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UniversiV Miaailms International

Skirbunt, Peter Daniel

PROLOGUE TO REFORM: THE "GERMANIZATION" O F THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1865-1898

The Ohio State University Ph.D.

University Microfilms I nternStion&l 300 N. zeeb Road, Ann Arbor. Ml 48106

Copyright 1983 by Skirbunt, Peter Daniel All Rights Reserved

PROLOGUE TO REFORM:

THE "GERMÀNIZÀTION" OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1865-1898

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of the Ohio State University

by

P e te r D. S k irb u n t, ]

The Ohio State University

1983

Reading Committee: Approved by:

Paul C. Bowers

A llan R. M ille t t

Williamson Murray A dviser Department of History The best reason for studying the past is to somehow better the

future. With that in mind, this of work is dedicated to the two most

important and precious people in my life: my wife, Rebecca, and my daughter, Christine, who have filled my life with love and vitality and who are my inspiration for the present and my hope for the future.

In the fervent hope that someday soon the world will be a safe

place for Rebecca and Christine to live, I refer the reader and the governments of the world to a statement made long ago, and yet so appropriate for our time:

Europeans call for peace, but maintain huge armies, claiming that this is t’e best deterrent to war .The older nations of Europe are wearing themselves out faster than need be with their hostile and costly armaments, when the revenues might be more usefully employed in fostering the national vitality and bettering the condition of the people. Lieutenant Colonel William Ludlow, Military Attache to the Court of St. James, London, January 1895: 19 years prior to the War to End A ll Wars. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A great many years and miles beyond count have gone into the compilation and writing of this dissertation, and a great many people have been of assistance in its completion. There are several who are deserving of special mention and gratitude:

Ify a d v is e r, A llan R. M i ll e tt , has shown a g re a t d e a l o f understanding, patience, and encouragement throughout some tough years, during which I showed mild discouragement and little productiv ity.

Donald Berthrong of the Department of History at Purdue University saw fit to hire me as a Visiting Instructor, thus giving me the opportunity to return to academic life and have the inspiration, atmosphere, and facilities for finally completing this work.

Gary Reichard and Richard Hopkins of Ohio State University deserve special mention for their willingness to rehire me as a GTA at a key point in my career - when I was an unemployed historian - thus making it possible for me to begin work in earnest on the first chapter.

Paul Bayless of the Purdue Affirmative Action Office provided me with the facilities to type the final drafts myself on a word processor. He was also very generous with vacations and leaves of absence, which enabled me to complete the final stages of my research. Mrs. Mary Ann Woerner of the Purdue Comptroller's Office helped me out of my difficulties with the word processor.

The Center of M ilitary History in Washington granted me a Dissertation Year Fellowship, which gave me the much-needed financial ability to devote an additional year for research and revision. The Center's personnel, as well as the good people at Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania, deserve my sincere thanks. Dr. Arnold Fisch, Dr. Dale Floyd, and the librarians at CMH, and Colonel Donald Shaw, Dr. John Slonaker, Dr. Jay Luvass, and Mr. Bob Boots of Carlisle were especially helpful.

The Staffs of the State Department and the Old M ilitary History Branches of the National Archives were extremely helpful. I especially wish to thank Dr. Timothy Nenninger and Dr. Mike Musick. The staffs of the Library of Congress and the Ohio Historical Society were all extremely courteous and very helpful in locating several pieces of obscure material.

My sister and brother-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. Frank Watson, have put me up (and put up with me) on nonerous occasions, providing food, shelter, and an inspirational, historical atmosphere in which to work. They have done this since 1972. On several occasions they have merited a Medal of Honor: in 1980, Paulette twice drove over 140 miles in order to pick me up and drop me off at the Balt imore-Washington Airport when I flew in on a research trip from California. On another occasion, she and Frank spent one of their precious few days off to drive to the Library of Congress in order to locate a manuscript - which they xeroxed in its entirety, despite the howls of protest from other researchers. The whole experience cost them one hundred miles in gasoline, a day off, and frayed nerves.

My father and mother have aided me in one way or another throughout the lean years of transient employment, during which this work was sporadically compiled, and my father struggled with an ancient manual typewriter in beginning to chum out the first draft. My sister Mary Lou, meanvAiile, has been sending her energies my way fo r some tim e now, which I know has helped a g re a t d e a l; my own energies have pretty much expired by now.

Joe Marko, who has been my friend since 1964, has followed me (or I him) back and forth across the country and has helped me in many ways. To him and his new wife Mary Jo I extend the sincere wish that this thesis may help wind us up in warmer climates within driving distance of each other. If one may indeed count his true friends on one hand, then Joe is c e r t a i n l y my index fin g e r : Number One.

Finally, the true inspirations for all of this are my lovely wife and daughter. I hope that the future may provide me with the opportunity to dedicate several more works to each of them. I met Becki when she worked as a page at the Ohio Historical Society when I began my research, so this paper is inextricably linked with our m a rria g e . December 20, 1950 ...... Born - Cleveland, Ohio

197 2 ...... B. S. in Education, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

197 3 ...... B. A. with Distinction in History, Ohio State University.

1974-1978, 1979-1 980 ...... Teaching Associate, De^rtment of History, Ohio State University.

1975 ...... M. A., History, Ohio State University.

1978-1979 ...... Chief of Service - History, Iroquois Research Institute, Fairfax, Virginia

1980-1982...... Visiting Instructor, Department of History, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana

1982-1 983...... Visiting Research Fellow, Center of M ilitary History, Department of the Army, W ashington, D. C.

1982-1983...... Affirmative Action Research Specialist, Office of the President, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

Studies in American M ilitary History. Professor Allan M illett

Studies in American Colonial History. Professor Paul Bowers

Studies in American Social Thought. Professor Robert Bremner

Studies in Twentieth Century Europe. Professor John Rothney TABIE OF CONTENTS

œ DICAT ION...... i i

ACKNOWIEDGEMENTS...... i i i

LIST OF FIGURES...... v i i i

INTRODUCTION...... 1

C hapter

I . AMERICAN INTEREST IN EUROPEAN MILITARY METHODS, 1789-1865.. 12

The Influence of John C. Calhoun ...... 16 Observers Following Calhoun : Interest in the French System 23 Jefferson Davis and the Delafield Commission...... 28 European Interest in the American Civil War...... 39

I I . THE UNITED STATES ARMY DISCOVERS GEIMANY...... 54

Initial Stirrings of Postwar Interest in Prussia ...... 56 Sheridan: America's First Major Observer of the German Army...... 58 Sherman: The Commanding General Tours Europe...... 63 Upton: A C rusader Adopts th e German System...... 69

I I I . INTEREST DEEPENS...... 85

Hazen: The French a re P a s s e '...... 86 A Growing Body o f O pinion on Germany...... 94 From Upton to the Attaches: Observers and Analysts, 1880-8 99 Formation of the MID and the Attache System...... 109

IV. EEBATES AND EEVELOIMENTS...... 129

Wagner: A Balanced View...... 129 Different Voices ...... 135 Some "Germanic" Changes...... 142 The New Meaning of "General Staff" in America...... 155 Miles, Schofield, and Root ...... 160 TABLE OF CONTENTS - C ontinued

Chapter Page

V. PASS IN REVIEW...... 173

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 182 LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 1. The General Staff: The 1864 Conception...... 136

Figure 2. The General Staff: Arthur L. Wagner's Conception, 1894..137

Figure 3. The General Staff: 1917 ...... 181 INTRODUCTION

The harsh lessons of the Civil War have long been taken for granted by m ilitary historians. This is especially true of the realization that using Napoleonic tactics while employing weapons of increasingly destructive capabilities was an unfortunate mistake, a horrible blunder recognized even as the war progressed. Through four y ea rs o f rugged w a rfa re , th e o f f ic e r s o f th e U nited S ta te s Army came to realize that the new weapons demanded new tactics, and mass warfare necessitated new methods of organization and mobilization. Today, it seems obvious that postwar réévaluation, reassessment, and reform were both necessary and desirable.

However, such reforms were actually not easily attained. Although some historians have labeled the conflict "the first modem war" because of certain strategic, tactical, and technological innovations, the Civil War's lessons were not immediately appreciated by war-weary

American civilians or their congressional representatives. Develop­ ments such as "total war," the destructive potential of rifled weapons, and the value of railroads in transporting troops and supplies were lost on no one; however, most Americans were more concerned with reducing the army to its prewar size and getting the nation back to peacetime pursuits. Even many European m ilitary authorities looked upon our national upheaval as an interesting but

1 2

not necessarily instructive example of "amateur" warfare. In short,

Americans wished for the experience to be relegated to the past, while

Europeans considered many of the Civil War's aspects to be inapplic­

able to Europe. This latter attitude was due to differences between

Europe and the United States in terms of terrain, population density, degree of m ilitary professionalism, and even the temperaments of the respective populations.^ With such deprecatory attitudes abroad and

the lack of enthusiasm for the maintenance of a large professional array at home, the spokesmen for reform and improvement found they had little or no audience.

Thus, the years 1865-1898 have sometimes been termed "the army's

Dark Ages," as the size of the army shrank and many proposals for reform went largely unheeded. American professional soldiers knew that adjustments had to be made in the manner of raising, training, and deploying troops in the field if the army were to assert itself with any measure of authority in future conflicts. There was no lack of respected soldiers willing to contribute ideas as to the substance o f such re fo rm s. Men from th e Commanding G eneral down through the ranks had a large nunber of suggestions and observations on how to

improve the army. But th e la rg e v o lu n te e r army o f the C iv il War was quickly mustered out of service, and many of the subtle lessons learned in the conflict were forgotten or faded away as the veterans pursued new careers, grew older, and gradually passed away. Their knowledge and experience died with them and was lost to the army forever. Factors contributing to the reduction of the army from over a million men in 1865 to 27,500 in 1895 included the traditional 3 concept of the army as primarily a force to guard the frontier; the long-accepted notion that a large standing army was dangerous to the nation's safety; and the apparent lack of necessity for such a force due to our relative isolation from Europe

Apart from the Indian wars and the occupation of the South during

Reconstruction, the army was largely out of the public eye in these years. Because of the seeming lack of activity, the progressive reform movement within the army itself has been largely ignored by historians and the nimber of works on the army reforms of these years has until recently been fairly limited. Three general histories which mention the movement are Oliver Spaulding's The United States Army in

War and Peace (1937), and a pair of books entitled History of the

United States Army, one by William Canoe (1928) and the other by

Russell F. Weigley (1967). Stephen E. Ambrose's Upton and the Army

(1964) is the best-known work on the most famous of the reformers.

Peter Karsten emphasized the managerial aspects of the army in his essay, "Armed Progressives: The Military Reorganizes for the American

Century" (1 972 ) . Jack Foner's The United States Soldier Between Two

Wars: Army Life and Reforms (1977) centers largely upon the living conditions and discipline of the typical soldier. Richard Allen

Andrews' dissertation, "Years of Frustration: William T. Sherman, the

Army, and Reform, 1869-1883" (1968), Marc B. Powe's The Emergence of the War Department Intelligence Agency: 1885-1918 (1975), Robert F.

St o him an's The Powerless Position: The Comamanding General of the Army of the United States, 1864-1903, (1975), and Timothy K. Wenninger's

The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, 1881-19 1 8 (1978) are four 4 other useful works focusing upon different aspects of the reform period. Most recently, James L. Abrahamson's America Arms for a New

Century (1981) has provided perhaps the most complete picture of the s u b je c t.

S till, these fine works seldom become extremely specific as to the origin and progression of the reformers' ideas. Many of the individuals who actually did "legwork" overseas while comparing the

American army to those of Europe, and others who contributed to getting proposed reforms instituted, were unsung participants in the modernization process and were often lost to history. Thus, this study was conceived in hopes of discovering the "missing links" of the reform period, as well as how their theories eventually emerged to become reality.

It was surely a difficult time for them, as the army's size and perhaps their own self-esteem shrank precipitously. The reduction of forces was symptomatic of the general national disinterest in the army. Such disinterest led to an inability of the reform-minded officers to gain a favorable response from either the War Department or from Congress. This in turn led to a nunber of destructive, counter-productive incidents, including the bizarre self-imposed removal o f Commanding G eneral W illiam T. Sherman to S t. L o u is, th e suicide of brilliant Colonel Emory Upton, and the pathetic state of unpreparedness for the war with Spain.^ It led also to less spectacular incidents of disillusion and discouragement among army officers who came to feel that they were in a thankless, stagnating profession. 5

It is ironic that American officers, who because of their recent experiences in "the first modern war" should by rights have had the most to teach the rest of the world's officers, were instead compelled to go to Europe in the last decades of the nineteenth century in order to relearn old lessons and to discover exactly how foreign armies were applying, adjusting, or ignoring the lessons of the American conflict.

There, they would discover that certain strategic and tactical lessons had been learned quite well, and that technology was making continuous contributions to weapons development, communications systems, and mobilization plans. They would also come away with models for consideration for American adoption, including styles of dress, field tactics, and staff organization. That these observers were ignored for so long may be evaluated either as a tribute to the American desire to avoid and forget war, or as a condemnation of American isolationism and stinginess with military appropriations. The few changes that did occur were largely superficial. Philip Sheridan commented that every time there was a war in Europe, we adopted the headgear of the vie to rS u b sta n tia l changes did not come until after the Spanish-American War. In fact, it was not until 1910, forty-five years after Appomattox, that major reforms in administration, staff organization, and mobilization became reality.

It took a long time to "relearn" the lessons of the Civil War, and even then the American experience had to be "legitimized" by European exam ples.

The reforms that eventually transpired were due in large measure to the junior officers and their senior sponsors who projected and 6

planned the sweeping changes that would later find some

fulfillm ent.^ These innovators saw that some of their most basic

problems involved proper organization and management of money, men,

and m aterial. Therefore, it is not surprising that the model most

attractive to them was that of the Prussian army. The Prussian

victories over Denmark in 1864, Austria-Hungary in 1866, and France in

1870-71 identified the Germans as the best managers and the most

skillful in utilizing science and the new technology.^ indeed,

these three victories gained the Prussian (later, German) General

Staff a solid reputation that still exists. The wars were, as Walter

M inis put it, "tidy, efficient, and victorious."^ They were also

comparatively quick. These factors contrasted sharply and favorably

with the horrible, drawn-out experiences of the United States' Civil

War, and such comparisons made these victories seem especially

noteworthy. That these triumphs had contributed heavily to German

unification made them all the more impressive.

The m ilitary analysts who studied the German campaigns noted that

improvements in the "art of war" which had been used only in

rudimentary form in the United States now made important advances in

Europe. Weapons such as the Prussian breech-loading "needle gun," the modern shrapnel shell, and breech-loading rifled artillery inspired

Americans to study metallurgy, ballistics, electrical equipment, m ilitary and marine engineering, and associated developments in an

effort to keep pace with European scientific contributions to the m ilitary art.® Americans investigated tactics used with and against

these weapons, and took a close look at the type of military 7

organization that had fielded the victorious aimies. Thus, the United

States Army showed a great amount of interest in every phase of

European - and especially German - m ilitary organization. To study

the situation abroad, nunerous officers travelling as private

individuals, other officers charged with specific observational goals and duties, and a nunber of m ilitary attaches would visit Europe and

tour military installations and battlefields. The Military

Information Division, formed in 1885, attempted to coordinate visiting officers' observations and was linked to official American attaches,

vdno went to Europe starting in 1889. Several boards studied such

problems as artillery production and emplacement and European reserve

systems, and Congressional committees considered various proposals to modernize the army.

Despite the army's efforts and obvious interest in improvement.

Congress felt secure in its memory of recent victory in the Civil War.

It perceived the army as a transitional institution, useful for reconstruction and fighting Indians but perhaps anachronistic in a world \^ere there was no immediate threat to American well-being. The

fact that there were so many experienced veterans who could be called to the fore in an emergency added to the nation's complacency. John

M. S c h o fie ld , who fo r a tim e was th e arm y's Commanding G en eral, correctly labelled this a "false sense of security."^ Some civilians felt (and some soldiers feared) that the need for the army was disappearing just as the frontier itself was vanishing. Only a

foreign war - which was an unlikely possibility until the 1890's - could bring the nation to pay attention to the army. Thus the army languished in its powerless role, aware of changes

that needed to be made but unable to effect those changes until

America entered the era of overseas expansionism. But when that move

was finally made, the prior steps necessary to reform had already been

taken by nunerous individuals who recognized formulas for success in

various European systems. While the only real battlefield action the

army saw in this period was against the Indians, various officers were

laying the groundwork for the great reforms of the twentieth century.

Official and unofficial observers overseas, officers testifying before

Congressional committees, the formation of various professional m ilitary training schools, and the interchange of ideas through the

s e rv ic e jo u rn a ls were a l l ways in vAiich co n cep ts were developed and

arguments were honed. Eventually, enough men in the proper offices

would listen to these army reformers' ideas and take action. S till,

only after a bungling war effort against Spain, a protracted struggle

against Philippine insurrectionists, and the beginnings of involvement

in the Caribbean inspired public (and, consequently. Congressional)

concern for the state of the army would any truly substantial changes

o c c u r. N e v e rth e le s s, when th e tim e came th e w ritin g s and o b se rv a tio n s

of numerous individuals could be drawn upon for ideas on subjects

ranging frcm the formation of a European-style General Staff to the

types of uniform worn on parade.

These initial reformers took their greatest interest in the

Germans, who had shown themselves to be the most efficient, progressive, innovative, and successful m ilitary organizers of the

late nineteenth century. Although American army reformers studied 9

German m ilitary affairs, they did not advocate mindlessly copying

German concepts and practices. Instead they sought an Americanized

reform program that would be both m ilitarily effective and politically

legitimate. Because of these progressive theorists, the years

1865-1898 cannot be fairly termed "the army's dark ages." Rather, they were years of compilation of information and formation of theory vdiich were a necessary prologue to the reforms following the War with NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. Jay Luvass, The M ilitary Legacy of the Civil War; The European Inheritance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 230. William T. Sherman interview in Army and Navy Journal (hereafter cited as ^ ) , IX 49 (June 20, 1877), p. 782.

2. O liv e r L. S p au ld in g , The U n ited S ta te s Army in War and P eace (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937), pp. 337-41 details the gradual decline in the army's size, and specifies the numbers of companies and regiments. Also see Peter Kars ten, "Aimed Progressives: The M ilitary Reorganizes for the American Century," in Jerry Israel (ed.) , Building the Organizational Society: Essays in Associational A ctivities in Modern America (New York: The Free Press, 1972.) Karsten gives the 1895 figure on p. 217. Colonel William Ganoe called 1865-1898 "The Dark Ages" in his History of the United States Army (New York: D. Appleton, 1928).

3. These incidents are well-known and well-documented. Typical sources are B. H. Liddell Hart, Sherman: Soldier, R ealist, American (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 414 for Sherman's removal; Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of the United States M ilitary Policy (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1973), p . 169 on U pton's s u ic id e ; and Graham Cosmas, An Army fo r Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-Amer ican War (Colunbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1971) for a candid evaluation of the army's shortcomings in 1898.

4. Thomas Bentley Mott, Twenty Years as M ilitary Attache (New York: Arno Press, 1979), pp. 117-18.

5. Karsten, "Armed Progressives," pp. 197-98. As the title implies, Karsten labels army reformers "armed progressives," arid the movement itself "a m ilitary revolution."

6. Walter Mill is. Arms and Men: A Study of American M ilitary History (New York: Mentor Books, 1956), pp. 122-23. Millis states the case th a t Germany was th e obvious n a tio n to em ulate.

7. Ibid., p. 123.

Ibid., p. 122. Mill is notes that Europeans made improvements "rudimentary methods" soon after the war's end. 9. Russell F. Weigley, "The Military Thought of John M. S c h o fie ld ," M ilita r y A f f a i r s , XXIII 2 (Summer 1 9 5 9 ), p . 79. CHAPTER ONE

AMERICAN INTEREST IN EUROPEAN MILITARY METHODS, 1789-1865

Professional American soldiers and m ilitary authorities recognized the problems inherent in maintaining a viable m ilitary force long before the Civil War. M ilitary theorists of the early nineteenth century confronted two of the same dilemmas that faced their post-

Civil War counterparts: first, how to build an effective army in a republic that was traditionally suspicious of a standing professional force; second, how to keep abreast of other nations' m ilitary devel­ opments while confronting a congress that was habitually conservative with expenditures for the armed forces. In an effort to solve these problems in the decades before Ft. Sumter, various men experimented with ideas designed to adapt the United States' army to fluctuating national and international situations, and nunerous observers investigatred the state of the m ilitary art in Europe in an effort to find models upon which the American armed forces could be fashioned.

From the very beginning of the Republic, the army was beset by nunerous problem s. The e a r l i e s t re g u la r army was t i n y , num bering o n ly

80 men. It was hampered by the popular myth of the civilian militiamen's ability to drop their plows and take up their muskets as the situation demanded, and then return to their fields once they had disposed of the immediate danger. While George Washington himself 13 believed the m ilitia should be the basis cor the national defense, he also advocated a small standing army that could garrison the fort at

West Point, protect the borders and the fur trade, and keep a close watch on the Indians. S till, Congress would disappoint him. Two years after Washington had assumed the Presidency, he complained that the First Regiment of Regulars was not one-quarter of what was needed on a permanent basis. The regiment at that time numbered only 700, and yet it composed the entire regular army. Though this was an improvement, it did not measure up to Washington's desires

Only after several disasters occurred on the Indian frontier did it become obvious that the m ilitia could not always be relied upon.

More regulars were added: the First Regiment was joined by the Second.

The M ilitia Act of 1792 allowed the President to call out the m ilitia and raise a six-month volunteer force to supplement the regulars.

This act was the first official Congressional recognition that the nation could not solely rely upon the m ilitia, especially when troops were needed for duty outside of extant state boundaries. But the act never altered the nation's basic military policy: the first line of defense was the navy; the regular army should remain small, augmented by volunteer enlistees and the state m ilitias.^

Alexander Hamilton was insLrunental in the formation of the early army. Hamilton's perceptions of the army's ultimate goals would remain as guidelines for our national m ilitary policy for many years.

Basic to his philosophy was a conviction that the United States needed to establish its own manufacturing processes in order to become 14

self-sufficient for military and "other essential" materials. This

accomplished, the United States would be difficult if not impossible

to conquer. A standing professional army would be maintained in

peacetime to provide frontier defense and to act as a positive force

in arbitration of European disputes. The mere existence of an army

that could potentially sway conflicts between two European colonial

powers one way or the other would thus be a powerful part of our

foreign policy.^

Hamilton's recognition of the nation's potential and his advocacy

of a professional standing army were early indications that the United

States could be neither isolated from nor unconcerned with European

events. His anphasis on a professional force revealed his realization

that while a m ilitia might be useful in providing support, a regular

army was necessary for use against professional European troops. To

some degree even the Jeffersonians would assent, as shown by the

founding of the M ilitary Academy at West Point during Jefferson's term as President. Though the Academy was primarily for engineers, its establishment indicates Jefferson saw that to combat European armies a certain amount of professional training was needed - at least in some areas of expertise

Those who advocated regular forces were vindicated during the War of 1812, when professional soldiers held their own against British

regulars at Lundy's Lane and Chippewa while the m ilitia sometimes did not even respond to calls for troops. The sack of Washington under

the very eyes of President Madison emphasized the need for a substantial body of disciplined regulars; but Andrew Jackson's famous 15 victory at New Orleans, during which he ut il zed a force composed of

regular soldiers, volunteers, m ilitia, pirates, and Indians, would be repeatedly recalled and glorified by defenders of a non-professional army. Their arguments, combined with a desire to cut federal expenditures, were convincing enough to assure that the regular army would remain small for years to come.

This is not to say that the War of 1812 brought no changes, however. In 1813 Jefferson himself wrote to Secretary of War James

Monroe :

We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens and make m ilitary instruction a regular part of collegiate education. We can not be safe till this is done.5

This statement was not a drastic change from Jefferson's prior statements, but it does indicate that the war inspired the former

President - and presumably others - to recognize that formalized training of some sort had to become an integral part of our m ilitary system. This training would be given to both the enlisted men and the o f f ic e r s .

In the same year, new Secretary of War John Armstrong secured from

Congress a law that contributed mightily to the organization of the regular army's highest levels. The law, passed March 3, 1813, established a General Staff for the Secretary of War. It was not the sort of General Staff that would emerge in Germany and later in

America ; rather, it created special offices in the War Department. It consisted of an Adjutant General and Inspector General with two assistants; a Quartermaster General; a Commissary General of Ordnance 16 with two deputies and an assistant; a Paymaster; and an Assistant

Topographical Engineer. The creation of this staff is indicative of a growing belief that certain functions within the armed forces were best fulfilled by professionals on a full-time basis. The wisdom of this program is demonstrated by the fact that the General Staff was destined to remain essentially unchanged for nearly a century, though the size of its supporting staffs would fluctuateInterestingly, though, the General Staff would also be one of the first facets of the army to be criticized by reformers and subsequently to undergo change

in the early twentieth century - a fact that demonstrated not only the importance of the m ilitary staffs but the changing aspects and necessities of warfare as well.

A congressional act of March 3, 1815 provided for a peacetime army much la r g e r th an any p re v io u sly e s ta b lis h e d . The u pper l i m it was set at 10,000 men, not including the Corps of Engineers. Though this was an improvement, the act also abolished the staffs of the Adjutant

General, the Topographical Engineer, the Inspector-General, and the

Quartermaster-General.^ Congress apparently expected that in peacetime, the staff officers could complete their own errands and paperwork; in reality, they were hard-pressed to keep up. Though the

United States had seen the sense of establishing a European-style administrative staff system. Congress had not yet begun to perceive the importance of fully staffing the system on a permanent basis.

The Influence of John C. Calhoun

The perfection of the General Staff became the first major o b je c tiv e o f John C. C alhoun, who was ap p o in ted S e c re ta ry o f War by 17

President Monroe in 1817. Calhoun, nominally a Jeffersonian, echoed

the ideas of Hamilton by proposing to place the citizen m ilitia in the

background and make the regular army the "cornerstone" of the national

defense. Capitalizing on the public's sympathetic attitude concerning

the army in the immediate postwar years, Calhoun improved upon the

General Staff developed during the war. In so doing, he established

the basis of an improved national defense system.® As the General

Staff's improvement was his first priority, a certain amount of

European influence was evident in his policies.

During his tenure as War Secretary, Calhoun contributed to the

eventual acceptance of a larger regular army, although in his own time

the regular forces were drastically reduced. Nonetheless, his

carefully-reasoned reports and argunents and his unceasing efforts to

render his department efficient would be noted both by his

contemporaries and later reformers. His plans would later be adopted,

to the great benefit of the army. It was not the size of the army but its competence that truly mattered.

That Calhoun regarded the improvement of the General Staff as

fundamental to the perfection of the regular army is evident in his

report to Congress of December 14, 1818, in which he stated:

...no part of our m ilitary organization requires more attention in peace that the General Staff. It is in every service invariably the last in attaining perfection; and, if neglected in peace when there is leisure, it will be impossible, in the midst of the hurry and bustle of war, to bring it to perfection...nothing more should be necessary than to give to it the necessary enlargement.^ 18

This philosophy, applied here to the General Staff, would later be

further developed to include a plan for wartime expansion of the

entire army.

The General Staff was a feature primarily of French origin, begun

on a permanent basis in the United States by Secretary of War John

Armstrong and then refined in Calhoun's War Department General Staff.

Calhoun added a Surgeon General and a Judge Advocate General, and made

each member of the staff the head of a particular bureau.He

clarified individual duties, as in the reorganization of the formerly

independent Supply Services when he instituted a system of direct

purchase by the Commissary General. He was also able to clarify both

the chain of command and the interrelationship between staff and

l i n e . 11

Perhaps the most important feature of the American General Staff

and its bureau system was its ability to provide the Secretary with

technical advice so he could exercise "uniform control." The inherent

problem was th a t th e s t a f f was a c o lle c tio n o f " e x p e rts " in v a rio u s

army concerns more than it was a "coherent entity" with a singular purpose.12 Calhoun himself would act as that singular, binding entity, using a staff that combined simplicity and efficiency. But once Calhoun was out of office, the system would begin to unravel, for

it was overly dependent upon not only the office of the Secretary of

War, but upon Calhoun himself.

That the concept of a General Staff was borrowed from Europe is n o t s u rp r is in g . The mass arm ies o f th e Napoleonic era commanded th e attention of m ilitary men the world over; the management of such 19

forces, which were apparently the wave of the future, was of

particular importance. Therefore, it was quite natural that

Presidents Madison and Monroe and their War Secretaries should express

an interest in sending m ilitary observers abroad to learn how these

armies were assembled and managed. This trend continued long after

the Napoleonic Wars; in fact, at least 105 U. S. Army officers visited

Europe, officially or unofficially, between the War of 1812 and the

Civil War. Among them would be such men as Irwin McDowell, Phillip

St. George Cooke, Robert S. Garnett, George Stoneman, William J.

Hardee, George B. Crittenden, Phil Kearny, George B. McClellan, and

Henry Halleck. In all, seventy of these officers eventually served in

the Civil War.^^

Among the earliest official observers was Colonel William Duane,

who went to Europe in 1810 under the orders of Secretary of War

William Eustis in order to report on the French and German cavalry

sy stem s. A p p aren tly , th is p a r tic u la r m issio n somehow went awry, as

Duane later claimed he was never compensated for his expenses. A more

organized effort began in 1815, when Monroe - then Secretary of War -

sent Captain (later Brigadier General) Sylvanus Thayer (USMA 1808) and

Lieutenant-Colonel William McRee (USMA 1805) to Europe at the

suggestion of Brigadier General Joseph G. Swift. Swift asked Monroe

to send these men to observe "European m ilitary establishments, their

fortifications. M ilitary Schools and M ilitary workshops." The officers were assigned to visit Spain, France, and England.The two men were well-chosen. Thayer and Winfield Scott, who joined the

pair for a time in France as a diplomatic envoy, had high regard for îfcRee; Thayer went so far as Co call him the army's "sole and

inspiring genius." Thayer himself would later become the

superintendent of the M ilitary Academy.

The timing of these visits placed the Americans in Europe a few weeks after Napoleon's final defeat. While they did not get to see

Bonaparte in action, McRee took advantage of the opportunity to see

troops from all over Europe on review after Waterloo. Though Thayer

was kept from these reviews due to illness, he recovered quickly and was able to help McRee collect nearly 1000 books and charts for the

Military Academy library. They also attended sessions at the Ecole

Polytechnique, in an effort to gain an appreciation for the French m ilitary educational system.Overall, Thayer and McRee agreed

that the Europeans seemed to be better m ilitarily prepared and

organized than the Americans, an observation that could hardly have

surprised knowledgeable American m ilitary analysts.

Thayer, McRee, and Scott would all return to the United States by

1817. They had helped to set an important precedent, and would be

followed by other observers, since m ilitary leaders recognized that

there were ideas to be gained from studying European m ilitary methods.

Quite possibly, Thayer and McRee's observations not only impressed

Calhoun, the new Secretary of War, enough to inspire the creation of

the American version of a general staff, but also influenced Calhoun's

famous plan for an "expansible army." This plan was based in part upon European models, as well as upon an apprehension of what sort of a threat the European armies presented. When in 1820 Calhoun was ordered to present Congress a plan for reducing the army, he delivered 21 his plan for an army which was small but could be quickly expanded in response to an emergency.

