective sense of 160 "Stalin is our commander," pp. 427-428. Is it by Maoism (as there is Leninism). Their argument chance that Mao reminds his audience of this would be more convincing ... if there had not been principle precisely in this article? the cult of personality—in Mao's lifetime!

Communist village organization before class conflicts within the peasantry did the seizure of power. Maoism innovated. not imply the immediate development of It did not ally with the peasantry from a socialist dynamic. The central place of an urban base, but actually structured democratic struggles in this sort of the rural mobilization. It became the revolution was confirmed.163 spokesperson for peasant demands, The need to deepen the taking over the terrain which, in Russia, understanding of the peasant question is had been traditionally occupied by the sorely evident here. In China as in Socialist Revolutionaries and only taken Russia, peasant reality flew in the face over by the Bolsheviks suddenly in of many preconceived notions: the 1917. peasantry did not disappear and did not In China, neither serfdom nor the turn against the socialist power.164 While juridically subordinate status of the failing to play an independent historical peasant corresponding to it, nor the role, it nevertheless refused to simply large feudal manor, ever had the same "decompose." It struck a lasting alliance reality as in Tsarist Russia. Nor did a with the revolutionary regime. It plantation economy develop as it did in emerged at once as individualistic, Malaysia. Agrobusiness, the green conservative, and open to modernizing, revolution, the import-export market collectivist and socialist endeavors. The had not yet penetrated as deeply as it Chinese experience fostered a whole has today in so many dependent new debate on the factors of cohesion countries. The situation varied from the and differentiation among the peasantry, more traditional north to the south on its narrowly family or community where the influence of modern cities was approach, on its backward or forward greater and the relations between the outlook.165 urban bourgeoisie, land ownership and trade, tighter. On the whole though, 163 Democratic demands include social questions, Chinese agriculture was, like the like land distribution, not just political questions, Russian, above all a genuine peasant like rights and freedom. agriculture, family farming in which 164 According to traditional Marxist analysis, the labor played a far more important role peasantry was supposed to decompose rapidly into than capital. The class contradictions a rural bourgeoisie on the one hand and a between peasants on the one hand, and proletariat on the other. As such, it was expected to gentry, rural notables and landowners oppose the revolutionary regime as soon as the first on the other, were getting sharper. We steps of the socialist stage were implemented. noted earlier that the CCP had dwelt Bolshevik policy therefore aimed at forging a temporary alliance with it and facilitating internal extensively on the analysis of the cleavages in stratification inside the peasantry.161 The 165 . It should be made clear that the debate on the struggle for land and goods, against agrarian question and the evolution of usury and debts, was not only directed contemporary rural structures in dependent against outsiders to the community, or countries cannot be reduced to the debate on the even the richest people within the peasantry. I have not yet satisfactorily assimilated village, but often took the form of a the arguments of these fundamental debates. There struggle inside the peasantry itself which is an abundant literature on the peasantry, of which divided into rich, middle, poor and the following deserve special notice: Teodor landless peasants.162 Shanin. Roots of Otherness, (already cited); The Chinese experience renewed "Measuring Peasant Capitalism, The the Russian experience and provided Operationaliza-tion of Concepts of Political similar lessons. Given the nature of Economy: Russia's 1920s-India's 1970s." in E. H. peasant demands (which determined Hobsbawm et al.. Peasant in History. Oxford concrete tasks) the early development of University Press. 1980; Samuel Pop-kin. The Rational Peasant. The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam, University of California Press. 161 See the end of chapter 2, volume 1, of this 1979; James Scott, The Moral Economy of the study. Peasant. Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast 162 This raises difficult problems with respect to the Asia, Yale University Press. 1976; Eric Wolf. social united front. See previous chapter. Peasants. Foundations of Modern Anthropology Series. 1966. and his classical Peasant Wars of the struggle. He actively defended the right The revolutionary administration to divorce against stubborn objections. and territorial dual power:between With the spread of the struggle to revolution and conservatism the north, women were mobilized. Female associations of the CCP were Dual power emerged in a established. Solidarity among wives territorial form. A revolutionary developed; "speak bitterness" meetings administration was created. Cut off from allowed the assertion of a collective the centers of the national economy, this consciousness of their condition. administrative power was not properly Battered wives revolted. In historical speaking the embryo of a state, a mini- perspective, it is clear that women's ature version of what it would be after emancipation was a major component of the victory—in fact, its isolation was to the fight for modernization, national have quite a few consequences after liberation and social revolution in China. victory. The corps of functionaries of the Already, the educated reformers of the liberated zones was to play a significant late Manchu dynasty had challenged the role in the creation of the Communist existing status of women. The popular regime. It had developed without direct uprising of the Taipings had advocated links with the urban classes, including equality of the sexes and many lower- the working class. The substitutionist class women had participated actively in relationship of the CCP apparatus and its dynamic phase. Later, the republican Red Army toward the proletariat, was revolution contributed to changing the strengthened by this particular process condition of bourgeois women. The May of struggle for power. Fourth Movement undermined the The village milieu, despite its legitimacy of Confucianism which revolutionary potential, remained quite straitjacketed daughters and wives in a conservative; this was particularly true web of stringent duties. Industrialization in Yan'an which sheltered the central completely changed the situation of Communist administration, where women workers by enabling them to thousands of new urban activists, escape the village structures. With the workers, students and intellectuals Third Chinese revolution, the struggle of gathered. Shaanxi was not Jiangxi. It women spread to the countryside and was a rural, distant, impoverished and deepened. only slightly populated province. The Chinese history highlights the implementation of Communist policy was portentous role that women play in affected by this environment, modern revolutions when they rise particularly in relation to the struggle for massively for their emancipation. But it women's liberation. also shows the resilience of the social This was an area where one could and cultural obstacles to this advance. find many contrasts in time and space in In Yan'an itself, the movement got revolutionary China of the 1930s and bogged down. Although the very radical 1940s. In the Jiangxi Soviet Republic, a 1934 Law on marriage was republished, very radical law on marriage was it was not enforced. Hua Chang-ming adopted. Mao waged a genuine fight for notes that in this region of the country, equality in sexual relations, which led marriage was mainly a financial him to clash with traditional morality. He transaction. The poor peasant who had made sexuality— and freedom for painstakingly saved enough to buy a women and men to look for a mate, a wife, was not about to let her get away partner, outside of arranged marriages— from him. The right to divorce did not into a weapon in the revolutionary win acceptance. Age limits were not respected. The Communist leadership sounded the retreat, and abandoned the Twentieth Century. New York: Harper & Row; theme of freedom of marriage for the Cohen. Gutkind. Brazier, eds., Peasants and less consequential one of "family Proletarians. The Struggle of ThirdWorldWorkers. harmony," which was to benefit wives. Monthly Review Press. 1979. The revolutionary political and

administrative apparatus backslid all the more easily on this issue as it got bigger Stalinism on the CCP. But the ideological and because it included few women. roots of Maoism were diverse; they Women became the privilege of cadres— included the May Fourth tradition and its cadres who did not necessarily respect cultural breadth, and the early the principles of equality within the contribution of the Communist couple and used their political power to International and of Chinese sources bolster their male power.166 Not before whose importance cannot be 1950 would a new Law on marriage be underestimated. decreed and the fight against tradition The CCP became Maoist by resume along with a further deepening freeing itself from the political and of the social revolution in the cities and organizational subordination imposed by country. Women's condition has changed the Kremlin masters. Nevertheless, it did in the People's Republic on the labor, not emerge as the revolutionary Marxist family and ideological fronts; but antithesis of Stalinism. Maoism emerged advances are constantly being both within the Stalinized world Com- challenged by the "old man," the weight munist movement and against Moscow's of "feudal customs," backwardness and policy. The CCP criticized the Stalinist bureaucracy.167 road of development169 but did not integrate key lessons of the Russian Stalinism and "national experience into its initial doctrine. communisms" Maoists were keenly aware that once in power, a party ran the risk of "cutting Maoism emerged as a full-fledged itself off from the masses." They thought distinct current at the Seventh Congress the "mass line" would help to overcome of the CCP. Neither by its origins, that danger, but they failed to determine doctrine or practice could it be reduced its precise nature and therefore its real to Stalinism;168 Stalinism formed in a magnitude.170 bureaucratic counter-revolution in a Within the world workers transitional society. Maoism formed in movement, the CCP's position remained the revolutionary struggle for power in a ambivalent. It supported the principle of semi-colonial society. We noted on independence of the national parties, but several occasions the influence of sided with Stalin when the Yugoslavs were expelled from the Co-minform171, in 1948, on slanderous charges.172 The 166 There are many examples of this sort of behavior, including relating to Mao. Nevertheless, if one takes into account the historical and 169 Jack Belden wrote: "I was often quite astonished conjunctural con-text. it is not certain that the while in the Liberated Areas to hear both Maoist cadres were any more conservative in this Communists and non-Communists declare that the field than contemporary revolutionary activists in Soviet Union had made the peasant the serf of the the Western world.... state. Furthermore, the Chinese Communists were 167 See among others Hua Chang-ming. La extremely critical of the violence of the Soviet land condition féminine et les communistes chinois en reform. "We want to avoid that,' they would often action. Yan'an 1935-1946. Paris: Centre de say to me. 'Not only did the Russians make many Recherche et de Documentation sur la Chine mistakes, which we don't have to repeat, but also contemporaine et Ecole des Hautes Etudes en their basic programme may not be suited to Sciences Sociales. 1981; Delia Davin. Women- China.”{China Shakes the World, pp. 103-104.) Work. Women and Party in Revolutionary China. 170 Moral armament was the favored method of Routledge&Kegan Paul. 1978; Elizabeth Croll, fighting bureaucratism. The role of political Feminism and Socialism in China. democracy in a socialist regime was basically Routledge&Kegan Paul. 1978. See also the already unknown. Only in the mid-1950s, after the cited reports by Bel-den and Hinton, as well as Hungarian and East German crises, did Mao deal Isabel and David Crook. Revolution in a Chinese with the specific problems of a transitional society Vil-lage: Ten Mile Inn. Routledge&Kegan Paul. (which cannot be reduced to the weight of the past 1959. and the pressure of imperialism). 168 This is why I believe it is not appropriate to call 171 The international network of CPs created after the CCP "Stalinist". even in the ideological sense. the dissolution of the Comintern. The CCP was precisely... Maoist. 172 The Yugoslav leader Dedijer wondered "how could the Chinese communists agree to that CCP asserted its independence but made The nefarious influence of it clear it was willing to pay the price Stalinism was particularly damaging at required to maintain its alliance with the time because the European workers Moscow. Examined from an international movement was on the retreat. Nazism standpoint, the Chinese positions appear ruled in Germany, Franco was winning contradictory. But seen in the Chinese the civil war in Spain, the French popular context, the CCP is a coherent party- front was mired in reformism. The world endowed in fact, with such remarkable war was approaching. The peoples of the coherence that it was able to pass all the colonial and semi-colonial world could tests to which it was subjected. It does not count on rapid help from a not deserve the label of "centrist" in the proletarian revolution in any advanced sense of a political current that vacillates capitalist country. The defeat of between reform and revolution, or revolutionary struggles in the imperialist between Stalinism and revolutionary world had very deep and lasting Marxism. consequences on the parties of the These two facets of Maoism colonial and semi-colonial world.173 reflect the weight of the historical Maoism, a revolutionary constraints, both national and movement, was not Stalinism, but international, which prevailed in its cannot be understood without it.174 The formative years and deeply influenced victory of the Soviet bureaucracy dealt a the general course of the revolution. The death blow to internationalism. These CCP assimilated the conditions of the were the circumstances in which what I struggle in China and adapted to them. call "national communisms", for lack of a Its national roots were its strength but better word, emerged.175 These currents also imposed certain limits on its political were shaped in a long struggle for evolution— this can be explained by the power. They proved able to define the world context at the time. road to their revolution; their coherence Maoism was shaped at a time was that of their own historical when Stalinism was triumphant. The trajectory. But, despite their qualities, history of the CCP illustrates the limits of the power of the Soviet bureaucracy. 173 Western activists "disappointed" by national Concerned mainly with events in Europe, liberation movements because their revolutions the Soviet bureaucracy did not succeed were not as pretty as hoped, should not forget this. in subjecting the Chinese party durably Third World peoples and revolutionary movements to its rule—a few other parties, such as pay a high price for battles lost in Europe (defeats the Vietnamese and Yugoslav, also which are largely due to the consequences of Stalinism.) escaped. But no one could escape its 174 The impact of Stalinism was so great that no influence altogether. Its power derived contemporary revolutionary current can be from its control of the Soviet state and understood without it. The roots of the Fourth from the blackmail it could use against International are precisely in the anti-bureaucratic movements that vitally needed its aid, or struggle launched in the 1920s and 1930s in the its neutrality, in their fight against USSR against the Stalinist degeneration of the imperialism. The selfish nationalism of Russian revolution. the Soviet bureaucracy aroused a 175 I put forward this notion in a debate on the nationalist resistance among the most Communist Parties and Stalinism in the review well-rooted and militant sections of the Critique Communiste (Marx ou Crève) in 1975- Comintern. 1976. See Michel Lequenne. "Sur le centrisme" (n°1. April-May 1975). Christian Leucate. "Sur la disgraceful resolution directed not only against the crise du stalinisme" (n°5. February -March 1976). Yugoslavs but against the principles upon which Pierre Rousset. "Stalinisme, centrisme et the Chinese revolution had developed and 'communismes nationaux" (n°6. April-May 1976). triumphed?" (Vladimir Dedijer. The Battle Stalin Roland Lew. "Marxisme en Occident, marxisme en Lost. New York: Grosset, p. 103). The Yugoslavs Orient" and "Revolution en Asie et marxisme" paid the Chinese back in kind two years later, when (N°24. September 1978). I call attention they refused to condemn the US intervention in particularly to the last article. which contains a Korea, a typical imperialist intervention under full—and very interesting—critique of my 1975 cover of the UN flag. book. Le Parti communiste vietnamien. they remained dependent on a context shaped by Stalinist supremacy over the international workers movement. The sclerosis of Marxist research accentuated their empirical inclinations. Since relations between the various parties became more and more formal, it became more and more difficult to rise above the national horizon of each revolutionary experience. The evolution of Maoism did not stop in 1945. It would soon be confronted to new tasks—those of the transitional society—and to a changing international context. But it had reached maturity at that point, and remained deeply marked by the conditions extant at the time of its formation.

