Caribbean Human Development Report 2012

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Caribbean Human Development Report 2012 Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security Caribbean Human Development Report 2012 Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security

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ISBN: 9789962688082

Website: http://www.regionalcentrelac-undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean

Editors: Robert Zimmermann, Carol Lawes and Nanette Svenson Cover design: Timothy Bootan and Juan Manuel Salazar Design and Layout: Miguel Nova y Vínculos Gráficos

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For a list of any errors or omissions found subsequent to printing please visit our website.

No consultation has been carried out in Guyana. The data on Guyana have been obtained through public sources and the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Caribbean Human Development Report 2012

Helen Clark Administrator United Nations Development Programme

Rebeca Grynspan Associate Administrator United Nations Development Programme

Heraldo Muñoz Niky Fabiancic Assistant Administrator and Director of the Deputy Director Regional Bureau for LAC Regional Bureau for LAC United Nations Development Programme United Nations Development Programme

Freddy Justiniano Leida Mercado Director a.i. Human Development Advisor Regional Centre for LAC Coordinator Caribbean HDR United Nations Development Programme Regional Centre for LAC United Nations Development Programme

Anthony Harriott Lead Author Caribbean HDR

Executive Board Marcia De Castro Luis Felipe Lopez Calva UNDP Resident Representative Former Chief Economist and Practice Leader Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname Poverty, MDGs and Human Development Regional Bureau for LAC Thomas Gittens UNDP Country Director Alvaro Pinto Suriname Former Practice Leader Democratic Governance Michelle Gyles-McDonnough Regional Bureau for LAC UNDP Resident Representative Barbados and OECS Pablo Ruiz Practice Leader Arun Kashyap Crisis Prevention and Recovery UNDP Resident Representative Regional Centre for LAC Jamaica

Khadja Musa UNDP Resident Representative Guyana Consultants

Richard Bennett Marlyn Jones Consultant on Police Consultant on State Policies and Policy Orientation of the Populations Terri-Ann Gilbert-Roberts Consultant on Youth Violence and Youth Charles Katz Resilience Consultant on Street Gangs and Organized Crime

Edward Maguire Consultant on Criminal Justice Systems

National Consultants

April Bernard Marlyn Jones Randy Seepersad Barbados Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago

Anthony George Janielle Matthews Saint Lucia Antigua and Barbuda

Mellissa Ifill Jack Menke Guyana Suriname

Survey and Statistics University of West Indies Quality Control Consultant Mark Kirton Helena Rovner Marlon Anatol Roy Russell

Peer Reviewers

Edward Greene Patricia Mohammed Peer Reviewer on Human Development Peer Reviewer on Gender

Gabriel Kessler Trevor Munroe Peer Reviewer on Youth Peer Reviewer on Policy Foreword

The increase in violence and crime in Latin America and the Caribbean is an undeniable fact that erodes the very foundation of the democratic processes in the region and imposes high social, economic and cultural costs. Our region is home to 8.5 percent of the world’s population, yet it concentrates some 27 percent of the world’s homicides. Violence and crime are therefore perceived by a majority of Latin American and Caribbean citizens as a top pressing challenge. The resulting alarm has often led to short-sighted, mano dura (iron fist) policies, which have proven ineffective and, at times, detrimental to the rule of law.

The situation varies much among and within countries. Broadly speaking, there are high- and low-crime countries in the region, and differences exist even within each of the sub-regions (i.e., South America, Central America, and the Caribbean). However perceived insecurity and citizens´ concern are independent of actual crime rates, so that mano dura policies are not exclusive of high-crime countries.

In this context, we are confronted by a paradox: Why is it that, despite the democratization process experienced in the region in the last 20 years, citizen security levels, as well as the justice and security institutions in the region, are in crisis? Why is it that, despite the structural and institutional reforms promoted by countries in the region in order to construct governance mechanisms which are more transparent, horizontal and democratic, the justice and security institutions are overwhelmed and confidence in them is shattered?

To begin to resolve this paradox and deal effectively with crime and violence, we need accurate assessments that provide evidence for action. To this end, the United Nations Development Programme, in association with governments, civil societies and international agencies, is leading numerous initiatives aimed at improving citizen security in Latin America and the Carib- bean. This report is a one of these efforts. Drafted by a team of outstanding scholars building upon previous research and practical experience, this report also reflects findings from the analysis of extensive new survey data and sustained consultations involving over 450 experts, practitioners and stakeholders in seven Dutch- and English-speaking Caribbean countries.

Of primary concern with citizen security is the issue of public confidence in state capacity to protect citizens and ensure justice. If citizens lack confidence in the police, the judiciary and other public authorities, no amount of repression will restore security. The success of any law enforcement system depends on the willingness of the people to participate and contribute. For the state to enjoy the trust and commitment of the people, it must strive to eradicate exclusion, improve transparency and create opportunities that encourage a sense of belonging for all.

A key message of the report is that Caribbean countries need to focus on a model of security based on the human development approach, whereby citizen security is paramount, rather than on the traditional state security model, whereby the protection of the state is the chief aim. Indeed, the contrast between prevention on the one hand and repression and coercion

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 V on the other is ill conceived. Social inclusion to help prevent crime and violence and efficient and effective law enforcement are by no means incompatible or mutually exclusive. In a truly democratic society, broad based social inclusion and swift criminal justice–or “prevention” and “coercion”—serve to reinforce and complement each other. This is one of the most important lessons to be taken from this report – and not only for the Caribbean but for all of Latin America as well.

An issue of common interest to Latin America and the Caribbean is security. Organized transnational crime, mainly that which involves drug trafficking, looms large in the security crisis currently affecting an increasing number of countries in both sub-regions. Although this report concentrates on implications for the domestic dimensions of the problem in the Carib- bean, especially among youth, it is also important to note that the Caribbean is a critical transit route between drug producers and large-scale consumers. As a result of this geographical positioning, it is necessary for the Caribbean to strengthen cooperation with its Latin American neighbours and project a larger voice in the global dialogue on existing policies and possible alternatives.

An improved worldwide policy addressing the problem of addictive drugs could contribute considerably to reducing levels of violence and social disruption in the Caribbean. This belief is substantiated by an encouraging finding presented in the report: despite exceptionally high homicide rates, the overall incidence of crime in the Caribbean as measured by the victimization survey data “compares favourably at the lower end with countries such as Japan,” referring to nations that participated in the 2004-2005 International Crime Victimization Survey This suggests that the spiral of violence generally associated with drug trafficking exists within the context of an otherwise durable social fabric that makes for lesser ordinary “street” crime.

This is but one of the constructive insights readers of the Caribbean Human Development Report 2012 will find. With its fresh prospective, solid data and rigorous analysis, this publication offers people from the Caribbean, along with those from Latin America and every other region, many valuable lessons to apply in the ongoing effort of confronting crime and fostering human development.

Heraldo Muñoz Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme and Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean

VI CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Acknowledgements

This groundbreaking report, the first regional Caribbean Human Development Report, represents an incredible collaboration across sectors of UNDP and non-UNDP experts, practitioners, academics and policy-makers whose combined insight and dedication have made this publication possible. Thus, the list of credits and thanks extends far beyond these pages, but first and foremost goes to the UNDP Country Offices in the Caribbean and the UNDP Re- gional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean for both financial and technical support of this process since its inception.

Likewise, the UNDP Bureau for Development Policy contributed funding and expertise, and the Human Development Report Office provided critical guidance and commentary. A special appreciation is also in order for the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery for its extensive and invaluable expert participation along with its financial backing.

Several teams and individuals were essential to the success of this production as well. Among them are the technical committee that included Trevor Benn, Sandra Baptiste Caruth, Akiko Fuji, Pablo Gago, Sonia Gill, Stein Hansen, Daniel Luz, Chisa Mikami, Paula Mohamed, Edo Stork, and Alana Wheeler; the communications team comprised of Pablo Basz, Maria Blanco Lora, Janine Chase, Franciois Coutu, Luke Paddington and Laura Raccio; the internal and external readers Carmen de la Cruz, Alfredo Gonzalez, George Ronald, Natasha Leite, Jairo Matalla- na, Gerardo Noto, Stefano Pettinato, Maria Tallarico, Hernando Gómez, Mitchell Seligson and Oscar Yunowsky; the research and finance component with Danielle Brown, Estefania Grijalva, Norma Peña, Querube Mora, Raj Ramnath and Cheryle Tewarie. A special appreciation is also due to Minh Pham (Former UNDP Resident Representative Jamaica), Paula Hidalgo, and Pedro Moreno who provided valuable inputs at onset of the preparation process.

The statistical team from the University of the West Indies was indispensible for the design and implementation of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Another important institutional contributor was the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project (LA- POP) that facilitated access to Caribbean LAPOP survey data and commented instructively on methodology and results.

With the support of UNDP Country Offices and the UNDP Democratic Dialogue Regional Project, a widespread series of consultations was conducted that involved over 450 government officials, policy-makers, opposition members, academic researchers, civil society representatives, and national and international development practitioners. A special effort was also made during these consultations to include representatives of typically underrepresented groups such as youth, women, Maroon communities and other populations facing potential discrimination. All of the participants in these consultations provided vital qualitative data as well as insightful references that were important for consolidating the findings and recommendations of the report. We thank those who acted as chairs and repertoires of the working groups, Mobola Aguda-F, Charles Clayton, Beverly Chase, Gianluca Giuman, Itziar Gonzalez, Lebrechtta Oye Hesse-Bayne, Meri- am Hubard, Gaston Ian, Anna West, Rosemary Lall, Ruben Martoredjo Carol Narcisse, Rachida Norden, Howie Prince, Philip Thomas, Joan Seymour and Stacey Syne.

We specially wish to acknowledge the contributions provided by the following government and non government representatives during the entire preparation process:

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 VII Barbados: Carson Browne, Permanent Secretary Economic Affairs and Team on the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs; George Belle, Dean, F.S.S and Corin Bailey, Research Fellow, University of the West Indies; Rodney Grant, CEO, Wildey Great House; Victor Roach, President National Committee for the Prevention of Alcohol; Cheryl Willoughby, Director, National Task Force on Crime Prevention. Jamaica: Dwight Nelson, Former Minister of National Security; Aubyn Bartlett, Minister of State, Ministry of National Security; Delroy Chuck, Former Minister for Justice; Peter Phillips, Minister of Finance, Planning and Public Services; Senator Oswald Gaskell Harding; Robert Rainford, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Justice; Vivian Brown, Chief Technical Director, Ministry of National Security; Richard Lumsden, Planning Institute of Jamaica; Dianne McIntosh, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Na- tional Security; Gladstone Hutchinson, Director General, PIOJ. Saint Lucia: Issac Anthony, Permanent Secretary, John Calixte, Deputy Permanent Secretary and Team on the Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and National Development; Mary Wilfred, Pro- gramme Officer UNDP-Government of Saint Lucia; Agnes Henry, Assistant Commissioner of Police and Dorian O’Brian, Police Inspector, Royal Saint Lucia Police Force; Hilary Herman, Director, Bordelais Correctional Facility. Suriname: Jennifer Geerlings-Simons, Speaker of the Parliament; Martin Misiedjan, Minister of Jus- tice and Police; Paul Abena, Minister of Youth and Sport Affairs; Robby Ramlakhan, Permanent Secre- tary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ewald Refos, National Champion; Krishna Mathoera, Commissioner of Police; Saskia Wip, Secretary and Raynel Fraser, Member, Suriname National Youth Parliament; Abigail Misdjan, CARICOM Ambassador for Suriname, Ratanlal Kalka, Advisor, Suriname Business Develop- ment Center; Lilian Ferrier, Chair, National Commission for Child Rights. Trinidad and Tobago: Timothy Hamel-Smith, President of the Senate; Bhoendradath Tewarie, Minis- ter of Planning and the Economy; John Sandy, Minister of National Security; Jennifer Boucaud-Blake, Per- manent Secretary, Ministry of National Security; Nizam Baksh, Minister of Community Development; Arlene Mc Comie, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government; Senator Surujrattan Rambachan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Communications; Gary Griffith, Security Adviser to the Prime Minister; Roy Augustus, Adviser to the Minister of National Security; Margaret Farray, Permanent Secretary, Min- istry of Community Development; Margaret Parillon, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Communications; Claire Exeter-De Bourg, Senior International Relations Officer, Multi Lateral Di- vision, MFAC; Petronella Sylvester, Asst. Director, Legal Affairs Unit, Ministry of Justice; Stephen Wil- liams, Deputy Commissioner of Police; Gillian Gellizeau-Gardner, National Security Council Secretariat; Mc Donald Jacob, Deputy Commissioner Police ASP, Crime and problem Analysis Unit (CAPA); Es- ther Best, Director, National Drug Council; Dave Clement and Sean O’Brien, Central Statistical Office (CSO); Wayne Chance, Vision on a Mission (VOM); Jessie-May Ventour, CNMG Television and Radio Producer and Journalist; Anselm Richards, Tobago CSP; Dana Seetahal, President of the T&T Law Asso- ciation; National Champions: Rhoda Reddock, Don La Foucade, Noble Khan, Winston Cooper, Folade Mutota, Richard Ramoutar, Renee Cummings, Robert Torry, and Ira Mathur. Regional organizations: Beverly Reynolds, Programme Manager Sustainable Development, CARI- COM Secretariat; Len Ishmael, Director General and Team on the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Secretariat; Regional Security System representatives: Grantley Watson, Coordinator; Leonard Cabral and Franklyn Daley, Antigua and Barbuda; Yvonne Alexander, Dominica; Franklyn Belgrove and Margaret Astona Browne, Saint Kitts; Jonathan Nicholls, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Brian Parkes, Grenada; Rhea Reid, Central Liaison Office.

A more detailed presentation of the background research, which was commissioned across a broad range of topics and the complete list of participants attending the consultations, are available online in the Caribbean HDR website http://www.regionalcentrelac-undp.org/en/ hdr-caribbean. Finally, we, the regional Caribbean HDR Team, would like to sincerely thank all of those who were involved directly or indirectly in the research and compilation of this report.

We particularly want to express our gratitude to the survey respondents whose number reached more than 11,000 and who generously supplied the responses that serve as the basis for the preparation of this report. The new regional insights provided in this publication are a reflection of the collective investigative effort, while any errors of commission or omission are the sole responsibility of the Report Team. We are all proud to have been instrumental in this pioneering endeavor and hope it will pave the way for many Caribbean Human Development Reports to follow.

VIII CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Contents

Overview 1

Chapter 1 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 13

Introduction 15 The aribbeanC Context 15 Human Development in the Caribbean Community 16 Trends in the Three Basic Dimensions of Human Development 17 The nequality-AdjustedI HDI 17 The Gender Inequality Index 17 Crime Trends since Independence 20 Crime Victimization 27 Determinants of Victimization 27 Domestic Violence and the Victimization of Women 29 Trafficking in Persons 31 Identification of Groups Vulnerable to Victimization 33 Fear of Crime 36 Perceptions of Security and Insecurity 36 Women’s Fear of Crime 39 Conclusion 41

Chapter 2 Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience 43

Introduction 45 Youth Violence and Caribbean Human Development 45 Youth Involvement in Violent Crime 46 The mpactI of Youth Violence on Caribbean Human Development 49 Risk and Vulnerability: Explaining the Patterns of Youth Violence 50 Societal Risks 52 Community and Interpersonal Risks 54 Individual Risks 56 Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience 57 Reducing Risk and Vulnerability 57 Enhancing Youth Resilience 58 Factors Supporting Risk Reduction and Resilience-Building 59 Conclusion 63

Chapter 3 Reducing the Contribution of Street Gangs and Organized Crime to Violence 65

Introduction 67 Scope and Nature of the Problem 68 Prevalence of the Problem 68 The Sex and Age Composition of Caribbean Street Gangs 71 The rganizationalO Characteristics of Street Gangs 72

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 IX The Consequences of Street Gangs and Organized Crime 73 The ausesC of Street Gangs and Organized Crime 79 Community-Level Explanations 79 Individual-Level Explanations 82 Responding to Street Gangs and Organized Crime 83 Suppression 84 The Consequences and Limitations of Suppression 85 The eedN for Intervention and Prevention 87 Conclusion 88

Chapter 4 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 91

Introduction 93 Policing under Colonial Rule: State-Oriented Security 93 Modern-Day Policing: The Citizen Security Approach 94 The oliceP in the Caribbean 95 The apabilityC Challenges 95 The ntegrityI Imperative 96 The Rights-Respecting Imperative 96 Accountability 97 Changing the Relationship with Citizens: Community-Based Police 97 Developing Capacity: Advancing Police Training and Education 99 Regional Cooperation 100 Perceptions on the Police in the Caribbean Region 101 Perceived Police Legitimacy 103 Perceived Police Competence and Performance 105 Willingness of Citizens to Participate and Cooperate with the Police 108 Conclusion 114

Chapter 5 Criminal Justice Systems 115

Introduction 117 Criminal Justice Systems 117 Legal Systems 117 Prosecution and Defence 119 Correctional Systems 119 Statistical Infrastructure 122 Indicators of the Effectiveness of Criminal Justice Systems 122 Case Processing Delays and Backlogs 123 Low Conviction Rates 124 Prison Overcrowding 125 Insufficient Alternatives to Incarceration 126 Opinions on the Effectiveness of Justice Systems 129 Confidence in the Justice Systems 130 Mechanisms to Prevent and Control Crime 131 Accountability 133 Regulating Police Misconduct 133 Regulating Official Corruption 135 Regional Links 136 CARICOM 136 The Caribbean Court of Justice and the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court 137 Regional Bodies Focused on Police, Prosecution, and Corrections 137 Additional Regional Efforts 138 Conclusion 138

X CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Chapter 6 State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations 141

Introduction 143 The olicyP Environment 144 Crime and Insecurity in the Caribbean: The Policy Factor 144 The volutionE of Policy, Deterring Social Violence, and the War on Narco-Trafficking 145 The Shift in Policy Reflected in Budgetary Allocations 146 Explaining the Policy Shift 148 The olicyP Orientation of the Population 152 The olicyP Environment 152 Public Attitudes towards Crime and Punishment 153 The alienceS of Crime in Public Opinion 153 Measure of Punitiveness 154 Social Tolerance and Ideals of Justice 155 Public Opinion on Mechanisms for Preventing and Controlling Crime 157 Balancing Crime Prevention and Crime Control 159 The mplicationsI of Policy Responses 160 State Capacity and Citizen Security 163 Institutional Capacity 163 Building the Human Capacity for Development 164 Youth Unemployment and Social Prevention 167 Conclusion 170

Chapter 7 Conclusions and Recommendations 171

Introduction 173 Conclusions 173 Existing Efforts 173 The Demand for Change 174 Directions for Future Efforts 175 Recommendations 175 Reducing Victimization 176 Reducing Risk and Building Youth Resilience 178 Reducing Gang Violence 181 Transforming the Police 182 Reforming the Justice System 184 Building the Capacity for Evidence-Based Policy 185

Notes 187

References 201

Technical Notes 225

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 XI List of Boxes, Charts, Figures and Tables

Boxes

Box 2.1 A Promising Family Programme: Parental Education, Suriname 59 Box 2.2 A Promising Peer Programme: Peace Ambassadors, Barbados 60 Box 2.3 A Promising State-Community Programme: The Peace Management Initiative, Jamaica 60 Box 3.1 Why Do Caribbean Youth Join Street Gangs? 71 Box 3.2 Do Gangs Have an Impact on the Number of Homicides in Communities? 73 Box 3.3 Deportees, Street Gangs, and Organized Crime in the Caribbean 82 Box 3.4 When Responding to Gangs Makes the Problem Worse 83 Box 3.5 On the Horizon: Caribbean Anti-Gang Legislation 88 Box 4.1 The Example of the Royal Grenada Police Force 95 Box 4.2 Rio de Janeiro: Community Policing in a Context of High Crime Rates 98 Box 4.3 Problem-Solving Partnerships in Suriname 99 Box 4.4 The Co-Production of Security in Nicaragua 99 Box 4.5 Caribbean Regional Police Training Centres 101 Box 6.1 The itizenC Security Programme, Trinidad and Tobago 147 Box 6.2 The Control of Firearms Trafficking in Central America and Neighbouring Countries 151 Box 6.3 Manifesto of the Democratic Labour Party, Barbados, 2008 161 Box 6.4 Inner City Basic Services for the Poor, Jamaica 166 Box 6.5 Special Youth Employment and Training Project, Jamaica 168 Box 6.6 Anti-Corruption: The National Integrity Action Forum, Jamaica 169 Box 7.1 Strengthening the Capacity to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Firearms in the Caribbean 177 Box 7.2 Citizenship Culture in Bogotá 179 Box 7.3 The uvenileJ Violence Prevention Unit of the National Police of Nicaragua 182 Box 7.4 The uvenileJ Liaison Scheme, Barbados 183 Charts

Chart 1.1 Human Development Index, Caribbean-7, 2011 17 Chart 1.2 Trends in HDI and HDI Components, Caribbean-7, 1980–2011 18 Chart 1.3 Sense of Security in the Caribbean-7, 2010 19 Chart 1.4 Homicide Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7,1990–2010 21 Chart 1.5 Firearm-Related Offences Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean Countries, 1990 - 2010 22 Chart 1.6 Robbery Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010 23 Chart 1.7 Burglary and Break-in Rates Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1990 - 2010 24 Chart 1.8 Rates of Rape Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1993–2010 26 Chart 1.9 Self-Reported Criminal Victimization, Caribbean-7, 2010 27 Chart 1.10 Self-Reported Victimization, by Demographic Group, Caribbean-7, 2010 28 Chart 1.11 Gender Differences in Victimization Rates for Specific Types of Crime, 2010 28 Chart 1.12 Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 29 Chart 1.13 Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence, by

XII CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Type and Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 30 Chart 1.14 Fear of Burglary and Robbery, Caribbean-7, 2010 37 Chart 1.15 Weapon-Related Self-Protective Behaviour, Caribbean-7, 2010 38 Chart 1.16 Gender Differences in the Fear of Crime Victimization, by Type of Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010 39 Chart 1.17 Fear of Sexual Assault and Partner Assault, Caribbean-7, 2010 40 Chart 2.1 The ainM Problem in the Country in the View of All Respondents, Caribbean-7, 2010 52 Chart 3.1 Perceptions of the Street Gang Problem, Caribbean-7, 2010 68 Chart 3.2 The irstF Appearance of the Gang Problem in Neighbourhoods, Caribbean-7, 2010 69 Chart 3.3 Neighbourhood Experiences of Gang Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 74 Chart 3.4 Respondents Who Believe Gangs Make Neighbourhoods Safer, Caribbean-7, 2010 76 Chart 3.5 Perceived Confidence in the Ability of the Police to Control Gang Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 85 Chart 4.1 Incidence of Key Topics in Police Training Curricula 100 Chart 4.2 The Role of Perceptions of the Police in Achieving Citizen Security 102 Chart 4.3 People Who Believe Police Treat Citizens with Courtesy, Equality, Fairness and Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010 103 Chart 4.4 People Who Believe Police Respect Their Rights and the Rights of All Citizens, Caribbean-7, 2010 104 Chart 4.5 Victims of Domestic Violence Who Believe Police Treated Them with Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010 105 Chart 4.6 Perceived Confidence in the Police to Control Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010 106 Chart 4.7 Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling Robbery and Burglary, Caribbean-7, 2010 107 Chart 4.8 Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling Domestic Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 107 Chart 4.9 Reporting Crimes to the Police, Caribbean-7, 2010 108 Chart 4.10 Satisfaction with Police after Violent Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 109 Chart 4.11 Satisfaction with Police after Property Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 110 Chart 4.12 Respondents Who Believe the Police Are Competent and Deserve Support, Caribbean-7, 2010 111 Chart 4.13 Respondents Who Believe the Police Need More Personnel and More Resources, Caribbean-7, 2010 112 Chart 4.14 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Violent Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010 113 Chart 4.15 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Age, Caribbean-7, 2010 113 Chart 4.16 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 114 Chart 4.17 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Socio-economic Status, Caribbean-7, 2010 114 Chart 5.1 Respondents Who Rate the Capacity of the Criminal Justice System as Sufficient, Caribbean-7, 2010 129 Chart 5.2 Perception of the Hopelessness of Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010 130 Chart 6.1 Estimates of Government Expenditure on Security, Caribbean-7 148 Chart 6.2 Problems of Insecurity, by Dimension, First Mention

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 XIII (Top of Mind), Caribbean-7, 2010 154 Chart 6.3 Crime as One of the Three Most Serious Problems, Caribbean-7, 2010 154 Chart 6.4 Respondents Who Agree the Military Should Control Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010 157 Chart 6.5 Citizen Support for Institution Building in Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010 159 Chart 6.6 Support for Social Interventions as a Means of Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010 160

Tables

Table 2.1 Youth Population, by Country, Caribbean-7, 2004 46 Table 2.2 Youth Self-Reported Criminal Accusations and Arrests, Caribbean-7, 2010 47 Table 2.3 Youth Victimization, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010 49 Table 2.4 The nnualA Cost of Youth Crime in Four Caribbean Countries 50 Table 2.5 Risk Antecedents and Risk Markers of Youth Violence in the Caribbean Region 51 Table 2.6 The ainM Problem in the Country in the View of Youth, Caribbean-7, 2010 53 Table 2.7 How Should One Resist Violence in Communities? The Point of View of Youth 58 Table 2.8 Analysis of the Context of Youth Violence in the Caribbean 63 Table 3.1 Official Police Estimates of the Population of Street Gangs, Caribbean-7 70 Table 3.2 Victimization and Neighbourhood Gang Presence, Caribbean-7, 2010 75 Table 3.3 Perceptions of Corruption, Caribbean-7, 2010 78 Table 3.4 Mean Levels of Informal Social Control and Community Cohesion with and without Gangs, Caribbean-7, 2010 80 Table 3.5 Mean Levels of Social Cohesion in Communities with and without Gangs, Caribbean-7, 2010 81 Table 3.6 Confidence of Neighbourhood Residents in the Police, Caribbean-7, 2010 86 Table 3.7 Residents Who do Nothing about Crime Because Criminals are too Powerful, Caribbean-7, 2010 87 Table 4.1 Police Strength and Density, Caribbean-7, 2011 95 Table 4.2 Police Accountability Systems, Caribbean-7, 2007 97 Table 5.1 A Statistical Profile of Prison Systems, Caribbean-7 120 Table 5.2 Police Accountability Systems, Caribbean-7 134 Table 5.3 Corruption Perceptions Index, Rankings, Caribbean-7, 2009–2011 135 Table 6.1 The Distribution of Government Budgetary Expenditures on Security 149 Table 6.2 Youth Labour Force Participation Rates, by Gender, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000–2015: History, Estimates and Projections 167

XIV CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Overview Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security

“The advantage of economic growth is not access to tertiary education. There have been that wealth increases happiness, but that it tremendous advances in reducing the levels of increases the range of human choice.”1 These poverty and improving the standard of living words were written in 1955 by Arthur Lewis, of the majority. These advances are reflected a Caribbean scholar and Nobel laureate in eco- in the Human Development Index (HDI) nomics who made an important contribution scores and rankings for these countries. to the development debate and development There have also been advances in politi- policy in the Caribbean and elsewhere. It is a cal development and democratic governance. profoundly people-centred approach to eco- Car-ibbean countries are, with some excep- nomic growth that prefigured the later debates tions, stable democracies with high levels of on human development. If people are generally political participation and low and declining regarded as the centre of the development pro- levels of political violence, which is, in the cess in that their freedom of choice, standard main, associated with electoral cycles. Demo- of living and general welfare are the purpose of cratic stability is evidenced by the repeated development and their participation, creativ- uneventful changes in the political adminis- ity and power in society, the economy and pol- trations in the countries of the region since ity are the primary drivers of these outcomes, independence (with interruptions in Grenada then these truths are important in Caribbean and Suriname).3 This stability in the electoral countries, which are generally characterized system has been accompanied by the progres- by small size and limited natural resources.2 sive consolidation of the rule of law. The re- This meaning of human development, which duction of undue and unlawful political influ- emphasizes freedoms and human choice, ences on law enforcement and the protection is found in the work of the Indian develop- of the independence of the courts have been ment economist Amartya Sen. Human devel- major achievements in political development opment means the enlargement of people’s since the end of the colonial era. freedom to lead lives they value. This revolves Despite these advances, several countries around expanding choices and capabilities. in the region are beset by high rates of violent The history and developmental aspirations of crime and troubling levels of non-criminalized the Caribbean are truly connected with this forms of social violence that are typically di- approach. rected at the members of vulnerable groups Caribbean people now have a vastly wider that historically have been disfavoured and range of choices than they had in the colonial discriminated against.4 If the purpose of devel- era when Arthur Lewis wrote the words quot- opment is to widen human choice, the elevated ed above. There have been significant advanc- rates of violent crime in the Caribbean may be es in human development especially in health taken as evidence of problematic development care and education. Since the 1960s, there paths that leave far too many behind because of have been marked increases in life expectancy rather limited choices and limited life chances. across most of the countries of the Caribbean Much of the crime that is evident in the region and a similarly marked decline in infant mor- is, after all, the outcome of a limited range of tality. There has been a virtual revolution in human choice, that is, the inequalities of op- access to education. Secondary education is portunity that restrict these choices among nearly universal, and there is much greater large sections of the populations of the region.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 1 Within the region, crime may thus rightly be fice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and regarded as a problem that is profoundly de- World Bank (2007), have made invaluable velopmental. contributions to the better understanding of Consistent with this understanding of the the problem, improving policy-making and relationship between crime and development, potentially enhancing the effectiveness of Amartya Sen, in the introduction to the glob- planning and programming in crime preven- al Human Development Report of 2010, The tion and control at the national and regional Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human levels. This HDR attempts to build on these Development, makes the point that, while efforts and to promote an explicitly develop- much has been accomplished on a global scale mental approach to the security of people. since the first Human Development Report This HDR does not aim to replicate or in 1990, “the human development approach to improve on these efforts, but, rather, to is motivationally committed to concentrat- extend them. There are unavoidable overlaps ing on what remains undone—what demands between the HDR and these earlier reports, most attention in the contemporary world— but this HDR reflects a deliberate attempt from poverty and deprivation to inequality to minimize these overlaps. Therefore, this and insecurity.”5 Insecurity is one of the issues HDR does not attempt to explore every as- that demand greater attention in the human pect of the security situation in the region. development process. Insecurity restricts the Thus, for example, the discussion of drug capacity of people to exercise their freedom use and drug-trafficking is somewhat lim- of choice and their autonomy. It reinforces ited, and, related to this, the discussion of inequalities because it mainly affects vul- the transnational activity of organized crime nerable people. It has a negative impact on networks is also limited. Indeed, the discus- economic growth. If insecurity is related to sion of organized crime is largely restricted to elevated rates of violent crime, as it is in the national dimensions and activities and, par- case of the Caribbean, it reflects the limited ticularly, the violence that is generated. This range of choices open to significant sections approach calls greater attention to the inter- of society and the inequalities of opportunity nal roots of the problem and does so without that prevail. Given the strong relationship minimizing the importance of international among crime, insecurity and human develop- cooperation in tackling transnational organ- ment in this region of highly vulnerable small ized crime networks and drug-trafficking. and island micro-states and the importance Similarly, while the UNODC and World of this issue to the people of the region, it is Bank report (2007) focuses on organized most appropriate that the problems of crime crime, the HDR places greater emphasis on and insecurity should demand the attention street gangs and their role in generating vio- of the first Human Development Report on lence. Consistent with the intent to avoid re- the Caribbean. tracing the paths followed by earlier reports, A Time for Action, the report of the West the important issues of white-collar and cor- Indian Commission (1993), was an attempt porate crime, as well as deportee or involun- to address the challenges of Caribbean de- tarily returned migrants, are also excluded.6 velopment in a comprehensive way. Written The focus on violence and the responses or in 1993, the report only briefly discussed the incapacity to respond effectively to violence problem of insecurity, through a focus on ille- is a central concern of the report. gal drugs. The decade of the 1990s was, however, a period in which the issue of insecu- The Caribbean rity became more problematic in the region. Subsequent regional reports, including the This is the first HDR on the Caribbean re- reports of the Task Force on Crime and Se- gion. The Caribbean is diverse. It consists of curity of the Caribbean Community (CARI- several subgroupings that may be categorized COM 2002) and of the United Nations Of- in different ways. It may be subdivided by

2 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 geographical features into the mainland African descent. Barbados has a numerically Caribbean and the insula (island) Caribbean significant—at 3 percent—and economically and by linguistic groups into the Dutch- powerful white racial minority. There are other speaking, English-speaking, Francophone, minority groups, including Amerindians, who and Hispanic Caribbean. constitute 9 and 2 percent of the population in The Caribbean is largely made up of so- Guyana and Suriname, respectively.9 People of cieties that are young in historical terms. Ex- Chinese origin are also present and have made cept for Haiti, the Dominican Republic and invaluable contributions to the development of Cuba, which became independent in 1804, the countries of the region. 1821 and 1902, respectively, Caribbean so- Differences in levels of development are cieties have only emerged as independent captured in the distinction between those nations in the last 50 years, and some still re- states that are classified as more developed main dependencies of European powers.7 In countries (MDCs) and those that are clas- the case of the English-speaking Caribbean sified as less developed countries (LDCs).10 countries that attained their independence This distinction is being erased by the higher between 1962 and 1983, the sense of national growth rates and HDI scores of the LDCs identity that emerged during the latter part of and former LDCs. The MDCs are typically the colonial era has not yet become consoli- small states, while the LDCs are typically mi- dated into a source of social cohesion. cro-states. The size of the populations of the These countries are also characterized by micro-states falls within a range of less than considerable variation in their basic demo- 40,000 in Saint Kitts and Nevis to almost graphic features, levels of development and 173,000 in Saint Lucia. These states have lim- state capacities. Caribbean populations are ited capacities. Among them, regionalism is young, and, in several countries, most per- thus treated as a problem-solving device. sons now live in urban areas. In the seven Historically, the countries of the region countries selected as the research sites for this have been producers of primary products for report (the Caribbean-7), the proportion of export. This pattern left legacies of inequal- persons below the age of 25 years ranges from ity that have since been eroded by changes in a high of 54 percent in Guyana to a low of economies, greater access to education and 36 percent in Barbados, with the correspond- high rates of social mobility. But, in some Car- ing population proportion for this group of ibbean cities, particularly those in the larger countries is 46 percent.8 The populations of territories, there are substantial populations the region are diverse. Cultural differences of excluded poor. In contexts of rapid social are expressed in the wide range of languages change and socially dislocating modernizing and religions. Christianity is the dominant processes, high levels of inequality and the religion, but there are significant proportions multiple deprivations that are associated with of Hindus and Muslims in Suriname, Trini- social exclusion tend to be strongly correlated dad and Tobago, and Guyana. In Trinidad with criminal violence. and Tobago, 23 percent of the population are The countries of the region have tried Hindus, and 6 percent are Muslims, and, in to increase their viability and reduce their Guyana, the corresponding proportions are vulnerabilities via regional integration. The 28 and 7 percent. Racial, colour and ethnic Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the diversity are variously configured within the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM), and the region. For example, in Guyana and Trinidad Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and Tobago, no racial group enjoys majority (OECS) are expressions of these efforts. status. The major racial groups are persons of CARICOM has a membership of 15 states. East Indian origin, at 44 and 40 percent, respec- CARIFORUM is simply CARICOM, plus tively, and persons of African origin, at 30 and the Dominican Republic. It was expected 38 percent, respectively. Other societies such to be a bridge to the Dutch-, French-, and as Jamaica and Antigua are of predominantly Spanish-speaking countries of the Caribbean.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 3 OECS is a subset of more closely integrated Seven countries within these two groups CARICOM states. Earlier attempts at po- have been selected as the research sites for this litical integration were not successful, and the report (the Caribbean-7). These countries are West Indies Federation, which was the archi- Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Ja- tecture for political integration, collapsed in maica, Saint Lucia, Suriname, and Trinidad 1961 before the first set of Caribbean coun- and Tobago. The report clearly focuses on the tries became independent. The movement for English-speaking group. These seven countries Caribbean integration now focuses on func- have been selected in a manner that accounts tional cooperation, economic integration, for geographical spread, population size, and the coordination of foreign policy, and, most the variations in the degree and character of recently, regional security cooperation and the problem of insecurity. They have been se- rationalization. These are the four pillars of lected with variation in mind. They represent the integration movement. CARICOM has a the geographical dispersion of the group in fairly elaborate structure. At the apex of this that they include countries in the northern structure is the Conference of Heads of Gov- Caribbean (Jamaica), the south Caribbean ernment. The regional security establishment (Trinidad and Tobago) and the east Caribbean includes the Council of National Security and (Saint Lucia). There are island territories (Bar- Law Enforcement (CONSLE). At the level of bados) and mainland territories (Guyana). the civil service, there are several committees There is variation in the size, including micro- consisting of heads of law enforcement and states (Saint Lucia and Antigua and Barbuda) military, customs and migration officials and and small states (Jamaica and Trinidad and other representatives of security and law en- Tobago). And there is variation in the levels forcement agencies. The operational arm of of development through the representation of the security establishment is the Implemen- LDCs and MDCs. The selected countries also tation Agency for Crime and Security (IM- represent the differences and range of varia- PACS), which, as its name suggests, coordi- tion in the level, structure and intensity of the nates the implementation of regional security crime and insecurity problems in the region. policies. IMPACS was established after the Barbados, for example, shows a high level of completion of the work of the CARICOM property crimes, but a relatively low level of Task Force on Crime and Security, which violent crimes. Jamaica is the opposite. Among identified a number of priorities and made the English-speaking countries, the countries several recommendations to the Conference selected approximate a maximum variation of Heads of Government, most of which re- sample. Suriname represents the Dutch-speak- main relevant.11 ing territories. It is the only unambiguously independent Dutch-speaking territory. In this The Selection of Countries sense, it is self-selecting. We emphasize variation to capture the range of problems and ex- The scope of this report is limited to the Dutch- periences and thereby enrich the analysis and speaking and English-speaking countries. The the proposed solutions to the problems. This selection of these two subregions is based on approach, we hope, will make the report rel- the understanding that insecurity has become evant and useful for all. a serious problem in these two groupings, but As a regional HDR, the report and the particularly in the English-speaking Caribbean. process associated with it present an oppor- In addition, systematic work aimed at a better tunity for the people of the region to learn understanding of the issues on a truly regional more about each other and to learn from each scale has been somewhat limited. Moreover, other. Learning more about each other is im- there has not been a regional HDR for these perative given the CARICOM and CARI- groups of countries previously, and there have FORUM integration frameworks and the been only a few HDRs on the individual impact of the forces of globalization. There countries within these two subgroupings.12 is increasingly intensive contact among the

4 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 peoples of the region. Because of increased may be a condition for development, but de- integration, there is more interdependence, velopment is also a condition for lower rates shared vulnerabilities and greater risks and of violent crime and more secure societies. opportunities. Learning about each other It is well known that growth is not equat- smashes ster-eotypes and reduces fear and ed with development. But the relationship the treatment of neighbouring citizens as between crime and growth may serve to illu- threats. Learning from each other involves minate the relationship of growth to develop- making accessible the positive and negative ment. experiences of the different countries of the The joint report of UNODC and the region, thereby enhancing collective learn- World Bank, Crime, Violence and Develop- ing from this larger pool of experience. Given ment: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the the dynamism and complexity of the crime Caribbean, presents evidence in support of and security problems and the importance the claim that, on average, increased economic of finding solutions to these problems for growth is associated with reduced crime rates.16 the people of the region, this ought to be a Economic growth increases opportuni- focal point for shared learning. Thus, in this ties. It may, however, also intensify inequali- report, promising practices are drawn from ties and exclusionary trends, and, in the several countries. This approach is extended rapidly changing societies of the Caribbean beyond the region to draw on some of the ex- region, it may also trigger unrealistic expecta- periences of Central America and other parts tions and have strong mobilizing effects even of the hemisphere. among the excluded. Exclusionary and jobless growth and, especially, high rates of youth un- Crime and Development in employment, coupled with unrealistic expec- the Caribbean tations and high levels of inequality, tend to result in high rates of crime, including violent The negative impact of crime on devel- crime. Particular countries may thus deviate opment in its various aspects is well docu- from the general pattern or average effect of mented. Crime, particularly violent crime, the impact of growth rates on crime rates or tends to have a negative impact on vulnerable crime patterns. The relationship is policy and economies such as those of the Caribbean. It context sensitive. High rates of violent crime erodes confidence in the future development and gender violence may be regarded as the of countries, reduces the competitiveness of outcome of a wrong approach to develop- existing industries and services by, for exam- ment that marginalizes large sections of the ple, imposing burdensome security costs, and population. may negatively alter the investment climate. Where crime, particularly violent crime, 13 Capital may take flight. Crime may gener- has become a major social problem, it has had ate insecurities among the general population feedback effects that retard the development that lead to loss of human capital via migra- process in the economic, social and even po- tion, that is, the loss of skilled and educated litical dimensions. citizens. People may take flight. The qual- The effects of crime on some of the econo- ity of education and health care suffer be- mies of the region have been documented. As cause of the diversion of scarce resources to suggested above, the effects extend beyond the control of crime. Crime destroys social the economy. In the more socially fragmented capital and thereby retards the development societies of the region, the victimization of 14 process. This negative effect of crime on de- members of one group by members of an- velopment represents an argument for more other group may have the effect of deepening effective crime prevention and control and race, class and gender divisions. For example, improved citizen security as a condition for if crime becomes racially motivated or other- 15 development. In the context of the Carib- wise associated with race, this may trigger race bean, effective crime prevention and control mobilization, which intensifies political con-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 5 flicts, thereby generating even greater inse- free movement is vital to the integration pro- curity. In such situations, it becomes exceed- cess and to development in the region. ingly difficult to achieve consensus policies The approach to crime control that re- for crime prevention and control that would gards it as a trade-off with freedom and rights permit greater community-level cooperation is but an expression of a broader attitude to- and avoid cross-pressures on law enforcement wards the place of the ordinary citizen in the and other state agencies that tend to make larger development process. Freedoms and these agencies ineffective in policy implemen- rights may be seen as threatening to the de- tation. Crime control and prevention policies velopment process, which, it is felt, requires thus become the policies of particular politi- a disciplined focus on economic growth and cal administrations rather than truly national capital accumulation. As in matters of crime policies. control and security, where freedom may be High levels of violent crime may have seen as an obstacle rather than as foundation- other negative political effects. These effects al to the security of citizens, so too in matters may include the amplification of already ex- of economic development: freedom may be isting authoritarian tendencies among citi- seen as an obstacle to development (at least zens that take the form of demands for greater in its early stages) rather than as constitutive punitiveness, support for laws that reduce the of development.18 rights of citizens and give greater power to the Given the effects described above, the police, and, more recently, significant support concern regarding the development strate- for military regimes as a means of managing gies of some countries of the region, partic- more effectively the problems of insecurity.17 ularly in the 1960s to 1980s, was that these These tendencies influence national policies, strategies were exclusionary and thus under- and it is the poor and the most vulnerable estimated the importance, in the develop- whose freedoms are most affected by crime ment process, of social integration and hu- and whose rights are most restricted by crime man creativity. The pattern of concentration control measures. At the national level, if of violent crimes in the communities of the crime is responded to or fought in ways that urban poor that is described in this report is reduce fundamental rights, then political de- evidence of the association of crime with ex- velopment may be arrested and notions of cit- clusionary processes that have long histories izenship may become problematic. Security and that have found much contemporary policies that unnecessarily restrict the rights reinforcement. In troubled countries, a vi- and freedoms of people tend to restrict politi- cious cycle has been set in motion, thereby cal development. making crime control and prevention more At the regional level, there is a reproduc- difficult. tion of this problem if citizens of the countries This vicious cycle of unbalanced develop- of the region who seek opportunities else- ment that generates high levels of crime and where or who, in various ways, conduct busi- insecurity that, in turn, impede development ness or simply wish to travel within the region may be avoided. Where this vicious cycle ex- are subjected to indignities and disrespectful ists, it may be transformed into a virtuous cir- treatment by border control agents. These cle. Balanced development reduces and pre- activities find their justification in narratives vents the emergence of crime as a major social that seek to tie links among freedom of move- problem. Sound crime reduction and preven- ment, the migration of poverty and a crime tion facilitate the achievement of develop- contagion. If crime and violent behaviour are ment goals. In the words of Helen Clark, the externalized in this way, then unwarranted Administrator of the UNDP, “If we fail to restriction on movement within the region is reduce [the] levels of armed violence in af- the likely outcome. Yet, given the small size of fected countries, our collective commitment the countries and the corresponding limited to MDG targets is not only under threat; but pools of human capital in any one country, indeed progress is likely to be reversed.”19

6 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 There is considerable variation in the pop- the national and regional levels. Such shifts ulation size, land area and natural resources of in thinking are most likely to first occur and the countries of the Caribbean, but they are, take effect as policy if there is an inclusive and in the main, small island developing states deliberative approach to policy-making based (SIDSs). They rely on state institutions to on an active citizenry and open and account- respond to the security challenges they face. able government and if the welfare and rights These countries, however, cannot afford to of the citizen are at the centre of security spend large proportions of their budgets to considerations and the citizen is regarded as strengthen law enforcement machinery. They a critical actor in the co-production of secu- must invest in the prevention of crime, in the rity. This report hopes to make a contribution capabilities of their people and in the creation to this process of change and innovation, not of opportunities. least by documenting and highlighting some The degree, intensity and character of the of the good practices that may be observed in problems of crime and insecurity vary from the region. country to country. The capacities of the state institutions that are charged with the respon- Citizen Security: a Shift in Ideas sibility to protect the populations they serve and to ensure justice are also quite different We believe that the required shift in thinking within the region. Regardless of these differ- is reflected in the idea of citizen security. Citi- ences, however, crime and insecurity have be- zen security may be regarded as a dimension come more generalized Caribbean problems. of human security. The more overarching con- Crime, violence and insecurity demand our struct, human security, “is based on a funda- attention. mental understanding that Governments re- The problem is acute and in need of urgent tain the primary role for ensuring the survival, action. A sense of urgency usually inspires livelihood and dignity of their citizens.”20 policies that are intended to yield short-term Human security articulates a core set of con- results and therefore are usually restricted to cerns, including safety for people from both more punitive measures, more robust law en- violent and non-violent threats and safety forcement action, and assigning more power from both state and non-state actors. It refers to the police, typically without the commen- to “one of the means or conditions for human surate systems of accountability. The chal- development, which in turn is defined as the lenge behind this report is to discover ways to process that opens up an individual’s options address crime as a fundamental development . . . [which] range from enjoying a long and issue without ignoring the pressing short- healthy life, access to the knowledge and re- term aspects of crime. The challenge is to sources needed to achieve a decent standard meet the requirements of urgency, effective- of living, to enjoyment of political, economic ness and justice without neglecting the root and social freedoms.”21 In this construct, citi- socio-economic causes of the problem. zen security is strictly a dimension of human It may reasonably be claimed that HDRs security because it is conceived as the social have helped shift the debate on development situation in which all persons are free to enjoy and that this shift has had some impact on their fundamental rights and in which public public policy and, consequently, on the con- institutions have sufficient capacity, against a ditions of the lives of people in the region. A backdrop of the rule of law, to guarantee the similar shift in thinking is needed in security exercise of those rights and respond efficiently 22 and crime control policy-making. Shifts in ways when those rights are violated. of thinking and acting on this scale are usu- Thus, the citizenry is the principal focus of ally the outcome of slow processes that may the state’s protection. It is a necessary, but not take place in many different sites of innova- sufficient condition ofhuman development. tion in crime reduction and prevention both Therefore, institutional interventions to pre- within the state and non-state sectors and at vent and control violence and crime (citizen

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 7 security policies) can be regarded as an indi- of others and acknowledging their responsi- rect, but, nonetheless, significant opportu- bility towards their fellow citizens. Security nity, first, to buttress sustainable economic and human progress entail a commitment to development and, second, to strengthen good citizenship. The capacity of responsible democratic governance and the observance of state institutions, however, remains central to human rights.23 the effective protection of the citizen. The concept of ‘citizen security’ is associated with security against the threat of Institutions crime or violence and is used to refer to the Strong and legitimate institutions and inclusive paramount security of individuals and social systems of governance are crucial to providing groups. It does not stand in opposition to the citizen security and justice so as to break cycles preservation of the territorial integrity of the of violence.25 In the Caribbean, the law enforce- state. Citizen security includes institutional ment and justice systems tend to be weak and and social actions to protect and guarantee have a limited capacity to provide the effective effective liberties and the rights of people protection of citizens. Thus, while building the through the control and prevention of crime capacity of state institutions, it is necessary to and disorder. transform the relationship between these insti- In addition, the “concept of citizen securi- tutions and the people so that, in the case of the ty involves those rights to which all members provision of security services and the adminis- of a society are entitled, so that they are able tration of justice, this is done with the people, to live their daily lives with as little threat as not only for the people. This is the option of possible to their personal security, their civic transitioning to citizen security, that is, a pro- rights and their right to the use and enjoy- foundly democratic approach to security. This ment of their property.”24 This conceptual- approach is even more important for the endur- ization entails the idea that the state has an ing stability of weak and vulnerable states such obligation to protect the citizen and to do so as those in the region. In this context, the term in ways that respect rights. These ideas have citizen security is not used to carry the idea of universal appeal and are particularly relevant pushing back or pushing out the state. Rather, it in the Caribbean. involves democratizing the state so that it better Elements essential to increasing citizen serves and protects the people. In its most devel- security in the Caribbean context therefore oped expression, it entails the co-production of include the reform of state institutions to security by state and citizen. As a co-producer make them more effective and ensure they re- of security, the citizen has a duty to respect the spect rights, the creation of avenues for citizen rights, physical integrity and dignity of others. participation and the development of pro- Traditional approaches to security in situa- grammes geared towards decreasing poverty tions where the capacity of the state to pro- and inequality, including gender and race or tect and ensure adequate access to justice is ethnic inequality, thereby increasing social in- doubtful may lead to external dependency and tegration. a renunciation of democratic processes and The idea of citizen security also places re- practices. Just as there can be jobless, voice- sponsibilities on the citizens. They are expect- less and rootless growth, there can be voiceless ed to participate actively in the co-produc- security, that is, a paternalistic state security tion of their security in partnership with state system whereby the state is not accountable to agencies. This means citizens must actively its citizens and, worse, whereby authoritarian engage in problem-solving in their communi- tendencies are strengthened in the state secu- ties and in demanding greater accountability rity establishment, the political administration among state agencies, including the police and among sections of the population. There and courts. It means taking greater respon- can also be a rights-less security whereby popu- sibility for their own security and their own lations are told that they must constantly give behaviour, respecting the rights and integrity up their rights as a trade-off for the more effec-

8 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 The time to act tive provision of security by the state. Through rity is most effective if states are responsive is now. The trajectory of these old patterns, security is set in opposition and accountable and are willing to integrate to any notion of political development that is crime prevention into larger development violence can be grounded in democratic principles of voice, planning and if citizens are aware of their civic interrupted, and participation and accountability. duties and rights and are engaged in the co- insecurity can be production of their own security. Social Prevention diminished. This A transition to citizen security means not only The Messages of the Report has been achieved institutional reform, but also a focus on the elsewhere and can reduction of social risks, that is, social crime The central message of this report is simple prevention. This assures a stable and sus- enough: the Caribbean countries need to be achieved in the tained security that does not rest primarily on complete the shift from an approach to secu- countries of the region. police action and the imposition of discipline rity that is centrally concerned with regime by the state and therefore does not constantly protection to the full adoption of a citizen se- seek to trade away the rights and freedoms curity approach that is consistently pursued in of security among citizens. Social crime pre- the context of human development. Caribbe- vention means ending marginalization and an countries have a long history of inequality more effectively integrating excluded sections and discrimination. The inequality includes of the population. The improved social inte- inequalities of social power that find expres- gration of society increases the potential for sion in the unbalanced distribution of state greater resilience and better state-society rela- protection and the inequitable treatment of tions, which may result in greater voluntary rights and freedoms. This historical pattern compliance with the law. This focus on social still affects the distribution of the protective crime prevention means paying attention to resources of the state and the way in which the the social conditions that are most associated rights of different groups, including the most with crime and creating greater opportunities vulnerable, are treated. Citizen security is cen- and choices for people, which does not neces- tred on profoundly changing this relationship sarily mean one must design expensive inter- between the state and the citizenry by making vention programmes in skills training and job institutions more responsive and accountable creation. The root causes of violent crimes, to the people they serve. Such a fundamen- especially youth crimes and delinquency, in- tal change entails greater social integration, clude less tangible factors that account for the which may be brought about by seeking to alienation and sense of exclusion among these resolve the problems of social exclusion and population groups. Paying attention to the marginalization among large sections of the root causes therefore also means treating peo- populations—including state security prac- ple with respect, positively protecting their tices that do not respect rights and unneces- rights, and promoting common integrative sarily stigmatize and criminalize—and by a identities that bridge race, colour, ethnicity, greater emphasis on human development. class, gender and other social divides, thereby These ideas may be simple, but they are hugely promoting a common sense of belonging and significant in the everyday lives of the people a common national and regional purpose. of the region. The survey which was conducted as a part of The main messages of this report are as follows: this project—the UNDP Citizen Security • First, with the right mix of policies, high Survey 2010—found majority support for levels of violence can be successfully turned this approach in every country. The adoption around. There are many useful and instruc- of programmes of social crime prevention is, tive cases of countries that have been able therefore, not a politically risky policy. to make considerable improvements in In summary, citizen security ought to have their security situations, while reducing the social prevention, citizen rights, and state in- levels of violence and insecurity. Some of stitutional reform dimensions. Citizen secu- these experiences are included in the vari-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 9 ous chapters of this report. There are also and responsive are likely to be more effec- valuable and instructive Caribbean experi- tive. ences at the country and community levels. • Fifth, there is considerable popular sup- Barbados, for example, has avoided high port for social crime prevention. Carib- levels of criminal and political violence. bean populations, including in the most Targeted prevention programmes, espe- crime-affected countries, tend to have a cially those that are directed at youth, the strong sense of social justice that informs greater responsiveness and accountability their thinking about crime prevention and of state agencies, national unity, and high crime reduction policies. Public policies levels of citizen participation all contrib- that are oriented towards social justice are ute to effective outcomes. The practices therefore likely to be consensus policies. and lessons of some of these experiences Considerable evidence in support of this may be helpful for other countries and are conclusion is presented in this report. discussed in the report. • Sixth, empowering young people by invest- • Second, gender-based violence (GBV) can ing in their development should be a prior- be controlled and prevented by interventions ity. Most Caribbean countries have young that interrupt the cycle of violence. Some populations. There are large populations forms of GBV, particularly domestic vio- of youth at risk, some of whom may drift lence, tend to show histories and patterns into self-destructive anti-social behaviour. of abusive behaviour that may be disrupted It follows that investments in youth and, in their early stages before they degenerate more specifically, investments in youth at into life-threatening and life-taking physi- risk or detached youth are likely to yield cal violence. This requires investments significant returns in terms of reductions in aimed at developing the capabilities of the violence and crime and greater citizen secu- responsible institutions of the state. rity. Because violent crime is a drag on de- • Third, social cohesion is generally greater in velopment, investments in the prevention communities that have no street gangs and of youth violence may, in turn, yield good less in communities that have street gangs. results in human development. Street gangs are major contributors to the • Seventh, opportunities matter. This is why high rates of violence. This message should the importance of social crime prevention instruct policy. Social cohesion is promot- is underscored, but a sense of belonging, ed by socially integrative policies that give participating in political and community people, particularly young people, a sense life, being respected by others, and having of being valued and belonging to the com- one’s rights respected matter equally; in the munity and the country regardless of eth- case of young people, they may matter even nicity, gender, class, or other differences. more. Improving security therefore does not • Fourth, security efforts are more effective if involve only the design and implementation the rights of the people are respected and the of costly programmes. It requires adequate people are involved as active agents and co- regard for the intangibles associated with producers of their own security. If they are to how people are treated and with greater so- be effective, the policy-making and policy- cial integration and cohesion. implementation processes and the state • Eighth, crime and insecurity are costly to long- institutions that are responsible for pub- term development. Successfully meeting the lic safety and the security of citizens must security challenges of the moment requires have the confidence of the people. Confi- the consistent adoption of a citizen security dence rests on respect for rights and adher- approach. The time to act is now. The tra- ence to the principles of good governance, jectory of violence can be interrupted, and including accountability, transparency and insecurity can be diminished. This has been participation. Processes that are open and achieved elsewhere and can be achieved in participatory and institutions that are fair the countries of the region.

