Towards Global Justice: Reconciling Rawlsian Liberalism and Cosmopolitanism in an Interconnected World Kate L
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Bates College SCARAB Honors Theses Capstone Projects Spring 5-2013 Towards Global Justice: Reconciling Rawlsian Liberalism and Cosmopolitanism in an Interconnected World Kate L. Fetrow Bates College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scarab.bates.edu/honorstheses Recommended Citation Fetrow, Kate L., "Towards Global Justice: Reconciling Rawlsian Liberalism and Cosmopolitanism in an Interconnected World" (2013). Honors Theses. 79. http://scarab.bates.edu/honorstheses/79 This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Capstone Projects at SCARAB. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of SCARAB. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Towards Global Justice: Reconciling Rawlsian Liberalism and Cosmopolitanism in an Interconnected World An Honors Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Department of Philosophy Bates College In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts by Kate Leslie Fetrow Lewiston, Maine March 22nd, 2013 Fetrow 2 Acknowledgements I would like, first and foremost, to express my sincere gratitude to Professor David Cummiskey, without whose guidance, support, and critical eye, this project would not have been successful. My profound thanks. I would also like to thank the Bates Philosophy Department for four wonderful years of instruction and intellectual development. I would also like to thank my parents, without whose love and assistance I would never have been able to achieve what I have. Your have made me the person I am today. Thank you and I love you. Fetrow 3 Table of Contents ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... 4 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 5 RAWLSIAN JUSTICE AND THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE ............................................................ 6 GLOBAL BASIC STRUCTURE ..................................................................................................... 10 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: COSMOPOLITAN, LIBERAL, AND LIBERTARIAN APPROACHES TO GLOBAL JUSTICE ................................................... 17 RAWLSIAN LIBERALISM ........................................................................................................... 18 COSMOPOLITANISM .................................................................................................................. 27 LIBERTARIANISM ...................................................................................................................... 32 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 37 CHAPTER 3: A JUST GLOBAL BASIC STRUCTURE: RAWLSIAN LIBERALISM WITH A COSMOPOLITAN PURPOSE ................................................................................. 39 ACTORS ..................................................................................................................................... 46 STRUCTURE ............................................................................................................................... 52 GENERAL PRINCIPLES .............................................................................................................. 55 Principles of Membership ...................................................................................................... 57 Principles of Limits ................................................................................................................ 60 Principles of Distribution ...................................................................................................... 66 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 77 CHAPTER 4: TOWARDS A REALISTIC UTOPIA: IMPLICATIONS AND RESULTS 78 THE IMPLEMENTATION OBJECTION ........................................................................................ 79 THE SUSTAINABILITY OBJECTION ........................................................................................... 85 THE INTERCONNECTIVITY OBJECTION ................................................................................... 89 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................ 94 BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 98 Fetrow 4 Abstract In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that, in constructing the basic structure of a just society, any social and economic inequalities must be part of a scheme of cooperation that works to the benefit of the least advantaged social class. He calls this principle of distributive justice the difference principle. In A Law of Peoples, however, he backs away from this claim, arguing for weaker cosmopolitan duties in constructing an international social order. This thesis does two things. 1.) It explores this tension in Rawls’s work, arguing that in order for the Law of Peoples to be consistent with A Theory of Justice, Rawls must embrace a global difference principle. 2.) It then investigates the implications of this conclusion, arguing that a global difference principle would necessitate robust duties of cosmopolitan aid, but would necessitate neither a world government nor open borders. Fetrow 5 Chapter 1: Introduction Social contract theory has, historically, looked inward, asking how governments and societies ought be structured. As the world becomes ever more interconnected, questions of justice increasingly arise on the international, rather than national, level. These questions of global justice have received philosophical consideration from a variety of schools of thought, including Rawlsian liberalism, cosmopolitanism, and libertarianism. One of the primary accounts of global justice is that offered by John Rawls. However, Rawls’s theory of international justice stands in stark contrast with his approach to domestic justice. In the former case, he advocates minimal principles of justice, whereas in the latter he promotes broad egalitarian principles. My project here explores this tension. Moreover, I argue that given the existence and scope of the global basic structure, a Rawlsian account of global justice would converge with a cosmopolitan account and yield principles of strong economic and social welfare rights. This question is important on both philosophical and empirical levels. Theoretically, I seek to align one of the primary approaches to political theory of international relations with empirical realities of the world. Moreover, questions of international justice affect the lives and livelihoods of billions of people around the world. Creating a consistent and valuable theoretical framework for understanding moral obligations in the international sphere is imperative to Fetrow 6 bringing justice to individuals and states across the globe. John Rawls’s theory of justice provides one potential source for understanding global justice. However, Rawls’s conception of justice is strikingly different at the domestic level than it is in the international sphere. Unpacking the differences between his two approaches requires discussion of several key terms—justice, the difference principle, and the global basic structure. Understanding these terms is essential to my later discussion of the application of Rawls’s domestic conception of justice to the international sphere. How applicable these principles are to the global order, I argue, depends on the nature global basic structure. In order to frame and situate justice in the international context, thus, I first define distributive justice, the difference principle, and global basic structure. Rawlsian Justice and the Difference Principle John Rawls writes that “justice is the first virtue of social institutions…laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust.”1 An evaluation of global structures or orders must, therefore, begin and end with an account of justice in a Rawlsian scheme. Rawls’s conception of justice is one of fairness. As Freeman explains, justice as fairness is The name Rawls gives to his conception of justice…The name derives from the idea that fair principles of justice should result from a fair initial choice situation that incorporates all the relevant moral and practical reasons—the fairness of the initial situation is presumed to transfer to the principles chosen therein.2 In other words, justice as fairness is the idea that the principles of justice are those that reasonable people would choose behind a veil of ignorance, that is, without knowing their own unique social position, race, creed, or other distinguishing characteristics. In the domestic case, 1 Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 3. 2 Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Rawls. Oxon: Routledge: 473. Fetrow 7 the principles of justice are “the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association.”3 This initial situation, or position, is the hypothetical original position. In the original position, participants are behind a veil of ignorance and are thereby