Territorial dual power Liberated areas of the Chinese Communist Party, Guomindang bases behind Japanese lines and territory occupied by the Japanese in northern China during the Sino-Japanese war [map from Jacques Guillermaz, Histoire du Parti communiste chinois (1921-1949), Paris: Payot, 1968]

Chapter 7 1945-1949 The conquest of power: national liberation, modernization and social revolution

The Sino-Japanese war played a far more important role in the defeat of Communist forces from conquering the the Japanese Empire in 1945 than main urban centers. The marines indicated by most Western textbooks intervened to seize control of which focus mainly on the war of the US communication hubs. With this help, the forces in the Pacific, the British counter- Guomindang was able to recover the offensives in Southeast Asia, and bulk of Japanese war booty. Australia's resistance. The Communist But the CCP was able to enlarge success testifies to the magnitude of the substantially the surface of the liberated fight waged for eight years on Chinese areas. It redeployed its forces and soil. As the war ended, the CCP concentrated new assets in Manchuria controlled 19 liberated regions or about which the Soviets occupied until April 10% of Chinese territory.176 But the 1946.179 Moscow was the recipient of the Japanese capitulation was precipitated Japanese surrender and carried away by the nuclear holocaust and came the industrial equipment of this region before the Chinese general staffs could where Japan had invested heavily. It let revamp their military plans. This the Guomindang take over the large triggered a race against the clock cities. But the CCP took advantage of between the Communist Party and the situation to sink more solid roots. Guomindang, as both rushed to occupy This time, it was able to recover a part as much territory and recover as many of the Japanese weapons. weapons as possible. At the same time as this race It all happened very fast. On against the clock was going on, peace August 6, the first atom bomb hit negotiations began between the two Hiroshima. On the 8, the USSR declared parties. They failed and a civil war war on Japan and invaded Manchuria.177 opened. Four years after the capitulation On the 9, Mao called for a "general of Japan, the People's Republic was counter-offensive" to destroy Japanese founded. The victory of the Chinese forces, "seize their equipment and revolution was a genuine historical test armament, and vigorously expand the that made it possible to verify, clarify liberated regions."178 On the 14, Tokyo and expand the analyses and lessons of capitulated. The Allied Command thirty years of struggle. ordered the Japanese troops stationed in China to surrender only to the Guomindang. The United States Negotiations and civil war: organized a gigantic air-lift to transfer countering Yalta Chiang's troops to the central and north- ern provinces posthaste and prevent Seen in its proper perspective, the civil war was the continuation of the 176 According to Communist sources, the liberated national defense war: it was the logical areas included 95 million inhabitants; the CP organized an army of 910 000 people, a militia of 179 According to John Gittings, 100 000 troops 2.22 million, and self-defense units totaling 10 were sent to reinforce Manchuria (where guerrillas million. See James P. Harrison, A History of the were already operating) by order of General Zhu Chinese Communist Party 1921 -1972, The Long De, on August 11, 1945. The principle of this March to Power, London: MacMillan, 1973, p. decision had already been adopted one year earlier 372. and did not depend on Soviet approval. The 177 In line with the Yalta agreements signed Chinese Communists complained on more than one February 11, 1945. At the Yalta conference, the occasion that they had not received the aid which world was divided into "zones of influence" by the they hoped to get from Moscow in Manchuria. The United States, Britain and the USSR. World and China, 1922-1972, London: Eyre 178 Mao, The Last Round with the Japanese Methuen, 1974, pp. 148-150. Invaders" (August 9,1945), SW, vol. III, p. 289. outcome of the fundamental political ♦ On the national plane, the conflict evident throughout the political climate was not favorable to experience of the anti-Japanese united civil war. The population yearned for front. Nevertheless, it was preceded by peace. The Chiang Kai-shek intense negotiations. There is nothing government still had some real paradoxical in this fact. Negotiations are authority. The theme of a national required as a necessary moment of war. union for reconstruction of the country They were required then for military and was popular. Neither the Guomindang political, and national and international leadership nor the CCP leadership had reasons. any illusions; a propaganda war raged ♦ The military situation: the CCP throughout the negotiations period. But was conscious of the real relationship of the party responsible for a return to the forces. The Generalissimo's army state of war risked losing the support of included 4 million troops and 199 a notable section of the population. operational divisions, was equipped with excellent weapons, enjoyed American The CCP documents of that logistical support and leadership, and period mention all these factors.184 had exclusive control of the air. It was a Communist policy probably contained an fearsome adversary. But Chiang was alternative: testing the possibilities for a paying the price of his previous policy; temporary peace but preparing for a his forces were concentrated in the resumption of the fighting. Mao Zedong southwest of the country. Despite the polemicized violently against Chiang Kai- airlift and maritime transport offered by shek and warned once again against a Washington, he needed time before he mistake similar to that committed in could move onto the initiative on a 1927: the concessions were designed to national scale again. His first attacks on unmask the true nature of Guomindang liberated areas were failures!180 policy and to gain the political initiative, ♦ On the international plane, the the sympathy of wavering elements, a Communist Party was isolated. Chiang legal status and a situation of peace.185 Kai-shek's government had "We must recognize difficulties (.. .). It consolidated its position during the war must not be imagined that one fine through a series of conferences like the Cairo conference and the Yalta some quarters. negotiations among the Great Powers. 184 He alone enjoyed official recognition, Such as the report presented to the North China including from the USSR.181 Moscow was Bureau between the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Mao's departure for Chungqing (August acting irresolutely in Manchuria—in line 28), which Van Slyke summarizes. The authors of with its own interests and not those of this document noted that a return to civil war was the CCP—but fundamentally abiding by likely, but that a peaceful development remained the spirit of the Yalta accords: China possible for three reasons: the people's longing for was to be part of the Western zone of peace, the fact that neither the United States nor influence. Washington promised its the USSR wanted a civil war at that point, and the 182 support to the "nationalist" regime. problems facing Chiang Kai-shek which could lead But the United States could not get him to make concessions. The CCP itself, the involved in a new war in China; they did document noted, was experiencing some not have the political means to do so.183 difficulties. It could not conquer the large cities because Chiang's forces were too well armed and 180 In October 1945, several divisions of Chiang's "the Soviet Union, because of the obligation to army were destroyed by Communist forces in carry out the terms of the [Sino-Soviet] treaty, southeastern Shaanxi and Honan. cannot help us directly." The reporter complained 181 A new bitter experience for the CCP occurred that "we do not understand actual Russian policy." when the USSR signed a treaty with the Chiang See Enemies and Friends..., pp. 186-188. Kai-shek government recognizing its sovereignty 185 See Mao, The Situation and Our Policy After over the entire territory, on August 14, 1945. the Victory in the War of Resistance Against 182 See among others John Gittings, chapters 5 & 6. Japan" and "Chiang Kai-shek Is Provoking Civil 5.183 Mao understood that the development of the War" (Augustl3, 1945), SW, vol. IV, pp. 11-26 and atom bomb did not fundamentally alter this state of 27-31. affairs and fought the pessimism that took hold of morning all the reactionaries will go weak, while simultaneously consolidating down on their knees of their own accord. and expanding its hold on territories In a word, while the prospects are where it was able to do so."187 A bright, the road has twists and turns."186 few months were enough to turn the As the war ended, the documents of the Consultative Political relationship of forces had reached an Conference into mere scraps of paper. unstable equilibrium. The United States As early as March and April, a civil war and the USSR, the CCP and the seemed unavoidable.188 By summer Guomindang neither wanted nor could 1946, it had become general. The move to a general showdown. The Guomindang launched a series of major equilibrium was upset after a few offensives. In July, 2 million troops months; the whole country slid into civil attacked the large Communist bases in war. This situation meant that the center and north. In March 1947, negotiations had an important role to Chiang Kai-shek's army occupied Yan'an. play. For a time, the central field of Nevertheless, thanks to their mobility, confrontation was the battle for peace. the Communists were able to preserve A first round of negotiations took their strength and progressively exhaust place in August and September 1945 that of their adversary. under the aegis of General Hurley, of the Hardly one year after the general US army; they resumed under the resumption of the civil war, the balance auspices of Gene-ral Marshall. Their of forces changed. The People's stated purpose was to create the Liberation Army—its new name since conditions necessary for the July 1946— launched counter-offensives establishment of a coalition government. in Manchuria, under Lin Biao, and in the A Consultative Political Conference central plain, under Liu Bocheng and convened in January 1946. Five Chen Yi. By late 1948-early 1949, the resolution were adopted calling for a military debacle of the Guomindang complete overhaul of existing began. It was defeated in Manchuria and institutions and making a cease-fire in the battle of Huai-Huai in central possible. Nevertheless, as noted by Van China, as well as in the north; the Slyke, the conference "achieved surrender of the Peking garrison was impressive results on paper, but neither obtained in January, Things then moved party limited its action in the light of very quickly. The northwest was these results, or had much confidence in liberated under Peng Dehuai. Shan-ghai the other's good faith. (...) Chiang Kai- was taken in May, Canton in October, shek was determined to extend his Nanning, on the border with Vietnam, in political and military control over the December, The Guomindang withdrew to whole of China. (...) The CCP spoke and the island of Taiwan. acted as a sovereign power, entitled to China changed camps: this was full equality with the KMT. (,.,) The CCP sought a political solution where it was 187 Van Slyke, p. 187. In a secret document of April 1946, while recognizing the USSR's right to accept 186 Mao, "On the Chungking Negotiations" compromises, Mao explicitly rejected the (October 17,1945), SW, IV, p. 60. In "On Peace implications of the Yalta conference for China: Negotiations with the Kuomintang—Circular of the "Such [international] compromise does not require Central Committe of the Communist Party of the people in the countries of the capitalist world to China" (August 26, 1945), Mao noted that "at follow suit and make compromises at home. The present the Soviet Union, the United States and people in those countries will continue to wage Britain all disapprove of civil war in China," but different struggles in accordance with their further on, he wrote that "if the Kuomintang still different conditions. The principle of the wants to launch a civil war after our Party has reactionary forces in dealing with the democratic taken the above steps, it will put itself in the wrong forces of the people is definitely to destroy all they in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole can and to prepare to destroy later whatever they world, and our Party will be justified in waging a cannot destroy now. Face to face with this war of self-defence to crush its attacks." Idem, pp. situation, the democratic forces of the people 48-49. should likewise apply the same principle to the reactionary forces." Idem, pp. 87-88. 188 Idem, p. 189. one of the great failures of the Yalta conference. The victory of the revolution * * * had not been wanted by Moscow which believed it neither desirable nor possible. The victory of the Third Chinese Both Stalin and Mao understood this and Revolution confirmed three points in our both later agreed—at least on the one analysis of Maoism: point—that this had been the case; both ™ The strategic horizon of admitted so much in talks given later, Maoism was definitely the struggle for Stalin in 1948, and Mao in 1962.189 power and not compromise.192 Dedijer states in his memoirs that Stalin ™ The victory followed a long re-counted in February 1948 the process of internal conflict within the meetings with the Chinese delegation, party based on the balance sheet of during which he had noted the Great revolution of 1924-1927.193 that"conditions were not ripe for an ™ This is precisely why Maoism won uprising in China and that [the Chinese in a fight against the policy of the Communists] should seek a modus Stalinist bureaucracy.194 vivendi with Chiang Kai-shek and disband their army. The Chinese 192 Communists agreed with us, their Soviet In a private letter of October 19,1984, Aldo Bronzo reproached me with underestimating the comrades, but when they went back to "stagist" aspect of the Maoist outlook in the 1930s China they did just the opposite. They and 1940s (see also his book, I Communisti in rallied their forces, organized their Cina, Milano: Nuove Edizioni Intemazionali, armies, and now they are beating 190 1983). The discussion point raised by Bronzo is Chiang Kai-shek." interesting. I noted in the previous chapter the When the polemic with relative indeterminateness of Mao's perspective, Khrushchev erupted, Mao reviewed the but it is true that I believe it was not as great as history of Sino-Soviet relations before a Bronzo does. What seems to me essential is that the plenum of the CCP Central Committee struggle was conceived as a revolutionary struggle held in 1962. "We spent the whole of for power. This was the perspective in which 1960 fighting Krushchev. (...) But in fact organizational, political, social and military forces the roots [of this conflict] lier deep in were accumulated; this is what explains that the the past, in things which happened very empirical grasp of the situation was fruitful and the long ago. They did not permit China to successive readjustments of the line made in time. 193 make revolution: that was in 1945. