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Why the Race Is on to Rebuild Gaza

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Why the Race Is on to Rebuild Gaza JANE’S ISLAMIC AFFAIRS ANALYST Why the race is on to rebuild Gaza The reconstruction period that followed the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War can be instructive for those seeking to curtail Hamas’ political influence as Gaza enters a period of restoration. David Schenker assesses the stakes for the Middle East and the international community in this early phase of rebuilding Gaza. As the smoke clears in Gaza and damage summit was not the pledges, but rather the assessments of the three-week Israeli military Cost comparison emergence of a regional division regarding campaign roll in, perhaps inevitably, compari- The post-war challenges for Hamas are how this aid should be distributed. Iran, Syria sons are being drawn between Israel’s latest similar to those encountered by Hizbullah in and Qatar supported the provision of as- operation against Hamas and its 2006 war on 2006, both in terms of the scope of the damage sistance directly to Hamas but Saudi Arabia, Lebanon targeting Hizbullah, the Shia militia and the fundraising required to carry out the Egypt and Jordan favoured channelling fund- and political party. reconstruction. ing through the Palestinian Authority (Fatah) leader Mahmoud Abbas. The evaluation is not academic: the 2006 Early indications are that it will cost bil- summer war is almost universally considered lions of dollars to rebuild Gaza. According to While UNWRA demonstrated little com- an Israeli fiasco. Not only did the Israeli De- a preliminary assessment from the Palestinian punction about providing assistance to Hamas fence Forces (IDF) underperform - and in the Central Bureau of Statistics, physical destruc- in the past, in the aftermath of the war, with process erode its deterrence and invite Hamas tion amounts to nearly USD2 billion, includ- all eyes on Gaza, the organisation has been a adventurism - Hizbullah emerged from the ing about USD200 million in infrastructure little more hesitant to do so. When UNWRA fighting stronger, both domestically and re- damage. UN sources say that over 4,000 homes staff refused to hand over aid supplies to the gionally. were destroyed, displacing 100,000 people Hamas-controlled Ministry of Social Affairs or roughly one in 14 residents. In total, some in Gaza on 4 February, Hamas confiscated the Weeks after the war, both Hamas and Israel 21,000 buildings were destroyed or damaged. aid. are declaring victory. Foreign Minister Tzipi As of mid-January, nearly half a million peo- Livni said that Israeli objectives were achieved; ple in the Strip still had no reliable access to Like Gaza, the direct costs of the 2006 war in meanwhile Hamas Politboro head Khaled water and the sewage network remained com- Lebanon were also substantial; Jihad al Bina’, Mishal claims that the “resistance emerged vic- promised. Hizbullah’s construction company, identified torious”. As these divergent views might sug- approximately 20,000 homes damaged or de- gest, the political fallout of the war remains In late January, the UN launched an appeal stroyed during the war with Israel. According unclear. Israel is facing the harsh public rela- to raise USD613 million for Gaza, much of to the Lebanese Council for Development and tions consequences of Palestinian civilian cas- which the UN Relief and Works Agency (UN- Reconstruction, the rebuilding alone would ualties and a burgeoning humanitarian crisis. WRA) will probably administer. Meanwhile, cost more than USD3.6 billion, including At the same time, Hamas has paid an extremely during the emergency Arab summit in Doha damage of USD2.4 billion to housing and high price and has reportedly launched a probe the same month, Arab states made their own commercial space and nearly USD500 million into its military failures. promises with an eye toward establishing a in the transport sector (roads and bridges). fund for Palestinians in excess of USD2 billion. When indirect costs were included, some esti- While the Palestinian militants were dealt The headline of the Arab meetings was a USD1 mates rose to USD7 billion. a military setback, like Hizbullah in 2006, billion pledge by Saudi Arabia. Hamas may yet derive political gains. Should In January 2007, Paris III, an international Hamas emerge from the war strengthened in Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadine- donor conference, was convened and USD7.6 Gaza and the region, it would be a boon for jad also attended the Arab summit, but un- billion in pledges was secured toward the re- its patrons in Tehran and Damascus. Con- like Saudi Arabia, did not volunteer a figure. construction. Heavy hitters in Paris included versely, it would constitute a strategic setback Instead, Tehran pledged to underwrite re- Saudi Arabia (USD590 million), Kuwait for Washington, its moderate Arab allies and construction of the Palestinian parliament (USD315 million), Qatar (USD300 million), for Palestine Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) building in Gaza, and an Iranian government- and the US (USD140 million). With some Fatah faction, which