Essentially, Calhoun argued that if the regular army had to be reduced, then the reduction had to be accomplished in such a fashion that the army "would remain ready to expand instantly in war," because the regular army was more effective than the m ilitiaTw o y ea rs previously, in a similar report to the House of Representatives,

Calhoun had noted the country had grown considerably since the days of the early Republic, with the population and territory both having doubled. This growth demanded larger regular forces to defend the borders. "To consider the present army as dangerous to our liberty partakes, it is conceived, more of timidity than of wisdom," he had said in 1818, when th e nunber o f men a v a ila b le for d u ty was about

10 , 000; two years later, when Congress decided to reduce the force to

6,000, he was forced to attempt to devise a system which would be as efficient as possible. The best he could really hope for was a system which would save the most vital services and permit them to be enlarged quickly in wartime. To that end, he wished to create a complete "skeleton army," possessing all necessary officers but reducing the rank and file. In times of emergency, troops would be added to already-existing units and these new men would quickly assimilate m ilitary knowledge and confidence from their association with the regular soldiers and officers in their company. The m ilitia,

Calhoun noted, was a good force when backed by regulars, but otherwise should not meet European troops in the field. C alhoun's concept was t h i s :

...at the commencement of hostilities, there should be nothing either to new model or new create. The only difference...between the peace and war formation of the army, ought to be in the increased magnitude of the latter; and the only change... should consist in giving to it the augmentation \diich will then be necessary. It is thus, and thus only, that the dangerous transition from peace to war may be made without confusion or disorder.

Calhoun apparently developed this plan after consulting with

Generals Brown and Scott, probably while considering the observations

o f Thayer and McRee. The scheme took in to account th e known s tre n g th

of European armies, the social and economic realities of the United

States, and the most practical means for assembling armies capable of

combatting European forces. That the plan was sound was demonstrated

by the grudging compliment paid by one of Calhoun's principal

opponents. Representative Thomas Cobb of Georgia, who admitted it was

the "ablest, the most ingenious, and, upon the whole, the best defense

of a standing army in time of peace" that he had ever seen.

Nonetheless, Congress rejected the plan on the basis that it proposed

to reduce the number of enlisted men but not the officers, leaving an

"elite" that Americans traditionally f e a r e d .^0

So the proposed reforms did not go into effect. Congress ignored

both reorganization of the m ilitia and the "expansible army." The

cavalry was abolished, and the Military Academy's budget was cut. But

the idea of an "expansible army" would be revived in the future.

Calhoun's ultimate influence lay in his utilization of European

concepts in proposing a viable alternative to traditional American methods of raising an army. By getting lawmakers to realize that 23

Europe had made certain strides while America lagged behind, he was

able to stabilize the War Department budget, improve coastal

fortifications, and establish an artillery school. He thus made the

first important moves toward raising the American army to the

standards of European regulars by examining and accepting certain

concepts from abroad. Although he would not live to see the ultimate

results, his willingness to overcome American parochialism was an

important initial step that set the stage for later reformers.

Observers Following Calhoun: Interest in the French System

A nunber of noteworthy individuals journeyed to Europe as

observers between Calhoun's term as War Secretary and the Mexican War,

Prom inent among them were Dennis H art Mahan (USMA 1824), who went to

France, 1826-1830; Lieutenant Daniel Tyler (USMA 1819), who joined

Mahan in 1828-1829; Phil Kearny, Jr., who went to France, Italy, and

Africa in 1839-1840; and William J, Hardee (USMA 1838), who studied at

the French Cavalry School at Saumur, 1840-1842, A board of ordnance officers interested primarily in the artillery systems of England,

Scotland, Sweden, Russia, Prussia, Belgium, and France went abroad in

1840,

Mahan was sent to Europe by none other than Sylvanus Thayer himself. He went with the intention of "restoring his health," but

Thayer recognized special qualities in Mahan and asked him to observe

European engineering methods even as he was recuperating. Apparently both Thayer and Secretary of War James Barbour were interested in

obtaining information on Europe's engineering advances and in developing Mahan's considerable m ilitary and analytical talents, Mahan d isco v ered f a ir l y e a rly in h is v i s i t th a t th e "man in th e

field" was much more aware and could more realistically appraise a

given situation than could the highly-placed official at the capital.

He would learn more by being in the field himself than by spending

time in Paris talking to various bureaucrats and administrators. It

was while personally examining French railroads, for example, that he

saw th e French sloped t h e i r tra c k when making c u rv e s , which

facilitated smoother movement of the trains. This seems obvious, in

retrospect ; yet Mahan noted the English had not tried this technique

because the builders of English lines had not personally inspected

their right-of-way and thus could not appreciate the problem.

But Mahan's main interest was the French m ilitary education

system. In 1828, joined by Lieutenant Tyler of the A rtillery, Mahan

visited the French m ilitary school system. He wrote of this system -

particularly the Schools of Application, Mines, and Bridges and Roads

- in letters to Secretary Barbour. Mahan recommended that at least

one officer from each branch of the United States' m ilitary services

attend the schools. He was sure that the United States could "reap

the benefits" of the previous half-century of European wartime

experience by sending officers on a regular basis to the various

F rench school s .

In 1829, Tÿler and Mahan themselves enrolled in the School of

Application at Metz, which Mahan considered to be the finest in Europe

in the practical application of Engineering and A rtillery. Both spent

a year of study there. Tyler had relieved Mahan of his responsibility

to investigate the artillery and wrote on the entire French artillery 25 system - field to seacoast - in his report to the War Department.

Tyler's report noted that the French artillery system was outdated: the British had developed new designs for guns and carriages which were superior to the old designs employed by France. Mahan concentrated on French engineering methods and stressed the need for integrating m ilitary education with specific scientific engineering problem s

Considering Mahan's flattering comments on the French school system and Thayer and McRee's earlier reports, it is not difficult to see why the Americans considered the French m ilitary system to be, overall, the finest in the world. The system, together with the nearly unassailable reputation of the armies of Bonaparte, stamped the

French m ilitary as the most advanced and the best; therefore, it would receive the most attention by Am ere ian overseas observers until events in 1870 forced a sudden réévaluation. Tyler's comments, in contrast, offered a lone sour note that was an early indication the French m ilitary was not all it was generally imagined to be. Though Tyler's assessment was acted upon with the American adoption of seme British artillery methods in 1836, the preponderance of American m ilitary opinion seemed to remain solidly in favor - if not in awe - of the

It is not surprising, then, that the next American observer of any stature and lasting influence to visit Europe also made France his most important stop. The observer was Lieutenant Philip Kearny, later to become a Union general with a reputation for a love and aptitude for battle that was probably unsurpassed in the entire army. Kearny 26

went to Europe in 1839 along with Lieutenants Henry S. Turner and

William Eustis. President Martin Van Buren sent this three-man

commission to study at the Royal School of Cavalry at Saunur, taking -

as had Mahan at Metz - two years' worth of courses in only one year.

The three were expected to become accomplished in the theory and

practice of the French cavalry and then return to the United States

and work out a system of tactics for the dragoons, modeled on their

knowledge accumulated abroad. Secretary of War Joel Poinsett, who had himself visited Europe a few years previously, considered the French

cavalry to be the finest on the continent

Kearny's stay in France was short-lived. He and the other members of the commission left for France in August, 183 9. By the following

May, Keamy was w ith th e French army in A lg ie rs , vdiere he f i r s t experienced being under hostile fire. He was interested in learning

about war firsthand, not simply studying books and theory. On several occasions, he actually took part in the fighting. After the successful summer campaign of 1840, Keamy and the rest of the commission returned to the United States. By February 1841 the

Cavalry Tactics prepared by Secretary Poinsett and the commission members were published. Though largely simply a translation of the

French tactics, the work was well received and proved superior to several subsequent attempted improvements.^^

Keamy did have his criticism s of the French service, however.

Especially revealing was his observation that the general condition of some of the French stables evidenced a lack of cleanliness and discipline on the part of the troops. He was sure that if he were to 27

inspect German stables, he would find that they kept the buildings and

the horses in perfect condition! So even Kearny, enamored of the

French in many ways, was a p p r e c ia tiv e o f th e r e p u ta tio n German tro o p s

already had for being well-ordered and disc ipl ined

Keamy returned to France two decades later and participated in

the French campaign against the Austrians in Italy in 1859. On that

occasion he acted as a private individual and he again took part in

the fighting, to the consternation of his French hosts. The fact that

he was not at that time officially attached to the United States Army

prevented possible embarrassment to France and the United States; in

fact, he was awarded the Cross of the Legion of Honor by the French

Emperor. On this trip Kearny did not prepare an official report, but his experience would serve the Union army well in the early months of

the Civil War

Another three-man commission followed Kearny's team to Saumur late

in 1840. This group was composed of Captain Lloyd J. Beall and

Lieutenants Washington Irving Newton and William J. Hardee. They

completed the entire course of instruction at Saumur and made such a

favorable impression that their hosts encouraged the United States government to send more officers of similar caliber. Hardee would

later instruct American cavalry in French methods, as well as publish his very fine Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics in 1855. Revisions to the 1841 cavalry report were also penned by Hardee, although the report does not bear his name.^^

The Ordnance Board o f 1840 c o n s is te d o f fo u r members: M ajor R. L.

Baker. Mr. W illiam Wade (a form er U. S. Army M ajor), C aptain A lfred 28

Mordecai (who would later visit Europe with another fact-finding

board), and Captain Benjamin Huger. The board reported its findings

in November, 1840. Materials they shipped or brought back included

drawings of buildings, maps, and blueprints; m ilitary books from

Prussia, England, and France ; and nunerous assorted items, such as

breastplates, pistols, rifles, belts, swords, and even howitzers.

The board concentrated its efforts on foundries and arsenals in

Great Britain and France, though it visited Sweden, Russia, and

Prussia as well. The German works they visited were located at

Berlin, Breslau, Potsdam, and Spandau. In each case the Americans

found the German facilities to be "neat," "tidy," and "clean," but

beyond noticing that the stereotype of the German penchant for

fastidiousness was apparently accurate, the board said little in the

way of criticism or evaluation. The members were interested primarily

in the armaments themselves and the methods of producing them, in

order that the United States could copy the most efficient weapons and

the corresponding manufacturing processes. Nonetheless, the mere fact

that the board was sent to Germany was again indicative of an American

awareness that there were things to be learned from the Germans as

well as the French.

Jefferson Davis and the Delafield Commission

The war with Mexico enabled Keamy and others to demonstrate and

put into practice their theoretical studies and their practical

experiences. It was also instrumental in convincing Congress that

some of Calhoun's plans were desirable, and certain changes had to be made in the methods of raising, equipping, and commanding an army. 29

Incompetent leadership, unwise recruiting practices, and state control

of volunteers all helped to make a mess of the American war effort.

That the United States was nonetheless successful had much to do with

building a new respect for the army.

It was obvious, however, that there was still plenty of room for

improvement. Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War under President

Franklin Pierce, chose to send a m ilitary commission to the scene of

the Crimean War in order to observe firsthand a variety of European

armies. Reflecting on America's disorganized Mexican War experience,

Davis feared that any one of the European armies in the Crimea might at some future time find the United States to be an easy adversary.

Davis realized the necessity of keeping abreast of m ilitary developments abroad, especially concerning the structure, mode of operation, and equipment of foreign armies.

Davis' commission was very capable. Its members were Major

Richard Delafield (USMA 1818) of the Engineers, who had at one time been the Superintendent at West Point; Major Alfred Mordecai (USMA

1823) o f th e Ordnance D epartm ent, a fu tu re Academy S u p erin ten d e n t and a member of the 1849 Ordnance Board; and Captain George B. McClellan

(USMA 1846) of the Cavalry, destined to become for a time the

Commanding G eneral o f th e Union A rm ies. Each was to p re p a re a re p o rt on his observations, particularly (but not exclusively) as they

related to their respective branches of the service. Davis'

instructions stated that they were to observe "the practical working of the changes which have been introduced, of late years into the m ilitary systems of the principal nations of Europe

Specifically, he wished them to take note of:

The organization of the armies and of the departments, for furnishing supplies of all kinds to the troops The manner of distributing s u p p lie s . The f i t t i n g up o f v e s s e ls fo r tra n s p o s r tin g men and horses .the medical and hospital arrange­ ments .... The kind of clothing and camp equipage used. The kinds of arms, ammunition and accoutrements used in equipping troops of the various branches ....advantages and disadvantages attending the use of the various kinds of rifle arms, which have been lately introduced extensively in European war fare.... The nature and efficiency of ordnance and ammunit ion... .construct ion of permanent fortifications, the arrangement of new systems of sea-coast and land defenses, and the kind of ordnance used in the armament of them .... The composition of trains for seige operations.... The engineering operations of a seige...both of attack and defense. The composition of bridge trains; kinds of b o a ts , wagons, &c. The construction of casemated forts and the effects produced on them, in attacks by land and

The use of camels for transportation, and their adaptation to cold and mountainous countries.

Davis thus initiated an undertaking designed to investigate every phase of European land warfare. This was the first such mission by

American m ilitary personnel to observe major European armies in the

field since Thayer and McRee's visit nearly forty years previously.

The commission had the opportunity to witness the operations of armies much larger than those used in the Mexican War. The mission would set a new, high standard for observers sent abroad in the future, as its

published reports were models of attention to detail.

The commission members stayed in Europe for nearly two years.

Because they went in time of war, they encountered various 31 difficulties in visiting certain locations. Nonetheless, they were

able to inspect foundries, m ilitary installations, and railroads in

England, France, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, and Poland. In the

Crimea they were able to enter the camps or trenches of the British,

Turks, Sardinians, French, and Russians, though the latter two were not as cooperative as the other s.

All three officers bene fitted from the experience, and their reports would influence the great American conflict to come in 1861.

Later, McClellan's tanporary assignment as Commanding General of the

Union armies made his European experiences all the more important; his impressions probably made him determined to discard the haphazard organization and training so common in the United States. His own re o rg a n iz a tio n o f th e Army o f th e Potomac was based in p art upon what he had seen in Europe

Although McClellan represented the cavalry, he was well-versed in engineering as well. As a result, he was able to dispassionately analyze the relative merits and shortcomings of each service. For example, he said it was difficult to see how anyone could have ordered the famous but ill-fated charge of the Light Brigade against the formidable Russian defensive positions. He praised the ingenuity of those defenses and the valiant sorties made by the Russian defenders.

Through his reports, American cavalrymen could learn that Russian irregular cavalry provided cover for regular troops, allowing the regulars to get into the action fresh and with a full force. American engineers could learn how pontoon bridges were constructed. 32 entrenchments laid out, seige operations conducted, and engineer companies equipped and organized

McClellan and his companions were frequently inspired to analyze and criticize American as well as European methods. McClellan admonished that "mere individual courage can not suffice to overcome the forces that could be brought against us" in a war against a

European power. Courage had to be "rendered manageable by.. .m ilitary skill which can only be acquired by a course of educat ion. . .and by long habit." For the United States to repel an invading European army, "it is not enough to trust to the nuaber of brave but undisciplined men that we can bring to bear against it He was not advocating a large regular army, however:

Our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be large enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defense of the frontier will justify; the nunber of officers and non-commissioned officers should be sufficiently large, to provide for a sudden increase.... The m ilitia and volunteer system should be placed upon some tangible and effective basis, instructors furnished them from the regular army, and all possible means taken to spread sound m ilita r y in fo rm atio n among them. In the vicinity of our seacoast fortifications it would be well to provide a sufficient number of volunteer companies with the means of instruction in heavy artillery; detaching officers of the regular artillery as instructors ----- In tim e o f w ar, or when war is im m inent, lo c a l companies of regular artillery might easily be enlisted for short terms of service, or for the war, in the seacoast towns. The same thing might be advantageously carried into effect, on a small scale, in time of peace.

The fu tu re Commanding General o b v io u sly reco g n ized both th e need for disciplined regular troops and the traditional American reluctance to trust tho? nation's fate to a large body of such soldiers. Some compromise needed to be reached between need and tradition.

Delafield concurred, as he sensed the United States was obviously unprepared to wage a war against a major European power:

The l a t e European c o n te st has shown how r a p id ly the continental powers could march to the coast and embark detachments from ten to twenty thousand troops in steam transports, accomodating a thousand men each, with supplies for a voyage equal to crossing to our shores; yet with a blind indifference, professing at the same time to be all powerful, our people neglect the many calls and statements of those they appoint to study this subject, leaving us at the mercy, in the first years of a conflict, of either of the naval and m ilitary powers of the Old World. Viewing the subject in all its bearings, I am more impressed than ever with our comparative want of preparation and m ilitary knowledge in the country, and that the Secretary of War will do a great good service to the nation by increasing the material and munitions, means of defense, and the diffusion of m ilitary information in every possible way that our institutions will permit, without creating any more of a standing army than the growth of the country calls for, preparatory to that great struggle which sooner or later may be forced upon us, and to resist which, with our present means, we are comparatively unprepared

The- shortcomings Delafield saw in the United States' system of m ilitary preparedness were due, he said, to those very factors by

\diich the United States had previously supposed itself to be secure from European invasion. Because of the false sense of security,

Americans had accomplished very little in the way of m ilitary advancement. European nations, because of their very proximity to each other, were constantly enlarging their armies and educating them in the art of war. They perceived m ilitary pursuits as being of the highest importance and deserving of great honor, sharply contrasting 34 with the United States' general distrust of a standing army. While recognizing the American reluctance to create a large regular force,

Delafield hoped that the handicaps posed by the lack of a sizable army could be overcome through proper m ilitary education, organization, and training of \^at forces were available.

Delafield made a surprising observation in his report's cover letter: while new principles of attack and defense had been used in the Crimea, "few new principles have been introduced with much success." The changes he observed were "found mainly in the increased magnitude of the engines of w a rT h o u g h the tactics of Napoleon and Wellington had not availed the opposing armies of the

1850's much success, no new developments appeared to compensate for the increased technical capabilities of defenders to work havoc upon attackers. This observation was significant, but it went largely unnoticed, for it would take the majority of Union and Confederate commanders some time to realize how poorly they were served by

Napoleonic tactics. McClellan took notice, however. In fact, the entire commission was impressed by the Russian defenses, and they saw how badly the attackers had been mauled by well-entrenched defenders.

Small wonder, then, that McClellan would move cautiously when he commanded th e Army o f th e Potomac in 1861-62. The Crimean c o n f li c t

indicated how terrible the carnage could be, and yet it offered no obvious insights as to how such a toll could be avoided by the attacking forces. McClellan learned his lesson well, but was unable to develop an alternative course of action in response to the new technology. 35

S till, the commission made several tangible suggestions for the

improvement of the American army. McClellan in particular devoted a

large segment of his report to suggestions for the cavalry. He felt

that light cavalry would be the most useful in America, while heavy

cavalry would hinder our own purposes against the Plains Indians or

other enemies who would use the vast open expanses of territory to

strike (and disappear) quickly. He also introduced a new model of

cavalry sabre and saddle-tree. The saddle, adapted from a Hungarian model used by the Prussians, was a fine piece of equipment, possibly

the best of its sort seen in the United States up until that time.

When the saddle was adopted for use in the United States, it would be

named for McClellan.41 For the infantry, McClellan suggested the

adoption of the French style of uniform as it was practical,

attractive and comfortable. The forage cap (like the saddle, it

would be named the "McClellan" cap) and zouave uniform thus became popular accepted standards in American m ilitary dress for a few

Major D elafield's report covered an immense amount of detail,

sometimes overlapping with items mentioned by McClellan. Subjects covered in his report included such varied topics as official

policies towards soldiers' wives, exact measurements of

fortifications, and descriptions of m ilitary hospitals. But perhaps more important than any detail on methods and operations was his

admonition to his peers regarding the seeming over-emphasis of French m ethods: ....I cannot forbear remarking on our custom of looking to France alone for m ilitary information ....O fficers of equal science, tact, and genius are to be found in the other European armies, whose writings and labors may prove quite as useful in their application to our wants as those of France... .^3

This straight forward observation went unnoticed by most American

m ilitary personnel. Delafield was serving notice that the world had

changed since the days of Napoleon I, but only after the events of

1870-71 would the truth of his remark be apparent to all. By that

time, of course, few people would even be aware that Delafield had

ever made such a prophetic statement fifteen years previously.

Major Mordecai's report was largely limited to precise measurements and descriptions of ordnance, but he did make an effort

to generally describe the m ilitary systems of each of the contending

powers. Though McClellan described in great detail the entire Russian

army and the cavalry systems of the other major nations, Mordecai was

the only one of the commission members to speak about the European

General Staffs. This was indicative of American lack of appreciation

for organizational concepts, as well as a preoccupation with minor

details. As a m ilitary historian pointedly noted in 1944:

...[in the Delafield Commission reports] there is not one brief discussion of the great Prussian Staff system, which was perhaps the most important m ilitary development on the European continent. [This] was probably an accurate.. .commentary on the state of American m ilitary intellect.... Had the members of this commission spent less time an a ly zin g th e m ethods o f hanging hammocks aboard ship and used it for delving into the organization and educational system of the Prussian staff, American m ilitary thought might easily have progressed at a much quicker pace.... But the Delafield Commission missed the significance of Prussian staff development, and the [American] staff system remained virtually unchanged in the between the states. Captain McClellan, as a member of the Delafield Commission, may not have been interested in staff organization or functioning, but General McClellan, commander of th e Army o f th e Potom ac, l a t e r was to be d ee p ly concerned about such matters.^^

Actually, Mordecai's report did mention the Prussian staff: without comment or criticism , he outlined its duties and structures in a mere one-half p a g e ! ^ 5 commission should not be held entirely at fault, however. Their primary task had been to visit "the

seat of war," and the Prussians were neutral in the Crimean conflict.

Davis' orders, while mentioning Prussian organization, had emphasized the "m aterialistic aspects of war," and this is precisely what the commission gave him. Furthermore, it is relatively easier for the modern historian to recognize the beginnings of the successful

Prussian staff development since we know the ultimate outcome of the wars of 1864-71. The commission members would have been hard-pressed

to make such accurate predictions, especially since their time in

Europe was limited and their major efforts were to be concentrated upon the various branches of the forces of embattled nations. S till,

it is strange that Davis, who in his 1854 report to Congress had

recognized the importance of the staff, should not have taken more

care to assure that the commission would investigate the European staff systems.46

Upon his return from Europje, Captain McClellan made two major observations: (1) the courses at West Point provided better training

than any of the European schools he had visited; and (2) he urged the 38

regular army be increased .47 xhur he repeated the often-heard

remarks which on the one hand vindicated the existence of the M ilitary

Academy and on the other condemned the nation's overall m ilitary

policy of stinginess and m istrust.

Davis, meanwhile, would end his term as War Secretary shortly

after McClellan and Delafield filed their reports, but he was

sufficiently able to recognize certain trends in European armament

development prior to receiving these reports. In December 1855 he

simultaneously ended the manufacture of smooth-bore arms at the

national armories and instigated the adoption of the 1855 model .58

caliber Springfield rifled musket. This weapon's range and accuracy

would in turn necessitate the development of a new system of tactics.

In fact, Davis had become interested in rifled pieces and new

ammunition long before; the eventual commission reports served to

strengthen his convictions about the new systems.^®

McClellan requested that a board or commission evaluate some of

his suggestions, but Davis wished the army to be immediately advised

of European methods without having the news bogged down by stodgy,

conservative boards. Thus, he had McClellan speak directly with

Hardee concerning changes in tactics necessitated by the new weaponry.

Hardee, who had visited France and attended the Cavalry School at

Saumur, published his Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics in 185 5 with

the new developments very much in mind. It seems that Davis, aware of

certain advances all along, shrewdly employed several of the "army's

own" to b rin g home news o f European te c h n ic a l ach iev m en ts, thus making these foreign innovations more acceptable to American m ilitary 39

personnel. It is ironic that the future President of the Confederacy

should have taken such pains to assure the modernization of the army

that would eventually utilize the new technology to crush the

Confederate rebellion.^^

European Interest in the American Civil War

Four years following Davis' term as Secretary of War, Calhoun's unfulfilled plan once again came back to haunt the nation's leaders.

The Union early felt the effects of not having developed an

"expansible army" as Calhoun had suggested so long before. In fact, both the Union and the Confederacy repeated the blunder of the Mexican

War: they initially obtained troops for short periods rather than for the "duration" of the conflict. In addition, both sides were forced to enter the war with only a handful of professional soldiers. Emory

Upton would note in 1880 that on the eve of South Carolina's secession the Union army was "destitute" of any meaningful force. Though the

Union managed to retain most of its regulars and about two-thirds of its officers, it mistakenly allowed the individual states to raise their own regiments and officer than with non-professional soldiers.

The states also raised new regiments rather than refill veteran units.

The entirely new units took a full year to acquire the veterans'

"edge," while those that mingled "green" with experienced troops took a fraction of that time.50

The staffs of both sides were reasonably adequate, but generals often clung to textbook guidelines for their doctrine even when the texts did not apply to their current tasks. McClellan was one of these; and in his memoirs, he would later complain that he "labored 40

from the want of that thorough theoretical and practical education

received by the officers of the German General Staff." Perhaps he was

speaking with the aid of hindsight; in any case, he at some point came

to recognize the value of the Prussian system, even though his

commission report had not reflected such an appreciation.^^

Despite years of admonition and warning by Calhoun, Davis, and

others, America went into the Civil War largely unprepared for the effort. Ironically, just as the United States had sent a commission

to the Crimea to observe the advancements and mistakes of the

Europeans, so too did the Europeans send official and unofficial visitors to see, in essence, whether Americans had learned anything

from their experience or had anything new to offer in weaponry,

tactics, strategy, or organization. Unfortunately, while the American

commission had missed "the most important m ilitary development on the

European continent" by ignoring the Prussian staff system, European visitors also blundered in their observations in America. Some let

their own prejudices blind them to the realities of the war. For

example. Captain Justus Scheibert of Prussia saw elements of the Union

array assembling at New York City - far from the battlefields, to say the least - and somehow managed to form a "lasting prejudice" against

it. Lieutenant Colonel James Arthur Lyon Freemantle of England was apparently sufficiently charmed by the Confederates' manner as to predict an eventual Confederate victory, even after Vicksburg and

Gettysburg were history.52

A major point apparently never fully comprehended by most European visitors was that the seeming incompetence of the Armerican armies was 41 not due to the inherent inferiority of the American as a soldier, but rather to the long-standing American traditions that assured the bulk of the armies would be amateur soldiers. Europeans in contrast had highly professional armies. Furthermore, this was the first great war

fought with both the new tools and weapons of the Industrial

Revolution and with the old French tactics, designed for the open

fields of Europe rather than the Wilderness of Virginia or the mountains of Maryland.53

Scheibert, for one, would admit that the mutually "sloppy" performances at First Manassas caused Europeans to lose interest in the war at an early stage. Thus they missed the later developments

\diich could have proven interesting or useful. Scheibert himself missed the fact that in America, dragoon cavalry (or "mounted infantry") could be of much more use than European-style heavy cavalry. But he was astute enough to notice the difference in Federal and Confederate employment of artillery, and that traditional brick and mortar defenses were not nearly as useful in withstanding seiges as reinforced earthworks. He noted the value of combined land-water operations, such as those along the M ississippi, and warned against the over-use of defensive fortifications. An admirer of Lee,

Scheibert advocated mobility and offensive action as the way to win wars. Years later, the French army at Metz would re-leam this lesson to their chagrin, as they lost the initiative by staying inside their d e fe n s iv e w o r k s .54

Scheibert was probably the best foreign observer and authority on the Army of Northern Virginia. He was intuitive enough to interpret 42

b o th th e c o n f l i c t 's o rig in and th e manner in which i t was waged as

products of the industrial age. He was not present during the

campaigns of 1864-65, in which the cavalries of Philip Sheridan and

Nathan B. Forrest played important roles; had he been, it is possible

he would have better understood American cavalry concepts. Nor did he

see the trench warfare of those years. However, his interpretations

went unquestioned in Germany, and his readers thus saw little in the

Civil War that could be incorporated into the German system. He and

later writers were often preoccupied with two concepts: the

"improvised" American armies, and the glaring lack of both training

and a general staff in the German s e n s e . 55

It is true that little from the Civil War could be directly

applied to Europe. Only the railroad systems and construction corps

seemed to have universal value. The respective geographies and

population densities were simply too different to make valid

analogies. But even where observers could see items worthy of mention, they often downplayed them intentionally. Many Europeans

writing about the war were junior officers concerned about advancing

their career, and so they seldom developed original views contrary to

accepted theory and texts.56 xn addition, it should be

remembered that the Europeans were otherwise occupied at that time.

The British were still mulling over the Crimean War; the Prussians

were shortly involved in the wars of German unification; and the

French were s till enamored with the memory of Napoleon I. Because of

the various revolutions of recent years, European m ilitary

professionals tended to look upon "unorganized mobs" - whether 43 peasants or clad in the uniforms of American armies - with disdain.

Nevertheless, observers from all three nations had a number of useful

(albeit different) insights, as well. The Prussians took close note of American railroads, the French noticed the organization and administrative bodies that made Union victory possible, and the

British were interested in the volunteer auxiliary forces. All vrere

favorably impressed with the American m ilitary academy.

Even those items which interested the Europeans were not always recommended for adoption into their own systems. Jay Luvass noted in

The M ilitary Legacy of the Civil War (1959) that "there never was a time when the Civil War exerted a direct influence upon m ilitary doctrine in Europe." Observations in America often simply confirmed what experiments with metals and artillery had already implied. The

European wars of the next decade actually offered a better opportunity

for observation. Had these wars not occurred, the American conflict would have been of more importance in the study of war. As it was, most Europeans completely missed or misunderstood some lessons (such as those of entrenchments and mounted infantry) though they did recognize others (notably, the railroads and the obvious transition in artillery from smoothbore to rifled pieces)

Interestingly, it was the Germans who demonstrated the greatest interest in the American Civil War. This was particularly true after

1871, when strategists had time to analyze and compare their own recent campaigns with other major conflicts. As early as 1866, the

Prussians created a field railway system, the Eisenbahn-Abte ilung, similar to the system used by the Union. The Germans also recognized 44

Che worth of underwater obstructions in coastal defense, the

Confederate cavalry's "courier service," the first use of armored

vessels and heavy rifled artillery, and the development of sanitary

methods for battlefield hospital s.They owed much o f t h e i r

information to Scheibert's "Die letzen Tage der Rebellion: aus dem

Tagebuch eines Kanoniers," and Sherman's Marsch Durch Georgian.

In the writings of Scheibert and others, Lee and Sherman - despite

their marked differences - seem to have made the greatest impression

and contributed the most to European m ilitary thought. Sherman was

especially popular among the Germans, representing the type of war yet

to come; Lee was perceived as gallant and interesting, but the last of

the old breed. S till, Scheibert later noticed the sim ilarities

between Lee's infantry of 1863 and the Prussian infantry of 1870: both

used the line and abandoned the column, and both used skirmishers.

The result was the placing of more responsibility in the hands of the

junior officers and less control held by the field commander.59

Scheibert saw three stages of tactics emerge in the Civil War.

First was the isolated, disjointed, undisciplined, inexperienced

com bat. N ext, a f t e r some d i s c i p l in e was ach iev ed , came th e em ergence

of linear tactics. Finally, the "tactical defensive" developed, and

with it came the use of sophisticated field fortifications. Luvass

saw this summation as "simplified and distorted," and it was.

Scheibert did not travel with Lee after 1863, and he did not witness

the offensive sidestepping tactics which Grant employed to counter

Lee's defensive movements in 1864-65.^^ 45

S c h e ib e r t's was not th e only German v o ice of p ra is e or c r it i c i s m

of American war efforts. Otto Heusinger, who was not an observer but

a combatant on the Union side, voiced his respect for the new

firepower in Amerikanische Kriegsbilder, Auszeichnungen aus den Jahren

1861-1865 (1869). He especially respected artillery in general and

canister in particular. Heusinger logically appreciated field

fortifications for the protection they offered from the improved weapons. In contrast to Scheibert, he stayed in America long enough to gain respect for Philip Sheridan's Union cavalry.