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Zhou Enlai Stalin wanted to prevent China from presented a report to the Party central school in making revolution, saying that we Yan'an, in 1944, which followed "six months" of analysis of "the struggle between two lines" on the should not have civil war and should occasion of "a study of the documents of the period cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, of the Great Revolution." Although factional and otherwise the Chinese nation would glossing over the role of Stalin, the report is perish. But we did not do what he said. interesting; in it, Zhou reviews the history of the The revolution was victorious. After the CCP with respect to its analysis of the character of victory of the revolution, he next the revolution from the standpoint of its tasks, suspected China of being a Yugoslavia, motor forces, and leadership. He recalls the and that I would become a second Tito. conception developed by Mao in 1939 that "the Later when I went to Moscow to sign the Chinese revolution was a bourgeois-democratic Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and revolution against imperialism and feudalism Mutual Assistance, we had to go through waged by the broad masses of the people under the another struggle."191 leadership of the proletariat." See Zhou, "On the Sixth Congress of the Party" (March 3 and 4,1944), and ""On the United Front" (April 30,1945), SW, 189 The two quotes have often been put together, for vol. I, pp. 177-210 and 213-244. instance by James Harrison, pp. 384-385. 194 The victory of 1949 cannot be explained by a 190 Dedijer, op. cit., p. 204. change of policy in Moscow due to the Cold War 191 Mao, "Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth between the USSR and USA. Such an explanation Central Committee" (September 24,1962), in cannot account for the continuity of the struggles Schram, ed., Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed-Talks and and the real chronological sequences in China Let-ters 1956-1971, p. 191. itself, for the political content of the debates over orientation inside the CCP, for the active role out to storm the heavens, or had to But a sharp break was avoided. exert great efforts to guarantee the Peking decided to "lean to one side only" independent action of the most deprived on the international arena and maintain layers who were prisoners of their clan its alliance with Moscow. The CCP hoped relations and haunted by the memory of that it would obtain material aid and a past defeats.196 development model from its Soviet big Land reform moved very quickly brother, a country that was already to the center of the CCP's action quite industrialized compared to China. program. The progressive transition Stalin, a realist, adjusted to the from rent reduction to land distribution accomplished fact. But, as Mao noted in began in late 1945. The new orientation 1962, the political conflict that emerged was made official by the Directive on the in the years of revolutionary struggle Land Question of May 4, 1946, whose foreshadowed that which would break central slogan was "the land to the out in the 1950s and end with the tiller."197 The decision shows the extent schism of 1960. to which the civil war was already a reality. The policy was implemented in The process of permanent revolution different ways though. Then, in 1947, it became suddenly more radical. The CCP The People's Republic was born leadership launched a "rectification on October 1, 1949. Victory came movement" targeted at Communist quickly, more quickly than the CCP cadres of the village level. The secrecy leaders had hoped. It concluded a long which had protected party members was process of revolu-tionary maturation: it abolished in Liberated Areas so that the was a social and political victory, local cells could appear before mass before being a military victory. The meetings held to pass judgement on impressive growth of Communist forces during the civil war testified to that. The 196 This sort of discrepancy between the action of party membership numbered 1.35 the party and the action of the masses, or between million in 1946; 3.1 million in 1948; 4.5 situations in different districts and regions, is found million towards the end of 1949; 5.8 in every revolution, including the Russian. 197 million in 1950. As for the PLA it jumped The anniversary of the May 4, 1919 Movement from 1.277 million in June 1949 to 2.8 The Directive is reproduced in Liu, SW, vol. 1, pp. million in June 1948, to 5 million in 372-378. Liu played a particularly important role in 1950.195 this field from 1946 to 1948. During the Cultural The truly revolutionary character Revolution, the Maoist faction blamed all "the leftist errors" of 1947 on him. According to Tanaka of the civil war was embodied in the Kyoko, it is possible that differences arose between agrarian struggles, the collapse of the Mao and Liu over how to apply the agrarian policy, Guomindang's urban power base, and but on the whole the two leaders seem to have gone the nature of the regime born in the through a parallel evolution. See Tanaka Kyoko, victory. "Mao and Liu in the 1947 Land Reform: Allies or Disputants?" The China Quarterly, n°75, • the agrarian revolution September 1978. The history of the CCP, as rewritten during the During the "third civil war," the Cultural Revolution, is obviously superfactional (it CCP radicalized its land policy until describes the eternal fight between Mao's "red line" 1947, then moderated it. Depending on and Liu's "black line). Its falsifications are the time and place, the party either countless. But it is worth noting that Liu seemed outflanked by the spontaneous recognized in 1949 that he bore among the mobilizations of poor peasants who set leadership a particular responsibility for the leftist errors of 1947; see "Some Questions Concerning Urban Work" (March 12,1949), SW, vol. 1, p. 417. played by the Maoist leadership over a long period It seems that when the war ended, the central in organizing the struggle for power, for the leadership of the CCP was com-posed of Mao tensions which appeared between the CCP and the Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Ren Kremlin, and for the statements of the actors Bishi, one of the earliest leaders of the CCP, who themselves about what happened. died of an illness in 1950. 195 See James Harrison, pp. 395-396 their activities. In September 1947, a ran up against a fundamental problem: National Land Conference was the shortage of land in the north of the summoned following the political country, and the nature of the peasant rectification campaigns, in the presence economy. of Liu Shaoqi.198 The principle of an According to Tanaka Kyoko, although Agrarian Law was adopted. This Law was the land reform developed very promulgated on October 10, 1947;199 it unevenly in various areas, it had already stipulated that "the system of feudal and been thoroughly implemented in its semi-feudal exploitation is abolished. radical version in many areas under The agrarian system of 'the land to the Communist control by late 1946.203 By peasants' must be instituted."200 The mid-1947, in many cases, the class of CCP leadership ordered more radical landowners had been eliminated and the measures: unconditional confiscation of rich-peasant-landowning elements were the land of landowners and its only marginally represented among the distribution on a per capita egalitarian village cadres.204 The reason the CCP basis. But by the end of the year, the leadership made a wrong assessment of Communist Party had to moderate its the situation was that it underestimated land policy and called for a correction of the scarcity of land. Even after the "ultra-left errors."201 The interests of the reform, there were still many poor middle peasants had to be taken into peasants left. Any attempt to equalize account. The new policy was spelled out the situation further by additional in detail over the course of 1948.202 distributions of land would have to The changes in the CCP's land policy can attack the middle peasantry. "In fact, be explained in part by the changes of the Party had to choose either equal the general conjuncture. In early 1947, distribution or preservation of the middle the military situation was difficult. peasant economy."205 Any challenge to Energies had to be stirred up; to do so, that economy meant ripping through the the radicalism of the poor peasantry had social fabric and breaking the productive to be unleashed. As the Communist equilibria. According to Tanaka Kyoko, forces regained their bearing in the the CCP leadership only realized the course of the year, social support for the extent of this problem in 1948. revolution had to be broadened to At any rate, a genuine agrarian consolidate the rear and weaken the revolution began during the third civil enemy. But the CCP's land policy also war and was generalized after 1949. The mass mobilization required for the pursuit of the war went hand in hand 198 See Liu, "Speech Concluding the National Land with a change in social and political Conference" (September 13,1947), op. cit.,pp. 379- power in the villages. 392. 199 The anniversary of the republican revolution of 1911. • the urban front 200 The text of this "Basic Programme on Chinese Agrarian Law Promulgated by the Central When the Chiang Kai-shek Committee of the Chinese Communist Party" is published in Appendix A, Hinton, Fanshen, pp. 203 Tanaka Kyoko, pp. 568-569. See also Zhou, 727-731. "Fanshen" means "to turn one's body "Agrarian Reform and Consolidation of the Party in around" and this "turn-around" or "upheaval" was the Old and Semi-Old Liberated Areas" (February one of the central slogans of the 1947 land reform. 22, 1948), SW, vol. I, pp. 322-331. The "rectification campaigns" assigned a single set 204 Kyoko, p. 592. of numerical goals for the entire country, in 205 Idem, p. 593. The problem also had a political contradiction with the principle of "operational dimension, as noted in chapter 5: the risk of decentralization." This was one of the handing over a new popular base to the contradictions of the "mass line" that would often Guomindang. In addi tion, the difference between create problems. the rich and middle peasant was often quite 201 See Mao, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" tenuous, and this had to be taken into account. The (December 25, 1947), SW, vol. IV, pp. 157-176. solution was found after victory, with the 202 See Mao's writings of this period in SW, volume development of a cooperative economy. IV. government returned to the urban movement became harsher. centers of the coastline, it enjoyed Within a few years, the student definite prestige. Yet its authority milieu and the "third force" elements, collapsed very quickly and "the regime represented mainly by the "Democratic lost the war first and foremost in the League," went over to an alliance with urban strongholds."206 the CCP. This crisis of the regime was one of the elements of the revolutionary ∆ Workers struggles and the CCP situation in China.207 Its corruption, negligence, factionalism and China had about two or three authoritarianism caused democratic million workers. The working class had public opinion and the students to turn been able to maintain its standard of away from it. Inflation reached gigantic living during the war. It now proportions. The price index—using a demonstrated its militancy and obtained base of 100 in 1937, at the outbreak of a sliding scale of wages in 1946. With the war— climbed to 627 210 at the end the continuation of economic stagnation, of 1946, and 10 340 000 by the end of demonstrations and strikes became 1947! The middle classes and civil more numerous in 1947-1948. However, servants were hit brutally. The working the urban proletariat was only very class moved into struggle. The regime slightly politicized—far less so than lost the battle of the cities in the political twenty years earlier. Corporatist and social arena. Victory was not simply traditions had become strong after the the product of a gradual evolution of the debacle of 1927. "This is one of the most relationship of forces. The final astonishing paradoxes of the Third confrontation took place when a genuine Chinese revolution: one has to recognize and acute national crisis and revolution- the coexistence of the vigorous militancy ary crisis, the groundwork for which had of the workers and their near-complete been laid by prior struggles, erupted. political lethargy," Roland Lew notes.208 The CCP had been able to keep a ∆ Political struggles network of activists in the labor movement, but a much weaker one than Student agitation began in late before. According to Alain Roux, these 1945. One year later, it spread activists | numbered 800 in Shanghai in throughout the nation and took on a 1948.209 In March 1949, Mao Zedong pro-nounced anti-imperialist tone announced that the center of gravity of following the indictment of two US Communist action was now located in marines for the rape of a young Chinese the urban centers: woman. In December 1946, a vast "From 1927 to the present the centre of movement against the US occupation of gravity of our work has been the the country began. Students demanded villages. (...) The period of "from the city the formation of a coalition government to the village" and of the city leading the including the Communists. In 1947, they village has now begun. (...) If we do not mobilized against the civil war and learn how to wage these struggles (...) denounced the carelessness of the re- we shall be unable to maintain our politi- gime in the face of the famine cal power , we shall be unable to stand devastating several regions. Nationalist on our feet, we shall fail."210 emotions reached a new pitch in 1947- 1948 when a new international alliance 208 Roland Lew, "Chine: Un Etat ouvrier? Le appeared to be in the works between the monde ouvrier chinois sous le socialisme réel," in Guomindang, the United States and... C. Aubert et al., La société chinoise après Mao, Japan. Repression against the student Paris: Fayard, 1986, p. 46. 209 Alain Roux, Le casse-tête chinois, Paris: Editions sociales, 1970, p. 83. 206 Lew, Mao prend le pouvoir, p. 14. 210 Mao, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of 207 The crisis of the bourgeois regime is one of the the Seventh Central Commute of the Communist distinctive features of every acute revolutionary Party of China" (March 5,1949), SW, vol. IV, p. situation. 361.

