Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty Author(S): Thomas W
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Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty Author(s): Thomas W. Pogge Reviewed work(s): Source: Ethics, Vol. 103, No. 1 (Oct., 1992), pp. 48-75 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381495 . Accessed: 05/03/2013 13:01 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Ethics. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 13:01:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Cosmopolitanismand Sovereignty* ThomasW. Pogge The human future suddenly seems open. This is an inspiration;we can step back and thinkmore freely.Instead of containmentor detente, politicalscientists are discussinggrand pictures:the end of history,or the inevitableproliferation and mutualpacifism of capitalistdemocracies. And politiciansare speaking of a new world order. My inspirationis a littlemore concrete. Afterdeveloping a rough, cosmopolitan spec- ificationof our task to promote moral progress, I offeran idea for gradual global institutionalreform. Dispersing political authority over nested territorialunits would decrease the intensityof the struggle for power and wealth withinand among states,thereby reducing the incidence of war, poverty,and oppression. In such a multilayered scheme, borders could be redrawn more easily to accord with the aspirationsof peoples and communities. INSTITUTIONAL COSMOPOLITANISM BASED ON HUMAN RIGHTS Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First,indi- vidualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons- rather than, say, familylines, tribes,ethnic, cultural, or religious communities,nations, or states. The lattermay be units of concernonly indirectly, in virtueof theirindividual members or citizens. Second, universality:the statusof ultimateunit of concern attaches to everyliving human being equally2- not merelyto some subset,such as men, aristocrats,Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality:this * This essay has benefited from various incisive comments and suggestions by Andreas F0llesdal, Bonnie Kent, Ling Tong, and myfellow participants at the "Ethikon East/WestDialogue Conferenceon the Restructuringof Politicaland Economic Systems," held in Berlin in January 1991, with fundingprovided by the Pew Charitable Trusts. 1. The differencesbetween the notions of a person and a human being are not essential to the present discussion. 2. There is some debate about the extent to which we should give weightto the interestsof futurepersons and also to those of past ones (whose deaths are stillrecent). I leave thisissue aside because itis at rightangles to the debate betweencosmopolitanism and its alternatives. Ethics103 (October 1992): 48-75 C 1992 by The Universityof Chicago. All rightsreserved. 0014-1704/93/0301-0948$0 1.00 48 This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 13:01:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Pogge Cosmopolitanism 49 special status has global force. Persons are ultimateunits of concern for everyone-not only for their compatriots,fellow religionists,or such like. Let me separate three cosmopolitan approaches by introducing two distinctions.The firstis that between legal and moral cosmopol- itanism. Legal cosmopolitanismis committedto a concrete political ideal of a global order under which all persons have equivalent legal rightsand duties, that is, are fellowcitizens of a universal republic.3 Moral cosmopolitanismholds that all persons stand in certain moral relations to one another: we are required to respect one another's statusas ultimateunits of moral concern-a requirementthat imposes limitsupon our conductand, in particular,upon our effortsto construct institutionalschemes. This view is more abstract,and in this sense weaker than,legal cosmopolitanism:though compatible with the latter, it is also compatible with other patterns of human interaction,for example, witha systemof autonomous statesand even witha plurality of self-containedcommunities. Here I presenta variantof moral cos- mopolitanism,though below I also discuss whetherthis position man- dates effortsto move fromour global statusquo in the directionof a more cosmopolitanworld order (in the sense of legal cosmopolitanism). The central idea of moral cosmopolitanismis that every human being has a global statureas an ultimateunit of moral concern. Such moral concern can be fleshed out in countless ways. One may focus on subjective goods and ills (human happiness, desire fulfillment, preferencesatisfaction, or pain avoidance) or on more objectiveones (such as human need fulfillment,capabilities, opportunities,or re- sources). Also, one might relativizethese measures, for example, by defining the key ill as being worse off than anyone need be, or as fallingbelow the mean-which is equivalentto replacingstraightforward aggregation (sum ranking or averaging) by a version of maximin or equalitarianism,respectively. In order to get to my topic quickly,I do not discuss these mattersbut simplyopt for a variant of moral cos- mopolitanism that is formulated in terms of human rights (with straightforwardaggregation).4 In doing so, I capture what most other variantslikewise consider essential. And my furtherreflections can, 3. One recent argument for a world state is advanced in Kai Nielsen, "World Government,Security, and Global Justice,"in Problemsof InternationalJustice, ed. Steven Luper-Foy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,1988). 4. I have in mind here a rather minimal conception of human rights,one that rules out trulysevere abuses, deprivations,and inequalitieswhile stillbeing compatible witha wide range of political,moral, and religious cultures.The recent development of, and progress within,both governmentaland nongovernmentalinternational or- ganizations supports the hope, I believe, that such a conception might,in our world, become the object of a worldwideoverlapping consensus. Compare Thomas W. Pogge, RealizingRawls (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1989), chap. 5. This content downloaded on Tue, 5 Mar 2013 13:01:55 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 50 Ethics October1992 in any case, easily be generalized to other variantsof moral cosmo- politanism. My second distinctionlies within the domain of the moral. It concerns the nature of the moral constraintsto be imposed. An insti- tutionalconception postulates certain fundamental principles of justice. These apply to institutionalschemes and are thus second-orderprin- ciples: standards for assessing the ground rules and practices that regulate human interactions.An interactionalconception, by contrast, postulatescertain fundamentalprinciples of ethics.These principles, like institutionalground rules,are firstorder in thatthey apply directly to the conduct of persons and groups.5 Interactionalcosmopolitanism assigns direct responsibility for the fulfillmentof human rightsto other (individualand collective)agents, whereas institutionalcosmopolitanism assigns such responsibilityto institutionalschemes. On the latterview, the responsibilityof persons is then indirect-a shared responsibilityfor the justice of any practices one supports: one ought not to participatein an unjust institutional scheme (one that violates human rights)without making reasonable effortsto aid its victimsand to promote institutionalreform. Institutionaland interactionalconceptions are again compatible and thus may be combined.6 Here I focus, however,on a variant of institutionalcosmopolitanism while leaving open the question of its supplementationby a variantof interactionalcosmopolitanism. I hope to show that making the institutionalview primaryleads to a much strongerand more plausibleoverall morality. Let us beginby examining how our two approaches would yield differentaccounts of human rightsand human rightsviolations. On the interactionalview, human rightsimpose constraintson conduct,while on the institutionalview theyimpose constraintsupon 5. Interactionalcosmopolitanism has been defendedin numerousworks. A paradigm example is Henry Shue, Basic Rights(Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1980). Luban, another advocate of this position, puts the point as follows: "A human right, then, will be a right whose beneficiariesare all humans and whose obligors are all humans in a position to effectthe right"(David Luban, "JustWar and Human Rights," in InternationalEthics, ed. Charles Beitz et al. [Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985], p. 209). Robert Nozick's Anarchy,State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974)- howeversurprising the rightshe singlesout as fundamental- is also an instance of interactionalcosmopolitanism. For institutionalcosmopolitanism, see Charles Beitz, PoliticalTheory and InternationalRelations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1979), pt. 3, and "Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,"Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 591-600; and Pogge, RealizingRawls, chap. 6. 6. This is done, e.g., by John Rawls, who asserts (i) a natural duty to uphold and promotejust institutionsand also (ii) various othernatural duties