10 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 The Process of Producing the Report was developed. The objective of this sample design was to attain the highest level of rep- The HDR Process resentativeness and distribution among the The process of producing the report may be selected sampling units and, in turn, the re- divided into two basic stages. During the first spondents of the survey.27 stage, monographs on the situation in the The report also relies on secondary data Caribbean-7 countries selected for participa- taken from official sources in the Caribbean-7. tion in the HDR process were prepared, al- It is well known that reported crime rates do beit with considerable limitations in the not usually approximate true crime rates. The availability of comparable data. During the proximity of the reported crime rate to the second stage, an analysis of the regional situ- true crime rate usually varies with the serious- ation was conducted, and the regional HDR ness of the type of crime. Thus, for example, was produced. The national processes and the in most jurisdictions, the reported homicide seven national monographs fed into the sec- rate may be assumed to approximate closely ond stage of the process. the true homicide rate. For those types of crimes on which the reported rates are high Methodological Issues across jurisdictions, valid comparisons within Evidence-based policy and programme design and across countries may be made. At the requires rigorous analysis of the problems to other end of the spectrum, the proportions of be addressed. This HDR relies heavily on property crimes that are reported will tend to primary data gathered through the UNDP be much lower and will tend to vary consid- Citizen Security Survey 2010.26 Extensive use erably across jurisdictions. This makes cross- is also made of secondary sources, including national comparisons somewhat problematic. official statistics on reported crimes, although However, if within any given country, the this was limited by the absence of comparable proportion of each crime that is reported is data on all countries. For example, data on stable over time, then trend analyses may be the caseloads of courts, the caseloads of police meaningful. investigators and other indicators of the ca- Some of the factors that may affect pacities and capabilities of institutions of the changes in the proportion of crimes that are criminal justice systems of the countries of reported to police services include the level the region are not uniformly available across of confidence in the police and other institu- all countries. tions of the justice system and patterns of in- The UNDP Citizen Security Survey surance coverage. Under normal conditions, 2010 was administered in the Caribbean-7, these factors tend to change rather slowly. which are named in the section on Selection Trends may thus be compared and contrasted of Countries. Some 11,155 resident citizens across countries even though the official sta- of the Caribbean-7 were randomly selected tistics may not represent true crime rates and and interviewed. The target population of the proportion of reported crimes may differ the survey was households with at least one across countries. person older than 18 years of age and residing Another obstacle to comparative analyses permanently in the household. of official crime statistics is the differences The sample for the survey was designed in legal definitions of various crimes. These to reflect the key demographic characteristics definitional differences may be found in the of the adult population of the participating Caribbean. This problem has been minimized countries based on the results of the most by selecting for comparative analysis only recent population censuses. For each coun- those crimes that are legally defined in similar try, the sample was self-weighted by regional fashion across the Caribbean-7 jurisdictions, and gender distribution and configured to such as murder and homicide, and those be representative of the target population. A crimes that are amenable to reconstituted op- multi-stage, stratified area probability sample erational definitions, such as burglary. Where

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 11 particular categories of crimes have been re- cross-check and flesh out the findings derived constituted to make them comparable, these from the data generated during the survey ac- changes are noted in the text. cording to the experiences of the participants in the consultative process. Consultations: Participation Matters Participation is an important principle. The process of producing the report has in- It ensures good recommendations that are volved extensive and intensive consultations grounded in the evidence generated by the with experts, practitioners and a variety of in- research process, as well as the experience of stitutional actors and interested parties across practitioners. Good recommendations are the region. There were three iterations of na- not simply bright new ideas. They are ideas tional consultations in Barbados, Jamaica, that are effective in the particular national Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago and few- environment and that sufficiently animate er, but similarly targeted consultations during people and motivate them to invest their time bilateral meetings in Antigua and Barbuda and energy in implementation. The best re- and in Saint Lucia. Some 194 persons, includ- sults are achieved if rigorous research is coming government officials and representatives of bined with efforts to tap into the experiences civil society, experts and practitioners, actively of practitioners and stakeholders. participated in this process. Five regional con- This requires the active participation of sultations were also held in Paramaribo, Suri- practitioners and stakeholders. The commit- name; Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago; ment to participation is grounded in con- Bridgetown, Barbados; Castries, Saint Lucia; fidence in the knowledge that people may and Kingstown, Jamaica between 1 and 20 contribute and the belief that people’s actions September, 2011 and involving 256 persons, make a difference in determining outcomes. including members of regional organizations For this HDR, the participatory process is ex- such as the Regional Security System and pected to be ongoing and may be even more CARICOM. The consultations were devel- fruitful after the report has been published. oped using the democratic dialogue method- The process initiated by the report will, hope- ology, and they provided the opportunity to fully, be more important than the report itself.

12 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 CHAPTER Crime Trends since Independence 1 and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups Proactive, pre-emptive policies need to target at-risk groups, eradicating violence before it starts

It’s not culture; it’s crime: no form of gender-based violence should be tolerated

Rejection by the mainstream breeds mischief on the margins Crime Trends since Independence and

CHAPTER the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 1 1

Introduction must bear some of the responsibility for these disappointing results. Better management of This chapter examines crime trends since in- the transition from independence might have dependence and locates these trends in the produced more positive outcomes among context of the development challenges faced populations. by Caribbean countries during this period. It For instance, governmental policy for eco- identifies aspects of citizen insecurity in the nomic development was based on direct for- region and shows how feelings of insecurity eign investment in key sectors of the region’s have shaped public attitudes about the effec- economies. When strains emerged soon after tiveness of Caribbean governments in fight- independence, evident in the resentment felt ing crime. about foreign ownership, enclave economic The chapter first reviews and describes -im growth, limited economic diversification, portant developments in crime in the region high unemployment and rising social discon- since independence. It then discusses the tent, these were not adequately addressed in victimization reported by the participants in creative and positive ways. Indeed, the current Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 for economic and social predicament facing the this Caribbean Human Development Report region demands innovative leadership and (HDR), followed by an examination of the sound long-term development strategies. fears about crime or the anxieties related to Thus, the region’s development and, by ex- the perceived risk of victimization that these tension, the peoples’ quality of life have been people experience and the protective steps affected by a range of negative factors. Eco- they have taken. At several points, the discus- nomically, except for Guyana’s agricultural sion focuses on the experiences and concerns sector and Trinidad and Tobago’s extractive of vulnerable groups. sector, the light industries and services that once sustained the region have struggled. The The Caribbean Context region now relies heavily on travel and tourism for economic wealth and job creation. Although the achievement of national inde- The World Travel and Tourism Council ranks pendence is supposed to signal a promising the Caribbean region first (among 12 re- moment in the path towards development, gions) in the relative contribution of tourism the optimism with which countries in the to the regional economy and the most tour- region engaged in their independence was ist-dependent area in the world. Tourism ac- soon challenged by economic, political and counts for 25 percent of the foreign exchange social factors that had foundations in the earnings, 20 percent of all jobs, and between colonial past. The legacy of deep social prob- 25 and 35 percent of the total economy of lems, such as high levels of income inequal- the Caribbean.1 The region’s heavy depend- ity and inequality of opportunity, including ence on tourism creates vulnerabilities, such gender inequality, high rates of unemploy- as the emergence of sex tourism, which ex- ment, high rates of rural and urban poverty, ploits young women and children. Tourism is and communities with histories of social ex- highly vulnerable to developments in source clusion, has continued to exert an influence countries such as tax regimes and changes in until today. Post-independence governments the business cycle in these countries, as well

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 15 as the effects of climate change, including the estimated since 1990 for most countries in 1 loss of shore-line and more extreme weather the world. However, a complete 1990–2011 conditions. It is also vulnerable to the effects HDI series has been calculated for only three of high rates of violence. Persistently high countries among the Dutch-speaking and rates of violence in a single country or group English-speaking countries in the Caribbean, of countries have the potential to damage the while, for many others, especially small island reputations of all the countries of a region. developing states (SIDSs), the HDI was esti- This is truly a regional issue and a regional mated for the first time only in 2010–2011.3 vulnerability. This represents a challenge in looking at HDI Politically, the region underwent dra- trends in the region. matic changes in response to powerful shifts The HDIs for the seven Caribbean coun- in global and local values that began in the tries selected as the research sites for this re- 1960s with the Black Power Movement and port (the Caribbean-7) are presented in chart continued into the 1970s with other social 1.1. The HDI for Barbados for 2011 is 0.793, movements that were inspired by grass-roots positioning the country in the very high hu- advocacy for social justice and social change. man development category and a rank of 47 The outcome was a shift to the left by some among 187 countries and territories. For the states, such as Guyana, which adopted co- rest of the countries, with the exception of operative socialism under Forbes Burnham, Suriname and Guyana, the HDI ranges be- and Jamaica, which turned to democratic tween 0.764 and 0.723, positioning these in socialism under Michael Manley. During the the high human development category. Suri- 1970s, the ideas associated with these social name and Guyana, with HDIs of 0.680 and Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups movements became, for a time, part of the 0.633, respectively, are in the medium human political mainstream and profoundly influ- development category. Among the Carib- enced the development policies of govern- bean-7, only Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, ments in the region. and Trinidad and Tobago have HDIs higher In one of the outcomes, social sensibili- than the HDI for the Latin America and Car- ties and public attitudes towards restraining ibbean (LAC) region (0.731). moral values underwent dramatic changes To reflect more closely the specific charac- beginning in the early 1970s. As the growing teristics of the Dutch-speaking and English- population of young people became more as- speaking countries, we have estimated a 2011 sertive, claims for individual empowerment aggregated HDI that covers all CARICOM and more open opportunity structures, espe- countries for which data are available.4 This cially wider access to education, created great- represents the first attempt to estimate such er pressure for social reform. This is reflected an HDI. The 2011 CARICOM estimated in the comparatively better performance of HDI is 0.564, which is considerably lower the countries of the Caribbean Community than the 2011 LAC HDI. Since the HDI is (CARICOM) on international indicators a population-weighted index, the low value such as the Human Development Index of the CARICOM HDI may be explained by (HDI) and their ranking as middle-income the impact of Haiti, given the proportion of countries.2 the CARICOM population accounted for by Haiti (nearly 60 percent) in 2011. If the CAR- Human Development in ICOM HDI is estimated without including the Caribbean Community Haiti, the value shifts upwards (0.724), which Human development measures rely on the better approximates the reality of the Dutch- HDI, which is a summary measure for as- speaking and English-speaking countries and sessing long-term progress in three basic is closer to the LAC HDI (0.731). dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. The HDI has been

16 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Chart 1.1 Human Development Index, Caribbean-7, 2011 1

0.800 0.793 0.764 0.760 0.750 0.727 0.723 0.731 LAC HDI 0.700 0.680 0.650 0.633

0.600 0.564 0.550 CARICOM HDI 0.500

0.450

0.400 Barbados Antigua & Trinidad & Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Guyana (47) Barbuda Tobago (79) (82) (104) (117) (60) (62)

Source: Calculations of the UNDP Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean based on International Human Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups Development Indicators (database), UNDP, New York, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/.

Trends in the Three Basic Dimensions introduced the inequality-adjusted HDI of Human Development (IHDI), which takes inequality into account Trends in the HDI and in the three basic di- across all three dimensions of the HDI by dis- mensions of the HDI for the Caribbean-7 are counting the average value in each dimension presented in chart 1.2. All the countries show according to the relevant level of inequality in positive average growth rates in the three a country.5 The human development poten- HDI components. Between 1980 and 2011, tial forgone because of inequality is indicated the increase in life expectancy ranged from by the difference between the HDI and the 10.4 years in Guyana to 2.6 years in Jamaica. IHDI, which can be expressed as a percent- Barbados has the longest life expectancy, age. Due to a lack of relevant data, the IHDI at 76.8 years, and Guyana has the shortest, has only been calculated for Trinidad and To- at 69.9 years, followed by Suriname, at 70.6 bago (0.644 and an overall loss of 15.3 per- years. In education, the mean years of school- cent), Jamaica (0.610 and an overall loss of ing in 2011 varied from 7.2 years in Suriname 16.2 percent), Suriname (0.518 and an overall to 9.3 and 9.6 years in Barbados and Jamaica, loss of 23.8 percent), and Guyana (0.492 and respectively. The increase in gross national in- an overall loss of 22.3 percent). In general, the come since 1980 shows positive trends in all overall loss among these countries is lower seven countries. than the overall loss among LAC countries (26 percent). The Inequality-Adjusted HDI The HDI is an average measure of basic hu- The Gender Inequality Index man development achievements. As an aver- The Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects age, it masks inequality in the distribution women’s disadvantage in three dimensions— of human development across a population reproductive health, empowerment and eco- at the country level. The 2010 global HDR nomic activity—for as many countries as data

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 17 1 Chart 1.2 Trends in HDI and HDI Components, Caribbean-7, 1980–2011

Human Development Education Index Health Index Income Index Index (HDI) value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80

0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60

0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40

0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1980 1990 2000 2011 1980 1990 2000 2011 1980 1990 2000 2011 1980 1990 2000 2011 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups

Antigua & Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Barbuda (47) (117) (79) (82) (104) Tobago (60) (62)

Source: Calculations of the UNDP Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean based on International Human Development Indicators (database), UNDP, New York, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/.

of reasonable quality allow.6 The GII shows some exceptions, countries in the region cur- the loss in human development caused by in- rently have high debt ratios, high unemploy- equality between the respective achievements ment rates and significant poverty rates. Gir- of men and women in the three GII dimen- van (2011, citing CARICOM 2010a) reports sions. The 2011 score on the GII has been that national poverty rates are 14.5 percent in estimated for Trinidad and Tobago (0.331), Jamaica, 15.9 percent in Nevis, 16.7 percent Barbados (0.364), Jamaica (0.450), and Guy- in Trinidad and Tobago, 18.4 percent in Anti- ana (0.551). The scores reflect a percentage gua and Barbuda, 27.0 percent in Saint Kitts, loss in achievement across the three dimen- 28.8 percent in Saint Lucia and 37.7 percent sions that arises because of gender inequality in Grenada.7 The majority of the region’s poor of 33.1, 36.4, 45.0 and 55.1 percent, respec- live in rural areas.8 UNDP (2004) finds that tively. Trinidad and Tobago, as well as Barba- there is considerable variation and uneven- dos, experienced the least loss, while Guyana ness in the poverty profile of countries in experienced the greatest loss. In the case of the region, as well as significant disparities in Jamaica and Guyana, the loss is higher than wealth distribution. the LAC average (44.5 percent). Women have made important advances in Advances in social policy that are rep- education, labour force participation, political resented in the HDI measurements noted participation and equality before the law, but above may be compromised by poor econom- gender inequalities persist.9 The economic sec- ic performance and high debt burden. With tors that have traditionally provided employ-

18 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 ment and contributed to the livelihoods of poor As the discussion above illustrates, the women and their families, such as agriculture growth of violent crime in the Caribbean 1 and light industries, have experienced signifi- region is one manifestation of declines on cant decline. In addition, the global financial cri- many national and regional fronts. Here, as sis has deepened the economic crisis in the Car- elsewhere in the world, crime is contextual- ibbean and undercut the well-being of women ized in an environment of high debt, high in the region. These economic factors, together rates of poverty and high unemployment, es- with other outcomes of gender inequality, such pecially youth unemployment. These occur in as the gender employment gap, the gender pay an environment of changes in crime patterns, gap, occupational segregation, and the burden changes in public attitudes, and weakening of unpaid work, are contributing to the mar- institutions. ginality of Caribbean women. Indeed, the sig- It is important to understand the out- nificant rate of poverty among women, coupled come of all these factors and changes on the with their dependent status within countries personal sense of security from crime among and in the region, has had long-term negative the respondents to the Crime Security Survey effects, not the least of which is the intergenera- 2010 (chart 1.3). Regionwide, 46 percent of tional transmission of poverty and inequality.10 the respondents said that, overall, they felt se- The current high level of violent crime in cure or very secure living in their countries; the Caribbean region is a result of some of looked at the other way, more than half felt these convergences. Increasing rates of violent insecure because of crime or uncertain about crime and the public’s deepened sense of inse- crime and security. The sense of security was curity have led governments in the region to strongest in Barbados (79 percent) and weak- undertake remedial measures. The crisis has est in Trinidad and Tobago (25 percent). Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups also encouraged collaboration with international and regional agencies and institutions. Indeed, the involvement of these agencies has Chart 1.3 Sense of Security in the Caribbean-7, 2010 contributed to a noticeable increase in scholarship on the region’s crime problems. The scholarship has introduced a needed com- 90 78.7 parative framework that goes beyond the ear- 80 lier concern about high crime rates in specific countries to focus on the whole region and ar- 70 gue that anti-crime efforts require a response 60 57.6 that is regionwide. CARICOM agreed in 2001 to establish 50 45.9 45.5 42.7 the Regional Task Force on Crime and Se- Percent 40 37.7 curity (RTFCS) to identify the major causes 35.7 30 of crime in the Caribbean and to recom- 24.7 mend approaches to deal with the interre- 20 lated problems of crime. The task force report identified the main security threats in the 10 region and highlighted the threats from ille- 0 gal drugs, from the increasing involvement of youth in crime and from the increased access Tobago Guyana Jamaica to and use of illegal firearms as major sources Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & of insecurity in the region.11 The threats and Saint Lucia Caribbean-7 challenges identified in the RTFCS report Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. overlap with those identified by Harriott Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “How secure or insecure do you consider (2002), Deosaran (2007a) and UNODC (living in) your country to be?” The chart shows the share of respondents who answered “Secure” or “Very secure”. and the World Bank (2007).

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 19 Crime Trends Since Independence ficking and high-intensity political violence). 1 The third and current stage is associated with The region consists of small, open societies that the activities of transnational organized crime have been subjected to globalization and fairly and gang conflicts. The third stage also evi- rapid modernization. These forces have also fos- dences an increase in violent crimes such as tered social instability and rising rates of violent homicide, more firearm-related offences and crime. As the literature on modernization and violence against women. This is not the inevi- development confirms, modernization has con- table trajectory of other Caribbean countries. tradictory effects. On the one hand, it enhances Indeed, several other Caribbean countries economic growth and living standards. On the have not followed this path, but they have other, it fosters social mobility that may widen been variously affected by the drug trade the gulf between rich and poor, thereby height- and gang violence, and, in several countries, ening the sense of relative deprivation among there was a clearly discernable turn towards marginalized groups. Indeed, a deep sense of higher rates of homicide and other categories relative deprivation may well have an impact of violent crime during the first decade of the on the crime rate precisely because it fosters, 2000s. During the consultations that were among marginalized groups, outrage and the part of the process of producing this report, search for remedies to injustice by any means.12 participants repeatedly expressed concern re- The increase in criminal violence across the regarding the elevated levels of violence in their gion threatens the post-independence develop- countries and in the region. ment trajectory of most nations and will have In some Caribbean countries, aggregate consequences in the attainment of or the poor crime rates are falling. Prior to 1990, with Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups performance in global indicators such as the some exceptions, the Caribbean was charac- Millennium Development Goals, as well as in terized by low rates of violent crime, and the national development plans. ratio of property crimes to violent crimes ap- The changes in post-independence environ- proximated the rates in developed countries. ments have coincided to impact the region’s For more than a decade, violent crimes have security landscape. This includes the economic been on a downward trend in most parts consequences of structural adjustment proof the world. Harrendorf, Heiskanen, and grammes in several countries. In addition, the Malby (2010) report that, in countries where region has been affected by the violence associ- trend data are available, the majority show de- ated with and emerging from political competi- creasing or stable homicide rates. In the Car- tion, growth in the drug trade and, more recent- ibbean, however, the trend in violent crime ly, gang-related violence. High levels of violence has been moving in the opposite direction; it represent a break from the colonial pattern of has been increasing. criminal offending, which was characterized Despite the rising rates of violent crime, by high rates of property crime and low rates of there are variations in the structure of crime violent crime. Jamaica was the first country to and the complexity of crime problems across break with this pattern and consistently exhibit the Caribbean countries. In some countries, high rates of violent crime. property crime rates continue to outstrip vio- In a discussion of crime trends in Jamaica, lent crime rates. A review of the current struc- Harriott (1996), identifies three discernable ture of crime throughout the region shows stages in the development of criminality in countries such as Barbados, Saint Lucia, and independent Jamaica. The first was a continu- Antigua and Barbuda with low violent crime ity with the colonial era in terms of the struc- rates, but high rates of property crime.13 Prop- ture of crime, that is, a continuation of a pat- erty crimes such as burglaries are often asso- tern that was dominated by property crime ciated with inequalities, especially relative rather than violent crime. The second stage poverty. was associated with a clear turn towards vio- Homicides: Homicide is one of the most lence (largely due to the growth in drug-traf- reliably and consistently recorded crimes.14

20 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Chart 1.4 Homicide Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010 1

Rate 30

0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups

Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago

Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Guyana Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

The patterns exhibited in the associated crime rates were relatively low and stable in the rates may therefore be discussed with consider- other five across the 1990–2000 period. Since able confidence. During the pre-independence then, the homicide rate has risen substantially period, Caribbean homicide rates were com- in Trinidad and Tobago and fluctuated, but parable with and, in some instances, lower trended mostly upward in Antigua and Bar- than the rates in other developing countries. buda, Guyana, and Saint Lucia. Barbados has After independence and prior to the 1990s, experienced some fluctuation, but tended to homicide rates within the region were below have a low and stable rate across the 20-year the global average.15 By 1990, however, Latin period of 1990–2010. America and the Caribbean had an average Some of the conditions that influence homicide rate of 22.9 per 100,000 citizens, and homicide rates across the Caribbean region the region was ranked first in the homicide rate include, but are not limited to crime clearance among regions of the world.16 rates, levels of development, low rates of eco- As depicted in chart 1.4, there has been nomic growth, and the proportion of young considerable variation in the homicide rates men in the population.17 Drug-trafficking (in across time in the countries of the Carib- some concrete contexts) and weapons avail- bean-7 on which trend data are available. ability are also associated with high homicide Jamaica has had particularly high per capita rates. homicide rates and is ranked among the most The RTFCS report identifies increased ac- violent countries worldwide. The homicide cess to firearms and the greater involvement of

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 21 youth in crimes as conditions influencing the as Barbados, there has been a rise in firearm- 1 commission of crimes in the region. Increased related offences. Between 1975 and 2010, the insecurity can be related to gun ownership. use of firearms increased in Barbados, and, On the one hand, it can lead to a rise in the despite a decline in firearm-related offence number of legal registration applications for rates between 2000 and 2009, the rates have firearms. On the other hand, insecurity also remained above the levels of the 1990s. Since arises from the spread of legal and illegal fire- 1997, Trinidad and Tobago has seen a steady arms, a condition that is now manifest in the increase, which peaked in 2005 at 66 offences rise in firearm-related offences. per 100,000 population. All three jurisdic- Firearm-related offences: Across the Car- tions showed a reduction in rates in the last ibbean, deaths and injuries because of gun three years of the data period, but the rates in violence have been exacerbated by the ready all remain significantly above the 1990 rates. availability and misuse of firearms. The -im The LAC region is disproportionately af- pact is being witnessed predominantly in fected by small arms violence. This type of vio- nations such as Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, and lence accounted for 42 percent of all firearm- Trinidad and Tobago, but, regionwide, fire- related deaths worldwide. The Caribbean is, arms are being used more often in the com- however, not a major producer, exporter, or mission of crimes. consumer of legal firearms. Indeed, between Chart 1.5 shows the rate of firearm-relat- 2004 and 2006, only 3 percent of global arms ed offences in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trini- trade transfers involved the Caribbean.18 Gun dad and Tobago, the only nations on which violence is related to the ease of access to US data are available. The rates have consistently markets for firearms and to narcotics traffick- Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups been highest in Jamaica. However, even in ing, as well as governmental inability to se- jurisdictions with low rates of violence, such cure the borders, which are issues intricately

Chart 1.5 Firearm-Related Offences Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean Countries, 1990–2010

40 Rate

0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Barbados Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago

Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

22 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 related to organized crime activities and the ies, and, while Saint Lucia shows a gradual incapacity of states.19 increase, Antigua and Barbuda has shown 1 The ready availability of small arms and the most dramatic increase. The rates in Suri- light weapons in the Caribbean region im- name, which has lower rates of violent crime pedes security, democratic processes and eco- than other Caribbean countries, posted an nomic development. Several initiatives under increase from 107 to 386 per 100,000 people way regionwide aimed at reducing gun use between 2004 and 2006 and have declined and availability may offer significant oppor- since then, though they have remained above tunities for stemming the tide of gun-related 300. crime.20 Similar to homicide rates, robbery rates in Robberies: Data of the UNDP Citizen the Caribbean are higher in countries show- Security Survey 2010 indicate that robberies, ing low economic growth.22 The exception is burglaries and break-ins are the crimes that Jamaica, which has had low economic growth, induce the most fear among Caribbean resi- but also records low robbery rates. Francis et dents. Robbery, defined as the theft of prop- al. (2009) indicate that businesses in Jamaica erty by relying on force or the fear of force, have experienced high rates of violent crimes, is traditionally classified as a violent crime. including robberies, but police records do not Robbery rates in the Caribbean-7 for the pe- distinguish between commercial and indi- riod 1990–2010 are shown in chart 1.6. They vidual victims. evidence an upward trend. While rates have Burglaries and break-ins are the unlawful been relatively stable in Barbados and have entering of a home or other building.23 Both declined in Jamaica and Guyana, the overall are discussed herein in the context of acquisi- rates have increased.21 Trinidad and Tobago tive crimes.24 Within the Caribbean region, Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups currently shows the highest rates of robber- citizens are most likely to be victimized by

Chart 1.6 Robbery Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010

600

500

400

Rate 300

200

100

0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Guyana Jamaica

Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 23 1 Chart 1.7 Burglary and Break-in Rates Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1990–2010

4500

4000

3500

3000

Rate 2500

2000

1500

500

0 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Antigua & Barbuda Barbados Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago Saint Lucia

Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

burglaries and robberies, crimes that involve groups. This is a general trend that does not high social, economic and personal costs apply to every country. Prenzler and Towns- among victims. As chart 1.7 shows, there has ley (1996) have reviewed the literature and been a long downward trend in burglaries. suggest that affluent homes often attract While Trinidad and Tobago saw low and sta- skilled professional burglars, while homes ble burglary rates, Barbados and Saint Lucia and businesses in poorer areas are vulnerable saw somewhat higher, but stable rates over to burglaries committed by individuals who 1990–2010. The burglary rate in Jamaica fell live nearby. Demographically, households significantly from a higher level, and the rate in lower socio-economic areas are the most in Antigua and Barbuda mirrored this behav- vulnerable, but burglary rates are also high in iour, but from an even higher initial rate. The communities that lack social cohesion. The low recent rates for Jamaica may be attributed number of people in a household, marital sta- to underreporting. tus, housing type, and time of day also impact Economists and criminologists have long the likelihood of a burglary.25 discussed the impact of economic condi- Another set of insecurity-generating tions on crime. Development affects crime, crimes worth examining is gender-based vio- but crimes of violence and theft are affected lence. Across the Caribbean, three specific differentially. Specifically, as development -in practices have become a significant concern creases, violent crimes decrease, while crimes primarily regarding women and the girl-child, of theft increase across all socio-economic although data generated by the Citizen Secu-

24 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 rity Survey 2010 suggest that smaller shares of Not every violent act that a woman may men also fear becoming the victims of these experience encompasses gender-based vio- 1 practices. These are sexual violence, domestic lence.28 Instead, the term ‘gender-based’ ac- violence and trafficking in persons. An -in knowledges that this sort of violence against crease in the incidence and brutality of some women is directly related to and shaped by of these crimes across the region has raised gender roles in society. Specifically, this is a “manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and dis- Gender-based violence also serves— crimination against women by men and to the by intention or effect—to perpetu- prevention of women’s full advancement.”29 ate men’s power and control. It is Gender-based violence has been reinforced sustained by a culture of silence by and in social, cultural, economic and his- and denial of the seriousness of the torical values, beliefs, norms and institutions. consequences of abuse. In addition Different forms of gender-based vio- to the harm they exact on the indi- lence may be experienced at different phases vidual level, these consequences also of the life cycle. Thus, the protection of exact a social toll and place a heavy women’s rights within the region is predi- and unnecessary burden on health cated on the existence of legal, cultural and services. social frameworks to empower and protect — ‘Gender Equality: Ending Wide- women. Across the region, there have been significant improvements in access to justice

spread Violence against Women’, Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups for women who are victims of gender-based United Nations Population Fund, violence. However, challenges remain. Thus, New York, http://unfpa.org/gen- this report supports the continuation of re- der/violence.htm gional programmes such as police training, the strengthening of service delivery through family courts, increased access to legal aid, and capacity-building to support legislation.30 public awareness and spurred demands for The effects of rape are particularly devas- redress. tating and life-changing. Rape is non-con- Combating gender-based violence is of sensual sexual intercourse with a female.31 In considerable importance if the Millennium some jurisdictions, police statistics on rape Development Goals are to be achieved. are often aggregated with statistics on other Violence against women, as defined by the sexual offences, making it difficult to discern United Nations in Article 1 of the Declara- national trends in the crime.32 Nonetheless, in tion on the Elimination of Violence against the five countries of the Caribbean-7 in which Women and reiterated in subsequent docu- police statistics can be disaggregated, the rates ments, refers to “any act of gender-based were low and stable in four in 1993–2010: violence that results in, or is likely to result Barbados, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad in, physical, sexual or psychological harm and Tobago (chart 1.8). The rates in Antigua or suffering to women, including threats and Barbuda were the highest among the five of such acts, coercion or arbitrary depriva- and doubled between 2006 and 2009, before tion of liberty, whether occurring in public declining to a low level. De Albuquerque and or in private life.”26 The Convention on the McElroy (1999) also note this puzzling differ- Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination ence in rape rates between larger and smaller against Women expanded the enunciation jurisdictions; they attribute it to the fact that, of the rights of women to include protection in small countries, minor increases in occur- against discrimination in the family, com- rence produce dramatic increases in per cap- munity, employment, and political life.27 ita rates. In Antigua and Barbuda, the rate of

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 25 1 Chart 1.8 Rates of Rape Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1993–2010

120

100

Rate 60

0 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009

Antigua & Barbados Jamaica Saint Lucia Trinidad & Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups Barbuda Tobago

Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statis- tics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

rapes and indecent assaults accounted for as UNODC and World Bank (2007), drawing much as 20 percent of the country’s violent on United Nations crime trend data for various crime rate. 33 years, state that 3 of the top 10 recorded rape Rape is one of the most underreported rates occur in the Caribbean. Among Caribbean crimes worldwide. The underreporting tran- countries on which there are available and com- scends age, race, class and geography. Accord- parable data, each showed a rape rate that was ing to worldwide estimates, 60 percent of all higher than the unweighted average of the full sexual crimes go unreported, and one in three set of 102 countries in the study. A comparison women will be raped, beaten, forced into sex, shows significant differences in incidence rates or otherwise assaulted in her lifetime.34 In across rape statistics as measured by reports to countries such as Guyana, Jamaica, and Trini- police, hospital records and surveys. In general, dad and Tobago, the risk of sexual victimiza- the number of self-reported rapes in victimization increases in specific geographical areas tion surveys is approximately 25 percent greater and among specific subpopulations.35 than the number known by or reported to the Across the Caribbean, rape rates are rela- police.37 It is even more difficult to estimate rates tively high, and clearance rates on cases are for some of the other sexual offences. low; so, by extension, conviction rates are also Regionwide, violence against women is low.36 For example, during the period 1970 to disproportionately borne by youth and sig- 2009, the average clearance rate for cases of nificantly impacts the girl-child. Amnesty In- rape and carnal abuse in Jamaica was 48 per- ternational (2008) finds that, in 2004, seventy cent. It declined from 62 percent in 1970, was percent of all reported sexual assaults in Ja- lowest, at 35 percent, in 1995, and then rose maica were committed against girls rather than to 50 percent in 2009. women. LAC is the region with the highest

26 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 proportion of adolescent females who claim spondents are important for understanding to have had their sexual debut before age 15, the risk of victimization. As chart 1.10 shows, 1 at 22 percent; there are no equivalent figures three groups were significantly more likely to for young men in the region.38 The Caribbean report that they had been victimized in 2009: region has the earliest onset of sexual initiation men, people 18 to 34 years of age, and people in the world.39 The World Bank (2003) cites a unemployed or seasonally employed. A simi- study on nine countries conducted by the Pan lar pattern emerges if the distinction is drawn American Health Organization that found the between victims of violent crimes and victims mean age of first intercourse was 10 years or of property crimes. The predictors of violent younger, and almost two-thirds of respondents crime victimization include gender (see chart reported sexual initiation before the age of 13. 1.11), age (18–30 years), class self-placement Early sexual debut and sexual violence impact (lower), education (low) and employment sta- adolescent pregnancy and expose the girl-child tus (unemployed or seasonally employed). In- to HIV/AIDS through forced sexual inter- come and race are not significant predictors.41 course with infected partners, increased sexual For property crimes, respondents whose in- risk-taking such as multiple partners or engag- come self-placement was high reported higher ing in transactional sex, and a lack of control levels of property crime victimization (12.8 or negotiation skills to use condoms and seek percent) compared with respondents who preventive health care services.40 placed themselves lower (10.8 percent). Age was also a significant predictor, as was educa- Crime Victimization tional attainment (lower levels).

Crime and violence have created a disequilib- Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups rium that now threatens human development, Chart 1.9 Self-Reported Criminal Victimization, national prosperity and regional stability. In- Caribbean-7, 2010 securities emerge from many sources, such as crime and natural disasters, and it is evident 12 that the consequences of such events are not 11.2 10.8 10.9 borne equally by all members of society. The 10.2 10 9.7 Citizen Security Survey 2010 included ques- 9.3 tions about crime victimization to assess the characteristics of individuals more likely and 8 7.8 less likely to have been victimized in 2009, the one-year recall period used in most of the sur- 6 5.6 vey questions. Percent

4 Determinants of Victimization The risk factors associated with victimization are multifaceted and vary based on the offence, the 2 offender type, the victim and the context within which the victimization occurs. Responses to 0 the Citizen Security Survey 2010 show that national context is important. The share of re- Guyana Jamaica Suriname spondents who reported that they had been vic- Barbados Saint Lucia tims of a crime in 2009, as recalled in the 2010 Caribbean-7 survey, ranged from a high of 11 percent in An- Trinidad & Tobago tigua and Barbuda, Saint Lucia, and Barbados to Antigua & Barbuda a low of 6 percent in Jamaica; the average for the Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Caribbean-7 was 9 percent (chart 1.9). Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “In the last year, were you the victim of a crime?” The demographic characteristics of the re- The chart shows the share of respondents who answered “yes”.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 27 1 Chart 1.10 Self-Reported Victimization, by Demographic Group, Caribbean-7, 2010

Females 9.3

Males 12.0

18 to 34 Years of Age 12.2

35 Years of Age & Over 9.3

Employed 10.4 Unemployed/ 12.5 Seasonally Employed

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

Percent

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “In the last year, were you the victim of a crime?” The chart shows the share of respondents who answered “Yes”. Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups

Chart 1.11 Gender Differences in Victimization Rates for Specific Types of Crime, 2010

Robbery with other 2.4 types of weapons 3.3

Domestic violence 2.3 involving a partner 1.0

Robbery at 2.2 gunpoint 3.4 1.6 Assault with a weapon 3.8

Sexual assault 1.5 and/or rape 0.4 1.4 Family violence 1.4

Female Male

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Within the last 10 years, have you been a victim of any of the following crimes/behaviour?” The chart shows the share of respondents who answered that they had been victims, for each type of crime. Differences are statistically significant at p<.01.

28 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 The overall self-reported victimization rate maltreatment and can be directed towards a of 9 percent among respondents can be com- person regardless of age, sex, sexual orienta- 1 pared with the corresponding rates among 30 tion, social class and marital or other status.43 nations that participated in the 2004–2005 Across the region, approximately 11 percent round of the International Crime Victimiza- of the survey respondents of both sexes re- tion Survey, which found that 16 percent of ported experience with domestic violence respondents reported that they had been vic- (chart 1.12). The rates ranged from a low of 6 tims of crime during the previous year.42 The percent of respondents in Jamaica to a high of Caribbean rate compares most closely with 17 percent in Guyana. Gender-based violence the rates in countries such as Japan that reg- has been a persistent problem in the region. istered at the lower end of the survey rate list. It is, however, now more well understood and can be controlled and prevented more effec- Domestic Violence and the tively by interventions that interrupt the cycle Victimization of Women of violence and the patterns of conflict that Domestic violence, a major human rights are associated with it. violation, takes many forms, including sexual, The violence was most likely to be psycho- emotional, physical, psychological and ecological, that is, insults (reported by 21 percent nomic abuse. It is often accompanied by child of the respondents), and least likely to be

Chart 1.12 Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence,

Caribbean-7, 2010 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups

20 17.3

15.7

9.7 11.7 10.9 10 9.6 8.3 Percent

5.9 5

0 Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “To what extent has any member of your household (age 16 or over) deliberately hit you with their fists or with a weapon of any sort, or kicked you or used violence on you in any way?” The chart shows the share of persons declaring that they had been victims of domestic violence.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 29 1 Chart 1.13 Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence, by Type and Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010

22.7 14.3 Female 13.2 10.7

19.0 8.8 Male 9.7 6.7

20.9 11.6 Caribbean-7 11.4 8.6 0 5 10 15 20 25 Percent

Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups Insulted Threat of Violence Violence Used Been Injured

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “To what extent have you been sworn at or insulted by a partner (ex-partner) or a boyfriend/girlfriend (or ex-boyfriend/girlfriend)?” “To what extent has your spouse (or ex-spouse) ever said things to you that frightened you, such as threatening to harm you or someone close to you?” “To what extent has any member of your household (age 16 or over) deliberately hit you with their fists or with a weapon of any sort, or kicked you or used violence on you in any way?” “To what extent have you been injured, even slightly, on any occasion when your spouse (or ex-spouse), or a partner (or ex-partner), or a boyfriend/girlfriend (or ex boyfriend/ girlfriend), used violence against you? By injuries we mean bruises, scratches and cuts of any kind”. The chart shows the percentage of persons who declared that they had been a victim at least once, by type of violence.

physical injury (reported by 9 percent). Do- ical violence and psychological aggression. The mestic violence is experienced by both males Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys for Guyana and females, but, as chart 1.13 shows, females (2006-2007) and Suriname (2006), as well as experience all forms of violence at higher McDonald (2008), who presents findings of rates than males. the 2008 Reproductive Health Survey in Ja- Psychological abuse is often downplayed maica, indicate that there are entrenched at- by victims, policy makers and the media. How- titudes held by men and women according to ever, evidence exists that psychological abuse is which it is justified to use violence in response often a precursor to physical abuse and, in its to violations of expectations about gender myriad manifestations, can be as devastating roles.45 Thus, the progression from aggressive as physical abuse.44 Le Franc et al. (2008), in a abuses such as pushing and insults to more three-country Caribbean study, find high lev- serious physical violence is cause for concern, els of interpersonal violence, which they sug- and efforts need to be undertaken to disrupt gest may be indicative of an entrenched culture this progression. of violence and adversarial intimate relation- In response to this problem, CARICOM ships. They also report significant between- has developed model legislation on issues af- country differences in the overall level of phys- fecting women; three of these initiatives spe-

30 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 cifically address gender-based violence.46 The ods and the inability to disaggregate statistics Model Legislation on Domestic Violence, by sex and age deter accurate assessments. 1 also known as the Family (Protection against Nonetheless, regionwide research reports and Domestic Violence) Act, seeks to address surveys by governmental organizations and domestic violence and provide remedies to NGOs providing services to women report mitigate the effects of such violence.47 CAR- increasing rates of violence against women.50 ICOM has prepared the model legislation Statistics of these agencies indicate that sexual to assist member states in drafting national assault and domestic violence are prevalent legislation and to assist non-governmental regionwide and create high levels of insecuri- organizations (NGOs) in research and advo- ty among women. The UN Women Regional cacy. Office in Barbados, drawing on data from cri- Since the introduction of the model legis- sis centres, contends that there is significant lation, domestic violence legislation has been underreporting of all forms of sexual violence. enacted widely across the region, with some Among the reasons for low reporting are the exceptions. However, concerns have been lack of responsiveness among law enforce- raised about the replication of weaknesses ment authorities and within the adminis- in the model. Nonetheless, Trinidad and To- tration of justice. Although legal, social and bago’s Domestic Violence Act that mandate political reforms appear to have improved the police to respond and keep careful records of chances that a rape or attempted rape will be all reports, has emerged as a model that has reported to the police, most victims still do influenced nations such as Dominica, Grena- not report. Consequently, police data are an da and Suriname.48 Beyond legislation, some inadequate tool with which to assess the prev- police services have introduced domestic vio- alence of this sort of violence; victim surveys Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups lence units, and others have rightly broadened are much more accurate. this to gender-based violence units. Other po- Despite the levels of violence and the diffi- lice forces and services should adopt similar culties described above, gender-based violence measures and ensure that the capabilities of can be more effectively controlled and pre- these units are extended. vented through interventions that interrupt Sexual violence creates high levels of inse- the cycle of violence. Some forms of gender- curity among women. Regionwide, 11 percent based violence, particularly domestic violence, of respondents to the Citizen Security Survey tend to have histories and show patterns of 2010 reported that they had experienced vio- abusive behaviour that may be disrupted in the lent sexual victimization, including rape and early stages before they degenerate into life- sexual assault (see above). The results of the threatening and life-taking physical violence. survey indicate that the reported occurrence of This requires investments aimed at developing sexual assault in 2009 was 2.1 percent. When the capabilities of the responsible institutions the respondents who had experienced a sexual of the state. assault were asked about their relationship to the offender, they were least likely to respond Trafficking in Persons that this was a stranger. This is consistent with Trafficking in persons is a practice of grow- other research that has found that women are ing concern that creates insecurity among Car- more likely to be victimized by persons they ibbean women and children, though it does know.49 Women’s vulnerability to sexual assault not exclusively affect these groups.51 Men are and domestic violence is dramatically greater also victims, but the patterns of victimization than men’s, and sexual offences are a category vary according to the gender of the victims. of crime that reflects this differential risk. Globally, at any given time, as a result of traf- There is no regionwide survey using a ficking, 2.5 million people are estimated to common methodology to document levels be trapped in forced labour, including sexual of violence against women. Similarly, lack of exploitation, of which 10 percent are in Latin standardized data and data collection meth- America and the Caribbean.52 Some countries