Liu Shaoqi encapsulated the es and the CCP during the struggle problem facing the CCP quite well. As became crystallized at the moment of stated by Chairman Mao, "we must rely victory. on the workers. But are they reliable? Nevertheless, the revolutionary Marxism holds that the working class is perspective of the Chinese most reliable. Generally speaking, this is Communist Party became clearer. In correct, but we still have some specific June 1949, Mao noted in "On the problems. So we must strive to enable people's democratic dictatorship," that: our working class to become completely "The people's democratic dictatorship is reliable. If we ignore these problems and based on the alliance of the working rely on the workers without doing any class, the peasantry, and the urban work among them, they won't petty bourgeoisie, and mainly on the necessarily be reliable." alliance of the workers and peasants, "Our Party used to have close ties because these two classes comprise with the workers, but later we were eighty to ninety per cent of China's compelled to move to the country-side. population. (...) The transition from new The Kuomintang has been operating democracy to socialism also depends among the workers for so many years upon their alliance. The people's that, through its influence, it has made democratic dictatorship needs the the ranks of the workers more leadership of the working class [that is complicated. Moreover, our ties with the of the CCP]. (...) We must unite with the workers have been weakened and our national bourgeoisie in common cadres (including members of the struggle. Our present policy is to Central Committee) do not know them regulate capitalism, not to destroy it. very well and are no longer good at But the national bourgeoisie cannot be working among them. Hence we must the leader of the revolution, nor should study assiduously. (...) There are three it have the chief role in state power."212 principal measures we must take: do all we can to maintain the workers' living • The nature of the revolutionary standard (...); conduct intensive regime education among the workers on a broad scale; and get them organized."211 From 1949 to 1952, the People's When Mao and Liu presented Republic placed itself under the banner their reports to the Central Committee, of "new democracy," but the the CCP had already won control of the revolutionary character of the regime great northern cities. It had two priority emerged clearly. While the situation concerns: guaranteeing the mobilization differed in various regions, on the whole, of all resources for the war and the victory deepened the dynamic revitalizing production to put an end to unleashed by the civil war. Under these the economic slump. After having helped circumstances, "from the outset, the to spread the strike movement, it Communists undertook a forced march suddenly called a halt to workers' towards a break with capitalism and struggles and offered the most extensive turned away from a long period of class guarantees to those entrepreneurs who collaboration."213 It was all settled very would produce. fast. The united front policy remained in In the cities as well as the effect. A Consultative Political country, the Guo-mindang's defeat Conference assembled on September was political and social and not just 30, 1949; it included, in addition to the military. But the working class was CCP, eleven "small parties" and groups basically passive at the moment and ten "democratic personalities." Non- when the CCP took power. The Communists were nominated to substitutionist rela-tionship which had developed between the urban class- 212 Mao, "On the people's democratic dictatorship" (June 30, 1949), in Schram, ed., The Political 211 Liu, "Some Questions Concerning Urban Thought..., pp. 234-235. For the complete text in Work," p. 419. the official version see SW, vol. IV, pp. 411-424. 213 Lew, op.cit., p.64. government positions. All, whether 60% of looms, 44% of the merchant parties or individuals, accepted the marine, almost the entire railroad and leadership of the CCP on government air transport network.216 afffairs. Moreover, this principle was Small-scale capitalist and clearly written down in the preamble of artisanal production remained very the Common Program adopted by the substantial. In June 1950, the CCP made Consultative Conference. While "people's its policy more flexible to facilitate democratic dictatorship" was the "power economic recovery. The state had to of the united front," its "base was the learn to manage the economy. But big alliance of the workers and peasants, capital, the economic core of the and its leader, the working class [that is, counter-revolution, had been the CCP]."214 massively attacked. The bourgeoisie had Counter-revolutionary parties lost its ability to act in centralized were dissolved. "Bourgeois democratic fashion on the economic and political parties" were given the function of planes. In 1952, the State Planning helping the CCP to influence certain Commission was officially created. That layers of the population. But their year, 56% of industrial output came activities were closely watched and they from the state sector, 5% from the held no power in the national state mixed state-and-private sector; of the apparatus.215 This state apparatus was remainder 21.5% was produced to fill created on the basis of the organs born orders from the state. Only 17.5% of in the struggle and in the revolutionary industrial output was both produced and dual power areas, such as the Red marketed through private channels. Army, the administration of Liberated The CCP hesitated to extend the Areas, the popular associations and land reform to the south of the country assemblies, the militia, etc. Real state immediately. It tried to see if alliances power on a national scale was in the were possible; it gave top priority to hands of the CCP, which intervened at production: 23% of the world population every level through the pyramid of its had to be fed from 7% of its cultivable own corresponding committees. land! But it only hesitated on the pace The economic, social, political and form of the reform. On June 28, and international actions of the regime 1950, the National Law on Agrarian during its first few years confirmed that Reform was officially adopted. In 1953, the victory had indeed signified a 45% of the land had been redistributed, portentous revolution. the power of the gentry smashed. Mutual aid teams (the very first phase of ♦ In the economic field the process of instituting cooperatives) were established. Japanese properties and "bureaucratic capital" (that is, controlled ♦ In the social arena by the Guomindang's "families") were nationalized. This represented: 80% of The upheaval of social relations in modern industrial capital, 67% of the the village continued while the struggle power plants, 33% of coal mines, 90% for women's emancipation resumed. The of steel capacity, 38% of spindles and regime forged a new alliance with the urban proletariat—or, at any rate, 214 "Programme commun de la Conférence with its privileged sector, the permanent consultative politique du peuple chinois" working class of state firms. (September 29,1949), Documents importants de la In June 1950, the CCP suspended Première Session Plénière de la Conférence further recruitment of peasants and Consultative Politique du Peuple Chinois, Pékin, launched a big campaign to recruit 1949, p. 1. Article 1 stipulates that "the People's workers. In 1949, already, 80 000 Republic (...) puts into effect the people's workers were admitted into the party in democratic dictatorship led by the working class." the industrial regions of Manchuria. In Idem, p. 2. The entire document borrows its key 1951, 6.3% of CCP membership were formulas from CCP documents. 215 See Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends..., chapter 10. There could be local exceptions, temporarily. 216 Figures from this section from Roux, op.cit. workers; in 1952, 7.2%; in 1956, 14%— acquired by this word during the French that is 1.5 million workers out of 11 revolution of 1793,219 left many victims. million members.217 Roland Lew notes The movement to repress counter- that this "working class, more and more revolutionaries ended with several structured by the Party, was mobilized million arrests, and from 600 000 to one to become the main support of the new million executions, between 1951 and regime. (...) [This] effort to obtain its 1952. The gangs and secret active participation seems to have been organizations that controlled many trade crowned with real success; this was unions were decapitated. During the made easier by the fact that the working Sanfan and Wufan campaigns, street class was able to retain and even committees were established, the power increase the gains it had made before of CCP-controlled trade unions was 1949. Better yet, an undeniable upward bolstered, and the links between social mobility, particularly during the workers associations and employers—as first years of the People's Republic, well as salaried staff and hiring made it possible for many workers to subcontractors— smashed. gain access to managerial and The working class remained technicians' positions. Some of them politically subordinated to the even were incorporated into the new Communist Party. But its organization privileged strata. The promotion of the grew and its class consciousness workers was often effected through the asserted itself. trade unions..."218 ♦ In the international arena ♦ Anticapitalist radicalization The revolutionary nature of the This revitalization of the urban victory was also expressed in the field of proletarian base of the CCP was made foreign policy. In November 1949, in his "particularly urgent by the fact that the opening speech before the congress of period of 'new democracy' was coming the World Federation of Trade Unions to a close," Roland Lew notes. "That held in Peking, Liu Shaoqi drew the stage gave way in 1952 to a sudden lessons of the Chinese experience for flare-up of anticapitalism which the countries of the East. "The road completely socialized the economy and followed by the Chinese people (...) is decapitated the capitalist class by about the road that must be followed by many 1955-1956." colonial and semicolonial countries. (...) Much as the land reform in the The working class (...) must form a vast countryside, the urban revolution was an united front which must be led by the act of class violence which came with a working class and its party. [This united series of CCP-initiated political front] must not be led by the vacillating campaigns from 1950 to 1952: the national bourgeoisie, always ready to Campaign of Information, Criticism and compromise, nor by the petty-bourgoisie Self-Criticism; the Campaign for the and its parties. (...) Armed struggle is Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries; the main form of struggle for national the Three-Anti Campaign (Sanfan) liberation in many colonies and against corruption, waste and the semicolonies."220 bureaucratism of cadres; the Five-Anti Campaign (Wufan) against pay-offs, 219 Roux, p. 132. fraud, fiscal evasion, misuse of state 220 Liu, "Discours d'ouverture a la reunion de la property, and illegal acquisition of state Federation syndicale mondi-ale" (novembre 1949), economic secrets, that is, against the Carrere d'Encausse and Schram, Le marxisme..., industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. pp. 381-382. Moscow did not appreciate in the Similarly to what happened in the least the suggestion of an alternative revolutionary countryside, the red terror, in the sense "model." The Kremlin let it be known that it did not believe that the "Chinese road" was suitable for other Eastern countries. See the extracts of Zu- 217 Figures from Lew, “Chine: Un Etat ouvrier?..., » kov's report to the Academy of Sciences of the pp. 48-49. USSR, idem, pp. 384-386. 218 Ibid. On January 18, 1950, while the considerable advantages such as the Indochina war was raging, Peking prestigious legacy of Sun Yatsen, power officially recognized the Democratic and material resources, international Republic of Vietnam.221 On February 14, recognition, an urban base. It was given 1950, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance ten years (1927-1937) to consolidate its and Friendship was signed after two power nationwide and eight years to months of difficult negotiations. On June prove its mettle in the war against the 21, 1950, the Korean War acquired an Japanese invaders. It was awarded one international dimension. On October 7, last chance after World War Two, thanks US forces arrived on the bank of the to Moscow's support and the active Yalu river, the border between China intervention of the United States. It and Korea. On the 16th, 700 000 to 800 failed. Its failure is that of a 000 Chinese soldiers intervened, later bourgeoisie incapable of leading the joined by massive reinforcements. They twofold struggle for liberation and pushed the US armed forces back to the modernization.222 38th parallel at the cost of enormous The Chinese Communist Party casualties (estimated at 800 000) enjoyed none of these advantages. caused by the unevenness in weapons Everything it won, was won in struggle, and equipment. in a very difficult struggle. After thirty In December 1950, Washington years of fighting, there is no way the imposed a commercial embargo and victory of the CCP can be explained economic blockade on China. On away as the result of an accident.223 The February 1, 1951, the People's Republic was expelled from the United Nations 222 The relative success of the Guomindang in where its seat was taken by Taiwan. The Taiwan does not invalidate the significance of its most numerous people of the earth was failure on the mainland. The scale of problems was ejected from the international not comparable in the island and in the country- community of states for having the continent. In Taiwan, the Guomindang also impudence to oppose imperialist dictates benefited from the after-effects of the revolutionary and win. victory in China. The extent of imperialist aid to From 1949 to 1953, when an Taipeh must be explained by the geo-strategic armistice was signed in Korea, China stakes involved: creating a cordon sanitaire around was at the forefront of the Red China. The Guomindang implemented international confrontation between measures it had opposed on the mainland (such as a classes. land reform directed against Taiwanese landowners, who were incidentally competitors of the Guomindang overlords who had fled the * * * mainland). The nationalization of imperialist