While Heusinger fought for the Union, Heros von Bor eke served as a member o f J . E. B. S t u a r t 's s t a f f . Von Borcke was ex trem ely p opular

in the South, and his fame gained his book. Memoirs of the Confederate

War for Independence (1866), many readers in America and Europe. He

too saw the effects of artillery and noted that bayonet fights and wounds were uncommon. The explanation for this went beyond an

abhorrence of hand-to-hand combat: the new effective range of rifles and artillery were prohibitive factors in approaching enemy lines for either close volleys or bayonet charges. Von Borcke also saw that the vast distances and large armies involved in the war contributed to the rise of the signal corps, "an institution peculiar to the American armies" but one which could prove valuable in Europe. Because of his status on Stuart's staff, he of course was prone to believe that cavalry was still valuable in warfare. Very little that Stuart had done would ever contradict that idea, so von Borcke was on safe g ro u n d .62 46

S till another German working with the Confederates was Viktor von

Scheliha, who served as Chief Engineer for the Confederate army in the

Department of the Gulf. His Treatise on Coast-Defence (1868) has been cited as "probably the most authoritative study on the Civil War of its kind."^^ Von Scheliha believed that coast defense was

"static" at the war's start, but Union successes against Rebel coastal installations led to the Confederacy's efforts to create new methods of defense. Torpedoes and other obstructions, floating batteries, earth and sand forts, and coastal railroads were all recognized as extremely important means of coastal defense.

It is significant that the aspects of the American war perceived by Germans as being important were those of a technical nature.

Nothing having to do with staff or organization was seen as possessing much value, since the Prussian staff was already perfected and functioning. Only the mechanical and technical details proved to be o f much i n t e r e s t.

Unfortunately, it seems that even Scheibert, the most a u t h o r ita tiv e of th e German o b s e rv e rs , was l a t e r com pelled by economic necessity simply to translate works by American authors and add a few personal observations, publishing the whole under his name. Volumes of material thus produced in Germany were eagerly absorbed by an in te r e s te d German au d ien ce. Much o f t h i s m a te ria l was of a

"narrative" rather than an "analytical" variety, and thus it offered few unbiased technical or tactical observations. Equally unfortunately, many junior officers were reluctant to criticize or provide their own insights to these writings if they were at variance w ith S c h e i b e r t 's .^5

Nonetheless, both original analyses and translated narratives that appeared in Germany helped to stimulate interest in, and respect for, the American army. Thus, when men of the stature of Sherman,

Sheridan, or Grant would later v isit Germany, they were cordially received and often were allowed to travel at will through German m ilitary installations. Other American m ilitary observers were also treated with deference. The Americans, in turn, would gain new insights into German organization, tactics, and technology, and into the lessons of their own Civil War as perceived by the Germans.

American insights into an efficient, respected German m ilitary organization and an awareness of how German m ilitary personnel viewed th e u n ite d S ta te s ' army helped to fa sh io n th e new American army th a t would emerge in the early Twentieth century. NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. Walter Mill is. Arms and Men: A Study of American M ilitary History (New York: Mentor Books, 1956), pp. 37-8.

2. Ibid., pp. 40, 46. This is, of course, much the same policy as exists today.

3. Ibid., pp. 44-3. Hamilton thought that a small volunteer army co u ld h elp keep th e p eace. Also see Edward Mead E a r le 's e s s a y , "Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, and Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of M ilitary Power," in a volume edited by Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy: M ilitary Thought from Machiavelli to H itler (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 130.

4. Earle, "Smith, Hamilton, and List," pp. 130-35. Also see Henry Cabot Lodge (ed.), Collected Works of Alexander Hamilton (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1903), Volume II, pp. 73, 100-02.

5. Ibid., p. 138. Also see Andrew A. Lipscomb (ed.). The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, D. C.: Thomas Jefferson Association of the United States, 1903), Volume XIII, p. 261.

6. R u s s e ll F. W eigley, H is to ry o f th e U n ited S ta te s Army (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1967), p. 123. This staff was not a General Staff in the modern sense, but more of a special adavisory staff. It was temporarily abandoned in 1815, but was revived 24 April 1816. See Emory Upton, M ilitary Policy of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), pp. 143-44.

7. Weigley. Army, p. 139; Upton. Military Policy, p. 143. Upton gives specific figures. For example, company limits were 68 privates ; 81 was the limit when officers, sergeants, corporals, and musicians were included. Four Brigade Inspectors replaced the Inspector-General; one regimant consisted of 10 companies, plus officers, staff, musicians, surgeons, and assistants.

8. Weigley, Army, pp. 117, 131-34. Calhoun did not accomplish all that he wished, but he greatly improved the army's position.

9. "Report on the Reduction of the Army to the House of Representatives," 14 December 1818, in Richard K. Cralle (ed.). Reports and Public Letters of John C. Calhoun (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1883), Volume V, p. 30. Also see Weigley, Army, p. 134. 10. Anonymous, "Mr. Calhoun's Army," M ilitary Review, 1957 #6. Gerald M. Capers, John C. Calhoun, Opportunist (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p. 63, outlines Calhoun's staff organization. Also see Weigley, Army, pp. 134-35. The Surgeon G eneral was Joseph L o v e ll; th e Q u a rterm a ste r General was Thomas S. Jessup, the "Father of the Corps."

11. Weigley, Army, p. 135.

12. Dale E. Floyd, "U. S. Army Officers in Europe, 1815-1861," in Proceedings of the Citadel Conference on War and Diplomacy. 1977, pp. 27-8.

13. Duane formally complained to Congress in 1824 concerning his overdue account. See Senate Document 57, 18th Congress, First Session, March 23, 1824. For Thayer and McRee, see Ernest Dupuy, Where They have Trod: The West Point Tradition in American Life (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1940), pp. 74-5.

14. Dupuy, Trod, p. 61.

15. Ibid.. pp. 83, 87, 92, 97.

16. Charles M. W iltse, John C. Calhoun, Nationalist (New York: B o b b s-M erfill Company, 1944), p . 210; U. S. C ongress, A nnals o f th e 16th Congress: First Session, in ^ Abridgement of the Debates of Congress from 1789-1856 (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1857-61), p. 2233. Mill is. Arms and Men, pp. 72-3. Weigley, Army, p. 140.

17. Weigley, Army, p. 140.

18. John C. Calhoun, "Report on the Reduction of the Army Communicated to the House of Representatives, December 12, 1820," in Cralle, Reports, pp. 26-8; Weigley, Army, pp. 141-2; W iltse, Nationalist, p. 223.

19. Calhoun, "Reduction of the Army," in Cralle, Reports, p. 81.

20. Weigley, Army, p. 142. Weigley says the plan was "too nationalistic" for the United States to accept. See Mill is. Arms and Men, p . 74 fo r some c r it i c i s m o f th e p lan . For C obb's comments, consult Wiltse, N ationalist. p. 224, and U. S. Congress, Annals of the 16th Congress, Second Session, in Abridgement, p. 728. p. 728.

21. Dupuy, Trod, p. 192.

22. Ibid.. p. 193.

23. Ibid.. pp. 197-200. 24. O liv er L. S paulding, The U n ited S ta te s Army in War and P eace (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937), p. 165.

25. Thomas Keamy, General Philip Kearny: Battle Soldier of Five Wars (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937), p. 49. Turner had already translated the regulations of the French Garde Royale, and later assisted in the preparation of cavalry tactics for the United States. Also, see Albert G. Brackett, History of the United States Cavalry (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1865), p. 74, and John Watts DePeyster, Personal and M ilitary History of Philip Kearny (New York: Race and Gage, 1869), p. 53.

26. Kearny, Kearny, pp. 52, 66. Brackett, Cavalry, pp. 47-8.

27. Kearny, Kearny, p. 52.

28. I b i d . , p . 160.

29. Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr., General William J. Hardee: Old Reliable (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1965), pp. 19-23, 41-50.

30. Report of the Secretary of War, 1840: Senate Document I and Senate Document 229 (26-2), Serial Set 375. 2 March, 1841.

31. William Starr Myers, A Study in Personality: General George Brinton McClellan (New York: D. Appleton - Century Company, 1934), p. 86. Letter, Jefferson Davis to Richard Delafield, Alfred Mordecai, and George B. McClellan, 2 April 1855, in Dunbar Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: His Letters, Papers and Speeches (Jackson, Mississippi: M ississippi Department of Archives and History, 1923), Volume XI, pp. 446-8.

32. Rowland, Constitutionalist, pp. 446-8. See also James Havelock Campbell, McClellan: A Vindication of the M ilitary Career of George B. M cC lellan (New York: The N eale P u b lis h in g Company, 1 946), p. 15.

33. G. S. Hillard, Life and Campaigns of George B. McClellan (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company, 1864), pp. 62-9, summarizes the Commission's route and their problems in obtaining permission to visit certain portions of the Crimean lines. Also see Myers, Personality, pp. 87-94, and Campbell, Vindication, p. 16.

34. This important observation is made by H. J. Eckenrode and Bryan Conrad in George B. McClellan: The Man Who Saved the Union (chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), p. 14. The source is obviously favorable to McClellan, and may exaggerate McClellan's eagerness to reform the army. Quite possibly, McClellan's observations in Europe did not influence his later work with the Army of the Potomac as much as Eckenrode and Conrad suggest. 35. General Peter S. Michie, General McClellan (New York: B. Appleton and Company, 1901), pp 40-2, describes McClellan's about the

36. Michie, McClellan, pp. 42-6.

37. George B. McClellan, The Report of George B. McClellan, One of the Officers sent to the Seat of War in Europe in 1855 and 1856: Senate Executive Document Number One, Special Session (Washington, D. C. : A. 0. P. Nicholson, 1857), pp. 23-4.

38. Letter, Richard Delafield to Jefferson Davis, 11 August 1856, in Richard Delafield, Report on the Art of War in Europe in 1854, 1855, and 1856: House of Representatives Executive Document, 36th C o n g ress, Second S essio n (W ashington: George W. Bowman, 1861), p. 3.

3 9 . I b i d ., p p . 1 - 3 .

40. I b i d . , p . 1.

41. Eckenrode and Conrad, Man Who Saved the Union, p. 15; McClellan, Report, pp. 211-12, 277-83.

42. Myers, Personality, p. 101; McClellan, Report, pp. 211-12, 277-83. Going into even more detail, McClellan recommended abandoning ornamentation such as the epaulette and shoulder scales. See Edgar M. Howell, United States Army Headgear 1855-1902 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 18-21 for information on the "McClellan Cap," and pp. 12-14 for the 1858 forage cap.

43. Delafield, Report, p. 277.

44. James Donald H ittle, The M ilitary Staff: Its history and Developement (Harrisburg, P a.: The M ilitary Service Publishing Company, 1944), p. 162.

45. Alfred Mordecai, M ilitary Commission to Europe in 1855 and 1856: Senate Executive Document Number 60, 36th Congress, First S essio n (W ashington: George W. Bowman, 1860) pp. 30-1.

46. Letter, Jefferson Davis to Franklin Pierce, 4 December 1854, in Rowland, Constitutionalist, pp. 389-418. Especially, see pp. 400-02. This is in Senate Executive Document Number 1, 33rd Congress, Second Session, as well.

47. Myers, Personality, pp. 102-03.

48. Letter, Jefferson Davis to Franklin Pierce, 3 December 1855: "Report of the Secretary of War." See Rowland, Constitutionalist, p. 562. Also see letter, Davis to Pierce, 4 December, 1854: "Report of the Secretary of War," in which Davis urges that experiments with new weapons should begin soon. This is also in Rowland, pp. 410-11.

49. It is equally ironic that Hardee, a future Confederate general, should provide the U. S. Army with updated tactics; but then, these are only two of many thousands of ironic situations present in the Civil War. See Hughes, Hardee, pp. 19-23, 41-50. Also see Weigley, Army, pp. 190-91, where Weigley notes that Hardee's Tactics were developed as a direct result of the new .58 caliber musket. Myers, Personality, p. 101, relates how Davis discouraged McClellan from obtaining a review board.

50. Upton. M ilitary Policy, pp. 223-25. Weigley, Army, p. 207.

51. Weigley, Army, pp. 242-43, Hittle, Military Staff, p. 163, relates McClellan's complaint.

52. Jay Luvass, The M ilitary Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p . 61.

53. Ibid., p. 2.

54. Ibid.. pp. 63-4, 67-70.

55. Ibid.. pp. 73-4, 230-36. Luvass holds that Scheibert set the pattern for German study of the Civil War, and his interpretations were rarely challenged.

56. This rather discouraging commentary on m ilitary hierarchy can be found in Luvass, Legacy, p. 76. Also see pp. 227-28.

57. Ibid.. pp. 226-30. Also, see a dispatch from Lt. Frank [Francis] V. Green, 'Military Attache in Russia,' 9 October 1877, in Dispatches from Russia, Volume 31: Executive and Foreign Affairs Branch, United States State Department Records, National Archives (Copy in Cater File 1877, Center of M ilitary History). Green said that the Russians were "in total ignorance of the History of the Army of the Potomac." He blamed this in part on our lack of an "Etat Major" and an "authentic official history of the [Civil] war."

58. Luvass. Legacy, pp. 229-30. Luvass believes the English lost interest until 1886, when F. R. Henderson's Campaign of Fredericksburg was published.

59. Ibid.. pp. 74-5, 231. Luvass says : "Sherman seems to have contributed more to European m ilitary thought than any other Civil War g e n e r a l." 60. Luvass recounts Scheibert's "three stages" in Legacy, pp. 63-4, and criticizes them on pp. 72-3.

61. Ibid., p. 54.

62. Von Borcke's observations are summarized in Luvass, Legacy, pp. 56-7. Also consult Heros von Borcke's own work. Memoirs of the C o n fed e rate War fo r Independence (New York: P e te r S m ith, 1938), Volume II. Chapters 15 and 16 on the battle of Fredericksburg are especially useful, though the whole work is filled with insights into the state of warmaking and tactics in America. Another work worth perusing is Ella Lonn's Foreigners in the Confederacy (Durham, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1940).

63. Luvass, Legacy, pp. 76-7.

64. Ibid., pp. 76-7. Scheliha especially noted Admiral David Farragut's success against Southern coastal defenses.

65. Ibid., p. 71. Luvass cites Scheibert's letter to J. P. Nicholson, 25 January 1880. See Catalogue of Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel John Page Nicholson— Relating to the War of the Rebellion 1861-66 (Philadelphia: 1914), p. 761. CHAPTER TWO

THE UNITED STATES ARMY DISCOVERS GERMANY

The United States Army emerging from the Civil War confronted a multitude of problems which were at least as vexing as those posed by the war itself. Between 1865 and 1870, the French occupation of

Mexico, the establishment of m ilitary districts in the "occupied"

South, and conflicts with the Indians of the Plains were of paramount importance. But underlying these three concerns was the simple problem that had bedeviled the army since its creation: establishing a force of sufficient size to be prepared for future contingencies and meet all present duties, and still small enough to assure the nation th a t th e army itself posed no threat to the existence of the republic.

Following the war, this last need became a sore point among those who believed that had the army been of reasonable strength in 1861, the

Civil War could have been quickly resolved. The army had served the nation as best it could, hampered as it was by decades of suspicion and a false sense of economy which had kept it small and conserved money prior to the war, but in the final analysis had cost the nation very dearly. Now that the emergency was over, the nation seemed determined to return the army to its prewar status as quickly as possible.

Really, there was nothing the army could do to avoid this situation. The Union Army, which numbered over a million volunteers in

54 55

May 1865, rapidly mustered out all but eleven thousand of these men by

November 1866, for the nation was eager to get its men back to their

peacetime pursuits. The regular army would be expanded beyond its

antebellum lim its, but as the years wore on periodical cuts would

yield a force barely able to meet the needs of an expanding, troubled

f r o n t i e r . !

Faced with a situation that was troublesome but not altogether

un for seen, the army reacted (as may be imagined) with a good deal of

unheeded protest and indignation. However, convinced that the nation

would someday need their services for purposes other than Indian

fighting, the army’s caretakers persisted in their efforts to keep the regular force as large as possible. More importantly, the ensuing

c o n f lic ts between th e War D epartm ent and th e Commanding G e n e ra l's office prompted the army's officers to press for a more logical,

professional approach to the relationship between the Department's

a d m in is tra tiv e and te c h n ic a l b u re au s, th e Commanding G e n era l, and th e men and o f f ic e r s o f th e li n e .^

These conflicts would eventually develop into a campaign not only

to modernize and revamp the Merican perception of a "General Staff," but they would of necessity lead to a movement toward professional ism

throughout the army. The period of adjustment, introspection, and

self-evaluation thrust upon the army after 1865 was difficult but in

the end beneficial, for it forced the formation of a body of thought

which would come to the fore as the opportunity presented itself. 56

Initial Stirrings of Postwar Interest in Prussia

Given previous interest in Europe, it was logical that army theorists would point to that continent for examples of postwar reform and the establishment of a high degree of professional ism.

Surprisingly, one of the first indications that the Germans, and not the French, would prove to be of particular interest to Americans came from General McClellan soon after he had been relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac. Though he had missed the importance of a staff system when he visited Europe in 1855 he would (as noted earlier) eventually recognize his error. The Prussian Staff system had indeed had a great deal to offer; in praising that system, he d e c la re d :

...one of the greatest defects of our military system is the lack of a thoroughly instructed Staff Corps Perhaps the greatest difficulties that I encountered in the work of creating the Army o f th e Potomac aro se from th e s c a r c ity o f thoroughly instructed staff officers.^

McClellan's thoughts were echoed by the Army and Navy Journal

(AHJ ), which in 1866 commented that "we have never had, in the

European sense, a genuine staff corps." That situation contrasted starkly with European armies, in which the staffs were a respected elite element. The ANJ further commented that the Prussian staff had demonstrated its great value in the war against Austria, during which

Prussia "elevated herself to be a first-rate power." But really, the staff was only one facet - albeit the most ’mportant one - of a m ilitary system that had been attracting worldwide interest since the

1850's. The German army had increased its size through conscripts. 57

shortened the term of active duty (and thus enlarged the reserves),

and placed regular officers in the "Landwehr" (a non-professional main

body of troops with extended periods of reserve duty) in addition to

creating a command structure centered around the General Staff

For the next several years, the army was primarily concerned with

immediate major issues of obvious pressing importance: postwar

reductions and their consequences for professional officers; the

occupation of the South; frontier duty against the Indians; the storm

of controversy over President Johnson's desire to fire Secretary of

War Edwin M. Stanton; and the new administration of Ulysses S. Grant,

which b rought bo th a new War S e c re ta ry (W. W. Belknap) and a new

Commanding G eneral (W illiam T. Sherman) to th e sce n e. But in t e r e s t in

European m ilitary affairs was not flagging. Although it had been

shoved into the background by more "pressing" issues, it was still

very much alive. As the decade neared its conclusion, articles

expressing this interest regularly appeared in the semi-official ANJ,

edited by William Con ant Church, which served as a for un for American

m ilitary theorists. In 1869, one officer observed and reported on the

P ru s s ia n m aneuvers. The same y e a r, th e ANJ s p e c u la te d th a t P ru s s ia

supported the United States' stand against the French regarding

Mexico, and p re d ic te d th a t c o n f lic t betw een Germany and France was

inevitable.5 Such a conflict would be extremely interesting to

those who respected either the French m ilitary reputation or the new m ilitary system vdiich had emerged in Prussia. When the ANJ reported

on 16 July 1870 that both the French and Prussians seemed to be

completely prepared for the "impending struggle," France had in fact 58

already declared war. "The spectacle," promised the ANJ, "will be most interesting."^

Sheridan: America's First Major Observer of the German Army

The Franco-Prussian War erupted at a time when the United States

Army was undergoing huge cutbacks in appropriations and personnel. In

March, 1869, the army was reduced by twenty infantry regiments - and

in sheer numbers, this meant a drop from 54,302 to 37,313. The appropriations acts of July 1870 - the same momh that marked the start of the Franco-Prussian conflict - reduced the army at every rank and level. This was truly a step backward, for in 1866 Congress had actually accepted, in principle, the idea of an expansible army. Now,

it appeared that Congress would on the one hand recognize a need for an expansible force but on the other it would trim the army's size so much th a t th e re would be few re g u la rs l e f t to tr a i n and command th e new men in tim e o f war ! ^

It was precisely at this time that Philip Sheridan, war hero and

Major General, requested permission to go to Europe to observe the hostilities in France. Sheridan may have believed that a man of his reputation might be able to convince Congress to preserve as much of th e re g u la r army as p o s s ib le by re p o rtin g to them (v ia th e Commanding

General) on the dangers arising from m ilitary developments overseas.

Whatever his initial thoughts were, Sheridan declared that he was quite anxious to go to the "seat of war." Although he had seen plenty of fighting in America, he believed he could learn things in Europe that might be of some use to the United States. Sherman approved the request, and Sheridan then asked the Europeans for permission to 59

accompany their armies. The French refused him for security reasons,

but the Prussian staff welcomed him warmly. Sheridan later claimed

that he was more interested in seeing the Germans anyway, since he

believed they were going to win. He may have based this estimation on

the recent Prussian performances against Austria and Denmark, but it

also sounds suspiciously like a case of after-the- fact pic que at

having been rebuffed by the French. In any case, the ANJ shared his

opinion: the Germans were "quietly resolute ;" the French were

"yelling, swaggering, and literally spoiling for a fight." The ANJ

believed the French battle cry of "take back the Rhine" was likely to meet with failure.^ Thus, the old reputation of the French was

already beginning to suffer in comparison with the Germans before any major battles were fought.

Sheridan was technically still in command of the Department of the

M issouri when he was o f f i c i a l l y "ab se n t in Europe" from 21 J u ly , 1870

to 23 May, 1871. Apparently Sheridan and Sherman both felt that there was much to be gained by stu d y in g th e war a t le n g th , or some le s s e r personage would have been sent. Besides, Sheridan was accorded more respect and cooperation from his European hosts than men of lower rank and reputation may have received. Accompanying him on his tour were

Colonel James W. Forsyth and Second Lieutenant Robert G. Rutherford.

Ihe annual official Engineer Commission stayed in England, never venturing near the seat of war .10

Sheridan managed to get to Europe in time to see some major

action. He met Bismarck the night before the Battle of Gravelotte and

stayed in his company several days. He was able to follow the campaign all the way to Paris and for a time relived some of his experiences from the Civil War: he came under fire, aided in caring

for the wounded, observed cavalry and infantry charges, and was allowed some insight into the German grand strategy. But though accounts of the war left most of the world with the impression that it was a dazzling, crushing German triunph, Sheridan had been involved in too much fighting in the United States to be overly impressed with the

Germans. His evaluations of the war were as well-balanced and as astute as could possibly be desired.

Sheridan offered some refreshingly candid observations. The only major differences between European and American warfare seemed to be the density of the European population (a factor vAiich afforded invading troops daily shelter and provender), and the broad, macadamized European roads which facilitated troop movements.

O th erw ise, S heridan said : "Nowadays, war is p r e tty much the same everywhere, and this one offered no marked exception to my previous experiences." This statement immediately placed him in conflict with those who maintained there was no possible comparison between the styles of war waged on the two continents.1^ Furthermore, he stated "I saw no new m ilitary principles developed, whether strategy o r grand t a c t i c s . ■phe experienced cavalry officer was also disappointed in the German failure to use their cavalry in a massed

force or to disrupt French communications and supply lines. He did, however, think that "the infantry was as fine as I ever saw," although he thought the regiments were too large and u n w i e l d y .13 61

But what impressed Sheridan the most in this conflict was the

German mobilization system. He gave Prussian Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke credit for the perfection of this system, vdiich mobilized

80,000 men "with unparalleled celerity" and allowed the Germans to c r ip p le the French in seven m onths. The whole German system was based upon a territorial scheme of recruitment, training, and maintaining a reserve; men were assembled, equipped, and sent to the

front through the efforts of regional depots. It was Sheridan's contention that the United States could leam something from this marvelously efficient system, but only to a certain extent; for the

"strikingly prompt mobilization" in this "perfect military system" was made possible by "autocratic power," an obviously un-American characteristic.!^ During Sheridan's conversations with Bismarck, b o th men had concluded th a t Germany was not y et ready fo r republicanism. Nor, presumably, would a republican system be able to adjust itself to a conscription, reserve, and mobilization scheme like

Germany' s .!5

General Sheridan spent five months with the Germans, during vdiich he saw not only how th e German army fought and u t i li z e d i t s highly-organized system to its best advantage, but also observed the functioning of the Prussian General Staff. General Albrecht von Roon and his staff system impressed Sheridan considerably, but here again he believed that a German-style staff would be unacceptable in the

United States because of the potential power and autonomy it would give the army. 62

In the United States, meanwhile, there was a growing interest in th e German s u c c e s s e s . The ANJ announced c o n f id e n tly in August 1870 that the Franco-Prussian War would be a "grand experiment in new principles of warfareThe ANJ presented a summation of "American

ideas in European warfare" that it expected to see adopted and put to use by France and Germany. The Germans were already utilizing some of these methods in coastline defense, and were expected to utilize our earthworks systems as well. German citizens were already forming sanitary and relief associations similar to those Americans had utilized a few years previouslyAs it turned out, the Germans lived up to the ANJ's expectations, demonstrating an awareness of recent m ilitary history and a great measure of ability and adaptability. By contrast, the French were miserably disappointing.

Although both Sheridan and m ilitary writers at home were shocked at the number of blunders committed by the French, it was clear that even had the French not been so inept, the Germans' system was far superior. However:

We doubt whether such thoroughness as this is p o s s ib le to any but th e p a tie n t German ra ce; b u t what could not such a staff have done for us in our War of the P.ebellion, where a lot of boys... ignorant of the first principles of military science were our chief dependence for the difficult and delicate duties of staff officers.^^

So, despite the interesting belief that only the Germans possessed an inherent organizational ability that made their staff system effective, there were a growing nunber of voices in favor of the construction of a similar staff system in America. Second Lieutenant

F. A. Mahan w rote th e ANJ a f t e r v i s i t i n g France th a t "th e g re a t want 63 of our own army during Che late rebellion was competent staff officers." He pointed out that the Prussian staff was superior to all others because of its policy of rotating officers from the line to the

staff and then baok again, a practice which guarded against stagnation

in the staff and insured against the formation of two separate

"cliques" of army officers. Mahan also cited the former French m ilitary attache in Berlin, a Colonel Stoffel, who had admitted prior

to the war that the Prussian staff was easily the finest in Europe, made up of the best, most intelligent officers.^®

Sherman: The Commanding General Tours Europe

Intrigued by Sheridan's experiences and the German conceptions of both a general staff and overall army organization, the army's

Commanding G eneral began to make arrangem ents fo r a p erso n al v i s i t to

Europe in order to see the various European systems himself. Sherman embarked on a trip that was in part aimed at publicly embarrassing

Secretary of War Belknap as well as to observe various m ilitary establishments on the continent. He said publicly that he might as well go to Europe, as he was obviously not in charge of the army at home. Sherman literally fled the country to escape the frustrations of his office. He felt his title was meaningless. He had no control over the various staff organizations that actually ran the army, as they all reported to the War Department. That Sherman was indeed powerless is evident from records showing the business Belknap's office conducted simultaneously with Sherman's official business. In one period, the Secretary issued orders for new uniforms, published promotion lists, issued transfer orders, announced retirements and 64 deaths of servicemen, and made assignments to court-martial proceedings. Sherman's business, meanv*iile, was limited to extending two leaves of absence!

Sherman went to Europe as a famous tourist, in no official capacity whatever, though he was technically on duty the entire trip .20 He was accompanied by his aide-de-camp. Colonel Joseph C.

Audenried, and was later joined by Frederick D. Grant, the President's son. The General toured m ilitary installations throughout Europe and the Mediterranean, from Gibraltar to Egypt to St. Petersburg, between

November 1871 and September 1872. Everywhere he went he was cordially received, but in Prussia he was disappointed to discover he would be unable to meet with the Emperor because of the American legation's incompetent bungling of the necessary diplomatic arrangements.21

Nonetheless, he would find his visit to Prussia and the Franco -

Prussian battlefields to be very worthwhile.

Sherman met General von Moltke and was favorably impressed with him. Through this meeting he began to form an appreciation for the

German people and their military institutions. He later commented:

...so far as my observation goes, the Prussian people are more intelligent and industrious than the French, and their troops very much superior in bearing, appearance, dress, and organization.22

The Commanding G eneral came to th i s ev en tu al co n c lu sio n a f t e r touring the battlefields and observing the everyday activities of both the armies and the respective populations. He was critical of the

French, who allowed themselves to be defeated due to various mistakes, and he praised the Prussians for "bold, prompt, and skilful [sic]" 65 movements which entitled them to a great victory.23 At times

Sherman's comments seem to indicate that he believed the war had been

lost by the French rather than won by the Germans; at one point he

noted that the French "should have instantly fortified," indicating

that perhaps the French had failed to learn a few lessons from the

American Civil War. The Germans, meanwhile, he evaluated as being

"much stronger and better than the French... .There can be no doubt

that the Prussians were the superiors, both in generalship and

fighting...."24 guc perhaps most significantly, he could see little future for the French army:

General McMahon is charged with reorganizing an army about Paris of one hundred thousand men...and he has uphill work in doing it.... At a l l e v e n ts , I saw nothing that showed much change in the French army since its overwhelming defeat in 1 8 7 0 -7 1.25

Adding to the French problems was the huge fine the Germans

imposed upon them, which left the nation "absolutely powerless, if not ridiculous, as far as her neighbors are c o n c e r n e d."26 The French were a n o n -e n tity as o f 1872, in Sherm an's judgem ent. The Germans now possessed the predominant force in Europe: "It is unquestionably the

finest army in the world," he said. "It is a perfect machine of w ar."27

The Germans, led by the Prussians, had accomplished this through

scentific study, which yielded an organization that was well-adapted

to their supposed "national temperament." This, according to Sherman, was their true lesson for the world: other nations would be mistaken in simply attempting to duplicate the Prussian system without a thought as to whether the system was truly applicable to their own society. He was echoing Sheridan's earlier evaluation when he said in

an interview with ANJ:

By hard thinking and close observation of the mental as well as the bodily habits of men, the Prussians have established a system exactly adapted to their national traditions, temperament, and moral and political organization. The same study would yield other results as applied to other countries, and therefore an imitation of the Prussian scheme in its details instead of in its spirit would in my opinion be a mistake .^8

The "most striking" detail of this army, according to Sherman, was

the sense of individuality imparted to the soldiers. "The army is an

aggregate of localized ^nd therefore individualized corps," in which

each man was entrusted with a sense of individual responsibility and

self-reliance. Yet, they were still well-disciplined and obedient.

In fact, the Prussian example was better than any other force on

earth, combining a sense of individual honor and responsibility with

an awareness of a higher, common duty. Sherman had some criticism s of

the German system, but these concerned such details as large companies

and mounted captains. In sum, he recognized that some of the Germans' major concepts were worth consideration, though he did not believe a

wholesale adoption of German methods by the United States would be

product ive.

When Sherman returned to the petty problems awaiting him at home, he must have often ruefully dwelt upon the vast differences between the army of his own nation and that of Germany. He had been accorded high honors throughout his travels overseas, but he was unable to do anything of consequence in America. He wrote bitterly to Sheridan only nine days after his return: The condition of our country, the smallness of our army, the jealousy of civilians and mistrust of our authorities make our situation so different from anything abroad that I do not see that we can do any good by comparison with the m ilitary experience of others

Actually, Sherman was too much of a fighter to give up so easily.

To Congress, he proposed changes in the army using the Prussian system as a model. Specifically, he proposed that all officers serve line duty before being assigned to a staff position, and that a rotating system would ensure that all staff officers were periodically returned to line duty. Secretary of War Belknap disagreed, and the proposal did not go through. S till, the effort indicated that Sherman felt th e re were some fa c e ts o f th e German system th a t would be u sefu l to the American army. Moreover, he may have hoped that breaking up the vested interests of staff officers by opening the staff to candidates from the line would help him wrest some control of the army from the

War D epartm ent.