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 31 in the Caribbean region serve as sources or ily affecting the most vulnerable members of 1 suppliers of this traffic, as transit points for society, particularly women and children, are victims of trafficking moving towards North similar to those found in other regions of the America and Europe, and as destination areas world, including poverty, lack of economic for both internal and intraregional flows.53 opportunities, marginalization, violence, il- The scale of the problem in the Caribbean literacy, gender discrimination, homeless- region has not been properly estimated, but ness, some distinctive vulnerability factors trafficking in persons appears to have become have been identified in Latin America and a particular problem in some countries in the the Caribbean. These include gang affiliation, region. While trafficking occurs in a variety persistent substance abuse and births among of exploitative forms, forced labour, domestic girls under the age of 18 years.59 With regard servitude and sex exploitation are believed to to children, who are often sexually exploited be the most common manifestations in the for the financial benefit of their families, lack Caribbean. Sex exploitation seems to be the of awareness of the risks, a history of sexual most predominant form. abuse of children and parental migration Most victims trafficked for the purposes of resulting in child abandonment have been sexual exploitation are women and girls, who found to be additional push-pull factors in are usually found eventually to be involved in some Caribbean countries.60 prostitution, exotic dancing, massages, por- In the Caribbean, the organization of the nography and other related activities. Evidence trafficking of persons and the main actors -in suggests that, while boys and young men are volved are not well understood, but, in the more at risk of becoming victims of traffick- larger Latin American and Caribbean region, Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups ing for labour exploitation, especially in the organized crime groups have become signifi- agricultural, construction and mining sectors, cant actors. They use trafficking in persons to some are also trafficked for sexual exploita- fund other illicit activities. Increasingly, traf- tion and domestic servitude.54 Across the re- ficked victims are at risk of contracting HIV/ gion, the number of children that are sexually AIDS and other diseases. Migrant communi- exploited may be increasing, and the average ties are especially vulnerable to trafficking.61 It age may be decreasing. Women are typically has also been found that minority and indig- trafficked internationally, while children are enous populations face specific vulnerabilities most often trafficked within their own coun- to trafficking. tries. The trafficking of children and children UNODC and UN.GIFT (2008) have iden- vulnerable to commercial sexual exploitation tified lack of knowledge, an inadequate national are most common in popular tourist desti- legal framework, ineffective policy and capacity nations and centres of sex tourism.55 Indeed, to respond, limited protection of and assistance the growing demand for sex tourism is largely for victims, and poor international cooperation considered the primary factor contributing to as the primary challenges to efforts to eradicate sex trafficking in Latin America and the Carib- trafficking in persons. A number of Dutch- bean, particularly in relation to minors.56 With speaking and English-speaking Caribbean regard to the Caribbean countries, for most of countries have ratified the Protocol to Prevent, which tourism constitutes a major industry, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Es- research suggests that trafficking cases exist pecially Women and Children (2000), which within the sex tourism industry.57 is attached to the United Nations Convention In 2005, the International Organization on Transnational Organized Crime, includ- for Migration identified unsecured borders, ing Jamaica (2003), Guyana (2004), Suriname lax enforcement of rules on entertainment (2007), and Trinidad and Tobago (2007).62 All visas and work permits, legalized prostitution countries are also signatories of various anti-traf- and the tourism industry as contributors to ficking and forced labour–related conventions, the problem.58 While most of the push-pull such as the Convention on the Elimination of risk factors for trafficking in persons primar- all Forms of Discrimination against Women

32 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 and the CARICOM Declaration on the Vulnerable groups face threats arising from Rights of the Child 2008. However, the Le- discrimination, exploitation, or displacement. 1 gal Review on Trafficking in Persons in the They are stigmatized relative to others mainly Caribbean conducted by the International on account of their status, characteristics and Organization for Migration (IOM 2010a) powerlessness. The stigma, in turn, limits their shows that the translation of the obligations access to needed benefits and services. Factors under these instruments into national legisla- such as poverty, sexual orientation, or eth- tion and the associated implementation have nicity, as well as demographic characteristics been rather limited.63 Until Caribbean coun- such as race, gender, language, and a myriad of tries are able to pass and effectively imple- other characteristics such as physical, mental, ment domestic counter-trafficking legislation, or health status (including HIV/AIDS) may they may resort to existing legislation for the create vulnerabilities to victimization. protection of victims and the prevention and Two concepts help to make sense of the prosecution of trafficking activities, including cultural endorsement of violence against vul- the application of criminal legislation that ad- nerable groups. The first, from the victimology dresses some of the aspects of the trafficking literature, is embedded in what Nils Christie process, such as procurement, forced deten- (1986) labels the ideal victim. Christie notes tion, prostitution, sexual offences, kidnap- that some victims are constructed as being ping, and abduction.64 Furthermore, given more deserving of victimization; this construc- the international nature of trafficking in per- tion of ‘legitimate’ victimization will deter- sons and the limited human, economic and mine an individual’s experience and treatment technical resources of most Dutch-speaking in the criminal justice system. The second is the and English-speaking Caribbean countries notion of the hierarchy of victimization, most Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups for tackling the issue, regional cooperation readily identifiable in the media construction needs to be enhanced to strengthen national and treatment of events. Singly or in tandem, and regional capacities to protect and assist these concepts operate to legitimize the de- trafficking victims, prevent trafficking activi- meaning treatment of the victim and to justify ties and prosecute traffickers. the politics associated with the victimization. The cultural endorsement of violence against Identification of Groups specific groups leads to net-widening and the Vulnerable to Victimization condoning of ‘legitimate’ violence against spe- Vulnerability and power are intertwined. While cific groups. vulnerability is a relative concept that includes Wome n : Gender is the strongest predictor natural or physical factors, it is often a function of criminal behaviour and criminal victimiza- of inequitable resource allocation in a society, tion.65 In the Caribbean, as well as elsewhere, that is, of social disadvantage. Consequently, women commit fewer crimes than men and vulnerable groups are those groups that suffer are disproportionately the victims of some from an inequitable distribution of social, eco- types of crimes. They are more at risk and nomic and political power. Vulnerabilities place more vulnerable to some types of crime, par- people at risk and limit the resources that are ticularly gender-based violence. Crimino- available to them to manage and navigate these logical debate about the relationship between risks. Vulnerable populations are often victim- crime and fear is in its fourth decade.66 This ized in familial settings, as well as non-familial literature indicates that men are more likely settings, are victims of human rights violations, to be victims of violent crimes, but women or are powerless to defend their own rights. are consistently found to worry about the Their concerns are not given priority by political threat of violence more than men. Among elites and may be undermined by systemic and the reasons attributed to vulnerability is that institutional discrimination. Mostly, they are de- women feel less physically able to defend nied the personal protection of the state or are themselves and consider the risk of some victims of benign neglect. types of victimization greater for themselves

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 33 and their social groups. Indeed, women and perpetrators of violence. In turn, this raises 1 men’s vulnerability to victimization differ in the vulnerability of children to recruitment two fundamental ways: relationship with the and participation in gangs. perpetrator and the type of victimization. Regionwide, children face increased vul- The United Nations Population Fund lists 16 nerability to sexual crimes, domestic violence, forms of gender-based violence. Worldwide, trafficking, child labour, commercial sexual patterns of violence indicate that women’s exploitation, sexually transmitted infections vulnerability to these forms of gender-based and early sexual initiation. Groups of children violence, especially intimate partner violence identified as especially vulnerable are abused and sexual violence by other perpetrators, children, children of absent parents, children is greater. Women and men are thus also af- in minority groups such as Guyana’s Amerin- fected differentially by crime. Women are dians and Suriname’s Maroon communities, more likely to be killed or sexually assaulted children in poor households, children living by someone they know. In addition, because in inner-city communities, disabled children, fear of victimization can be disempowering, and children of parents who are disabled, it has the potential to constrain the ability have mental health problems, or suffer from to participate fully in society. This is partly drug or alcohol abuse. why gendered vulnerabilities must be taken Across the region, there is concern for seriously by the state and why gender-based the safety of children in institutional care, in violence must be reduced. children’s homes and other custodial settings Approximately half of all households in the and in correctional institutions. In many of Caribbean are headed by women, who must these institutions, children are often placed Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups therefore shoulder the responsibility for both alongside adult residents, which is a violation productive and reproductive work. Women of the Convention on the Rights of the Child also have longer life expectancies than men. because this exposes the child to physical and Together, these factors contribute to the femi- sexual violence.70 nization of poverty.67 Women who live in pov- Youth: Across the Caribbean, youth are erty experience additional vulnerabilities, such the primary victims and perpetrators of as higher infant mortality rates, higher likeli- crime. According to CARICOM (2010b), hood of early pregnancy, lower school enrol- crime and violence associated with poverty, ment, lower employment rates, and increased unemployment, and other political and social likelihood of experiencing violence. Poverty is inequities remain the number one concerns the typical condition of single mothers, elderly among adolescents and youth in the Carib- women and disabled women.68 bean Community. Levels of youth unemploy- Children: Within the Caribbean, chil- ment in the region are among the highest in dren are disproportionately affected by the world, and the education system does not crime and violence.69 Published by UNICEF prepare youth adequately for the regional and (2006), the United Nations Secretary-Gen- global labour market. Youth violence affects eral’s Study on Violence against Children victims, families, friends and communities. highlights a range of physical, emotional and In addition to death or injury, there are nega- social abuse children experience in homes tive psychological outcomes such as a poorer and families, communities, schools, institu- quality of life, reduced productivity and gen- tions, and work situations. They are witnesses erally disrupted lives. to and victims of violence across all the major Youth-related vulnerabilities and insecuri- social institutions and in the media: domestic ties have also emerged because of an upward violence, child abuse and neglect, and cor- trend in drug-trafficking, the spread of HIV/ poral punishment at home and in school. In AIDS, adolescent pregnancies, gang involve- some jurisdictions, there has been an increase ment, and access to and use of firearms. While in the number of children killed and a rise in crime is typically male-on-male and youth- the number of children who are victims and on-youth, young girls face the added burden

34 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 of forced or early sexual initiation. This has culturally insensitive health care delivery and consequences for early pregnancy, health sta- encroachment on communal land. 1 tus such as HIV/AIDS infection, exposure to Sexual minorities: While constitutions intimate partner violence, intergenerational around the region bar discrimination on the transmission of violence and poverty in later basis of race and gender, no such protection life. exists for sexual orientation or sexual minori- Minorities and indigenous populations: ties. Legally, homosexuality remains a crime Crime trend data show geographical patterns in much of the region. Eleven CARICOM in victimization across the Caribbean based countries use laws against buggery to crimi- on minority or indigenous status. Examples nalize relationships between men who have include the interior areas of Guyana and Suri- sex with men.73 The insecurities faced by and name that are populated largely by indigenous exacerbating the vulnerabilities of lesbian, people (Amerindians) and descendants of gay, bisexual, and transgender communities Maroon populations.71 These groups face vul- encompass problems in accessing health care, nerabilities that are inconsistent with their verbal and physical harassment, isolation and status as officially protected minorities. Their violence. This community also faces secondary communities are especially insecure because of victimization, including job loss, eviction from their remoteness, the people’s lack of knowl- housing, denial of accommodation, and HIV/ edge and inadequate access to criminal justice AIDS-related stigmatization. Despite the gen- institutions, and the expansion of extractive eral stigmatization of the entire community, economic enterprises in and around their com- there is a relative tolerance for lesbians communities that generate few benefits for them. pared to a more vociferous hatred of gay men, Within these communities, young girls are par- which can be explained by what Herek (1984) Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups ticularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation and labels defensive coping attitudes.74 Many of human trafficking, while indigenous women these issues are facilitated by the illegal status are at risk of violence in both the public and of homosexuality in the English-speaking Car- private spheres, as well as within and outside ibbean. the indigenous communities. Sexual minorities are targeted for brutal Caribbean indigenous groups face discrimi- violence and even death; consequently, gay nation, systemic racism, inequity, and margin- men are an increasingly vulnerable group in alization that are related to colonialization, the region. Homosexuals are stigmatized and dispossession, and forced assimilation. Con- stereotyped and generally seen as the nega- sequently, in many communities, indigenous tion of masculinity. Their vulnerability arises people continue to suffer from infringements from the social construction of masculinity on cultural rights, loss of protection of property and the hatred for persons who challenge het- and inadequate access to justice. A major aspect erosexual notions of manliness. Thus, people of the marginalization is their exclusion from who are or who are perceived to be mem- the dominant culture; they are often denied citi- bers of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or zenship. They frequently occupy areas that are queer communities live in an environment of poorly explored and that are underdeveloped, stigma, stereotype, and constant vulnerability and they are often exposed to land appropria- to violence (Norman, et. Al. 2006; White & tion and industries in their communities that Carr 2005). Violence towards sexual minori- erode their cultural and social habits.72 They face ties is tolerated and is, at times, even openly social exclusion if they reside in urban commu- advocated in the media, religious practice and nities. Historic inequities have also left many in- music in the Caribbean. digenous children, youth and families without Regionally, there are numerous agencies, support and services. Their exclusion is often in initiatives and programmes that have citizen response to their resistance to acculturation and security and the conditions of vulnerable external control and is exercised through the populations as their mandate or area of focus. mechanisms of education, language training, These include the CARICOM Implementa-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 35 tion Agency for Crime and Security (IM- of the respondents there indicated they felt 1 PACS), the Inter-American Observatory on secure from crime; in contrast, the violent Security, the Inter-American Commission crime rates in Jamaica and in Trinidad and on Human Rights, and the Citizen Security Tobago are high, and respondents in these and Justice Programme of the Inter-American countries expressed more negative feelings Development Bank. Their work can strength- about security. en the knowledge base on citizen security and Caribbean citizens are sensitive to is- aid creative policy-making. sues of safety and security. The insecurity can be measured by the fear of crime, that Fear of Crime is, the feelings and subsequent behaviours of citizens in response to perceived criminal Citizen security refers to the freedom from threats. Chadee, Austen, and Ditton (2007) physical violence and to the freedom from characterize this as differential sensitivity fear of violence.75 It encompasses security at to risk. Insecurity is manifest in a feeling of home, in the workplace and in political, so- safety only in specific places, a willingness to cial, and economic interactions with the state engage in only specific activities and the tak- and other members of society. ing of protective actions based upon the fears generated. Perceptions of Security and Insecurity The affective aspects of fear are assessed Public opinion polls and surveys have gen- by asking people about the level of worry or erally provided means to assess the public’s fear they feel about the possibility they will perception of crime and insecurity. However, become victims of crime. Across all countries, Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups while there are some national and regional 48 percent of respondents to the Citizen Se- surveys, there is no consistent regional assess- curity Survey 2010 had worried at some time ment in the Caribbean, nor is there system- about becoming victims of crime. House- atic participation throughout the Caribbean breaking (41.3 percent) and robbery (33.7 in international standardized surveys such percent) were the most frequent among eight as the International Crime Victims Survey. crimes possibly facing communities; so, it is Harrendorf, Heiskanen, and Malby (2010) not surprising that these two crimes created rank the Caribbean as the second most vio- the greatest level of insecurity. Chart 1.14 lent region of the world. Central America is shows the percentages of respondents in each the first. Violent crimes increase insecurity country who said they worried about each and create challenges for regional develop- crime all or most of the time. The data indi- ment. How secure do Caribbean citizens feel cate that the fear of victimization associated in the face of the crime profile documented with the two crimes was highest in Guyana in police records and the victimization data (47 percent) and lowest in Barbados (14 per- presented in this chapter? cent). The Citizen Security Survey 2010 con- Primary insecurities emerge from the ducted for this report asked respondents perception that burglary is highly likely to about their perception of security. As shown occur and, more importantly, that the crime in chart 1.3 nearly 46 percent of all respond- constitutes a violation of the home, a space ents reported that they felt secure or very se- considered private. In addition, there are cure. The sense of security ranged from a low psychological consequences of burglary that of 25 percent in Trinidad and Tobago to a relate to the fear that one will be victimized high of 79 percent in Barbados. The feelings again. Robbery at gunpoint is more terrifying of security were negatively correlated with to the victim because of the arbitrariness and the level of violent crime, especially homicide unpredictability of the situation. rates, in a country. For example, Barbados Across the surveyed countries, 73 per- and Suriname record low levels of officially cent of respondents felt safe walking in their reported violent crime, and high percentages neighbourhoods during the day; 65 percent

36 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Chart 1.14 Fear of Burglary and Robbery, Caribbean-7, 2010 1

25.0 25 24.5 22.4 22.6 22.8 20.9 20.5 20 19.3 19.1 17.9 18.2 16.6

15 14.2

Percent 11.2 10 8.4

5.2 5

0 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7

House Broken into at Night Robbed at Gunpoint

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about having your house broken into at night.” “Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about being robbed by someone with a gun.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “All the time” or “Most times”. felt safe at home after dark; 61 percent felt Carrying a weapon is an extreme response safe at work; and 50 percent felt safe walking that could escalate the potential of victimiza- in their neighbourhoods at night. tion, that is, concern for safety may encour- Behavioural aspects of fear relate to the age weapon-carrying behaviour; however, extent to which people modify their behav- weapon-carrying may also reduce the concern iour in response to their level of fear. This for safety and thus increase both vulnerability includes protective strategies such as changes and the likelihood of victimization. Weap- in routine to avoid activities and locations ons, especially gun ownership, may also be that are perceived to increase the risk of being part of a self-help tradition that has devel- victimized or such as ‘target hardening’ (for oped because of a lack of access to the legal example, carrying pepper spray or installing system.76 Thus, building institutional capacity security devices in the home). The Citizen Se- to enhance the public’s sense of security may curity Survey 2010 reveals that the major be- significantly reduce the fear of crime and, by havioural changes included keeping a weapon extension, the reliance of citizens on weapon- at home (23 percent of all respondents) and carrying for protection. carrying a weapon at night (9 percent) (chart Jackson and Gray (2010) point out that 1.15). insecurity need not be debilitating. Instead,

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 37 1 Chart 1.15 Weapon-Related Self-Protective Behaviour, Caribbean-7, 2010

31.4 30

26.8 25 23.0 22.3 21.1 21.1 20 19.6

16.0 8.4 15

Percent 12.5

10 8.9 8.9 8.6 7.8 7.2 6.6 5

0 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7 Keep a Weapon at Home Travel with a Weapon at Night

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “Do you keep a weapon at home (when you are there)?” “Do you travel with a weapon at nights?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who responded “Yes”.

it can motivate vigilance and routine pre- community decreases trust among peers and caution or problem-solving to increase per- neighbours. Distrust hinders social capital sonal and collective safety. For example, the and possible civic participation. Citizen per- results of the Citizen Security Survey 2010 ceptions of the government’s ability to ensure show that, across the region, 5 percent of re- freedom from crime are also an integral part spondents moved to a more secure location in of feeling secure. Across the Caribbean-7, 2009; 11 percent put in a security device; and there was general optimism on this point: 41 72 percent indicated that their communities percent of the respondents to the Citizen Se- had taken steps to address the crime problem. curity Survey 2010 expressed the belief that However, the extent to which they mobilize their country had sufficient capacity to solve to solve problems within their communities or manage the problem of insecurity. is affected by their perception of social sta- The levels and patterns of fear of crime bility, moral consensus and informal control documented through the survey indicate that processes. only a small percentage of the respondents Citizens are concerned about trouble were fearful of being killed, and fewer than in the neighbourhood and the physical en- one-fifth were seriously worried about hav- vironment. Perception of crime within the ing their homes broken into or being robbed

38 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 at gunpoint. Overwhelmingly, the survey of crime in the Caribbean. These findings participants expressed feelings of safety at should, however, not be understood to indi- 1 home, at work and in their neighbourhoods cate an essential or naturally occurring fearful- and were unlikely to move or install security ness among women. Thus, while both men and devices to reduce the perceived risk. More women were equally likely to say they felt very importantly, respondents were optimistic secure living in their countries, some gender that their countries had the capacity to man- differences were apparent. Women indicated age the crime problems, and, regionwide, a higher levels of fear of sexual assault (30.4 per- majority of respondents said their neighbour- cent compared with 11.1 percent among men), hoods were engaging in activities to address of being killed (35.4 to 32.8 percent), and of crime problems. being beaten by a spouse or partner (11.5 to 8.6 percent). Women were also more likely to Women’s Fear of Crime report travelling in groups at night for security Perceptions of the risk of victimization are not reasons (28 to 17.3 percent). necessarily based on official crime statistics. A Chart 1.13 above documents that major influence on fear of crime is gender, as women self-report that they had experienced noted by Ditton and Farrall (2000, xv), who each of four types of domestic violence at conclude that the “single demographic fac- higher rates than men. While women are less tor positively related to fear” is gender. Over- likely than men to be victims of crimes gener- all, women demonstrate higher levels of fear. ally, they are more likely to be victims of rape Chadee (2003) and Brathwaite and Yeboah and sexual assault (chart 1.16). Nearly 10 per- (2004) also report gender differences in fear cent of both sexes across the Caribbean-7 fear Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups

Chart 1.16 Gender Differences in the Fear of Crime Victimization, by Type of Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010

Having your house 44.0 broken into at night? 39.7 Being robbed by 40.9 someone with a gun? 38.0 Having a close 38.2 relative killed? 35.7 35.3 Being killed? 32.7 Being sexually 30.4 assaulted? 11.1 Having your 22.2 vehicle stolen? 21.8 Being attacked by 21.1 someone that you know? 20.2 Being beaten-up by 11.5 your spouse/partner? 8.6

Female Male

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about them.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “All times”, plus “Most times” and “Sometimes”.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 39 1 Chart 1.17 Fear of Sexual Assault and Partner Assault, Caribbean-7, 2010

20 19.1

15 12.2

Percent 10 9.4 9.4 9.6 6.7 7.4 5.7 4.5 5.0 5 3.8 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.8 1.6 0 Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7

Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups Beaten-up by Spouse /Partner Sexually Assaulted

being sexually assaulted in some fashion; one- is matched by outrage about the victimization third of this subgroup also fear being beaten of women and girls. This paradox may partial- by a spouse or partner (chart 1.17). ly be explained by the highly individualistic The Citizen Security Survey 2010 asked and deeply religious cultures in the region. about the likelihood that members of one’s Concern for individual rights, a political community would intervene in a suspected culture of democracy, and widespread piety case of domestic violence. Of the respond- often lead to protection for victims and vul- ents, 45 percent said an intervention would nerable populations. This concern for rights be made. Implied in the question was that an is most notable among sections of the Carib- intervention would stop or prevent violence bean population, both working class and the against women. This finding highlights a wealthier class, that are law-abiding, church- contradictory aspect of Caribbean popular going and justice-seeking. In such cases, as the culture on matters pertaining to the status of data show, sizeable minorities can be counted women. Despite the general indifference to on not only to condemn, but also to inter- the plight of women in the region and broad vene against the victimization and demeaning complicity in what might be deemed a rape treatment of women, girls and other vulner- culture, the prevailing attitudes on the status able groups. of women, recognition of their victimization, Community activism is important in a and concern regarding their fears are far more context where the general perception of per- complicated. Hence, indifference to women formance and the confidence in the police’s

40 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 ability to control domestic violence and rape the capacity of their institutions to respond are not high. Among women who were physi- effectively to these problems. 1 cally or sexually abused in 2009 and reported The increase in violent crimes has been the incidents to the police, the majority were accompanied by a decrease in crime clearance dissatisfied with the action taken by the po- and conviction rates. In some countries, the lice in response. Although the vast majority rapid rise in rates of violent crime has been ac- of respondents did not have this traumatic companied by a similarly precipitous decline experience, their perception of police perfor- in arrest and conviction rates to low levels. In- mance was not much more favourable. equality and social exclusion are big contribu- Violence against women and women’s fear tors to the high rates of violence, but the near of victimization are both manifestations of immunity to arrest also partly accounts for gender inequality, which leads to the mainte- the high rates of violent crime in some coun- nance of an unequal balance of power. Shef- tries. These issues will be examined in more field (1989) uses the term ‘sexual terrorism’ to detail in chapters 3 and 6. describe the reality of such violence in wom- Changes in the post-independence en’s lives. Sexual terrorism refers to systems crime environment have coincided to compli- that operate to frighten, control, subordinate, cate an understanding of the Caribbean crime intimidate and punish women. This takes the situation and its impact on the sense of secu- form of actual or threatened violence, both of rity among residents. which tend to create a heightened level of fear Caribbean citizens are keenly aware of among potential victims. Underlying the con- the region’s crime problems. Despite the high trol is a good woman–bad woman dichotomy rates of violent crime and, in particular, homi- that justifies women being ‘punished’ for ‘bad’ cide, general victimization rates remain fairly Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups behaviour, usually a violation of sexual norms. low by international standards, and majorities These norms are contained in the images and in all countries in which the Citizen Security messages that society perpetuates and that Survey 2010 was conducted felt secure. This women and men receive during socialization. is true of both men and women. This sense The norms provide legitimacy and social sup- of security is greatest where the level of con- port for the victimizers. Indeed, the fact that fidence in the institutions of law enforcement nearly half the respondents said members of and justice is highest. their community would disregard the norms New types of crimes have emerged and intervene in a domestic violence situation that may not now be prevalent, but that pro- is an important finding of the study. foundly affect the most vulnerable groups in Caribbean societies. Trafficking in persons is Conclusion an example of this, especially if children are victimized. These crimes should receive great- The security situation in the Caribbean has er attention, and greater capacities should be changed. In several countries, the rate of vio- developed to prevent them and to support lent crime has escalated and has become high the victims. relative to rates in other regions of the world. Citizen security, human development and hu- The region has become more violent. This is man rights are interdependent. The transition the main challenge facing Caribbean coun- to a more secure environment will necessitate tries. The rate, level of intensity, and primary change to ensure more well integrated socie- form of violence, however, vary from country ties, the social, economic and political empow- to country. In those countries with the high- erment of excluded and vulnerable groups to est rates of violence, organized crime and counter the decades of deprivation caused by gang violence present the greatest challenge. poverty, social, cultural, political and institu- In others, gender-based violence is the main tional practices, respect for human rights, and concern. Regardless of the primary forms, all more effective and responsive institutions. countries should be encouraged to improve

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 41

CHAPTER Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and 2 Enhancing Resilience Don’t just react – pre-empt, prevent and protect

Sow the seeds of security – invest in youth development

Today’s empowered youth are tomorrow’s responsible citizens Youth Violence: Reducing 2CHAPTER Risk and Enhancing Resilience 2

Introduction motion of human development in the region. In support of this argument, the chapter uses Youth violence has become an important de- primary and secondary data sources, includ- velopment challenge worldwide. Declining ing the results of the UNDP Citizen Security social and economic development conditions Survey 2010 conducted specifically for the have increased the risk that youth will become report, to discuss the phenomenon of youth 1 violent offenders and victims of violence. In- violence. Although the chapter focuses pri- creased youth involvement in violence has marily on violence among 15–24-year-olds, contributed to popular perceptions of grow- the survey did not capture the views and be-

ing insecurity in the Caribbean. At the same haviour of Caribbean citizens under 18 years Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience time, the experiences of and involvement in of age. In this regard, all references to youth crime and violence among Caribbean youth responses in the survey provide the perspec- have become linked to other developmental tives and experiences of a smaller sample of issues, including high levels of youth unem- youth between the ages of 18 and 24 years. ployment, poor educational opportunities, Against this background, the next section un- and feelings of voicelessness and exclusion dertakes an overview of the current state of from national and regional governance pro- affairs with regard to youth violence and its cesses. In this context, youth violence is more impact on Caribbean human development. than a security concern. It is a major human The following section analyses the risk and development problem. The feelings of inse- vulnerability factors that predispose and ex- curity among Caribbean citizens on account pose youth to violence. The subsequent sec- of youth violence have stemmed from inad- tion explores the available approaches to risk equate attention to youth development and reduction and resilience-building that are youth empowerment, which has increased aimed at preventing youth violence. The final the risk of youth offences and victimization. section concludes the discussion by proposing In recognition of the public significance of the policy recommendations to prevent youth vi- issue, this chapter analyses the relationship be- olence by reducing risk and enhancing youth tween youth violence and human development resilience. in the Caribbean. In keeping with the overall view of the Caribbean Human Development Youth Violence and Caribbean Report that youth development and youth Human Development empowerment are important parts of the citizen security response, the chapter argues that The prominence of youth violence as a Carib- investments in reducing the risk factors associ- bean developmental concern is not surprising ated with violent offending and victimization, given the fact that 64 percent of the popula- coupled with strategies for boosting youth re- tion of the Caribbean Community (CARI- silience, can optimally reduce or even reverse COM) consists of young people under 30 the negative impact of youth violence on Car- years of age, while 30 percent of the popula- ibbean human development. In other words, tion is between 18 and 30 years of age.2 Even reducing risk factors and enhancing the resil- the specific youth category of 15–24-year- ience of Caribbean youth are imperative for olds represents significant proportions the prevention of youth violence and the pro- (around one fifth) of national populations of

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 45 Table 2.1. Youth Population, Youth Involvement in Violent Crime 2 by Country, Caribbean-7, 2004 Youth crime and violence in the Carib- percent bean have been characterized as a phenomenon pitting youth against youth and male Country Youth population against male and have been closely linked to the emergence of criminal gangs, a feature Antigua & 14.9 discussed more fully in chapter 3. Notwith- Barbuda standing the youth-on-youth profile of youth Barbados 18 .0 crime, youth who use violence are a minority of the youth population. Guyana 21.3 The country studies and the findings of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 Jamaica 18.7 highlight that, while young people are involved in serious crimes, most of the activities Saint Lucia 20.3 they undertake that violate the law or social norms are not serious or violent. Nonetheless, Suriname 18.6 it is also likely that episodes of youth violence may be underreported for a variety of reasons. Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience Trinidad & 20.7 These include community tolerance and ac- Tobago ceptance of some non-criminal violent be-

Source: World Bank (2011a). haviour, a desire to keep youth out of criminal Note: Youth are individuals 15–24 years of age. justice systems, and a lack of confidence that authorities will respond if crimes are reported. the countries selected as research sites for this It is also true that crime data hide other forms report (the Caribbean-7) (see table 2.1). of delinquent behaviour. However, there is Thus, there is a logical expectation that gains sufficient evidence in the country studies and in Caribbean human development will depend the survey to suggest that violent behaviour heavily on the well-being and contribution of is not prevalent or endemic among the youth the youth population. At the same time, any populations of the region. In the context of increase in violence among youth, however overall youth behaviour in the Caribbean, re- marginal, will have a significant impact on so- liance on violence is uncommon. ciety, including increased fear and insecurity In fact, most youth who come into contact among youth and other citizens. The preven- with the police and the justice system are not tion of youth violence is therefore an impera- involved in violent crimes, but have run away tive for human development. from home or are associated with behaviour Caribbean governments have pledged indicating a desperate need for care and pro- their commitment to preventing youth vio- tection following abuse, neglect, or abandon- lence through the World Plan of Action ment. Such ‘status offences’, which are not for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond.3 considered criminal if they are committed by However, the increase in reported youth adults, often bring children and youth into violence suggests that policy, planning and conflict with the law. In Jamaica, 52 percent programme responses to the problem have of the female juveniles who appeared in court failed to address adequately the fundamental in 2007 were found to be in need of care and social and economic development issues that protection. Only 23 percent of the male ju- have predisposed youth to violence. Against veniles who appeared in court fell into the this background, the following subsections same category. Although comparable data are outline, first, the current status of youth vio- not immediately available for the other six lence and victimization in the Caribbean and, countries of the Caribbean-7, national-level second, the impact of youth violence and vic- research suggests there is a similar gender timization on regional development. pattern in court appearances by juveniles for

46 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Table 2.2. Youth Self-Reported Criminal Accusations and Arrests, Caribbean-7, 2010 2 percent Country Violent Violent Property Ganja Other Other No Not crime crime crime use drug answer applicable with without use weapon weapon

Antigua & 0.9 0.5 2.3 2.3 0.0 4.6 6.5 82.9 Barbuda

Barbados 4.0 1.3 0.0 7.3 0.7 1.3 0.0 85.3

Guyana 1.4 4.2 1.1 2.0 0.0 2.8 0.6 87.9

Jamaica 0.0 1.9 0.6 3.8 0.0 1.3 1.6 90.9

Saint 2.7 4.3 1.1 3.7 0.0 2.1 2.7 83.4 Lucia Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience Suriname 0.5 1.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 4.6 3.6 86.6

Trinidad 3.0 2.6 1.3 1.3 0.0 2.6 0.4 88.9 & Tobago

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: Respondents aged 18 to 24 years (N = 1,653). Question: “Have you ever been arrested by the police? If yes, for which of the following: 1. A violent crime involving the use of a weapon (blunt instruments excluded), 2. A violent crime not involving the use of a weapon, 3. A property crime, 4. Ganja use, 5. Use of other drugs, 6. Other.” The table shows the percentage of the respondents answering positively in each case. non-violent offences. Meanwhile, young men been accused or arrested for violent crimes was are more likely than young women to be in low (0 percent with weapons, and 1.9 percent conflict with the law for violent offences. without). It should be noted, though, that, in In the context of the survey, only 1.6 per- absolute terms, the actual number of cases in all cent of youth between 18 and 24 years of age countries was small. had been accused or arrested for violent crimes Six key patterns associated with the in- involving the use of weapons, and only 2.5 per- cidence of youth violence were observed cent for violent crimes without weapons. The through the UNDP Citizen Security Survey variations across countries are highlighted in 2010. We now list these. table 2.2. The variations across countries are First, youth violence has a gender dimen- highlighted in table 2.2. The highest propor- sion. Across the region, the majority of ag- tions of reported youth violence occurred in gressors and victims are young men who use Saint Lucia (2.7 percent with weapons and 4.3 violence for protection against threats—real without), followed by Guyana (1.4 percent with or perceived—or who have been socialized weapons and 4.2 percent without), Trinidad into a male-dominated tradition of conflict and Tobago (3 percent with weapons, and 2.6 resolution through violence. At the same time, percent without) and Barbados (4 percent with young women are victims of verbal and physi- weapons, and 1.3 percent without), despite the cal violence, particularly in the interpersonal country´s reputation for low levels of violent and domestic spheres. Relative to men, almost crime. Notwithstanding Jamaica’s regional and twice the proportion of women reported being international reputation for relatively high levels threatened by spouses, partners, or ex-partners of violence, the proportion of Jamaican youth (14 percent of young women compared with survey respondents who reported they had 7.5 percent of young men). This reinforces the

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 47 2 “We feel more secure point that young men are predominantly the of victimization has contributed to the for- when we form gangs in violent aggressors among Caribbean youth. In mation of delinquent groups and gangs in addition, the majority of youth reporting fear schools, as students seek to defend themselves the schools; each member of sexual assault are young women. Young fe- from community violence that permeates the looks out for each other.” male respondents were over three times more educational environment.8 Gang formation is —Focus group, CARICOM likely to be fearful of sexual assault (37.7 per- most likely to occur at the secondary school cent of all young women surveyed compared level. Young people usually represent gang for- Commission on Youth with 11 percent of all young men surveyed). mation as a security response to the context of Development Second, violence among pre-adolescents is a the community, a way to protect themselves growing concern among citizens. Although rare, from students and others in the surrounding primary school children as young as 11 years community who prey on them because of on- of age have begun using violence at home or going gang conflict. School gangs are gener- at school. These early manifestations are con- ally represented as defensive even if they share tinued into adolescence and youth. (The po- some characteristics with street gangs. They tential for family and school environments to are not simply peer groups. Boys are more contribute to early violent behaviour is dis- likely to be involved in school gangs. cussed in the section on risk and vulnerability.) Fifth, youth violence is closely associated The gender dimension is apparent among the . The use of violence Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience with community violence youngest offenders: mostly boys use violence, has often emerged from exposure to vari- although the incidence of female aggression ous forms of neighbourhood or community also appears to be increasing. Younger boys violence directly as a victim or indirectly as a tend to commit less serious offences than older witness.9 Over 7 percent of youth frequently boys, but at greater frequency.4 experience community violence. These expe- Third,school violence has escalated. Conse- riences and the subsequent use of violence are quent on the emergence of younger offenders, also linked to feelings of fear among youth. In violence in schools appears to have increased.5 their communities, Caribbean youth worry The reported cases of apparent escalation in about child abuse, rape, robbery, guns and youth violence have largely emerged from me- shoot-outs, police abuse, unemployment, dia debates given the fact that adequate data drugs, and lack of road safety. The UNDP on the phenomenon are not readily available Citizen Security Survey 2010 found that in the region. However, where school vio- almost half of youth (46.8 percent) express lence has been observed, there have been sug- fearfulness about the possibility of becom- gestions that the acts of violence have become ing a victim of a crime. Among these, many more brutal. There have been a few reported are worried all the time, most of the time, or cases of the use of guns in Guyana, Jamaica, sometimes about becoming victims of vio- and Trinidad and Tobago. Student sexual violent crimes, including through murder (48.7 lence against other students has also been re- percent), the murder of a relative (24.4 per- ported across the region and was highlighted cent), assault by a spouse or other person as a special concern in Suriname.6 The resort (44.8 percent), robbery at gunpoint (28.2 “I hope to be alive given to violence at school has been expressed as percent), or sexual assault (24.4 percent). a function of the need for self-defence, self- They often experience psychological trauma all that is happening. The protection, or peer protection and, in rarer and grief, including fear, anxiety, aggression, crime and violence situ- instances, also for image profiling and to in- depression and physical trauma such as aches ation makes death in five timidate others. It is believed that youth who and pains and racing heartbeat as a result of have experienced verbal and physical abuse at exposure to community violence.10 This sug- years an imminent reality.” home often transfer this behaviour to school gests that youth may conceptualize their con- —Focus group, CARICOM through physical and psychological bullying cerns about violence in a different way other 7 Commission on Youth of classmates and teachers. than ‘insecurity’, but that their concerns with Fourth, youth violence is often a response to personal safety are not unlike those of other Development the threat and fear of victimization. The fear members of society.

48 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Sixth, youth victimization by peers and The Impact of Youth Violence on adults creates an environment for more violence. Caribbean Human Development 2 Among youth respondents to the UNDP Cit- Notwithstanding its exceptional nature, youth izen Security Survey 2010, 19.4 percent had violence poses a challenge for human develop- been victims of a crime within the last 10 years ment. Indeed, displays of violence among youth (table 2.3). The survey validates the assump- create a risk that patterns of persistent violent tions in the literature that much crime is peer- behaviour will emerge and, once entrenched, af- on-peer in that 28.6 percent of the youth who fect the future of society. The sheer number of said they had been assaulted reported that the youth in the region has meant that youth crime assaults were committed by acquaintances or and violence have already had several negative friends, which can reasonably be assumed to influences on all sectors of society.14 The direct be peers. Meanwhile, adult abusers included monetary costs to governments and citizens of police, teachers, and parents and guardians.11 corrective measures include budgetary expendi- Relative to the level of the fear of violence, ture on security, policing, judicial processing, the actual incidence of violent victimization is and incarceration, in addition to private security limited. While 9 percent of respondents had expenditure by businesses and individuals. The been victims of crimes in 2009, only 3 percent indirect monetary and economic costs include had been victims of violent crimes. Sexual as- loss of earnings of incarcerated youth, loss of life Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience sault affected 2.9 percent of all the respond- among young productive citizens, lower eco- ents; over half of these were female victims. nomic growth and reduced tourism revenues. The fear of victimization, however, resulted In a situation analysis for the CARICOM in changes in behaviour, which included self- Commission on Youth Development, Chaaban imposed curfews and decreased participation (2009, 15) highlights some of the economic in community activities.12 This fear also led to costs, as follows (see also table 2.4): increased use of weapons in and out of school. “Overall, youth crime is costing CARICOM The survey indicates that as many as 359 countries . . . between 2.8% and 4% of GDP an- youth (21.7 percent of the youth surveyed) nually, in terms of direct expenditure on fight- carried weapons at night, 269 (16.2 percent) ing crimes and in lost revenues due to youth in- carried weapons during the day, and 538 (32.5 carceration and declines in tourism revenues. percent) kept weapons at home. Youth vio- . . . With the highest numbers of youth con- lence has therefore constrained youth choices, victed, Jamaica incurs more than 529 million freedom and opportunity, while creating an USD every year as direct public and private environment conducive to more violence. The costs linked to fighting youth crime. Youth fear of victimization has left some youth feel- who are incarcerated in Saint Lucia every year ing hopeless about their prospects for long and could have contributed to increasing the coun- happy lives.13 try’s income by 1.9 million USD each year. In

Table 2.3. Youth Victimization, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010 percent Gender Once Twice Three times or Not applicable more

Males 9.1 5.9 5.8 79.2

Females 9.7 3.8 4.3 82.0

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents aged 18 to 24 years (N = 1,653). Question: “Within the last 10 years, how many times have you been a victim of a crime?” The table shows the percentage of respondents.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 49 2 Table 2.4. The Annual Cost of Youth Crime in Four Caribbean Countries Country Year Youth Direct Forgone Forgone Opportunity Total cost, Total 15–24 costs, earnings, tourism costs, US$ US$ cost, % convicted, US$ US$ revenue, GDP total US$

Guyana 2002 425 68,717,820 289,678 1,665,000 1,954,678 70,672,498 2.79

Jamaica 2005 1,959 529,098,000 4,262,815 91,125,000 95,387,815 624,485,815 3.21

Saint 2005 663 43,485,580 1,935,977 17,100,000 19,035,977 62,521,557 4.01 Lucia

Trinidad 2005 786 616,983,450 2,792,403 35,415,000 38,207,403 655,190,853 2.88 & Tobago

Source: Based on data in Chaaban (2009).

Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience Note: US$ figures are in purchasing power parity dollars.

Trinidad and Tobago, decreasing youth crimes recognized internationally by the United Na- by 1% could increase tourism revenues by tions in the context of monitoring the imple- nearly 35 million USD yearly.” mentation of the World Programme of Ac- Linked with estimates of the costs of tion for Youth.16 In other areas of the world, low educational achievement and poor progress has been made towards analysing health status among youth, these fig- these relationships through the correlation of ures represent a good contribution to our a youth development index and the Human understanding of the youth crime and vio- Development Index.17 However, to date, no lence–human development nexus. However, Caribbean country has formulated a youth de- the estimates do not account for the non- velopment index. Such an instrument would monetary costs of youth violence. Thus, there certainly enhance the regional capacity to are certainly social costs of youth violence, in- measure the contribution of advances in youth cluding physical and psychological pain, suf- development to national and regional develop- fering and trauma, the erosion of social capital, ment, including reductions in youth crime and the intergenerational transmission of vio- violence. The lack of national and regional data lence, and lower quality of life.15 There are also management frameworks to support evidence- political costs associated with the labelling, based planning and programmes for youth is marginalization and exclusion of at-risk or addressed elsewhere below in our discussion problem youth from participation in govern- on approaches to building resilience. We turn ance, the economy and society. The general attention at this point to an examination of the labelling of youth holds potential for encour- contextual factors that have contributed to the aging negative stereotyping, which can be patterns of youth violence and victimization internalized by youth, causing frustration and outlined above. fuelling aggressive behaviour. There is still a lack of appropriate data in the Risk and Vulnerability: “Youth are assets in the Caribbean to permit rigorous analysis of the Explaining the Patterns of Youth Violence relationships among youth development, hu- development process but man development, and youth violence and An explanation of the patterns of youth vio- remain vulnerable to risk.” delinquency. The need for these data has been lence and its impact on human development

50 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 requires a discussion of the factors that give development context to predispose youth to rise to the violence in light of the considera- violent behaviour and expose youth to victimi- 2 tion that youth are inherently vulnerable as- zation. sets in the development process. Youth at risk are described as those young Although Caribbean youth aspire to lead people who “face environmental, social and honourable and productive lives and to experi- family conditions that may hinder their per- ence a good standard of living, they are vulner- sonal development and successful integration able to several factors that erode their capac- into society as productive citizens.”19 Youth ity to achieve their personal, professional and become vulnerable if they are exposed to these social goals and predispose them to significant hindrances, which are multidimensional and risk of becoming perpetrators or victims of acts emerge from various levels of the social expe- of violence.18 This section discusses the prin- rience of the youth population. In the Carib- cipal factors that emerge from the Caribbean bean, some of the most vulnerable youth are living on the streets, in group homes or correctional facilities, or they are living on their own Table 2.5. Risk Antecedents and Risk because they have been orphaned, neglected, or Markers of Youth Violence in the Carib- left unsupervised by parents who have migrat- bean Region ed or been incarcerated. These young people Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience are among those individuals likely to become Category Risk antecedents and involved in criminal or violent offending. risk markers In general, the risks that may increase the likelihood of youth involvement in violence Societal Limited socio-eco- may be grouped in three main categories: so- nomic opportunities cietal; community, including interpersonal; Increased criminal and individual. The factors are often inter- activity and access to related in a complex web of risk and vulner- drugs and firearms ability. They may include unemployment, Tolerance of violence societal or community tolerance of violence, illegal drug use and trafficking, gang activity, Community, Community and gang disconnection from or poor attitudes towards interpersonal volatility school and low educational attainment, and Exploitation and abuse lack of effective and caring parenting.20 It is by adults in the home useful to have a framework for identifying and at school risk and vulnerability by, for example, looking Loss of social cohesion out for risk antecedents and risk markers that, because of distrust and if addressed early in a young person’s life cycle, lack of support among could prevent later manifestations of high-risk neighbours behaviours and negative outcomes. Risk antecedents include environmental conditions Individual Poor health status, such as poverty, neighbourhood environment early sexual initiation, and family dysfunction. Risk markers include drug abuse and mental behaviours such as poor school performance. health problems Some researchers use these antecedents and Inherent youthful de- markers to predict youth violence. However, sire to take risks with we use the terms here without claim to mak- personal security and ing predictions. Rather, we argue that various safety combinations of risk antecedents and markers may contribute to youth violence. Table Source: Adapted from Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999). 2.5 summarizes the principal risk antecedents and risk markers in the Caribbean context

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 51 that have potential to contribute to high-risk high levels of unemployment, particularly 2 youth behaviour involving violence. They are among youth. Taking a telescopic view, one discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. may see that criminal activity has increased, including narco-trafficking and the drug Societal Risks trade, while firearms have become more ac- Caribbean society presents significant risk to cessible to young people. In addition, society young people. The socio-economic develop- has sent subtle signals of tolerance and even ment context is challenging and marked by respect for violence through the political and community systems of governance. The three risk antecedents are as follows: Chart 2.1 The Main First, limited socio-economic opportunities Problem in are a push factor for violence. Unemployment the Country in and the high cost of living are not in them- the View of All selves predictors of ordinary criminal vio- Respondents, lence.21 Yet, they are constituents of a socio- Caribbean-7, economic context that increases vulnerability 2010 and the risk of violence. The youth respondents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience 2010 were concerned about four main socio- 30 economic issues: unemployment (27.7 per- 27.7 cent), violent crime (20.0 percent), the cost 25 25.0 of food (13.2 percent), and the cost of living

20.3 (10.5 percent) (chart 2.1; table 2.6). 20 20.0 Unemployment is the number one problem according to youth in five of the Caribbe- 15 an-7; in Saint Lucia and in Trinidad and To- 13.5 13.2 12.7 Percent

10.5 bago, violent crime was the top concern of the 10 majority of youth respondents to the survey. In the Caribbean countries in 2004, the youth 5 unemployment rate (among 15–24-year- olds) was higher than the overall unemploy- 0 ment rate: 34.0 percent in Jamaica; 25.4 percent in Trinidad and Tobago; 44.0 percent in Saint Lucia; and 21.8 percent in Barbados.22 Among the youth surveyed, 8.6 percent were Cost of food

Violent crime unskilled labourers, while 18.8 percent had Cost of Living

Unemployment never been employed. Over 20 percent of the youth surveyed indicated that they did not 18-24 years old Total sample have enough income to live comfortably or to cover basic needs. The emotional frustration

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. arising from the social exclusion associated Note: Base: respondents aged 18 to 24 years (N = 1,653) with unemployment or low income has been and total survey sample (N = 11,155). Question: “From the list of problems mentioned above [listed hereafter], which linked to aggression among youth and may three are the most serious in your country?” The list of pro- 23 blems: a. Level of unemployment, b. Inadequate housing, motivate violent crimes such as homicide. c. Inadequate schooling for children, d. Cost of food, e. Low levels of educational achievement Level of property crime, f. Level of violent crime, g. Level of insecurity, h. Cost of living, i. Level of poverty, j. Level of have also been identified as a socio-economic corruption, k. Level of migration, l. Inadequate sanitation, risk factor for the involvement in violence.24 m. Inadequate access to health care, n. Inadequate voice in governmental affairs. The chart shows the percentage Access to education at the primary level is of respondents who chose the problem either as their first, second, or third option as the most serious problem. close to universal in the Caribbean, and young people have good access to education at high-

52 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Table 2.6. The Main Problem in the Country in the View of Youth, Caribbean-7, 2010 2

Country Main Second Third problem (N = 1653) problem (N = 1543) problem (N = 1523)

Problem % Problem % Problem %

Antigua & Unemployment 30 Cost of living 26 Corruption 16 Barbuda

Barbados Unemployment 28 Cost of food 25 Cost of living 21

Guyana Unemployment 27 Cost of living 19 Poverty 10

Jamaica Unemployment 41 Cost of living 22 Corruption 17

Saint Lucia Violent crime 38 Unemployment 20 Cost of living 18 Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience

Suriname Unemployment 22 Corruption 13 Cost of living 11

Trinidad & Violent crime 39 Cost of living 19 Cost of food 14 Tobago

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents 18 to 24 years old (N = 1,653). Question: “From the list of problems mentioned above [listed hereafter], which three are the most serious in your country?” The list of problems: a. Level of unemployment, b. Inadequate housing, c. Inadequate schooling for children, d. Cost of food, e. Level of property crime, f. Level of violent crime, g. Level of insecurity, h. Cost of living, i. Le- vel of poverty, j. Level of corruption, k. Level of migration, l. Inadequate sanitation, m. Inadequate access to health care, n. Inadequate voice in governmental affairs. The chart shows the percentage of respondents who chose the problem either as their first, second, or third option as the most serious problem. er levels. However, concerns remain about the cent for English). These outcomes are wor- increasing rates of school drop-outs and de- risome given the acknowledged correlation clining levels of educational attainment, par- between declining educational achievement ticularly among boys. Data of the Caribbean and increasing levels of violence in society.27 Examinations Council show that overall pass Departure from school without the requisite rates in the basic subjects of mathematics and skills and abilities increases the likelihood of English at the secondary school level have de- youth exposure to and experience of other clined and declined more significantly among risk factors, including higher levels of unem- boys.25 On average between 1997 and 2009, ployment, teen pregnancy, risky sexual activ- the pass rate in mathematics fell by over 8.0 ity and substance abuse, which contribute percent among boys and by about 2.5 percent to other problem behaviours among youth. among girls, even though boys had higher The early departure of boys from school cer- pass rates.26 Over the same period, in English, tainly contributes to the male-on-male char- the pass rates declined by over 13.0 percent acter of violence in the Caribbean. On the among boys and by 12.5 percent among girls one hand, school drop-out rates suggest that (girls had the higher pass rates). Overall, the educational institutions do not meet student average pass rates among boys and girls in expectations. On the other hand, it is impor- 2009 were low in both subjects (around 35 tant to acknowledge other factors that may percent for mathematics and around 55 per- impinge on the capacity of students to con-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 53 tinue schooling. The lack of financial support munity environment include exposure to com- 2 for studies, school closures due to violence, munity and gang volatility, exploitation and and inability to concentrate because of envi- abuse by adults, and loss of social cohesion. ronmental conditions, including community Exposure to community volatility has a nega- violence, may all contribute to students drop- tive impact on youth development. The majority ping out, making them even more vulnerable of youth respondents to the UNDP Citizen to recruitment into violent activity. Security Survey 2010 live in neighbourhoods Second, access to drugs and firearms makes that are free of gang violence (67.7 percent); crime an alternative for youth. Because of the therefore, fewer youth thought that criminal lack of legitimate socio-economic opportuni- gangs were a big problem in their communities, young people are vulnerable to recruit- ties. However, a significant proportion had ment into a vibrant illegitimate economy experienced some gang violence through the fuelled by gangs, including those involved presence of a criminal gang based in their in the drug trade. Through these channels, communities. Over 20 percent of youth re- youth gain access to firearms, which creep spondents were living in neighbourhoods in into the school environment. which murders had been committed in 2010; Third, the tolerance and acceptance of vio- 29.1 percent where shootings had occurred; . 16.4 percent, rapes; 44.2 percent, fights in the Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience lent crime influence the perspectives of youth The acceptance of violence, particularly streets; and 16.1 percent, gang violence; while non-criminalized social forms of violence, 29.7 percent had witnessed community mem- has been a worrying trend, particularly in Ja- bers threaten other community members. The maica and in Trinidad and Tobago. In these highest proportion of youth who indicated contexts, youth model the behaviours of in- they had experienced significant levels of gang fluential others in their homes, at school, in violence was in Saint Lucia, though, in Jamaica their communities and in different spheres of and in Trinidad and Tobago, there is a wider national life. National figures in music and perception of gang problems. The lowest pro- politics, among other fields of activity, have portion was found in Barbados. The theme of signalled to young people that some forms of disturbance by gun violence and gang warfare violence may be acceptable and, in some in- was prevalent among the focus groups con- stances, may be worthy of respect. The highly ducted by the CARICOM Commission on visible role of violent criminals in the politics Youth Development. Recurring community of some countries provides the evidential shootouts disturbed school work, homework support for this claim. This reinforces illegiti- and sleep, raised fears of personal injury and mate structures (such as gangs) and reduces death, or family injury and death, and in- youth confidence in legitimate structures of creased the concern about freedom to move political representation. Young people may around the community, especially after dark.28 lose faith in formal governance processes and We note above in our discussion of the status seek to create subcultural systems of partici- of youth violence that gang and community pation through gangs, which become viable conflicts often spill over into the school envi- alternatives to legitimate employment. The ronment, as youth take up arms out of a sense value of legitimate structures and agents of of a need for protection. In the focus groups, socialization and their influence on youth be- youth lamented that “a lot of good, decent in- haviour are diminished. Although this con- nocent youth get killed; violence is no good to text of tolerance for violence is not general our communities.” to the region, it is plausible that intraregional Exploitation and abuse by adults have been cultural transfers through media and music linked to youth violence. There is no consensus may influence youth in other countries. among researchers that abuse by adults is a firm predictor of youth violence.29 However, Community and Interpersonal Risks there have been suggestions that youth may Risk antecedents that are manifest in the com- model the behaviours of their aggressors and

54 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 mimic the acts of violence they witness or ex- been injured by partners; 10.8 percent had perience, and the pain and frustration they been threatened by partners; and 21.4 per- 2 feel that arises from the victimization may cent had been sworn at or insulted by part- evolve into aggression and rage.30 Further- ners. By country, only in Jamaica and in Trini- more, victims of abuse in the home, particu- dad and Tobago did fewer than 10 percent of larly victims of sexual abuse, often run away the sample report themselves as victims (6.8 from home and end up living on the streets. percent and 9.8 percent, respectively), while Street youth are at increased risk of resort- Saint Lucia had the highest proportion, at ing to criminal activities, which may involve 51.2 percent; Guyana, at 43.3 percent; Suri- violence.31 Abuse by adults may be most nega- name, at 19.1 percent; Antigua and Barbuda, tively influential if it is meted out by a par- at 18.7 percent; and Barbados at 15.7 percent. ent. Several studies have highlighted the sig- The highest shares of respondents who re- nificant impact of parental relationships on ported experiencing domestic violence many youth behaviour, particularly in school and times—4.1 percent—were in Suriname and other institutional settings. Positive parental in Antigua and Barbuda. relationships characterized by care, discipline Despite the potential significance of vio- and encouragement are likely to promote lence in the household, others argue that it positive youth behaviours. Negative parental is from their interactions outside the home, Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience relationships characterized by neglect, abuse particularly among peers, that youth learn and violence are likely to lead to negative be- and adopt particular behaviours.33 Additional haviours.32 sources of abuse may emerge in school set- However, our survey data show that, of tings. For example, the use of corporal pun- the youth respondents who had been victims ishment in schools, which remains legal in of domestic violence (n = 238), only 4.1 per- Caribbean countries, has also been linked to cent had been charged with crimes. Further- youth violence. It has been suggested that “be- more, among the 73 youth who had ever been cause students were beaten but rarely praised charged with crimes, only 10 reported having or received kind words from their teachers, ever been victims of violence in the house- corporal punishment served mainly to alien- hold. These findings cast additional doubt on ate and cause resentment among students.”34 the relationship between offending and vic- Although guidelines have been established timization through abuse. Domestic violence for corporal punishment in many countries to may not directly predispose youth to violence mitigate the potential for severe abuse, youth in other settings; however, if combined with may still experience other forms of abuse by other factors, violence may ensue in a variety teachers, usually of a verbal and psychological of contexts. In the meantime, we note that nature, which is more difficult to regulate. domestic violence, particularly sexual abuse Loss of social cohesion in communities sig- (which was not specifically probed in the nificantly affects the ability of youth to live pro- survey), may be underreported, particularly ductive lives. Certainly, many of the aforemen- among males. In addition, the survey’s focus tioned risk factors contribute to breakdowns on criminal forms of violence may have hid- in social cohesion. In the context of periods den other forms of social violence that may of socio-economic decline, people lose jobs become manifest as a result of abuse. Against and have limited access to educational and this background, youth are under threat of health services, and the capacity of commu- abuse from several quarters: in the community members to support one another declines. nity (abduction and rape), at school (verbal This decline may lead to conflict and violence. and physical abuse) and in their homes (child At the same time, youth violence in itself may abuse and domestic violence). Over 14 per- erode social capital by creating conditions that cent of the respondents had been victims of are even more unsuitable for job creation and domestic violence many times, a few times, the provision of services. Youth violence may or on one occasion. Of these, 8.6 percent had also reduce the level of trust and cooperation

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 55 35 2 “Living is a big risk in our among community members. This loss of their environment, the young people admit- society.” “It is easy to die social cohesion because of inadequate sociali- ted taking personal risks to their health, safety zation by parents and schools leads to social and security. but hard to live.” exclusion among youth. Madden (2011) has Risks to sexual, mental and physical health —CARICOM (2009) argued that, if young males have no meaning- include promiscuity, unprotected sex, skin ful social status or ties (whether at home or bleaching (mostly in Jamaica) and substance in the community), they are more prone to abuse (including alcohol abuse). Youth health gang recruitment. One may therefore assume insecurity and health risk-taking have been as- a strong correlation among the strengthening sociated with exposure to new and potentially of social capital, increased youth participation, more deadly risks, including violence. Vio- inclusion in community activities, and the pre- lence against self in the form of attempts at vention of youth violence. Indeed, advocates suicide has been a subject of growing concern have called for a focus on youth populations as in the region and has been linked to commu- a whole rather than on problem youth.36 En- nity and interpersonal risk factors associated couraging youth from a variety of backgrounds with violence. For example, youth who have to work together helps build social capital. admitted that they have attempted suicide have often been victims of physical or sexual abuse, have had relatives who attempted sui-

Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience Individual Risks At the individual level, the choice to pursue cide, and have expressed feelings of rage con- the use of violence is often affected by peer -in nected to these experiences. Such histories of fluence, low self-esteem and employment sta- violence may fuel aggression against others tus. The CARICOM Commission on Youth and violence against oneself. Development engaged youth between 15 and In the Caribbean, the two principal con- 29 years of age in discussions on the mean- cerns in relation to the risk that youth will ing of risk and vulnerability in their own real- use violence against others have been related ity. Youth conceptualized risk as potentially to early sexual initiation and substance abuse. both positive and negative. Some responses Early sexual initiation has been a worrying fea- of youth are highlighted here that reflect this ture of Caribbean youth development. The age duality in the concept.37 of first sex is among the lowest in the world: On the one hand, risk was viewed in the as early as 12.5 years of age among males.39 In context of relative life-or-death situations. 2007, two thirds of youth who had reported On the other hand, risk-taking was viewed as they had had sex claimed to have done so be- a necessary part of a young person’s life that fore the age of 13 years.40 Early sex has put could lead to the achievement of personal young people at greater risk and made them goals. The negativity of risk seemed to over- more vulnerable to exposure to HIV and other whelm the potential for positive outcomes. sexually transmitted diseases, as well as teenage Risk-taking appeared to be more about sur- and unexpected pregnancy, which constrain vival and fitting in than about achievement. socio-economic potential. These outcomes The reasons for negative risk-taking included often lead to interpersonal conflict between the following:38 partners and to depression, frustration and ag- • Desire to belong to a group and to be cool, gression. The early sexual initiation of girls in popular, a trendsetter or an admired rebel some communities in Jamaica is also associated • Yielding to peer pressure with the use of coercion and appears to be re- • As a means to obtain money from older lated to the socialization of girls into depend- people who influence them ent relationships with men.41 Evidence shows • For mere survival or to better themselves that early sexual initiation is linked with child • To create a new space for self-expression abuse in many Caribbean countries.42 and to distinguish themselves from others Substance abuse is the second most wide- • To add excitement to their lives ly recognized risk in terms of youth violence In addition to battling the risks that arise in and has also been linked to early sexual ini-

56 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 tiation. Blum et al. (2003) find that 60 per- Reducing Risk and Vulnerability “Youth have to run risks 2 cent of sexually active boys indicated they The concern about increasing levels of youth to achieve things, youth were using marijuana. Alcohol use is most violence has led to the mobilization of sup- risk their lives to eat food, closely associated with increased aggression port and resources for many youth develop- and violence.43 ment programmes at various levels across the they have to leave from The context of youth risk and vulnerabil- region. These programmes are mounted by a one point to another and ity is complex, but an understanding of these variety of actors, including governments, civil during this process youth factors provides the foundation upon which society organizations, the private sector, com- effective approaches to preventing violence munity associations and faith-based organiza- end up getting killed.” may be built as a priority in human develop- tions. It is perhaps too early in many cases to “Youth hardly consider ment. assess fully the success of various programmes risk: it’s something they implemented in the Caribbean, especially giv- Reducing Risk and en the lack of data.44 Nonetheless, the follow- don’t want to hear about Enhancing Resilience ing six themes are presented as the founda- because they view it as tions of good practice. However, stakeholder being scolded for doing Given the significance of youth in the Carib- preparedness to engage with these principles bean region, there is a need to develop effec- is likely to be hampered by the limited re- something wrong.” tive approaches to preventing youth violence. gional capacity for systematic data collection —CARICOM (2009) Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience An understanding of the challenge of youth on youth to support evidence-based planning violence in the Caribbean should lead to ac- and programme design. ceptance of the fact that strategies for reduc- First, the contextualization of programmes for ing youth violence must tackle the context in violence prevention among youth as aspects of which violence arises, while carving out a space a broader project of societal development is im- for youth to be equipped to take responsibility perative. Programmes must address community for resisting the recourse to violence. The pre- risk factors, as well as the national and regional vention of youth violence therefore requires contexts for development, including unemploy- a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, ment, political corruption, gang violence and there is a need to address the fundamental organized crime, government inefficiency, and structural issues that predispose youth to act the low penetration of public services. violently and make them susceptible to vic- Second, the principle of inclusivity should timization. This will require a reduction in the be applied in age- and gender-targeted in- societal and community or interpersonal risk terventions. Initiatives need to be tailored to factors highlighted above. On the other hand, different stages of the life cycle by integrating there is a need to equip youth with enhanced all levels and involving all categories of youth, agency so as to prevent and reverse trends to- including youth who are at risk, good youth, wards crime and violence in communities by offenders, and school drop-outs. Everyone building youth resilience. Certainly, the reduc- deserves a second chance, and good youth tion of risk factors is also likely to contribute should not be neglected. In addition, because to the enhancement of youth resilience. For ex- the age of offenders is decreasing, the adop- ample, a reduction in the exposure to violence tion of the life cycle approach, which targets eliminates the stress, frustration and trauma children and adults, as well as youth, provides that would otherwise prevent youth from cop- a pre-emptory avenue to address violence. It ing with periodic socio-economic stressors in does this through preventive interventions their environments. The reduction of risk and prior to the display of any forms of violent the enhancement of youth resilience are there- behaviour among younger cohorts, in part- fore inextricably linked. The attention to one nership with parents and teachers who are to the detriment of the other is likely to reduce responsible for youth socialization. the effectiveness of policies and programmes Inclusive programmes acknowledge the gen- on violence prevention. dered dimension of the patterns of youth violence and develop preventive steps that take into

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 57 2 Over 80 percent of the account gender differences. However, male-fo- ships among social institutions may contribute youth surveyed indicated cused initiatives are not considered as effective to encouraging law-abiding behaviour. as more holistic gender-based approaches that Sixth, for their willingness to work the provision of specific alternatives seek to address the causes of the differences be- offenders and second-chance programmes for towards the reduction of tween boys and girls in relation to violence and school drop-outs help lower youth risk and violence. Building their reinforce the factors that have contributed to reduce the funnelling of youth unnecessarily lower rates of female offending.45 into the criminal justice system. resilience will enable them Third, integrated planning and pro- to act as agents of change grammes are most effective. For example, Enhancing Youth Resilience and of greater human de- linking drug abuse counselling to anger man- While the context for development must agement, entrepreneurship and skills training change through the reduction of exogenous velopment in their homes, at the community level on a voluntary and risks, any violence prevention programme schools, communities, demand-driven basis helps address all levels must also acknowledge the role that youth countries and the region. of risk in a holistic, coordinated manner. themselves must play in the process. In the Fourth, coordination and partnership Caribbean, youth are willing to participate among intergovernmental, governmental and in enhancing citizen security. The youth re- civil society stakeholders is imperative and spondents to the UNDP Citizen Security must support youth-adult partnerships. There

Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience Survey 2010 displayed strong feelings about is a general perception that civil society pro- participation in community violence preven- grammes are more effective even though the tion programmes. Stakeholders need to en- majority of programmes are run by the state. able youth to play a role in violence reduction The effectiveness could be due to the fact that and prevention. civil society organizations are more likely to Resilience involves positive adaptation involve young people in the planning and im- under stress and the development of good plementation process so as to understand more outcomes despite serious threats to well- fully the context in which youth function. In being.46 It refers to the capacity of youth to addition, civil society organizations are more cope with challenges and resist risk factors. likely to employ social rather than punitive ju- It is about supporting youth agency—the dicial approaches to risk reduction. capacity of youth to resist the overwhelming Fifth, trengtheneds police-youth relations, in- influence of risk and to take responsibility for cluding police outreach in schools, are likely to their own development—through processes provide a good foundation for social violence that promote youth well-being and empow- prevention. These kinds of voluntary partner- erment. The situation analysis of the CARI-

Table 2.7. How Should One Resist Violence in Communities? The Point of View of Youth

Passive Active-destructive Active constructive

Isolate oneself and stay Form gangs to protect Report violence to the police indoors each other (notwithstanding some distrust Try to stay neutral and do Face risk directly and of police in Jamaica and in Trin- not take sides in any conflict defend oneself using vio- idad and Tobago) Be polite to everyone lence Go to church and pray Focus on productive work, a job, or other activity Go to parties to relieve stress

58 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 COM Commission on Youth Development The family: Families, particularly parents, has revealed that young people have their play an important role in shielding youth 2 own understandings of resilience and the ac- from some of the societal and community tions that contribute to the enhancement of risk factors they encounter.48 The socializa- resilience.47 The responses that youth have tion of the child away from violent conflict is exhibited in an attempt to resist violence in an important tool in promoting more socially their communities can be placed into three positive behaviours at school and in the com- categories: passive, active destructive, and munity. Close, stable and positive family con- active-constructive (table 2.7). nections and positive, supportive and non-violent relationships with parents who provide Factors Supporting Risk supervision and discipline are the linchpins of Reduction and Resilience-Building youth resilience, particularly among children In addition to observance of the six planning under 16 years of age, although the provision and programme principles outlined above, of basic needs in care and protection, includ- a contributory factor in achieving the two- ing food and shelter, is essential. Most pro- pronged approach to violence prevention is grammes in the Caribbean seek to strengthen the mobilization of protective institutions the protective capacity of the family by offering training in parenting and family counsel- to achieve the interconnected objectives of Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience risk reduction and resilience-building. The ling, with a focus on young and teenage par- protective institutions that influence young ents (see box 2.1, for example). Practitioners people’s decision-making with respect to risk- have suggested that these kinds of interven- taking have been widely discussed in the lit- tions have only limited success unless they are erature. They may be distilled into four main linked to other activities that build the resil- spheres of influence: the family, peers, the ience of the wider family with respect to the community (including schools), and state promotion of poverty reduction, increased institutions. These spheres correspond and income generation and worthwhile employ- relate to several societal and community risk ment. These approaches should also provide factors. Therefore, the mobilization of each spaces for youth participation in family deci- of these spheres of influence into positive sion-making to begin the process of building action is likely to contribute to both risk re- youth self-esteem and the capacity of youth to duction and resilience-building. The process make good decisions. of strengthening protective factors has been Peer support groups: Participation in clubs, achieved to a varying extent through a variety associations and other peer groups may help of programmes and interventions for youth prevent youth violence. Positive influences violence prevention. have been as effective in persuading youth away

Box 2.1. A Promising Family Programme: Parental Education, Suriname

The Parental Education Programme has been offered for education, scarce family resources, abuse and violence, more than seven years by the Bureau for the Development impaired parental mental health and the presence of non- of Children, an NGO in Suriname. The programme of- biological parents. Parents and professional educators have fers combined socialization and educational services to collaborated on strategies to address risk factors, while also a low-income community in Sophia’s Lust, a slum in the acknowledging the context of discrimination against Ma- urban periphery of Paramaribo, where the majority of the roons. Healthy social networks, positive role models, the population is of Maroon descent. The risk factors that have existence of friends who are at low risk, and fair treatment been identified in the family setting include low parental have been indicated as positive protective factors.

Source: Parental Education, Suriname. Bureau for the Development of Children, Suriname.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 59 2 Box 2.2. A Promising Peer Programme: Peace Ambassadors, Barbados The Peace Ambassadors Programme was established in nities. The programme currently involves over 150 Peace 2006 to confront the rise of violence and conflict in sec- Ambassadors at seven secondary schools in Barbados. It ondary schools in Barbados and to influence positive encourages the establishment of zones of peace at each choices and decision-making among boys and girls. The school, supported by events and activities that promote an programme targets young people interested in living in atmosphere of harmony within the school environment. peace by promoting respect for themselves and others. It The Peace Ambassadors are easily identified by other stu- brings girls and boys together to speak out and take action dents through the pins that the ambassadors wear that are against violence by encouraging them to become involved inscribed with the word ‘Peace’. with others to solve problems in their schools and commu-

Source: Peace Ambassadors, Barbados. Personal communication, Adisa (AJA) Andwele, Program Director.

from violence as negative influences have been to their peers. A revival of structures for youth effective in pushing youth towards violence. participation is critical to building resilience. Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience Several programmes have been developed The community: Schools, community across the region that seek to link youth perpe- groups and faith-based organizations also trators to their victims and to other youth who play a role in the protection of youth and in have been rehabilitated and reintegrated into building their resilience. Several successful society (box 2.2). These types of interventions violence prevention programmes have been are considered most effective in resilience- located across the region within such social building. The decline of youth movements institutions and are implemented by civil so- and capacity issues among youth organizations ciety groups, including NGOs, faith-based have affected the ability of youth to reach out organizations, universities and coalitions of

Box 2.3. A Promising State-Community Programme: The Peace Management Initiative, Jamaica

A programme of early intervention, the Peace Manage- contributed significantly in lowering the homicide rate; ment Initiative (PMI) seeks to stop conflict from escalat- during the first two years of its operations, the homicide ing into violence and strengthens civic organizations that rate dropped by 15 percent. Although Jamaica’s crime rate offer stability, sustainable development, security and self- escalated again thereafter, PMI is still seen as a worthwhile respect in inner-city communities. These objectives are initiative. There is a prevailing perception that, in the ab- achieved through a number of short- and long-term strat- sence of the programme, the homicide rate would have egies such as deploying mediators, providing support to been even higher. community organizations and developing economic liveli- Among the lessons learned through PMI, programme hoods. PMI has worked to control gang violence, negoti- members have highlighted the following: capacity build- ate peace agreements, provide counselling and treatment ing reduces the incidence of violence; there is a need to to individuals affected by violence, and cultivate relations distinguish between community and criminal violence in with community leaders. planning and programmes; understanding the role played Led by the Ministry of National Security, PMI involves by civil society is fundamental in supporting governmental several interest groups, such as churches, academia, politi- initiatives; and employable skills and training are crucial to cal parties, government agencies, and NGOs at the local preventing and reducing crime. and national levels. Established in January 2002, PMI has

Source: The Peace Management Initiative, Jamaica. Personal communication, Rohan Perry.

60 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 organizations. The Peace Management Ini- the literature for integrated programmes and tiative, in Jamaica, is one such coalition (box planning that treat youth violence holistically 2 2.3). The initiative holds potential for build- by focusing on the development of youth coming collective effectiveness whereby commu- munities rather than targeting only problem nity members participate for the common youth.50 However, experience has shown that good of violence reduction.49 It helps young there are weaknesses associated with many people build good relationships with adults state violence prevention programmes that are other than their parents and model positive not unrelated to the failure to embrace the six values and attitudes. principles for effective approaches outlined Data of the UNDP Citizen Security Sur- above. vey 2010 show that, even among those youth We highlight four main weaknesses. The who had been charged with crimes, most in- first relates to the extent to whichresponses dicated that they appreciated the presence of that revolve exclusively around legislation and associates and the feeling of belonging to and law enforcement have been able to contend being proud of their neighbourhoods. How- properly with the phenomenon of youth vio- ever, 30 percent did not participate in com- lence. In 2008, CARICOM mandated the munity activities, and 20.5 percent did not establishment of a Caribbean Community trust people in the community. Nonetheless, Social and Development Crime Prevention Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience the level of social inclusion among young peo- Action Plan, which is now in draft stage. The ple who had been charged with crimes was action plan aims to reduce violence, foster comparatively high, even if isolation from the social inclusion, promote reintegration, em- community seems to affect more than 20 per- power victims, and protect the environment cent of the youth among them. Overall, most and economic resources.51 It highlights young of the youth felt that the people in their com- people as priority stakeholders. At the same munities would intervene on their behalf if time, even though some of the Caribbean-7 they fell victim to crimes. Even among victims have adopted national youth policies (Bar- of domestic violence, 34.7 percent felt that bados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago), community members were likely to intervene the majority of policies and frameworks that in incidents of domestic violence, though deal with youth relate to children and the 36.2 percent did not feel this way. This kind criminal justice system. Much of the available of social cohesion is an important strategy in framework is couched within the context of violence prevention and has been employed defining unacceptable youth actions as delin- successfully in the Caribbean through neigh- quency, that is, actions in conflict with the bourhood watch groups and other collabora- law. This approach limits the responses of the tive efforts among citizens. state to youth issues to national security strat- State institutions: A significant share of the egies that address delinquency rather than initiatives aimed at reducing violence have been human development strategies to promote launched by state institutions, which also play the development of young people (including a role in protection and resilience-building. by reducing risk factors) and youth empower- Typically, the police, criminal justice systems ment (including by enhancing resilience). and social departments and ministries have had The second issue within the state policy the greatest access to young people. There is a framework relates to the promotion of the plethora of programmes and approaches being institutionalization of problem youth, which implemented by the state, which suggests that has led, in many cases, to the incarceration of there is a need for greater coordination across young people who are in need of care and pro- agencies and for integrated programmes and tection from neglect and abuse and who have planning that contextualize youth violence come into contact with the justice system for prevention initiatives within other, broader offences variously defined as wandering, being initiatives so as to address community and so- out of control, or running away from home.52 cietal risk factors. There is certainly support in The youth are often housed in penal facilities

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 61 together with serious offenders, where they vide voluntary supervision for the youth, who 2 are often victimized again. are placed in remedial programmes. A success These policy preferences for the institu- of the scheme has been the extent of police tionalization of youth in need of care and collaboration with other government depart- protection also harbour a gender bias. Data ments and civil society organizations in form- on Barbados reveal that the majority of youth ing an inter-agency management committee institutionalized for wandering are girls. It is for the programme. likely that the pattern is similar in other coun- While in contact with the criminal justice tries. system, youth have become victims of abuse Meanwhile, the majority of youth living or fail to receive adequate rehabilitative or re- on the streets are boys or young men. For ex- integration services. Over 50 percent of the ample, Cooke (2002, 6) notes that, among youth respondents to our survey believe that street children in Jamaica, “boys outnumber the justice systems in their countries are cor- girls by a proportion of 70:30.” These boys, rupt, and 47 percent believe that the police averaging about 13 years of age, become in- are incompetent. Of the youth who reported volved in various forms of child labour and that they had been victims of violent crimes, other forms of exploitation. That boys out- 64.1 percent had reported the crimes to the number girls on the streets is likely to be a police, while 34.5 percent had not. The rea- Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience regional trend. These findings suggest that sons for non-reporting have not been deter- young men who leave their homes for various mined, but, of those youth who reported, reasons, including child abuse, are allowed to 18.6 percent were ‘dissatisfied’ with the police live on the streets, while young women who investigative processes, and 18.8 percent were leave their homes for similar reasons are more ‘very dissatisfied’. Nonetheless, the majority likely to be institutionalized. This distinction of the youth respondents felt that the police is in itself a sign of inequality; however, we deserved their support, and they indicated a argue that neither approach is appropriate. willingness to work towards violence preven- Both reflect neglect: a neglect of the responsi- tion. The strengthening of police-youth rela- bility to provide care and protection to youth. tions can become the foundation of strategies Neither young males living on the street, nor to reduce youth violence by adopting social young females in institutions receive the kind measures in policing and by preventing the of support, counselling, or encouragement immediate institutionalization of youth. This required to address the issues that lead them issue is discussed in more detail in chapter 5. to abandon their homes and families. The third weakness apparent in state re- There should be a shift away from insti- sponses is the failure to create effective links tutionalization as a first response for youth to build communities and strengthen social in conflict with the law. The focus of state capital and social cohesion while in pursuit of approaches should be on working with civil violence reduction. society to provide a protective environment The fourth weakness of the state frame- to prevent youth from coming into conflict work is the lack of the pursuit of youth-adult with the law. However, where conflict with partnerships by which youth and civil society the law has not been avoided, governments become acknowledged as joint stakeholders should encourage the use of alternative ap- in the process of violence prevention. Youth proaches to incarceration, including diver- have a role to play in violence reduction and sion and restorative justice. An example of a prevention. The majority of youth surveyed good practice originates in Barbados. The Ju- indicated that they currently contribute or venile Liaison Scheme, which was launched are willing to contribute to violence reduc- by the Royal Barbados Police Force in 1983, tion programmes and human development has helped over 3,000 young people and their programmes. They express hope that they families by diverting offenders away from the will be able to contribute. “We have the criminal justice system. Police officers pro- skills to make a contribution but have no

62 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 tools,” Joseph, Holder, and Alexis (2009) problem, particularly through anecdotes re- quote a youth from Belize saying during the ported in the media, may serve to stereotype 2 consultations conducted by the CARICOM youth, particularly young males. Stereotyping Commission on Youth Development. If they contributes to the adoption of heavy-handed are provided with the opportunity to par- and rights-violating security responses that ticipate, youth become empowered and can foster youth exclusion and unnecessary insti- contribute to the enhancement of their own tutionalization through the criminal justice resilience. system. Nonetheless, all instances of youth vio- Conclusion lence, however small in proportion to the incidence of violence generally, should be taken The risk of violent offending and violent vic- seriously. Responses must address the struc- timization among young people has increased. tural, societal, community, and individual This has occurred in a context of high levels of risk factors that account for youth violence youth unemployment, inadequate education- and victimization. These responses should al opportunities, and exposure to violence at take into consideration country-specific con- home, in schools, in communities and in the texts and gender differences in the patterns of offending and victimization. wider society. At the same time, youth con- Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience tinue to express feelings of exclusion from Interventions aimed at reducing vio- national and regional governance processes, lence must acknowledge youth agency and which helps predispose them to participate in the rights of youth to participate in the de- alternative structures, including gangs. sign, implementation and monitoring of While the problem of youth violence war- violence prevention processes. Significant rants urgent attention, exaggeration of the opportunities exist for youth participation

Table 2.8. Analysis of the Context of Youth Violence in the Caribbean

Strengths Weaknesses

a. The majority of youth are not violent a. Youth are stigmatized as violent b. Some youth are already contributing to violence reduction b. Youth offenders do not receive adequate rehabilitation and human development and reintegration support c. Several promising programmes have been implemented to c. Lack of appropriate data to support planning and pro- reduce risk and build youth resilience; these now require grammes evaluation, assessment and replication as appropriate

Opportunities Threats

a. Youth are open to new experiences and pursuits, and, so, a. High levels of youth unemployment and inadequate edu- change is not as threatening to them cational opportunities b. Youth generally feel respected in their communities, b. Parents neglect and abuse their children which provides a foundation for building youth-adult c. Societal tolerance of violence threatens to erode progress partnerships in non-violent socialization among youth at home and c. Youth have strong feelings about participation and are school and in communities willing to contribute to violence prevention d. Most youth believe that the police deserve their support

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 63 in a context in which the majority of Carib- The context in which policy makers, pro- bean youth surveyed have positive attitudes gramme implementers and youth respond to participation in community activities and to the phenomenon of youth violence offers supporting law enforcement officers. These distinct strengths and opportunities for vio- young people have expressed the willingness lence reduction and the development of more to contribute to violence reduction in their socially just societies. These issues are summa- countries. rized in table 2.8. CHAPTER Reducing the Contribution of Street 3 Gangs and Organized Crime to Violence More social cohesion, less crime

Stronger bonds, safer societies

Caribbean governments must make security a policy priority Reducing the Contribution of Street 3CHAPTER Gangs and Organized Crime to Violence 3

Introduction crime and neglected to differentiate organized crime and street gangs. Over the last several years, street gangs and or- In general terms, there is agreement that

ganized criminal groups have become increas- street gangs are characterized as “any durable, Street Gangs and Organized Crime ingly perceived in many regions of the world street oriented youth group whose involve- as a major problem contributing to violence ment in illegal activity is part of their group and crime and undermining local economies, identity”.2 Durability generally means that the rule of law, and human development. The the group has been around longer than a few Caribbean is no exception. Nations across the months. Street oriented refers to the group Caribbean region are struggling to determine spending substantial time on the streets and the scope, nature and causes of the problem of in parks, malls and other public places. Youth crime and the appropriate mix of programmes refers to those who are, on average, between and resources to be dedicated to suppression 13 and 25 years of age. Illegal activity refers and prevention to respond to street gangs and to criminal activity, not merely disorderly organized crime. This chapter focuses on street conduct or presenting a public nuisance. gangs and organized crime in seven Caribbean Identity refers to the sense of the group, not nations (the Caribbean-7). Its primary concern merely to an individual’s self-image.3 Organ- is the connection among street gangs, organized crime, in contrast, “is characterized by ized crime and violence. It does not focus on the enterprise activity, the use of violence (ac- links to drug-trafficking and related issues such tual and/or threatened) and corruption as as money laundering, which have been covered typical means and exploitable relationships in prior reports.1 Following the definitions of with the upper-world.”4 In this regard, enter- street gangs and organized crime, the chapter prise activity involves the provision of illegal presents a cross-national approach to examining goods or services to individuals. Traditional the scope and nature of the problems, the causes examples have revolved around trafficking in of street gangs and organized crime, and the drugs, guns and people, as well as extortion. current responses throughout the region. Organized crime groups are also character- There is often substantial confusion and de- ized by their organizational sophistication. bate over the terms street gang and organized In general, their organizational structure can crime. The difference between the two is -im be observed in two forms: corporate and re- portant, however, not only for diagnosing the lational. Those groups that operate within related issues accurately, but also for the imple- the corporate model possess formal hierarchy mentation of effective and efficient responses. and clear lines of authority. Those groups that Street gangs and organized crime are different operate with a relational model are organized and require different responses. While organ- based on personal and social networks that ized crime can have greater consequences for often already exist in a community or area.5 nations, attention to street gangs is needed be- Street gangs are different from organized cause of the high risks associated with policies crime groups in several ways. For example, that are directed towards delinquent youth in street gangs typically lack organization and general and gangs in particular, but that are have limited centralized leadership, whereas poorly conceived and implemented. Other organized crime groups have clear lines of au- reports have focused primarily on organized thority. Street gangs are also more likely to be

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 67 motivated by issues of status, while organized 2010, the key finding is to realize that youth 3 crime groups are often economically moti- gangs are a complex, changing and differenti- vated. Whereas street gangs may be involved ated phenomenon.6 A comprehensive review in neighbourhood-level drug sales, organized of studies on this topic reveals the dangers of crime groups are involved in the wider distri- oversimplifications, especially the ones that bution and trafficking of drugs. picture gangs as out-and-out criminal groups or as innocent youth clubs. The lack of research Scope and Nature of the Problem in the Caribbean should not come as a surprise given that, as Caribbean scholars report, little Research on street gangs and organized crime attention has been given to citizen insecurity has a long and extensive history in the United until recently and even less attention has been States; in Europe, the topic has also received

Street Gangs and Organized Crime dedicated to gangs and problems related to or- increasing attention, but these phenomena ganized crime. Most of what is known comes have not been as systematically examined from the two largest Caribbean nations: Ja- in the Caribbean. According to the Central maica and Trinidad and Tobago. American Human Development Report 2009– Prevalence of the Problem Multiple data sources show that street gangs are Chart 3.1 Perceptions of the Street Gang active in much of the Caribbean region, albeit Problem, Caribbean-7, 2010 the magnitude of the problem in each nation varies substantially. Popular tools in the research 45 on the issues are resident perception data, official police data and self-reporting data.7 40.7 39.7 38.0 40 Of the respondents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 across the Caribbean-7, 35 32.4 12.5 percent believe that gangs are in their 30.8 29.6 30 neighbourhoods (chart 3.1). However, per- 25.8 ceptions vary by nation. Almost 18 percent of 25 residents surveyed in Saint Lucia report the presence of gangs in their neighbourhoods, 17.9 20 followed by Trinidad and Tobago (13.9 per- Percent cent), Guyana (13.2 percent) and Antigua 15 13.2 13.9 12.4 12.7 10.8 12.5 and Barbuda (12.4 percent). About 9 to 18 10.3 10 9.2 percent of the residents claim there are gangs in their neighbourhoods. Chart 3.1 also 5 shows that, among those who report a gang presence in their neighbourhoods, about 32.4 0 percent state that the problem is a big one. These perceptions of the magnitude of the Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda gang problem also vary by nation. Around 41 Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia

Caribbean-7 percent of residents in Jamaica, 40 percent in There are criminal gangs in (neighbourdhood) Saint Lucia, and 38 percent in Trinidad and Criminal gangs are a big problem in your Tobago state the problem is a big one because neighbourdhood (if there is a gang problem) of gangs in their neighbourhoods. Between 26 and 30 percent of residents in Antigua and

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Barbuda, Guyana, and Suriname report the Note: Base: respondents who answered that gangs were in their neighbourhoods (N = 1700). same. Meanwhile, only about 13 percent of Questions: “Is there a criminal gang (or gangs) in your neighbourhood?” “To what extent is there a criminal gang problem in your neighbourhood?” The chart shows, for the first question, the residents in Barbados so report. percentage of respondents who answered “Yes” and, for the second question, the percentage of Chart 3.2 examines when respondents in respondents who answered “A big problem”. *p<.05 each of the Caribbean-7 first observed the

68 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Chart 3.2 The First Appearance of the Gang Problem 3 in Neighbourhoods, Caribbean-7, 2010

18.3

36.8 36.1 39.0 37.0 42.3 42.7 44.8 19.1

19.1 17.4 23.1 19.1 27.6 20.6 42.6 20.3 Street Gangs and Organized Crime

31.3 29.4 16.2 18.7 26.4 20.5 25.9

22.3 18.7 15.9 11.8 14.7 15.3 12.9 16.3 Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7

Within the last year More than 1, but less than 3 years ago More than 3, but less than 5 years ago More than 5 years ago

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who answered that gangs were in their neighbourhoods (N = 1,700). Question: “If yes (if there is a criminal gang or gangs in your neighbourhood), since when has this become a problem?”

gang problem. While a small proportion of Another method of measuring a nation’s Caribbean residents observed the gang prob- gang problem is through official police data. lem emerged over the previous year (16.3 Official police data capture information from percent), most said it had emerged over the people who come into contact with the po- previous three to five years (20.6 percent) or lice, and this information therefore tends to five or more years ago (37.0 percent). While refer to older individuals who are more heav- this pattern was similar across most Carib- ily involved in criminal activity.8 As shown in bean countries, Guyana was a notable excep- Table 3.1, the police in Jamaica have identi- tion. The data clearly show that respondents fied 268 gangs and approximately 3,900 gang in Guyana observed the emergence of gangs members. In Trinidad and Tobago, the police in that country much later than respondents have identified 95 gangs and approximately in most other Caribbean countries, with 1,269 gang members. Law enforcement of- about two thirds of the observers in Guyana ficials in Antigua and Barbuda have reported reporting that gangs had emerged in their 15 gangs and estimated there are between 264 neighbourhoods in the previous three years. and 570 gang members. Barbados has report- These findings suggest that, with the excep- ed 150 gangs and 4,000 gang members, but tion of Guyana, many Caribbean nations these figures may be inflated. Police estimates have had a gang problem for five years or of the street gang problem in Guyana, Saint longer. Lucia and Suriname are unavailable, which

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 69 Table 3.1. Official Police Estimates of the Population of 3 Street Gangs, Caribbean-7

Country Gangs, Gang Estimate Source number members, year number

Antigua & 15 264-570 2008 OAS (2008a) Barbuda

Barbados 150 4,000 2008 OAS (2008b) Street Gangs and Organized Crime Guyana ——

Jamaica 268 3,900 2010 Data of Ministry of National Security

Saint Lucia ——

Suriname ——

Trinidad & 95 1,269 2006 Katz and Choate Tobago (2006)

Note: The notation “— “ indicates unavailability of data.

represents a challenge to policy makers in might have a relatively significant gang prob- these nations to have an accurate understand- lem. Similarly, Katz, Choate, and Fox (2010) ing of the problem. Some Caribbean police have examined a sample of 2,292 youth at- agencies do not have the capacity to diagnose tending schools in urban areas in Trinidad and the scope of local gang activities. Tobago. Their analysis indicates that 12.5 per- Possibly the most common strategy adopt- cent of school-aged youth self-report they have ed in examining the prevalence of gang-related been in gangs. In contrast, self-reported data phenomenon is the use of self-reporting. Self- obtained from school-aged youth in Jamaica reported data have proven to be a robust, valid indicate substantially lower rates of gang mem- and reliable method for collecting informa- bership. Wilks et al. (2007), utilizing a com- tion from gang members.9 Ohene, Ireland, munity-based sample of 1,185 youth, find that and Blum (2005) have conducted one of the only 6.4 percent self-report ever being in gangs; few studies that examine the prevalence of using a school-based methodology, Fox and gang membership across the Caribbean. They Gordon-Strachan (2007) find a like propor- have collected self-reported data from 15,695 tion (6 percent). Data collected through focus school-aged youth in Antigua and Barbuda, groups and survey-based convenience samples the Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, of school-aged youth in Antigua and Barbuda Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica and have confirmed the presence of gangs in neigh- Saint Lucia. They find that 17–24 percent of bourhoods and schools, although quantitative males and 11–16 percent of females (vary- estimates are unavailable.10 Self-reported data ing by age) report they have been involved in collected from adults on their participation gangs. Their research suggests that, compared in street gangs in the Caribbean are rarer. As with more developed nations, the Caribbean part of the 2009 Jamaican National Crime Vic-

70 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 timization Survey, over 3,100 residents were females in Jamaican street gangs. Police data surveyed, of which fewer than 0.51 percent of suggest, however, that gang membership is 3 those aged 16 years or older self-reported ever predominately male. A survey of experts with being in a gang.11 Katz, Maguire, and Choate the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service found (2011) interviewed over 400 arrestees who had that there were no female-dominated gangs in been booked in Port of Spain, Trinidad. They the country.12 Similar findings were reported find that 5.1 percent of recently booked arres- in a study comprised of police experts in An- tees self-reported current street gang member- tigua and Barbuda.13 Together, these findings ship. might suggest that, while females are involved Measuring the prevalence of organized in street gangs in the Caribbean, their involve- crime is substantially more difficult. Organ- ment might not be sufficient to come fre-

ized crime groups, in their many forms, have quently to the attention of police. Regardless, Street Gangs and Organized Crime been found in Antigua and Barbuda, Bar- bados, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. However, the number of groups and the number of individuals who identify with Box 3.1. Why Do Caribbean Youth Join Street Gangs? such groups are relatively unknown. The most comprehensive examination of organized There is almost no Caribbean-based empirical research examining why crime in the Caribbean has been conducted in youth join street gangs. One of the few studies to examine the issue col- Jamaica by Anthony Harriott, Glaister Leslie, lected self-reported data from almost 2,300 school-aged youth in Trini- and Donna Moncrieffe. Moncrieffe (1998) es- dad and Tobago. The study found that most youth joined for reasons of timates that there were seven organized crime friendship (42 percent) and protection or safety (29.4 percent) (chart groups in Jamaica in 1998. A decade later, Les- a). The remaining joined because a family member was in a gang (5.9 lie (2010) counted 12, and Harriott (2009) percent), to make money (8 percent), or for other reasons (14.7 percent). found 20. Harriott (2011) notes that organ- Chart a. The Reasons Given by Trinidadian Youth for Joining Gangs ized crime in Jamaica is now more active, powerful and entrenched and perhaps more well 45 tolerated by the people and some of their po- 42.0 litical representatives than ever before. While 40 there is anecdotal evidence of organized crime in the other six Caribbean-7 nations, there has 35 been almost no systematic research examining prevalence. As a consequence, the data and in- 30 29.4 formation required to understand the problem Percent are lacking in the Caribbean basin. 25

The Sex and Age Composition of 20 Caribbean Street Gangs We know little about the socio-demographic 15 14.7 characteristics of street gang members in the Caribbean. Preliminary evidence on Jamaica 10 8.0 and on Trinidad and Tobago indicate that, among school-aged youth, the majority of 5 3.8 street gang members are male; however, fe- 2.1 male gang membership is also prevalent. For 0 example, Katz, Choate, and Fox (2010) find Protection/ Friendship Parent(s) Sibling(s) Make Other that, among a national sample of Trinidadian Safety in a Gang in a Gang Money youth in urban schools, 40.1 percent of self- reported gang members were females. Simi- Source: Katz, Choate, and Fox (2010). larly, Meeks (2009) notes a strong presence of

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 71 these findings hint that increased focus needs members self-report delinquency. A report by 3 to be placed on understanding how females an officer of the Royal Barbados Police Force impact gang structure, culture, and criminal- suggests that street gangs in that country use ity and the role females fulfil in gangs. symbols and initiation rituals.17 Street gangs This same body of research suggests in Jamaica, however, appear to be more well that individuals join street gangs at a young organized. According to Leslie (2010), gangs age (see box 3.1). In Trinidad and Tobago, there are characterized by an organizational school-aged youth who self-reported gang hierarchy and a division of labour, typically membership stated that, on average, they had including an all-powerful leader, an upper first become involved with their gangs when echelon, a middle echelon and bottom-level they were 12 years old.14 Surveys of school of- ‘workers’. Gangs in Jamaica exhibit several ty-

Street Gangs and Organized Crime ficials in Antigua and Barbuda have indicated pologies that range from small, loosely organ- that most gang members are between the ages ized gangs to large highly organized gangs. of 12 and 15 years.15 These preliminary find- Leslie (2010) also notes that these gangs lack ings together imply that the street gang prob- defined territories and do not use identifying lem is largely confined to young marginalized signs such as tattoos or gang colours. males. School-based gang prevention efforts Much less is known about organized crime should therefore begin early in life to inocu- groups in the region. In Jamaica, organized late youth from gang membership. crime groups are hierarchical and are led by ‘dons’. Dons typically have several ‘soldiers’ who The Organizational perform many functions. While some may be Characteristics of Street Gangs involved in a gang or criminal lifestyle; others Available research finds that the organiza- may be more involved in local politics. Soldiers tional characteristics of Caribbean street have access to the resources that are derived gangs vary by nation. Studies based on data from their activities.18 Dons play a leadership collected from law enforcement experts in role in politics, community affairs and the un- Antigua and Barbuda and in Trinidad and To- derground economy. For example, they have bago indicate that street gangs typically have veto power over political party decisions and an accepted name and that gang members regularly provide essential public services that refer to themselves as a gang or crew, spend the government cannot provide such as food, a lot of time in public places and claim turf. jobs and community safety.19 These organized While, in Trinidad and Tobago, according to crime groups have identifiable territories, re- police experts, most street gangs do not have ferred to as ‘garrisons’, that are considered safe symbols such as recognizable styles of cloth- havens from law enforcement. Harriott (2008b, ing, ways of speaking, or signs, police experts 24) notes that “entry into these areas by the po- in Antigua and Barbuda say that most street lice may precipitate armed battles that are costly gangs do make use of such symbols.16 Rely- in lives lost and may be politically costly for the ing on self-reported data from self-identified police and the political administration.” school-aged gang members in Trinidad and In Trinidad and Tobago, there have been Tobago, Pyrooz et al. (2012) indicate that, several drug-trafficking networks, some of while most gang members state that their which have evolved into organized crime gangs hold regular meetings (56 percent) groups. There are, however, alternate trajec- and have rules (52 percent), fewer than half tories to organized crime. Members and ex- state that their gangs have a leader (45 per- members of the Jamaat al Muslimeen consti- cent) or insignia (45 percent). While these tute a network that is involved in organized gangs exhibit relatively low levels of organiza- crime activities. The network is reportedly tion, Pyrooz et al. (2012) find that gang or- highly organized and prolific.20 International ganizational structure is positively related to attention turned to the group in 1990 when delinquency. In other words, the more struc- members attempted to overthrow the govern- turally organized a gang, the more the gang ment of Trinidad and Tobago.21 The structure

72 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 of organized crime groups in Guyana and to which countries are affected by gang-related Suriname is less well known, but is believed to crime and violence. For example, in Antigua 3 be comprised of loosely organized networks and Barbuda, homicide data for 2006–2007 that support the drug and gun trade. show that only 1 of the 29 homicides reported in that country were gang related.22 In Barbados The Consequences of Street and Guyana, while the problem does not ap- Gangs and Organized Crime pear prevalent, there are periodic news reports Street gangs and organized crime groups are of gang homicides.23 However, the situation in major obstacles to meeting regional devel- these countries has not been systematically ex- opment goals. They affect the quality of life, amined. The number of gang homicides in Saint erode the development of human and social Lucia appears to be growing and contributing

capital and divert substantial resources away to a greater share of the nation’s homicides, but Street Gangs and Organized Crime from more productive uses. Below, we illus- there is no systematic research. The number of trate how street gangs and organized crime gang homicides in Jamaica and in Trinidad and have contributed to violence and crime and Tobago, however, are substantial and increasing. undermine local economies, the rule of law In Jamaica, in 2006, there were 1,303 homi- and human development. cides, of which 32.5 percent (n = 423) were Crime and violence are perhaps the most classified as gang homicides, and, in 2009, the publicly visible consequences of street gangs and country experienced 1,680 homicides, of which organized crime (box 3.2). Available data indi- 48.1 percent (n = 808) were classified as gang cate there is substantial variability in the degree related. Similarly, in Trinidad and Tobago, in

Box 3.2. Do Gangs Have an Impact on the Number of Homicides in Communities?

After controlling for social-structural factors, the authors of a recent study have found that there is a strong relationship between the presence of gangs and gang members and the incidence of homicide in communities. Thus, for every additional gang member in a community, the number of homicides increased by 0.4 percent, and, for every additional gang in a community, the number of homicides increased by about 10 percent (table a).

Table a. The Relationship between Gangs and Homicides

Increase in gangs, number Increase in homicides, % Increase in gang members, number Increase in homicides, %

1 9.1 1 0.4

2 19.0 5 2.0

3 29.9 10 4.1

4 41.7 50 22.1

5 54.6 100 49.1

10 138.9 150 82.0

20 470.8 200 122.2

400 393.7

Source: Katz and Fox (2010).