properties was easy because these were mainly It is now time to sketch a first Japanese. These were the circumstances that made overall balance sheet of the revolution it possible for Taiwan to benefit, in a pattern of 1949 similar to South Korea, from changes in the international division of labor in the capitalist At the beginning of the century, world. China was thrust into a global crisis of 223 Or of "exceptional circumstances" that society and confronted with two vital supposedly explain how the victory could be won tasks: national liberation (anti- against the the policy of the CCP. These imperialism) and modernization ("anti- "circumstances" (world war, the final paralysis of feudalism"). Two parties contended for the imperialist powers, etc) are not in fact the leadership of the oppressed nation exceptional. They were present in the case of the over three decades: the Guomindang Russian and Yugoslav revolutions (which were and the Communist Party. victorious) and of many other revolutions, which The Guomindang benefited from were defeated! By contrast, the Vietnamese revolution, whose leadership, though different, is "kindred" of the CCP's, was forced to win without 221 . Something Moscow had not yet done even benefiting from any of these "exceptional though the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was circumstances." The truth is that what made the proclaimed in 1945, in the wake of the August difference between victory and defeat was, in revolution. general, the way in which the struggle was success of the CCP is the success of a democratic tasks to the socialist tasks, revolutionary answer to a global as well as by the way in which they crisis of society. combined after victory. The Chinese experience sheds The revolutionary overthrow of light on the highly controversial question the old class state power and its of the relationship between the replacement by a new one appears democratic and socialist stages in the clearly in the Chinese experience as the revolutionary process of dependent lynchpin of the growing over of the countries. There was a clear revolution. Indeed, along with the mass distinction in terms of fundamental mobilizations, the new Chinese workers tasks between the period of the state played an active and extremely struggle for power and the period that important role in changing the followed the conquest of power. There relationship of forces between classes were also conjunctural tasks and and in transforming society.225 alliances determined by contingent Thus, the Chinese revolution situations. But, in terms of the motor clearly displays the features of a forces and political leadership, the process of permanent revolution (or revolutionary process stands as a single uninterrupted revolution). In this overall process: two phases, or two respect, it is interesting to note that the stages224, of a single revolution, and not leaders of the CCP refused to erect a two revolutions separated by a historical Chinese wall between the regime they period of capitalist development. The called "new democracy" and the regime link between the two stages of the they called "dictatorship of the revolution is underlined by the speed proletariat." In his political report for the with which the People's Republic took Central Committee before the Eighth anticapitalist measures and above all— Congress of the Communist Party, Liu because the issue is not primarily one of Shaoqi states that: "Since the speed—by the continuity of the establishment of the People's Republic of process of transition from the China, the working class has won the power to rule throughout the country in conditions of a firm alliance with several conducted. hundred millions of peasants; the party This question has been the subject of a long debate of the working class—the Chinese in the Trotskyist movement. Peng Shuzi and Peng Communist Party—has become the party Bilan believe that the "exceptional circumstances" that leads the state power of the whole alone explain the CCP's victory; see Chen Pi-lan country; therefore, the people's (Peng Bilan) "The Real Lessons of the Chinese democratic dictatorship has in essence Experience with Guerrilla Warfare," International become a form of the dictatorship of the Internal Discussion Bulletin, vol. 10, n°2, 1973. On proletariat. Thus, it has become possible the other hand, Wang Fanxi believes the circumstances were not "exceptional" and in for the bourgeois-democratic revolution themselves, explain nothing. He believes that in our country to be directly transformed Chinese Trotskyists cannot spare themselves a self- by peaceful means, into a proletarian- criticism by invoking the "circumstances"; see F. socialist revolution. The establishment of H. Wang, "On the Causes of the Triumph of the the People's Republic of China signifies CCP and the Failure of Chinese Trotskyists in the the virtual completion of the stage of 3rd Chinese Revolution—A Reply to the Pengs", bourgeois-democratic revolution in our International Internal Discussion Bulletin, vol. XIX, n°3, June 1983, pp. 5-16; and jointly with Lau 225 . On the long run, there must be a concordance K., "It is still necessary to draw the lessons from between the class nature of the state and the the failure of the Chinese Trotskyists (A thesis dominant mode of production, or more generally— submitted to the coming congress of the Fourth to include transitional societies—and the socio- International for consideration)," September 1983, economic structure. But periods of social 8 pages, mimeographed revolutions are precisely characterized by 224I do not give much credence to subtle attempts to discrepancies between the state-political level and distinguish between a "phase" and a "stage", a the socio-economic level. In such periods, the role particularly fickle argument when translated into of the state as a historical agent and not just as a 60 different languages... historical product, asserts itself with particular force. country and the beginning of the stage national scale). It structured the peasant of proletarian-socialist revolution: the mobilization and sometimes opposed it, beginning of the period of transition in order to channel and orient it. It from capitalism to socialism."226 reasserted its urban perspective as soon as it felt it could focus its activity on the The Chinese Communist cities. Party: an appraisal According to some analysts, notably Roland Lew, the CCP was the But can one really speak of a party of the revolutionary intelligentsia. process of permanent revolution, that is Faced with the gravity of the crisis and of the creation of a society of transition the inability of either the bourgeoisie or to socialism, in a country where the proletariat to implement a solution, this proletariat only accounted for a tiny social layer crystallized in the party, put percentage of the population, did not forward its own prospect for a new directly lead the struggle, and where the society, harnessed the rural mobilization leading party was so grievously cut off and subsequently transformed itself into from the cities? a new social elite that struck an alliance To answer this question fully, one with the labor aristocracy.227 The strong would have to analyze China from 1949 point in this analysis is that it sticks to 1987 and show that its fundamental quite closely to the historical trajectory features and specific contradictions were of the CCP. It has a major handicap indeed those of a transitional society; though, namely its seeming inability to that would take us beyond the answer two questions that arise from its boundaries of this study. One aspect of interpretation of the events: what is the the question, though, is in the purview nature of the new society and what is of this study, namely the analysis of the the world significance of the emergence party which led this revolution. of such revolutions in our century (from The CCP was not a bourgeois the Russian revolution to the Cuban and party. It was created and waged a fight Nicaraguan revolutions)? against the Chinese and international Although it may at first sight bourgeoisie—and when it tried to follow seem paradoxical, the characterization the bourgeoisie's lead, the latter turned of the Chinese Communist Party as a on it and crushed it. The CCP used its workers party seems to me to state power to smash the political and correspond most satisfactorily to its economic power of the bourgeoisie. history and to the nature of the The CCP acted among and with revolution it led. There can be no simple the peasantry. But, in spite of Trotsky's sociological explanation for the existence (and a few other observers') prognosis, of a party like the CCP. A number of it did not become a peasant or agrarian national and international, political and party. It assumed the role of social factors must be taken into spokesperson for peasant demands but account, including: elaborated its orientation on the basis of ♦ The depth of the overall crisis of goals and considerations that stood far beyond the social and ideological horizon of the peasantry (the project of an 227 See Lew, Mao prend..., and "La formation du industrialized society, the perspective of communisme chinois et l'emergence mao'iste." collectivization of agriculture, the grasp Lew's analysis converges partly with David of the international relationship of forces Rousset's on China and the USSR. But they also and the evolution of the situation on a diverge on some points. David Rousset uses the concept of state capitalism and analyzes the trajectory of these revolutions in the framework of 226Liu, The Political Report of the Central a world crisis of transition caused by a Committee of the Communist Party of China to the development of the productive forces so rapid that Eighth National Congress of the Party" (September it overtook the capacities of the old fundamental 15, 1956), in Eighth National Congress of the classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat See La Communist Party of China-Documents, Beijing: societe eclatee, Paris: Grasset, 1973, and Sur la Foreign Languages Press, 1981, p. 15. guerre, Paris: Ramsay, 1986.