This was not Sherman's last attempt to control the staff. In his annual report for 1873, he criticized Congress for consistently reducing the line but not the staff. His comments made no real d if f e r e n c e , though C ongress d id make some p ro v isio n fo r ap p o in tin g line officers to staff positions - even as they slashed the line by

5000 men. This took place despite Sherman's earnest request to maintain an army of at least 30,000 men - which he followed with the sarcastic remark that he had no report to make, since no portion of the army was under his direct control.31 68

In 1874 the personal and official rift between Sherman and

Secretary Belknap became so severe that the General moved his headquarters to St. Louis. The well-publicized move and Sherman's bitter remarks about his lack of authority briefly focused national attention on the organizational problems within the army. The ANJ commented that it was the fault of the system itself rather than

Sherman or Belknap that the two men were unable to c o o p e r a t e .

The question remained: who could change the system, given the predominantly uncooperative nature of the current political climate?

Secretary Belknap soon found himself mired in the political scandals that infested Washington toward the end of Grant's second term. He was replaced by Alfonso Taft, who was more sympathetic to the problems Sherman had experienced. Accordingly, Sherman moved his headquarters back to Washington in 1876. Some papers labelled the whole affair - and the circonstances that had driven the General to take such drastic action - as an "outrageous indignity" placed upon him. Apparently, the rift had extended even to the White House, because Sherman had refused to take the newly-graduated Fred Grant

(USMA 1873) into his personal staff. It appears that Sherman had several reasons to leave Washington in disgust. Making the indignity even more onerous was th e f a c t th a t G rant as Commanding G eneral had received (and complained about) treatment from the War Department that was identical to Sherman's under Belknap; Sherman was the latest victim of the same illogical, confusing system that had plagued Grant, and yet Grant proved to be of no help to him whatever 69

In Che final tally, Sherman weathered the storm and entertained dreams of modernizing the army's concepts of waging war until the day he died. The memory of what he had seen in Europe - and the thought that facets of the German system might be applicable on this side of the Atlantic - played no small part in his hopes. S till, Sherman was pessimistic, feeling that his hopes were probably in vain and his dreams would go unfulfilled. But a far more optimistic, idealistic

individual had already burst upon the scene, expanding upon what

Sherman and Sheridan had seen and said and refining his arguments for reform so brilliantly and logically that eventually even the most conservative men of rank were forced to take notice. If Sherman and

Sheridan had provided the initial spark for reform along Prussian l i n e s , Emory Upton was about to tak e th a t sp ark and ig n ite a crusader's torch.

Upton; ^ Crusader Adopts the German System

Perhaps a comparison of Upton with Generals Sherman and Sheridan would be unfair, since Upton enjoyed the luxury of his lower rank: he d id not come d i r e c t ly to g rip s w ith some o f th e o p p o s itio n and problems of his superiors. Nor did he have to play political games to the extent they did. He had more time to develop his ideas on

European methods being applied to America and was able to give the topic more than a cursory going-over. But a comparison of Upton with any of his contemporaries - of lower or higher rank - reveals him as a driving, brilliant man, possessed by a vision of how the army of the

United States could improve itself with a few seemingly-simple steps that had already been demonstrated in Germany. 70

Upton left on a world tour with Major George A. Forsyth of the

Cavalry and Captain Joseph P. Sanger of the A rtillery in August 1875 a t th e b eh e st o f Sherman h im se lf. The to u r was sponsored by the War

Department, and Upton predictably received conflicting advice from

Belknap and Sherman. The General to ld him to not spend too much tim e studying European (and especially German) methods as plenty of other observers, including himself, had already toured Europe. Sherman

figured that by contrast nearly nothing was known about the armies of

Asia, so Upton's commission should concentrate its efforts there.

Belknap, however, wanted the commission to concentrate heavily on

German methods, noting in particular the schools for o f f i c e r s .

Upton was a marvelous choice for such a tour. He had acquired a fine reputation as an officer, fighter, and tactician during the Civil

War. He had witnessed and analyzed the flaws of a m ilitary system that pushed aside professional soldiers in order to promote politically-connected amateurs. Following the war, he developed a new system of tactics in response to the form id ib 1 e new weaponry of the

1860's. These tactics, utilizing a strong skirmish line and advances by rushes against fortified lines, were adopted in 1 8 6 7 . In

187 9, he was ap p o in ted as Commandant o f C adets a t West P o in t. Four years later he delivered a paper to the Thayer Club at the Academy e n t i t l e d "The P ru ssia n Company C olunn," which analyzed P ru ssia n tactics. He concluded the paper by pronouncing the Prussian column system as being superior to a line. However, he found the 250-man

Prussian companies too large and cunbersome; he preferred the United

States' 100-man companies. 71

So Upton had already investigated some facets of the Prussian

system before ever visiting Europe. His tactical system - which recognized the value of breech-loading weapons - proved to be the correct approach during the Franco-Prussian War, as breech-loaders time and again checked linear mass assaults. It was logical that he would be detailed to see firsthand the armies that had put his basic

ideas to the test, as well as other armies from which he might glean some h e lp fu l in fo rm a tio n .^ ^

Upton's tour took him first to the Orient, where he was impressed by the Japanese and surprised by some sim iliarities between the loosely-organized systems of China and America. The Chinese raised troops within provinces, as we did in our individual states; the

Chinese army, like our own, was very decentralized, disorganized, and weak.An important distinction, however, was the existence of a rampant corruption in the Chinese forces that was largely absent in

Am erica.

Upton and his companions reached Europe in 1876, after touring

Japan, China, India, Russia, and Turkey. Once in Europe, Upton was quick to discover that a great many of the professional officers he met considered the German system to be the "peak of m ilitary efficiency." The Germans had proven their system's worth in 1864,

1866, and 1870-71. Now, it seemed everyone - even their French enemies - was attempting to imitate them. Upton then cast aside

Sherman's advice to not investigate the Germans, as he became more and more convinced that there was much to be learned from them, particularly regarding the staff and reserve systems. He was 72 interested to see that most European armies had adopted the Prussian system of promotion, the use of m ilitary districts to aid in conscr pit ion and mobilization, and the rotation of officers from staff to line duty and back again. The United States had nothing comparable to all these policies.^^

Upton was impressed by the concept of the German mass army; one percent of the total German population had been in uniform in 1871, making the army a truly national force. The basic concept - short term service for large numbers of draftees - was being widely emulated. The General Staff and the freedom of the army from civilian control were also noteworthy, and symbolized to Upton facets of an ideal sitation from a professional soldier's standpoint. By contrast, the United States was "recklessly extravagant" in making war, wasteful of human and material resources. He became determined to make his report a "vehicle for reform" by using it to critically compare our system with those of Europe. As had Sherman some years previously,

Upton admitted "we cannot Germanize, neither is it advisable, but we can apply the principles of common sense ."40

Not all of the Prussian system could be adopted or even considered for adoption. Partly out of friendship for Sherman, Upton said n o th in g about doing away w ith th e post o f Commanding G eneral (a non-existent position in Germany). Nor did he advocate peacetime conscription, which was an essential feature of the Prussian system.

But he came to believe that the existing American staff system was the source of the army's troubles, that the army should not be forced to 73 rely upon volunteers alone, and that the individual states were

"intruding" into m ilitary affairs.41

His solutions to these problems were straightforward, though in practice they were hardly simple to implement. His vision of a new system conisted of a larger regular army; a force of "National

Volunteer Reserves;" one battalion of two hundred men per congressional district, to be officered and supported by the Federal government; and the m ilitia, used in its proper sphere of upholding the law, suppressing rebellion, and repelling invaders. This was basically like the German scheme of a regular army supported by the first and second Landwehr reserves. In both systems, every able-bodied male would have to take part. Taking a page from both

Calhoun and the Germans, Upton also declared that the reorganized army should be expansible on a ratio of 1 man per 1000 population.42

Upton's ideas on the staff were a bit more complex. The staff he envisioned would consist of five branches, with two reporting to the

S e c re ta ry o f War and th re e to th e Commanding G eneral. The bran ch es reporting to the Secretary were to handle paperwork; the three other branches (as with the German General Staff) would be in charge of gathering intelligence on foreign armies, conducting scholarly investigations of past wars, and maintaining personnel records. The

General Staffs were to be a central coordinating agency free from civilian control. Staff membership would be periodically rotated with those on line duty.

The German system from which Upton borrowed his ideas was a model of logic and efficiency. All able-bodied men, with certain 74

exceptions, were liable for m ilitary service. Each of the 275

Landwehr districts determined the order in which its qualified men would be called into the service. Men called to duty served a total of twelve years: three with the colors, four in the reserve, and five

in the Landwehr, which which was in essence a second reserve. The reserves turned out for muster twice yearly and attended manei ’rs twice in four years; the Landwehr assembled for drill twice in ve years. The result was a well-trained army backed by well-tra reserves, a fact that enabled the Germans to assaable a largr

prepared army quickly and with a minimal amount of wasted ti-e and e f f o r t . 43

The German conception of a general staff was considerably different from the American view. In the United States, the "General

Staff" meant the heads of ten bureaus: the Signal Corps, the Corps of

Engineers, the Subsistence, Pay, Medical, and Ordnance Departments, and the Departments of the Adjutant-General, the Inspector-General, the Judge Advocate General, and the Quartermaster-General. In

Germany, the General Staff was primarily a group of knowledgeable officers charged with organization and planning of mobilization, strategy, and tactics. Members of the General Staff had to graduate

from th e War Academy and serve w ith d i s ti n c ti o n in th e l i n e .

Selection to the staff was on a rotating basis: after three years, staff officers were sent back to the line and replaced with other line officers. This guaranteed an infusion of new ideas into the staff, and guarded against the alienation of the staff from the line, such as had occurred in the United State s.44 75

The German G eneral S ta ff was headed by th e c h ie f o f s t a f f and was independent of the Minister of War, a factor that obviously would appeal to American officers who disliked the predominance of the War

S e c re ta ry over th e Commanding G e n era l. I t was d iv id ed in to s e v e ra l branches, with each one responsible for different facets of war preparedness and execution. The "Great General Staff" in Berlin was responsible for staff personnel, the Intelligence Bureau and Military

Attaches, and the railway system. The General Staff in the field was in charge of planning and carrying out all details of campaigning, from tactics and line of march to quartering the troops. The

"accessory branch" of the staff was responsible for the study of

M ilitary History, the collection of information on foreign nations, geography, cartography, and triangulation and topographical survey w ithin Germany.45

As Upton saw i t , th e o f f ic e o f th e American Commanding G eneral would be concerned with management and policy planning, leaving the command o f tro o p s in th e f ie ld to an improved G eneral S ta ff in th e

German fashion. Sherman, however, conceived of his position not as one of planning, but of implementing policies dictated by the governm ent.46 This distinction illustrated the new ways in which

Upton p erceiv e d th e ro le s of Commanding G en eral, S ta f f , and Line a f t e r he had seen first-hand the German Staff System.

Probably the major thrust of army reforms as envisioned by Upton would be the nation's reliance upon and acceptance of the regular army as the primary force in America’s land defense. Utilization of an

"expandable" force would allow the professional army to remain small 76

(perhaps no larger than 25,000 men) but it would provide a cadre

around which the wartime force would be constructed. Politically-

influential but unqualified men would not be allowed to receive

officers' commissions. Essentially building iqjon Calhoun's ideas,

Upton (and Sherman) advocated a broad system of postgraduate m ilitary

schools to train these officers properly. Infantry and cavalry

schools, as well as the already-extant artillery school, and a

proposed War College at the system's pinnacle were what Upton deemed

desirable and necessary. West Point itself was far better than any

European academy for preparatory training, but Upton admitted that

America simply had nothing to compare with the war colleges of Europe.

Of these, he felt the War Academy in Berlin was particularly

impress ive.47

The German school system included cadet schools for boys aged

10-15 who could later attend the Central Cadet School in Berlin prior

to becoming officers in the regular army. It was also possible to

become an officer through special examination or completion of the

course of study at the War Schools. There were also non-commissioned

o f f i c e r s ' sch o o ls and sch o o ls for e n lis te d men. The War Academy

prepared officers for staff and high command duties through a

three-year course of advanced s t u d y .48

In summation, Upton borrowed heavily from the Germans in his

advocacy of two proposals: the National Volunteer Reserve and the

General Staff Corps. The adoption of these ideas would imply the acceptance of others as well, including rotating assignments between

staff and line, an expanded school system for officers and men. 77 examinations prior to promotion, and more rapid promotion for deserving individuals.^^

Later analysts have sometimes commented that Upton made an obvious mistake in assuming an organized professional army would provide a cure-all for this nation's m ilitary woes without considering vAiat would happen if tw> well-prepared, well-organized nations met each other in war - such as occurred in World War I. This criticism , though, is somewhat suspect. Were Upton to have been appraised of such a "flaw'' in his thinking, his most probable response would have been to inquire whether it would be better to allow an ill-organized

American force to be overrun by a we 11-organized European army, or to have a good American force that was able to battle such an opponent to a standstill. "Parity" in those days was something to be achieved, not maintained. A more telling appraisal of Upton's philosophy was that it came at an un propitious time. The Civil War was still a recent, painful memory; plenty of trained soldiers (a potential army) still existed; there was not yet any real threat to the United States by any major European power ; and the Indian "menace" was rapidly dwindling even as Upton began work on his official report. If Upton was politely ignored for twenty years by American policymakers, there was a simple reason: there was no obvious, immediate need for the professionalism and reorganization as far as lawmakers were concerned.

A further criticism was that Upton ignored the need for a mass army to replace a professional force. Nothing could be further from the truth. By his own admission, Upton stated that he was trying to adapt the European systems insofar as possible to existing American 78

traditions and mentality. America was not ready for a mass army.

Even the huge forces of 1861-65 were not truly mass armies, as they lacked universal conscription. Upton could not have failed to

appreciate the considerable gulf between the concept of a mass army and the ideas held by descendants of immigrants who came here to escape from (among other things) conscription and a universal m ilitary obligation. Realistically, American tradition doomed the concept of a mass army; Upton knew better than to fight such a hopelessly lost battle.It was difficult enough to suggest seriously that the

small regular army could not defend the nation. Upton said:

...recognizing, in the fullest degree that our present geographical isolation happily relieves us from the necessity of maintaining a large standing army, I have sought to present the best system to meet the demands of judicious economy in peace, and to avert unnecessary bloodshed, in time of

Returning home, Upton submitted his official report - later published as The Armies of Asia and Europe - and would be totally frustrated in achieving his goals during his lifetim e. In 1881, despondent over his seeming inability to effect changes and apparently suffering from a brain tumor, he committed suicide.53 Most of his recommendations, however, would eventually be at least partially adopted. His second great work. The M ilitary Policy of the United

States, was published posthunously during the era of reform that followed the Spanish-American War. By then, Upton was beginning to gain the widespread attention that had been denied him in life.

Forward-looking m ilitary thinkers had always recognized his genius. After his return from Europe, a great nimber of observers (both official and unofficial) travelled to Europe - and Germany in particular - to see for themselves the system upon which he had heaped such praise. Whereas Upton's comments had usually been of a broad nature, those who followed him concentrated their attention upon a great variety of details which both Upton and Sherman would probably have categorized as minor or too exclusively "Germanic" to bother c o n s id e rin g . But th e seeds o f i n t e r e s t in th e German army had been sown by three of the most successful, respected American soldiers of the day. There was no stopping the sudden fascination with every detail of the German system once Sherman, Sheridan, and Upton had given that system their stamp of approval. NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. General Grant called for an army of 80,000; Congress voted for 54,302 in July 1866. This was cut to 47,000 in 1869. Eventually, the army would nmnber only 25,000 - and this was on paper. In reality, there were even fewer than this. See Maurice Matloff ( ed.), American M ilitary History (Army Historical Series, Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of M ilitary History, 1973), p. 282.

2. For extensive analysis of this subject, see Robert F. Stohlman, The Powerless Position: The Commanding General of the Army of the United States, 1864-1904 (Manhattan, Kansas: M ilitary A ffairs, for the American Military Institute, 1975).

3. Major H. B. Webb, "The United States General Staff, Its E v o lu tio n : An E pitom e," in M ilita r y Review , V olm e XXVI, 8 (November 1946), p. 34.

4. The quote is from The Army and Navy Journal. Volume II, 1 (25 August 1866), p. 12, and Volune VI, 2 (1 September 1866), pp. 1, 24 (hereafter cited as ANJ ). A good summation of German m ilitary progress is contained in Richard Allen Andrews, "Years of Frustration: William T. Sherman, the Army, and Reform, 1869-1883" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1968), p. 80.

5. See ANJ, VII, 6 (September 1869), p. 86; VII, 7 (2 October 1869), p. 97; and VII, 10 (23 October 1869), p. 150, respectively.

6. ANJ, VII, 48 (16 July 1870), p. 749.

7. Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 10-15.

8. United States State Department, Franco-German War and I n s u r r e c tio n o f th e Commune: C orrespondence o f E . B . W ashburne, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to France (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878). See p. 9 (27 July 1870 entry): General Gramont said he was sorry, but not even "the illustrious soldier" Sheridan could be allowed to visit. For Bismarck's welcome of Sheridan into his camp, see U. S. State Department, Papers Referring to the Foreign Relations of the United States, in Record Group 84, National Archives: P. 5, letter of J. R. Jones, Legation of the United States in Brussels to Hamilton Fish, 11 August 1870. Also see Philip H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, (New York: Charles L. Webster and Company, 1888), Volime II, pp. 358-59. 9. VII 49 (23 July 1870), pp. 765. 771.

10. ANJ, V III, 22 (11 Jan u a ry 1871). S h erid an , M emoirs, I I , p . 360; Robert C. Boots, The American Army and the Prussian Scheme (Harrisburg: Penn State University Capital Campus, unpublished undergarduate paper, 1982), p. 2.

11. Sheridan, Memoirs, II, pp. 447-48.

12. Ibid., p. 451.

13. Ibid., p. 449-50.

14. Ibid., pp. 447-48.

15. Ibid., pp. 364-366.

16. VII, 52 (13 August 1879), p. 822: "ike Situation in Europe; " VII, 51 (6 August 1870), p. 797: "American Tactics in European Warfare."

17. ANJ, V III, 34 (8 A p ril 1 871), pp. 540-42: " P ru s s ia n S ta ff Organization."

18. VIII, 34 (8 April 1871), p. 542: Letter, F. A. Mahan.

19. X (12 July 1873), pp. 759-60.

20. Statement of Sherman's m ilitary service from the Office of the Adjutant-General, dated 11 March 1891, in Sherman ACP File (610 ACP 1884), Record Group 165, National Archives.

21. Colonel Joseph C. Audenried, "Notes on Travel in Europe." William T. Sherman Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Collection 57, Box 11, p. 198.

22. Extract from Sherman's diary of his European tour, entry for 29 June 1872. Quoted in The Century Magazine, LVIII, 2 (June 1899) p . 281.

23. Ib id , ,, p . 282.

24. Ibid. entries for 11 July and 17 July 1899, pp. 284-85.

25. Ibid. 27 July 1899, p. 286.

26. Ibid. 27 July 1899, p. 286.

27. ANJ, IX , 49 (20 Ju ly 1872), p . 782: "G eneral Sherman Interviewed." 28. I b i d . , p. 782.

29. Letter, Sherman to Sheridan, 26 September 1872: Sheridan Papers, "Sherman-Sheridan Correspondence," Library of Congress.

30. House Report 74, 42nd Congress, 3rd Session (Serial 1576). Also see Andrews, Frustration, pp. 94-9.

31. Report of the General of the Army, in Report of the Secretary of War, 1873, House Executive Document 1, Part 2, 43rd Congress, 1st Session (Serial 1597), p. 6.

32. ANJ, XI (4 July 1874, and 11 July 1874). Also, see Toledo Democrat and Herald, October 1874, in Sherman Papers, Ohio H istorical Society, Collection 57, Box 13, pp. 156-57.

33. An article from an unknown newspaper (but originally published in the New York Sun) is present on p. 157 of the Sherman scrapbook in Collection 57, Box 13, Ohio Historical Society. Though it appears without accompanying commentary from any of the Sherman family, its presence leads one to surmise that Sherman agreed with its contents: a summation of "Why General Sherman is Out of Favor" [with the White House]. The paper speculates that "It all grows out of Sherman's misconduct toward the ruling family;" that is, the General had rebuffed Fred Grant's request for a staff job which would have kept him well-paid and "at court," given him a higher rank, and protected him from having to fight Indians. But the crowning blow was the wedding of Sherman's daughter, an affair that outshone the Grant g irl's wedding. These two outrages, the Sun speculated, were enough to produce animosity and to prompt Grant to consider asking Sherman fo r h is r e s ig n a tio n . T his would have made S heridan th e new Commanding General, and accompanying him to his new post would have been his new aide-de-camp - Fred Grant! If any of this idle speculation was true - and Sherman apparently thought it was - Sherman would have yearned for a promotional system which was based more upon m ilitary ability than upon favoritism. A system rewarding ability was what the Prussians had, and as such they were envied by Sherman and others \dio disliked our methods of prom otion. Also, see Toledo Democrat Herald article in the Sherman scrapbook regarding sim ilarities in problems confronted by Grant and Sherman.

34. "officers Ordered Abroad," General Information Index, Records of the Office of the Adjutant-General, Record Group 94, National Archives. Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York: D. Appleton Company, 1878), pp. iii-ix . Letter, Upton to Henry A. DuPont, 11 October 1874, in DuPont Papers, Library of Congress. Stephen E. Ambrose, Upton and the Army (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), pp. 86-7. 35. Ambrose, Upton, pp. 52-9, 65. Ironically, Upton's tactics were similar to those of the Frenchman Colonel Charles J. Ardant du Picq in their emphasis upon skirmishers.

36. Emory Upton, "The Prussian Company Column," in International Review. March 1875, pp. 302-16; Upton, Armies, pp. 27-32. Upton apparently later changed his mind and accepted the superiority of the Prussian numbers; s till, they had not proven their worth during the war of 1870-71. See Boots, Prussian Scheme, pp. 11-12.

37. Ambrose, Upton, p. 83.

38. Richard C. Brown, "General Emory Upton - The Army's Mahan," in M ilitary Affairs. XVII, p. 125. Upton, Armies, pp. 27-32.

39. Upton, Armies, pp. 320-27. Ambrose, Upton, pp. 89-100.

40. Stephen E. Ambrose, "Emory Upton and the Armies of Asia and Europe," in M ilitary A ffairs. XXVIII, 1 (Spring 1964), pp. 27-8. Ambrose, Upton, pp. 94-7. Andrews, Frustration, p. 268.

41. Andrews, "Frustration," pp. 269-70. Walter Mill is, Arms and Men: A Study of American M ilitary Strategy (New York: Mentor Books, 1956), pp. 124-25. Emory Upton. M ilitary Policy of the United States (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1917), pp. xiii-xiv.

42. Upton, Policy, pp. xiii-xiv. Brown, "The Army's Mahan," pp. 127-28. Marc B. Powe, The Emergence o f th e War D epartm ent Intelligence Agency (Manhattan, Kansas: M ilitary A ffairs, for the American M ilitary Institute, 1975), pp. 13-14.

43. Upton, Armies, pp. 196-201.

44. Ibid.. pp. 218-19. Utley. Frontier Regulars, pp. 11-12.

45. Upton, Armies, pp. 219-23.

46. Powe, Intelligence Agency, pp. 13-14. Ambrose, "Upton and the Army," p. 31. Andrews, Frustration, pp. 270-71.

47. Ambrose, Upton, pp. 97-109. Upton, Armies, pp. 213-18, 360-62.

48. Upton, Armies, pp. 203-218.

49. William Harding Carter, "The Evolution of Army Reforms," in The United Service. Series 3, Volume III, 5 (May 1903), pp. 1190-91. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 54-5. 50. Ambrose, Upton, pp. 100-05, is typical of this criticism .

51. Ibid., p. 19.

52. Upton, Armies, p. 369.

53. San Francisco Evening Bulletin, 16 March 1881. To his sister Sara he wrote on 13 March: " ...I have been in no little distress over the revision [of his tactics]. It has seemed to me that I must give up my system and lose my m ilitary reputation...." He reportedly feared that his tactics "would prove disastrous to this country in the event of war." The problems centered on the deployment of a double column with companies over 200 strong; Upton believed the new French system was capable of countering this, with devastating results. CHAPTER THREE

INTEREST DEEPENS

Although Sheridan, Sherman, and Upton's visits to Europe attracted

plenty of attention and inspired later visitors, a number of other

American officers travelled to the continent at about the same time

and offered observations of their own. Some of these went as private

individuals or on leaves of absence, while others were detailed as

official observers of the m ilitary organizations of Europe. These

temporary personnel served as models for the establishment of a

permanent attache system in 1888.

Actually, one of the first major reports on the Prussian army was

written while the Civil War was still in progress. A civilian employee of the State Department, H. S. Sanford, toured Europe in 1863

and submitted a report to Secretary of State William Seward in January

1864. The report was remarkable for two reasons. First, Sanford took note of the terms of military service in Prussia: three years in

active service, two in the reserves, seven in the Landwehr first

class, and seven more in the Landwehr second class. This system,

which Upton noted enthusiastically a decade later, could provide the army with a great many trained men in a very short period of time.

Secondly, Sanford remarked that Prussia was unlike other nations in that it did not enforce a "draft," but simply instituted a universal

85 86 m ilitary obligation. As he reported on the Prussian system's simplicity and efficiency, he probably reflected upon the miserable wartime bounties and drafts that had created chaos in America.1

Such evaluations were but a prelude of what would become a fairly steady stream of commentary on the merits and shortcomings of the

Prussian system over the next thirty years.

Hazen: The French are Passe'

In 1867, only three years after Sanford filed his report. Colonel

(Brevet Major General) William B. Hazen of the Sixth Infantry noted while touring France that the "tone and character of the French army and people, and their attitude toward Germany" was arrogant and overconfident. Thus he was able to state in 1871 that the results of the Franco-Prussian War were a "foregone conclusion" as far as he was concerned.2 Hazen, like Sheridan, had entertained doubts about the

French, who seemed to be resting on their reputation.

Hazen was the first American m ilitary officer to actually publish a book about his European tours. The School and the Army in Germany and France, w ith_a Diary of Seige Life at V ersailles. appeared in

1872. It offered not only the exciting details of life under seige, but a comparison between the French and German systems as well. This in turn offered the opportunity to compare the European systems with the American, which Hazen believed to be weak and typified by

"indolence, ignorance, and shiftlessness" during the Civil War.3

Hazen followed Sheridan to Europe by a little more than a month.

Sherman had bestowed upon Hazen a high recommendation, and Hazen took an indefinite leave of absence to observe the Franco-Prussian War from 87

both the French and German perspectives. He visited several

battlefronts and personally interviewed Bismarck and von Moltke, He

also met with former Union General Ambrose P. Burnside, who had been

in Europe on private business and now acted as a voluntary emissary

between the warring parties during the investment of Paris.^

O bviously, Hazen was in a p o s itio n to make some v a lid judgem ents

about the French army and to appreciate fully the strengths of the

Germans - particularly the Prussian organizational system. He

marvelled at the Germans' ability to conceal themselves; they were so

proficient that one could not see them even when one knew their

specific location. He praised the Germans' investing line, utilizing

mounted pickets at posts well forward in the no-mans-land. The

Germans could mass 60,000 troops on any point of the battlefield "on a

moment's notice." Meanwhile, the French cavalry was "bottled up" in

Paris, quite unlike the active cavalry of Forrest, Sheridan, or

Grierson in the American Civil War, which would have been harassing

the enemy's communications. The French had committed a blunder in

depopulating the outskirts of Paris, as they gave themselves an extra

100,000 mouths to feed; this was unnecessary, since the German

soldiers treated the French civilians very well. This was, Hazen

noticed, a pleasant change from the behavior of Union troops who had mistreated civilians in Georgia.^

It is difficult to say whether Hazen found the French inept and

hopelessly bumbling or the Germans infallible. Nothing the French did

seemed to impress him favorably. He said they had a habit of

disbelieving their enemy's successes or even their potential to be successful. The French use of an artillery bombardment prior to an attack was "absurd" since it merely advertised their intentions - just as American armies had in the previous decade. Hazen hoped that people would realize "the folly of dependence upon any system of the past, however effective it may have been in its day," an error committed by the French. In contrast Hazen found next to nothing wrong with the Prussian system. German drill, tactics, marching, equipment, and the actions of the officers "all showed that perfection of m ilitary detail so essential, and so rarely found." The German soldier and his equipment were commendable, though the breech-loading needle gun was unreliable in rainy or dirty conditions. But above all, it was "the greater moral power of the German people" that enabled them to win such a decisive victory over the French. Hazen reported that French civilians had murdered helpless Germans and generally behaved like despicable cowards. Selfish French peasants would not even willingly aid their own troops. Clearly disgusted,

Hazen wrote:

It is to be hoped that we shall no longer look on France as an example of civilization worthy of admiration and imitation I found much to admire in the simple, earnest life of the German people, who have accom plished so much by r a tio n a l and persistent labor.^

This moral strength enabled the Germans to maintain such good discipline and organization, even when occupying enemy cities.

Contrasting this to America's propensity for loose discipline and unnecessary frills and extravagances, he commented:

I never see the spectacle [among the German army], so common in the first two years of our war, of a general thundering along the street with a cavalcade at his heels, making the dust fly and everybody run for his life

The Germans wasted no personnel on bloated personal staffs and escorts; nor did they clog their depots with tons of useless supplies.

Finally, Hazen reported there was "no bickering, no questioning of orders...a single purpose prevails - to secure the success of the

German arms."®

This idyllic view of the German army was most probably due to the truly outstanding morale which could be expected of an army that has fairly handily defeated a powerful foe in a quick, convincing manner.

But the Prussian organization was indeed impressive, and Hazen's memories of America's recent war stood out in sharp contrast to the efficient Prussian victory. The use of superlatives may have been extravagant, but there is little doubt that Hazen had reason to be impressed. The Germans were, in his estimation, our equals or betters in every way, from the design and material of the infantryman's uniform to the General Staff organization. The individual to whom

Hazen gave full credit for the victories of 1866 and 1870-71 was

Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian General Staff; but the whole conception of the army being tied with "the very framework of society" had been that of King Frederick William, the first King of Prussia.

To Hazen, the King's concept of parcelling his realm into cantons and making each one responsible for keeping its own regiment was the key to the Germans' success. Through this arrangement local pride and concern supported the regiments, and administration was simplified through the resultant diffusion of responsibility. It also fulfilled Hazen's estimation that "an army, to be of value, must possess the

true national spirit of its time, and be allied in sympathy to the

p eo p le ."^

Naturally, Hazen realized that good officers were necessary in

making this entire sytstem work properly. Here too the Germans

re ceiv e d H azen 's p r a is e , and i t was h e re th a t he made a g re a t many

unfavorable comments about the American system. The Prussians had the

"ablest, best instructed, and in all that makes men socially and

technically worthy, the finest body of officers in the world."

Incompetent or inefficient men did not become or remain officers in

Prussia, but in the United States "influential persons" could gain

appointments for men "without a single qualification." In Germany,

service and talent brought promotion; in the United States, "those who

do honest, rough duty uncomplainingly are very likely to do it all

their lives." Hazen warned, for example, that the state governors

should not have the power to appoint officers. Nor was it justifiable

to promote men solely for seniority or bravery: an officer should be,

as in the Prussian fashion, "sensible, cultivated, industrious, and moral." Many officers during the early stages of the United States'

Civil War had been "indolent, ignorant, and shiftless," a situation

that lowered the morale of the soldiers and did nothing to increase

the respect of the men for their officers. Hazen believed that the

United States could save a million dollars per year that was instead being lost due to desertions and incompetence caused by low morale and

poor officers. In his opinion, the only glaring weakness in the

Prussian system was the predominance of officers from the 91 aristocracy.10 But then, to do away with this would be contrary

to tradition, as the Prussian upper class had supplied the army with officers for years. No such practice existed in the United States, as

Wesc Point was theoretically open to qualified individuals of all

If the officers in Prussia were of better quality, their entire

.■îtacf s y s ta n had much to recommend i t as w e ll. The P ru ssia n s t a f f was it 'purely m ilitary body" whose duties were likewise purely m ilitary.