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 73 2006, there were 371 homicides, of which 26.4 out the Caribbean, gang homicides may be 3 percent (n = 98) were classified by the police more pronounced than official police statistics as gang related; in 2009, the country reported and news reports indicate. 506 homicides, of which 34.8 percent (n = 176) Perhaps our greatest understanding of the were gang related. Accordingly, not only did the threat posed by Caribbean street gangs was proportion of gang-related homicides increase provided by research conducted in Trinidad in both countries, but the number of gang-relat- and Tobago. A national study diagnosing the ed homicides almost doubled in both countries issue of street gangs was funded by the Min- over the same period. istry of National Security. It examined several Research suggests that these figures may data sources, including official data, self-report- underreport the extent of the problem. Over ed data of school-aged youth, and self-reported

Street Gangs and Organized Crime the last several decades, a number of research- data of arrestees. All three data sources yielded ers have described the limitations of gang similar outcomes. The official data showed that homicide data and the under classification of gang members, relative to non–gang members, homicides as gang related.24 One such study were two times more likely to have been arrest- was conducted in Trinidad and Tobago. Katz ed for property crimes, three times more likely and Maguire (2006) examined the nature of to have been arrested for violent, gun, or drug the homicides in the Besson Street Station offenses, and five times more likely to have District, a station district with one of the worst been arrested for drug sales.25 Self-reported homicide rates in the nation. They determined data of school-aged youth showed that, com- that, while the police classified about 25 per- pared with non–gang members, gang members cent of the district’s homicides as gang related, were about 11 times more likely to be involved interviews and document reviews revealed that in drug sales, 7 times more likely to be involved at least 62.5 percent of the homicides were ac- in violence, 5 times more likely to be involved tually gang related. This suggests that, through- in property crimes, and three times more likely

Chart 3.3 Neighbourhood Experiences of Gang Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010

20.2 20

15 14.5 12.7 12.6 12.1

Percent 10.0 10 8.7 5.7 5

0 Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “In the last year, did any of the following crimes/behaviours occur in your neighbourhood?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Gang violence”.

74 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 to have been arrested.26 While similar findings We also explored the impact of street were reported by adult arrestees, analysis indi- gangs by examining the personal experiences 3 cated that many gang members in the nation of residents as victims during the year previ- possessed firearms (52.6 percent), which were ous to the survey. We compared the victimi- carried for self-defence.27 zation rates among residents who lived in Surveys of residents are another common neighbourhoods with gang problems and the strategy for understanding the consequenc- rates among residents in gang-free neighbour- es of street gangs and organized crime. The hoods. Table 3.2 shows that, regardless of UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 reveals country, people who live in areas with gangs varying levels of gang violence in the Carib- were about twice as likely to have been crime bean-7. Slightly more than 12.1 percent of victims during the year previous to the survey.

the residents in these nations stated that gang While extortion has been strongly related to Street Gangs and Organized Crime violence takes place in their neighbourhoods the presence of gangs in neighbourhoods in (chart 3.3). Saint Lucian residents were the Central America, this does not appear to be most likely to report such gang violence (20.2 the case in the Caribbean. Property crime, percent), followed by Trinidadians (14.5 per- however, is associated with the presence of cent), Antiguans (12.7 percent), Jamaicans gangs in the Caribbean. In Antigua and Bar- (12.6 percent), Guyanese (10.0 percent), Suri- buda, Barbados, Guyana and Suriname, peo- namese (8.7 percent), and Barbadians (5.7 per- ple who live in neighbourhoods with gangs cent). were more than twice as likely to have been the

Table 3.2. Victimization and Neighbourhood Gang Presence, Caribbean-7, 2010 percent Country Any Violent Property Extortion victimization victimization victimization victimization

No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs gangs gangs gangs gangs

Antigua & 9.3 23.3 3.1 12.7 4.8 12.7 0.1 0.0 Barbuda

Barbados 10.1 26.1 4.3 14.1 4.0 11.5 0.1 0.0

Guyana 6.2 17.7 1.7 6.9 2.9 6.9 0.2 0.0

Jamaica 5.3 8.3 1.8 4.3 2.4 4.3 0.0 0.0

Saint Lucia 9.1 19.7 3.2 11.4 4.9 9.3 0.1 0.4

Suriname 8.7 18.1 2.0 7.1 6.7 13.8 0.0 0.0

Trinidad & 9.6 16.0 3.7 10.1 4.2 5.3 0.2 0.0 Tobago

Caribbean-7 8.4 18.5 2.8 9.6 4.4 9.0 0.1 0.1

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “In the last year, were you victim of a crime, a violent crime, property crime, financial crime?” and “Is there a criminal gang in your neighbourhood?” The table shows, according to the presence or absence of gangs, the percentage of respondents who answered “Yes” to the first question by type of crime. *p<.05

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 75 victims of property crimes. In Jamaica and in terms of the impact of gangs on neighbour- 3 Trinidad and Tobago, there was not a signifi- hood safety. Specifically, we were interested cant relationship between gang presence and in determining if residents believed that the property crime victimization. With respect presence of street gangs made their neigh- to victimization through violence, the rela- bourhoods safer or less safe. While most re- tionship was particularly strong in the Car- spondents stated that gangs made their com- ibbean-7: almost 10 percent of the residents munities less safe, a surprisingly large share of of neighbourhoods with gangs had been vic- the respondents in Barbados (14.3 percent) tims of violent crimes, compared with about and Jamaica (14.9 percent) stated that gangs 3 percent of the residents of neighbourhoods made their neighbourhoods safer (chart 3.4). with no gang problems. The highest rates of This might reflect the concern of Barbadians

Street Gangs and Organized Crime victimization by violence in neighbourhoods about the high risk of victimization and their with gangs were found in Barbados, a coun- perception that gangs might provide citizen try in which the gang problem appears to be safety. In Jamaica, these findings may reflect fairly modest relative to the other countries; the view of resident that the state has failed in the lowest rates were in Jamaica, a country in its responsibilities to ensure citizen security, which the gang problem is fairly substantial and gangs have filled the void. relative to the other countries. These findings Organized crime groups are engaged in ac- may arise from the fact that neighbourhoods tivity that is often less visible to the public, but with emerging gang problems experience that can nonetheless have an equally or more greater conflict than neighbourhoods with damaging effect than the activity of street gangs. long-standing and chronic gang problems. Data are sparse; for most nations, we must rely We sought to understand these same issues on learning about the consequences of organ- by examining the perceptions of residents in ized crime through anecdotal evidence. For example, such evidence indicates that, in Guyana and Suriname, both South American nations Chart 3.4 Respondents Who Believe Gangs Make geographically, but Caribbean in culture, the Neighbourhoods Safer, Caribbean-7, 2010 consequences of organized crime are varied, but are often related to drug-trafficking. Local officials note that “the people who are involved 16 14.9 14.3 in moving drugs are often the same people who 14 will use the same operation for many other il- 12 legal activities” such as money laundering and terrorism.28 Drug-trafficking perpetuated by 10 9.4 organized crime groups also often leads to lo- 8 7.8 cal drug use problems because traffickers are 6.6

Percent frequently not paid in cash, but in product and 6 5.8 are therefore required to sell in domestic mar- 4.4 4 kets, which then has consequential effects on 3.0 local criminality, including youth gangs, pros- 2 titution, and violent and property crime relat- 0 ed to drug markets.29 Drug-trafficking likewise leads to the proliferation of firearms, which are frequently traded for drugs, and the presence Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname

Antigua & of armed men to protect turf and other illegal Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia

Caribbean-7 property. Indeed, drug-trafficking has been linked to the rise in execution-type killings, Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who said gangs were in their neighbourhoods (N = 1,700). Question: which account for around a third of homicides “Have the gangs made the neighbourhood safer or less safe?” The chart shows the percentage of in Guyana each year.30 Additionally, it fosters respondents who answered “Safer”. the corruption of public sector employees and

76 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 law enforcement personnel by drug traffickers, ca, and Saint Lucia were forced to serve as sex who use their wealth to buy influence and pro- workers in nightclubs. The investigation deter- 3 tection from prosecution. Finally, in Guyana, mined that organized crime groups obtained drug-trafficking distorts the local economy the cooperation of immigration officers and and undermines legitimate economic activity senior officials, who were frequently bribed to because the monies derived from drug sales are allow the women into the country.34 Similarly, laundered by pricing commodities and services Jamaica is a source of internally and externally much lower than the prevailing market rate.31 trafficked children and adults. A US State While all the Caribbean island nations Department (2010a) report indicates that Ja- experience problems associated with drug- maica serves as a transit country for illegal mi- trafficking, Jamaica continues to be the largest grants going to Canada and the United States

Caribbean supplier of marijuana and serves as and that Jamaicans are trafficked into forced Street Gangs and Organized Crime a major transit point for cocaine trafficked labour in the United States. Foreign victims from Central and South America to North of this trafficking have also been identified in America. Drug production and trafficking in Jamaica. These findings raise questions about Jamaica are both enabled and accompanied the effectiveness of policies that constrain free by organized crime and domestic and inter- movement throughout the Caribbean for the national gang activity. Cases such as United purpose of suppressing human trafficking or States vs. Knowles and the indictment of Ja- of policies that address organized crime issues maican drug lord Christopher Coke illustrate related to guns and drugs. the transnational nature of the drug-traffick- In Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago, ing component of organized crime.32 In Ja- business scams are becoming more sophisticat- maica, similar to Guyana, there is also a strong ed and more difficult to detect. For example, relationship between the illicit drug trade and Jamaican Lotto scams, which are concentrated the illicit arms trade. The trade in guns in ex- primarily in Montego Bay, disproportionately change for illicit drugs exacerbates the crime target elderly people in the United States. Lot- problem because unregistered handguns flow to scammers email or phone individuals claim- freely into the country, contributing to the ing that the individuals have won large sums high rates of firearm-related crimes.33 In like of money and only need to wire small admin- fashion, but to a lesser extent, officials of the istrative fees to Jamaica to receive their win- Royal Barbados Police Force report that or- nings. The scams reportedly generate US$30 ganized crime has been linked to drug-traf- million a year for organized crime groups, and ficking and fighting over turf, primarily at sea, more than 100 killings have been linked to where disputes over drug shipments have led the scams. The scammers have been found to to deadly violence. illicit the help of local police officers. In one While drug-trafficking has often domi- Jamaican police station, 10 officers were asked nated public dialogue, trafficking in persons to retire because of their role in the scams.35 has been identified as a new problem in the In Trinidad and Tobago, criminal groups region (see chapter 1). Criminal networks in commit high-level fraud through the Unem- Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, and Jamaica ployment Relief Programme (URP), which is are increasingly becoming involved in human designed to provide short-term employment trafficking. For example, investigative work in to the jobless. The criminal groups obtain con- Antigua and Barbuda and Barbados recently tracts to manage URP projects and fraudu- discovered that the majority of prostitutes in lently magnify the number of persons required the country were immigrant women forced to complete particular jobs. For instance, a into the sex trade. The investigation uncovered job requiring only one person is presented as at least 80 women who were told they would if it requires seven people. The ghost opera- be earning decent salaries as bartenders, mas- tions are staffed, on paper, by the seven indi- seuses, hotel workers, or dancers. Instead, the viduals, who eventually receive cheques from women, who were mainly from Guyana, Jamai- the government for their supposed work and

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 77 turn over part of the proceeds to the criminal tion of the judicial process.37 Even if an indi- 3 group. URP contracts offer the crime groups vidual or group of individuals are arrested, the opportunities to provide resources not only to rule of law can be subverted through multiple those who support them (their soldiers), but avenues. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey also to community residents in need, such as 2010 suggested that judicial corruption is per- the elderly, children, or pregnant women, and vasive. For example, 53 percent of residents in this garners good will for the benefit of the the Caribbean-7 believe that politically con- criminal groups. Because URP contracts are nected criminals go free; about 50 percent administered through local community lead- believe that the justice system is corrupt; 47.3 ers, organized crime groups seek to increase percent believe powerful criminals go free; and their territory by pressuring community lead- 37.2 percent believe judges are corrupt (table

Street Gangs and Organized Crime ers to cooperate so that the groups may obtain 3.3). While organized crime appears to have more URP contracts. Disputes over territory undermined the faith of the public in the rule frequently arise. There are no official statistics, of law across the Caribbean, the problem ap- but one report indicates that, since 2002, over pears particularly acute in Trinidad and To- 100 URP supervisors, foremen, contractors, bago. Almost 70 percent of the residents there and workers have been killed because of the believe the judicial system is corrupt and po- schemes.36 litically connected criminals go free, and about Organized crime can also have a substantial 62 percent of respondents believe powerful impact on the rule of law through the corrup- criminals go free and 59 percent believe judges

Table 3.3. Perceptions of Corruption, Caribbean-7, 2010 percent Country Judges are Justice system Powerful Politically corrupt is corrupt criminals go connected free criminals go free

Antigua & 32.3 44.3 37.8 44.8 Barbuda

Barbados 24.5 33.8 40.1 41.9

Guyana 39.0 47.7 46.9 51.8

Jamaica 36.3 57.3 52.7 57.8

Saint Lucia 33.7 48.1 47.7 51.3

Suriname 35.6 45.8 38.9 47.0

Trinidad & 58.7 69.8 61.6 70.2 Tobago

Caribbean-7 37.2 49.6 47.0 52.5

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “Using a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Don’t know, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree), indicate your assessment of the performance of the criminal justice system on the following (fairness, integrity, effectiveness): ‘The judges are not corrupt’, ‘The justice system is free of corruption’, ‘The justice system is unable to convict powerful criminals’, ‘Powerful criminals are likely to go free’, ’Politically connected criminals are likely to go free’.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Strongly disagree” or “Disagree”. *p<.05

78 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 are corrupt. While the nation has invested con- The Causes of Street Gangs and siderable resources in improving the police ser- Organized Crime 3 vices, it appears that the judicial system is also in dire need of improvement and reform. This section focuses on the causes and cor- Combined, these crime and social prob- relates of street gangs and organized crime in lems impact Caribbean nations in a number the Caribbean. The first part of the section of other, less visible ways. For example, gang focuses on the social structural conditions homicides are much less likely to be solved or that give rise to and sustain street gangs and result in a conviction compared with other organized crime. Specifically, it addresses types of homicides. This undermines the such issues as community cohesion, social rule of law in two main ways, as follows: (1) cohesion, and informal social control and the

Residents lose faith in the government’s ca- relationship these may have with the rise and Street Gangs and Organized Crime pacity to exact justice. General and specific spread of street gangs and organized crime in deterrence is weakened. The community at the Caribbean. The second part of the section large perceives fewer formal consequences focuses on the risk factors and the protective for criminal actions. Individuals who have factors associated with street gang member- committed crimes and who have not been ship. Our purpose is to understand why peo- punished view the benefits outweighing the ple in the Caribbean are becoming involved consequences, increasing the probability they in street gangs. will commit such crimes again. (2) The citizenry begins to seek justice through informal Community-Level Explanations mechanisms. Victims and others may seek Community cohesion and social cohesion are retributive justice on their own or solicit oth- important because they allow for the develop- ers, such as a don or a gang leader, to execute ment of shared goals and provide the means justice on their behalf. for collective action. The willingness and The rimesc and corruptive influence of ability to develop and achieve shared goals— gangs and organized crime also lead to de- labelled collective efficacy by Sampson, creased economic performance.38 Crime di- Raudenbush, and Earls (1997)—promote co- verts a country’s limited resources towards operative efforts to define, monitor and con- crime prevention and control initiatives and demn undesirable behaviours occurring with- away from sectors that can fuel economic in a community. Absent these social ties and growth and human development such as relationships, communities cannot exercise education and the maintenance of physical informal social control over their neighbour- infrastructure. Corruption helps discour- hoods. As a result of this diminished capac- age positive corporate investment decisions, ity for control, these neighbourhoods begin foreign investment and private and public experiencing elevated levels of crime and de- loans from abroad. In the Caribbean region, linquency relative to the neighbourhoods of in particular, crime and corruption dampen other communities.39 tourism. Potential tourists are alienated by Analysis of the data obtained through the violence and criminal activities and search UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 sug- for other locations where there is no threat to gests that informal social control, community personal safety. Finally, crime and corruption cohesion and social cohesion are generally cause Caribbean citizens to divert substantial lower in communities with street gangs. In resources away from more productive and en- the Caribbean-7, neighbourhoods with gangs trepreneurial uses. Finances are squandered exhibited less community cohesion than on bribes, compensating for bureaucratic de- neighbourhoods that did not have gangs (ta- lays, and engagement with organized crime ble 3.4).40 In five of the Caribbean-7, informal rather than on personal savings and invest- social control was significantly less in neigh- ment and human and social capital develop- bourhoods with gangs than in communities ment. that did not have gangs.41 These findings sug-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 79 3 Table 3.4. Mean Levels of Informal Social Control and Community Cohesion with and without Gangs, Caribbean-7, 2010

Country Informal social control Community cohesion

No gangs Gangs No gangs Gangs

Antigua & −0.06 −0.42 −0.13 −0.71 Barbuda

Barbados −0.10 −0.12 −0.15 −0.63 Street Gangs and Organized Crime Guyana 0.15 −0.17 0.15 −0.44

Jamaica 0.31 0.13 0.41 −0.14

Saint Lucia 0.20 −0.31 0.03 −0.57

Suriname −0.20 −0.28 0.01 −0.17

Trinidad & −0.02 −0.32 0.13 −0.39 Tobago

Caribbean-7 0.03 −0.23 0.07 −0.44

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). ‘Gangs’ and ‘No gangs’ refer to the presence or absence of gangs in the neighbourhoods of respondents. *p<.05

gest that community cohesion and informal a sense of belonging to their nation. Feelings of social control might be important factors in societal inclusion were also significantly associ- understanding the causes of street gang for- ated with the presence of gangs in the neigh- mation in the Caribbean. bourhoods of respondents. Inclusion is the We also examined various dimensions of extent to which respondents believe they are social cohesion and their relationship to the similar to others in the country.43 In Antigua presence of gangs in the neighbourhoods of and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad respondents. Our results indicate that some and Tobago, respondents who lived in neigh- dimensions of social cohesion are specific to bourhoods with gangs were significantly less nations and that policy makers cannot neces- likely to feel a sense of inclusion. Participation sarily generalize across the Caribbean (table was also significantly related to the presence of 3.5). Across the Caribbean-7, respondents re- gangs in the neighbourhoods of respondents. siding in neighbourhoods with gangs were sig- Participation was measured by the willingness nificantly less likely to feel a sense of belonging of respondents to work with others to reduce than respondents residing in neighbourhoods violence and improve the country.44 In Barba- without gangs. Belongingness is the sense of dos, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, resi- pride and loyalty that respondents feel towards dents of neighbourhoods with gangs were less their countries.42 In Antigua and Barbuda, likely to state that they were willing to partici- Barbados, Guyana, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad pate with others to reduce violence or improve and Tobago, respondents who lived in an area the country. We also examined the relationship with gangs were significantly less likely to feel between neighbourhood gang presence and

80 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Table 3.5. Mean Levels of Social Cohesion in Communities with and without Gangs, Caribbean-7, 2010 3

Country Belonging Inclusion Participation Legitimacy Respect

No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs gangs gangs gangs gangs gangs

Antigua & −0.25 −0.82 −0.11 −0.56 −0.06 −0.56 −0.04 −0.53 −0.18 −0.50 Barbuda

Barbados 0.17 −0.14 −0.06 −0.32 −0.39 −0.60 0.23 −0.02 −0.04 −0.31 Street Gangs and Organized Crime

Guyana −0.25 −0.56 −0.04 −0.49 −0.06 −0.28 −0.23 −0.64 −0.15 −0.47

Jamaica 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.06 0.32 0.20 0.21 0.04 0.21 0.01

Saint Lucia 0.00 −0.19 0.01 −0.05 0.23 −0.05 0.20 −0.02 0.28 0.04

Suriname 0.07 0.05 0.03 −0.07 −0.04 0.05 −0.09 −0.14 −0.08 −0.11

Trinidad & 0.20 −0.08 0.20 −0.22 0.11 −0.17 0.02 −0.47 0.18 −0.22 Tobago

Caribbean-7 0.03 −0.23 0.03 −0.23 0.01 −0.11 0.04 −0.26 0.03 −0.21

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “Is there a criminal gang (or gangs) in your neighbourhood?” “To what extent is there a criminal gang problem in your neighbourhood?” the perceptions of respondents about the le- As a consequence of the lack of social co- gitimacy of the criminal justice system and the hesion, community cohesion and informal perceptions of respondents about the respect social control, as well as the lack of effective granted to them within society. Legitimacy formal social control to respond to gangs was measured by the willingness of respond- and organized crime, criminal groups have ents to support institutions such as the police filled the void, empowering them and help- and the courts and the views of respondents ing them become engrained into the fabric of on judicial fairness.45 Respect was measured by local communities (see below and chapters 5 the perceptions of respondents about whether and 6). In Jamaica, formal and informal social they were respected by their fellow citizens, control and social and community cohesion people earning more than them, and people of have deteriorated to such an extent that some different ethnic origins.46 With the exception communities have turned to dons and street of Suriname, the respondents in all the Car- gangs for help. Mogensen (2005) reports that, ibbean-7 who were living in neighbourhoods in Jamaica, citizens do not believe that the with gangs scored lower on the legitimacy and police can effectively address crime, and they respect scales than the respondents who were seek justice from local dons through kangaroo living in neighbourhoods without gangs. To- courts. “When crimes are carried out within gether, these findings suggest that people living the community, dons enforce discipline, in- in neighbourhoods with gangs feel isolated, cluding beatings or executions, to an extent disenfranchised and apathetic and are less sup- considered commensurate with the level of portive of formal mechanisms of social control. the crime.”47 Dons also provide housing, food,

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 81 medical assistance, policing services, early through the risk factor prevention paradigm. 3 childhood education and other assistance to Risk factors are those characteristics or symp- citizens who are loyal, as well as greater oppor- toms that, if present, increase the odds that an tunities for political advancement to people individual will be involved in problem behav- with political aspirations.48 Research in Trini- iour. Conversely, protective factors are those dad and Tobago yielded similar findings. One characteristics or symptoms that, if present, community leader, when asked about this is- decrease the odds that an individual will be sue, stated, “Gangs bring down crime. They in- involved in problem behaviour.50 The risk and stituted a community court that meets weekly protective model has been used extensively in where young males are punished and given public health since researchers first learned strokes. . . . One to two local councillors have that heart disease was associated with risk

Street Gangs and Organized Crime gone to the courts to observe their practice.” factors such as tobacco use, lack of exercise, Another stated, “Gangs are the first ones to and family history of heart disease and that respond to crime; the police are incompetent, individuals were less likely to experience heart they take too long and never finish the work. disease if protective factors such as exercise If you go to the gang leader you know they will and low-fat diets were present in the individu- take care of you.” Still another explained, “If als’ lives.51 Since then, the risk and protective you live in a community where there is gang factor approach has been used extensively to cohesion you are more safe because they [pro- understand and develop public health policy tect you]. . . . Gangs provide safety, create jobs surrounding cancer, mental health, and dis- . . . , give people food, give mother’s milk for ease. Most recently, it has been applied to their babies.”49 Harriott (2008b) notes that, as achieve greater understanding of the reasons a consequence, leaders of street gangs and or- people join gangs. ganized crime groups have served as role mod- There is almost no research on the risk and els and mentors in some communities, which protective factors associated with street gang necessarily perpetuates a culture that places membership. Anecdotal evidence hints that additional value on these criminal organiza- membership is related to risk factors such as tions and their positive role in communities. neighbourhood social disorganization, neighbourhood levels of crime and drug use, lack Individual-Level Explanations of attachment to school, poor school perfor- Another approach to explaining and under- mance, unemployment, poor family manage- standing delinquent and criminal groups is ment, attachment to antisocial peers, and an

Box 3.3. Deportees, Street Gangs and Organized Crime in the Caribbean

In the Caribbean, public policy makers and residents have and 15 percent of deportees to Trinidad and Tobago were made claims that deportees from Canada, the United King- later charged with a crime. There have been similar findings dom and the United States have contributed to the prob- in Jamaica. However, the UNODC and World Bank report lems of gangs and organized crime in the region. The claims noted that, while most deportees are not involved in crime, have largely focused on the belief that individuals learn a small number might be responsible for much violence. For about criminal behaviour in developed nations and, after instance, the report states that, between 2001 and 2004, they have been deported home, are responsible for much of 224 individuals were deported to Jamaica who had previ- the crime. While there has been little research on this issue, ously been convicted of murder. The report concludes that, preliminary evidence indicates that deportees are not a ma- given the relatively small population of Jamaica, such a large jor contributor to crime and violence in the Caribbean. number of deportees can have a significant impact on local A joint report by UNODC and the World Bank (2010), for crime rates. example, shows that 13 percent of deportees to Barbados

Source: Katz and Fox (2010).

82 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 individual’s prior involvement in delinquency Responding to Street and drug use. The only empirical study to date Gangs and Organized Crime 3 is the one conducted by Katz and Fox (2010) in their examination of school-aged youth in Responses to street gangs and organized Trinidad and Tobago. The authors report that crime groups can be varied and multidimen- gang involvement is associated with youth who sional (box 3.4). Domestic responses fall into (1) have parents with attitudes that favour an- five broad strategies, as follows: (1) suppres- tisocial behaviour, (2) live in neighbourhoods sion; (2) the provision of academic, economic that are characterized by high mobility, (3) and social opportunities; (3) social interven- live in neighbourhoods in which handguns are tion; (4) community mobilization; and (5) widely available, (4) have been involved in an- organizational change and development. In-

tisocial behaviour from an early age, (5) have ternational responses tend to focus on trea- Street Gangs and Organized Crime the intention to use drugs, (6) have antisocial ties, inter-agency cooperation, and capacity- peers, and (7) have peers who use drugs. Also building. In the sections below, we discuss the of interest was their finding that school-related responses that have been implemented in the risk factors were not, for the most part, signifi- Caribbean to address street gangs and organ- cantly associated with gang involvement.52 The ized crime, and we discuss the public’s percep- case of deportees is also revealing (box 3.3). tions of these responses.

Box 3.4. When Responding to Gangs Makes the Problem Worse

Malcolm Klein (1995), an eminent gang scholar, notes that, strategies finds that they are ineffective in reducing gang in Los Angeles, gang sweeps by the police are not an effec- membership or gang crime.b Indeed, some of the research tive means of generating gang arrests and do not appear to indicates that these programmes lead to an increase in gang justify the US$150,000 a day that they cost the local police membership and gang delinquency. Klein (1971) reports department. Klein claims that such tactics may actually have a that the assignment of caseworkers increases the local repu- negative impact on the community’s gang problem. He argues tation of particular gangs, which helps attract new members that, because the majority of the people arrested were imme- and leads to more gang activity in the areas employing de- diately released without having been charged, gang cohesive- tached caseworkers. Spergel (1995) reports similar findings ness may have been strengthened, and the deterrent impact on in his examination of a programme that was designed to pro- gang members may have been reduced. vide job training and job opportunities for gang members in Suppression efforts in Central America have yielded simi- Chicago. Project staff were primarily comprised of gang lead- lar results. Mano Dura, the gang-reform programme in El ers from two of the largest gangs in Chicago. The analyses Salvador, criminalized gang membership, and, as a conse- indicate that the project was a failure by almost all accounts. quence, youth, even if they were only remotely associated Job training and placement efforts were unsuccessful; gang with gangs, were arrested, incarcerated and then discrimi- structures became more sophisticated; and the number of nated against upon their return to their communities from gang-motivated homicides rose. As a consequence, many prison. The policy had the unintended impact of increasing policy makers no longer believe that prevention and social gang cohesion and the proliferation of gangs.a intervention approaches represent a successful method to A number of researchers have evaluated the impact of other deal with gangs. This has led to a general decrease in in- prevention and social intervention approaches on gang tervention efforts conducted by youth-oriented agencies, membership and gang crime. While a few studies report which have since undertaken more general prevention ini- some positive impacts, most of the research examining these tiatives aimed at younger at-risk youth.c

a. USAID (2006). b. Short (1963); Spergel (1995). c. Spergel (1986).

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 83 Suppression demolish the gangs identified; and (3) open a 3 Suppression is the main approach that is used Proceeds of Crime Act file on each person ar- by Caribbean nations to respond to street rested or charged with a serious gang or drug- gangs and organized crime. The suppression related crime.55 Security officials report that strategies are typically reactive in nature and this crime-fighting strategy has resulted in a make use of criminal law to control behaviour. 44 percent reduction in killings in the first The objective of the strategies is not only to quarter of 2011 compared with the same pe- address immediate issues (to arrest individuals riod in 2010.56 Trinidad and Tobago was one for criminal activity, for example), but also to of the first nations in the Caribbean to estab- deter youth and adults from joining gangs and lish a specialized unit with trained personnel organized crime groups and discourage gang to respond to gangs. Trinidad and Tobago’s

Street Gangs and Organized Crime members from engaging in future crime. Typi- Gang/Repeat Offender Task Force—since cal tactics involve arrest, prosecution, interme- disbanded (see below)—was established in diate sanctions, and imprisonment by criminal May 2006 and staffed with approximately 40 justice officials. sworn officers.57 The unit was trained by gang While general law enforcement strate- specialists (sworn officers) from the United gies have been used to respond reactively to States, and the staff included a coach (a for- crimes perpetrated by gangs, no nation, with mer sworn officer from the United States) the exception of Jamaica and of Trinidad and who was responsible for mentoring the unit’s Tobago, have focused efforts on the gang leadership. The unit was responsible for ap- members or gangs that are disproportionately prehending wanted persons, collecting gang involved in gang crime. Most of these nations intelligence, disseminating information to lack sufficient intelligence services to iden- units across the police service, and conduct- tify accurately the members of gangs or the ing random patrols in areas with gang prob- main groups involved in violence. The police lems. response has generally lacked the adequate Much of the response to organized crime focus on persons and places that can lead to in the Caribbean has come through the enact- good results. ment of legislation and drug-related interna- Operation Kingfish was launched in Ja- tional treaties. These treaties support the op- maica in 2004 to restore community confi- erational work of the United Nations Office dence and reduce the fear of crime by target- on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and help ing dons and leaders of gangs and by breaking secure membership in regional and interna- up organized crime groups. The operation tional organizations that foster collaboration task force reportedly made a major dent in or- and cooperation to suppress drug-trafficking. ganized crime, effected the arrest of some of However, in many ways, the legislation and Jamaica’s most wanted men, smashed at least treaties have served more as symbolic re- two gangs, and disrupted six others.53 Jamai- sponses to the problem rather than as effec- can police stepped up their efforts in 2011, tive means to combat organized crime. Carib- targeting 47 groups, particularly those with bean nations have not had the law enforcement more sophisticated ties to local political par- capacity to implement many of the laws they ties. The new strategy appears to be focused have passed, and the result has been suppres- on local police commanders, who identify the sion strategies targeting end-users and street- three worst criminal groups in their jurisdic- level drug traffickers, rather than apprehending tions and undertake suppression efforts.54 Ad- those who profit most from drug-trafficking. ditionally, the Jamaica Constabulary Force, Some effort has been made to address other through an enhanced anti-gang strategy, has types of activity associated with organized recently identified the dismantling of gang ac- crime such as money laundering, bribery and tivities as a priority. It requires officers to (1) fraud; however, these efforts have been ham- focus on streets and public spaces; (2) iden- pered by lack of financial resources and person- tify, profile and act to disrupt or completely nel with the relevant investigative skills.

84 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Recently, the Global Commission on Drug the past few years, the Jamaican Constabulary Policy, a group comprised of current and past Force has been accused of killing civilians in 3 influential statesman from Brazil, Columbia, pursuit of gang members. One report indicat- Greece, Mexico, Switzerland, the United ed that, as part of its crackdown on gangs, 253 States, and other nations, as well as influential civilians were killed by police in 2009, and leaders from the United Nations, proclaimed another 400 were killed in 2010. The increase that, after 50 years of financing and repressive in 2010 was, in large part, a consequence of measures, the global war on drugs has failed. police saturating Tivoli Gardens, a garrison They argued that suppressive strategies aimed neighbourhood controlled by gangs, to cap- at traffickers and consumers have not taken ture Christopher Coke, a drug lord.60 Third, into consideration that other traffickers too evaluations of the police response to gangs in

rapidly replace those who have been appre- the Caribbean have shown that suppressive Street Gangs and Organized Crime hended. The Global Commission on Drug efforts are generally ineffective. For example, Policy (2011, 2) also pointed out that these in Trinidad and Tobago, the Gang/Repeat same suppressive efforts obstructed “public Offender Task Force made 495 arrests from health measures to reduce HIV/AIDS, over- May 2006 through August 2007. Of those ar- dose fatalities and other harmful consequenc- rested, only 110 (22.2 percent) were charged; es of drug use” and that suppressive efforts the rest were released or transferred. Moreo- aimed at violence related to drug markets ver, the police capacity to collect, maintain (that is, gangs and organized crime groups and disseminate intelligence—a core func- fighting over turf ) resulted in higher homi- tion of the task force—was poor, unorganized cide rates and decreased overall public safety. and unreliable.61

The Consequences and Limitations of Suppression Chart 3.5 Perceived Confidence in the Ability of In the Caribbean, similar to early efforts in de- the Police to Control Gang Violence, veloped nations, the police response to gangs Caribbean-7, 2010 has been limited and has experienced substantial setbacks.58 First, while police policies 45 39.0 that define the gang phenomenon have begun 40 to emerge, the policies are not well known among the police services and are rarely fol- 35 29.7 lowed. This has led to unreliable gang intel- 30 ligence. Officers do not necessarily document 24.0 25 23.5 23.1 23.4 individuals because of the behaviour of these 19.1 individuals. Instead, they document individu- 20 als according to the ideas, beliefs and biases Percent 15 9.9 of the police. Second, specialized police units 10 dedicated to responding to gangs are themselves frequently the target of suspicions 5 about serious misconduct and human rights 0 violations. For example, in Trinidad and To- bago, the Gang/Repeat Offender Task Force Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname had to be disbanded after it was accused of Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia involvement in kidnappings, passing infor- Caribbean-7 mation to criminals about imminent police raids, providing illegal extra security at night- Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate how clubs, running ghost gangs to acquire public much confidence you have in the police to effectively control gang violence. Use ‘1’ for a low level of confidence and ‘5’ for a high level of confidence.” The chart shows the percentage of money fraudulently, and participation in nu- respondents answering “High” and “Very high”.. merous extrajudicial killings.59 Similarly, over

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 85 Table 3.6. Confidence of Neighbourhood Residents in the Police, Caribbean-7, 2010 3 percent Country Murder Gang violence Drug- Powerful Crime in trafficking criminals general

No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs No Gangs gangs gangs gangs gangs gangs Antigua & 29.2 19.4 28.2 20.4 23.1 20.4 9.0 2.7 10.7 3.2 Barbuda

Barbados 45.3 37.7 45.6 43.3 41.4 43.7 11.7 3.8 17.6 14.0

Street Gangs and Organized Crime Guyana 23.9 17.8 17.9 9.6 17.8 10.1 5.8 3.4 6.9 3.4

Jamaica 22.7 21.4 22.8 22.0 20.5 17.9 9.1 5.8 11.7 6.9

Saint Lucia 20.2 21.1 19.8 23.3 18.5 19.9 6.2 9.1 7.2 6.6

Suriname 34.6 36.0 30.4 28.5 27.7 24.8 9.5 12.2 12.4 15.3

Trinidad & 9.5 4.1 11.4 4.5 10.6 4.5 3.5 1.8 3.7 0.9 Tobago

Caribbean-7 26.7 21.3 25.4 20.5 23.0 19.2 7.9 5.7 10.2 6.8

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “How much confidence do you have in the police to effectively control the crime problem in your country?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “A great deal of confidence”. ‘Gangs’ and ‘No gangs’ refer to the presence or absence of gangs in the neighbourhoods of respondents. *p<.05

According to analysis of the UNDP Citi- with gangs. Second, Barbados and Trinidad zen Security Survey 2010, only 24 percent of and Tobago were outliers in our measures. respondents in the Caribbean-7 had confidence Specifically, resident confidence in the po- in the police to control gang violence (chart lice to control crime was relatively high in 3.5). In Trinidad and Tobago, fewer than 10 Barbados, but, in Trinidad and Tobago, few percent of respondents were confident that the residents stated they had high confidence in police could perform this task. Respondents the police. Third, residents in all Caribbean-7 in Barbados showed the highest level of confi- nations had little confidence in the ability of dence, at only 39 percent. the police to control crime in general or the In the Caribbean-7, survey respondents criminal activity of powerful criminals. The in neighbourhoods with gangs have even less public appears to believe that the police and, confidence in the ability of the police to con- potentially, the judicial system are heavily in- trol gang crime (table 3.6). Relative to crimes fluenced by organized crime and that the rein general, respondents expressed more con- sponse of the police to crimes of a less serious fidence in the ability of the police to solve nature, but experienced more frequently by crimes involving homicide, gang violence residents is rarely effective. and drug-trafficking. A few other findings are The roblem,p however, is more compli- also of particular interest. First, in Jamaica, cated than residents simply having little con- Saint Lucia and Suriname, confidence in the fidence in the police and believing that judges crime-fighting ability of the police did not and the justice system are corrupt. Because significantly vary even in neighbourhoods they believe criminals are too powerful, sur-

86 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Table 3.7. Residents Who Do Nothing about Crime Because Criminals Are Too Powerful, Caribbean-7, 2010 3 percent Country No gangs Gangs Overall

Antigua & Barbuda 4.2 2.8 4.0

Barbados 0.8 4.5 1.3

Guyana 9.4 8.4 8.9

Jamaica 8.3 21.8 10.4 Street Gangs and Organized Crime

Saint Lucia 4.2 12.1 6.5

Suriname 3.2 7.8 3.6

Trinidad & Tobago 5.4 11.9 6.6

Caribbean-7 4.8 10.4 5.7

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who answered that there was no neighbourhood response to crime (N = 4391). Questions: “What has been done about crimes in your neighbourhood?” “If nothing, why?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “The people who are involved in the violence/crimes are too powerful”. ‘Gangs’ and ‘No gangs’ refer to the presence or absence of gangs in the neighbourhoods of respondents. *p<.05 vey respondents also do nothing about crime The Need for Intervention and Prevention (table 3.7). This finding was particularly If implemented properly, suppression can be pronounced in neighbourhoods with gangs. an important strategy in addressing street About 4.5 percent of respondents in Barba- gangs and organized crime, but it is only part dos, 12.0 percent in Saint Lucia and in Trini- of the solution. Suppression strategies typi- dad and Tobago, and 22.0 percent in Jamaica cally address problems that already exist; they reported that they did not respond to crime do little to prevent individuals from joining because criminals were too powerful. gangs or organized crime groups, and they do While it is difficult to assess what re- not address the social conditions that give rise spondents mean by ‘too powerful’, prior re- to these gangs and groups. Caribbean govern- search in Trinidad and Tobago suggests that ments have been slow to adopt such interven- this answer may be related to the perceived tion and prevention strategies (box 3.5). inability of the police to do something about It is necessary for Caribbean nations to the problem and the perceived belief that implement mobilization tactics that focus on gang members will seek retribution. For ex- the development of community coalitions in- ample, through a community survey in the volving schools, churches and public health neighbourhood of Gonzales in Trinidad and and criminal justice agencies for the purpose of Tobago, Johnson (2006a, 2006b) found that coordinating services and developing collabo- more than 85 percent of residents had heard rative responses to gangs and organized crime. gun-shots in the previous 30 days, but only 7 Collaborative efforts that have been undertak- percent had reported the gun-shots to police. en are often not focused solely on gang issues. At the same time, 86 percent of the respond- Likewise, Caribbean nations should imple- ents stated they believed gangs would retali- ment opportunity provision strategies aimed ate against people who reported gang-related at addressing the root causes of gangs and crimes to police. organized crime. This approach assumes that

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 87 3 Box 3.5. On the Horizon: Caribbean Anti-Gang Legislation As of late 2011, no Caribbean nation had enacted legisla- a second conviction. Likewise, individuals who aid gang tion that defines gangs, gang membership, or gang crime. members may be imprisoned for up to 25 years. Gang legislation can supply an opportunity for public dis- There are a number of troublesome aspects to these legis- course on the scope and nature of the problem and can of- lative initiatives. First, they do not define a gang or gang fer policy makers an opportunity to define concepts. Well- membership, nor do they place a check—a quality-control developed legislation provides guidelines and supports the review, for example—on the discretion of the police or the police in documenting gangs and gang membership. It can courts in labelling a group as a gang or a person as a gang also represent an opportunity for citizens to review gang- member. Second, the proposed legislation would have only related police records, the success or failure of anti-gang limited impact in suppressing gang membership, gangs, or

Street Gangs and Organized Crime initiatives, and decisions related to the identification of gang activity. Both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have gang status. low clearance and detection rates in gang-related crime. Two nations have begun the process of enacting gang leg- For example, Katz and Maguire (2006) report that, in 53 islation: Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Both nations homicide investigations associated with gang activity in are seeking to criminalize gang membership and individu- one Trinidadian community, there were only three arrests als who assist gang members. The legislation provides the and no convictions. While the legislation may have a mod- police in both nations with greater authority to search and est effect on arrest rates, it would likely have no impact on seize individuals involved in gangs. Thus, the proposed leg- the conversion of arrests to convictions. Instead, the legislation in Trinidad and Tobago—Act No. 10 of 2011— islation may have the undesirable effect of increasing the would allow the police, without a warrant, to enter and probability that gang members will threaten witnesses be- search any location where they believe gang members may cause of the severity of the potential sentences if they are be found. Furthermore, gang members would be sentenced convicted to 10 years in prison for a first conviction and 20 years for

many individuals become involved in criminal and involvement with criminal groups. The groups to obtain goals and resources because programmes focus on the supply of services they do not have access to legitimate opportu- to an entire population or to populations in nities. These strategies focus on improving the high-risk communities. Primary prevention academic, economic and social opportunities services can be provided to youth, families, or of disadvantaged youth. They often rely on job communities by schools, NGOs, government training and job placement, educational initia- agencies and faith-based groups. Examples tives and the development of problem-solving of such programmes include school-based skills. The use of social intervention strategies instruction, individual- and family-based life is also lacking. Social intervention strategies skills training and public service opportuni- often rely on outreach workers to supply im- ties.63 There are few formal prevention efforts mediate services to gang members in moments aimed at dissuading youth in the Caribbean of need. For example, following a violent inci- from becoming involved in street gangs or or- dent, an outreach worker may provide counsel- ganized crime groups. ling, crisis intervention, or temporary shelter. Outreach workers also undertake inter-gang Conclusion mediation, group counselling and conflict resolution among gangs.62 This chapter argues that street gangs and or- Primary prevention programmes are also ganized crime contribute significantly to the needed for youth in the Caribbean. The goal levels of criminal violence and other forms of such programmes is to change life trajec- of crime and undermine the rule of law in tories among youth by offering encourage- the region. Street gangs and organized crime ments for them to avoid gang membership should therefore be among the most impor-

88 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 tant concerns for Caribbean policy makers in trafficking and fraud. While less visible than their goal of improving human development street gangs, but perhaps more consequen- 3 in the region. A key first step is to understand tial, organized crime has infiltrated state in- the scope and nature of the problem, the caus- stitutions in many Caribbean nations to the es of the problem, and contemporary respons- extent that the public believes the rule of law es to the problem if we are to address street has been substantially compromised. gangs and organized crime in the Caribbean An examination of the causes and corre- effectively. This chapter highlights several ma- lates of criminal groups in the Caribbean re- jor findings with respect to these issues. These veals that informal social control, community major findings are summarized below. cohesion and social cohesion are generally The scope and character of the problem lower in communities with street gangs. Ad-

vary across nations in the Caribbean. Antigua ditionally, there is evidence that youth who Street Gangs and Organized Crime and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Saint Lu- have parents with antisocial attitudes, who cia and Suriname appear to have street gang live in communities in which guns are avail- problems, but the extent and nature of these able, who have engaged in antisocial behav- problems are unclear because of the lack of iour at an early age, and who have peers who available information. Data do suggest, how- have engaged in delinquency and drug use are ever, that Guyana is experiencing problems more likely to be involved with street gangs. with organized crime. The problems are suf- Finally, Caribbean nations lack the infra- ficiently substantial to influence the national structure and capacity to respond effectively economy and have been associated with sig- to street gangs and organized crime. This is nificant corruption. The research findings- in illustrated by the fact that crimes associated dicate that street gangs and organized crime with street gangs and organized crime groups are a serious major issue in Jamaica and in rarely lead to arrests and even more rarely lead Trinidad and Tobago. to convictions. This is also illustrated by the Despite the variations in scope, our find- fact that, in Jamaica and in Trinidad and To- ings suggest that there is some consistency in bago, where street gangs and organized crime the characteristics of street gangs and organ- groups appear to be more well developed, the ized crime groups across the Caribbean. For formal social control mechanisms in some example, these gangs and groups are largely neighbourhoods have broken down to the comprised of poor young men (or young point that criminal groups are now providing men from poor backgrounds). While young many vital social services—such as policing, women are also involved in these groups, their welfare services and even education—that involvement in violence and other crimes is state institutions can no longer adequately substantially less than that of the young men. provide. Street gangs often lack formal leadership and structure and are frequently bound together by symbols and turf; organized crime groups are more sophisticated with respect to structure and leadership. The ncidencei of homicide and other forms of violence has risen sharply as a consequence of street gangs and organized crime. The association between street gangs and higher rates of neighbourhood homicide is significant, and, in neighbourhoods in which street gangs are located, residents report much higher rates of victimization through violence and property crimes. Organized crime groups are associated with violence, high-level drug-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 89

CHAPTER The Police: Transitioning 4 to Citizen Security An open ear is more powerful than an iron fist – involve the community

Earn the confidence of the community by being open, fair and accountable in safeguarding security

Respect citizens’ rights while ensuring security The Police: 4CHAPTER Transitioning to Citizen Security 4

Introduction accept the responsibility of helping to produce their own security by becoming co-pro- Historically, in nations under colonial rule, ducers of safety and crime control alongside formal social control of the population was their police.5 undertaken by a security force that had the This chapter analyses the evolution of the mission of maintaining the status and prerog- security sector in the Caribbean, describes atives of the colonizers and their political and aspects of the historical background and con- The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security social elites. Therefore, post-colonial nations text of the efforts to reform the police forces striving for full democracy, economic devel- of the region and explores the perceptions of opment, social stability and citizen security the performance of police forces by Caribbe- must find ways to evolve the role of security an citizens. The main focus is the seven Carib- personnel into one whereby the rights of bean countries (the Caribbean-7) in which we all people are protected and defended. This have conducted the UNDP Citizen Security means that the security agency must transi- Survey 2010. The chapter argues for a more tion from a state security–oriented force to thoroughgoing transformation of Caribbean a citizen-oriented force. This type of force police forces that is consistent with the no- should include professional managers, a per- tion of citizen security. sonnel system that makes the force representative of the population it has sworn to serve Policing Under Colonial Rule: and a standardized method so that citizens State-Oriented Security can share their grievances with police, and it must include officers who see their first duty The police forces imposed by colonial powers as loyalty to their countrymen and the rule of in many countries during the last century or law, not the state or its political leaders.1 earlier had a number of common characteris- 6 The other necessary change in the transi- tics, as follows: tion to an effective, democratic police force • Their primary role was to maintain the sta- must take place in the minds of citizens. Citi- tus and prerogatives of the colonial politi- zens must begin to perceive changes in the cal and social elites that ruled the country. police function and, more importantly, must • Police functioned as a paramilitary organi- experience for themselves treatment by po- zation. lice officers that is respectful of their rights, • Police stayed in station houses, only leaving courteous and fair.2 Citizens have to believe to enforce governmental crackdowns on that laws are enforced equally among all citi- demonstrations, riots and crimes against zens, regardless of social status, and that the the colonizers and, to a lesser extent, major police are responsive to their needs and will crimes against other people. use only appropriate force to ensure a safe so- • Authority and responsibility were held ciety.3 However, the citizenry must not view by top police officials only; officers lower the state as the sole provider of security from down the hierarchy had little discretion in crime and disorder.4 Citizens must resist the the performance of their duties. urge to allow or encourage the state to imple- • Interaction with local people was limited ment draconian laws that limit human and to treating them as suspects or accomplic- civil rights in a misguided attempt to control es, never as resources for solving crimes or a spiraling crime rate. Rather, citizens must as potential crime victims.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 93 The policing model deployed in the Eng- administrative staffs to address crime and dis- 4 lish-speaking colonial Caribbean was based order in London proactively. They did this by on the Irish Constabulary, which was formally establishing street patrols and engaging with established in 1822.7 This constabulary was citizens. The constables prided themselves on designed to quell governmental disruption in responding to citizen reports of victimization, Ireland and control political and social dissent. investigating reported crimes and capturing It was a well-armed paramilitary force that was and charging perpetrators. To accomplish primarily concerned with the protection of the this, they were assigned to geographical dis- state and not with the quality of life or human tricts with the mandate to get to know local rights among the citizenry. The model was im- families and community organizations for the plemented in the English-speaking Caribbean purpose of intervening early with individuals and other British colonies; the role of the po- or groups that might commit criminal acts lice as protector of the state was most poign- and building trust and respect so that com- antly exhibited during the labour unrest in the munity members would alert them whenever The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security Caribbean in the late 1930s.8 interventions were needed.11 Theindependence gained by the British This focus on police-citizen relations and colonies in the Caribbean in the second half citizen cooperation with the police relies on of the 20th century did little to change the three principles, as follows: (1) citizens co-pro- role of the police. Rather than protecting the duce security in cooperation with the police, old colonial government, the police protect- (2) police function as problem solvers, and (3) ed the newly independent governments.9 The the police and the populace jointly seek organ- same was true in the nations of the Nether- izational changes in the police and in neigh- land Caribbean in which the police served to bourhoods that will improve crime prevention protect Netherland colonial interests to the and control. Community policing is a philoso- detriment of citizens. phy rather than a rigid set of requirements, and police agencies are expected and encouraged Modern-Day Policing: to apply the philosophy in ways that meet the The Citizen Security Approach specific, self-defined needs of the public.12 The underlying philosophy also implies a commit- One of the first steps in the modernization and ment on the part of the police to serve as a democratization of a police force was taken in catalyst for local change through outreach, or- London in 1829. The Peelian reforms, institut- ganizational initiatives and educational efforts ed by Sir Robert Peel, were based on the simple that reflect citizen input and concerns.13 Com- principle that police should be citizens pro- munity policing entails a commitment on the tecting citizens from crime and social disorder. part of the police to greater responsiveness and As a symbol of their citizen status, the police accessibility to citizens (see box 4.1). were dressed like the gentlemen of the time With the move towards community polic- and were not allowed to carry military-type ing, police officials began to realize that positive weapons. According to the premise underly- citizen perceptions of the legitimacy and coming the reform experiment, effective policing petence of the police were critical.14 Legitimacy required the confidence and the cooperation and competency are directly related to a police of the citizens of London. As Peel wrote in a force’s ability to control and prevent crime, as letter to the Duke of Wellington on 5 Novem- well as ensure citizen security from disorder, ber 1829: “I want to teach people that liberty victimization and insecurity.15 The role of the does not consist in having your house robbed populace is essential for excellent and effective by organised gangs of thieves, and in leaving policing because if citizens do not report crimes the principal streets of London in nightly pos- to the police, cooperate in police investigations session of drunken women and vagabonds.”10 and alert the police to potential crimes and The eelianP reforms required constables criminals, crimes are not solved and criminals of the London Metropolitan Police and their are not removed from the streets. Thus, citizen

94 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Box 4.1. The Example of the Royal Grenada Police Force 4 The Royal Grenada Police Force provides a good example of innovation in community policing. It has expanded the functions of patrol cars in some neighbourhoods to serve as substations where residents can file victimization reports and obtain information. The force conducted a competition among agency divisions that had to develop and carry out projects with members of neighbourhoods; the launch of the programme included a health fair, cultural displays and an open house to attract citizens.