Chinese society.228 This crisis exerted a The social formation: dynamic and powerful pressure on the an appraisal agents of the revolution; its considerable duration provided them with the time The experience of the Chinese needed to readjust progressively their revolution illustrates the dialectical orientation. interplay between the national and ♦ The impact of the Russian revolution socio-economic reality (the objective and the existence of the USSR which, factors) and the political actors (the despite Stalinism, made the possibility of subjective factor).230 The history of the a non-capitalist development more CCP makes it possible to broaden the credible and endowed the reference to analysis of revolutionary practice in the Marxism with a material reality. contemporary world; this is a most ♦ The emergence of a modern mass stimulating aspect for activists. But the nationalism, based on the people, in a Chinese revolution also makes it possible dependent country, that was able to fuse to renew the analysis of the social with the contemporary emergence of a formation of dominated countries. This is socialist perspective. a difficult task, particularly for observers ♦ The origins of the CCP, which, before who neither know the given society first being thrown back into the countryside, hand nor speak its language, because it had acquired a genuine mass proletarian requires the assimilation of a mass of character, and the lessons of the 1924- empirical data.231 They must venture 1927 experience. These lessons, and the beyond generalities and seek the cadre apparatus, contributed to insuring originality of the country's history and the continuity between the original contemporary social formation,232 as well Communist movement and that of the as the variety of regional situations, to Maoist period. compare the impact of given political ♦ The requirements of a life-and-death practices in real social settings and struggle waged without a break. conjunctures. Insuring a mass base and the quality of I make no claim to having the membership as well as the completed this analytical task but I leadership became permanent would like to conclude this study by prerequisites for survival. This made identifying certain questions which a reformist renunciation quite difficult and discussion on the Chinese social contributed to insuring the continuity of formation might help to elucidate. a living revolutionary reflexion.229 ♦ Social base of the process of ♦ The nature of the social formation. All permanent revolution that is said above could be operational The Chinese revolutionary only if the CCP could find support among process—and many others after it— social layers which, although not exactly confirmed the substance of the theory of proletarian, could be integrated into a permanent revolution. But its form permanent revolution perspective. diverged widely from the original model in which the urban working class was to physically lead the struggle thanks to the emergence of its own organs of power (the councils). This discrepancy raises both political (for "form" is just as 228 On the roots of this crisis see, among others, the important as "substance" for those who book by Lucien Bianco, Origins of the Chinese wish to act) and theoretical problems Revolution,1915-1949, Stanford, California: (what made possible the continuity of Stanford University Press, 1971. In the introduction to the latest French edition (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), the author presents the evolution of his own 230 See Bianco, op. cit., concluding chapter. thinking over the twenty years since the first 231 Marx knew this well, and learned Russian to edition. study the country and assimilate its originality. 229 The number of central cadres of the CCP who 232 A given society, a concrete social formation, is capitulated after the defeat of 1927 seems the product of a particular ancient and recent remarkably small. history, and therefore always original. the revolutionary process?) each one of them. The order in which We already mentioned the tasks and slogans follow each other and question of this peasantry which turned the way in which they combine, the form out stabler and more willing to integrate of the process of growing over, cannot in a transitional society than tradition be identical in peasant China and Cuba, had expected. We noted the role of the where plantations are prevalent; or in activist intelligentsia and the recurring urbanized Argentina and Eastern Timor. importance of school youth. We should In the most advanced semi- also note the way in which declassed industrialized countries, proletarian and uprooted elements were temporarily demands can be more central. In the or durably organized in the revolutionary most backward countries where fight; the weight of the rural towns and (modern) classes have not yet fully their impact on the social congealed, it is debatable whether a environment233; the existence of a vast process of permanent revolution can urban and rural semi-proletariat, like the take place without, at least, the traditional Chinese rickshaw puller, and spillover-and-pull-along factor of a not one but several working classes with struggle in the same region (such as different situations and traditions. We affected Mongolia in relation to Russia or should also recall the rural women's China). struggle which, in the Chinese In East Asia alone, the variety of revolution, was broader and more national histories and therefore of constant than that of the urban contemporary social formations is quite proletariat! broad.235 If the substantial debate is to Above all, there is the way in go forward, it must move beyond which diverse layers can be organized general characterizations. Indeed, what for the revolutionary fight by an activist lessons can be drawn from the Chinese vanguard and can build links with one experience if one has not thought out another in the struggle: for example, the the differences as well as the way in which the mobilization of women resemblances (the state of dependency, of the people was able to play the role of the weight of the rural world)? a link in the policy of alliances, or the role of the urban poor, who were a ♦ Forms of the revolutionary genuine social crossroads of the city and regime the country, the proletariat and petty- bourgeoisies. The dictatorship of the proletariat The analysis of social formations can appear in a variety of different in the light of revolutionary struggles forms. This can be explained easily: a allows a considerable enrichment of the workers state is born in an unique conception of social alliances in the struggle and carries the imprint of that permanent revolution.234 The Chinese struggle. The historical factors that experience seems to show that the shape the form of revolutionary regimes social base of a permanent revolution are many236 and none of them can process is broader than believed. determine the course of events alone, but the social formation is certainly one ♦ Diversity of the social formations of dependent countries 235 See for instance the comparative approach sketched by Fritjoff Tichel-man, The Social A comparison of the social Evolution of Indonesia, The Asiatic Mode of formation of various dependent Production and its Legacy, The countries sheds light on the originality of Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980. 236 In addition to the social formation: the nature of the period; the national, regional and international 233 This is a point to which Leslie Evans called my conjuncture; the course of the struggles and the attention. forms of dual power, the concrete balance of 234 In the framework, it should be clear, of the forces; the political traditions; the choices made by general formula of the worker-peasant alliance the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary winning over to its side the petty-bourgeoisie. actors... of the most important such factors, shek (from 1931 to 1937)!238 particularly if it is understood in its The repression of the Trotskyists totality (the combination of the socio- was not conducted in the same fashion economic, politico-state and ideologico- by all factions of the CCP. In this respect cultural formations). too, the "28 Bolsheviks" worked hand in For instance, the key question of glove with the Kremlin. Moscow socialist democracy and legality, can be displayed its irritation with the Maoist approached from two complementary leadership.239 But the repressive face of angles: the programmatic and the the Maoist leadership is a reality too; it political. The experience of the last sixty is embodied by the gloomy police figure years confirms the extent to which of Kang Sheng who joined the leadership socialist democracy and legality are upon his return from Moscow, in 1937, fundamental needs of all societies of and poured the vilest slanders on Chen transition to socialism, from the Duxiu. During the Cultural Revolution, programmatic standpoint. Their absence he thrived on executions and dirty work. creates acute contradictions. But When it returned to power, the Deng experience also demonstrates that all Xiaoping faction expelled him countries cannot arrive at such a political posthumously (he had died in 1975) regime by the same road. From the political standpoint (the determination of 238 See Gregor Benton, "Le dirigeant trotskyste concrete tasks), each process must be Zheng Chaolin libéré en Chine," Inprecor, n°59, analyzed in its specificity. September 19,1979, and Bianco and Chevrier, eds., Political actors are endowed with Dic-tionnaire biographique.... There is a solid anti- free will which can determine, to a large Trotskyist tradition in the CCP to which all its extent, the success or failure of the leaders seem to have paid a tribute. See for instance struggle. The CCP leadership must bear Zhou, "On the Causes of the Emergence of a the responsibility of its options for the Trotskyite Opposition Faction in China and its better—the definition of an effective Prospects" (October 1929), SW, vol. I, pp. 57-60. orientation, for instance—and for the Also, in an otherwise interesting article, Zhu De worse: acts of repression that were not drops the usual slander of "pro-Japanese required by the situation and that Trotskyites": "De la guerre des partisans violated revolutionary legality and antijaponaise," (EC, vol. I, p. 47. 239 democracy. I am referring here to the The Executive Committee of the Communist repression unleashed against radical International adopted a resolution on the Chinese intellectuals in Yan'an in 1942, for Question denouncing drily the lack of energy with instance, which was a prelude to the which the anti-Trotskyist campaign was 237 prosecuted; "In this area, the Party is far from crisis of the Hundred Flowers in 1956 , having done all that was called for. It is absolutely and to the repression visited upon the false to consider the Trots-kyites as a party or Trotsky-ists. political current, and the way in which last year's On December 22, 1952, the CCP appeal is-sued by the CC posed the question of the security forces arrested between 200 possibility of including the Trotskyites in the and 300 Trotskyist activists and National Anti-Japanese United Front is absolutely sympathizers. These secret arrests were inadmissible. We must strengthen by all means the never justified publicly and never led to struggle against the Trotskyites, these agents of the regular trials. The fate of many of them Japanese militarist clique." "Decision de l'IC sur la remains unknown. A Trotskyist leader question chinoise," Point 7, L'IC et la lutte contre like Zheng Chaolin was only freed on le fascisme el la guerre, Moscow, 1980, p. 480. June 5, 1979, at the age of 78, after The Maoist leadership had indeed left open the spending over 25 years in prison in the possibility of the Chinese Trotskyists participating People's Republic, he who had already in the National Anti-Japanese United Front. This spent six years in the jails of Chiang Kai- was the time of the Moscow trials and the sections of the Comintern were supposed to take analogous measures. As a result of Kremlin instructions, 237 See in particular Gregor Benton, "The Yenan many revolutionary activists-both Trotskyist and 'Literary Opposition'," New Left Review, n°92, non-Trotskyist— were assassinated criminally July-August 1975, and his Wild-Lilies, Poisonous throughout the world. Weeds. from the CCP, a thoroughly unusual permanent worker in a state factory measure. became a desirable job where cadres While the Maoist leadership was sent their children. responsible for its own decisions, it But we have also seen the weight waged its struggle in a particular of the non-democratic factors in the environment; historical constraints Chinese revolution, from the bored down on it with their full weight. conservatism of the village to the Soviet Mao Zedong inherited from the days of Stalinist influence and the exigencies of his youth a populist vein colored by a harsh military fight. The revolution libertarian inclinations. But he became a produced a regime that was at once man of war, a faction fighter, an popular and democratic, authoritarian authority figure. Comintern influence and bureaucratic. The party is almost and the process of protracted armed completely confused with the state. The struggle played a role in his evolution. CCP is subject to mass criticism on a The social base of the party also did: the local basis—something a typical Stalinist relationship of a Communist Party to the party could not tolerate. But it has full peasantry is not the same as its sovereignty over the running of the relationship to the working class.240 The state. It is rooted in a mobilized central theme of the "mass line" is quite population, but it rises far above the revealing in this respect. The party had classes in whose name it speaks. This is "to listen to the masses" because correct one of the main internal contradictions ideas issued from the masses helter- of the regime, which was apparent in its skelter and had to be systematized by subsequent development. the party before being returned to the To be resolved, this contradiction masses. The Party was the irreplaceable requires that the activist vanguard mediator. scrupulously respect the self- A humanist tradition exists in organization of the population and be China, but not the centuries-long armed with a medium and long-run experience of political democracy whose orientation: the prospect of a society roots, in Europe, go back to the Greco- whose very core is socialist democracy Roman tradition and the development of and legality; a political plan and the free bourgeois towns. In the Empire of choice of appropriate means to make the the Middle, that tradition was smothered anti-bureaucratic battle a concrete by the power of the centralized state. reality.241 Objective conditions made this The Chinese revolution is a great battle particularly diificult in China. The democratic revolution because it freed a country was very backward economically people from a certain form of economic and isolated internationally (it faced an exploitation, but also because it was a imperialist blockade, could not count on rising of rural women and poor a revolution in the West, and had to pay peasants, despised and contemptible, for for Soviet aid at a high price).242 The human dignity. The violence of the revolutionaries could not base "speak bitterness" sessions and the themselves on and supersede bourgeois explosion of hatred against the village democratic traditions, as they can in the notables can only be explained by the West. The Maoist leadership tried to memory of exploitation, and perhaps more relevantly, by that of repeated 241 In particular, socio-economic measures limiting humiliations. The Chinese revolution strictly the standard of living of cadres, all the way made manual labor respectable in a to the top ranks, must be taken. country where the rich had let their nails 242 This last point is particularly important because grow long to prove they need not work the transition to socialism requires organization on with their hands. The status of the international plane. The building of socialism cannot be completed within the national borders of a single state, be it the largest on earth. The 240 . Because there is a coincidence between the revolution, of course, can and must progress party's program and the proletariat's (potential) without wailing for an international extension, but consciousness of its own class interests which does it can do so only at the price of increasing not exist in the same way in the case of the problems. peasantry. apply to the transitional society the conference Seventh Congress of the principles of the "mass line" that worked Comintern so well in the struggle for power. 1936 "Xian incident" (December) Although it failed, this experience 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese war deserves to be studied in critical fashion 1937-1938 Japanese advance Wuhan because it can help to find the modes of falls (October 1938) organization and action suitable for 1939-1945 World War Two original conditions, the national forms 1939-1940 Soviet-German Pact and and sources that can make possible a Tripartite Pact (Germany, Italy, Japan) real advance in the building of a 1941 "South Anhui incident" (New transitional society.243 Fourth Army) Germany attacks the * * * USSR Pearl Harbor: US declares war on The experience of the Chinese Japan military conference of UK-USA- revolution is a living vindication of the China essential points of the revolutionary 1942 "Rectification movement" in the Marxist program for dominated CCP countries. But it raises many questions 1943 Cairo conference dissolution of whose answer is by no means obvious the Communist International yet. It invites a collective reflexion on 1944 Japanese take Changsha revolutionary practice and its 1945 Yalta conference VIIth congress of foundations, on the historical constraints the Chinese Communist Party Germany that every revolution must face, and on capitulates; nuclear holocaust the means to cope with them. (Hiroshima, Nagasaki); USSR declares The same applies to the war on Japan; Japan capitulates. Sino- experience of the People's Soviet Treaty CCP-Guomindang peace Republic from 1949 to this day. But that negotiations civil war-type incidents is another story. 1946-1949 civil war in China 1946 land reform resumed Guomindang offensives in Shandong and KEY EVENTS: A REMINDER Jiangsu 1947 Communist offensive in 1839-42: Opium war Manchuria student mobilizations 1850-1864 revolt of the Taipings Guomindang army occupies Yan'an 1899-1900 Boxer rebellion Communist counter-offensive in central 1911-1912 republican revolution (First China promulgation of Agrarian Law Chinese Revolution) 1947-1948 workers strikes 1914-1918 World War One 1948 large-scale Communist offensive 1918-1919 foundation of the 1949 foundation of the People's Communist International Republic of China (October 1, 1949) 1919 May Fourth Movement 1950 Guomindang flees to Taiwan 1921 foundation of the CCP 1950-1953 Korean war 1925-27 Second Chinese Revolution 1928 Mao Zedong and Zhu De in the Jingganshan 1929-1934 Jiangxi Soviet Republic 1930 Communist uprising in Changsha fails 1931-32 Japan occupies northeastern China, attacks Shanghai 1934-1935 Long March - Zunyi