On the other hand, the United States "had an immense preponderance of staff," which was becoming a powerful, autonomous interest group in

Washington, able to perpetuate rank and influence. Some individual

American staff members actually held control over the army they were supposed to serve. The various staff departments were "substantially independent bodies" with no real link to a chain of m ilitary administration. They had access to archives and records and were able to gain personal congressional contacts. In Hazen's estimation, the sum total of this situation was the waste and extravagance resultant o f to o many independent so u rces o f power. A s t a f f member in

Washington was able to lead an easy life, hiring "a half dozen civilians to sod his grounds" while distant posts were unable to employ a single civilian blacksmith. Our systan turned promising young officers into administrative personnel prone to "luxury and laziness" rather than soldiers; the best men from the line were taken by the staffs to do administrative work, just as in wartime the best soldiers had often been detailed for ambulance work. There were as many men administering the army as there were fighting in it, Hazen claimed. This created a huge number of wasteful, high-paying

p o s itio n s II

The Prussian General Staff had nothing whatsoever to do with the

administrative duties of paying, clothing, feeding, and supplying the

army. In fact, "every good army in Christendom save our own," Hazen

complained, had a true General Staff, "one of the first great needs of

all armies." Our lack of a proper staff hindered the war effort in

1861-65, because the centralization of administration resulted in

countless mixups and delays originating in Washington. In contrast,

the Prussian administration was decentralized, though power was

centralized; each officer and civil official knew his duty; there was

a minimum of responsibility, confusion, and delay. It was Hazen's

view that the American administrative staff not only was far removed

from the true duties of a general staff, but it was flawed in terms of

its incompetence, its high rank, and its independence from m ilitary

control - mistakes made by the French in 1870-71. In fact, Hazen

would later say that "it is doubtful if the French staff possesses

anything worthy of copying." The system to emulate was that of the

Prussians, whose staff was primarily engaged in preparing plans for m ilitary operations.

Hazen's whole purpose in later writing The School and the Army in

Germany and France was to show how America's m ilitary system could

profit from a study of the successful German system. Hoping we could

"take lessons from the first m ilitary power of the world," he

cautioned that the system that had worked in the Civil War was not the

best possible system; that even the successful Prussians "constantly 93

seek improvement." He stressed that the time to prepare for war was

during peacetime, so that when war came the United States would not

"lose valuable time in unlearning errors perpetuated in peace." As

first steps, he advocated permanently assigning officers as observers

to every active foreign army; the creation of a war school along

German lines, which in turn would make possible the formation of a

tr u e , w e ll-tr a in e d g en e ral s t a f f whose c h ie f would command th e army;

and the "harmonizing" of the duties of this Chief of Staff and the

Secretary of War. He remarked that the absence of substitutes and the rare incidence of exemptions to m ilitary duty, along with the general

education and high intelligence of men and officers, helped to assure

the pre-eminence of the Prussian system. Unimpressed with the overall

quality of German armaments, Hazen believed that the secret of their

success lay in the quality of the men and officers, as well as the overall organization of the army.1^

If there was a weakness in Hazen's argument, it was in his hope

that Americans would trust the army enough to lessen the control of

th e c i v i l i a n S e c re ta ry o f War over th e Commanding G e n era l, o r th a t

they would placidly accept elimination of a system allowing numerous exemptions from m ilitary service. If the "moral character" of the

German people were primarily responsible for the German victories, then it would be nearly impossible to transfer specific traits of this

"national character" to the United States. But the details of his

suggestions regarding a general staff, the officer corps, and a m ilitary educational system were plausible and acceptable ideas to most Americans with the exception of those who would lose comfortable 94

positions under such plans. Quite often, of course, these were the very people whose approval or cooperation was needed before any such

changes could readily transpire.

A Growing Body of Opinion on Germany

The groundwork was laid, however, for further observations.

Sheridan and Hazen both returned from Europe with praise for the

Germans, and a shift in American m ilitary thinking began to manifest

itself. The discredited remnants of the defeated French army left

little doubt as to the identity of the preeminent military power of

the world, and American attention abruptly swung to the army that had

so easily humbled the highly-touted French. Previous victories over

Denmark and Austria had been largely downplayed as victories over inferior, antiquated powers; the humiliation of the m ilitary descendants of Napoleon I, however, caused the world to reevaluate the

European m ilitary situation.

In 1872, th e Army and Navy J o u rn a l (ANJ) began tak in g more n o tic e of Prussian affairs. One article touted the "Benefits of Prussian

M ilitary Training," noting that:

When a soldier at the end of his three years' service returns to his home, he presents himself often to the astonishment of his friends as an entirely different man, greatly improved physically and mentally, and thereby enabled to fill positions in society for which he would have been entirely unfit without his military education....the m ilitary service in Prussia is looked upon by the people generally, not as a burden, but rather as an institution for a better education; a benefit to the nation; and the d e s ira b le n e s s to be a s o ld ie r is v e ry much heightened by the law that nobody is admitted to any public office unless [he has] the requisite credentials for his military career....^^ 95

Such a law would be unthinkable in the United States, but there was no doubt that army officers in this country were envious of the stature enjoyed by their German peers. Indisputably, the difference was a matter of culture: professional m ilitary service in Germany was perceived as an honorable profession, but in the postwar United States it was not.

No less a personage than Ulysses S. Grant, former President of the

United States and former Commanding General of the Union Armies, visited Europe in 1878. This was after both Sherman and Upton had made their visits, but prior to the publication of Upton's report. Little is known of Grant's impressions of the German army as his memoirs say little and family letters reveal even less. Nor did Grant go as a m ilitary observer; though he visited many m ilitary installations, he was primarily a very famous tourist. He took special note of the

German f o r tr e s s e s along th e R hine, but made no in -d e p th a n a ly s is o f the German m ilitary system itself. His observations were of far more interest to the American public than they were to the m ilitary, but that is how they were intended. Places he visited included Hanover,

Berlin, and the huge fortress at Ehrenbreitstein. But these were tourist attractions more than they were valuable examples of m ilitary engineering, and so were of no particular interest to American m ilitary leaders.

Upton's report, prepared at nearly the same time as Grant toured the continent, was obviously of more m ilitary value than Grant's observations. Not so well known was the report of Upton's aide.

Captain Joseph P. Sanger of the A rtillery. Sanger's report on 96

European artillery was as much a plea for updating the American system as it was an evaluation of what already existed overseas. In fact,

Sanger said frankly that comparisons of our artillery with that of other nations was "humilitating" to us. The only remedy was to make some immediate adjustments.^^

Sanger found it strange that the United States, with so little actual experience, had not followed the European lead in terms of army organization. The Europeans were innovators and knew what they were doing. The European artillery kept pace with scientific advancements, while America lagged behind. The United States followed two different systems, one for war and another for peace, and relied too much upon good luck and good field commanders. The officers were usually strangers to the troops; there was no system of regimental depots; batteries varied in size; differing types of cannon were present in each battery. In short, the whole system "was as much the result of chance as design.

Sanger, like Hazen, stressed that the American artillery needed a system which in time of peace would enable it to prepare for war. He felt that despite the lessons of the Civil War, the artillery, at least, was no better off, because nothing had substantially changed.

In contrast, the Germans' peacetime organization was an impressive m odelE verything from the "skeletonization" of the army to the means of procuring horses appealed to him. The actual mobilization of the army was a thing of beauty: "everything to be done, and everyone to be involved, is determined beforehand." The General Staff had previously discussed every probable contingency so the entire 97 operation, from its start to the arrival at the front, went quickly

and smoothly.^^

The German artillery's success on the battlefield began with its regimental equipment management and supply coordination. Experienced officers and a healthy supply of trained reserves also helped, and tactics were the model of simplicity. But perhaps the most basic and y e t o verlooked fa c to r was th a t German a r t i l l e r y was always commanded by artillery officers; no one else - not even a general of infantry or c a v a lry - could command a b a tte r y o f a r tille r y .^ ® .

Training for the German artilleryman, particularly the officers, examined all elements of battery management from driving the caissons to the actual use of the piece. This was in keeping with the Prussian practice of ensuring the efficient operation of all facets o f th e army, in spite of casualties. Similarly, the division of the artillery into battery divisions was "in perfect harmony with the co rp s o rg a n iz a tio n o f th e German Army" as a whole. The e n t i r e arrangement was logical and efficient.21

German officers of artillery were, in Sanger's estimation, "equal in ability and well surpass in zeal and professional expertise those

I officers] of any other army in the w o r l d ."22 xhe artillery s c h o o l, known as th e o b e r-fe u e rw e rk e r sch o o l, was th e p in n ac le o f th e artillerym an's profession, but officers were expected to attend yearly lectures and conferences covering new problems and fresh approaches even after they completed their schooling. Sanger felt that this sort of education wac worthy of imitation, in that it was "designed to cover all grades and degrees of intelligence."23 But he pointedly 98

omitted saying that the entire system was worthy of American

imitation, probably because he realized that such a goal was

impractical. But that he was impressed by the German artillery is

beyond question.

He ended his summation by noting that the Germans were never

totally satisfied with the performance of their armies. After each

recent war, reforms in personnel management, m aterial, or mode of

artillery utilization had taken place. This progress "shattered

ideals, however sacred," and broke down useless traditions. The

Germans learned from the past but were not bound by it; that was the key for reform in every branch of the army.2^ Perhaps Sanger's most important message lay between the lines: if the Germans could

improve their artillery after a successful war (rather than "resting

on their laurels"), then why tould not the United States do likewise

with a system that had displayed so many shortcomings in its latest wartime experience?

Major George A. Forsyth, who had accompanied Upton to Europe, apparently filed no major report on his observations. Interestingly, when asked by The Journal of the M ilitary Service Institute (JMSI) in

1883 to comment on the needs of the American cavalry, he never mentioned anything about his European experience. In 1900, he dedicated a few paragraphs of one of his books to an analysis of the

American staff system, saying that overall, despite its faults, it was better than that of most European nations. This was in sharp contrast

to the opinions of many of his peers. In fact, he spoke disparagingly of European systems generally and seemed to view a tour of Europe as 99

little more than a pleasant and educational way to spend six months'

o f f i c i a l le a v e ,25

But Forsyth was an exception. Armed with flattering comments from

other major American observers abroad, an increasing number of

m ilitary analysts in the United States were beginning to take serious

note of the Germans. By 1877, a large number of articles and

officers' reports concerning the German m ilitary system were appearing

in a variety of American journals and periodicals. Observers began

journeying to Europe in greater numbers and wrote about their

impressions of the m ilitary establishments of the continent. These

published professional opinions furthered the cause of the reformers,

and drew critics of the American m ilitary system into an ever-growing

collection of men who saw elements of a m ilitary "salvation" in the

example o f th e s u c c e s s fu l German army.

From Upton to the Attaches: Observers and Analysts. 1880-1888

The men who went to Europe after Upton and Sanger were sources of

additional information on the German system. Sometimes they provided

the basis of many minor adjustments and innovations in American

organization. Captain (later Brigadier General) Louis H. Carpenter is

an example. He was granted a leave of absence to visit Europe in

1881. At that time, army regulations, recognizing the importance of

information on foreign armies, required all officers visiting foreign

nations to submit reports on matters of professional m ilitary

interest.26 Carpenter attended both the French and the German maneuvers and, like most observers of the time, found the Germans to

be superior soldiers working within a superior organization.22 100

Substantial contributions of a different sort were introduced over several years starting in 1879 by a number of individuals who saw value in emulation of the German war game, the Kriegsspiel. Prominent advocates of different game versions were Major W. R. Livermore (The

American Kriegsspiel, 1879); First Lieutenant Charles A. L. Totten

(S tra te g o s : A S e rie s o f American Games o f War, 1880); C aptain C harles

W. Raymond (K rie g s s p ie l, 1881); and C aptain Eban S w ift's 1894 adaptation and translation of Von Verdy du Vernois' A Simplified War

Game. These were "A m ericanized" v e rs io n s of th e German K rie g s s p ie l that had been used for fifty years to educate Prussian officers and develop specific tactical problems and possibilities. The American o f f ic e r s b eliev e d th e se "games" would serv e much th e same fu n c tio n in

America as they had in Germany. Though primarily intended for education and study, it was hoped that they could also reeducate

Americans regarding the problems of war. Totten's version utilized

American and foreign battle statistics (such as casualty figures under varying combat conditions) in order to approximate reality.

Livermore's incorporated both a game and a textbook for applying the game's lessons. Livermore's wargame is especially noteworty for its updated 1898 version, which took into account lessons and statistics of the Spanish War; the use of smokeless powder, for example, was a new v a r ia b le p re v io u sly ig n o red .

These "games" were widely praised and played by individuals and in the service schools, but not by a planning staff with an eye toward future operations. In 1880, the future battlefields of Cuba and the

Philippines were unforseen, and World War I was nearly forty years in 101

the future; so in the end, American Kriegsspiel and Strategos really

prepared no one adequately for the real wars that eventually

developed. True, basic strategies and problems did become apparent to

th o se who p a r tic ip a te d in th e game in in fo rm al s e s s io n s , bu t i t s t i l l

was usually perceived only as a complex game decided by the roll of

the dice, not by smoking cannon, raw courage, and death-defying

assaults. Thus it was seen as only a theoretical teaching tool,

inferior to the ultimate teacher: experience. It was important, but

generally perceived as incomplete within itself. The fact that the

Germans utilized it so well curiously did little to improve its

stature in the United States. Also lost on American critics was the

authenticity of the German games: specific terrain and actual casualty

statistics were used to make the games accurate and plausible.

Two articles by well-travelled officers appeared in the JMSI in

1883. Both were written in response to a call for essays on

"Important Improvements in the Art of War in the Last Twenty Years and

Their Probable Effect on M ilitary Operations." Captain Francis Vinton

Greene and Lieutenant Colonel Wesley M erritt, both of the Engineers,

had been to Europe and wrote from personal observation. Greene's

article emphasized comparisons between the American Civil War, the

German wars of 1866 and 1870-71, and the Russian-Turkish conflict of

1877-78. M erritt's piece examined the same conflicts, but emphasized

the Germans' dominance in emerging m ilitary thought and

organization 29

Greene and M erritt both recognized the obvious technologial changes since 1862: the railroad, telegraph, breech-loading weapons. 102 and steam-driven warships. Greene stressed, however, that it was

tactics - mobility and proper use of fortifications - that truly decided the issue in any conflict. In particular, he cited the

Austrian disaster at Koniggratz, the result of both the Prussian use of the needle-gun and the Austrians’ own failure to fortify their positions. In 1870, when the French possessed superior arms, the swift German mobilization won them the initiative and, ultimately, the war. This proved that weapons by themselves were not the decisive factor in war.^^

The Germans, in other words, seemed to be doing something extremely well; they kept one step ahead of potential enemies. No sooner had their rivals caught up with them (and perhaps surpassed them) in one aspect than the Germans developed new ideas or improved their own methods once again, maintaining their overall superiority.

For example, they had not used their artillery very well in 1866, but they remedied this in 1870 to such an extent that "the French were disposed to ascribe their defeats almost wholly to itThe

French had better arms than the Prussians, but the Prussian speed of mobilization, and their mobility in the field negated the French advantage. Like everyone else, the Prussians were learning, but they seemed to do it faster than anyone else.

But of all the changes in the previous two decades, Greene placed

"changes in organization" at the top of his list. He particularly stressed the development of expansible armies, which enabled a nation to keep only part of the army in uniform while still allowing the rapid mobilization of trained armies. Next in Greene's order of 103

priorities were the utilization of steam and electric power, improved

weapons and entrenchments, the changing tactics due to the new

weapons, and new uses of the cavalry. The Germans had demonstrated

all but the last of these in their victories against France and

A u s t r i a .32

M e r ritt made much th e same o b s e rv a tio n s. The P ru s s ia n s made

advancements and then were widely it> itated by other European armies.

They perfected the tactics of the company column, which M erritt

believed was easy to maneuver (other analysts, such as Arthur L.

Wagner, would disagree) and was much superior to older battle methods

that were too large, cumbersome, and slow. In artillery, the German

firm of Krupp had pioneered rifled field guns made of ingot steel and

later developed a breech-loader which was used in 1864 and 1866.

M erritt called these "the best in the world," noting that armies of all nations had purchased them. The Germans utilized the railroads effectively, and required officers to "serve longer in its [the railroad] division of the General Staff than any other." Only in

terms of cavalry development were the Germans lagging behind — and the

leaders here, M erritt believed, were the Americans. Soon, of course,

th e new weaponry would make c a v a lry charges o b s o le te ; so M e r ritt was unknowingly praising the United States for leading the world in a u s e le s s a r t . 33

M erritt applauded the Prussian system, extolling its virtues with the highest words of praise. He stressed most of all the concepts of peacetime work and pre-war preparedness. The maxim "in time of peace prepare for war" was followed to the letter by the Prussians: ...never was the principle better illustrated than in the organization and discpline of the armies of Germany. Her system of recruiting and supplying her armies had been worked out and perfected by years of patient, but energetic l a b o r .

That an army should be directed by only one head was accepted by

M erritt as indisputable. He was undoubtedly mindful of the conflict between American civilian officials and the generals during and after the Civil War. What was basic and necessarily true was simple: "Small arms and their improvements can have no possible effect upon grand tactics. The form of army government has everything to do with them.The marvelous preparations by the Prussian General

Staff, providing mobilization plans down to the "most minute details," had been possible largely because the General Staff was wholly entrusted with this task. The Staff had done its work completely:

He [Moltke, Chief of Staff] knew that in ten days he could bring three hundred thousand men to the front, and in eighteen days he could be superior to any force the French could command....Every possible contingency had been provided for. It was only necessary to insert the date of the first day of mobilization...the great military spirits of Germany. . .must be regarded as the greatest in the world....^^

This was the ultimate in praise from M erritt, who would visit

Europe again and would in 1903 be instrumental in gaining support for

American army reorganization along German lines.

Surprisingly, neither Greene nor M erritt suggested in their essays the need for a permanent, organized set of observers with an agency to act as a coordinating clearinghouse in Washington. Both men had been, essentially, m ilitary attaches and had personally seen elements 105 of European m ilitary systems about which they could then effectively report to the War Department. It seemed that to keep abreast of the situation overseas would be of prime importance and worth some passing mention. Possibly, Greene and M erritt were constricted by both the essay’s and title as well as limitations on length, and simply did not construe attache work as an "improvement in the art of war" as such.

Yet Greene, at least, had already gone on record as favoring the establishment of a formal attache system. In a report to the

Secretary of State from the American legation in St. Petersburg, where he was temporarily stationed with the unofficial title of "military attache," Greene extolled European attache arrangements. He defined the attache's duties as simply keeping their governments informed of the course of military affairs, strengths, and capabilities in the nations where they were stationed. He pointed out that in most of

Europe's great nations, there was a special section of the general staff - known as "foreign statistics - that arranged, studied, and classified all such information collected by the attaches. This was, of course, an extremely valuable service. The Germans had made good use of their information in their Wars of Unification. The French, however, had largely ignored the reports of their attache in Berlin, with disastrous results.

Greene pointed out that though m ilitary attaches would be something new for the United States, they were a long-established part of the m ilitary scene in Europe. The Americans, having no such system, had instead found it periodically necessary to send individuals or commissions to abroad to make the observations and 1C6

reports which could have been made by permanent observers for less

expense and with far fewer special arrangements: "They would be able

to furnish our m ilitary...information of great utility, more than the

equivalent of their expenses...." This would do away with the need

for all sorts of special commissions. An officer stationed in each of

the great European capitals - Berlin, Paris, London, and St.

Petersburg - would be of great value to the United States

government.3® The American attache system was a thing of the

future, however. Nearly ten years were to pass between the writing of

Greene's letter from Russia and the actual formation of America's

attache organization. In the meantime, additional commissions and

individuals continued to go to Europe and file their reports.

In 1880, Lieutenant John Bigelow (USMA 187'') wrote the first of his three major contributions to American m ilitary thought.

Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte, published as an Ordnance Department

Report in 1884, examined two battles of the Franco-Prussian War.

Bigelow's study was both marvelously detailed and very readable. He

considered Gravelotte one of the "greatest armed conflicts of modern

times," a battle deserving of unbiased examination and criticism . He

found that the Prussians still had a number of lessons to learn.

Among them were the importance of skirmishers; the proper "preparation of the enemy" by artillery bombardment prior to an assault (the same concept that Hazen had labelled "absurd"); the utilization of cavalry as efficient scouts and as a force having the ability to fight on

foot; and the proper use of field entrenchments. On the other hand, he noted the Germans had made good use of their signal and telegraph 107

service, and their strategy was clearly superior to that of the

French, though they failed to execute it completely. The German plan of operations was "singular for its simplicity and disrespect of

conventionality," the credit for which, as so many other observers had

said, belonged to Moltke. Overall, Bigelow's estimation of the German war effort was very favorable.

Bigelow's most famous work. Principles of Strategy, was released

fifteen years later. Surprisingly, he incorporated next to nothing

from his first monograph into this later work. He only mentioned the

German army a few times in Principles, although he had spent much time examining the principles of the Prussian victory. Principles was primarily concerned with American examples, the Prussians being mentioned only in reference to their mode of protecting supply lines and their line of march. The most praise Bigelow gave them in this book was for their ability to continuously supply their units from the original provincial depots, due largely to the efficiency of their rail supply system. Bigelow also referred to their "design of operations" for the 1870 war, in which their initial singular purpose was to cut off the French armies from any connection with Paris. Upon doing this, they could then form a new design - one for the seige of

the French capital itself.^0

Lieutenant William Birkheimer, gaining much of his material second-hand through State Department communiques, published a history of American artillery which compared the American system with those of the major European powers. Birkheimer marvelled particularly at the

Prussian ability to effectively bring the full weight of their 108

artillery into action at once from the head of their columns. Echoing

Sanger's report, he said the peacetime organization of this artillery

fit in perfectly with the expansible nature of the entire army, as it

had peacetime officers commanding "fleshed out" regiments and

batteries or taking places at the various higher headquarters. No

wonder the "circle of fire" at Sedan had been so effective in bringing

about a French capitualation! Everything was organized; everyone knew

his duty.^^

Such organization was not only admirable; it was unattainable with

the existing system in the United States. Lieutenant Arthur L.

Wagner, who would later help plan the reorganization of the American

army, warned in 1884 that what little money the nation was allocating

for the army usually ended up being spent on unimportant (or illegal)

purposes. Such a situation helped no one other than its perpetuators,

William R. King of the Engineers agreed. The cost of our army was

"excessive," considering what little we had to show for the expense.

Reforms of a "radical" nature were needed to rectify the financial

situation.^2

Thus by 1885, clear warnings against American complacency had been

sounded by various officers who recognized that the great armies of

the Civil War were now twenty years gone, and to trust solely in the m ilitary expertise and the veterans of that war was simply foolhardy.

Captain George F. Price put it bluntly, charging that the United

States had not learned the primary lesson of the Franco-Prussian War:

France's reputation had not saved her from defeat. She had been content to rest upon her reputation and the memory of past glories. 109

just as the United States had too much confidence in the "prestige of

past successes." Price feared a "national humiliation" was bound to occur, for the ways of war had changed drastically in two decades, but

the United States seemed determined to ignore that very obvious

f a c t . 43

The War Department was of course aware that m ilitary practices abroad were changing and developing. The Department, in conjunction with the Adjutant-General's office, had begun sending individuals and groups of officers overseas soon after the Civil War. Between 1870 and 1877, at least ten officers went to Europe for the Secretary of

War. Under General Order #64 in 1880, at least twenty-five officers, including Major General John M. Schofield and Brigadier General Oliver

0. Howard, visited Europe between 1881 and 1885. Some of these, such as Captain Carpenter, went while on official leaves of absence.

Others were ordered to go as official observers for the War

Department. Unfortunately, many of these visits were superfluous; most of the major observations necessary to prompting and guiding changes in the American system had already been made by Sheridan,

Upton, and their contemporaries. What was truly lacking - and what was so vitally necessary - was a means of recording and coordinating all information from abroad.44

Formation of the M ilitary Intelligence Division and th e Attache System

Prompted by the Adjutant General's inablity to provide the

Secretary of War with information on foreign armies, the War

Department began to assemble an agency for gathering information and 110 compiling records in 1885. This was tantamount to acceptance of at least one of the traits of the European general staffs, as they all had intelligence bureaus. This was the first real breakthrough for advocates of reform along European lines. In particular, it was inspired by the Prussian success of 1870-71, as the Prussians had known "ever> st'ategic point in France" thanks to their intelligence agency. The . erican version of this agency was placed under the control of the Adjutant General's Office (AGO) and named the "Bureau of M ilitary Information" (BMI) until 1890, when it became known as the

"M ilitary Information Division" (MID). Adjutant General R. C. Drum,

Major William Wolkmann, and Captain Daniel M. Taylor, Chief of the

BMI/MID, d ire c te d th e agency in i t s e a r ly y e a rs , assem bling information gathered around the world and monitoring the ability of the m ilitia to meet unforseen emergencies effectively.^5

This was an important step. The responsibility for compiling information gathered overseas now rested with an agency rather than on the occasional conscientious individual who took the time to accurately record his observations. Even greater changes were on the way, however, for the formation of BMI/MID was only the first step.

The continual, temporary assignment of boards and individuals abroad was expensive and cumbersome. The agency would find - as Greene had previously suggested - that personnel assigned abroad for several years at a time would be much more practical and economical.

S till, BMI/MID was only in its embryonic stages, and an attache system was three years in the future. So individuals continued to make their way across the Atlantic with only general guidance from the I l l

War Department and a request by General Drum in 1886 that all officers abroad report on any and all information gathered during their travels. This was much like the earlier regulation requiring reports of individuals. The agency could assemble information, but as yet had no authority to send individuals to gather that information. Thi’S, people like Lieutenant (later General) Tasker H. Bliss were still sent abroad by the AGO to do such things as "sift the current thought of the m ilitary schools of England, France, and Germany" for one year, while a group of individuals stationed abroad for a number of years could have easily performed the same task and probably could have accomplished a great deal more.^^

Because th e BMI/MID was s t i l l an incom plete fle d g lin g organization, m ilitary publications such as the Army and Navy Journal continued to be primary sources of information from abroad for several more years. Between 1885 and 1889, the ANJ was filled with articles which revealed a continued intense interest in all things European.

The emphasis continued to remain on Germany. In 1886, one article criticized German infantry equipment, saying that the famous

"pickelhaube" (spiked helmet) was too hot and heavy. The following spring, the ANJ announced that not only were the Germans adopting a new rifle (the Mauser), but they would soon start using "velocipedes"

- bicycles and tricycles - as well! Two months later, diagrams of the new German knapsack, lighter and excellent for distributing weight, took up much of the ANJ's front page. In 1887, ANJ estimated that

Germany could "put 10,000 men on French soil within eight minutes a f t e r th e o rd e r to move" was re c e iv e d . The awe and re s p e c t for th e 112

Geraan a b i l i t y to move q u ick ly had reached new h e ig h ts! By March

1888, ANJ p erceiv e d Germany no t only as a n a tio n , b u t "an armed camp" as well. Finally, in 1889, ANJ reported that the l*i£est maneuvers in

Germany utilized "smokeless powder" having the lone disadvantage of smelling "very abom inably!Sim ilarly, JMSI published articles on such d iv e rs e a s p e c ts o f th e German army as se ig e w arfare and th e

Sanitary Corps; the latter, said one observer, was obviously copied from our Sanitary Commission of 1861-65 48

Articles such as these continued to appear, of course, but after

1888 they were no longer the primary source of information on happenings abroad. The attache system that Captain Greene had spoken of a decade earlier finally became reality and came under the auspices o f BMI/MID. B uried in an a p p ro p ria tio n s b i l l passed by Congress on 22 September 1888 was a brief paragraph providing funding for military attaches to be stationed at five embassies: Berlin, London,

Paris, St. Petersburg, and Vienna. More appointments were add^d later. By 1898 the United States had military attaches at sixteen embassies, including Rome, Brussels, Japan, and Mexico City. The first two attaches were sent to Germany and Great Britain which were, respectively, the nations possessing what were deemed to be the world's greatest army and navy.^^

The BMI/mid itse lf now became independent of the AGO's M ilitary

Reservation Division and was placed directly under the control of the

Adjutant General. Captain Daniel M. Taylor was placed in charge, and the initial attache appointment for the Berlin post was Captain J. C.

Sanford of the Engineers, who served in that capacity from April 113

through December, 1889. Sanford had applied for the post two days after Congress had made the appropriation. He was initially assigned as a "rotating" attache, but after spending two weeks in London he was

transferred to Berlin on a permanent basis. In December, he requested and was granted a sick leave, during which he escaped to the warmer climates of Italy and Nice, France. He was recalled to the United

States in March 1890. He had been ill for most of his stay in Europe and filed no report of consequence, partly because no clear guidelines enumerating the attaches' duties had yet been established

This situation was not rectified until March 1892, when General

Order #23 specified the MID's specific missions. These included the collection and classification of military information pertaining to

the armed strength (including reserves), means of communication, types of arms and ammunition, and means of supply available to the foreign armies; the issuing of detailed instructions to officers travelling abroad; the publication and issuing of books, monographs, papers, maps, and other information obtained overseas ; correspondence with state m ilitias; instructions to regular army officers detailed to visit state m ilitias; and the study and preparation for the mobilization and transport of m ilitias to strategic points, as necessary. This order was issued seven years after the inception of

BMI/MID, and y et i t s p e lle d ou t th e ag en cy 's d u tie s fo r the f i r s t time! From this point on, MID could function as a purposeful body.

Given the lapse in time, it is not surprising that it had accomplished little in the previous years. 114

Before 1892 the attaches had only a memorandim from Secretary of

War Red f ie ld P ro c to r to C ap tain Theodore A. Bingham, S a n fo rd 's replacement in Berlin, to guide their actions. (Presumably, all attaches received their own copy.) The memo to Bingham, issued in

December 1889, was quite clear: attaches were to report on all matters of m ilitary or technical importance which would be of use to any branch of the service. They were to observe all ordnance trials and

"military exhibitions," and visit all m ilitary libraries - in general, to keep their eyes and ears open at all times. More simply, the attaches' duties were to "ferret out" those attributes of foreign armies which America's lacked, and to coax the War Department to institute improvements of a similar nature. The attaches were answerable to both the Secretary of War and the United States

Ministers at their assigned legations - which meant that they were answerable to the Secretary of State as well. Proctor's instructions also admonished attaches to keep strict account of their expenses since little money was actually allocated for their services

The attaches were expected to maintain a sense of propriety as they went about their business. They were, after all, invited guests who were entertained and provided with "every comfort" by their host government. William C. Endicott, Proctor's predecessor, had instructed the first group of attaches to avoid offending their hosts.

They were to use legal means to gather information, and their information was to be treated confidentially with only a limited number of people having access to their re p o rts.F a ilu re to respect the sensitivities of the host nation could easily result in 115 the expulsion of the attache, lack of future cooperation in the exchange of m ilitary information, and even strained relations between the respective governments.

Captain Bingham arrived in Berlin in January 1890 and remained th e re u n t i l Septem ber 1892, when he was ap p o in ted a tta c h e in Rome. In contrast to Sanford, Bingham proved to be a healthy, active attache, filing a number of reports and eventually receiving a promotion to the rank of major and an appointment as an Assistant Adjutant General.