Source: Personal communication, James Clarkson, Commissioner, Royal Grenada Police Force, April 2010.

participation and cooperation promote partner- integrity because corruption invariably com- ships with the police and the co-production of promises performance and weakens public The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security crime prevention and control. Neighbourhoods confidence. This issue bridges both perfor- engaged in effective community policing yield mance and what may be called the problem nations in which citizens feel unthreatened by of values, authority and legitimacy. The third crime and sufficiently secure to lead productive challenge is to reduce abuses of power and to and creative lives. become more rights-regarding.

The Police in the Caribbean The Capability Challenges The responsiveness and effectiveness of po- This section provides a brief description of the lice services are related to capacities and main challenges facing the police services of capabilities. Consistent with the size of the the region. These include, first, the challenge populations in the region, Caribbean police of improving effectiveness and responsiveness forces are small (see table 4.1). Still, police to the security demands of citizens. We call density is greater in the Caribbean than in this the problem of performance legitimacy. Latin America. There is a recurrent debate The second is the challenge and imperative of among practitioners on the proper density

Table 4.1. Police Strength and Density, Caribbean-7, 2011 number Country Strength Density

Antigua & Barbuda 560 1:114

Barbados 1,415 1:190

Guyana 2,900 1:259

Jamaica 9,903 1:273

Saint Lucia 1,060 1:148

Trinidad & Tobago 6,302 1:201

Sources: UNDP estimation based on data from Regional Security System, Christ Church, Barbados, http://www.rss.org. bb/; Jamaica Constabulary Force, http://www.jcf.gov.jm/. Note: The population estimates are taken from the most recent census and are therefore dated. Police reserves are excluded for all countries except Jamaica, where the auxiliary, the Island Special Constabulary Force, is included because it consists of full-time, fully salaried officers. All part-time actual reserves are excluded. The data for Guyana are for 2007.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 95 of police officers per inhabitant. Despite the The amaicaJ Constabulary Force (JCF) 4 importance of this indicator, it depends on has a long and varied history in fighting cor- multiple factors, including the distribution ruption. Corruption within the JCF was a of a population between rural and urban set- major reason behind the selection of individu- tings and the geography of the territory. als from outside the force as members of top The fairly high police densities across the management. For example, Trevor MacMillan, region suggest that, with the possible excep- a former military officer, was selected as com- tion of Guyana and Jamaica, coverage is not a missioner of police in 1993. In the following particularly acute problem. Perhaps the more two years, 572 allegations of misconduct were challenging issue is the effective use of these investigated. This represented approximately human resources. Adequate police strength 10 percent of the JCF at the time.17 After Mac- and density are conditions for effective ser- Millan’s tenure ended, the force sank back into vice delivery and the protection of the popu- a pattern of corruption. Currently, the JCF lation, but they are not sufficient conditions. is again making serious strides in combating The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security The effectiveness and efficiency of even the internal corruption, and it is achieving fairly largest police services enjoying the best re- good results. Commissioner Ellington and the sources may be compromised by corruption. Ethics Committee have aggressively identified corrupt police officers and have terminated the The Integrity Imperative employment of these officers: 20 since the be- The performance and values dimensions of ginning of 2011, with 137 officers denied reen- legitimacy can be insidiously undermined by listment in 2010 because of allegations of cor- corruption. One of the major barriers to the ruption.18 The JCF is attempting to reform the adoption of more effective and efficient crime police culture from the acceptance of corrup- control methods and the meaningful inclu- tion to zero tolerance. The Jamaican example sion of citizens in police operations is corrup- demonstrates that the police can do something tion. Corruption is particularly devastating to to control corruption and thereby increase crime prevention and control efforts because their legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry. of the detrimental effect that it has on citizen perceptions and subsequent actions.16 Tankebe The Rights-Respecting Imperative (2009) notes that, in developing nations, the If corruption has the effect of weakening the relationships between the public and the po- values-based moral authority of the police, lice are fraught with distrust and alienation. abuses of power that take the form of a disre- In Suriname and in Trinidad and Tobago, 89 gard for the rights of citizens tend to have an percent of the respondents to the UNDP Citi- equal or even greater negative effect on this zen Security Survey 2010 believed that gov- dimension of the legitimacy of the police. In ernments should invest more in reducing cor- this area, there is considerable variation in the ruption so as to lower the incidence of crime. performance of Caribbean police forces. In the The respondents in Barbados were not as con- countries with high rates of violent crime, the cerned about corruption as those in the other abuses of citizen rights and, particularly, extra- six nations: only 71 percent agreed or strongly judicial killings tend to be more frequent than agreed that the government should invest in countries with lower homicide rates. This is more in reducing corruption. The Jamaican re- supported by data of the UNDP Citizen Se- spondents were the most concerned about this curity Survey 2010. Situational factors seem issue: 94 percent believed that corruption and to play an important role in determining these crime are linked and that government should outcomes. The governments and police ser- invest more in reducing corruption. Accord- vices of the region have tried to respond to the ingly, it is difficult to speak of the success of challenges by improving accountability and modern police reforms without simultane- capability and by introducing new methods of ously acknowledging the destabilizing role of policing that aim at greater responsiveness to corruption. needs and better relationships with citizens.

96 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Accountability Based on the performance of these police ser- One of the challenges facing police forces in vices, these systems have not, however, proved 4 the Caribbean, as elsewhere, is the necessity effective in ensuring a desirable level of crime to improve accountability mechanisms. Ac- control or rights-respecting results. The expe- countability has the potential to enhance per- riences in the region indicate that the systems formance, integrity and regard for the rights of accountability ought to be evaluated and, of citizens. perhaps, re-engineered so they may support To a greater or lesser extent, all the police the transformation of policing that is re- forces in the Caribbean suffer from the prob- quired. lems of unreformed police structures. The With the exception of Antigua and Bar- constitutions of the Caribbean countries that buda, the systems of internal accountability are members of the Commonwealth entrench include internal police investigative units that considerable power in the hands of the prime investigate corruption and ensure profession- minister, including the power to appoint mem- al standards. These units have varying capa- The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security bers of the police services commission after the bilities and, in some instances, are not robust. consent has been obtained from the governor Some capacity development may therefore be general or the president, as head of state. required. Thepolice services commissions make top-tier appointments to the police services, Changing the Relationship with Citizens: as well as senior promotions, and provide, in Community-Based Police the main, retrospective oversight of the po- While these efforts to combat corruption are lice services. Table 4.2 describes the systems necessary, national leaders across the region of accountability across the Caribbean. At have also sought to implement other initia- first look, most police services appear to have tives and programmes intended to increase adequate external systems of accountability. the perceived legitimacy and competency of

Table 4.2. Police Accountability Systems, Caribbean-7, 2007

Country Police service Internal police Ombudsman Civilian over- commission investigative sight body division

Antigua & Yes No No No Barbuda

Barbados Yes Yes No Yes

Guyana Yes Yes No Yes

Jamaica Yes Yes Yes Yes

Saint Lucia Yes Yes No Yes

Suriname _ _ _ _

Trinidad & Yes Yes No Yes Tobago

Source: Gomes (2007). Note: Jamaica relies on a police public complaints authority (a civilian body) and a police civilian oversight authority. The notation “— “ indicates unavailability of data.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 97 4 Box 4.2. Rio de Janeiro: Community Policing in a Context of High Crime Rates Throughout the 1990s, the police of Rio de Janeiro faced were problems. The small units had to confront powerful serious credibility issues because of severe human rights drug-trafficking networks, and many of the police volunteers abuses and the poor relations of the police with urban poor were not accustomed to these sorts of operations. Moreover, communities. In response to these problems, the police es- the resources were insufficient to realize an integrated, effec- tablished a unit, Grupamento de Aplicação Prático Escolar (lit- tive approach. erally, the group for Applied Practice), that was responsible Unidades de Policia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Units), for ensuring public security within communities. At the end the initiative currently being tried, represents quite a differ- of the 1990s, another initiative, Mutirão pela Paz (or Collec- ent approach. First, the units begin patrolling into the favelas, tive Effort for Peace), was undertaken by the police to deliver the poor shantytowns of Rio de Janeiro, where they confront social services to communities in an effort coordinated with and attempt to neutralize drug networks and suppress other labour, welfare and other governmental departments. criminal activities. Next, fresh graduates of the police academy

The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security In the 2000s, Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais who have received special training in community policing are (Police Unit for Special Areas) was created to patrol high-risk stationed in the favelas. However, they are not deployed in areas. Participating police officers had to be volunteers. The isolation. They are assisted through social services and other areas in which the units were active all had high homicide support programmes. This permits effective engagement with rates. Small police stations were opened in these areas. The community members and promotes a less repressive image of results were revealing; the units had an impressive effect in the police. These new units are larger and have more resources bringing together police and communities. However, there than the Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais.

police forces. Many of these efforts have cen- mise with a change in administration and a tred on the adoption of community-oriented rapidly rising rate of violent crime. (See box policing. For example, Barbados made the 4.2 for an example of a similar context.) To- shift to a community-oriented approach be- day, Jamaica is trying again to reform the po- ginning in the 1970s. The establishment of lice. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service the Office of Public Relations in the early has also adopted a community-oriented ap- 1980s was a crucial part of this transforma- proach, but, because of the high levels of vio- tion. The Community Policing Unit has been lent victimization among citizens that strain credited with reaching out to neighbour- police and the shortage of public resources, hoods through education and programmes these reforms have not been achieving pro- to help citizens protect themselves and their gress as quickly as desired. neighbours. The results of the UNDP Citi- The other Caribbean-7 nations have not zen Security Survey 2010 indicate that sup- achieved the same level of reform as Barba- port for police is greater in Barbados than in dos, but are not struggling as much as Jamaica the other Caribbean-7 nations; Barbadians or Trinidad and Tobago. For example, Suri- believe the police to be a legitimate force. name has also adopted a community policing Given these findings, it is not surprising that approach. Citizen involvement in crime pre- Barbados has been the most successful nation vention grew organically during the 1990s, in the region in instituting reforms that tran- when an increase in crime was coupled with sition the police force beyond older models of an economic downturn. Citizens formed policing. Jamaica made great strides towards their own neighbourhood watch groups be- reform beginning in the 1990s with the in- cause they were displeased with the effective- tent of increasing the transparency, effectiveness of the police. Such groups usually do not ness and legitimacy of the police. Communi- build a sense of general security because they ty policing was implemented along with these do not involve two-way communication and changes. However, the reform movement and coordination with the police. The formation community policing came to an untimely de- of these groups represented, however, an ef-

98 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Box 4.3. Problem-Solving Partnerships in Suriname 4

The community police manager plays a fundamental role in solving conflicts and preventing violence at the community level. The manager is supervised by the police and, in 2006, involved the participation of commercial institutions, small businesses and individual citizens in the activities of 12 police subregions in the district of Paramaribo and in 3 rural districts. The managers deal with problems such as the presence of informal street vendors or the need for parking spaces for private buses.

fort by the citizenry to begin to take responsi- tween the 1950s and the 1980s.19 Chart 4.1 bility for public safety. The police found ways summarizes the training programmes offered. of positively responding to this problem by It is based on information provided by the The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security establishing community police managers who security agencies of the respective countries. engaged with residents in problem-solving Investigative competence, use of force, human (box 4.3). rights, women’s rights, appropriate responses In 2009, Antigua and Barbuda imple- to gender-based violence and community mented community policing based on the policing are curriculum topics in most of the principle of the co-production of security. training programmes. Police salaries were also increased. A formal complaint procedure for citizens was established, and other reforms were undertaken. Box 4.4. The Co-Production of Security in Nicaragua Despite the major changes, community-oriented policing has not been fully realized, In 2001, the national government established the Comprehensive Policy on and the police continue to behave in a largely the Police and the Community, which defined the concepts and strategies of reactive manner by focusing on response a community policing model. Since 2004, the Proactive Community Polic- times. A recent initiative is intended to equip ing Model has brought together the government, NGOs and communities law enforcement with the latest in computer to address the issues of violence and crime by sharing information and to and telecommunications technology, an ef- build trust, interaction and partnerships. The programme helps identify the fort that modernizes rather than reforms the security needs of citizens and address them through comprehensive initia- police and their relationship to the public. tives and planning. Although the modernization of equipment The Proactive Community Policing Model has four main components. The is important in the Caribbean, it will not first is the operation of a police ‘total school’ that was established by the po- enhance feelings of security among citizens. lice academy and is used to train and develop officers throughout their ca- There must be reform aimed at improving reers. Police training and related programmes were also inaugurated in each the relationship between the police and the local police station. The second component involves fostering police-citizen public so that effective co-production of secu- partnerships to address local crime issues. The third is the commissioner for rity can occur. The Nicaraguan experience is women and children, a position created to address the prevention of domes- a good example of citizen-police partnership tic and sexual violence. The fourth component is the Adolescents and Youth for the co-production of security (box 4.4). Affairs Department, which was created to address youth violence and rein- tegrate youth into their communities. The programme is being supported by Developing Capacity: the Youth Affairs Division of the National Police. Advancing Police Training and Education Another aspect that is important for the fu- Sources: UNDP (2009). ture of policing in the Caribbean is the model of police training. All the Caribbean-7 countries have police training academies. These institutions or units were all established be-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 99 4 Chart 4.1 Incidence of Key Topics in Police Training Curricula percent

Women’s Rights 33 International Humanitarian Law 50 Gun Control 58 Intelligence 75 Fraud 83 Drug Control 83 Management 83 Gender Violence The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 83 Crowd Control 92 Community Policing 92 Use of Non-lethal Weapons 92 Suspect Interrogation Techniques 100 Traffic Control and Management 100 Investigation 100 Human Rights 100 Use of Lethal Weapons 100 Criminal Law 100

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Source: Data of CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, http://caricomimpacs.org/impacs. Note: Special thanks is owed to IMPACS for granting UNDP access to the report led by IMPACS and funded by the European Commission.

Training in topics related to the treatment of Regional Cooperation people by the police are present across most The Conference of Heads of Government of or all of the programmes. These topics may be CARICOM, the Caribbean Community, at viewed as supportive of the transformation its 22nd Meeting, held in Nassau, the Bahamas process in the police forces of the Caribbean. in July 2001, expressed concern over the crime Likewise, skills training in topics such as drug and violence that continue to pose a threat to control, fraud investigation and intelligence regional security. This gave impetus to efforts to gathering and analysis are no less important. develop and intensify regional cooperation on The culture and structure of the institutions security matters. These efforts have been facili- also have to be considered to ensure the effec- tated by the establishment of the Regional Task tive application of positive principles and the Force on Crime and Security. improved performance of the police. More- At the regional level, significant training over, in the small countries of the region, the has been undertaken among senior-level po- rationalization of police training from a re- lice officials on specific issues such as drug- gional perspective would be of considerable trafficking, intelligence and management benefit to all. (box 4.5). The purpose is to foster a regional

100 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Box 4.5. Caribbean Regional Police Training Centres 4 There are four regional training centres on security issues created in the 1980s to promote a collective response to se- in the Caribbean. curity threats among eastern Caribbean states. The current The Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Centre, member nations are Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Gre- located in Jamaica, trains officials in drug-related topics nada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vin- such as criminal law, management, intelligence, investiga- cent and the Grenadines. Trainees include police, military tion, drug control and suspect interrogation techniques. personnel and customs, prison and immigration officials. The courses address a wide range of law enforcement offi- Up to 30 trainees are accepted at a time, though none can cials, including military personnel, police, prison officials, be new recruits. Courses cover patrolling, investigation, immigration officers and customs officials. The institution crime forensics and diving. was established in 1996. It offers courses for 50 trainees at The Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre was created in a time. Trainees are full-standing staff, not recruits. 2007 to provide intelligence support to regional and in-

The Caribbean Centre for Development Administration, ternational stakeholders and to serve as a mechanism of The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security located in Barbados, trains immigration and customs of- intelligence integration in the region. Training is offered ficials and others. The overall aim is to enhance public gov- for police and military officials, as well as civilians involved ernance. The centre has only six instructors, all university in intelligence gathering. All course contents pertain to graduates, and 10 support staff. It was created in 1980 and intelligence gathering and analysis. Up to 25 trainees are offers courses for 30 trainees at a time. Trainees are recruits accepted. It does not train new recruits. and regular officers of all ranks. The Regional Security System, located in Barbados, was

approach to common regional challenges and ceptions of respondents about the police to establish a regional network of security opin terms of the protection of the rights of eratives and officials. individuals and equitable treatment of all These ariousv initiatives and programmes people have advanced the process of change within • The performance and competence dimen- the police services of the region. This process sion of the legitimacy of the police, that is, should be intensified. The perceptions of the the perceptions of respondents about the populations of the region who are served by effectiveness of police in controlling spe- the police reveal the extent of concern about cific types of crimes in the community and these issues and the extent of the demand for at the national level change. • The willingness of citizens to cooperate with the police in crime prevention and to Perceptions on the Police in the Carib- work with others in the community to re- bean Region duce violence. The public’s perceptions of the police are This section presents analysis primarily of re- crucial in the transition to citizen security. sponses to questions on the UNDP Citizen The police must be viewed as possessing the Security Survey 2010 regarding experiences, legitimate authority to uphold and enforce opinions and perceptions about the police. the laws and the rights of citizens, as well Four main topics are explored, as follows: as the competence to fulfil these duties in a • The effects of crime on the general sense of way that is fair, appropriate and respectful. If insecurity among citizens citizens view police in this light, they will be • Indicators of the values dimension of the more likely to cooperate with the police and legitimacy of the police, that is, the per- participate in crime prevention and control

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 101 4 Chart 4.2 The Role of Perceptions of the Police in Achieving Citizen Security

Perceive Police Legitimacy

Citizen Co-production for Citizen Sense Participation and Crime Prevention of Security from Cooperation and Control Crime The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security

Perceive Police Competence

efforts. As the role of citizens in crime preven- Violent crime was considered a more se- tion and control grows, citizens will begin to rious problem than property crime by the co-produce the positive outcomes along with respondents in almost all the Caribbean-7 the police, ultimately increasing the public’s countries. The fact that violent crime is per- sense of security from crime (chart 4.2). As ceived as more threatening is typical of most fear of crime lessens and the sense of security developed nations in the world, even though increases, citizens will become more able psy- the incidence of property crime is gener- chologically to pursue human development ally many times greater than the incidence of activities that enhance the quality of their violent crime.20 At the neighbourhood level, lives. robbery and day-time break-ins were rated as Crime is salient to citizens in the Carib- the first or second greatest crime problems in bean region. Less than half of the survey all the Caribbean-7 countries except Guyana respondents felt secure from crime (see and Jamaica. In Guyana, citizens worried the chapters 1 and 6). Given the high rates of most about robbery and night-time break-ins homicide, robbery, burglary, rape and domes- in their neighbourhoods; in Jamaica, murder tic violence documented in chapter 1, it is not was feared the most. surprising that insecurity is widespread. The In the rest of this section, we discuss the region is also facing economic challenges that two factors—shown in chart 4.2—that are are sometimes more immediate and threaten- predictive of a sense among citizens that they ing than the fear of becoming the victim of a are secure from crime: perceived police legiti- crime. It is therefore revealing that the survey macy and perceived police competence. If cit- found that nearly one fifth of the respondents izens see the police as credible agents of social said crime is the number one problem in their control operating under the rule of law and nations; a smaller percentage said crime was as competent in that role and worthy of assis- the first or second greatest problem in their tance and cooperation, then citizens are likely neighbourhoods. to feel secure from crime. Perceived legiti-

102 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 macy and perceived competence may both be Chart 4.3 People Who Believe Police Treat Citizens 4 eroded by the use by police of excessive force with Courtesy, Equality, Fairness and or by police corruption; so, it is important for Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010 police organizations to develop mechanisms percent and incentives that increase positive police conduct and reduce misconduct. 19.3 17.6 Perceived Police Legitimacy Antigua & 12.1 Barbuda If one perceives the police as a legitimate 14.5 agency for social control, then one believes 37.3 that the policies and procedures of the police 31.2 promote humane, equitable and consistently Barbados 27.2 applied treatment among all citizens and that 32.1 officers respect the rights of everyone.21 The The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 in- 17.2 cluded eight questions concerning the perfor- 14.8 Guyana mance of the police with regard to their han- 12.4 dling of civil rights, a key aspect of perceived 15.5 legitimacy. To simplify the presentation of the 15.0 results, we conducted a factor analysis to deter- 12.6 mine the items that could be grouped together Jamaica 8.9 in an empirical fashion.22 The analysis revealed that the way police deal with the civil rights 12.1 of citizens can be described according to three 24.0 concept clusters: respect and fairness in deal- 20.2 Saint Lucia ing with citizens; the treatment of citizens 14.8 with courtesy; and on the basis of equality 21.4 and respect for political rights. The urveys responses on the respect, fair- 11.1 9.4 ness, equality and courtesy displayed by the po- Suriname lice in their dealings with citizens are outlined 7.2 in chart 4.3. The chart is based on respondent 10.0 ratings on a five-point scale ranging from very 23.4 poor to very good. The data displayed in the Trinidad & 21.2 chart refer to the combined percentages of re- Tobago 15.1 spondents who answered ‘good’ or ‘very good’. 16.0 Across the three questions, an average of only 20.7 15 percent of the respondents gave ratings that 17.8 indicated substantial perceived legitimacy. The Caribbean-7 highest average percentage was associated with 13.7 respect for the rights of citizens (20.7 percent), 17.1 followed by fairness in dealing with people (18 Respect for Citizens’ Rights Treating People Equally percent), courtesy towards citizens (17 percent), and equitable treatment of all people (14 Fairness in Dealing with People Courtesy to Ordinary Citizens percent). The variation across the Caribbean-7 is noteworthy. Among all respondents, the police were perceived to be the most legitimate by Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “How do you rate the performance of the respondents in Barbados, while the police were police on the following items? Courtesy to ordinary citizens; respect for citizens rights; fairness in dealing with people; treating people equally.” The chart shows the percentage of respon- perceived to be the least legitimate by respond- dents who answered “Good” or “Very good”. ents in Trinidad and Tobago. These findings are

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 103 4 Chart 4.4 People Who Believe Police Respect Their Rights and the Rights of All Citizens, Caribbean-7, 2010

60 51.8 50 48.8

39.7 37.7 40 36.3 37.9 33.0 30.2 30 25.7

Percent 23.9 23.3 19.3 20.7 20 17.2 15.0

The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 11.1 10

0 Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7 Respect for All Citizens’ Rights Respect for Your Rights

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Using a scale from 1 to 5, please rank the extent to which the police have generally been respectful of your rights as a citizen. Use ‘1’ for very respectful and ‘5’ for very disrespectful.” A similar question associated with a different rating scale was asked about respect for the rights of others. The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “respectful” or “very respectful”.

supported by a study that examined calls for po- lied on different five-point rating scales; the lice service assistance by citizens in three of the answers are thus not strictly comparable. The Caribbean-7.23 Using the proportion of calls results suggest, however, that the respondents related to non-criminal matters as an indicator tended to feel their own rights are respected of legitimacy, the study found that Barbadian more than those of their fellow citizens. Thus, citizens regard their police as more legitimate almost 49 percent of the respondents in Saint than the citizens in either Trinidad and To- Lucia felt that the police respected their bago or Jamaica. The police in Barbados have rights, but fewer than half of this 49 percent also achieved the greatest amount of reform, believed that their fellow citizens were treated while the police in Trinidad and Tobago are in a respectful manner. Agreement that the struggling to keep pace with the high levels of police showed respect for the rights of other criminal activity there. The other four coun- citizens averaged only 21 percent across the tries fall somewhere in between. Caribbean-7, while respect for the respond- Respondent perceptions of the respect ents’ own rights averaged 39 percent. Except shown by the police for citizen rights gener- in Barbados, neither set of answers seemed ally and for civil rights in particular are out- to indicate that the police in the region are lined in chart 4.4. The two relevant survey regarded as legitimate. This finding is likely questions probed police legitimacy through related to the perception that the police are the perceptions of respondents on the re- corrupt. In any case, it appears these countries spect displayed by police for the rights of face a significant challenge in seeking citizen the respondents, but also the rights of other cooperation with the police or citizen co-pro- citizens. The questions were asked at differ- duction in crime prevention and control. ent points in the survey interviews and re-

104 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Chart 4.5 Victims of Domestic Violence Who Believe Police 4 Treated Them with Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010

50 42.2 40 38.2 38.9 34.5 32.2 32.9 Percent 31.0 30.0 30 29.9 29.9 27.5 24.3 25.3 24.1 22.5 20 16.0 10

0 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security Guyana Jamaica Suriname Barbados Saint Lucia Caribbean-7 Trinidad & Tobago Antigua & Barbuda Female Male

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who declared they had reported an incident of domestic violence to the police (N = 1,192). Question: “Please rank the extent to which the police have generally been respectful of your rights as a citizen.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “respectful” or “very respectful”.

The pattern is different among victims of the percentage of respondents in the Carib- domestic violence (chart 4.5). The level of bean-7 who chose the last two answers. Re- satisfaction of these people, both men and spondents in Barbados showed the greatest women, regarding their treatment by police is amount of confidence in the competence of low. the police in this area: 16.7 percent responded “a great deal”, and 65.4 percent responded Perceived Police Competence and “some confidence”. As above, this is not sur- Performance prising given the transformation of the police The perception that police officers and police in Barbados. For example, the Royal Barbados agencies are competent rests on the belief that Police Force has recently improved its already the police can control crime through preven- well-regarded services by expanding outreach tion activities and by solving criminal cases, to rural areas. If we sum the two response op- as well as the perception that the police are tions within each country, the data show that effective in carrying out their myriad other more than 55 percent of the respondents in responsibilities.24 The UNDP Citizen Secu- each country felt some confidence or a great rity Survey 2010 included three questions deal of confidence in the ability of the police that measured perceived competence. The to control crime. first question asked respondents to gauge The urveys findings show that the confi- how much confidence they had in the ability dence of respondents in the police also mir- of the police to control crime effectively: no rors the assessment by respondents of the confidence, some amount of confidence, or performance of the police in controlling two a great deal of confidence. Chart 4.6 displays major crimes: robbery and burglary (com-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 105 4 Chart 4.6 Perceived Confidence in the Police to Control Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010

70 65.4 62.5 62.1 60 59.4 59.1 57.3 53.9 52.7 50

40 Percent 30 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 20 16.7 14.3 14.3 15.5 11.6 11.9 10 6.7 4.6 0 Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7 Some Amount of Confidence A Great Deal of Confidence

pare charts 4.6 and 4.7). The respondents in the measures so far discussed, and this trend Barbados had the greatest confidence in the continued with regard to performance. In police: around 82 percent had a great deal contrast, the respondents in Trinidad and To- of confidence or some confidence in the po- bago had little confidence in the police and lice (chart 4.6). Their rating of police perfor- also rated the performance of the police the mance in controlling robbery and burglary lowest in controlling robbery and burglary. was also the highest relative to respondents Suriname was second to Barbados: 77.6 per- in the rest of the Caribbean-7: 40 percent of cent of the respondents there indicated they the respondents in Barbados rated the police had confidence in the police to address the good or very good in controlling both rob- crime problem, while 29.1 and 27.7 percent, bery and burglary (chart 4.7). Respondents in respectively, rated the police as good or very Trinidad and Tobago showed the least con- good in controlling robbery and burglary. fidence in the police: 58 percent had a great It is also evident in chart 4.7 that the per- deal of confidence or some confidence in the ceptions of the police control of robbery (that police (chart 4.6). They also rated police per- is, theft from a person) tracks closely with formance the poorest in controlling robbery perceptions of the police control of burglary and burglary: only 10 percent rated the po- (theft from a building, car, home, and so on), lice good or very good in these areas (chart even though the latter is a much more frequent 4.7). As seen in charts 4.3, 4.4 and 4.6, the crime in the Caribbean. Another conclusion respondents in Barbados rated the police as is that, although the respondents have more the most legitimate and most competent on or less confidence in the police to control the

106 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Chart 4.7 Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling 4 Robbery and Burglary, Caribbean-7, 2010

40 39.4 40.1

30 29.1 27.1 27.7 25.4 23.5 24.123.7

Percent 20.6 20.5 20 19.8 20.8 19.8

10.510.8 10 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 0 Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7 Burglary Robbery

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate how much confidence you have in the police to effectively control the following crimes: robbery and burglary. Use ‘1’ for a low level of confidence and ‘5’ for a high level of confidence.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “High” or “Very high”.

Chart 4.8 Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling Domestic Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010

31.9 30 28.9 27.4 27.1 22.9 23.3 23.9 25.6 23.0 22.9 21.7 19.6 20.7 20 18.0

Percent 10.8 10 8.9

0 Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7

In country (Good + Very good) In community (Good + Very good)

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate how much confidence you have in the police to effectively control domestic violence. Use ‘1’ for a low level of confidence and ‘5’ for a high level of confidence.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Good” or “Very Good”.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 107 crime problem, they do not feel that the police more on training officers in domestic violence 4 are performing at an appropriate level. prevention and intervention and implement Chart 4.8 focuses on the perceived perfor- best practice in this area. Noteworthy also is mance of the police in controlling domestic the fact that the respondents rate the perfor- violence in the communities and the coun- mance of police in their communities more tries of the respondents. The findings show favourably than the performance of police in that the rating by respondents of the ability their countries. This parallels research show- of the police to control domestic violence ing there is greater support for the police in mirrors the assessment by respondents of one’s own community than for police else- the performance of the police in controlling where, suggesting that familiarity has a some- robbery and burglary. Thus, Barbados ranks what positive effect on assessment. the highest, and Trinidad and Tobago ranks the lowest. However, even in Barbados, only Willingness of Citizens to Participate 29 percent of the respondents thought the and Cooperate with the Police The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security performance of the police in the community was either good or very good; the majority If citizens perceive the police to be both legiti- perceived the performance of the police as mate in the use of social control mechanisms less effective. This indicates that police de- and competent in doing so, citizens are more partments in the Caribbean need to focus likely to participate in crime control activities with the police and to be generally supportive 25 Chart 4.9 Reporting Crimes to the Police, of police efforts. The crime control activities Caribbean-7, 2010 include reporting crimes to the police, coop- erating in investigations, coming forward with information about future or past criminal inci- 80 dents, and donating time and money to police 73.4 70.8 programmes. The only relevant question on 70 67.1 65.3 65.9 participation in the UNDP Citizen Security 62.4 63.1 62.0 60.9 Survey 2010 came at the end of a question se- 60 quence: “In the last year, were you the victim 51.1 of any of the following 18 violent crimes, and, 50 48.2 47.6 43.9 46.8 if yes, did you report the violent incident to the 40 39.2 police?” A similar sequence of questions dealt 33.9 with property crime. Research in developing na-

Percent 30 tions and in the United States suggests that the seriousness of an offense is the best predictor of 20 whether the crime will be reported to the police: as the seriousness increases, so does the report- 10 ing. However, factors other than seriousness play a role in decisions to report. Research has 0 shown that, especially in the developing world, past victimization and socio-economic status Tobago Guyana affect a victim’s willingness to report a crime to Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados 26 Trinidad &

Saint Lucia the police. Thus, the rate of reporting crime Caribbean-7 victimization has frequently been treated as an Reported Violent Crime Reported Property Crime indicator of the public’s trust that the police will respond appropriately to such reports and Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who were victims of violent crime (N=1060) and respondents who were neither ignore nor punish the citizens filing the victims of property crime (N=882). Questions: “Did you report the (violent) incident to the police?” “If you were the victim of a property (non-violent) crime, including fraud, did you report this crime reports. to the police?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who said they had been victimized Chart 4.9 displays the percentage of re- by crimes and who reported the crimes to the police. spondents to the UNDP Citizen Security

108 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Survey 2010 who had been victimized and their satisfaction with the police reaction on a said they reported the violence or the prop- five-point scale ranging from very dissatisfied 4 erty crimes to the police. There is a fairly simi- to very satisfied. On average, across the Carib- lar reporting rate of around 60–70 percent bean-7, the level of satisfaction with the police for violent crimes across the Caribbean-7. response to reports of violent crimes (28.7 per- The likelihood of reporting property crimes cent satisfied) was surpassed by satisfaction with is consistently lower, around 40–50 percent the response to reports of property crimes (54.9 except in Antigua and Barbuda (34 percent) percent satisfied). For comparison, the aver- and Suriname (65 percent). Comparable data age satisfaction level found by the 2004–2005 on reporting in the United States and many International Crime Victimization Survey for European nations have been available from property crimes was incrementally lower at 53 the International Crime Victims Survey since percent.28 1989. The 2004–2005 surveys conducted in The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 30 countries found that the reporting rate as- did not ask respondents about the reasons for The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security sociated with five property crimes was 53 per- their assessment of their encounter with police cent.27 This comparison suggests that the level after they had reported crimes, but practices of trust in the police found in five of the Car- that have been adopted in some countries may ibbean-7 is consistent with the correspond- help explain some of the variation. For exam- ing level in other developed and developing ple, Suriname has established informal neigh- countries. bourhood councils composed of community A frequent follow-up question among re- members. The councils serve as an alternate spondents who had been crime victims and means to encourage community involvement who said they had reported the crimes gauged in evidence-based crime prevention and con-

Chart 4.10 Satisfaction with Police after Violent Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 percent

Caribbean-7 27.7 29.7

Antigua & 20.0 15.7 Barbuda Barbados 28.2 42.6

Guyana 35.0 23.3

Jamaica 28.9 26.1

Saint Lucia 35.7 48.8

Suriname 22.4 18.9

Trinidad & 25.5 34.1 Tobago Male Female

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who were victims of violent crimes and reported the crimes to police (N = 643). Question: “How satisfied were you with the action taken by the police?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who declared they were “Very satisfied” or “Satisfied”.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 109 4 Chart 4.11 Satisfaction with Police after Property Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 percent

Caribbean-7 55.0 54.9

Antigua & 50.6 16.3 Barbuda Barbados 50.9 60.5

Guyana 79.0 82.3

Jamaica 56.2 17.6

The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security Saint Lucia 35.7 59.6

Suriname 28.3 19.1

Trinidad & 20.7 26.4 Tobago Male Female

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: respondents who were victims of property crimes and reported the crimes to police (N = 1,074). Question: “How satisfied were you with the action taken by the police?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who declared they were “Very satisfied” or “Satisfied”.

trol. This informal mechanism may explain tigua and Jamaica. As measured by the survey, the low satisfaction of some citizens with the the lack of gender differences across the region police response to crime reports. In Guyana, indicates that the police do not systematically citizens say they do not believe the police will respond differently to crime reports filed by follow up on reports regarding non-violent women or men. This suggests that inputs by crimes and, so, often do not file such reports. women into discussions on the best way for Nonetheless, relative to respondents elsewhere, police forces to transition to a citizen security when citizens in Guyana do report property focus or inputs by women serving on police crimes, they are the most satisfied with the po- oversight bodies are not being discounted by lice reaction. police services. Charts 4.10 and 4.11 show that, across the Attitudes that support the police can be as Caribbean-7, there was no particular general important as participation with the police in gender pattern in the satisfaction of respond- crime prevention and control activities. The ents with the police reaction to reports of UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 included violent crimes or property crimes. There were, five items measuring supportive attitudes. Two however, marked differences across the seven items focused on the personal attitudes of re- nations. For example, significantly higher per- spondents about the competence of the police centages of women in Barbados, Saint Lucia, and whether the police deserve support (chart and Trinidad and Tobago were satisfied with 4.12). The first question allowed a simple yes the police response to their reports of violent or no. On average, 57 percent of the survey re- or property crimes. In contrast, significantly spondents said “yes” in answer to this question higher percentages of men were satisfied with about police competence. The share varied the police response to violent crime reports in widely across the Caribbean-7, from a low of Guyana and to property crime reports in An- 42 percent in Guyana to a high of 72 percent

110 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Chart 4.12 Respondents Who Believe the Police Are Competent 4 and Deserve Support, Caribbean-7, 2010

80 72.0 70 68.5 64.8 67.3 65.5 60 57.7 55.9 56.7 53.6 54.8 52.9 50 49.1 49.9 43.0 41.640.1 40

Percent 30 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 20

0 Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7 Police are Competent Police Deserve my Support

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Do you believe that the police are competent?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Yes”. Question: “Using a scale from 1 to 5 (1 weakest, 5 strongest), indicate how you rate the cohesiveness of your community on the following: ‘The police force deserves my support.’” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who gave the two most positive answers.

in Barbados. Agreement with the statement have rated the effectiveness at a higher level. “The police force deserves my support” was Second, the respondents might not think the measured on a five-point scale ranging from police are currently effective, but, because there “the weakest feeling” to “the strongest feel- is only one police force, they feel the police ing”. For this question, the two most positive deserve citizen support to help them become responses were combined. The overall rate of more effective. Third, support is a fuzzy term, agreement with the statement was 54 percent, and some citizens may base their support on and the positive responses ranged from a low confidence in the ability of the police to pre- of 40 percent in Guyana to highs of 65 percent vent and solve crimes, while others base their in Jamaica and 67 percent in Saint Lucia. Both support on the friendliness and fairness of the measures showed considerable attitudinal sup- officers with whom they come into contact.29 port for the police. Thus, these questions may be measuring quite It may not be inconsistent for citizens to be different aspects of the willingness to partici- dissatisfied with the police and unsure about pate and cooperate with the police. Fourth, the the effectiveness of the police in respond- belief that police deserve support may reflect ing to major crimes and, yet, also believe that the optimism and hope of respondents that the the police deserve their support. First, the police will continue to reform and meet the de- respondents were only asked about effective- mands of modern policing. ness regarding specific major crimes and not Three other attitudinal measures in the a fuller range of crimes for which they might UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 gauged

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 111 4 Chart 4.13 Respondents Who Believe the Police Need More Personnel and More Resources, Caribbean-7, 2010

90 82.6 82.0 80 76.4 76.7 77.0 71.9 72.1 74.8 69.2 70.7 68.5 72.5 70 68.8 67.3 66.3 65.0 64.9 60.1 60 57.9 54.4 52.7 51.0 52.6 53.1 50

40 Percent

The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 30

0 Antigua & Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Caribbean-7 Barbuda Tobago

Increase Size of Police Invest More in Police More Police on the Street for Security

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “Do you think that increasing the size of the police force would be an effective means of reducing crime?” “In order to reduce the crime rate the government should invest more in the police force/service.” “Would putting more police on the streets make you feel more secure?“ For the first two questions, the chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Strongly agree“ or “Agree”. For the last question the chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Yes”.

the support of respondents for governmental the rule of law and service of the citizenry. The action that would enhance police services by government and the police should not take ad- putting more police on the streets, investing vantage of this support only to modernize the more in the police force and increasing the force (for example, by obtaining better weap- size of the force. Together, all three actions ons, communications systems and transporta- garnered more than 55 percent agreement tion), but also genuinely to reform the force (chart 4.13). Across the Caribbean-7, an aver- by enhancing the organizational structure of age of 75 percent of the respondents supported the police, the incentive and reward structure investing more in the police; 69 percent fa- within the service and the relationship be- voured putting more police on the streets; and tween the police and the public. 58 percent favoured increasing the size of the The nalfi measure of the likelihood of citi- police force. Together, the findings outlined in zen participation was the response to a survey charts 4.12 and 4.13 demonstrate considerable question on working together with others attitudinal support for the police in terms of to reduce violence. At least 45 percent of re- competence, reputation and the need for more spondents across the Caribbean-7 expressed resources from the government. These results their willingness to do this (chart 4.14). Ja- indicate that citizens are interested in support- maica showed the highest positive response ing the police. This support can be leveraged rate (65 percent), and Barbados the lowest to aid the police in realizing the transition to (46 percent). The latter finding is not surpris- an organization that is more well oriented to ing because the respondents in Barbados do

112 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Chart 4.14 Respondents Chart 4.15 Respondents 4 Willing to Work Willing to Work with Others to with Others to Reduce Violent Reduce Crime, Crime, by Age, Caribbean-7, Caribbean-7, 2010 2010

70 70 65.5

60 59.3 60 58.9 58.3 59.2 57.4 56.8 56.8 54.0 54.6 56.6 50 50 51.6 46.2 45.7 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 40 40

Percent 30 Percent 30

20 20

10 10

0 0 Guyana Support Jamaica Suriname Barbados Saint Lucia Police Force Caribbean-7 Deserves my Willingness to Work Together Trinidad & Tobago Antigua & Barbuda 56+yrs 31-55 yrs 18-30 yrs

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “Using a scale from 1 to 5 (1 weakest, 5 strongest), indi- “How do you rate the cohesiveness of your commu- cate how you rate the cohesiveness of your community nity on the following: ‘To what extent would you be on the following: ‘To what extent would you be willing willing to work together with others to reduce violence to work together with others to reduce violence in this in this country?’ ‘The police force deserves my sup- country.’” The chart shows the percentage of respon- port.’?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “A great extent”, “A good extent” dents who answered “Strongly agree” and “Agree”. or “A fair extent”. not believe that the country has a major crime may not have the means, knowledge, or lead- problem warranting more widespread col- ership to do so effectively. For example, even laborative action. The Jamaican respondents though neighbourhood watch programmes realized, in contrast, that they have a serious are common in Suriname, they do not nec- crime problem. essarily make citizens feel safer. Nonetheless, These atad indicate that a crucial element the data indicate there is an untapped pool in citizen participation and cooperation in of respect for the police and a sense of social solving the crime problem exists across the connectedness that, if properly mobilized by Caribbean: the willingness of citizens to work an innovative police agency, could lead to the collectively to reduce crime. However, the co-production of citizen security. willingness to work collectively is not identi- To assess the distribution of this willingness cal with engaging in partnerships with the po- across populations, the answers of respondents lice.30 Although citizens may express a desire were broken down by demographic character- to engage in the co-production of safety, they istics. Charts 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17 show that the

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 113 willingness is exhibited in all age categories, crease security. These findings differ from -find 4 both genders and all but the lowest socio-eco- ings in the United States, where older citizens nomic category. Thus, the distribution is broad and women are more likely to participate and throughout the populations of the Caribbe- cooperate with the police.31 an-7. Even among respondents who described While the survey data show that the citi- themselves as poor, almost 60 percent stated zens of the Caribbean-7 do not view the police that they are willing to work together to in- as legitimate in all dimensions, the respondents evaluate the police as competent, are willing to work together with others to reduce violence, and support increased public resources for the Chart 4.16 Respondents Willing to Work with police. The combination of these three factors Others to Reduce Crime, by Gender, can significantly help the transition of the police Caribbean-7, 2010 to a citizen-oriented organization and begin the co-production of national security from crime. The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security 55.2 Willingness to Work Conclusion Together 58.1 Caribbean countries suffer from unreformed Police Force Deserves 55.5 police structures. Despite progress in some my Support 54.0 nations, the predominant policing model is still focused on state security, not citizen secu- Female Male rity. The transition to citizen security requires institutional reforms within police forces and changes in police work and attitudes so Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “How do you rate the cohesiveness of your that community-based policing becomes the community on the following: ‘To what extent would you be willing to work together with others norm. Improving mechanisms to promote to reduce violence in this country?’ ‘The police force deserves my support.’?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Strongly agree” and “Agree”. accountability in police performance that are independent of police agencies will con- Chart 4.17 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to tribute to the transformation process and Reduce Crime, by Socio-economic Status, enhance citizen security. The attitudes of citi- Caribbean-7, 2010 zens will then change, and people will become more willing to cooperate with the police in new and meaningful ways to prevent crime 55.1 and control criminality. Willingness to Work 57.7 Theresults of the UNDP Citizen Secu- Together 66.7 rity Survey 2010 offer grounds for optimism. 37.0 Even though the necessary organizational changes within police forces are far from complete, citizens across the Caribbean re- 47.7 gion already perceive the police as moderately 54.9 Police Force Deserves legitimate and competent. They are willing 55.7 my Support to become co-producers of their own secu- 68.6 rity, and, in each nation, they are supportive of government investment in more resources Poorest Lower Class Middle Class Upper Class for the police to transform the police services and enhance their effectiveness. If citizens Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. perceive the police as both legitimate and Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “How do you rate the cohesiveness of your community on the following: ‘To what extent would you be willing to work together with others to competent, they are more likely to participate reduce violence in this country?’ ‘The police force deserves my support.’?” The chart shows the in crime control activities and be generally percentage of respondents who answered “Strongly agree” and “Agree”. supportive of the other efforts of the police.

