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Robert Michels Michels Began by Asking a Series of Questions: The Chapter 13: Fascism in Germany had surprised the intellectual The Shadows of Hitler world. (Michels, Mannheim, and Mills) Fascism =authoritarianism The attention of social theorists anti-modernism turned from social order to anti-scientific understanding social/political power and control. anti-rational anti-democratic The reason was the surprise rise of Hitler and fascism. Why would people allow for fascism? 1 2 Michels began by asking Robert Michels a series of questions: (1876-1936) If you expect democratic • historian in Germany organizations (or governments) to begin • Predicted and provided an replacing autocratic explanation for the fascist systems, who do you expect government in Germany. to hold the power? (Iron Law of Oligarchy) The membership 3 4 Michels proposed his now famous Iron Law of Oligarchy In modern organizations (4 parts or stages of development) and governments, does the membership actually hold 1. A small number of persons the power? (leaders) actually make the decisions If not, who then? The masses of people typically turn the day-to-day decision- The leaders making over—if everyone tried to be involved nothing would get done. 5 6 3. The leaders are in a different “social world” than the 2. The leaders have more power membership, subsequently they than the membership see things differently. Once in power the leaders are Leaders gradually develop their able to stay and “nurture” own values and purposes for their power—they the organization “know the ropes” The leader gives preference to her/his purposes over the membership’s 7 8 4. Leaders have a variety of In sum, in modern methods they use to stay in organizations, does the focus power and maintain their of the leaders typically mirror power. the desire of the membership? What might these be? --leaders have better information 1 legitimacy and resources 2 better organized than membership -over time, leaders have their own 3 control communications agendas 4 better informed 5 control finances 9 -leaders focus on staying elected 10 What organizational Michels concludes that the characteristics might increase leaders of organizations often oligarchy? control their members rather than vice versa (i.e. oligarchy) •Large, dispersed membership Do you agree? •Large, centralized administrative staff that What would be some examples? leadership controls Some exceptions? 11 12 Michels eventually supported What organizational Fascism when Mussolini came to characteristics might power . decrease the control of leaders (i.e. oligarchy)? Why would fascism be acceptable to people? •Involved membership •Need for some kind of •Issues that get attention of stability, avoid chaos many members •Cynicism with regard to the •Competition with other failure of other ideologies organizations for members •Join a winner 13 14 Research has supported Karl Mannheim Michels view in the study of a (1893 – 1947) variety of organizations A second German social thinker —for example, political parties, One of many coming out of the trade unions, charities, PTAs, Frankfurt School in Germany professional associations, government agencies. presented a description of political ideologies Of course, oligarchy is not necessarily the case. 15 16 Five Political Ideologies: Presented five unique 1. Traditional Conservatism: political ideologies, each found to have some prominence at --Respect tradition. different points in history. --Don’t try to change. --Things are as they should be. Proposed a sixth ideology to be used by modern societies. --Doesn’t address truth Who in society supports or has supported this view? 17 18 3. Bourgeois Liberalism: 2. Bureaucratic conservatism: does not ask what should Argues that the problem with be done or why (ignores traditional and bureaucratic “truth”). People are to conservatism is that not simply follow the rules that exist. everyone benefits. “Don’t rock the boat” We should consider issues Criticism? and let the people decide. Who has these beliefs? Does this work? Is this our bureaucrats 19 current ideology? 20 Those with material wealth 4. Socialist Thought: reveals have the advantage in political weakness of a democracy debates. where the wealthy are able to control the economic What is an example where the system. wealthy are controlling the debate? Only the workers should be involved in decision-making. Issue Advocacy Groups (the environment) Criticism? 21 22 5. Fascism: the control of the people by a single or few Workers simply persons. represent the interests of one group or one more -Occurs as a reaction to cynicism in identifying set of politicians. “political truth” -Truth is viewed as relative, no one position is right. Therefore, people select the winning side. 23 24 Which of the following five do you think is Mannheim’s theory of best? Or, do you favor something else? social relativism: Bureaucratic conservatism – bureaucrats Truth is not absolute. No values are certain, no truths are sure. No Traditional Conservatism – aristocrats political ideology the best. Bourgeois Liberalism – middle class Ideologies change from age to age. entreprenuers Therefore, we should select those Socialist Thought – workers policies/ideas that match the values of the time. Facism – ideologues 25 26 Mannheim believed that current social problems are 2. Interdependence—a crisis in the result of two social one part of the society now conditions: effects all parts making it more harmful (a few “far-flung 1. democratization/centralization organizations can create huge a small number of leaders who damage). lead by emotion and simplistic solutions rather than intelligent --complexity results in only a understanding. small group of technical experts controlling things. This is the opposite of what Saint Simon recommended. Example? 27 28 Mannheim’s solution for modern society: C. Wright Mills (1916 – 1962) 1. Implement a “planned economy” A maverick among intellectuals to avoid catastrophic depressions, inflation, and unemployment (again, Over the course of his life he Saint Simon). focused on three groups: 2. Implement a “planned social -labor and unions environment” to avoid -the emerging middle class irreconcilable conflicts (e.g., class -mega organizations conflict). 29 30 Mills’ The Power Elite The Power Elite Power is in the hands of The top leadership provides the top leaders of three the rationale for the masses. groups Their positions are interchangeable (example: generals go to top corporate National government and government positions) bureaucracy Corporations Can you think of any examples? Military Eisenhower 31 32 The Power Elite Functional rationality causes a variety of problems: Functional Rationality •New ideas are hard to come by Organizations/military control what is rational, e.g., rationality •National government carries out for Vietnam war. the desires of corporations and the military. prevails rather than Can you think of any examples? Substantial Rationality Monetary policy to assist Intellectual insight is in control. corporations? Iraq? 33 34 Mills (like Mannheim) believed Wrote: Sociological Imagination modern governments can take one of three forms: Mills outlined how society should be viewed through sociological eyes Bumbling planlessness, functional rationality Personal troubles reveal larger Fascist dictatorship public issues Planning by a humanistic elite For example: high divorce rate may Mills saw the U.S. clearly as the be the result of gender first form. discrimination and unemployment may be the result of government Do you agree or disagree? policy to control inflation 35 36 How would you classify Mills, a conflict theorist or The End a functionalist? 37 38.
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