That he was well-qualified for foreign duty is obvious. He was able to read, w rite, and speak fluent German; he was also accomplished in

French, competent in Spanish, and "held his own" in Italian.^^

Bingham filed several reports on the artillery systems of the continent, paying particular attention to the new Krupp quick-loading field pieces, which he found highly reliable and accurate. His most important impressions, however, concerned the "Prussian Great General

Staff," about which he reported to the War Department and published an article in JMSI. This article appeared one month following his re assig n m e n t to Rome, although he had not yet l e f t B e rlin for h is new post. It thus represented the sum of his personal observations on the

Prussian staff system, which I.s had seen in operation for well over a y e a r .55

Bingham's article ranks alongside the classic statements of Upton for its concise summary of American attitudes in relation to the establishment of a true general staff and its argument for adoption of certain facets of the German system. The concept of a General Staff was, Bingham said, still misunderstood in America in 1892. America's 116

"General Staff" had duties "purely of administration and supply" and

nothing whatever to do with planning and running m ilitary campaigns.

An accurate title , in English, to describe what the Prussians meant by

"G en eral S ta ff" would be "Corps o f C hiefs o f S ta ff fo r Commanding

Generals," or "Corps of Specially Educated and Trained Aides-de-

Bingham pointed out that war was becoming more scientific and complicated all the time, and one general simply could not be expected

to keep up with all the demands of the modern battlefield without some help. The Prussians solved the problem by carefully selecting and thoroughly training junior officers in the "art of generalship," which involved a number of subjects: strategy, grand and minor tactics, the writing of orders, modern languages, geography, m ilitary history, and the solution of m ilitary problems. He noted, a bit ironically, that

"such qualities are exactly what are not lequired of good ' staff o f f i c e r s '" in th e American sen se . The German G eneral S ta ff was tru ly th e " b ra in " o f th e German Army and had made s o ld ie rin g in to a s c ie n c e .

The lesson of the Prussian staff was that correct leadership meant

"untold economy in blood and treasure" and could be learned only by study and hard work. Political cppointments thus had no place in a true staff system in the Prussian sense

Bingham stressed the importance of the Prussian war game, especially in planning future campaigns. He told the oft-repeated story of how Prussian Chief of Staff von Moltke had figured the details for various campaigns far in advance by utilizing the

Kriegsspiel, so that once the War of 1870 began Moltke could say. 117

" I 'v e n o th in g a t a l l to do now. The work was done long ago and i t only remains to execute it." The United States, Bingham charged, had no such plans or any definite plans for defense against invasion. He did not specific ally mention Totten's Strategos or the Kriegsspiels of

Livermore and Raymond, but he said that American versions were either unappreciated or incompletely developed.58

P rid in g them selves on a fa ls e sense o f economy was going to co st

Americans dearly in the end, Bingham warned. Boards of officers had gone abroad at great cost to try to gather information that should have been compiled years earlier: "This is at once the reason for and the business of our Bureau of Military Information," he wrote, enthusiastically endorsing the system of which he was a part:

M ilitary Information is at once the foundation and the sustaining wall of Prussia's instant readiness for war...Here appears the advantage of teaching officers to read modern languages .the world is an open book to the Prussian General Staff.59

What the United States needed to recognize was that the Prussians never would have been able to make such advances in m ilitary techniques had they not freed themselves from the bonds of tradition.

Herein lay the lesson: America did not need a duplicate of the

Prussian General Staff, but it did need m ilitary information of all types, which it could adapt to its own needs and refer to in the event of war. The United States needed to understand its potential opponents. Thus it had to keep abreast of all foreign developments and advancements. This would be adequately provided for by the MID, the "cheap and practical" way to meet information needs. It was a 118

short-cut to achieve the same ends attained by the Prussian system,

which Bingham praised as the "cleverest and the most successful

m ilitary invention of our age."^®

Bingham's seemingly boundless enthusiasm for MID was realistically

tempered by a good sense of American political, psychological, and

economic reality. He appealed to American common sense and scolded

that the United States had not taken advantage of its "dearly bought"

Civil War experience. For twenty years it had ignored European

m ilitary developments, and American "General Staffs" had had little or

no idea what the rest of the world was learning. The only practical

way to rectify this error was to utilize the MID to its fullest

p o t e n t i a l .

The time for MID had truly arrived, and more reforms were to

follow. Few people could deny the practicality and obvious frugality

of the system. By itself, it threatened no one's position in the War

Department, so it continued to exist and function unimpeded; yet it

would be the vehicle by which ideas were planted and changes were

originated. Bingham was one of the MID's best attaches, but many more

men like him were needed to force the United States to begin the task

o f c a tc h in g up w ith Europe b efo re it was too l a t e .

Lieutenant R. K. Evans of the Infantry replaced Bingham in 1892

and remained in Berlin for six years. Near the end of his stay, he

too published an article in the JMSI. Though it centered primarily on

the infantry, its message was applicable to all branches of the

American service. Its content was symbolic of the progress American m ilitary thought had made now that the nation was about to enter into 119

not only an era of reform in its army and other institutions, but an

era of overseas expansionism as well. His message was simple:

It is possible for us to have the best infantry on earth. Troops hastily collected and only half organized and drilled after the outbreak of war, however excellent the component individuals, are nevertheless utterly unreliable under fire, and to send them into battle against a good modern army is simply wholesale murder

Evans did not have to look far from his office in Berlin to see

the sort of organization that would greatly benefit the United States.

America needed a good code of m ilitary law, a good schane for recruiting, a manual of uniform field service regulations, and

adoption - as Upton had said long before - of the three-battalion regiment. The German system of localized regimental depots impressed

Evans the most, and he heartily recommended it for American adoption.

The Germans had "the best system of recruiting in the world," worthy

in at least some respects of our imitation. The French mobilization

in 1870 suffered from overcentralization; the Germans, in contrast, knew th a t a l l was in re a d in e s s b ecau se e v e ry th in g was lo c a liz e d , making successful mobilization a matter of everyone's immediate concern, attention, and pride; thus it was a highly successful

o p e r a tio n .62

Evans was only repeating, albeit in a condensed form, what had been said so often before. What made Evans different from his predecessors was his timing. Congress and high ranking officers were almost ready to listen; and although when changes came they were not everything Evans would have wished, his six years in Germany had not 120

been wasted. His opinions were respected and would receive serious

attention in the years to come.

During Evans' tenure as attache Major Theodore Schwan, the

Assistant Adjutant General, visited Germany and wrote a report of his

own for the MID. Although he submitted it in 1893, it was not

published by the War Department until 1902. Entitled Report on the

Organization of the German Army, it was a detailed and complete

examination of every major facet of the German forces, but it lacked

an evaluation or recommendations for American adoption. Schwan left

such discussion for later. While his report was certainly an

excellent piece of factual reporting, it could just as easily have been written by Evans, who was already in Berlin. So even with

competent attaches at their stations, the AGO had yet to learn to delegate duties properly. Schwan*s report was filed away until the

Spanish-American War revived the MID's interest; had he offered some recommendations, it may have received attention earlier.

The fourth of the Berlin attaches. Lieutenant (later Major

General) Henry T. Allen, had previously served as attache at St.

Petersburg. Unfortunately, no sooner had Allen reached his new post

in th e summer o f 1897 than th e Army's Commanding G e n era l, Nelson A.

Miles, arrived in Europe to attend the major powers' summer maneuvers and observe the conflict between Greece and Turkey. Allen accompanied

Miles to Sweden and Russia, and then took a temporary post as attache

in Sweden. It was autumn before he settled into his work at Berlin.

He attended several parades and the autumn maneuvers. The parades, he said, were "magnificent never in my life have I seen such 121 excellent infantry." He enjoyed the maneuvers immensely, and marvelled that the troops could perform so well on only one meal per day. He was very impressed by the Germans except for one incident in which the Emperor's cavalry attacked his own infantry!^^

Allen did not remain in Germany very long. The USS .iaine olew up in Cuba the following February, and Allen soon tried to find a v-y to get involved in the fighting. By the middle of May he had succeeded.

During his half-year of work in Berlin he had accomplished nothing that was extraordinary and ha'i submitted no major reports, but he had filed 128 dispatches, accompanied by clippings, books, and technical data. It is apparent that Allen was thorough and took his work seriously, though he felt he was "in exile." After the war, he re tu rn e d to Germany fo r a sh o rt tim e. In 1900, JMSI p u b lish e d h is article on needed reforms in the American staff system, a piece that reflected his years in Europe generally and in Berlin especially. It also reflected the intelligence and thoroughness that helped establish him as a fine officer

The attaches in Berlin provided an official means of gathering and exchanging military information. The attache system did not by itself change attitudes about our army and War Department, though it aided in the dissemination of ideas and the growth of new perceptions and forms o f th o u g h t. The v ery fa c t th a t such a system had come in to being was an indication of the growing influence of a reform movement within the army itself that was becoming more vocal and successful as time wore on. It was a major turning point: an admission by the War Department 122 that something had been faulty and needed adjustment, and that other nations had ideas worth imitating.

But it was the Spanish-American War itself that awoke not only the army but the entire nation to the fact that there were major problems in the existing m ilitary structure: the administration and coordination o f mob il i zat ion ; the supply system, and the supplies themselves; the use of antiquated equipment; the delays and problems besetting the invasion fleet from embarkation to landing. All came under the scrutiny of the public. Congress, and the army itself, and all America could breathe a sigh of relief that it had been Spain, and not Germany, that had been our opponent. It began to occur to

Americans that if there were a "next time," the foe might not be so easily overcome. Something had to be done, and quickly; the days of fo o t-d ra g g in g had to end. The example o f Germany as both a model o f how things could be done, as well as a spectre of a well-prepared prospective enemy, played no small part in the ultimate triumph of the reformers who heretofore had attained only mere tokens of what they desired. To this end, the MID and its attaches - themselves examples of a modernizing European influence - had worked since 1885. At the turn of the century, they began to make real headway. NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session, 88th Congress, Part IV, 1864 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1865), pp. 235-49: Report of H. S. Sanford to William H. Seward, 14 January 1864.

2. W illiam B. Hazen, The School and th e Army in Germany and France, with a Diary of Seige Life at V ersailles (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1872), p. iv.

3. M arvin E. K roeker, G reat P la in s Command: W illiam B. Hazen in the Frontier West (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), p. 115.

4. Hazen was granted leave in Special Orders #224, 29 August 1870. See K roeker, P la in s Command, pp. 102-03; Hazen, S ch o o l, pp. 11-15, 35-6. Burnside's European experience served him in good stead when he later headed the 1878 Congressional Committee on Army Reorganization. However, the General could not seem to shake a strange jinx that had followed him since Antietam: simply put, Burnside and water did not mix. At Antietam, Aquia Creek, and Fredericksburg he had experienced great difficulties in crossing rivers or building bridges or wharves; now in Paris, he had a great deal of dificulty in crossing a river to get to the negotiations at the German headquarters. See Hazen, School, pp. 35-36. Sheridan, meanwhile, believed that Bismarck was using Burnside to unwittingly obtain and divulge needed information. See Philip H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of Philip H. Sheridan, Vol. 11 (New York: C. L. W ebster and Company, 1888), p. 429.

5. Hazen, School, pp. 57-64.

6 . I b i d . , pp. 59-65, 82-5, 96-9, 127, 147, 381-82

7. I b i d .. pp. 127-28.

8 . I b i d .. pp. 127-28.

9. I b i d . . pp. 78-9, 137; the quote is from p. 147.

10. Ibid., pp. 151, 222-25. William B. Hazen, A Narrative of M ilitary Service (Boston: Ticknor and Company, 1885), p. 384. Letter, Hazen to General John Coburn, Chairman of the Committee on M ilitary A ffairs, House of Representatives, titled "Army-Staff Organization," in House Executive Reports (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1873), pp. 173-77. K ro ek er, P la in s Command, p . 117.

11. Hazen, School, pp. 227-29. Hazen, Narrative, p. 398.

12. Letter, Hazen to Coburn, House Executive Reports, 1872, pp. 172-77. Hazen, Narrative, p. 422. Hazen, School, p. 182.

13. K ro ek er, P la in s Command, p. 115. Hazen, S ch o o l, pp. 227-29, 183-83. Hazen, Narrative, pp. 394, 424-26. Hazen sent a report to th e War D epartm ent, 14 August 1874.

14. Army and Navy J o u rn a l (ANJ) , Volume X, 13 (1 8 7 2 ), p . 206.

15. James D. McCabe, A Tour Around the World by General Grant (Philadelphia: National Publishing Company, 1879), pp. 112-13.

16. Joseph P. Sanger, Report on the Organization and Use of A rtillery by the Armies of Japan, China, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany. France, and England, 1879. Microcopy 666, Rolls 456-57, National Archives. Originally located in 375 AGO 1879. For this particular section, see Roll 456, p. 8. Hereafter, cited as Sanger Report.

17. Sanger Report, Roll 456. Pages at this point of the report are unnumbered.

18. Ibid.. Roll 457.

19. Ibid., Roll 457.

20. Ibid.. Roll 457.

21. Ibid.. Roll 457, "Remarks."

22. Ibid., Roll 457, "Remarks."

23. Ibid.. Roll 457, "Remarks."

24. Ibid.. Roll 457, "Remarks."

25. No mention of an official report by Forsyth has been located in the records of the War Department or the Reports of the Secretary o f War. A ccording to R obert C. B oots, The Am erican Army and th e Prussian Scheme. 1870-1881 (Penn State University Central Campus: unpublished undergraduate paper, 1982), p. 5, Forsyth compiled a journal containing "only accounts of his diet and the problems of getting a horse" and no substantive comments about the German army. 26. In Carpenter's file, 1562 AGP 1881 (now filed with 6947 AGP 1883), is a copy of Paragraph 86 of the U. S. Army Regulations in effect in 1881: "Officers of the Army travelling or stopping in foreign countries, whether on duty or leave of absence, will avail themselves of all opportunities properly within their reach, for obtaining information of value to the m ilitary service of the United States, especially that pertain to their own arm or branch of the service. They will report fully in writing the results of their observations to the Adjutant General of the Army on their return to duty in the United States, if unable to do so at an earlier date." National Archives, Record Group 165.

27. Record of the M ilitary Service of Brigadier-General Louis Henry C a rp e n te r, U.S. Army. 1861 to 1899 (P h ila d e lp h ia : J . B. Lippincott Company, 1903), p. 21. War Department, Special Orders #62, 17 March 1881 ; Carpenter's report is on file in 6947 AGP 1885: see e s p e c ia lly e n try o f 20 May 1881. O r ig in a lly f ile d in 1562 AGP 1881.

28. For details on Swift, see Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Port Leavenworth Schools: Post Graduate M ilitary Education and Professionalization in the U. S. Army, 1880-1920" (PhD., University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 73-6. For the original authors of these war games, see W. R. Livermore, The American Kriegsspiel (Ft. Monroe, Virginia: U. S. Army A rtillery School, 1881); and Charles A. L. T o tte n , " S tra te g o s : The American Game o f War," in JM SI, Volume I , #2 (April 1880), p. 185. Totten published a two-volume book outlining the game's rules, objectives, and procedure: Charles A. L. Totten, S tra te g o s : A S e rie s o f Am erican Games o f War (New York: D. A ppleton and Company, 1879-1880). Also see C. H. Barth, "Value of Maneuvers and Kriegs-Spiel," JMSI, XIII 59, pp. 937-50.

29. Both articles bear the name of the essay topic : "Important Improvements in the Art of War in the Last Twenty Years and Their Probable Effect on M ilitary Operations." Both are in JMSI, Volume IV; Greene's essay is in 13, pp. 1-41; M erritt's is in 14, pp. 172-87.

30. Greene, "improvements." pp. 18-19.

31. Ibid., pp. 36-37. Greene calls the German artillery organization the one best suited to "achieve the greatest results."

32. Ibid., p. 41.

33. M erritt, "improvements," pp. 173-82.

3 4 . I b i d . , pp. 183-84.

35. Ibid., pp. 184. 126

36. I b i d . , pp. 184-85. This was scmevrtiat of an e x a g g era tio n . C olonel E. P. P earson w rote to JMSI in 1892 th a t " i t is a d e lu sio n to believe that a plan of war may be laid for a prolonged period and carried out in every point." S till, M erritt's point was well taken: the Germans had a definite plan and framework in place when the war started, and had a fair idea of what sort of results to expect.

37. Greene's letter appears in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Transmitted to Congress with the Annual Message of the President (Government Printing Office, 1879), pp. 906-10.

38. Ibid., p. 910.

39. John Bigelow, Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte. Ordnance Notes #330 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1884), pp.1-69.

40. John Bigelow, Principles of Strategy (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1894), pp. 30, 34, 114, 117, 262.

41. William E. Birkheimer, Historical Sketch of the Organization, Material, and Tactics of the Artillery, U.S. Army (New York: Greenwood Press, 1884), pp. 105, 379-80. For Birkheimer communications, see letter from A. A. Sargent, Berlin Legation, to Secretary of State F. T. Frelinghuysen, 18 February 1884: Microcopy 689, Roll 241, Entry 5212, National Archives.

42. Both Arthur L. Wagner and William R. King wrote essays for JMSI entitled "The Military Necessities of the United States and the Best Provisions for Meeting Them." Both essays appeared in Volume V, 19 (Septem ber 1884).

43. George F. Price, "The Necessity for Closer Relations between the Army and the People, and the Best Method to Accomplish the R e s u lt," JMSI, VI 24 (December 1885).

44. For 1870-77 visitors to Europe, see National Archives, Record Group 77, "Historical Reference File: Foreign: Memoranda of Officers of the Corps of Engineers ordered to Europe on Official Business, etc." For 1881-85, see National Archives, Record Group 94, Adjutant-General's Office, "Brinckerhoff File," 7 November 1885. This lists the officers visiting foreign countries since 1880 under War Department auspices or as private individuals on leave. The reports of these indivduals are all missing] those listed as having been placed on microfilm are also missing. Possibly they are all tucked away in some o b scu re, see m in g ly -u n related War Departm ent F ile . No mention of them appears in the published reports of the Secretary of War beyond occasional vague references. 127

45. Marc B. Powe, The Emergence o f th e War Departm ent Intelligence Agency: 1885-1918 (Manhattan, Kansas: M ilitary A ffairs, for the American M ilitary Institute, 1975), pp. 16-18, 27. ANJ, XXVI 34 (20 A p ril 1 8 8 9 ), p . 683, s t a t e s th a t th e b u reau (MID) was as y et unnamed, and that Congress refused to officially establish it! See a ls o ANJ, XXVII 31 (2 9 March 1890). T ay lo r was a s s is te d by two Lieutenants of A rtillery, George P. Striven and Hamilton Rowan. Striven later served as M ilitary Attache in Rome and Mexico City.

46. R. Ernest Dupuy, Men of West Point: The First 150 Years of the United States M ilitary Academy (New York: William Sloane Associates, Publishers, 1951) p. 117. Powe, Intelligence Agency, p. 18. General Information Index, "Officers Ordered Abroad," Office of the Adjutant-General, Record Group 94, National Archives.

47. See ANJ. XXIV 11 (9 O ctober 1 886), p . 220; 34 (12 March 1887), p. 664; 42 (14 May 1887), p. 829; XXV 5 (27 August 1887), p. 93; 37 (31 March 1888), p . 724; and XXVII 8 (19 O ctober 1889) p . 147.

48. Captain John D. Knight, "The Attack and Defense of Modern Fortifications, and the latest Experience and Principles of Modern Seiges," in JMSI, VIII 31 (September 1887), pp. 381-404; Charles L. Heizmann, "The French and German Sanitary Corps on the B attlefield," JMSI, VII 14 (December 1885), pp. 354-55.

49. Alfred Vagts, The M ilitary Attache (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 33. "Bureau on M ilitary In fo rm atio n " in ANJ, XXVII 31 (29 March 1 890). "An Act Making Appropriations for the support of the Army for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1889, and for other purposes," in United States Statutes at Large, 50th Congress, 1887-88 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), Chapter 1027, p. 483: "An Act Making Appropriations for the Support of the Army for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1889, and for other purposes."

50. Sanford ACP file, 4874 ACP 81, Record Group 165, National A rch iv es.

51. Elizabeth Bethel, "The MID: Origin of the Intelligence Division," M ilitary Affairs, Vol. II, Spring 1947, pp. 17-24.

52. For this memorandum, consult Bingham's ACP file (3597 ACP 1879), dated 2 December 1889. Also, see Vagts, Attache, p. 113. The financial situation was indeed very tight. Even twelve years later, Thomas Bentley Mott, M ilitary Attache in Paris, found it necessary to pool his resources with those of the Naval Attache in order to hire a single clerk and purchase one typewriter. See Mott, Twenty Years as M ilitary Attache (New York: Arno Press, 1979), p. 74. 128

58. Powe, Intelligence Agency, pp. 16-18. W. A. Simpson to Assistant Secretary of War, "Brief Outline of the Origin, Growth, and Work of the M ilitary Information Division, Adjutant General's Office," 21 February 1902: Record Group 155, File MIC 639-13, National Archives. Letter, Colonel Babcock to Colonel Gilmore (nd), AGO 17925 in 5425 ACP 1884 (ACP file of N. C. Wren).

54. Bingham ACP file, 3597 ACP 1879, Record Group 165, National Archives. Included in the file is "The .lilitary Record of Theodore A. Bingham," a booklet published by the Corps of Engineers in January 1895. This states Bingham was initially appointed : ^-^rlin on 27 November 1889, though the "Historical Reference Fi?o, 1894-1923" of the Office of the Chief of Engineers states the date was 4 December. Both sources say he accepted the appointment on 9 December.

55. "Results of experiments with Troisdorf Smokeless German Powder," n. d ., entry 1002, Record Group 165, National Archives. Theodore A. Bingham. "Krupp's Quick-loading Field Guns," Report #38, filed 4 September 1893: Record Group 156, National Archives.

56. Theodore A. Bingham, "The Prussian Great General Staff and What i t C ontains th a t i s P r a c tic a l from an American S ta n d p o in t, " JMSI (July 1892), pp. 666-76.

57. Ibid., pp. 669-70.

5 8 . I b i d . , pp. 671-72.

5 9 . I b i d ., pp. 674-75.

61. R. K. Evans, "The Infantry of our Regular Army: Its History, P o s s i b i l i t i e s and N e c e s s i t i e s ," JMSI, XXII 93 (May 1898), p . 457.

62. Ibid., pp. 459-69.

63. Theodore Schwan, Report on the Organization of the German Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902).

64. Heath Twichell, Jr., Allen: The Biography of an Army Officer, 1859-1930 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974), pp. 85-6. H. T. Allen Diary for 1897-98, H. T. Allen papers. Library of Congress : entries for 2 7 August and 7, 9, and 15 September 1897.

65. T w ic h e ll, A lle n , pp. 8 6 -7 , 92. "Memorandum fo r D isp atch e s Received," July 1897-May 1898, Record Group 165, National Archives. Henry T. Allen, "Proposed Reorganization for Our General Staff," JMSI XXVII (July 1900), pp. 26-30. Allen ACP file, 6655 ACP 1885, Record Group 165, National Archives. CHAPTER FOUR

DEBATES AND DEVELOPMENTS

Wagner: A Balanced View

In 1889, the year J. C. Sanford became m ilitary attache in Berlin,

a study of the decisive encounter of the Austro-Prussian War was

published in the United States. The Campaign of Koniggratz: A Study

of the Austro-Prussian Conflict in the Light of the American Civil War was written by Arthur L. Wagner, a future chief of MID. This was probably the most important single piece of work to emerge in the

period 1865-1898 comparing the Prussian and American systems. Although the tactics of Koniggratz were long since outmoded, the principles

Wagner discussed and the observations he offered were still valuable long after the book's publication. Like most other observers, he praised the Prussian mobilization and organization system; but unlike some other observers, he reasoned that factors such as the breech-loading needle gun were not as important to the Prussians'

success as was their organization. This organization was as superior to the Austrians' as the needle-gun was superior to Austrian arms.^

But from the beginning Wagner's work was as much a vindication of

American methods as an endorsement of the Prussian system, and in this regard Wagner certainly differed with many of his contemporaries. He chided American professional soldiers who "bestow all possible

admiration" on European operations simply because of the fact that

129 130 they were European, while ignoring the operations of their own Civil

War simply because they were American. European m ilitary w riters, meanwhile, were usually too provincial:

European m ilitary writers generally...still fail to recognize in the developments of our war the germ, if not the prototype, of m ilitary features w hich are regarded as new in Europe

Wagner held that even "the most seasoned" European troops were

"conscripts" in comparison to American veterans. Von Moltke had once disparagingly referred to American troops as an "armed mob." Yet this

"mob" could, on occasion, continue to press home an attack despite four times (in percentage) the losses suffered by the Prussians in the

Battle of St. Privât. Was the "mob" simply so disorganized or delerious that it could not see how terribly it had been mauled? Or d id i t p o ssess some in n er s tr e n g th , some iro n d i s c i p l in e , some g re a t m oral purpose th a t had somehow su sta in e d it? ^

It was Wagner's opinion that the Prussians, Austrians, and French had learned precious little from the American Civil War. The

Austrians did not use hasty entrenchments; no one used their cavalry to disrupt enemy communications and supplies; the Austrians still valued the bayonet ; no one utilized the carbine in the hands of dragoons; German companies and battalions were too large and unwieldy.

What Wagner ignored, however, were two basic facts. First, the

Prussian Army was organized well enough to virtually guarantee a quick end to the hostilities. They did not use our "lessons" because they had little need for them. They were organized, while our armies of

1861 were not. Had this degree of organization not been present, it 131

is possible that the 1866 war would have dragged on for some time.

Wagner held that if the war had become protracted, then the Europeans would presumably have discovered through trial and error the same lessons that we had learned. In fact, the Prussian preparedness had made Wagner's point meaningless. There was no "trial and error" b ecause th e re was no need fo r itSecondly, there simply had not been enough time for the Europeans to thoroughly study and incorporate the lessons of our conflict into their plans in time for the 1866 campaign, even had they desired to do so.

Nonetheless, these facts do not refute Wagner's basic contention that aside from the "preparedness" factor, the art of war in the

United States was superior to anything the Europeans had to offer in

1866 and possibly in 1870 as well. The Americans were five years ahead of everyone in battle experience and all that it entailed tactically. In aspects such as mobilization and organization the

Prussians were our superiors primarily because their system was decentralized as much as possible; but once the combat began, Wagner believed the Americans had the upper hand.

Wagner p u b lish ed an a r t i c l e in JMSI comparing th e German and

American m ilitary education systems the same year that The Campiagn of

Koniggratz appeared. Here his evaluation was that neither nation need apologize. Though they took differing approaches, neither provided their officers inferior schooling. Wagner's respect for the German instructional system was a departure from his defensive, pre-American attitude on our implementation of tactics, and proved he held a balanced view of the situation, giving credit where it was dueIt 132

also indicated American thought was indeed drifting in a "Germanic"

direction, even among staunch defenders of the American wartime

experience. They could see that for the Prussian General Staff to

function properly, a properly-educated officer corps was necessary.

"Properly educated" meant to be prepared in all phases of warfare in

theory and experience. If education was necessary beyond (or

exclusive of) the M ilitary Academy - for officers who had not gone to

West Point, for instance - then perhaps the United States should

consider such a schooling system.

Years later. Colonel T. Bentley Mott, a twentieth century attache,

would note that the new War College and the old school at Lea’/enworth

"responded from their inception" towards a German rather than a French

line of thought. The French were "more suitable" for American

imitation, though, because of the German penchant for "useless

formality" and a demand for unquestioning compliance with orders.

S till, these comments may reflect a post-World War I prejudice against

as "autocratic" ex-enemy more than they do an accurate evaluation of m ilitary perceptions of the lB90's. The fact is, as Mott himself

admitted, that in the 1890's the Germans enjoyed a tremendous amount

of prestige in this nation.^

Five years after the publication of The Campaign of Koniggratz,

Wagner's Organization and Tactics appeared and presented further observations on the German wars of 1866 and 1870. Wagner once again refused to allow his vision to be clouded by the prevailing awe for

Germany's armies and instead emphasized the value of our own

experiences. Noting that the Germans had learned some lessons once 133

they got to the battlefield, he held that the "tactical lessons of the

War of Secession were to be confirmed in a striking manner by great wars on the continent of Europe a few years l a t e r . s o th e

American experience was not freakish; the war with "two armed mobs" held valuable lessons, as even the Germans would discover.

The Germans d isco v ered some th in g s the hard way; th ey had not learned them from observing the Americans. In the war with Austria, both the cavalry and artillery were mismanaged. This was much corrected by 1870-71, as the Germans learned how to use their cavalry

for detached action and their artillery was massively and boldly deployed. Their infantry had instinctively tried to adjust to the new firepower available in 1866, but only after enduring tremendous losses in 1870 did the Germans actually change their infantry tactics. In the end, new tactics, "born of experience and common sense," emerged.

"It became evident," Wagner wrote, "that tactical science had not kept pace with the improvement in weapons."^ When the French Chassepot rifle, with a range double that of the needle-gun, began to take its toll, it was obvious that adjustments in tactics were immediately necessary. German officers then benefited from their system's emphasis on end results rather than the methods used to attain them, as this allowed them freedom to adjust in whatever way possible to new conditions on the battlefield. This philosophy, and the decentralized organization that made it workable, had enabled the Germans to adjust to adverse conditions and unforseen circumstances and was the single most decisive factor in their victories.^® 134

Wagner published one other major work at this time. The Service

o f S e c u r ity and In fo rm atio n appeared in 1893 and was d estin e d to go through numerous reprintings. Eventually it was adopted as a text in army schools. It was meant to be a compilation of the major military principles followed by armies of the world. Wagner continued his criticism of the German system, having little to say in praise of their efforts but offering several examples of mismanagement in the

Franccr-Prussian War. The name Moltke was not even mentioned, and the victory at Koniggratz was belittled for the confusion it had generated within the German ranks. This was in keeping with Wagner's old theme: tactically, the Americans were superior to the inexpereinced

Europeans. Since this book was primarily a work on tactics and intelligence rather than organization, Wagner had very few compliments to offer the Germans, but he also neglected to say whether experience gain ed by th e Germans between 1864 and 1871 had now brought them to a position of equality with the United States^

Although he was not as impressed as many of his contemporaries with the overall field capability of the German armies, Wagner did recognize their staff-line coordination as far superior to America's.

"Nothing is more injurious to the efficiency [of the army] than the complete segregation of the staff and the line," he cautioned, which was precisely the problem the United States had. What the Americans called a "General Staff" was what Wagner termed an "Administrative

Staff," while his "Military Staff" did not exist apart from the

Administrative bureaus (see Figure I). Various pieces existed, but they did not fit together as Wagner envisioned they should. His 135

conception of a "perfect army" was similar to that of other great military analysts of the era, even to his choice of words: the army

should respond to one head as the parts of the human body respond to

one brain. The "Brain" of the army was ideally the General Staff,

a id in g th e Commanding G eneral ("C h ief o f S ta ff" ) who was i t s g u id in g

force. Existing conditions, however, made the Commanding General a virtual non-entity and gave him almost no authority whatever over

either the line or the "Administrative Staff" (Figure II).

Different Voices

Wagner's voice was only one in a now-growing chorus calling for a reorganization of the War Department and the Staff system. "Staff" officers found themselves in comfortable Washington offices -

sometimes for life - effectively divorced from all connections with the concerns of the line. Many line officers felt that men in staff offices tended to be jealous of their soft positions, insensitive to

the line's needs, and ignorant of the line's responsibilities. In essence, the line perceived that the army was being run by a group of

professional paper-shufflers who knew and cared little about the men who would risk their lives in wartime, doing the job for which the entire army - line and staff - supposedly existed. This dilemma had made no sense to Sherman, who twice left Washington in disgust over

the issue, and Wagner was similarly mystified and frustrated by the s i tu a t io n .