114 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 CHAPTER Criminal Justice 5 Systems Security and justice are equal priorities for Caribbean people

Opportunities for all, justice for all, respect for all, security for all 5CHAPTER Criminal Justice Systems 5

Introduction nal justice systems such as public confidence Criminal Justice Systems and the relationship of national institutions This chapter examines the role of criminal to regional structures and governance. justice systems in addressing crime, violence and insecurity in the Caribbean. Chapter 4 Criminal Justice Systems analyses the important part the police play The long shadow of colonialism has exerted in promoting citizen security. The primary an indelible influence on the cultures and focus of this chapter is legal systems, includ- institutions of the Caribbean for centuries. ing prosecution, the courts and sentencing, Forms and structures of government, includ- correctional systems and the criminal justice ing the legal codes and criminal justice sys- system as a whole. The major issues of interest tems of interest in this chapter, continue to are as follows: exhibit characteristics of each nation’s coloni- • Institutional structures and operations al legacy. Despite post-independence efforts • The effectiveness of institutions, including to bring about change and to make national systems of accountability and the capacity institutions more responsive to the needs of to deliver the required services fairly and the people, understanding the criminal jus- efficiently tice systems in the Caribbean involves under- • The extent to which institutions are held ac- standing the history of colonialism and the countable ways colonialism still influences the nations • The relationship of national institutions to in the region. regional institutions and NGOs Throughout the chapter, special attention is paid to the treatment of juveniles and other Legal Systems vulnerable groups by the criminal justice The legal systems of six of the seven nations system, including their access to justice.1 Re- examined in this report (the Caribbean-7) are search has demonstrated that the behaviour based on British common law and national of criminal justice institutions can have a vital statutory laws. (The seventh is Suriname, impact on citizen security, especially with re- where the legal system is based on the sys- gard to vulnerable groups. This chapter also tem of the Netherlands.) Although the legal provides a critical evaluation of existing re- systems of the former British colonies share form projects and outlines a vision for crimi- many similarities, they also differ in some re- nal justice reform in the Caribbean region. spects. The legal systems of Guyana and Saint The chapter is organized according to the is- Lucia, for instance, are often described as hy- sues listed above. The discussion therefore brid or mixed. The legal code in Saint Lucia is begins with a description of criminal justice a hybrid of British common law and French systems in the region. Next, the chapter ex- civil law owing to Saint Lucia’s history as amines objective indicators of system ef- both a British and a French colony. Similarly, fectiveness, including problems such as case Guyana’s legal code is a hybrid of British com- processing delays, low conviction rates and mon law and Netherland civil law. In all six insufficient alternatives to incarceration. The nations, British common law was the primary chapter then explores the subjective assess- foundation of the legal systems at the time of ments of citizens of the effectiveness of crimi- independence, though there were hybrid ele-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 117 ments. Suriname once relied on the British da, as well as Saint Lucia.8 The ECSC serves 5 common law system, but this was replaced by as a unified supreme court for these countries. Netherland civil law in the 1600s when the It consists of two divisions: the High Court United Provinces (the Netherlands) defeated of Justice and the Court of Appeal.9 Both England in battle during the Second Anglo- are based in Saint Lucia. It acts as an itiner- Dutch War.2 ant court, travelling to member states at fixed In addition to the similarities in the foun- periods throughout the year to “hear appeals dations of their legal systems, the criminal from the decisions of the High Court and justice systems in the Caribbean-7 also share Magistrates Courts in Member States in both Criminal Justice Systems structural similarities. Each nation has a simi- civil and criminal matters”.10 Whereas other lar hierarchy of courts that handle both civil countries may operate their own independent and criminal matters, as well as appeals. With high court and court of appeals, the ECSC the exception of courts in Suriname, the offers these functions regionally for member courts in each country have a three-tier struc- states. However, the ECSC does not serve as a ture that includes magistrates courts, a high final appellate court. For Antigua and Barbu- court and a court of appeal.3 The terminology da and for Saint Lucia, final appellate jurisdic- used for these three entities is fairly consist- tion rests with the Judicial Committee of the ent, though there are variations.4 The magis- Privy Council, an entity located in London trates courts serve as the lowest level of the and formally tied to the United Kingdom and court system, hearing lesser judicial matters, to judicial systems in many Commonwealth including small claims civil actions and less countries. severe criminal matters.5 Typically non-jury The ajoritym of the countries of the Carib- cases are handled in the magistrates courts, bean Community (CARICOM) use the Judi- while more serious civil and criminal matters cial Committee of the Privy Council as a last are handled through the high courts. Con- venue for appeals.11 As the only country of the sistent caseload statistics are not available for Caribbean-7 that does not have a predomi- each country, though it has been estimated nantly British legal foundation, Suriname uses that approximately 90 percent of the legal its own High Court of Justice as a final court proceedings in the judicial system in Guyana of appeals.12 Only Barbados and Guyana rely on emanate from the magistrates courts.6 the regional Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) The court structure in Suriname, the only na- as final appellate court.13 tion in the Caribbean-7 with a legal system The CCJ was established by a treaty that based on laws of the Netherlands, is some- was ratified in 2003. However, “although the what different. Suriname’s legal system is Agreement was signed by nearly all of the grounded on three cantonal or district courts, Member States of the Community, only three each of which is presided over by a single of those States (Barbados, Belize and Guyana) judge, whose decisions can be appealed to have enacted the required domestic legislation the Court of Justice. The First District Court to accord access to the Court by their nation- tries civil cases in specific regions of the coun- als.” 14 The CCJ is modelled after the British try. The Second District Court tries criminal appellate system and replaces the Privy Coun- cases in specific regions of the country. The cil for those countries that choose to enact Third District Court hears civil and criminal the appellate jurisdiction of the agreement. cases in those regions not covered by the two The CCJ was established to “provide for the other courts. There is also a lower court, the Caribbean Community an accessible, fair, Martial Court, which has jurisdiction over efficient, innovative and impartial justice sys- cases involving military personnel.7 tem built on a jurisprudence reflective of Car- The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court ibbean history, values and traditions, while (ECSC) has jurisdiction in the member maintaining an inspirational, independent in- countries of the Organization of Eastern Car- stitution worthy of emulation by the courts of ibbean States, including Antigua and Barbu- the region and the trust and confidence of its

118 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 people.”15 The court, located in Port of Spain, provides for court-assigned attorneys in both capital of Trinidad and Tobago, is intended to civil and criminal matters.19 5 have both original and appellate jurisdiction Each of the Caribbean-7, with the excep- among all CARICOM member states. The tion of Suriname, has a functioning bail sys- original jurisdiction of the court is applicable tem. Most deny bail in cases involving more to all CARICOM countries, including the serious crimes or if the offender has been pre- Caribbean-7, while the appellate jurisdiction viously convicted of a violent crime. There is must be ratified by each country. The original some speculation that judges in some coun- jurisdiction allows the CCJ to “adjudicate tries may use high bail and distant remand Criminal Justice Systems disputes among Member States pertaining to dates as leverage in trying to secure guilty [their] economic integration”.16 pleas, though the extent of this practice is unknown.20 In the wake of a serious outbreak Prosecution and Defence of violent crime, including a 488 percent The prosecutorial system within the Carib- increase in the homicide rate from 1999 to bean varies across countries. In each country, 2008, Trinidad and Tobago enacted a bail re- defendants are entitled to a fair trial, are pre- form that is intended to keep violent offend- sumed innocent until proven guilty and have ers behind bars. 21 the right to appeal. With the exception of Suri- name, which has no jury system, all countries Correctional Systems allow jury trials. Juries are typically relied on in With the exception of Suriname, Caribbean cases involving serious criminal offences. Trial correctional systems are housed within gov- by jury for civil cases is permissible in some ar- ernment ministries that are separate from the eas, though rare. Guyana and Saint Lucia do offices responsible for public prosecutions. not allow jury trials for civil cases.17 One indicator of transparency in correctional In each of the Caribbean-7, detained sus- practices is the extent to which nations per- pects are provided access to defence counsel mit access to prisons and jails by outside ob- upon request, though some countries provide servers, particularly NGOs that focus on hu- this access more promptly after arrest than man rights. Each of the Caribbean-7 allows others. In Suriname, for example, prosecu- for the possibility of access to prison facilities tors may choose to deny access to counsel if by independent human rights observers.22 they feel such access would harm an ongoing The umbern of prisons in the Caribbean-7 investigation. The extent to which the state ranges from 1 (Antigua and Barbuda, Barba- provides defence counsel for indigent suspects dos and Saint Lucia) to 12 (Jamaica). Table varies. In Antigua and Barbuda, legal defence is 5.1 provides basic descriptive statistics about only provided to indigent persons facing capi- prisons in each country. The existence of sepa- tal charges. Similarly, in Saint Lucia, defence rate facilities for women, men, juveniles and counsel is provided only to people charged those awaiting trial varies across the region. In with serious criminal offences. Trinidad and Antigua and Barbuda, there are separate youth Tobago provides counsel to indigent persons facilities for juvenile delinquents. However, in charged with murder and other serious offenc- 2010, a small number of juveniles were housed es. In Barbados, the government supports “free in the country’s prison alongside adult inmates. legal aid to the indigent in family matters, child In Barbados, women are housed in a separate support, serious criminal cases such as rape or wing in the adult prison facility, while a sepa- murder, and all cases involving minors.”18 In rate juvenile facility houses boys and girls. In Guyana, the right to counsel is only provided Guyana, there is a single women’s prison, and in capital murder cases that reach the High juveniles under the age of 16 years are housed Court. For other offences, the Georgetown Le- in a separate detention facility, while those over gal Aid Clinic supplies legal advice. Legal aid the age of 16 are incarcerated in adult facilities. attorneys in Jamaica are available in cases that Jamaica’s prison facilities include four locations can result in incarceration, while Suriname for juveniles, while adult men and women of-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 119 5 Table 5.1. A Statistical Profile of Prison Systems, Caribbean-7

Country Prisons, Prison populationa Official Popula- number capa- tion Total Rate Pre-trial, Juveniles city densityb remand

Antigua & 1 295 330 34.2 4.1 150 130.7

Criminal Justice Systems Barbuda (2010) (2010)c (2010)d (2007) (2007) (2007) (2007)

Barbados 1 910 354 37.2 1.8 1,250 72.8 (2010) (2010)e (2010)f (2009) (2009) (2010) (2010)

Guyana 5 2,122 284 41.0 0.0 1,580 134.3 (2010) (2010)e (2010)g (2010) (2010) (2010) (2010)

Jamaica 12 4,709 174 15.0 9.2 4,247 110.9 (2009)h (2007)e (2007)i (2007) (2007) (2007) (2007)

Saint 1 568 323 23.2 0.9 450 126.2 Lucia (2011) (2011)e (2010)j (2011) (2011) (2011) (2011)

Suriname 6 915 175 55.0 5.7 1,233 162.7 (2009)k (2009)l (2009)m (2005) (2005) (2002) (1999)

Trinidad 8 3,591 276 41.9 3.0 4,386 87.8 & Tobago (2010) (2010)e (2010)n (2008) (2006) (2006) (2006)

Source: World Prison Brief (database), International Centre for Prison Studies, London, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/ worldbrief/. Note: The data year is in parentheses.

a. The total includes pre-trial detainees and remand prisoners. The rate is per 100,000 national population. The population of pre-trial detainees and remand prisoners and the population of juveniles are shown in percentages of the total prison population. Juveniles = under-18-year-olds. b. Prison population as a percentage of official prison capacity. c. US State Department (2010c). d. Based on an estimated national population of 89,500 in December 2010 (United Nations data). e. Data of the national prison administration. f. Based on an estimated national population of 257,200 in October 2010 (United Nations data). g. Based on an estimated national population of 761,000 in October 2010 (United Nations data). h. Eight prisons are for adults; four are for juveniles. i. Based on an estimated national population of 2.7 million in October 2007 (United Nations data). j. Based on an estimated national population of 176,000 in December 2010 (United Nations Data). k. Three adult prisons, one pre-trial detention centre, one juvenile detention centre, and 19 temporary detention centres in police stations. l. US State Department (2010e). m. Based on an estimated national population of 522,000 at the end of 2009 (United Nations data). n. Based on an estimated national population of 1.3 million in January 2010 (United Nations data).

120 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 fenders are housed in separate facilities. Suri- The racticep of pre-trial detention is name has a pre-trial detention centre for adults widespread within the region and often con- 5 and juveniles, as well as a juvenile detention tributes to significant problems with case facility. Within the three adult prison facili- backlogs and prison overcrowding. Table 5.1 ties in Suriname, women and men are housed provides data on the share of the prison popu- separately. Of the eight correctional facilities lation that is incarcerated during pre-trial de- in Trinidad, one is specifically for women, and tention for each country. Elsewhere below, we another is for juveniles. Even in the countries review complications criminal justice systems with separate facilities, juveniles may often be face as a result of pre-trial detention practices, Criminal Justice Systems detained in adult prisons because of security case processing delays and backlogs. concerns at youth facilities. Female juveniles Probation and parole are common in are especially vulnerable to placement in adult criminal justice systems in the Caribbean, but prisons because of a lack of female youth facili- the nature and extent of these practices vary ties. The extent to which juveniles are isolated widely across the region. Probation services from adult populations within adult facilities are generally more widespread than parole varies as well. services. Because probation services are more In each country, arbitrary arrest and deten- common, we discuss them briefly, paying par- tion are prohibited by the constitution. How- ticular attention to the services available for ever, there are varying practices regarding the juvenile offenders. length of time a person may be detained on Probation services are often considered suspicion of involvement in criminal activ- part of community corrections strategies in ity. In Antigua and Barbuda, detainees must the region. Jamaica began experimenting with be brought before a court within 48 hours of probation in the 1940s as a way to alleviate arrest or detention. In Barbados, the constitu- “the harshness of punishment and [prevent] tion allows for the detention of individuals for the contamination of the criminal novice in up to five days without arrest. Once an arrest the unsavoury atmosphere of the prison”. 24 is made, the individual must appear before In Barbados, the Penal System Act of 1998 en- the court as promptly as possible. Guyana law courages community sentencing options such states that, once an arrest has been made, the as probation and community service. As a re- individual can be held no longer than 72 hours sult, since 2000, the Barbados Probation De- before appearing in court to be charged. Saint partment has supported offenders that have Lucia also allows for a 72-hour holding period been given the option of community service. for persons detained with a warrant before a However, community-based correctional ser- court appearance is required. In Jamaica, devices in the region are limited. Other nations, tainees are to be charged within 24–48 hours including Guyana and Jamaica, have also ex- or be released. Justices of the peace or resident perimented with a variety of community cor- magistrates may grant special waivers to this rections strategies, including community ser- law in extenuating circumstances. In Suri- vice orders, community-based rehabilitation name, if the sentence for a crime is longer than programmes and the appointment of com- four years, officials are authorized to detain a munity members to parole boards. Many such suspect for up to 14 days, during which time programmes have come and gone because of the suspect must be brought to court to face budget crises and shifts in the national and charges. However, if additional time is needed, international political environment. judges may extend this holding period for an- While there is no systematic data avail- other 150 days.23 Finally, in Trinidad and To- able to compare the number of persons on bago, detained suspects must appear before the probation across nations, anecdotal evidence court within 48 hours. For more serious of- provides insights. For example, Probation De- fences, magistrates have the discretion of plac- partment data from Barbados indicates that, ing detainees on remand or allow them to post in 2000–2007, an average 75.5 adult men bail while a preliminary inquiry is conducted. and 10.8 adult women were placed on proba-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 121 tion annually (most frequently for drug- and first-time offenders away from lives of crime, 5 theft-related offences). Compared with the today’s minor offenders will often become to- number of persons incarcerated in Barbados morrow’s serious offenders. (see table 5.1), this appears to be a small share of individuals being diverted away from de- Statistical Infrastructure tention facilities. Data obtained from the Only the most rudimentary official data useful Guyana Police Force indicate that, in 2008 for measuring and describing the operations and 2009, 183 juveniles were charged with of criminal justice systems are available for the offences. Of these, 74 (approximately 40 per- Caribbean-7. Statistical infrastructures in the Criminal Justice Systems cent) were placed on probation. Probation Caribbean-7 are sorely lacking, and even basic may be a more frequent alternative to incar- descriptive data on the flow of cases through ceration for juvenile offenders. criminal justice systems are not consistently Probation is also increasingly viewed as a available. If elementary descriptive data on the viable alternative to incarceration because it activities of criminal justice systems are either can help alleviate the overcrowding in prisons of generally poor quality or are simply unavail- and jails and the lengthy court backlogs (as- able, then the more rigorous kinds of data and suming that defendants mount a more vigor- research necessary to judge the effectiveness of ous defence if they are facing prison instead of criminal justice operations across the Carib- probation). Probation may serve the interests bean are even more difficult to obtain.25 of justice by giving those people who have not Building a regional statistical infrastructure yet become committed to crime an opportu- for measuring threats to human security and nity to turn their lives around. Probation is studying the capacity of governments to pre- likewise a framework within which the state vent and alleviate these threats are critical. The can attempt to rehabilitate young or inexperi- solution to these statistical and research capac- enced inmates. ity issues needs to be multifaceted, involving Most often, probation officers are as- governments, NGOs, development banks and signed court supervision over juveniles re- universities. Putting in place effective criminal quiring additional oversight and support. For justice solutions depends heavily on proper example, in Barbados, magistrates courts can analysis of the crime problems in each nation require juveniles and probation officers to re- and across the region. Accurately diagnosing turn to court every three months for assess- the nature of crime problems and the capacity ment. During this time, the judge reviews the of criminal justice systems will require a serious juvenile’s progress and provides recommen- investment in the development of statistical dations for continuing or suspending support infrastructure for measuring crime and justice services. Juveniles on probation in Barbados at the regional level. It will also require work- may also be ordered by the court to attend force development, including training and the non-residential drug counselling services. education of technical experts to manage the Probation departments in the Caribbean data and make the data widely available and of often struggle with access to adequate resourc- policy analysts and scholars with the diverse es, including referral sources. In many instanc- skills necessary to interpret the data properly. es, probation officers are unable to refer their Only with such an investment can Caribbean clients to appropriate rehabilitation or support nations improve their capacity to diagnose services, limiting their effectiveness. Some crime and evaluate the effectiveness of criminal countries have attempted to respond to this justice institutions.26 limitation by linking community-based services with local probation departments. The un- Indicators of the Effectiveness of fortunate reality is that, if resource or political Criminal Justice Systems constraints inhibit effective probation services, juvenile offenders are often the most affected. The most common performance measure of Without adequate probation services to steer criminal justice systems is the extent to which

122 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 cases are processed fairly and efficiently. This 20 percent. 28 These low homicide detection section reviews evidence on four issues that rates were compounded by long case process- 5 exert a profound influence on the fairness and ing delays and low conviction rates among effectiveness of criminal justice systems: case those who were arrested. processing delays and backlogs, low convic- “Although more than three quarters of the tion rates, prison overcrowding and insuffi- 160 defendants charged with murder in the cient alternatives to prison. Like many issues Port of Spain Magistrate’s Court from 2003 in criminal justice, none of these issues stands through 2006 were committed to the High in isolation; they are strongly interconnected. Court to stand trial for murder, very few of Criminal Justice Systems Addressing them remains an enduring chal- these cases had been concluded as of July lenge for the Caribbean-7. 2008. . . . Only seven of the defendants had been convicted by trial or plea and 20 had Case Processing Delays and Backlogs been acquitted at trial. Although most de- The ability of criminal justice systems to pro- fendants suspected of murder were charged cess cases effectively and efficiently is a basic within 60 days of the homicide, the median ingredient of proper system functioning in time to disposition in Magistrates Court any nation. Significant delays in one part of was 107 days and the median time to case the system often reverberate through other filing in the High Court was 271 days.”29 parts of the system, reinforcing the cliché that Mark (2007, 20–21) provides insight on a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. why case processing delays are such a problem Case processing delays and backlogs have had in Trinidad and Tobago, noting as follows: a debilitating effect on criminal justice sys- “If after the initial appearance, the accused tems in the Caribbean. person is remanded in custody then that Many of the Caribbean-7 are struggling person‘s case must be listed every ten days with caseloads that far exceed the processing before the court to which the matter is ad- capacity of the criminal justice systems. Vari- journed. In the vast majority of these cases ous explanations exist for the case processing the parties are not ready to proceed and delays, including increases in crime and, thus, the case is adjourned on several occasions court caseloads and a subsequent harshening thereafter. In most cases, the court takes of sanctions against offenders; inadequate no significant steps to ensure that parties staffing levels; incompetent criminal justice are ready for trial or ready to proceed with prosecutors, courts, and correctional systems; any aspect of the case on the date to which and deliberate delays by lawyers and other the matter is adjourned. The prosecutor is criminal justice practitioners.27 Furthermore, the functionary traditionally charged with institutional weaknesses, corruption, poor the responsibility of ensuring that the case management, and inadequate finances and is ready to proceed. Almost every adjourn- resources are often blamed. ment request from the defence or the pros- While there is convincing evidence that ecution is granted.” these delays and backlogs exist, there is only Thus, in Trinidad and Tobago, inefficient anecdotal evidence to explain why. Data on court scheduling practices appear to con- case processing delays and backlogs are not tribute to case processing delays. However, available in a systematic way throughout the case processing delays in Trinidad and To- Caribbean, but the available evidence paints bago were not limited to the courts. Delays a disturbing picture of challenges to the effec- in evidence processing in the nation’s crime tiveness of criminal justice. For instance, Trin- laboratory were responsible for holding up idad and Tobago experienced a sharp increase thousands of cases. For instance, in 2005, in homicides from 1999 to 2008. During the researchers estimated that a backlog of un- last four years of this period, police detection processed ballistics evidence in firearms cases rates in homicide cases (the proportion of cas- had held up more than 2,000 cases, some for es in which an arrest was made) never reached more than five years.30 The problem became

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 123 so bad that some police officers stopped judges were appointed to adjudicate cases and 5 gathering ballistics evidence at crime scenes help eliminate the backlog. To eliminate the and stopped turning over seized firearms for backlog in criminal cases, a similar strategy processing by the crime laboratory.31 The re- was proposed in the Guyana Justice Sector Re- searchers concluded that the backlogs at the form Strategy of 2006–2010.35 However, even laboratory were partially responsible for the with this programme in place, the shortages of nation’s massive increase in homicides and judges make it virtually impossible to reduce shootings because violent repeat offenders the civil litigation backlog. Estimates suggest who might have been incarcerated based on that, even if two judges were assigned and even Criminal Justice Systems the evidence were free to continue offending. if each one concluded one civil matter every Trinidad and Tobago’s solution to the prob- working day of the year (249 days), this would lem was to hire foreign firearms examiners only lead to the completion of 498 cases out from the United Kingdom and the United of an average of 5,600 cases filed, thus leaving States. Such short-term measures may be use- a backlog of 5,102 cases.36 ful, but they suggest a failure to recognize the No silver-bullet solutions have emerged in systemic nature of this problem and associ- the Caribbean for case processing delays and ated problems. No long-term solutions were backlogs. As more of these nations begin us- put in place to prevent the backlog from re- ing sophisticated forensic evidence process- turning. ing techniques (such as ballistics imaging and The issue of evidence processing backlogs DNA profiling), it is likely that the delays will will become even more resonant as Caribbean actually worsen. Finding a way to address this nations grow increasingly reliant on foren- problem is crucial. sic evidence to close cases. For instance, the United States is currently dealing with massive Low Conviction Rates backlogs in DNA evidence.32 While DNA is Although systematic data are not available, a wonderful tool for identifying and convict- scattered evidence suggests that conviction ing offenders, processing DNA evidence is ex- rates in the Caribbean are alarmingly low. pensive and resource-intensive and is likely to For instance, Guyana’s Justice Sector Re- worsen case processing delays and backlogs. form Strategy 2006–2010 reports that an Backlogs are, however, not merely a matter estimated “90% of criminal prosecutions in of efficiency; they go directly to the ques- the Magistrates Courts are unsuccessful.”37 tion of whether defendants are being treated Brathwaite (1996) reports that, in Barbados, justly. Consider Guyana, which reports that, the number of convictions fell from 1,729 in in 2010, nearly 41 percent of its prisoners had 1960 to only 775 in 1990. not yet been tried or convicted on the current Part of the challenge in studying the prob- charges for which they were being detained.33 lem is that case processing delays make it dif- For defendants who are not guilty, backlogs ficult to measure conviction rates: the two is- might mean spending a lot of time in jail for sues are hopelessly intertwined. For instance, offences they did not commit. Consider Suri- a study conducted in Trinidad and Tobago name, where many prisoners awaiting appeal found that, of the 123 cases involving defend- end up serving their full original sentence ants committed to stand trial in the High before their appeal is heard because there are Court in 2003–2006, only 30.1 percent had not enough judges to adjudicate these cases.34 been concluded as of July 2008. Only seven The general consensus within the region is (5.7 percent) of the 123 cases had produced that backlogs are exacerbated by inadequate a conviction either by trial or by plea.38 Simi- staffing. However, even attempts to address larly, a report on human rights practices in these concerns highlight the crippling extent Guyana notes that “Prisoner Justin John was of the problem. For example, Guyana reduced taken into custody in 2003 and charged with to some extent its backlog in the civil court murder; his trial was scheduled to begin in under a special project whereby part-time 2008, but, in May 2010, he was among 23

124 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 prisoners who requested an early trial; he was only approximately 20 to 25 percent are pros- freed on June 16 after the state was unable to ecuted. The remaining cases are dismissed or 5 produce witnesses in support of its case.”39 left in limbo. The prosecution office simply This may be an extreme case, but it highlights lacks the human resource capacity to handle the general problem. In nations that process all the criminal cases that are submitted. cases expeditiously, computing conviction Many commentators blame the police for rates is simple, but, in nations with excessive these issues. For instance, Guyana’s 2005– case processing delays, estimating conviction 2007 Supreme Court Annual Reports argue rates is challenging. that deficiencies in police investigation and Criminal Justice Systems One explanation for the low conviction evidence management practices make suc- rates has been the increase in case dismissals. cessful prosecutions difficult. Gaps in prose- Case dismissals are common because of wit- cution give defence attorneys plenty of room ness intimidation, lack of victim participa- to secure acquittals. Police point to case back- tion in prosecution and attorney absenteeism. logs in crime laboratories and case processing While data on the reasons for case dismissals delays in courts. There is lots of finger-point- are not available across countries, anecdotal ing in the region about which institutions are evidence illustrates the extent of this prob- to blame for low conviction rates. The reality lem. In Trinidad and Tobago, the majority is that the problem is systemic. The solution of homicide case dismissals in the magistrates lies in the comprehensive reform of entire court between 2006 and 2008 occurred as a criminal justice systems to ensure that police result of complications with witness testi- gain the confidence of the population and are mony.40 Witnesses frequently failed to appear given sufficient resources to prevent crime, -ar in court or, once on the stand, recanted state- rest offenders and gather evidence; that crime ments they had made to the police earlier. In laboratories are properly trained, staffed and one example, a murder witness went into hid- equipped to process criminal evidence quick- ing, and charges against the defendant were ly and accurately; that the prosecutors offices dropped “despite the fact that the defendant and courts are given sufficient resources and was charged with shooting the victim dur- adopt more appropriate structures and proce- ing a proceeding in the Magistrates Court”.41 dures to move cases along rapidly and justly; Witness intimidation is especially challeng- and that nations begin to institute mecha- ing in a region of small countries with weak nisms for criminal justice planning across witness protection programmes. these various sectors to ensure that they work In Barbados, the National Task Force on in harmony. Crime Prevention found that 48.8 percent of the adjournments in the magistrates court in Prison Overcrowding 2003 were accounted for by absenteeism by Many people awaiting trial in the region are attorneys, the accused, or witnesses (at 17.2, held in pre-trial detention, sometimes for 15.0 and 16.6 percent, respectively). Absen- years. The practice of pre-trial detention is teeism in the High Court also contributed to controversial. Setting pre-trial detainees free more than one third of the adjournments. In may endanger the public and reduce citizen 2003, 22.7 percent of the adjournments oc- security in the region, but holding them for curred because the accused were not prop- lengthy periods is an affront to justice and erly represented by counsel, and 15.2 percent overwhelms the capacity of prisons. As shown because the attorneys were absent.42 In Bar- in table 5.1, five of the Caribbean-7 countries bados, trial scheduling is often not synchro- report prison occupancy levels well above 100 nized across cases, and attorneys are often percent of capacity, thus signalling a serious double-booked in the magistrates courts or problem with prison overcrowding. Table 5.1 the High Court. Similarly, of an estimated also shows the percentage of prison popula- 6,000 to 7,000 criminal records that arrive tions held on pre-trial detention. Five of the annually in Suriname’s prosecution offices, seven countries report that at least a third

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 125 of their prison populations are being held ficiency and fiscal prudence. The result of this 5 for pre-trial detention or remand.43 Guyana balancing act in some nations is to incapacitate reported that this figure was higher than 40 only violent offenders and those with a high percent in 2010, while, in 2005, Suriname likelihood of recidivism and to develop alter- reported that more than 50 percent of the natives to incarceration for nonviolent offend- prison population was being held for pre-trial ers and those whose likelihood of repeat of- or remand. fending is minimal. This idea of a correctional While overcrowding is problematic on its triage strategy applies most directly to three face, it has also generated residual issues as- types of offenders: juvenile offenders, older Criminal Justice Systems sociated with the conditions of confinement. offenders and people convicted of drug pos- Some reports document widespread deterio- session. Juvenile offenders, particularly those ration in prison conditions in the Caribbean new to crime and those who commit nonvio- because of overcrowding, poor sanitation and lent offenses, will often either be victimized or resource constraints. According to the US will go on to commit more crime as a result of State Department (2010b, 2010e), among spending time in a criminogenic environment the Caribbean-7, only the prison facilities in such as a prison. Imprisoning older offenders, Barbados and Saint Lucia meet international who are often long past the peak of the age- standards. crime curve, is not always the most efficient use The argel number of people held in pre-trial of prison space. Finally, imprisoning offenders detention is a major contributor to backlogs and convicted of drug possession is also often not overcrowding, but other factors also contribute. wise because many such offenders need treat- For instance, many nations faced with increases ment for addiction. In all three cases, offenders in crime, particularly violent crime, have passed and society may be best served through alter- laws containing provisions for harsher sanc- native punitive sanctions, coupled with reha- tions and longer prison terms for certain types bilitation. of offenders, particularly those convicted of gang-related crimes. Harsher prison sentences Insufficient Alternatives to Incarceration for certain types of offenders are likely to pro- Policy makers facing increases in crime and duce public safety benefits, but such sentences high levels of violence often focus so intent- for other types of offenders—particularly non- ly on being tough on crime that they forget violent drug offenders and older offenders who about the importance of rehabilitation and have aged out of crime—contribute to prison alternative sanctions. The Caribbean region’s overcrowding. Brathwaite (1996) finds that, in nascent criminological infrastructure is not Barbados, the share of offenders sentenced to yet supported by a well-developed knowledge prison for three or more years rose from 6.9 to base on effective sanctions and rehabilitation 38.5 percent between 1960 and 1990. Brath- strategies. This is so despite the experiences of waite also notes that patterns in crime changed other nations, which provide evidence on the across this time period so that there was an in- effectiveness and promise of a range of strate- crease in drug-related offences, robbery and gies, as well as approaches that may actually theft. Caribbean nations can learn from the increase crime. For instance, Scared Straight!, experiences of California. Decades of tough- a popular programme that has evolved from a on-crime rhetoric by politicians led to runaway ground-breaking film, involves exposing juve- spending on prisons and contributed to a finan- nile offenders to the reality of life in prison. cial meltdown that resulted in major cuts to Critics assert that such programmes not only public services, especially education. Moreover, fail to deter crime, but increase offending the financial crisis caused California to release among young participants.44 Lacking a com- tens of thousands of prisoners under less than prehensive local knowledge base on effective ideal circumstances. strategies, Caribbean policy makers run the Correctional policy must balance the require- risk of excessive reliance on the knowledge ment to protect the public and the need for ef- base of more developed countries. A regional

126 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 investment in an institute to study the effec- policy makers. tiveness of strategies in reducing crime and Of course, any wise correctional strategy 5 recidivism would be a positive step towards will account for the fact that offenders pre- building the knowledge base that is so desper- sent different levels of risk. Offenders pre- ately needed.45 senting the greatest risk of recidivism or caus- Rehabilitation services can be established ing harm to others need to be identified and within the prison system, or they can involve incarcerated. For this reason, correctional sys- the use of alternative sanctions that allow of- tems should employ selective incapacitation fenders to avoid incarceration, but still pay strategies that assign prison terms only for Criminal Justice Systems their debt to society for the crimes they have serious offences and to persons who are most committed. Alternative sanctions may in- likely to recidivate (as evidenced by a culture- clude fines, community service, curfews, or appropriate dangerousness assessment). Per- house arrest for non-dangerous offenders. sons who are unlikely to reoffend or who have Other sentencing alternatives to prison are not committed serious offences should be mediation, restitution to victims and proba- sentenced to alternative dispositions. Selec- tion. These options offer a number of poten- tive incapacitation will reduce the strain on tial benefits: they often cost less than a con- correctional systems, improve cost-efficiency ventional prison sentence; they help avoid the and protect the public. Imprisonment should labelling and stigmatization of imprisonment, only be used as a last resort. thereby reducing the tremendous challenges Some nations have taken initial steps to- associated with reintegrating offenders into wards establishing programmes to reduce case society following their release; they eliminate processing delays and incarceration rates. In the negative socialization processes that occur 2003, for instance, the Guyana Bar Associa- in prison (and that often increase recidivism); tion and the Guyana Association of Women and they often bring greater satisfaction to Lawyers launched a pilot project on alterna- victims. Moreover, if well-calibrated, they can tive dispute resolution that focused on civil encourage and reinforce the bonds with con- cases. This project involved creating a media- ventional society that help to prevent crime tion centre and providing training for Guya- over the long term. Alternatives to imprison- nese lawyers, while the law programme at ment have been explored within the region, the University of Guyana introduced a new including curfews, electronic monitoring, course option for law students on alternative drug courts and drug treatment, transitional dispute resolution. During this time, 98 cases housing, and community sentencing for non- were transferred from the court to the alter- violent prisoners, but we are not aware of any native dispute resolution system within one studies of the effectiveness of these efforts. year.47 Furthermore, in Guyana, out of the While many nations in the region have ac- 21,366 civil matters pending for 2008, a mere knowledged the need to implement alterna- 72 civil cases went to the mediation centre for tives to imprisonment, the use of relevant 2007, and 140 mediation cases were pending programmes has been sporadic. The most from 2006, resulting in 212 cases pending for commonly cited explanation for this is a lack mediation in 2007. At the end of 2007, 63 of adequate resources. For instance, in Barba- cases had been successfully mediated, leaving dos and elsewhere, resource shortages are of- 149 pending.48 ten blamed for the lack of important services In Barbados, the Penal System Act of 1998 aimed at offenders, such as dedicated mental has encouraged a philosophical change in health resources, a functional after-care pro- ways to deal with offenders by creating com- gramme, entrepreneurship training and tran- munity sentencing options such as probation sitional housing necessary to meet the needs and community service. Since 2000, the Bar- of prisoners as they prepare for release.46 bados Probation Department has supported Moreover, in a tough-on-crime climate, reha- offenders who have been given the option of bilitation is often not a political priority for community service. Some of the challenges

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 127 associated with this effort include substance rules specifically outline that “no minors 5 abuse treatment, job placement and commu- should be held in a facility where they are nity support. The Prison Service of Trinidad vulnerable to the negative influences of adult and Tobago is experimenting with restorative detainees” and that “the danger to juveniles of justice strategies. In 2002, the Government of ‘criminal contamination’ while in detention Trinidad and Tobago appointed a task force pending trial must not be underestimated. It to review the penal reform system. One of the is therefore important to stress the need for key recommendations advanced by the task alternative measures. . . . to avoid such deten- force was the implementation of a restorative tion in the interest of the well-being of the Criminal Justice Systems justice philosophy throughout the criminal juvenile.”51 justice system in Trinidad and Tobago. The The degree to which countries in the region Prison Service is facing a familiar set of chal- observe the set of principles outlined in the lenges in its efforts to shift from retributive Beijing Rules varies. In Guyana, provisions for justice to restorative justice. juveniles are deficient in that there are no al- Theissue of alternatives to incarceration ternatives to detention prior to trial, nor have is particularly salient for juvenile offenders. adequate facilities been established to support Each of the Caribbean-7 has indicated that juveniles while they are kept in detention. A juveniles detained for non-criminal matters detention centre has been constructed, but it such as truancy, lack of appropriate guardian- has not been functional, and juveniles, both ship and victimization through abuse are of- males and females, have been housed with ten housed together with juveniles who have adults in detention facilities. This increases committed criminal, often violent offences.49 the risk of sexual abuse. Indeed, it has led to Because it is a long-standing truism of crimi- news reports of the sexual and physical abuse nology that one of the most potent causes of of juveniles by law enforcement operatives delinquency is exposure to delinquent peers, and adult inmates.52 any strategy that houses minor offenders to- Concerns about proper supervision and gether with serious offenders is likely to in- staffing at some juvenile facilities or, in some crease crime. Furthermore, these approaches instances, a complete lack of a juvenile correc- are also likely to expose the less serious of- tional facility may result in the detention of fenders to further victimization. juvenile offenders in adult facilities, as in An- Researchers find that “for the entire popu- tigua and Barbuda and in Guyana. In Antigua lation of three juvenile institutions in Trini- and Barbuda, the Boys Training School is crit- dad and Tobago, 58.5 percent of youth in an icized for inadvertently preparing abandoned institution for young boys and 92.8 percent and abused boys for lives of crime by housing of youth in an institution for young girls were offenders and non-offenders together in the institutionalized for non-illegal acts.”50 Suri- same facility. Many magistrates try to avoid name, on the other hand, has a pre-detention remanding juvenile offenders to the facility. juvenile facility specifically for youth awaiting One magistrate revealed that she is extremely trial. The facility, which is called Opa Doeli, upset with the system’s failure to address ad- was founded in 2007 and houses young per- equately the problem of young boys who con- sons aged 10 to 18 years. It can accommodate stantly get into trouble. This particular magis- 54 boys and 14 girls, and these are able to at- trate has joined the chorus of complaints with tend school normally within the centre. The respect to poor management, untrained staff, purpose of the facility is to provide the youth ineffective rehabilitation and little oversight with the skills to defend themselves against of the boys. Because of these inadequacies, criminal influences. boys who commit serious offences are com- The Beijing Rules, adopted by the United mitted to Her Majesty’s Prison, the country’s Nations in 1985 to define a set of principles adult prison. Furthermore, in Antigua and for the proper administration of juvenile jus- Barbuda, aside from probation, there are no tice, speak directly to these concerns. These alternatives to sentencing and no restorative

128 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 justice options, and juveniles are tried in the justice planning agencies in Caribbean na- same courts as adults. tions. Putting in place agencies capable of 5 There are a number of reasons to support this kind of systems thinking to monitor the the use of alternatives to incarceration within criminal justice system will help these nations the region, especially in the case of juveniles. address inefficiencies, locate case processing Systems should be put in place to house non- blockages and delays, identify slack resources criminal juveniles in facilities that do not ex- and put in place strategies to optimize the pose them to peers who have been charged functioning of the entire system. Each part of with or convicted of criminal offenses. Addi- the criminal justice system has a specific role Criminal Justice Systems tionally, the benefits of alternatives to incar- to ensure the stability of the whole system. ceration are particularly important to juvenile Although there is evidence of scattered re- offenders, who represent a more vulnerable form efforts in the region to address the issues population. identified in this chapter, a significantly more The issues of case processing delays, back- integrative approach is necessary to reduce logs, low conviction rates, overcrowded pris- backlogs, improve case processing, increase ons and a lack of alternatives to incarceration conviction rates, reduce prison overcrowding are all interconnected. As Deosaran (2009, and provide more alternatives to incarcera- x–xi) indicates, “there are some factors which tion. push criminal behaviour such as family neglect and bad schooling, but there are also Opinions on the other factors which pull crime such as weak Effectiveness of Justice Systems and ineffective prosecution, low conviction rates, lawyer absenteeism, poor police re- Even if criminal justice systems are judged ef- sponse, corrupt police and having the prisons fective by objective standards, public percep- as a criminogenic ghetto.” These issues rein- tions of the criminal justice system are vitally force the dire need for system-wide criminal important. Thus, another way to assess the

Chart 5.1 Respondents Who Rate the Capacity of the Criminal Justice System as Sufficient, Caribbean-7, 2010

80 70.3 70

60 51.7 50

Percent 40 40.0 40.9 37.8 32.3 30.6 30 27.2 20

0 Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “What is the capacity of your country to solve and better manage the problem of insecurity?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Sufficient” or “Very sufficient”.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 129 effectiveness of criminal justice systems in to manage human security threats effectively. 5 promoting human security is to gauge the Third, perceptions of this capacity do not ap- opinions of citizens. The UNDP Citizen Se- pear to be linked to national poverty levels. curity Survey 2010 asked respondents in the Trinidad and Tobago is the wealthiest of these Caribbean-7 to assess the capacity of their nations, yet is perceived by its citizens to have countries “to solve and better manage the the lowest capacity to address citizen security problem of insecurity.” The share of respond- concerns. Similarly, Suriname and Guyana are ents rating the capacity of their nations as among the poorest nations in this group, yet ‘sufficient’ or ‘very sufficient’ varied widely by they rank second and third, respectively, in Criminal Justice Systems nation, from a low of 27 percent in Trinidad perceived level of capacity to address citizen and Tobago to a high of 70 percent in Bar- security.53 National wealth alone is insuffi- bados (with an average of 41 percent) (chart cient to guarantee citizen security and safety. 5.1). Three patterns are striking in the findings. First, the wide variation across nations Confidence in the Justice System suggests that some governments have done a One of the principal goals of government gen- substantially better job in the eyes of citizens erally and criminal justice systems specifically in building capacity to address security issues. is to provide for the security of the popula- Second, although perceived capacity varies by tion. This security has an objective component nation, it is quite low overall. Less than half of that is reflected in official statistics on crime, the respondents across the Caribbean-7 per- violence and other threats to human security. ceive their nations to have sufficient capacity It has a subjective component as well. For in-

Chart 5.2 Perception of the Hopelessness of Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010

45 41.1 40

35 31.6 30 30.3 28.9 26.8 26.8 25 24.6 22.9 20 Percent 18.4 17.8 15.9 15.8 15.7 15.5 15 14.5 10.4 10

0 Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7 The problem of crime has no remedy Nothing can be done to control crime in this country

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “The problem of crime has no remedy.” “Nothing can be done to control crime in this country.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Strongly agree” or “Agree”.

130 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 stance, one way of viewing the perceived effec- of trends and trend changes in violence, par- tiveness of criminal justice systems is to gauge ticularly if such phenomena are documented 5 the extent to which citizens have grown hope- regularly by local media. Second, these find- less about crime. Effective criminal justice sys- ings are reminiscent of a body of research that tems inspire public confidence. Hopelessness suggests there is a disjuncture among people’s is a sign of a system that is failing to meet one actual risk of victimization, their perceived of its most important goals. Two questions in risk of victimization and their fear of crime.54 the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 ad- Hopelessness about crime does not appear dressed the extent of hopelessness by asking to be a simple function of crime rates. In the Criminal Justice Systems respondents in the Caribbean-7 to indicate same way as police departments worldwide their level of agreement with the following have been implored by reformers to put in statements, both of which served as proxies for place solutions to manage people’s fear of hopelessness: “The problem of crime has no crime, this finding suggests that governments remedy” and “Nothing can be done to control may be able to take steps to address the hope- crime in this country”. lessness or despair felt by some residents over Chart 5.2 presents the results by country. the issue of crime. The good news is that the share of respondents agreeing with the statement that crime Mechanisms to Prevent and Control Crime has no remedy is low, never exceeding 19 per- What is the extent of support for severe crime cent in any of the nations. On the other hand, control policies such as the death penalty and people tend to be more sceptical regarding the construction of more prisons? To what what can be done to control crime. The most extent do these preferences vary by nation? sceptical are in Suriname, and the least in Ja- The esultsr of the UNDP Citizen Security maica. Survey 2010 indicate that public support for The urveys data reveal stark disparities crime prevention policies such as increased across the Caribbean-7, and some of the re- investment in education, youth development, sults are curious. Respondents in Saint Lucia, job creation and poverty reduction is fairly which does not have the highest rates of in- universal across the Caribbean. Analysis of security and violence among these nations, these results indicates a fairly complicated appear to have the greatest levels of hopeless- picture (see chapter 6 for a fuller analysis). ness. Among them, 18.4 percent believe “the Citizens also expressed mixed feelings about problem of crime has no remedy”, and 26.8 harsher policies, and opinions varied much percent believe “nothing can be done to con- more strongly by nation. For this reason, it is trol crime in this country”. At the same time, important to examine each policy in detail. Jamaican respondents appear to have lower The severity of punishments: Across the Car- levels of hopelessness than their peers in sev- ibbean-7, about 83.1 percent of the survey eral nations that have lower rates of crime and respondents agreed that criminals should be violence. These findings point to a disjuncture punished more harshly. Indeed, the respond- between the levels of crime and violence and ents across the countries displayed only a lim- feelings of hopelessness among citizens. ited degree of variability; the shares ranged Two factors may explain this disjunc- from 75.2 to 89.6 percent. The two nations ture. First, it may be that the levels of crime with the highest share of respondents agree- are not as important as changes in crime. The ing that harsher punishments are necessary homicide rate in Jamaica is about twice the were Trinidad and Tobago (89.8 percent) homicide rate in Saint Lucia (53 versus 26 per and Jamaica (89.6 percent). Both nations 100,000 population, respectively), but homi- face high levels of gang violence, and citizens cides are decreasing in Jamaica and increasing understandably want to see offenders held ac- in Saint Lucia. Citizens may have difficulty countable for their behaviour. comparing homicide rates between their own Capital punishment: About 62.6 percent nation and others, but they may be cognizant of respondents support the death penalty.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 131 The respondents in the six British Common- level of certainty. Capital punishment is 5 wealth countries of the Caribbean-7 (that is, clearly severe. However, low detection rates less Suriname) exhibited only a narrow range and case processing delays in the Caribbean of variation in their support, from 61.5 to make it unlikely that capital punishment will 75.5 percent. Similarly, a 2001 study of the be administered with sufficient swiftness or opinions of college students on capital pun- likelihood to produce a deterrent benefit. ishment found that 86.7 percent of males The research evidence on capital punishment and 78.4 percent of females in Saint Augus- is mixed, but generally tends to indicate that tine, Trinidad favoured capital punishment capital punishment is a weak deterrent.61 In- Criminal Justice Systems in cases of first degree murder.55 The study deed, there is evidence suggesting that it may noted that “not one of the respondents in even backfire by legitimating the use of deadly Saint Augustine checked the ‘No Opinion’ force.62 Moreover, regardless of its actual or category, suggesting that capital punishment potential instrumental benefit, the death pen- is a particularly salient topic there.”56 Mean- alty is incompatible with the values that are while, in Suriname, the only recent former associated with the human development ap- colony of the Netherlands examined here, proach. only 35.7 percent of respondents supported Human rights: The UNDP Citizen Se- the death penalty.57 What accounts for this curity Survey 2010 asked respondents about puzzling disparity? It is often said that colo- their agreement that human rights are obsta- nies, even after independence, continue to cles to more effective crime control. Across take on the characteristics of their colonizers. the Caribbean-7, only about 43.2 percent of The Netherlands abolished capital punish- the respondents agreed, ranging from a low of ment more than a century ago (in civil law, 34.2 percent in Guyana to a high of 62.8 per- not in military law) and remains steadfast in cent in Saint Lucia. The nation with the sec- its rejection of capital punishment. To this ond highest share of respondents who agreed day, the Netherlands will not honour extra- was Suriname, at 48.2 percent. Thus, with the dition requests in which the death penalty is exception of Saint Lucia, the extent of varia- a possible sanction.58 In contrast, the United tion in the responses was fairly narrow. What Kingdom abolished capital punishment only accounts for the relatively high proportion of a little more than a decade ago. A 2009 poll respondents in Saint Lucia who view human on attitudes towards the death penalty in rights as an impediment to crime control? The the United Kingdom found that “70 percent most likely explanation is a recent outbreak of think the U.K. should still have the death violent crime in Saint Lucia. Another potential penalty as the maximum possible penalty for explanation is a Privy Council ruling prohib- at least one of the twelve different types of iting Saint Lucia from enforcing a mandatory crime surveyed.”59 Thus, the variations in the death penalty for all capital offenses and the support for capital punishment in the Carib- Privy Council’s general unwillingness to up- bean seems to be directly linked with the cul- hold death sentences during appeal phases.63 ture of support for the death penalty among Building more prisons: The survey asked re- the former colonizers. spondents to rate their level of agreement that The overwhelming level of support for government should build more prisons to re- capital punishment in six of the Caribbean-7 duce crime. Across the Caribbean-7, only about appears to be out of proportion with the 26.0 percent agreed, ranging from a low of 11.7 likely deterrent value of the punishment. A percent in Barbados to a high of 41.3 percent long-standing axiom of criminology holds in Guyana. Excluding these two outliers, one that deterrence has three components: cer- sees that the extent of variation in support for tainty, severity and celerity (or swiftness).60 building more prisons is minimal (from 21.7 This means that the sanctions with the great- percent in Jamaica to 33.8 percent in Trinidad est deterrent value are sufficiently severe and and Tobago). Moreover, these findings point are administered swiftly and with a strong to a curious pattern. Across the Caribbean-7,

132 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 83.1 percent of respondents believe criminals the policy options that come to mind most should be punished more harshly, and 62.6 quickly. The data here suggest that the public 5 percent support the death penalty; yet, only is looking at other options as well. 26 percent agree that more prisons should be built. The level of crime alone does not seem to Accountability account for any preference for an expansion in the number of prisons, given that, in Jamaica, Worldwide, the public relies on the police which has the highest rate of violent crime and on criminal justice systems to control among these nations, the support for prison crime and maintain a sense of security. At the Criminal Justice Systems expansion is at one of the lowest levels. same time, the public also demands that pub- What accounts for the two outliers: Bar- lic officials, including the police and criminal bados at the lower end of the distribution and justice officials, be held accountable for be- Guyana at the upper end? Reports on human having lawfully. rights practices in both countries help shed Likewise, in the Caribbean, two types of light on this question. Barbados has a rela- accountability are particularly noticeable in tively healthy prison system. A 2010 report the area of security. First, to what extent are concludes as follows: the front-line agents of justice—the police— “Prison and detention center conditions gen- held accountable for misconduct? Second, to erally met international standards. Dodds what extent are other government officials, Prison, built in 2007 in St. Philip, was de- both within and outside the criminal justice signed to meet modern international stand- system, held accountable for corrupt behav- ards with a capacity of approximately 1,250 iour in office? Chapter 4 examines the police prisoners. According to prison officials, in in detail, but the larger criminal justice sys- October it held 910 prisoners, including pre- tem also serves a crucial role in reducing and trial detainees.”64 preventing misconduct, including within the Guyana, in contrast, faces a serious over- police and elsewhere. So, the topic is relevant crowding problem. A 2010 report concludes here as well. as follows: “Prison and jail conditions were poor and Regulating Police Misconduct deteriorating, particularly in police hold- In general, data on police misconduct in the ing cells. Capacity and resource constraints Caribbean-7 tend to be incomplete. It is thus were a problem. The Prison Authority re- useful to rely also on data from external sourc- ported that at the end of October, there es, although these sources may not always be were 2,122 prisoners in five facilities, which reliable. Various national human rights groups had a combined design capacity of 1,580. such as Jamaicans for Justice play an important Approximately half of the prisoners were in role in advocating for police accountability to Georgetown’s Camp Street Prison, which the law. However, the NGO that has the big- was designed to hold 600 inmates but held gest part in examining police misconduct on 1,060. Overcrowding was in large part due a regional scale is Amnesty International. This to backlogs of pre-trial detainees, who con- organization regularly tracks human rights stituted approximately 41 percent of the to- violations throughout the Caribbean. It has tal prison population.”65 raised concerns about various issues with re- Public support for prison expansion ap- gard to police misconduct. Its sights have fo- pears to be a function of both crime rates and cused most firmly on Jamaica and on Trinidad current prison conditions. and Tobago.66 National human rights groups, The atad of the UNDP Citizen Security as well as Amnesty International, have called Survey 2010 show that public opinion about on the governments of both nations to put in crime and justice is complex. In nations expe- place solutions that will hold police accounta- riencing serious outbreaks of violence, prison ble for various forms of misconduct, especially expansion and capital punishment are two of the excessive use of force.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 133 Amnesty International has long be- police kill people suspected of being violent 5 moaned the police use of deadly force in Ja- offenders, they may be attempting to make up maica. Between 1983 and 2009, almost 5,000 for weaknesses in other parts of the criminal persons died as a result of the use of force by justice system. For instance, the Guyana Hu- police. Of these, 1,748 died between 2000 man Rights Association (GHRA 2002, 37) and 2009. Many of these killings have been concluded that the relative regularity of exe- justified by statements that they occurred cution type killings by the police implies that during shoot-outs with gunmen. However, there are elements in the Guyana Police Force the high number of killings, eye-witness testi- who attempt “to ensure that persons they be- Criminal Justice Systems mony, and other evidence such as the virtual lieve to be guilty of crimes do not escape the absence of injuries or fatalities among police consequences”. The courts are therefore impli- have raised concerns about the possibility of cated in the police use of excessive force in at summary executions by police. least two ways. First, by failing to hold police In Trinidad and Tobago, excessive use of officers accountable for the excessive use of force by police is reportedly widespread, and force, courts may be implicitly supporting it. “mechanisms to hold members of the police Second, by failing to hold offenders account- service accountable for alleged abuses are able for their crimes, they may be implicitly weak”.67 Trinidad and Tobago’s Police Com- (and unintentionally) promoting the exces- plaints Authority, which reviews allegations sive use of force by police. Research in other of police misconduct, reported that the sys- countries shows that courts can play a crucial tem to investigate killings by police “contin- role in controlling the police use of deadly ues to be unsatisfactory and unacceptable”.68 force, but only if this is matched by internal These patterns are suggestive of a more wide- controls within police departments.70 spread trend in developing nations with a The aribbean-7C countries all face con- potent combination of weak judiciaries and cerns about police misconduct to varying de- high crime rates. Police in these nations may grees. However, each has undertaken efforts hold the view that their job is to sanitize be- to curb misconduct and create a system of cause the court systems fail to hold offenders checks and balances to strengthen oversight. accountable for their crimes.69 Thus, when Gomes (2007) highlights some of the police

Table 5.2. Police Accountability Systems, Caribbean-7

Country Police service Internal police Ombudsman Civil oversight commission investigation body division

Antigua & Yes No No No Barbuda

Barbados Yes Yes No No

Jamaicaa Yes Yes Yes Yes

Saint Lucia Yes Yes No Yes

Trinidad & Yes Yes No Yes Tobago

Source: Gomes (2007). a. In Jamaica, there is a Police Public Complaints Authority (a civilian body) and a Police (Civilian Oversight) Authority.