243 This is not counterposed to an internationalist conception of the revolution and socialist reconstruction. Mao, unfortunately, because of his training, or because he tried to make a virtue of necessity, conceived the building of socialism "in a single country." Reading for beginners We have selected the following books for the reader who wishes to begin a study of the Chinese revolution. Publication details are in the bibliography. There are some discrepancies concerning the history of Chinese communism in the works listed below. Historical research is still in progress and new material is appearing all the time. The list also includes a variety of analyses and opinions.

General overviews ¾ Peng Shuzi, one of the leaders of Chinese Trotsky ism, wrote the "Introduction" to the above The following six books are good reference works, collection, and lays out his analysis of the each with its own qualities: trajectory of the Chinese Communist Party in it.

¾ In Chinese Revolutionary, Wang Fanxi, ¾ A History of the Chinese Communist Party another Trotskyist militant, recounts the formation 1921-72, The Long March to Power, by James of the Chinese Left Opposition in the USSR and Pinckney Harrison provides a lot of information on presents an analysis of the role of the CCP which is the evolution of Chinese communism. different from Peng's.

¾ A History of the Chinese Communist ...eyewitness accounts Party, 1921-1949, by Jacques Guillermaz, has a very clear outline. It is more precise on military Three reports written at the time by Western questions than original in terms of political travelers particularly deserve to be read by those thought. who wish to understand the history of the Chinese revolution and CCP: ¾ China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution and China from the 1911 Revolution to ¾ Edgar Snow wrote * Red Star Over China Liberation, by Jean Chesneaux et al., is a very after visiting the Communist zones in 1936-1937, useful systematic presentation with many a key transitional period between the Long March documents. It is often written from a standpoint and the Sino-Japanese war, and interviewing the very favorable to Maoism. CCP leaders, a scoop at the time.

¾ Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915- ¾ In * China Shakes the World, Jack Belden 1949, by Lucien Bianco, is an original analysis and sketches an extraordinary panorama of the very interesting synthesis of the course followed situation and struggles in different regions of the by the Chinese revolution, with particular attention country from 1946 to 1949, at the height of the to its social background. civil war that led to the victory of 1949.

¾ Mao Tse-tung, a biography by Stuart ¾ William Hinton's * Fanshen is Schram, presents the now classic analysis of the contemporary with Belden's book: it is a formation of Maoism. Schram is one of the first fascinating study of the history of one village in authors to have focused on the question of the North China during the civil war and land reform; it "sinification" of Marxism. is one of the rare concrete illustrations of many aspects of revolutionary developments in the ¾ Marxism and Asia, 1853-1964, by Hélène countryside. Carrère d'Encausse and Stuart Schram enables the reader to reconstruct the international context of ...writings of Chinese leaders the communist movement; an anthology, it includes documents by authors known only by One should, of course read the writings of *Mao specialists, and touches on many controversial Zedong. But the Works of other CCP leaders are questions. now being published again in English by Peking and also deserve to be studied. We should mention for the period before 1949 the Works of *Liu a few other books... Shaoqi, *Zhou Enlai and *Zhu De.