It seems that every officer recognized that the army confronted problems, but every officer seemed to perceive these problems in a different light and thus proposed differing solutions. The one FIGURE 1

THE GENERAL STAFF; THE 1864 CONCEPTION

(Source; Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 564)

QUARTER- CHIEF OF ENCINEERS

CHIEF ADVOCATE GENERAL GENERAL GENERAL FIGURE 2

THE GENERAL STAFF: ARTHUR L. WAGNER'S CONCEPTION, 1894

(Source: Wagner, Organization and Tactics, pp. 30-2)

SECRETARY

'MILITARY STAFF" 'ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF"

CHIEF OF STAFF CHIEF ORDNANCE OFFICER AIDES DE CAMP CHIEF QUARTERMASTER OFFICERS FROM AGO CHIEF COMMISSARY/ PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL

CHIEF OF ARTILLERY MEDICAL DIRECTOR JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL COMMISSARY OF MUSTERS 138 unifying factor in their thoughts seemed to be the acceptance of

Germany as a good example to follow in some fashion in order to rectify the situation. Throughout the 1880's and 1890's this was one of the most frequent themes of the Army-Navy Journal, The Journal of the M ilitary Service Institution, and even non-military periodicals such as Harper's Weekly and North American Review. In 1890, Lieutenant

C olonel J . G. C. Lee w rote:

I am such an admirer of the genius, originality, inventiveness, and capacity of our country.. .that I refer to a system of another country with great reluctance; still, I advert to the great simplicity of the orgam'zatiop of the German army throughout....[ its] methods of mobilization, of reinforcement, and of supply are clear and alike everywhere [throughout Germany].

To Lee, th e b a s ic f a u lt o f th e American army was i t s lac k o f simplicity in administration, which rendered it inefficient. He shared this opinion with many others, including Major General John

Gibbon, who wrote in 1893 on behalf of reducing the power and influence of the various staff bureaus and warned against the

"centralizing" tendency of the "paper machine" emerging in the individual departments. Gibbon also hoped that promotion could be removed from political influence, a problem which increased as the bureaucracy of the departments became more entrenched. "Of all useless things in the world a paper soldier is the most useless," he warned, and there seemed to be more of them - with increasing power and political connections - every day.^^

More and more analysts concurred. Differing in opinions on other assorted details, the writers of the day agreed upon the need for a 139

revised staff system, with the German General Staff usually regarded

as the exemplary system. Captain E. L. Zalinski, for example, wrote

in 1892 that the success of the German armies was due to the work done

by their Great General Staff, and while the United States could not

create such a staff without completely changing its organization, it

could at least establish a staff school and utilize MID to the utm ost.H e also suggested that "much of the best military

literature is published in German, and perhaps it was time for the

M ilitary Academy to begin stressing that language as a field of

study.L ieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier General) Willi.

Ludlow, our m ilitary attache in London and a future advocate of an

Am erican Army War C o lle g e, noted th a t much o f th e German su ccess was due to "careful study and solution, in advance, of every possible m ilitary complication" of a cam paign.G eneral Oliver 0. Howard

saw a basic sim ilarity in the wars of Prussia against Austria and

France, Japan against China, and Turkey against Greece: the side that was organized and prepared was the victor. In Germany, the most

important facet in this preparation was the General Staff; it had always guaranteed that Prussia was a step ahead of its adversaries.

In 1866, the Prussians had a breech-loading rifle while the Austrians did not; in 1870, the Prussians integrated their railroads into their m ilitary planning vdiile the French had not

The war w ith Spain was only a year away when an a r t i c l e by

Lieutenant J. G. Harbord of the Cavalry appeared in JMSI. Harbord's piece was a simple summation of much of the pro-German m ilitary thought of the previous two decades, as well as a nationalistic call 140

to duty in fulfillm ent of the "manifest destiny" of the Anglo-Saxon

race in America, Stressing that "lack of preparation means disgrace

and disaster," he said the "plainest lesson" of the Franco-Prussian

War was that "patriotism and numbers are as nothing unless the

patriotism has beforehand prepared the numbers for the emergency."

Harbord warned that we were totally unprepared for hostilities:

Our country...today maintains an infantry organization, bom in the age of flint locks, which would go down in th e f i r s t engagement w ith a civilized enemy.

Throughout his essay, Harbord reiterated the lessons of the past.

He lauded Calhoun's "expansible army," conceded that the regular army would never be large, maintained that we should reduce the size of our infantry companies, warned that we had few officers left with any

Civil War combat experience, and called Germany "the foremost m ilitary nation." Harbord did not realize it, but the timing of his essay made

it an important summary of pro-re form arguments since 1870. He had no way o f knowing th a t a war was fa s t approaching th a t would f in a lly begin to change the face of the American army.

But as the time for adjustment approached, the proponents of reorganization also offered words of caution. Ludlow complained that

Europe, the center of Western civilization, was an "armed camp."

Germany had contributed heavily to this disheartening development, as her successes made her the "war school of Europe." Zalinski voiced a fear of "Prussianismr" "How can we become a m ilitary people, potent for sudden emergencies, and not be a nation in arms?" So it seems that preparedness for war did not necessarily solve all problems. In 141

fact, those problems might just then be starting, as the United States would be in danger of becoming the very sort of nation that Americans

feared and mistrusted! Ironically, this is exactly what opponents of a large, strong professional army had been saying all along, but this very basic concept would be lost amid the events of the next h a l f - c e n tu r y .19

Even the Army-Navy Journal began to run articles expressing doubts. One piece suggested that German troops were subjected to overly harsh disciplinary measures, and that on at least one occasion seven German soldiers had drowned during maneuvers because their officers had "taxed their strength beyond endurance." In peacetime, eighteen percent of the deaths in the German army were due to suicide, a figure that suggested something was seriously amiss. Such accounts indicated that not everything the Germans did was praiseworthy or deserving of attention, and shows that even proponents of reform along

German lines could hold a balanced view.^® There was a general acceptance that, as Sherman and Upton had said many years previously,

Germany and the United States were simply too different to allow the

Americans to adopt the German system wholesale.

The German people, after all, perceived their army in a different light: it was the instrument of German unification. They were everywhere surrounded by and concerned with the army, for it contained many relatives and friends. Officers were widely respected for their

"frugality" and "stoic sacrifice" in their devotion to their mission despite extremely low pay. The situation in the United States was not 142

at all similar, except that line officers received low pay here as w ell.^^

Public opinion, then, was a key to change. Fortunately for the army, the approaching war with Spain and the acquisition of new

territories would bring about a transition in the American people's perceptions of their armed forces. When these perceptions changed, the army itse lf would begin to make some long-overdue adjustments.

Some "Germ anic" Changes

The individuals who had visited or written about foreign armies d id have some e f f e c t on th e American army p rio r to th e S p an ish -

Am eric an conflict. A number of boards and Congressional committees met and discussed certain changes, and some of these adjustments went

into effect. Most were merely cosmetic, but some, like the attache system, were of lasting benefit.

Although most observers favorable to the German system believed that the most meaningful adjustment would be the adoption of a remodeled General Staff, such a great, sweeping change was somewhat

frightening to more conservative officers and as such inspired much opposition and delay. Meanwhile, minor changes in items such as uniforms managed to slip through channels with relatively little objection because they were, by themselves, essentially meaningless concessions to either fashion, the spirit of experimentation, or the demands of climate.

The uniform's most conspicuous and least expensive feature was the headgear. Though seemingly a minor point, the subject attracted a great deal of attention, especially after a board on Army Equipment 143

(th e "M iles B oard," headed by fu tu re Commanding G eneral Nelson A.

M iles), recommended a helmet for adoption in 1879. Nearly six hundred

officers petitioned General Sherman that this helmet be adopted. The

new helmet was to replace an 1872 model which, the petitioners

claimed, was "unmilitary" in appearance, impractical, and

uncomfortable. Sherman noted in a memo dated 11 November 1880 that

th e new helm et was fin e w ith him, so long as i t did no t "weigh down"

upon the head of the wearers.

This seemingly minor exchange was actually part of a fairly volatile issue, and it was not until the following January that a

number of new helmets were approved for the entire army. Most of

them, like the 1872 model they replaced, were meant only for dress and

parade. Most were made of felt or cork, and were certainly not peices o f p r o te c tiv e h e a d g e a r.23 Because th e 1872 helm et had been

adopted soon after the German victory over France, and because of the

German penchant for similar spiked helmets dating back to 1842, the

American helmet was generally referred to as the "Prussian helmet," and was cited as an example of the obvious extent of Germanic

in flu e n c e upon our army. A c tu a lly , t h i s was f a lla c io u s . The B r itis h had adopted a helmet of Prussian derivation in 1843, and the Americans had gained their inspiration for their helmet from this British piece.

Colonel Henry J. Hunt, one of the members of the 1872 board that approved th e h elm et, w rote in 1875 th a t " th e helm et model was th a t o f

the English horseguards."24 This 1872 version was too heavy and was poorly constructed, with visors that were prone to crack and offered little protection from the elements in the rear. The 1881 144 model improved upon this and actually was more distinctly "Prussian,"

a style that was popular here and abroad. This general "Prussian"

style was considered to present an "admirable m ilitary appearance" and

was e s p e c ia lly p o pular among American m i l i t i a u n i t s .

The helmet seemed to symbolize something; exactly what that

"something" was depended upon the individual observer. Perhaps a

civilian, Henry Loomis Nelson, said it best for the helmet's critics.

Remarking that our helmet was only an "awkward imitation" of the

Prussian model, he noted:

The Germans have imposed the helmet upon the armies of the world, but it would be difficult to explain the reason of their success, except upon th e i r r a t io n a l th e o ry th a t in some my ste rio u s way it enabled the Germans to beat the F r e n c h . 26

Nelson was critical of the entire uniform, remar'’"g that the

American soldier "has never worn anything to be proud of." Even the dress uniform seemed to ha e been "the ugliest costume in the world,"

and was supposedly at its ugliest on the day Loomis was writing! He hoped that the Quartermaster General would begin to take note of the

fact that the clothing needs of a trooper in Arizona were some\diat different from those of a soldier in the northwest, because up to that

point (Nelson claimed) he had not done s o !27

Nelson was both humorous in delivery and serious in intent. His genuine concern for the welfare of the soldier was reflected by a number of other individuals who wished to see some changes made. In

1868, Surgeon General Alfred A. Woodhul1 recommended certain

adjustments in uniform from a standpoint of "hygienic fitness."

Captain Theodore Bingham, recently returned from his attache duties. 145 made some practical suggestions based upon his experiences in Europe,

noting especially the German greatcoat's warmth and practicality. In

1885, the ANJ ran a series of thirteen illustrations on "Uniforms of

the German Army," which pictured weapons and accoutrements as well as

actual clothing, noting in one issue that French soldiers wore the

same uniform regardless of the weather or where they were stationed!

Clearly, the overall message was that the best example to follow was once again that of the Germans, who were both practical and efficient

in their approach to soldiers' c l o t h i n g28 .

Interest in facets of German uniforms and equipment did not necessarily imply that the authors of such articles wanted the army to adopt ex act d u p lic a te s . What i t d id s ig n if y was a wish by re fo rm ers to illustrate the versatility and logic of the German system. The mere existence of an assortment in types of uniforms showed that the

Germans were prepared for different climates and battlefield conditions. Such preparation was indicative of a well-organizaed system, whose concerns went far beyond uniforms. An army that showed such log'c and concern for the individual soldier would, by implication, be logical and efficient in more subtle aspects as well.

Wars were obviously not won simply with well-clad soldiers; they were won with good armaments, tactics, strategy, and overall planning and preparation. It was not so much a question of duplicating details of th e German system th a t was im p o rtan t; r a th e r , German a t t i t u d e s and efficiency throughout their system provided inspiration and were worthy of imitation. 146

Between 1867 and 1897, a number of army boards and Congressional

committees considered a number of questions vital to the adequate

defense of the nation. All of these would at some point take note of

European examples, and naturally German means and methods were often

the subject of discussion. There were about a dozen noteworthy boards

and commissions in these years. The first of these were the "Marcy

Boards," headed by Inspector General William Marcy, which met in

1867-68 and again in 1872 to devise and propose a set of new army

regulations. In 1869 the "Garfield Committee" on Military Affairs of

the House of Representatives proposed s number of changes, not the

least of which was a desire to place the heads of staff departments

under the control of the Commanding General. This committee also

recommended cutting the pay of staff officers to the same level as

received bv line officers, and desired to merge several departments

together to cut costs and confusion. In all of these aims, the committee's recommendations went unheeded.

In addition to the "Miles Board" on army equipment, the 1870's produced a new report from the House M ilitary Affairs ("Coburn")

Committee on Army-Staff Organization in 1873. This committee made recommendations on House B ill 495, which proposed to "re-organize and reduce the staff of the Army." The Coburn Committee reversed the recommendations of the Garfield Committee regarding the merging of various staff departments, stating that they should remain separate.

The Coburn Committee report gave some attention to the proposition that officers not be assigned permanently to staff positions, which was one of the major purposes of the German rotation between staff and 147

line. The committee assigned this proposal some importance, despite

the remarkably differing opinions of the officers called upon to

testify. Sherman, for example, took pains to stress Moltke's

development of staff-line rotation. Lieutenant Colonel Stewart Van

Vliet claimed it was unfair to compare our system with those of

Europe, because of the immense territories our armies had to cover

(the Germans had to march only 250 miles to Paris, while our nation

was as large as all of Europe). Assistant Adjutant General Thomas M.

Vincent, who long previously had called for staff reorganization,

included in his written testimony a lengthy comparison of European and

American armies, as well as an endorsement of school systems and a

German-style staff.

Significantly, Vincent cautioned against "worshipping" the German

system the way we had "worshipped" the French system prior to 1870.

Major Benjamin Alvord said the German system was too autocratic for

implementation in America, and the-’r logistical nroblems were minimal

compared to ours, so it would be foolish to follow their example. But

all of the testimony was of no real consequence, as the committee's

final suggestions on providing periodic, rotating vacancies in the

staff departments were ignored by the House. This was really the

dying gasp of the movement for staff reform in the 1870's.

The remainder of the decade was a waste of time for reformers who hoped for congressional action. In 1876 ^ board headed by Secretary

of War J. D. Cameron and Major General John M. Schofield convened to

consider new army regulations, but failed to meet two congressional deadlines and was consequently disbanded in 1877. In 1878 the Banning 148

Congressional Committee, headed by Representative Henry Banning of

Ohio, proposed some sweeping reforms: lim itation of the army to 20,000 men; fixing a retirement age of 62 years; and racial desegregation of

units. Laudable as this latter suggestion is by modern standards, it

received little support. The ANJ, presumably referring to the troop

lim itation figure but probably hesitant about integration as well,

said "the bad outweighs the good" in the b ill. Devoid of substantial

support, these proposals all failed to see fruition.^^

The year 1878 also saw the formation of a joint Congressional

Commission led by Senator (ex-General) Ambrose Burnside. This commission was to propose army reorganization measures, which it did; no less than 724 sections were present in the proposed bill that

emerged in December 1878. From the start, the Burnside measures were doomed to failure. Potential supporters, from Sheridan and Upton to the ANJ, were lukewarm to the committee at best. The ANJ disliked it because it was devoid of any active army officers, and half its members were Democrats - perceived to be enemies of a strong army.

Representative Banning was a member of the Commission, and one of his old committee's proposals found its way into the Burnside report: retirement at age 62. The Burnside proposals also included consolidation of certain staff functions, rotation between staff and line, giving control of line and staff to the Commanding General, and

(like Calhoun's plan) fixing the n’jmbsr of regiments, to be filled with new men in wartime. As if this were not enough to create opposition, the committee's members consistently failed to attend committee sessions, testifying officers gave contradictory advice 149

("change," said the line; "continue the present system," cried the

staff), and the whole scheme received criticism for being "copied from

the organization of European armies, probably that of Germany.. . .an

army organized for an Emperor...will not suit us." Burnside himself

was dubbed "Kaiser Wilhelm" by his opponents and was ineffective in

gathering support for the bill. The commission's proposals went

nowhere, mostly because in attempting so many changes it managed to

alienate many potential supporters with one proposal or another. The

very size of the bill was enough to frighten anyone reluctant to make

sweeping changes.

The only tangible progress army reformers made in the 1870's was

in the search for a new weapon for the infantry soldier. A board of

officers convened in 1872 to select a new weapon for the infantry

soldier. This was only a year after the French and Germans had

confronted each other with modern breech-loading rifles. The

following year, the board selected the Springfield single-shot, breech

loading rifle and carbine as the standard all-service weapon. This

piece would remain in use until 1898. The same board suggested that

further study be devoted to magazine weapons. But it was not until

1877 that Congress made it financially possible for the ordnance

department to investigate seriously the possibility of obtaining a

repeating rifle for the army and navy. Since the Prussian success at

Koniggratz and the "Fetterman Massacre" were by this time eleven years

in the past, the probable influences upon Congress at this point were

the recent Custer disaster and the success of the Turks - using repeating rifles - against the Russians at the Battle of Plevna. 33 150

The search for a suitable repeating rifle dragged on for years, with various styles tested both at the armory and in the field. It was not until 1892 that the bolt and magazine elements of the Danish

Kr ag-J o rg en so n were adopted for a rifle selected for general distribution to the army, and it was several more years before a

further-refined, .36-caliber model had actually reached all of the army's regular troops. The "Krag" was a small caliber, high velocity magazine arm utilizing smokeless powder. ("Smokeless is the coming powder," ANJ announced in 1891.) There were not enough of them to meet the army's needs for the influx of volunteers during the

Spanish-American War, and on occasion the weapon proved to be slow and awkward. It was ultimately replaced by the 1903 model

Springfield.^^ Unlike other needed reforms that went unattended, the army was able at least to attempt keeping pace with European small arms developments because the importance of weapons improvement was an easy principle to grasp, and such a change jeopardized no one's position in the army or the War Department.

Similarly, the formation of an Army-Navy Gun Foundry Board in 1893 marked the beginning of some fairly swift adjustments in our coastal fortifications. After touring the foundries of Europe - with the notable exception of Germany's Krupp, which refused them entrance - the board excitedly and semewhat nervously reported on European developments in armor plate and armor-piercing shells, and successfully recommended that the United States offer contracts to private industry to produce materials necessary to developing comparable armor and shells in America. (The board also noted that 151

Krupp manufactured nearly all of Germany's heavy ordnance, a fact that made that nation a "slave" to the Krupp corporation.) The Endicott

Board of 1885 (named for Secretary of War William C. Endicott, its

President) then built upon the foundations established by the Gun

Foundry Board, calling for abandonment of the old coastal forts in favor of new earthworks, armor-plated concrete pits, and disappearing ten and twelve-inch rifled guns.^^

The whole nation could sympathize with the desirability of coastal defenses keeping pace with naval developments, because this was a matter of self-preservation in an increasingly hostile world. What few people bothered to consider was that the utilization of such defenses also presented the world with the impression that the United

States was girding for war. This was an impression that would make other powers perceive the United States as a threat to their interests, and thus could bring about the very war against which the fortifications were supposed to guard. The result of the Fortification

Board's work in 1886 was a call for a tremendous amount of new defensive works in twenty-seven cities. This goal stood little chance of being completed due to the immense cost : $ 127 m illion, which did not include ammunition.

Unfortunately, the government spent so much money on these fortifications (not to mention the navy, which always seemed to receive first priority as America's "first line of defense") that the other branches of the army continued to suffer from neglect.

Furthermore, what work was accomplished on the fortifications went at an incredibly slow pace. A single sixteen-inch gun took five years to 152

manufacture, test, and mount. The work that Congress approved

proceeded at one-seventh the proposed rate. By the start of the

Spanish-American War, only 151 of a proposed 2,363 guns were in place.

America was fortunate that the foe was Spain and not Great Britain or

another nation with a respectable navy. Nonetheless, the Endicott

Board and th e Army F o r t if i c a t i o n s Board th a t follow ed i t in 1888

inspired a new interest in the artillery. This led to the formation

of an "artillery council" in 1887 and several artillery-oriented

publications in the 1890's, while War Secretary Red field Proctor and

Commanding General John Schofield began to devote more attention to

the artillery.

A board on the revision of A rtillery and Infantry tactics met in

1888, the year in which Congress established the American attache

system. From the start, members of this board expressed a desire to

obtain a copy of the new German system of physical exercise, d rill,

and tactics, as well as an interest in Austrian, French, and British methods. No one set of methods seemed to dominate the Americans'

interest, although the simplicity and straightforward approach used by

th e Germans pro b ab ly made an im p ressio n . The German adm ission th a t

battlefield conditions were considerably different from those of the

dr il 1-field elicited no recorded response from the board members, but

the statement proves that this system was not concerned so much with

"useless formality" as with establishing the discipline so earnestly

needed under the frightening conditions of battle. It was three years before General Schofield recommended to Secretary Proctor that the various changes in tactics be adopted. The delay was due in part to a 153

tremendous preoccupation with detail on the part of certain

individuals who offered assorted comments. Brigadier General Thomas

H. Ruger, for example, submitted a thirty-page critique stating, in

essence, that the new regulations were not detailed enough. Others

offered mercifully brief comments ; Wesley Merritt wrote only three

pages.^^

If change came grudgingly from Congress and the army boards,

reformers could still point with some satisfaction to the beginnings

of a m ilitary school system whose very existence reflected ideas

popularized by the Germans. Changes in m ilitary instruction began as

early as 1866, when the Engineers lost sole responsibility for the m ilitary academy. Two years later, a Signal School of Instruction

was established at Ft. Greble, and General Grant revived Calhoun's old

A rtillery School at Ft. Monroe. Sherman's General Order 42 of 7 May

1881 established the Infantry and Cavalry School at Ft. Leavenworth,

which gave "special and supplemental" training in those branches;

Wagner later helped this school evolve into the General Service and

Staff College. An Engineer School of Application came into being four

years later at W illett's Point, New York, and in 1893 the Army Medical

School was established at Washington. These schools formed the basis

for higher education beyond the M ilitary Academy. The pinnacle of

this education would be the Army War College, formally established in

1901 as the result of efforts by Secretary of War Elihu Rbot and a

special board convened in 1899 under the leadership of Brigadier

General (and former attache) William Ludlow. As Wagner perceived

them, the schools would emulate the schools of the Prussian system; 154 the German schools and the Kriegsakademie served as inspiration for both the formation and the direction of the American schools

The re s p e c t fo r th e P ru ssian schools once shown by Thayer th u s revived itself through the efforts of Sherman, Wagner, and others who were aware of the strides foreign nations had taken in educating and preparing their officers. The Prussians had been the first to organize such well-honed professional schools. They had a half-century of experience behind them, and had shown that they could turn out superb products. In the United States, schools were perceived as being more acceptable than other proposed reforms, and received less opposition. At this point Americans were more inclined to imitate this facet of the Prussian system than any other.

Beyond this, a number of semi-official organizations and journals sprang up in the last half of the century. Included among these were the Essayons Club of engineer officers, begun in 1866, and the

M ilitary Service Institution of the United States and its Journal, founded in 1878 by Major General Win field Scott Hancock. Other new papers and journals included The United Service (1879), the Cavalry

Journal (1888), the Journal of the United States A rtillery (1892), and, of course, the Army and Navy Journal.While these were not necessarily the direct result of European influence, they were part of a general trend that owed its inception to a widespread desire to professionalize the army and exchange ideas - a trend which began because of the obvious success of innovative and progressive measures tak en by Germany. 155

The New Meaning of 'VSeneral Staff" in America

The progress made in these areas of concern was largely the result of the establishment of BMI/MID in 1885, and the birth of the attache

system three years later. These improvements guaranteed the army a growing body of knowledge concerning the functioning of foreign armies, and provided ideas and inspiration for adjustments to our system. Such concepts had long been recognized by European theorists such as Jomini and Clausewitz as an essential element of a "general staff" system, but they had only been truly integrated and utilized when Moltke reorganized the Prussian General Staff after 1850. When he met with such astounding success in 1864, 1866, and 1870, other

European nations - suddenly threatened by the proximity of such an efficient m ilitary organization - took notice and began earnestly to apply their efforts in establishing viable intelligence systems for t h e i r staffsThe United States, perceiving itself as safely isolated from events in Europe, lagged behind. When changes were finally implemented, Americans took a different approach, as they formed their intelligence division nearly two decades prior to establishing a new, European-style general staff. But without the information gathered by the BMI/MID between 1885 and 1903, it is highly likely that the United States would never have appreciated the value of a true "general staff" in the Prussian sense. Certainly, it would have lacked the capacity to establish such a staff system as quickly as it did following the war with Spain.

The General Staff was really the most important reform of all.

Everything that had come previously was mere window-dressing or else 156

would have remained relatively meaningless had the United States not

formed the staff to properly complement and fu lfill the promise of its

emerging school system. The army reorganization that then occurred

was a logical result of the national concern over the disorganization

so in evidence in 1898, as well as a new desire for modernization to

keep pace with our expanding overseas commitments. The ultimate

effect of the attaches, observers, and writers who investigated

European armies would ultim ately be measured not in terms of spiked

helmets, uniforms, weapons, or even tactics, but in the boost in morale and effectiveness brought about by the new staff system.

The Prussian staff that was initially the focus of study and later

the subject of imitation by the United States actually reflected

French influence as well, with origins in the Napoleonic Wars.

However, the Prussian victories of 1864-66-70, in which adaptations of

the French concept were utilized, had attracted American attention.

The doctrines of Carl von Clausewitz dominated German m ilitary thought

throughout much of the nineteenth century, but it was General Gerhard

Scharnhorst who devised the Prussian General Staff concepts and

Helmuth von Moltke who adjusted Scharnhorst's concepts and played the key role in the eventual evolution of the highly-successful staff

responsible for the German victories. Following the stunning Prussian

successes, the Prussian staff "basked," as one recent author put it,

"in an atmosphere of almost mystical invincibility. It was regarded

as a model for the rest of the world's armies to follow.

There were some elements of the General Staff that were unappealing to Americans. It was viewed as a "small and highly 157

influential m ilitary clique;" it was "preponderantly aristocratic;" it

developed a "considerable (and harmful) influence on foreign policy"

until, cut off from political circles after 1891, it became

dangerously isolated from political concerns and planned grand

strategy with little or no concern for diplomatic considerations.

Nonetheless, the system was attractive to some Americans because of

its outstanding successes. It appealed to American line officers because it would give them the chance to control the direction of

their own profession at a time when they found themselves completely

isolated from the "staff" functions that governed promotions, supply,

and other facets of m ilitary life.

Thus there were two schools of American thought regarding the

German General Staff. On the one hand were those who perceived the staff system as a threat to either the democratic traditions of the nation or to their own comfortable positions as administrative staff officers. On the other hand were those who wished to borrow ideas

from th e Germans to make th e American army more modern and e f f i c i e n t .

That it took so long for changes in this direction actually to occur

is testimony to the amount of vigorous opposition it inspired. That

the call for change never ceased for thirty years and eventually met with success is indicative of the viability of the German staff concept, the great nimbers of officers supportive of such a change, the impact of the Spanish-American War, and the acceptance of the

United States' new role as an expansionist power upon American m ilitary and political thought. 158

In the 1860's, the United States had a perfect opportunity to develop a viable staff system, since the Civil War had brought out many practical lessons pertaining to staff thought. Little of lasting value developed, however, because no studies were made of our wartime staff experience. Since the end result had been a Union victory, no pressing need was perceived for changing or studying a "successful" system. The knowledge of experienced individuals was never combined by any army board or Congressional committee that had any powers to enact change. In 1870, Adjutant General Thomas M. Vincent published

"A Plea for the General Staff of the United States," inspired largely by the writings of Jomini, Napoleon's Chief of Staff, and by our own warime experinces. This went largely unheeded, as it was - for

America - twenty-three years ahead of its time.

During those twenty-three years, the German General Staff gained worldwide respect. It selected its members through highly competitive examinations, distinguished sharply between routine staff functions and duties related to field operations, gave its officers broad authority, and by 1883 could communicate directly with the head of s t a t e . The German system included a " F ie ld Forces G eneral S ta ff" serving with the field commanders, and the "Great General Staff" in

Berlin which dealt with strategy and supervised operations. It proved to be successful because it handled maneuvers, mobilization, communications, reconnaissances, intelligence, and army organization, and left disciplinary actions, discharges, decorations, orders of the day, and reports to a "Routine Staff." Finally, the Germans placed great emphasis on returning staff officers to the line. Nothing 159 resembling this system existed in the so-called "General Staff" of the

United States.

Henry T. Allen wrote in 1S96, just prior to his assignment as attache in Berlin, that "there is no analagous use in other countries to our misused word 'S taff.'" As Allen (and others) saw it, the

United States had a great many administrators but few true "staff" officers. Only the Adjutant General's and Inspector General ' s offices were "staff" in the sense that European nations understood the term.

Of course, the problem was not solely one of semantics. The dominant r o le o f th e c i v i l i a n "War M in is te r" (th e S ec re ta ry o f War) in th e

United States was a harmful influence; the lack of a real staff made the United States vulnerable, and might actually encourage a nation to go to war a g a in st i t

Potential problems which reformers had long anticipated were brought into the open by the Spanish-Amer ican War. The administrative bureaus had not functioned efficiently because of a lack of planning, cooperation, and coordination; the War Department found that certain details of m ilitary operations were simply beyond its control because it did not have the personnel necessary to handle the situations confronted in the invasion of Cuba. General R. C. Dr un later noted that the bureaus ran perfectly until the war disrupted them! When the war ended, the reformers found they had many new allies among both the military and the civilians. Colonel (later General) William Harding

Carter of MID, who would help make a new American General Staff a reality, would later comment that during the war, "public opinion was aroused over our shortcomings to a degree that victory could not 160

assuage.It would be well to note that the press, so often

perceived as an adversary in the late twentieth century, had aided

army reformers immensely at the turn of the century by exposing m ilitary shortcomings to a degree unheard of in the days of mindlessly

"patriotic" journalism during the Civil War.