controls the Palestinian affiliated organisation offered to rebuild 1,000 exceptions, most notably Qatar, most of this Authority in the West Bank. In this regard, the houses, 10 schools, a hospital, a university and funding was provided to the pro-West central trend lines already seem to be tipping in Ha- five mosques. government, which distributed the funding mas’ favour. throughout Lebanon, including to Shia organ- The most important development at the isations controlled by Hizbullah. jir.janes.com l © IHS (Global) Limited 2009, Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst. Reproduced with permission. l March 2008 JANE’S ISLAMIC AFFAIRS ANALYST toward securing the opening of the Rafah pas- Lebanon. When the fighting ended, Hizbullah The Shia militia and political party also re- sage, Gaza’s economic lifeline that had been and the pro-West democratically elected gov- ceived substantial funding from Tehran, which closed since Hamas took control of the Strip ernment of Lebanon engaged in a fierce com- according to press reports granted it USD500 from Fatah in June 2007. Israel and Egypt, petition to control and politically benefit from million, a gift that prompted popular protests which border the town of Rafah, had sealed the the post-war reconstruction process. in Iran. This assistance provided Hizbullah frontier in an effort to undermine Hamas and with increased flexibility and independence increase support for Fatah leader Mahmoud In the days after the Lebanon war when the from the central government, enabling the or- Abbas with the support of the international central government was in disarray, Hizbul- ganisation to better compete against the gov- community. But now, it seems that Hamas may lah moved to disburse USD12,000 in cash to ernment in the reconstruction process. Hiz- succeed in removing this lever of pressure as homeless families. Not surprisingly, on 22 bullah derived additional political credit from well. January 2009, Hamas indicated that it would the Qatari assistance, which was delivered take a similar tack, announcing that it would directly to the Shia group in the south. Weeks According to the Jerusalem Post , Israeli start to distribute the first installment of up to after the fighting ended, for example, Qatari Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, during his re- USD40 million to affected Gazans, including officials descended on Bint Jbeil, a town that maining days in office reversed his 2006 po- USD5,200 for families with damaged homes, was heavily damaged in the fighting, to hand sition and offered to free 1,000 prisoners and and USD1,300 for the families of the dead. over a cheque to a local Hizbullah official to open the Gaza crossings in exchange for Gilad cover the costs of rebuilding the municipality. Shalit, the IDF soldier who was captured by Hizbullah’s constituents were pleased at Hamas in June 2006, leading to the failed Is- the organisation’s initial response to the cri- raeli incursion to free him, Operation Summer sis. Aware of the stakes, however, the Lebanese Diplomatic gains Rains. The current Israeli proposal is parallel government made a concerted effort to prevent One does not have to look far for signs of to the Israeli-Hizbullah deal in 2008 that re- Hizbullah from translating the reconstruction a preliminary post-war paradigm shift benefit- turned Samir Kuntar to Lebanon in return for into political capital by precluding Hizbullah ting Hamas. Before the Israeli offensive, there the bodies of two dead IDF soldiers kidnapped from acting as the exclusive agent of Lebanese was a broad international consensus that dip- by the Shia militia in 2006. Shias. In support of this goal, the international lomatic engagement with Hamas should be community, with the exception of Iran, chan- contingent on the organisation accepting Is- The 2006 Hizbullah kidnapping of Israeli nelled funding through Beirut. rael’s right to exist, agreeing to abide by PLO soldiers, whose stated purpose was the return accords with Israel and foreswearing violence. of Lebanese prisoners in Israel, sparked a war. This strategy slowed the pace of reconstruc- These conditions were set by the Middle East With a prisoner exchange two years later, how- tion, generating criticism against Hizbullah. Quartet (US, EU, Russia and the UN) shortly ever, the Hizbullah provocation was essentially Months after the war, Lebanese polling sug- after Hamas’ parliamentary election victory in vindicated. Should Israel open Rafah, it will gested a nearly 50 per cent decline in support, January 2006. In the aftermath of the war, this likewise be seen, by Hamas and many Israelis, both among the Shias and the entire Lebanese consensus appears to be eroding. as a Hamas victory. population for Hizbullah and its popular sec- retary general Hassan Nasrallah. Hizbullah Like Hizbullah, which emerged from the Perhaps more important for Hamas than its eventually succeeded in bypassing government 2006 war with a burnished image in the region, regional or international standing, is its status hurdles, making progress on the ground and Hamas too seems to be heading for greater in- among its constituents in Gaza.
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