... criticizing Stalinist policy in China and With respect to Mao Zedong, the 5-volumes of presenting the views of the Left Opposition: Selected Works (the first four volumes cover the period before 1949 and were published while he ¾ The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution by was alive) should be complemented by Stuart Harold Isaacs, a classical study of the Second Schram's The Political Thought of Mao Tse-toung. Chinese Revolution and Communist defeat of 1927. This anthology is very well put together, with an The first edition was written when the author was interesting introduction, and presents the original a revolutionary and supported the Trotskyist version of the texts touched up by Mao in 1951 for position. The edition now available was revised official publication. It is therefore a complement, when the author was no longer a revolutionary. but not a substitute for the Selected Works, which Nevertheless it remains quite useful. offer, despite the amendments, an irreplaceable overview of the Maoist outlook. ¾ Leon Trotsky on China, edited by Leslie Evans and Russell Block, brings together the bulk and for fun... of the Russian leader's writings on China from 1925 to 1940. ¾ ...relax while you learn about imperial China with Robert Van Gulik's Judge Ti's Investigations. Bibliography

Works listed here include all works cited in this study and a few other important ones. Some texts were published as documents or in a collection: they are entered under the author's name. Abbreviations: BCAS=Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars ; BQC=Broue, La question chinoise...; C1MT =Cahiers de l'lnstitut Maurice Thorez ; CUT =Cahiers Leon Trotsky; Cd'E/ S=Carrere d'Encausse and Schram, Le Marxisme et l'Asie, CC =Critique communiste ; CQ=The China Quarterly ; FLP =Foreign Languages Press, NLR =New Left Review; QI =Quatrième Internationale

___.(Hua Fu), "Un problème urgent de la guerre Anderson, Perry. Lineages of the Absolutiste révolutionnaire", 2 April 1934, pp. 197-207; State. London: New Left Books, 1974, 573 pp. "Opposons-nous a une interprétation erronée de Avenas, Denise. Maoisme et communisme . notre tactique", 18 May 1934, pp. 208-213; "A Paris: Galilee, 1976, 290 pp. propos, une fois encore, des principes de notre Balazs, Etienne. La Bureaucratic céleste, tactique", 18 May 1934, pp. 214-217, in Hu Chi- Recherches sur l'économie et le société de la Chine hsi, L'Armée rouge et l'ascension de Mao . traditionelle. Paris: NRF-Gallimard, 1968, 346 pp. Bronzo, Aldo, I Comunisti in Cina - Dalle origini ___. Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy. Arthur alla presa del potere, 2 volumes. Milano: Nuove F. Wright ed. New Haven, London: Yale University Edizioni Internazionali, 1983, 307 & 343 pp. Broue, Press, 1964, 309 pp. Pierre, ed. La question chinoise dans Belden, Jack. China Shakes the World, l'Internationale communiste (1926-1927).Paris: Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973, EDI, 1976, 2e edition revue et augmentée, 539 pp. 688 pp. ___.Chen Duxiu et la We Internationale de 1938 a Benton, Gregor. Forthcoming: "After the Long 1942 , CLT n°l5, September 1983,pp. 27-39. March", S. M. Goldstein et K. Hartford eds., Single Cadart, Claude; Cheng Yingxiang. Mémoires de Sparks , New York: Columbia University Press. Peng Shuzhi , L'Envol du communisme en Chine. ___.ed., Wild Lillies, Poisonous Weeds, Dissident .Paris: Gallimard, NRF, 1983, 488 pp. Voices from People's China. London:Pluto Press, Cahiers Leon Trotsky. N°15, September 1983: 1982,218 pp. Le Trotskysme et la Chine des annees trente. ___."The 'Second Wang Ming Line'", CQ n°61, Paris: Institut Leon Trotsky, 128 pp. March 1975, pp. 61-94. Cai Heshen."Lettre a Chen Duxiu" (pp. 293-296), ___."Reply" to Shum Kui Kwong's comment, CQ "La victoire du parti nationaliste turc" (pp. 299- n°69, March 1977, pp. 145-154. 302) in Cd'E/S. ___."Two Purged Leaders of Early Chinese Carr, E.H. A History of Soviet Russia , 14 volumes. Communism", CQ n°102, June 1985 ,pp. 317- London: MacMillan, 1953-1978. 328. Carrère d'Encausse, Hélène and Stuart Scram, ___."Greg Benton replies", CQ n°107, September EDS. Marxism and Asia. London: Alien Lane, 1969. 1986, pp. 355-356. [We have unfortunately not been able to transfer ___."The South Anhui Incident", The Journal of references from the French original to the English Asian Studies vol. XLV n4, August 1986,pp. 681- edition. The French edition is: 720. ___.Le Marxism et I'Asie 1853-1964. Paris: ___."The Yenan 'Literary Opposition"', NLR n°92, Armand Colin, 1965, 494 pp. July-August 1975, pp. 93-106. Chen Boda (Tch'en Po-ta). La théorie de Mao ___."Chinese Communism and Democracy", NLR Tse-toung sur la revolution chinoise. Peking: n°148, pp. 57-73. Editions en langues étrangères, 1953, 85 pp. ___."Le dirigeant Zheng Chaolin libéré en Chine", Chen Duxiu. "Appeal to All the Comrades of the Inprecor n°59, 19 September 1979,pp. 37-39. Chinese Communist Party", (10 December 1929), Bianco, Lucien. Origins of the Chinese in Leon Trotsky on China , pp. 597-619. Revolution, 1915-1949. Stanford, Calif.: Stand- [quotations in this study are translated from ford U. Press, 1971. French version: "Lettre a tous les membres du PC ___."Peasants and Revolution", Journal of chinois", BQC, pp 441-465.] Peasants Studies , 2(3) 1976, pp. 313-336. ___."Patriotisme et conscience de soi" (pp. 280- Bianco, Lucien; Chevrier, Yves, ed. Dictionnaire 283); "Le Monument a von Ketteler"(pp. 289-291); biographique du mouvement ouvri-er international. "Salut a l'esprit des Hunanais" (pp. 291-292); La Chine . Paris: Les Editions ouvrières/presses de "Deux idées erronées au sujet des Boxers" (pp. la Fondation Nation-ale des Sciences Politiques, 310-312) in Cd'E/S. 845 pp. ___."A la cour supreme du Jiangsu (20 February Boorman, Howard L. et Howard, Richard C, ed. 1933)", pp. 95-102; "Lettre ouverte au comité de Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. 4 redaction du Sin Hua Jih Pao" (17 March 1938), volumes. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 103-104; La guerre de resistance et la 1967-1971,1850 p. fondation de l'Etat (24 April 1938), pp. 105-107; Bukharin, Nikolai. "Les problèmes de la "Declaration politique" (3 November 1938), pp. revolution chinoise", BQC, pp. 235-287. 108-112, in CUT n°l5, September 1983. ___."Sur la revolution chinoise (Extraits d'un Ch'en, Jerome. Mao and the Chinese Revolution. compte rendu de l'Executif de l'IC, 4 juin London: Oxford University Press, 1965,419 pp. 1927), BQC, pp. 377-397. Chen Yi. (Dong Li) "Rapport sur l'histoire et la Brandt, Conrad. Stalin's failure in China,1924- situation actuelle de l'Armee rouge de Zhu Mao", 1927. Cambridge, Massachusset: Harvard ler sept 1929, Hu Chi-hsi, L'Armee rouge et University Press, 1958, 226 pp. l'ascension de Mao , pp. 149-178. Brandt, Conrad, Benjamin Schwartz and John Chesneaux, Jean. Le Mouvement ouvrier chinois K. Fairbank. A Documentary History of Chinese de 1919 a 1927. Paris: Mouton, 1962. Communism. New York: Atheneum, 1973, 552 pp. ___.Le mouvement paysan chinois 1840-1949. Braun, Otto. A Comintern Agent in China, 1932- Paris: Seuil, Point, 1973, 190 pp. 1939. Standford, California: Standford University ___.Sun Yat-sen, Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, Press, 1982, 278 pp. 1982, 264 pp. ___."La Chine Rouge", Toynbee ed., La Chine,.., pp. 253-276.

Chesneaux, Jean, Françoise Le Barbier and Universal Library, Grosset & Dunlap, 1972, 341 pp. Marie-Claire Bergfere, China from the Opium Domes, Jurgen. Peng Te-huai, The Man and the Wars to the 1911 Revolution. Sussex: Harvester Image. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1985, 164 Press, 1976. pp. ___.China from the 1911 Revolution to Liberation. Eudin, XJ. et North R.C. Soviet Russia and the Sussex: Harvester Press, 1977, 372 pp. East 1920-1927 - A Documentary Survey. Chi Hsin. Teng Hsiao-ping, a political biography. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford U. Press, 1957. Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 1978, 274 pp. Evans, Leslie; Block, Russel, ed. Leon Trotsky The China Quarterly, an International Journal on China , introduction by Peng Shu-tse. New for the Study of China, Contemporary China York: Monad Press, 1976, 687 pp. Institute, Schools of Oriental and African Studies, Frank, Pierre, Histoire de l'Internationale London. communiste, 2 volumes. Paris: La Brèche, 1979, La Chine: De Mao a la démaoisation. "Exposes 949 et 462 pp. du Cercle Leon Trotsky", Paris, supplement a Lutte Freiberg, J.W. The Dialectics in China: Maoist and ouvrière , 1984, 64 pp. Daoist", BCAS vol.9, n°l, January-March 1977, pp. The Chinese Revolution and its Development. 2-19. National Education Department Socialist Workers Gandini, Jean Jacques, Aux sources de ta Party, Education for Socialists, September 1976, révolution chinoise, les anarchistes, contribution New York, 47 pp. historique de 1902 à 1927. Lyon: Atelier de Chinese Communist Party. A Documentary création libertaire, 236 pp. History of Chinese Communism , Brandt,Schwartz, Gittings, John. The World and China, 1922-1972. Fairbank. London: Eyre Methuen, 1974, 303 pp. ___."Manifeste du Troisième congres national du Griffith, Samuel, "Introduction", Sun Tzu, The Art PCC", BQC., pp. 41-43. of War pp. 1-56.. ___."Résolution du CC du PCC sur la dissolution de Godelier, Maurice. "Preface" to Textes Choisis de l'Internationale communiste", Alain Roux, C1MT. Marx Engels Lénine, Sur les Sociétés ___.VIIIe Congres national du Parti communiste précapitalistes. chinois, Receuil de documents. Peking:Editions en Guillermaz, Jacques. A History of the Chinese langues étrangères, 1956), 1 - Documents. 356 Communist Party, 1921-1949. Boulder, pp, 2 - Interventions. (408 pp.), 3 - Discours et Colorado/Folkestone: Westview Press/Dawson, messages de salutations. 279 pp. 1976. ___.Eighth National Congress of the Communist Harrison, James Pinckney. A History of the Party of China (Documents) . Peking: FLP, Chinese Communist Party 1921-72, The Long 1981,348 pp. March to Power. London, Basingstoke: MacMillan, Chow, Tse-tsung. The May Fourth Movement 1972, p. 647. .Stanford, Ca.: Stanford U. Press, 1960, 446 pp. Hinto, William. Fanshen. London: Penguin Books, Claudin, Fernando. The Communist Movement Ho Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese from Comintern to Cominform. Har-mondsworth, Revolution. 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Notebooks for Study and Research

N°3 (ISSN 0298-7902) May 1987

In the "studies" series

The Chinese Revolution Pierre

Rousset

Part II: The Maoist Project Tested in the Struggle for Power

Chapter 4: 1932-1936 - Victory in defeat: revolution and protracted warfare

Chapter 5: 1937-1945 - The Sino-Japanese war: revolution and the united front

Chapter 6: The Maoism of Yan'an: revolution and historical constraint

Chapter 7: 1945-1949 - The conquest of power: national liberation, modernization and social revolution

Map of North China during the Sino-Japanese war

Key events: a reminder

Reading for beginners

Bibliography

Pierre Rousset was born in 1946. He has been involved in the fight for socialism since the 1960s, and participated in many campaigns of solidarity with national liberation struggles, particularly those of the peo-ples of Indochina and other Southeast Asian countries. He has produced several studies on Vietnam, in-uding two books, Le Parti communiste vietnamien (Paris: Maspero, 1975) and Nationalisme et Communisme au Vietnam (Paris: Galilee, 1978), and an essay "The Peculiarities of Vietnamese Communism," ablished in The Stalinist Legacy (Tariq Ali, ed., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984). He has traveled exten-sively in East Asia and regularly contributes articles on the region to several periodicals. He is a collaborator ' the International Institute for Research and Education.