Following the war. President :dcKinley established a commission headed by Grenville M. Dodge which studied the war's operations and made recommendations concerning the Medical Corps, the stockpilirg of

certain critical supplies, and the need for harmony between the

S e c re ta ry o f War and th e Commanding G eneral. L a te r, th e army board headed by Brigadier General Ludlow, who had been both an attache in

London and an unofficial observer in Germany, recommended the establishment of the Army War College but stopped short of actually

advocating a new General Staff. The staff concept was eventually presented by Colonel Carter at the express request of Secretary of War

Root. The reforms proposed by Ludlow, Carter and Root had their origins in both the French and German General Staffs ; the writings of

Einory Upton and British theoretician Spenser Wilkinson; the defeated

Hull Bill of 1901, which had advocated the elimination of permanent appointmenmts to War Department bureaus ; and the numerous comments offered by attaches and observers abroad

M ile s, S c h o fie ld , and Root

C a rte r recommended th a t th e o f f ic e o f Commanding General be done away with and a General Staff, headed by a Chief of Staff, be established. This suggestion of course inspired plenty of opposition from th e c u rre n t Commanding G eneral, Nelson A. M iles. M iles had in 161 his own way been a voice for reform, but his ideas did not entirely coincide with philosophy coming to the forefront of American m ilitary th eo ry a t th e tu rn o f th e c e n tu ry . He had reco g n ized th a t th e German army was well-managed and well-equipped; but he also said it cost too much, and the very possession of a strong m ilitary force was a temptation to become an aggressor. In 1895, he had gone on record as backing Upton's old proposal for the three-battalion regiment, and after seeing the huge European armies while on his foreign tour of

1897, he called for an enlarged army of seventy thousand men. But he opposed the proposal for staff reform partly because his own position was threatened, partly because he did not entirely grasp what it was that he was opposing, and partly because he truly felt the existing system to be more "democratic" than a scheme based on the systems of

Europe

It would be unfair to label Miles a conservative member of the

"old school." He had never attended West Point, and this fact may have made him unpopular with officers who resented his position. As early as 1876, he had seen the need for education beyond that provided by the M ilitary Academy, and felt that such education, made available to all officers, would tend to "democratize" the army and keep it out of the sole "grasp" of West Point graduates. While he decried the small size and "defective organization" of the army upon taking command in 1895, he also reco g n ized th a t th e la rg e stan d in g arm ies o f

Europe placed a "colassal burden" upon the European civilians, and was pleased that there was no immediate need for the United States to establish a huge standing army. He complained that Congress had been 162

slow to understand the great changes in ordnance since the Civil War and spoke enthusiastically of the "magnificent organization" of the

German military system. Miles had also been the first officer in the post-civil War period to engage his troops in mock combat outside of the m ilitary schools; and while this particular exercise may have been unrealistic (the troops labelled it "the monkey war of Jack Rabbit

Flat"), at least it was a step in the right direction, providing a model upon which Wesley M erritt's troops improved a year later. In any case. Miles could hardly be labelled a backward-thinking reactionary.^^

General Miles was outspoken, abrasive, and politically naive. He was not w e ll-lik e d and was open ly d esp ised by some o f h is s u b o rd in ate s and by people within the War Department. Henry T. Allen had recorded in his diary while stationed as attache in Berlin that he was

"astonished" at Miles' "lack of knowledge" \dien Miles observed the

German m aneuvers in 1897. Though th e G eneral had g r e a t " n a tu ra l intelligence," he was act well-read and his opinions, according to

Allen, were "not well-founded." A clear example of this was his vacillating stance on the General Staff concept. He had reportedly favored such a staff in 1899, but when actually confronted by the bill which would eventually establish the staff he claimed it would

"Prussianize and Russianize the small army of the United States.

Defending the old system before the Senate Committee on Military

Affairs, Miles declared the existing staff structure was "the fruit of the most eminent patriots and ablest m ilitary men" the nation had produced, and as such it should not be destroyed by instituting a 163

system "more adapted to the monarchies of the Old World." He objected

to proposed consolidations of the Pay, Quartermaster's and Commissary

departments; he labelled Germany - the nation from which the bill

borrowed the most - "one vast m ilitary canp;" and he expressed a fear

that the proposed changes would open the way for "m ilitary despotism"

if an unscrupulous President were to reward his friends with positions

on the staff. But Root, well aware of Miles’ opposition, recruited

form er Commanding G eneral John M. S ch o field and Major G eneral Wesley

Merritt to testify in favor of the bill. They ware both widely

repeated and had m ilitary records equally as impressive as Miles' .

Perhaps more importantly, Schofield was eloquent and somewhat of a

v is io n a ry . As Commanding G eneral he had su b o rd in ate d h is own p o s itio n

for the good of the army by becoming an "unofficial Chief of Staff' to

both the President and the Secretary of War. Surprised that this had

not been done previously, he noted that this was basically the scheme

followed by European armies

Both Schofield and M erritt had improved upon Miles' efforts in

holding realistic peacetime maneuvers. M erritt's 1889 exercises were

later labelled "the first real maneuvers the army had ever conducted,"

which in three weeks drew a "lively" response from the soldiers and

introduced them to "civilized" warfare. As the maneuvers concluded,

the participating officers were suddenly aware that "the day of the

Indian war was over," and the time had come to prepare themselves for conflicts with "civilized peoples.Two years previously,

Schofield had taken the novel approach of conducting joint exercises vith the Navy in simulating a defense against a naval assault upon our 164 coastal fortifications. On the surface, it seemed that Schofield and

M erritt would have been of like mind with Miles; but their ideas on

properly preparing the army for war were actually very different.

While all were advocates of a "war army" - that is, an army that in peacetime was reasonably prepared for war with a major power - their conceptions of this army were radically divergent. Miles centered his

ideas for preparation upon establishing a much larger peacetime force, while îferritt and Schofield favored a reorganization of the staff structure. This would include the proper subordination of the bureaus to the army which it was supposed to serve. As such, they opposed not only Miles, who wished to leave the staff system untouched, but also

those who advocated using the army as a sort of "constabulary" that would control labor violence. Schofield saw this as more of a threat to both the army and the nation itself than the establishment of a viable European-style organization that with little effort could be quickly transformed into an effective instrument of war. It was the m ilitia's job to maintain the peace at home; involving the army in

such tasks could seriously endanger domestic interests and place the army at the disposal of unscrupulous men bent upon subjugating the population. If the army were also greatly enlarged, as Miles wished, the danger would be compounded. Schofield was opposed to such possibilities, which seemed to be an unsavory influence from Europe ; if any ideas were adopted from the Europeans, these were certainly not the examples to follow.

Ultimately, the views of Schofield and M erritt would prevail. In

1903, Congress passed legislation that created the office of the Chief 165

o f S ta f f , a b o lis h in g th e p o s itio n o f Commanding General as o f th e moment of Miles' resignation, which occurred later that year. The

Chief of Staff was to be aided by a small General Staff. All bureaus would answer to the Chief of Staff, who would be the chief m ilitary

adviser to the Secretary of War. Root was, for the time being,

trivmphant; and in addition, he had already established the Army War

College, which would provide trained officers for the General Staff.

A running battle between Root and the National Guard was also resolved

through the passage of the M ilitia Act (the Dick Act) of 1903, which

firmly established the Guard's proper duties in relation to the

Federal Government and the national army. This accomplished. Root retired from the War department in 1904. ^2

Reforms that had taken three decades to bring about were not easily implemented and still inspired some active opposition. To begin with, the members of the new General Staff really did not know what it was that they were supposed to do. Then the new Secretary,

W illiam Howard T a ft, proceeded to tu rn some o f th e Root reform s around, allowing his office to return to a sort of "alliance" with the bureau chiefs. Adjutant General Fred C. Ainsworth attempted to gain himself a measure of power and influence through loopholes in the

General Staff Act. But the General Staff and its Chief were now a reality, and there was no getting rid of them. If they were at first unable to fulfill the functions Root originally intended, it was due largely to inexperience and unfamiliarity with the history of the army reform movement. This would change. In 1910 President Taft's own appointee as Qiief of Staff, Leonard Wood, reestablished his office's 166

position as the key to the system, aided by written insubordinate remarks by Ainsworth which conveniently forced that officer's resignation.^^

This opened the way to the true implementation of the promising reforms Root had instituted. Not until World War I did the benefits of the efforts of Wood, Root, and earlier reformers become apparent, but the story of progressive change of any type must begin long before the change is accepted. Such was the case of the army reformers since

1865, who had looked abroad and perceived both a possible threat to the security of the United States and a means to strengthen that s e c u rity . Though so many o f t h e i r v o ice s were s t i l l e d - Sherman,

Sheridan, Upton and others having died many years previously - their efforts had eventually seen some fulfillm ent. NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. This argument seems suspect, or at least self-contradictory. In the same work, Wagner says that the Prussians could no longer attack in company columns in the 1870 war because the French arms would not permit the use of such tactics. When the arms situation was balanced but the tactics stayed the same as those of 1866, the Prussians lost. This would seem to indicate that it was indeed the superior Prussian guns which allowed them certain liberties in 1866 that were denied them four years later. See Arthur L. Wagner, The Campaign of Koniggratz: A Study of the Austro-Prussian Conflict in the Light of the American Civil War Twestport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1972), pp. 9-11, 81-5.

2 . I b i d . , p. 4 .

3 . I b i d . , pp. 4 , 85.

4. Ibid., p. 99. Wagner seemed to think the quick Prussian victory of 1866 was due largely to luck: the Austrian cavalry should have struck at the Prussian supply line. Had this occurred, Wagner claimed, the war would not have been decided so quickly. But this seems to be begging the argument. That is: the Austrians had not studied our war closely; had they done so, they would have used their cavalry as Wagner suggests, thus protracting the war and giving themselves time to learn first hand more of the lessons we had learned. But therein lies the fallacy: had they studied our c o n f li c t, they a lre a d y would have known no t only how to use th e cavalry, but they would have had an awareness of all the "other" lessons as well, and could theoretically have smashed the Prussians. This is all fairly meaningless, of course. The fact is, the Austrians had not learned any lessons from the American Civil War, while Moltke knew enough about our "armed mobs" to recognize that with superior organization a speedy victory and avoidance of our pitfalls were both possible. Of course, this is what actually transpired.

5. Ibid., p. 9. "Division of reponsibility:" the key to success.

6. Arthur L. Wagner, "An American War College," in Journal of the Military Institution of the United States (JMSI), Vol. X, 39 (July, 1899), pp. 287-304.

7. Thomas Bentley Mott, Twenty Years as M ilitary Attache (New York: Arno Press, 1979), pp. 111-13. 8. Arthur L. Wagner, Organization and Tactics (Kansas City: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Company, 1894), pp. 103.

9. Ibid., pp. 105-07; see pp. 225-31 for Wagner's comments on the German cavalry, and pp. 323-28 for the artillery.

10. I b i d . , p . 105.

11. Arthur L. Wagner, The Service of Security and Information (Kansas City: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Company, 1893). pp. 18, 21-2, 159-60.

12. J . G. C. Lee, "Reform in Army A d m in istra tio n ," JMSI, XI 45 (July, 1890), p. 542.

13. John Gibbon, "Needed Reforms in the Army," North American Review, Vol. 156 (February 1893), pp. 212-19.

14. E. L. Zalinski, "The Army Organization, Best Adapted to a Republican Form of Government, which w ill Insure an Effective Force," JMSI, XIII, p. 952.

15. I b i d . , p . 933.

16. William Ludlow, "The M ilitary Systems of Europe and America," North American Review, Volume 160 (January 1895), pp. 73-4. Ludlow visited Germany to examine the German General Staff a few years

17. O liv e r 0 . Howard, "A P le a fo r th e Army," The Forum, V ol. 23 (August 1897), p. 643. Dennis Showalter, "Soldiers into Postmasters? The Electric Telegraph as an instrument of Command in the Prussian Army," M ilitary A ffairs, XXXVII 2 (April 1973), pp. 48-51.

18. J. G. Harbord, "The Necessity of a Well Organized and Trained Infantry at the Outbreak of War, and the Best Means to be Adopted by the United States for Obtaining such a Force," JMSI, XXI 88, pp. 4-6.

19. Ludlow, "Systems," pp. 72-3; Zalinski, "Organization," p. 926.

2 0. ANJ, XXIX 28 (5 May 1 8 9 2 ), p. 491; XXIX 43 (20 August 1892), p. 905; XXX 28 (4 March 1893), p. 468.

21. ANJ, XXX 45 (1 J u ly 1 8 9 3 ), p. 751; XXVI 36 (4 May 1889), p. 716; XXVI 52 (17 August 1889) p. 1040.

22. Microcopy 666, Roll 546, #6: Petition for new helmet, with Sherman's memorandum in reply, 11 November 1880. National Archives. 23. Ibid., draft copy of General Order #4, issued by Adjutant General R. C. Drum, accompanied by a compilation of the numbers of officers of various ranks who signed the petition (573 total).

24. H. L. Hunt to Adjutant-General, 13 March 1875, Adjutant-General’s Office, Letters Received, Record Group (RG) 94, National Archives. See also Edgar M. Howell, U. S. Army Headgear, 1855-1902 (Washington: Government Printing Office, Smithsonian Studies in History and Technology #30, 1975), pp. 40-2. S. E. Whitman, The Troopers: An Informal History of the Plains Cavalry, 1865-1890 (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1962), pp. 191-95.

25. Howell, Headgear, pp. 44-63. Captain Fred Mears to Adjutant General's Office, 23 February 1879, Letters Received, RG 94, National A rch iv es.

26. Henry Loomis Nelson, "Reform in Army Uniforms," Harper's Weekly, XXXIV 1758, 1890, p. 683.

27. I b i d . , p. 683.

28. Alfred A. Woodhull, A Medical Report upon the Uniform and Clothing of the Soldiers of the U. S. Army (Washington: Surgeon General's Office, 1868), in RG 92, Office of the Quartermaster General, "Consolidated Correspondence File," Box 1171, National A rch iv es. Theodore A. Bingham, "Army U n ifo rm s," JMSI, XX, pp. 285-95. ANJ, XXlll 4-7, July-August 1885.

29. Richard Allen Andrews, "Years of Frustration: William T. Sherman, the Army, and Reform, 1869-1883" (Northwestern University Ph.D., 1968), p. 158. Garfield Committee Report, 40th Congress, 3rd Session, House of Representatives, Serial 1388, Report 33 (26 February 1869), p. 2.

30. Report of the Committee on M ilitary A ffairs, 42nd Congress, 3rd Session, House of Representatives, Report 74, Serial 1576 (3 February 1873), pp. ii-xi, 186-96. Other officers consulted included McClellan, Gibbon, Hazen, and Upton.

31. Andrews, "Frustration," pp. 159-60, 197-98.

32. Andrews, "Frustration," pp. 206-12. Senate Report #555, 45th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 1, Serial 1837. "The Burnside B ill," (n.p., Washington, 1879): pamphlet in Garfield Papers, Library of Congress. Robert Boots, The American Army and the Prussian Scheme, 1870-1881 (Penn S ta te U n iv e rs ity C e n tra l Campus u n p u b lish ed undergraduate paper, 1982), p. 8. 33. Sidney B. Brinckerhoff and Pierce Chamberlain, "The Army's Search for a Repeating Rifle: 1873-1903," M ilitary A ffairs, XXIII 1 (Spring 1968), pp. 20-1.

34. I b i d . , pp. 27-30. XXVIII 28 (7 March 1891)

35. Senate Executive Docunent #97, Serial 2204, Vol. XXVIII, 1883-86, pp. 33-46. Hovse Executive Document #49, Serial 2393-96, 49th Congress, 1st Session. Andrews, "Frustration," pp. 293-6. Edward Ransom, "Ihe Endicott Board of 1883-86 and the Coast Defenses," M ilita r y A f f a i r s , XXXI 2 (Summer 1967), pp. 74-83. ANJ, XXIII 17, p . 321. ANJ, XXIII 27, p . 330. W eigley, Army, p . 284. The ANJ r e fe r re d to the Endicott Board simply as the "Army Fortification Board," headed by Endicott and General Stephen Vincent Benet, Chief of Ordnance.

36. Ransom, "Endicott Board," pp. 80-2. J. P. Sanger, "The A rtillery Council of 1887," A rtillery Journal, XLIX 4 (September - December 1918). Graham Cosmas, "From Order to Chaos: The War Department, the National Guard, and M ilitary Policy, 1898," M ilitary A ffairs. XXIX 3 (Fall 1963), p. 107.

37. Microcopy 689, Rolls 600, 601, 606, and 607, National Archives, contain the records of the Tactical Board.

38. Andrews, "Frustration," pp. 287-90. Frederick Louis Huidekoper, The M ilitary Unpreparedness of the United States (New York: MacMillan Company, 1913), pp. 131-2. Weigley, Army, pp. 274 -73. Anonymous, "History of the Command and General Staff School," M ilitary Review, March 1939. See Ira L. Reeves, M ilitary Education in the United States (Washington: The Army Library, 1914), pp. 198-202, for a discussion on the establishment of the Army War College.

3 9. W eigley, Army, pp. 2 73 -7 4 .

40. Anonymous, "Ihe Evolution of M ilitary Intelligence," Mij.lLdi.y Review, XXVI 6 (September 1946), pp. 77-8.

41. General Leo van Geyr (German Army, R e tire d ) , "The German General Staff, Part I: The Imperial Period, M ilitary Review XLII 11 (November 1962), pp. 20-1. J. M. Scammel, "German War Doctrines and Plans," Infantry Journal, XXX 3 (March 1927). Major E. J. Perkins, "Ihe M ilitary Staff: Its History and Development," Canadian Army J o u r n a l, A p ril 1933, and M ilita r y Review, XXXIII 6 (September 19 3 3 ), p . 87.

42. Perkins, "Staff," p. 87. Casey Brewer, "ihe General Staff of the German Army," M ilitary Review, XXXVI 6 (September 1936), pp. 30-3. Major H. B. Webb, "Ihe United States General Staff, Its Evolution: An E pitom e," M ilita r y Review, XXVI 8 (November 1946), pp. 3 3-4. 171

A3. Henry T. Allen, "The Central Military Administrations of Five Great Powers," JMSI, XIX 82 (July 1896), p. 80. H. M. Boies. "The Defense of a Free People, In the Light of the Spanish War," JISI, XXIV (January 1899), p. 25.

A4. William Harding Carter, "Army Reformers," North American Review, Vol. 208 (July-December 1918) p. 522. Anonymous, "The Future of our Army and Navy," Outlook, LX, 11 (12 November 1898), pp. 659-62. James Hewes , "The United States Army General Staff, 1900-191 7," M ilita r y A f f a ir s XXXVIII 2 (A p ril 197A), p . 68.

A5. Chief of Army Field Forces, Selected Readings in American M ilitary History, Volume II (Leavenworth, Kansas: Infantry School, 1953), pp. 66-7. Carter, "Reformers," pp. 553-5A. W. A. Simpson, Target Practice and Remount Systems Abroad (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), War De par tmen t/MID Docunent 159, examines German target practice techniques in detail in response to the desire for training improvments.

A6. Carter, "Reformers," pp. 553-5A. Carter obviously had a low opinion of Miles. He never named him, simply referring in a d is p a ra g in g manner to " th e Commanding G e n era l." Also see V irg in ia Weisel Johnson, The Unregimented General (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Houghton M ifflini Com^ny, 1962), pp. 313-1 A. James D. H ittle, The M ilitary Staff: Its History and Development (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The M ilita r y S erv ice P u b lish in g Company, 194A) , p . 169. Edward Ran son, "Nelson A. Miles as Conmanding General, 1895-1903," M ilitary A ffairs, XXIX A (Winter 1965-66), p. 183.

A7, Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Fort Leavenworth Schools: Post Graduate M ilitary Education and Professionalization in the U. S. Army, 1880-1920" (University of Wisconsin Ph.D. Dissertation, 197A), pp. 3, 16. James L. Abraham son, A m erica Arms fo r a New C en tu ry (New York: Free Press, 1981). Nelson A, Miles, Report of Major General Nelson A. Miles of His Observations in Europe, May 5 to October 10, 1899 (Washington: War De par tmen t/MID Doc men t ir91, AGO). Nelson A. M iles, Serving the Republic (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1911).

A 8. Ran son, "Miles," pp. 194- 99. Henry T. Allen, Diary of 1897-98, entry of 9-11 August 1897: H. T. Allen Papers, Box 1, Library of Congress. XXXVI 24 (11 February 1899), p. 550. XXXIX 30 (29 March 1902), p. 758. In Allen's "Proposed Reorganization for Our C en tra l S ta ff" ÜMSI XXVII, 1900), pp. 26-30, he s tre s s e d th a t th e General Staff concept was really quite simple, and chided that opponents were making the whole issue seem much too complex.

49. ANJ XXXIX 30 (2 9 March 1902), pp. 757-60. Russell F. Weigley, "The Military Thought of John M. Schofield," M ilitary Affairs XXIII 2 (Summer 1 9 5 9 ), pp. 77-84. John M. S c h o fie ld , F o rty -S ix Y ears in th e Army (New York: The Century Company, 1897). pp. 421-22. The President of the United States was already on record as supporting Root's basic ideas. Four years previously, Theodore Roosevelt had lauded the "Root Report" in which Root had made his initial call for making staff appointments from the line on a rotating basis. "Every first-class fighting army in the world is modeled on the system suggested by Secretary Root," Roosevelt had said. See Roosevelt's letter to Outlook, LXIII 16 (16 December 1899), pp. 915-16.

50. Abraham son. New Century, p. 46.

51. Ibid., p. 50. A large volime of material concerning martial law and riot control was published in the latter stages of the nineteenth century. Examples are: G. Norman Liéber, The Justification o f M a rtia l Law and The Use o f th e Army in th e A id o f th e C iv il Power (both: Washington, Government Printing Office, 18987; William E. Birkheimer, M ilitary Government and M artial Law (Washington: James J. Chapman, 1892); E. G. Sprowl. Street Tactics: Armory Formation and Street Marches Adapted to the Use of the National Guard in Cases of Emergency (San Francisco: E. G. Sprowl, 1889); William H. Brownell, Formation for Street Riot Duty, Prepared for the National Guard (New York: ANJ Press, 1884); William N. Blow, "Use of Troops in Riots" (JMSI July 1899), pp. 45-47; Richard W. Young, Legal and Tactical Considerations affecting the Employment of the M ilitary in the S u p p ressio n o f mobs, in c lu d in g an essay on M a rtia l Law (New York: The P u b lic S erv ice P u b lish in g Company, 1888).

52. Graham Cosmas, "M ilitary Reform after the Spanish-American War: The Army R eo rg an izatio n F ig h t o f 1 8 9 8 -9 9 ," M ilita r y A f f a i r s , XXXV 1 (February 1971), pp. 12-20. Anonymous, "The General Staff," M ilitary Historian and Economist, I 4 (October 1916) pp. 388-90. Philip L. Semsch, "Elihu Root and the General Staff," M ilitary Affairs XXVII 1 (Spring 1963), pp. 16-2 7.

53. Hewes, "General Staff," pp. 68-70. Webb, "General Staff," pp. 34-5. CmPTER FIVE

PASS IN REVIEW

The Root reforms ultim ately triumphed and were expanded upon by^

Wood and others because an ever-increasing number of officers and

influential civilians recognized the need for change. Although in

1903 the American General Staff was a strange mixture of French and

German structure, German theory, and British nomenclature, it was

still a distinctly Americanized version of an old European concept.

Reformers and analysts such as William Harding Carter gave most of the

credit for the many changes in the Army (up to and including the Root

b ill of 1903) to one man: Emory Upton, who had been "substantially

correct" in all of his argunents for improvement back in the 1870's .

By the time America entered World War I, many of Upton's proposals been at least partially accepted. The genius of Upton lay in his

ability to perceive so many problems so far in advance. The

individuals who later worked to remedy particular problems often did

so along Uptonian lines. Some of these may have been concerned only with their immediate tasks and were unaware of Upton's as-yet unpublished M ilitary Policy. However, most reformers were probably

acquainted with his ideas through the circulation of his manuscript.

Upton had an overall perception of the future army and proposed

some sweeping changes that in actuality took nearly forty years to

173 174

implsnent. Other ideas, ignoring American traditions in favor of m ilitary expediency, were doomed to failure. But the major reforms he

proposed that were based primarily upon what he had seen in Geimany were for the most part eventually accepted. His proposals were:

(1) The three battalion system for infantry regiments;

(2) Rotation of officers between staff and line ;

(3) Examination prior to promotion;

(4) Schools for enlisted men;

(5) Schools for officers receiving commissions;

(6) Schools to further train officers in the finer points of their

profession;

(7 ) An "expansible" army, similar to Calhoun's conceptions ;

(8) A mobilization scheme similar to Germany's, with regimental depots and universal obligation;

(9) Formation of a "National Volunteer Reserve;"

(10) Establishment of a "General Staff Cbrps."^

Every one of these proposals became a matter for study and dd)ate over the quarter-century between 1878 and 1903. Such sweeping reforms were bound to cause controversy, and the principal objections to

Upton's proposals were weighty. His opponents found the amount of time a citizen would spend in the reserves - and the numbers of men serving in the armed forces - to be excessive under his system.

Education and post-graduate schools were fine for men who were making a career of the army, but there seemed to be no need to train the average citizen for two years before calling him a soldier. Wood, for one, believed it could be done in a few months The most 175 persuasive argunent against Upton, however, was the oft-repeated concern - voiced by Sherman even before Upton left on his world tour, and echoed by others for years - that the United States could not adopt in its entirety a system devised by an autocratic power which was surrounded by potential enemies. Our democratic traditions were contrary to a system incorporating imiversal m ilitary obligation and large-scale conscription; our geographic situation did not warrant an army of the size or style of Germany's.^ While Upton himself ad m itted th a t adoption o f th e e n t i r e German system was n e ith e r possible nor desirable, he persisted in advocating principles that closely resembled those he had witnessed abroad. In this insistence, he seems to have been mistaken.

Upton's reforms were the focal point of those who either advocated or attacked the idea of imitating Germany because they received a large audience. Upton was a close friend of Sherman; he was a well-respected, gallant soldier himself; and he was extremely logical and articulate. But he was not the only officer to advocate

"Germanic" reforms, and he was certainly not the first to show such interests. Prior to the Civil War, Calhoun, Thayer, Mahan, Kearny,

McClellan and others visited Germany or admired various facets of the

German system, though they gave their greatest attention and praise to the French. Following the war, Sheridan, Sherman, and Hazen visited

Europe and were impressed by Prussia's successes in the field and in

German unification. Hazen wrote eloquently and in depth about the

German army and severely criticized both their French counterparts and the wasteful, flawed system in his own country. It was Hazen who 176

said, several years prior to Upton, that the major problem confronting

the United States was that of a poor General Staff system which was

entirely unlike those of Europe.

After Upton visited Europe, he was hardly a lone voice crying in

the wilderness. He had numerous disciples who consistently lauded the merits, logic, and prowess of the German system. These included

Joseph P. Sanger, who had accompanied Upton on his tour; Louis

Carpenter, who visited Europe on a special leave of absence; Charles

A. L. T o tten , W. R. L iverm ore, C harles W. Raymond, and Eban S w ift, who devised American versions of the German war game; Francis V. Greene,

Wesley M erritt, John Bigelow, William Birkheimer. R. K. Evans - the list is long and impressive, coming eventually to include Arthur L.

Wagner, Elihu Root, and William Harding Carter at the tur.i of the c e n tu ry .

To say that these men merely echoed Upton would be incorrect, as each o ff e re d h is own e v a lu a tio n s o f th e German and American sy stem s.

Their evaluations covered areas as diverse as mobilization schemes and styles of knapsacks. Nor were all of them entirely enamoured with the

Germans. Arthur L. Wagner presented a balanced view, alternately praising and criticizing their ideas. General Charles P. Stone wrote to JMSI in 1883: "For the work I have seen a squadron of United States

Cavalry performing on the Plains, Germany would send two regiments, and deem it hard service."^ Later, though he had previously advocated adoption of a Gennan-style general staff. Nelson A. Miles would oppose the establishment of such a system as it would unduly

"Prussianize" the army. 177

The advent of the Bureau of Military Intelligence and later the m ilitary attache system enabled the Adjutant General's Office to begin a systematic canpilation of information on foreign armies and was both a necessary step in the eventual emergence of a true General Staff and a symbol of the realization that armies of other nations might in fact have some facets worthy of im itation. As increasing amounts of overseas information became available, more discussion and ddjate took place regarding the merits and demerits of the German army. A number of m ilitary organizations and journals became forums for these discussions and helped to disseminate opinions. Comments from the o f f i c i a l a tta c h e s were o f s p e c ia l i n t e r e s t ; Thomas K. Bingham, R. K.

Evans, and Henry T. Allen were the attaches in Berlin who made notable contribut ions to these per iod icals .

Congressional concern over the army was reflected in committees that met to consider army reorganization, and the Army itself produced several boards that investigated and made recommendations upon types and styles of armaments and equipment. Once again, the example set by the Germans was of major interest. After the demonstrated superiority of Prussian weaponry against the Austrians in 1866, there was a great deal of concern over the ability of the American army and coastal defenses to repel foreign invaders who could conceivably enjoy a similar advantage against the United States. Tactics, meanwhile, underwent frequent scrutiny and adjustment as observers gave their evaluations of the various European conflicts and developments in armaments. As Germany had been successfully involved in three noteworthy wars in a short period of time and had contributed 178

significantly to the m ilitary utilization of technological advances,

it was again the nation of primary M eric an scrutiny.

Due largely to the example and prompting of Sherman and Upton, the

army formed several schools for advanced training in the various

service divisions. The Prussian m ilitary schools which culminated in

a Kriegsakademie that in turn provided officers for the General Staff

was a principal inspiration for this facet of American reform.

E v e n tu a lly , an Army War C o lle g e , co rresp o n d in g to the German War

School, emerged as the "capstone" of the American system, and it too would contribute officers to a General Staff.

Ultimately, the reorganization that took place following the

Spanish-Americ an War, as well as the establishment of a true staff

system, resulted because of a new attitude by the American people

towards their army. The United States was embarking upon an age of

overseas expansionism, and a larger army would be required to maintain

control of the new possessions. The American people, formerly willing

to accept a modern navy as their "first line of defense" but unwilling

to accept a good-sized professional standing army at home, would alter

their perceptions once a "foreign war" had been successfully - though

some^at incompetently - undertaken. The Navy would become a tool for

possible offensive actions; the Army could become larger, as long as most of it remained overseas to keep natives of our new "colonies"

under control and maintain foreign respect for our new-found sphere of

in flu e n c e .

In 1916, Leonard Wood wrote about the influence of the Australian

and Swiss systems upon our m ilitary development while making no 179 mention of the substantial effects of the German model.^ It is ironic that the man who was the most responsible for ensuring the eventual implementation of the Root reforms should ignore the very real contributions made by those who had studied and adnired the

Germans, lhat the Germans were in 1916 fast becoming unpopular in the

United States may have had something to do with this sleight ; and though even today Americans on the whole would be reluctant to equate t h e i r army w ith th a t o f Germany, the fa c t rem ains th a t i t was the m a g n ific e n t su ccess o f th e P ru ssia n s in t h e ir Wars o f German

Unification that began to shake American officers into an awareness that complacency had no place in a fast-changing world.

If "the price of liberty is eternal vigilance," it was the

Prussians who effectively demonstrated that vigilance could never be replaced by a smug sel f-satis fact ion in previous victories, which only bred stagnation, complacency, and disaster. This lesson should be eminently clear to us today in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, when civilians and government officials alike were unable to understand how the American armed forces, victorious in World War II, could not achieve victory despite an overwhelming superiority in firepower and technology. In 1866 and 1870, the Austrians and the

French had paid a high price for such overconfidence, and American reformers, recognizing the lesson, were determined to prevent a similar catastrophe to our army. "Fortress America" could not stand forever if it did not keep pace with m ilitary developments abroad.

The best example of success overseas was that of the Prussians, who had "institutionalized" constructive self-criticism to expedite needed re fo rm s. Ihus i t was la rg e ly th e army o f a n ew ly -u n ified German

nation that M eric ans examined and attempted to emulate as we brought

an end to the wars on the Indian frontier and began to seek out a new

"manifest destiny" overseas.

If the United States wishes to benefit by studying its own

history, the army reform movement of the nineteenth century, coupled

with an examination of American stagnation and overconfidence during

the Vietnam involvement, would serve as an excellent starting point.

The pouring of huge amounts of treasure, men, and armaments into some

"trouble spot" is in itself no way to ensure victory. Confronted with

wars of "national liberation," modern American policy must recognize

that ideas are best fought with other ideas. Lacking such commitment

to an ideology believed to be just, the United States is doomed to

failure. In this regard, it should be noted that the reformers of the

late nineteenth century were eager to find and adapt better ideas into

a new American army ; they were more concerned with the quality and organization of the army than its size. The United States would do

well to follow this example in regard to foreign and m ilitary policy and the internal workings of the armed forces. Stagnation in the

1890's could easily have meant eventual disaster. It would surely mean th e same th in g to d ay . FIGURE 3

THE GENERAL STAFF, 1917

(Source: Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 565)

SECRETARY

CHIEF

STAFF

CHIEF OF QUARTER- BUREAU OF SURGEON GENERAL GENERAL

CHIEF PANAMA CHIEF OF SIGNAL CANAL OFFICER BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Unpublished M aterial

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