134 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 accountability systems that exist within sev- Table 5.3. Corruption Perceptions eral countries in the Caribbean, including Index, Rankings, Caribbean-7, 2011 5 five of the Caribbean-7. (Guyana and Suri- name are absent from her analysis.) Table Country Ranking 5.2, adapted from Gomes, illustrates that the majority of countries already have systems in Antigua & — place to provide oversight. However, ques- Barbuda tions remain about the extent to which these systems function properly, have sufficient -au

Barbados 16 (2011) Criminal Justice Systems thority and resources to carry out independent investigations, or are merely symbolic ges- Jamaica 86 (2011) tures. In the case of extrajudicial killings by police, symbols mean little. Effective systems Guyana 134 (2011) are those that result in fewer shootings of civilians without endangering officers or other Saint Lucia 25 (2011) civilians. Suriname 100 (2011) Excessive force is not the only form of police misconduct in the Caribbean. Police cor- Trinidad & 91 (2011) ruption is thought to be problematic as well. Tobago For instance, Guyana’s Ministry of Home Af- fairs recently established a five-year strategic Source: Transparency International (2011). plan for the Guyana Police Force; the plan de- Note: The notation “— “ indicates unavailability of data. The scribes corruption as a strategic risk that will year of the ranking is in parentheses. “adversely affect public trust and confidence in the police”.71 As a result, the plan includes a component that will “enhance the capability of the force to deal with internal corrup- Regulating Official Corruption tion.” 72 Although some nations are thought Criminal justice systems need to control not to experience more police corruption than only the official misconduct of police, but others, all of the Caribbean-7 have wrestled also of all other types of government officials, with corruption issues. Police corruption un- including its own officials. dermines the legitimacy of the law and legal Perceived corruption levels vary widely authorities in the eyes of the public. Legitima- throughout the Caribbean. One of the most cy problems undermine the ability of police well known measures of corruption is Trans- to secure witnesses and build viable criminal parency International’s Corruption Percep- cases. These same problems may lead judges tions Index, which “ranks countries accord- and juries to second guess the police, thus in- ing to perception of corruption in the public fluencing conviction rates. sector. The CPI is an aggregate indicator that Excessive use of force and corruption combines different sources of information among police are widespread in several coun- about corruption, making it possible to com- tries of the region; some police services are pare countries.”73 Table 5.3 shows the ranking thought to carry out summary executions of of each of the Caribbean-7. known serious offenders. These illegal pat- According to the Corruption Perceptions terns of behaviour by police undermine not Index, Guyana ranks 134 in 183 countries. only the authority of the police specifically, (Larger numbers indicate greater corrup- but of law, legal authorities and the state more tion.) Citizens appear to be well aware of this generally. Putting in place meaningful solu- problem. The Guyana country report for the tions to these issues is an important challenge 2011 Index of Economic Freedom concludes for Caribbean criminal justice systems. that “there is extensive corruption at every level of law enforcement and government.74

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 135 Given some of the perceived high levels lems (according to the Corruption Percep- 5 of corruption within the region, what steps tions Index) have not ratified the convention. are nations taking to respond to corruption, strengthen regulations and provide over- Regional Links sight? Some nations have chosen to increase transparency by requiring public officials to Regional initiatives to address public cor- disclose financial assets. Antigua and Bar- ruption constitute a tiny share of the many buda, Barbados and Suriname are the Car- regionalization efforts in Caribbean crimi- ibbean-7 countries that do not have such nal justice. Given the unique characteristics Criminal Justice Systems disclosure laws. While Guyana and Jamaica of the region, including a profusion of small have relevant laws, questions remain about islands, a shared sense of culture in many of the extent to which the laws are carefully and the nations and a long history of colonial in- regularly enforced. In Guyana, the newly es- fluence (and interference), it makes sense that tablished Transparency Institute (Guyana) there is a strong push for regionalization. A “hopes to raise awareness of the many faces number of regional bodies have emerged to of corruption, its causes and consequences provide a structure for establishing multilat- resulting in a society diminished of resources, eral support in many sectors, including crimi- unable to provide its citizens with function- nal justice. Here, we review just a handful of ing institutions and a decent standard of liv- these organizations. ing.”75 The Transparency Institute hopes to use educational tools to inform the public CARICOM about the negative effects of corruption and The largest and most influential regional body also to establish a Freedom of Information in the Caribbean is CARICOM, which was Act, creating greater governmental transpar- established in 1973 by treaty between four ency. In 2004, Antigua and Barbuda passed Caribbean-7 nations: Barbados, Guyana, Ja- an act to establish an Integrity Commission maica, and Trinidad and Tobago.77 Since then, charged with “receiving declarations of the 11 other nations have joined, for a total of 15 affairs of persons holding specific positions member states, including all the Caribbean-7. in public life, for the purpose of establishing Additionally, five British overseas territories probity, integrity and accountability in pub- are associate members. CARICOM serves as lic life and for related matters.”76 The region one of the primary conduits for regional links appears to be taking some steps to address in multiple sectors, including criminal justice. public corruption. Within CARICOM, the Implementation Regional bodies have also played a role in Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) attempting to regulate corruption in the Car- houses several entities designed to facili- ibbean. All Caribbean-7 countries are mem- tate regional coordination and cooperation bers of the Organization of American States around crime and security issues, including and the United Nations, both of which have the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre and established international anti-corruption the Joint Regional Communications Centre. conventions. To date, Antigua and Barbuda, These entities “are specifically geared towards Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad strategic research, programme and project and Tobago have ratified the United Nations implementation, evaluation, analysis and mo- Convention against Corruption. Barbados bilization of resources to support the collec- has signed, but not ratified the convention, tive fight against serious crime and to counter while Suriname have neither signed nor rati- other security threats in the Region.”78 IM- fied. Three of the countries with the most se- PACS has recently implemented the Region- rious corruption problems—Guyana, Jamai- al Integrated Ballistics Information Network. ca, and Trinidad and Tobago—have ratified This system will allow users quickly to access the convention. Meanwhile, the two nations ballistics information to identify weapons with the lowest perceived corruption prob- used in the commission of crimes and will

136 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 facilitate tracing the movement of weapons Eastern Caribbean States), the ECSC func- throughout the Caribbean. This important tions as a high court of justice and court of 5 advance may help address some of the issues appeals for nine Caribbean nations (two of involved with backlogs and case processing which are among the Caribbean-7). Described and should have a significant impact on the by Favaro and Peretz (2008, 15) as “a pioneer- ability of prosecutors to secure convictions. ing example of outsourcing by individual sov- The Council of National Security and Law ereign countries of the provision of justice to Enforcement (CONSLE), within CARI- a regional court”, the ECSC has functioned COM, facilitates regular meetings of the re- within the region since 1967. While final ap- Criminal Justice Systems gion’s national security ministers. CONSLE peals for ECSC member states still rest with recently commissioned an audit to review the Privy Council, the ECSC, on its own ac- IMPACS operations and financial expen- cord, has “fostered responsible governments, ditures during 2006–2010. Justification for supported its objective of guaranteeing an in- the audit included a desire for full disclosure dependent judiciary, and secured individual and transparency in IMPACS operations to human rights”.81 The successes of the ECSC ensure “the Region’s security agenda [is] not highlight the importance of regional links in compromised”.79 The CONSLE audit may the Caribbean. Favaro and Peretz (2008, 16) provide an opportunity to create additional note that “as a regional court, the CCJ has the accountability mechanisms in the region. benefit of drawing on 40 years of experience from the ECSC.” The Caribbean Court of Justice and the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Regional Bodies Focused on Police, Another important regional criminal jus- Prosecution and Corrections tice entity is the Caribbean Court of Justice The Caribbean is home to several professional (CCJ). The CCJ facilitates uniform judicial associations that aim to link officials and raise practices within the region. The CCJ hopes to the level of professionalism within the region. replace the Privy Council as the final court of For instance, the Association of Caribbean appeals in the region, establishing an entirely Heads of Corrections and Prison Services has self-sufficient Caribbean-based justice system. 16 member states, including the Caribbean-7. However, only Barbados and Guyana have During the opening ceremony of the 2010 officially recognized the CCJ as their desig- association’s annual conference, Elliston Rah- nated final court of appeals. There are a num- ming, superintendent of Her Majesty’s Prison ber of reasons why countries have been averse in the Bahamas, echoed some of the themes to ratifying the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction. raised throughout this chapter: “Corrections Most notably, the Privy Council is viewed is not just about control and containment. within the region as an impartial judicial We are equally engaged in the business of body, immune to political influences.80 There crime prevention via ongoing staff develop- appears to be a general lack of confidence ment, proper sentence planning, rehabilita- within influential subpopulations of the re- tion programmes and successful reintegration gion that a Caribbean-based court of appeals of offenders”.82 could perform at the same level of proficiency Similarly, the Association of Caribbean and integrity as the Privy Council. This lack Commissioners of Police includes police com- of confidence, which is fuelled by pessimism missioners from all the Caribbean-7, as well associated with the region’s struggles to pro- as many other countries. During a meeting in cess cases efficiently, serves as a roadblock to Kingston, Jamaica among nine commission- regional acceptance of the CCJ. ers of police in 1986, a resolution was passed There is reason to believe that a regional calling for the creation of the association. The court could act independently and effective- association was formally established the fol- ly, as exhibited by the ECSC. Developed by lowing year during the meeting of commis- another regional body (the Organization of sioners in Saint Lucia. The association con-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 137 venes annual conferences to discuss issues of tices from one another and provide continu- 5 regional importance to the law enforcement ing education. The various regional bodies community. During the 2011 conference in can serve as an effective locus for change, tak- Antigua and Barbuda, the issue of anti-cor- ing on some of the issues raised in this report. ruption was identified as an important area of Regional professional bodies can serve as concern, as were issues of youth violence and an outstanding venue for professional devel- the enhancement of forensic and ballistics ex- opment by offering an arena for contact with aminations. peers from other parts of the world who can The aribbeanC Association of Judicial share their ideas and help ensure a more vi- Criminal Justice Systems Officers is a relatively new regional organiza- brant dialogue about regional criminal justice tion: it held its inaugural conference in 2009. practices. To support this goal, regional pro- Membership consists mostly of current or fessional bodies (such as the Association of retired judicial officers from throughout the Caribbean Commissioners of Police) might Caribbean. The association aims to enhance seek affiliation with larger bodies (such as the the administration of justice, promote judi- International Association of Chiefs of Po- cial independence and standards of integrity lice). and accountability, foster professional de- Regional cooperation and communi- velopment among judicial officers, support cation are vital in any plan to improve the research on the administration of justice and practice of criminal justice in the Caribbean. improve the public image of the judiciary, However, there are at least two main caveats. among other goals. The topics featured at its First, the benefits of regional cooperation are annual conferences echo many of the themes often overstated. Professional meetings can raised in this report, including trial manage- serve as a forum for spreading effective prac- ment; expanding access to justice, especially tices, but they can as easily serve as a forum for among vulnerable populations; and protect- reinforcing shared assumptions and spreading ing victims from reprisal. However, other bad ideas. Second, while globalization has important themes have not been taken up, had a fundamental impact on criminal jus- especially case processing backlogs and over- tice systems throughout the world, including crowding in prisons. the Caribbean, not all the crime and criminal justice problems faced within Caribbean na- Additional Regional Efforts tions are regional or global. Some are local The organizations outlined above represent phenomena, and local solutions are needed some of the more well known and well estab- to address these problems. While regional lished forums for regional cooperation and problems deserve regional solutions, local collaboration, but other ongoing efforts not problems deserve local solutions. Making the described here might also play a role in im- distinction is vital. proving the practice of criminal justice in the region. Conclusion Regional initiatives are a good way to enhance the level of professionalism, coordina- This chapter outlines important issues facing tion and cooperation in dealing with issues Caribbean criminal justice systems. Research of vital importance to Caribbean nations. has demonstrated that the structure and be- Such initiatives enable nations to work to- haviour of criminal justice institutions can gether to solve common problems, providing have a critical impact on citizen security. At economies of scale often not possible in some the same time, they can undermine public of the Caribbean microstates that lack suffi- faith in the criminal justice system and gov- cient resources to address some problems on ernment authority more generally. A long tra- their own. Regional professional bodies also dition of research in criminology has shown provide an opportunity for nations to share that criminal justice systems can generate un- ideas, borrow effective programmes and prac- intended increases in crime and decreases in

138 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 human security if they do not adopt fair, ef- system. Medium-term gains can be realized fective, transparent and accountable practic- by establishing a credible, secure and well-de- 5 es. Although the region’s criminal justice sys- signed witness protection programme at the tems have made major strides in some ways, regional level. Other medium-term gains can much remains to be done. be realized by establishing greater capacity Data presented in this chapter indicate for analysing crime and criminal justice issues that, in the region, confidence in the courts within the region and testing the fairness and is fairly low. This is a somewhat unexpected effectiveness of crime control interventions. finding of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey The deeper and more challenging changes Criminal Justice Systems 2010. Caribbean officials, judiciary and court involve how people are treated by criminal managers, and populations should act on this justice systems. Police abuses, sentencing dis- red flag. parities and substandard confinement condi- There is also a strong demand for change. tions all contribute to a massive crisis of legiti- The findings described in this chapter repre- macy in the region’s criminal justice systems. sent an argument for a comprehensive pro- As long as some people have greater access to gramme of change in criminal justice systems justice than others, the region’s inhabitants in the region. Some aspects of this change will will continue to exhibit deficits in trust and be more challenging than others. It is possible confidence in the system. These issues consti- to achieve useful short-term gains by adopting tute a long-term reform agenda that will take immediate administrative measures to solve many years to put in place. At the same time, problems such as case overload and process- these comprehensive reforms require urgent ing delays in the courts. These are problems and well-coordinated action if the region is to of efficiency that, however, influence system achieve its aims in citizen security. effectiveness and overall confidence in the

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 139

CHAPTER State Policies and the Policy Orientation 6 of Populations Sustainable security needs community collaboration

Don’t trample our rights en route to protect our safety

Embrace, empower, respect, protect – we’re all in this together

An investment in sustainable development is an investment in sustainable security State Policies and the Policy 6CHAPTER Orientation of Populations 6

Introduction It examines the official crime control plans of various governments, the evolution associated Across the Caribbean region, citizens want with the current policy framework, and the safer societies. The region is at a critical junc- support for state policies among the popula- ture: effective policy-making could make so- tion as expressed in the UNDP Citizen Secu- cieties safer for citizens, including the most rity Survey 2010 conducted for this report. vulnerable. While governments have made The policy outcomes are then reviewed, and considerable efforts to improve security, the the capacity of states to effectively implement challenge is to respond more effectively and their expressed policies and to effect change is in ways that are grounded in respect for citi- assessed. State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations zens. Theassessment of public attitudes towards The ightr mix of policies is important. A crime and violence indicates that, despite ex- carefully crafted and effectively executed crime pressions of support for punitive responses, control policy, while only one of several tools citizens overwhelmingly favour social crime to make society safer, could become a critical prevention strategies. Ordinary citizens and reference point for the effective functioning the media play a central role in crime policy- of other vital influences that also affect public making. Each citizen influences the criminal safety in the region. This chapter makes the justice policy arena through the decisions, case for a rebalancing of policy so that there judgments and actions taken on specific issues. is a stronger focus on social crime prevention, Citizen perceptions of security, the level of fear which could thereby contribute to an improve- felt by citizens and the level of risk of crime and ment in the larger human development strate- victimization impact decision-making pro- gies of the countries of the region. The chapter cesses and determine what each citizen con- demonstrates that there is strong support for siders serious societal problems. If citizens feel such a shift in policy and, specifically, for a shift empowered and know the state is concerned to to social crime prevention. It also discusses the protect their rights, their confidence in govern- influence of various policy-making actors, in- ment is enhanced. In such circumstances, their cluding the media, civil society and the state decisions can positively influence crime policy bureaucracy. It argues for greater capacity in and efforts to reduce crime. If citizens join the policy analysis and policy-making in the state quest for a safe society in this way, they can also and civil society and better evidence-based contribute to positive changes in the philoso- inputs to accomplish the transition to citizen phy, policy and governance of society. security efficiently and effectively. The assm media are a primary means of in- The eformr of institutions to enhance forming the Caribbean public about the issue their ability to serve the people is an impor- of crime and an important actor in influenc- tant aspect of policies that are oriented to- ing public policy. Recent surveys indicate that wards citizen security, but this issue has been crime and violence dominate media coverage discussed in previous chapters and is therein the Caribbean. Crime accounts for 27 per- fore subordinated here. This chapter consid- cent of media reports regionwide. The share is ers the development of appropriate national 30 percent in Jamaica, and the average world- and regional responses to ensure a safe and wide is 20 percent.1 The media also play an secure environment for Caribbean citizens. important role in the policy-making process

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 143 by bringing pressing issues to the public’s at- media report on public opinion, and public 6 tention and providing forums for debate. opinion shapes what the media report. Thus, TheCaribbean has seen the expansion of the media reflect and inform public opin- the media in several countries, and this devel- ion on a variety of issues, including crime. opment has deepened citizens’ awareness of In this way, the media shape agendas, act as public issues and enhanced an already well- a watchdog for the public interest and play a developed democratic culture. By the same role in the governance process. They facilitate token, the media amplify the population’s accountability, help reduce the policy imple- concerns, influence the perceptions of citizens mentation gap and bring the people into the regarding the acuteness and character of prob- process of governance. lems, help to set the agenda of concerns, and, in so doing, help to frame policy discussions. The Policy Environment Across the region, the media in their various expressions exist as a form of open par- Crime and Insecurity in the Caribbean: ticipation for the public. This ranges from The Policy Factor radio talk shows and television programmes Crime control involves social, economic and that allow call-in participation to lively print political dimensions that require the imple- State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations publications that invite letters to the editor. mentation of strategies to reduce and prevent Despite the prevalence of television, radio criminality. Crime policies should actually remains a primary source of information for prevent rather than seek to manage the relat- Caribbean residents. Across the region, espe- ed problems. They must prevent and control cially in Jamaica, weekday radio programmes crime by targeting its most violent and de- are dominated by call-in sessions. These help structive expressions, while also being acutely hold the government and governmental sensitive to the protection of citizen rights agents accountable. The ability to rebroadcast and contributing to meeting social and eco- via YouTube and the use of other social media nomic needs. An optimal response includes aid the process of accountability. For exam- crime prevention strategies that address the ple, during the May 2010 operation to arrest root and proximate causes of crime, as well as and extradite Christopher Coke, a Jamaican crime reduction initiatives such as the remov- drug lord, social media were used to follow al of criminals from society. Achieving this and report on the activities and, particularly, balance is integral to citizen security. There- the alleged human rights abuses of Jamaica’s fore, how crime policy is developed and ex- security forces. Likewise, news reports of po- ecuted and the level of effectiveness of crime lice-civilian confrontations in Jamaica and in policy are at the core of the achievement of a Trinidad and Tobago have been rebroadcast safe society. via YouTube.2 Establishing a safe society, however, does The rstfi stage in a policy process might not mean the absence of crime and violence. involve the framing of an issue by the media. Rather, it means the calibration of policy so Across the region, this is evidenced in edi- that policy can help lead to desired outcomes torials and commentaries on the role of the such as lower crime rates, increasingly effec- Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) in its juris- tive public institutions, growing conformity diction as a court of last resort. Regionwide, with laws and citizen support for crime policy the media are a strong institution operating and the agencies and actors responsible for to strengthen governance. They facilitate par- enforcement of the policy. The ultimate aim ticipation and transparency by giving citizens is a more well integrated society. a voice and permitting the free flow of infor- However, while effective crime control mation, while helping hold governments ac- policies can never be a panacea for all the ills countable through reporting, investigative of unsafe societies in the region, the policy journalism and a whistle-blowing role. The response to the challenge of crime in these media and the public work symbiotically: the democracies and the effect of the response on

144 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 citizen perceptions of government efforts in a reduction in the incidence of crime and ad- crime reduction and in the respect for rights dress the social roots of crime, while securing 6 uniquely determine whether these societies citizen support for state policy. It also invites will experience statistically normal crime rates capacity development and a focus on the pro- and the greater security that citizens want. tection of citizen rights. The espectr of states for civil and politi- The outcome would represent an index cal rights creates a favourable environment of the state’s ability to control crime. By pro- for open debate and the transparent devel- ducing effective crime control, crime policy opment of crime policy, as well as the public would invariably enhance other outcomes, support for the policy. An appropriate policy- such as increased citizen security. The sense of making process requires political account- safety and security among citizens is a valua- ability and meaningful citizen participation. ble asset in crime policy because an increase in This is occurring in the region: civil society public confidence in government strengthens organizations, an attentive public and the me- the state’s connection with citizens, thereby dia are participating in the debate about the enhancing the legitimacy of the state. best ways to address crime. The active and Policies should also be sensitive to the op- engaged public, the involvement of interest portunities and constraints in the policy envi- groups and the general disposition to resist ronment for dealing with crime. The Christo- State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations state encroachment on liberties and rights pher Coke case in Jamaica appears to confirm are features that, in the main, offer protection a truth about the policy environment in terms against government excesses. Combined, they of achieving success in deterring criminals. It are compelling governments to be account- was possible to capture and extradite Coke able and to consult with civil society actors in because the environment was rich in variables policy-making.3 that compelled concerted action to end the Such efforts by governments indicate state’s protection of a wanted criminal. These that a transition towards enhanced citizen included an inflamed public opinion and the security is possible. The democratic, consti- pressure of influential civil society groups, tutional forms of government in the region such as the Jamaica Civil Society Coalition and the region’s ideological moderation and and Jamaicans for Justice, that were willing to centrist political orientation would support a stand up for democratic rights and the rule of crime policy framework that avoids gross and law even under extreme circumstances. Com- unchecked violations of citizen rights in the bined with Jamaica’s private sector, which had quest to control crime. In addition, the long- become integrally involved in issues of crime standing membership of Caribbean countries over the years, citizens succeeded in forcing in international organizations and the par- the Jamaican state to undertake the steps they ticipation of these countries in protocols on desired.4 In sum, key factors in the Jamaican national development and citizen security are policy environment overcame other powerful also exerting a favourable influence on crime constraints and proved decisive in securing policy. This affiliation is a source of funding Coke’s extradition. and expertise for crime-relevant policies, but also exposes governments to the policy frame- The Evolution of Policy, Deterring Social works represented by the international con- Violence, and the War on Narco-Trafficking ventions and protocols to which Caribbean Caribbean countries have, at different times, states are signatories. adopted various approaches to address crime. These advantages need to be matched These approaches include crime control, due through nuanced local crime reduction poli- process and social justice models. All seven cies that combine the effective policing of countries that have been sites of the research crime, respect for citizen rights and positive for this report (the Caribbean-7) subscribe to social interventions. This multifaceted ap- the due process perspective, which emphasiz- proach to the problem of crime would target es fairness and equal treatment under the law.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 145 There have also been elements of a new Nonetheless, other initiatives have also fo- 6 approach emphasizing social interventionist cused on citizen security needs beyond public policies designed to reduce poverty, empower safety and enriched and nuanced the crime traditionally disadvantaged groups and meet control model. However, such initiatives have the demands of these groups for social justice. not become priorities in policy-making nor Components of this approach have been pre- do they reflect a “comprehensive integrative sent in the policies and programmes of various vision of crime control and citizen security.” countries, but were most evident in Guyana Rather, the initiatives have taken the form of and Jamaica in the 1970s.5 Yet, this empha- ad hoc measures, pilot programmes and ex- sis on social policy and on remedial measures periments in bridging the gap between citi- to assist the poor had uneven effects. While zens and the state. crime rates in Guyana remained low, Jamaica The rimec control approach and the social experienced violent political conflict, high crime prevention–social justice approach are levels of crime and near economic collapse. often viewed as polar opposites: one is tough Unlike the due process model, the social on crime, and the other is soft on crime. Yet, justice model is a powerful critique of exist- both are more nuanced than the either-or de- ing social arrangements as they affect crime scription suggests. The integrated model that State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations and punishment. The social justice approach combines the best of both approaches bridges assumes that crime is caused, in large part, by the dichotomy between the two. Despite ges- unjust social arrangements and unequal power tures in this direction, nowhere in the Carib- relations.6 It demands more than the equal- bean has any country moved fully towards ity and fairness required under a due process an integrative model linking crime control framework. It is a rights-seeking model that and social justice. The model has yet to find a favours socially excluded and disadvantaged champion among the ranks of the incumbent groups through state intervention. It encapsu- Caribbean political elite. lates civil and criminal justice, deals with the Nevertheless, at the turn of the millenni- overall fairness of a society and society’s rela- um, governments in the region were spurred tionships and seeks to advance human well- to adopt tighter preventive measures. This being, including by addressing the needs of the shift saw initiatives ranging from constitu- most disadvantaged through the redistribu- tional reforms, implementation of citizen tion of resources.7 security and justice projects, to gun buy-back Central to this approach is the notion that schemes in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Toba- government has a responsibility to ensure a go. In a similar vein, several countries adopted basic quality of life for all citizens. The focus complementary initiatives aimed at restrain- of the approach is crime prevention and the ing delinquency among the young, encourag- reduction of criminality. The crime prevention ing community development and facilitating methods seek to improve life chances through citizen empowerment. This was buttressed greater social integration, cohesion and respect with the installation of independent commis- for human rights and by confronting the pow- sions in Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and er relations in society. It is valuable for dealing Tobago that were created to achieve equal with problems of social marginalization and opportunity for ethnic groups, secure respect the lack of legitimate opportunities. for human rights and protect women and Across the region, most states exhibit a children from abuse. Box 6.1 offers an exam- preference for the crime control model and, ple of an integrated programme.8 specifically, an excessive reliance on law enforcement. As described by Packer (2004), The Shift in Policy Reflected in the “Crime Control Model is based on the Budgetary Allocations proposition that repression of criminal con- There has been a shift at the level of ideas duct is by far the most important function to about crime prevention and control. In some be performed by the criminal process.” countries, this shift has been accompanied by

146 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Box 6.1. The Citizen Security Programme, Trinidad and Tobago 6 The Citizen Security Programme seeks to reduce crime Ministry of National Security by improving its ability to and violence by addressing risk factors—such as firearms plan, coordinate and manage violence and crime prevention use, unsafe neighbourhoods and violent behaviour—in 22 projects; (b) institutional strengthening of the police service high-need communities of Trinidad and Tobago. Led by the to increase public confidence by improving performance, Ministry of National Security, the programme involves the training, management and supervision; and (c) coordina- Trinidad and Tobago Police Service and members of the tar- tion and implementation of community-based preventive geted communities. The programme’s strategy involves three strategies. approaches, as follows: (a) institutional strengthening of the

Source: ‘Citizen Security Programme: Promoting a Culture of Peace and Lawfulness’, Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, http://csp.gov.tt/.

social crime prevention programmes, such as budgets to security, Barbados and Antigua citizen security programmes in Jamaica and in and Barbuda, where the problem is not as se- Trinidad and Tobago targeting youth at risk vere, both allocate 7.1 percent to security. It State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations and communities of urban poor. It is worth- may be that budgetary allocations are also a while to probe the extent of this shift in actual function of economic and fiscal constraints policy through an analysis of public security and political pressures on governments to ap- budgets. pear to be responsive to the security needs of Budgets reflect the actual policy priori- the populations. Debt burdens are certainly ties of governments. They may reveal a gap countervailing constraints. between declared and actual priorities. An ex- Likewise, the outcomes in terms of crime amination of public expenditures on security reduction have no apparent association with in six of the Caribbean-7 reveals that between expenditure. The expenditure of Trinidad and 5.9 percent (in the case of Guyana) and 13.9 Tobago on security is relatively high, but the percent (Trinidad and Tobago) of the 2010 country’s serious crime rate remains high. Fi- budgets were spent on security (see chart 6.1).9 nancial investment is not a sufficient condi- These are fairly large proportions of the budg- tion for crime reduction. Much depends on ets of these countries. As a proportion of GDP, the mix of policies, the public support for the the figures are also significant. The average policies and the capacity to implement the public expenditure on security in other regions policies effectively. such as Central America is around 2.5 percent The ightr mix of policies means rebalanc- of regional GDP, which is lower in comparison ing policy to give appropriate emphasis to with the expenditure in the Caribbean coun- social crime prevention. The distributions of tries.10 These levels of expenditure reflect the the security budgets in six of the Caribbean-7 increasing security problem and increasing risk (less Suriname) suggest that, despite new pro- in the Caribbean, but also highlight the risk of grammes that have been introduced in some diverting resources from other areas that are countries, crime prevention is relatively ne- similarly vital to achieving the developmental glected (table 6.1). goals of these countries. The rimec prevention figures in table 6.1 The budgetary allocations that are shown are rough estimates based on aggregating ex- in chart 6.1 do not fully represent the level, penditure on youth development, commu- intensity and complexity of the problem. nity development and other such blunt pro- Thus, while Jamaica and Trinidad and To- grammes and thus may tend to overestimate bago, which have the highest rates of serious the actual expenditure. However, some social crime among the Caribbean-7, respectively al- crime prevention projects and programmes locate 6.2 and 13.9 percent of their national are funded through loans and grants that may

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 147 6 Chart 6.1 Estimates of Government Expenditure on Security, Caribbean-7

16.0 13.9 14.0 12.0 12.0 11.0

10.0

8.0 7.1 7.1 6.2 5.9

Percent 6.0

3.3 3.8 4.0 2.9 2.1 2.1 2.0

State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations 0.0 Antigua & Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Trinidad & Barbuda Tobago

Security Expenditure as Security Expenditure % National Budgets as % GDP

Source: Calculations based on government data (see the text).

not all be included in the estimates. These dif- grammes are required. Accountability, evalu- ficulties aside, the data in the table reveal the ation and innovation are also required. reality that, while a shift towards greater so- If the shift towards social crime preven- cial crime prevention may be occurring, this tion is to be realized more fully, greater advo- is still in the early stages and is insufficiently cacy will be needed. Old and new advocates reflected in the budgetary allocations of Car- will have to exert greater influence on policy. ibbean governments. Further consolidation of this shift will mean rebalancing security Explaining the Policy Shift budgets in favour of crime prevention. Crime control has consistently been on gov- Meanwhile law enforcement, the courts ernment agendas in the Caribbean for more and corrections rely on elaborate structures than three decades. Deep concerns about po- that require large payments for salaries and litical violence and regime protection against the maintenance of buildings and equip- subversion influenced policy from the 1960s ment, which are not necessarily a measure through the mid-1980s. From the late 1960s of responsiveness to the security demands of to the early 1980s, Caribbean leaders expend- citizens. Social crime prevention has no such ed the effort in managing rising street crime structures. Higher proportions of the preven- and the mounting criticism of racial and tion dollar are therefore more likely to go di- class bias in policing and in the dispensing of rectly to programmes. criminal justice. For example, both Jamaica As in the case of law enforcement and and Trinidad and Tobago declared states of the other areas of the criminal justice system, emergency: Jamaica in 1966 and 1976, and there is no guarantee that the expenditure on Trinidad and Tobago in 1970. prevention will have a commensurate return By the mid-1990s, as governments came in terms of crime reduction. Effective pro- to see narco-trafficking as the main threat to

148 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Table 6.1. The Distribution of Government Budgetary Expenditures on Security 6 percent Category Antigua & Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Trinidad & Barbuda Lucia Tobagoa

Law 5.08 3.36 4.78 5.24 6.99 10.70 enforcement

Preventionb 0.04 0.18 0.26 0.22 0.81 2.1

Justice 0.68 0.93 0.69 0.85 1.33 1.1

Corrections 0.32 0.82 0.88 0.71 1.86 0

Total 7.12 7.10 5.90 6.17 11.00 13.9

Sources: Calculations based on government data. Note: The table shows the share of national budgets going to each security category.

a. For Trinidad and Tobago, correction facility expenditures are included among law enforcement and prevention expenditures. State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations b. Prevention includes budgetary items covering prevention of armed violence, community-based solutions, initiatives to limit drug and alcohol consumption, witness and victim protection programmes focused on women and youth, local security management programmes, and the prevention of human trafficking, among other topics.

national and hemispheric security, crime con- velopment of strategic intelligence on crime.13 trol came to be directed primarily at deterring Strategic intelligence refers to the capacity to violent criminal behaviour and stemming the discern optimal approaches to the solution increasing trade in guns and drugs. Trafficking of crimes and to calibrate policy in ways that in drugs and the associated ills created such a produce effective results. Thus, targeting and sense of exposure and heightened vulnerabil- a tight focus on drug-running were matched ity among the region’s leaders, that they imag- by meaningful cooperation and coordination ined the danger as an existential threat to the among the members of the Caribbean Com- entire region.11 munity (CARICOM). The perception of an existential threat was This regional focus on crime control with not unfounded.12 However, political leaders its emphasis on law enforcement, deterrence and law enforcement agencies in the region and interdiction constituted a major policy had to be sensitive to the already inadequate departure: the initiatives displayed a grasp of capacity of Caribbean states to secure their the fact that narco-trafficking was susceptible borders, conduct sophisticated surveillance to a regional and coordinated strategy. This of traffickers and devise new legislative and shift to a more nuanced policy orientation was other enforcement measures to bring traffick- encouraged by several developments. They ers to justice. included the recognition that addressing the Between the mid-1990s and the present, crime problem required crime reduction, but Caribbean leaders, local law enforcement also crime prevention. In addition, the loss of agencies and allied international organiza- citizen confidence in the ability of Caribbean tions have responded to the crime threat. states to provide public safety encouraged the Recognizing that they could not work alone, states to seek alternative solutions. heads of government in the region readily In general, factors influencing policy shifts adopted a regional approach to the problem. include ideas, institutions and actors.14 Across In policy terms, the regional response to the Caribbean, the most influential of the the crime threat in recent years seems to con- three may be official and unofficial policy ac- firm the growth in policy-learning and the de- tors. The Caribbean crime policy arena con-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 149 sists of several main policy actors, often known ber states are parties to several regional and 6 to each other, who, singly or in tandem, seek international conventions that are comple- to effect change in the crime landscape. These mented by bilateral and multilateral coop- actors include CARICOM, police and other eration initiatives such as the Barbados Plan law enforcement organizations, international of Action of May 1996, the Action Plan of development partners, and the United States. October 1996 for the implementation of Civil society groups, particularly the private an anti-drug strategy in the hemisphere, the sector, the media, regional organs such as the Bridgetown Plan of Action, and the Europe- Association of Caribbean Commissioners of an Union–Latin America Action Plan.17 The Police and the Regional Security System, and, Barbados Plan of Action sets out specific ac- to a lesser extent, engaged citizens have also tivities to be undertaken by states in the area influenced crime policy in the direction of of drug control and coordination. The Car- social crime prevention. ibbean has also partnered with international The shift across the region has involved initiatives such as the Drug Prevention Net- a change in ideas, as well as policies. For ex- work of the Americas. ample, there are currently more social pre- CARICOM leaders moved to deepen vention programmes within the region than their knowledge of crime in the region and State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations there were five years ago. This includes the sought expertise by appointing a Regional citizen security programmes sponsored in Task Force on Crime and Security in 2001. Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago They received the report and recommenda- by the Inter-American Development Bank. tions of the task force the following year.18 Success in swaying policy depends on the In 2007, as a demonstration of its commit- ability to influence policy makers. However, ment to regional security and in response to across the Caribbean, this sort of influence the scope of the regionwide crime problem, has not occurred through lobbying or the for- CARICOM adopted security as the fourth mation of coalitions of civic groups. Instead, pillar of the community. In 2008, the CARI- the ability to influence changes in policy is re- COM Secretariat, in tandem with the United lated to but not restricted to party member- Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, pro- ship, funding status, knowledge of the system duced the draft Caribbean Community Ac- and group interest and power. tion Plan for Social Development and Crime Through organs such as the Implemen- Prevention. The action plan seeks to prevent tation Agency for Crime and Security (IM- and reduce levels of violence and crime in PACS), the Council for Human and Social member states. It has five specific goals: re- Development and the Council of National duce violence, foster social inclusion, promote Security and Law Enforcement, CARICOM integration, empower victims and protect the has had the most influence on crime policy environment and economic resources.19 from within the region. One avenue has been CARICOM crime control initiatives the formalization of IMPACS, an outgrowth also include regional gun-marking and gun- of the CARICOM task force report on crime tracing programmes, as well as regional ini- and security. IMPACS provides, among other tiatives to promote firearms marking in Latin assistance, “mobilization of resources to sup- America and the Caribbean.20 (See box 6.2 for port the collective fight against serious crime a sample regional firearms trafficking control and to counter security threats in the re- initiative.) In collaboration with international g i o n”. 15 These CARICOM entities have been and regional NGOs and civil society groups able to influence a shift towards advocacy for and the Institute of International Relations and the adoption of prevention programmes at the University of the West Indies campus such as the Social and Development Crime in Saint Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago, Prevention Plan. CARICOM IMPACS launched a regional For more than two decades, CARICOM initiative aimed at reducing the use of guns in has had regional drug control plans.16 Mem- the commission of violent crimes.21

150 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Box 6.2. The Control of Firearms Trafficking in Central America and Neighbouring Countries 6 A new project seeks to control the illicit accumulation and gamut of national and international partners. It is being exe- trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and cuted in Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Hondu- thereby reduce the impact of these weapons in armed vio- ras, Nicaragua, and Panama with the close collaboration of lence in Central America. The project has been developed the Caribbean countries, Colombia and Mexico. The project by the General Secretariat of the Central American Inte- receives support and advice from the UNDP Regional Cen- gration System, the Central American Small Arms Control tre in Panama, which manages the financial resources of the Programme, which works mainly with the governments project. The project has already registered some successes, as comprising the Central American Integration System, and a follows: • Ratification and implementation of instruments for the regional and international control of SALW. All countries in the region have signed the Inter-American Convention against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms and other international instruments that complement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. They have adopted a regional code of conduct and many of them have made progress in the analysis of the model law (ley marco) approved by the Latin American Parliament for eventual incorporation in national legislation. • Creation and strengthening of the capacities of national and regional institutions and agencies responsible for SALW con-

trol and development of a system for information exchange and improvement of border and customs control. Costa Rica, State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations Guatemala and Nicaragua have established national commissions. • Strengthening capacities among civil society organizations to promote SALW control. NGOs in the countries of Central America have participated in training events organized through the project, as well as in dialogues generated by the project. • Strengthening and implementation of regional processes for control of SALW. The Central American Small Arms Control Programme, in coordination with Central American countries, has elaborated the Central American Common Agenda on SALW Control 2010–2015 to enhance the control of illicit trafficking in arms. The current draft agenda contains five major recommendations that have resulted from national and regional dialogue and comparative analysis, as follows: (a) update the Central American regional diagnostic process by developing comprehensive data, (b) ensure coherence across national law enforcement bodies and with the international instruments ratified by the countries, (c) observe the progress towards the reduction of SALW, (d) promote the development of additional controls on SALW transfers, and (e) promote a comprehensive understanding of the issues so as to foster sustainable responses among actors.

Source: OAS (2010c).

The Association of Caribbean Commis- support Crime Stop, a partnership among sioners of Police helps build cooperation and the community, the police and the media coordinate drug strategy. The Regional Se- designed to involve the public in the fight curity System, hitherto established to deter against crime. political subversion, was upgraded in 1996 to However, many less influential civil soci- address the problems emerging from the trade ety organizations in the region are struggling in illicit drugs. Both also help influence the for resources. One of the principal roadblocks policy landscape. to the development of relevant transnational The active participation of civil society is support from private funds, corporate foun- critical in increasing citizen security. Across dations and wealthy individuals is the lack of the region, civil society actors such as NGOs, an enabling legal environment for civil society the private sector and human rights groups organizations and other actors.22 have sought to influence the crime control Opportunities for civil society organiza- landscape. For example, the Private Sector tions from across the region to increase their Organization of Jamaica has developed a Na- influence through better coordination of tional Crime Prevention Fund that is used to their efforts, knowledge sharing and a com-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 151 mon understanding are unlikely unless there for their ideas. Policy shifts are also evident in 6 is support from governments or international the justice sector reform funded by the Ca- institutions. Regional institutions, such as nadian International Development Agency, the Organization of American States, pos- community policing initiatives and support sess mechanisms to allow civil society par- for the rule of law through the United States ticipation in their activities. CARICOM, for Agency for International Development, and example, has adopted the Charter of Civil the support offered by the UK Department Society for the Caribbean Community. At for International Development for police the national level, however, acceptance of forces.26 civil society’s role in influencing national This emergent orientation, with its em- policy-making and debate is still feeble. In phasis on crime prevention, poses a challenge most countries, the architecture for regular to competing ideas about law enforcement in engagement between governments and civil the region. For example, debates about en- society is still being developed. Strengthen- forcing the law generated advocacy within the ing civil society participation was among the law enforcement community for increased re- recommendations of the Caribbean Sub Re- sources to heighten police visibility and deter gional Civil Society Forum held in Prepara- crime. Consequently, across the region, the State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations tion for the Fifth Summit of the Americas, in implementation of this approach has seen an 2009.23 Government–civil society collabora- increase in the number of police officers on tion requires a climate of cooperation, the the streets. Law enforcement influence on the institutionalization of civil society partici- policy landscape occurs through interest and pation and a framework of supportive legal membership. Law enforcement community and regulatory structures. Many civil society influence on the implementation of policy is organizations are struggling for legitimacy. exemplified by the role of the Jamaica Con- Mutual respect and trust are still being devel- stabulary Force in the realization of Jamaica’s oped between governments and civil society ‘six anti-crime bills’ in 2010 (see the section organizations. on implications below).27 TheUnited States is also a major actor The portfolio of CARICOM initiatives in crime control policy, influencing policy on drug-trafficking and criminal activities is through initiatives such as the Caribbean Ba- an example of how to address the crime chal- sin Security Initiative, through capacity de- lenge effectively. Moreover, it evidences an es- velopment programmes and through annual tablished framework for pursuing social and reporting protocols such as the annual Nar- development crime prevention initiatives to cotics Control Strategy Report, the Traffick- facilitate the transition to citizen security. ing in Persons Report and the State Depart- ment Country Reports on Human Rights.24 The Policy Orientation The United Kingdom has also sought to of the Population influence the region with respect to human rights practices.25 Among the more powerful policy actors The Policy Environment in the region are bilateral and multilateral Public opinion has become an integral part agencies and international development part- of the public policy process. This means that ners, such as the Canadian International De- attention to the orientation of the public velopment Agency, the European Union, the and to the level of support of the public for Inter-American Development Bank, the Or- policies is an essential element in the shift to- ganization of American States, the UK De- wards greater citizen security. Across the re- partment for International Development and gion, data on public attitudes are increasingly the United States Agency for International being assessed. Simultaneously, research on Development. These actors do not remain public attitudes towards the insecurity arising isolated, but seek allies, support and leverage because of crime and related issues has grown

152 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 substantially. Much of this research has taken results of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey the form of opinion surveys assessing the pub- 2010, the value orientation of the popula- 6 lic’s attitudes about a range of crime-related tion reflects inconsistencies and ambiguities. issues.28 There are what appear to be numerous con- Across the region, inadequate state ca- tradictions: respondents simultaneously fa- pacity and diminished authority to address vour punitive and liberal approaches that are citizen insecurity led to a preoccupation with reflected in an apparent conflict between fa- new areas of danger. Citizen demand for vouring punishment and supporting rehabili- stronger and clearer responses from the state tation. that were not forthcoming created public distrust and caused citizens to assume greater re- The Salience of Crime in Public Opinion sponsibility for their own protection. An in- Violent crime commands more attention crease in burglar bars on doors and windows from the media and is a primary source of in- and guarded and gated communities and the security. As a result, citizens are acutely aware growth in private security firms are evidence of criminal activities in their communities of the feelings of insecurity. and the activities being undertaken to control The salience of crime, especially in terms crime. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey of the fear and concern about crime, and anx- 2010 indicates that crime is among the top State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations ieties caused by social and economic change three issues citizens blame for their sense of impact the attitudes of citizens towards crimi- insecurity. Yet, overall, respondents did not nals and their support for the punishment of view crime as the most serious social problem criminals. Other influences include symbolic (chart 6.2). Instead, regionwide, social prob- politics, social and political values and per- lems related to the economy were considered ceptions of procedural fairness. However, the most serious problem: 52.9 percent com- punitive attitudes have their strongest roots pared with 27.4 percent for crime. in fear. Where the media constantly draw at- However, crime was mentioned as one of tention to crimes, insecurities increase, and, the three most serious problems by a low of hence, persistent representation and sensa- 8.9 percent of the respondents in Barbados tionalism of crime in political discourse and to a high of 47.6 percent of the respondents the media generate popular support for puni- in Saint Lucia (chart 6.3). Barbados is at the tive policies.29 lower end of the violent crime rates in the Social tolerance is a term used to describe Caribbean-7; thus, this lower concern about the extent to which people support certain crime may be expected. Similarly, Trinidad rights and privileges for others. It thus offers and Tobago has high and increasing rates of insight into the value orientation of citizens. violent crime; consequently, increased worry Social tolerance is integrally associated with about crime is also to be expected. While the social value orientations of altruism and co- homicide rate in Saint Lucia is at the lower end operation, but it may also support individu- among the Caribbean-7, it has been increas- alism, competitiveness, or aggression. The ing, rising from 13 per 100,000 population concept helps in assessing the extent to which in 2000 to 26 in 2010. Simultaneously, the individual rights and liberties are viewed as robbery rate has also been steadily increasing. social goods to be defended or promoted. The steady rise in the crime rate has heightened the sense of urgency in the Saint Lucian Public Attitudes towards political directorate. Crime is characterized as Crime and Punishment the number one issue for an island that is “un- This section assesses the policy orientation of der siege by criminals”.30 It is increasingly be- populations in the Caribbean-7. The available ing used to mobilize the population, and the data outline some general directions in public issue has entered the nation’s psyche because opinion on crime that cannot be character- of its salience, but also because of the recur- ized in any simple way. As is evident from the ring emphasis by policy makers.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 153 Chart 6.2 Problems of Insecurity, by Dimension, Chart 6.3 Crime as One of 6 First Mention (Top of Mind), the Three Most Caribbean-7, 2010 Serious Problems, percent Caribbean-7, 2010 Social Development Institutional Issues Issues (housing, (corruption, voice) schooling, 5.9 50 47.6 47.2 poverty, migration, sanitation, health) 45 13.9

29.9 Crime Issues 30 27.4

(property Percent crime, 25 State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations violent crime, Economy/Prices 21.7 Issue insecurity) 27.4 20 (unemplyment, 17.4 cost of food, 16.1 cost of living) 15 52.9 10 8.9

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “From the list of problems mentioned above, 5 which three are the most serious in your country?” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who chose one problem within the dimension as their first option for “Most serious problem”. 0 Guyana Jamaica Suriname Barbados Saint Lucia Caribbean-7 Across the Caribbean-7, 27.4 percent

of the respondents, more than one in four, Trinidad & Tobago Antigua & Barbuda considered crime the most serious problem, and 47.9 percent were fearful of becoming Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. victims of crime. Nonetheless, 45.5 percent Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: of the respondents thought their countries “From the list of problems mentioned above, which three are the most serious in your country?” The chart were safe. Although only 40.8 percent of the shows the percentage of respondents who believe respondents expressed general optimism that crime is among the top three “Most serious problems”. the state has the capacity to solve and manage the problem of insecurity more effectively, 68.8 percent reported that they would feel more secure if more police were on the Measure of Punitiveness streets. The salience of crime and, specifically, Across the region, public opinion polls and the growing concern about crime are leading newspaper headlines continue to reflect the to increased support for punishment. Across sentiments of a populace that is being forced the Caribbean, punitiveness associated with to adjust to the problem of crime and vio- the loss of the capacity of the state to contain lence. One of the attitudes most consistently crime is most evident in the discourse around reported, found through research and men- and support for the death penalty. tioned by policy makers is support for the

154 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 death penalty. As reflected in media reports facilitate sentences of death. A review of an- and in discussions, there is mounting advo- nual reports of the Inter-American Commis- 6 cacy for the readoption of the death penalty sion on Human Rights shows that appeals as a panacea across the region. This preference have been lodged against sentences of death for severe penalty can be explained by rising across the region.34 crime rates and the politicization of crime. The death penalty debate has resulted in As the UNDP Citizen Security Survey a backlash against human rights in the re- 2010 shows, 63.2 percent of respondents gion.35 The perceptions of citizens on human across the region support the death penalty. rights have consequences for their respect The support is strongest in the six British for the rule of law. Across the region, citizens Commonwealth countries. In the outlier, are aware of their human rights and respon- Suriname, only 35.7 percent of the respond- sibilities. Nonetheless, there is a perception ents support the death penalty. This former that human rights activists protect criminals colony of the Netherlands more closely re- by constraining governments in their ability flects the position of the European Union in to use the death penalty to address the high its rejection of the death penalty. homicide rates. As a result, civil society and Caribbean citizens overwhelmingly sup- NGOs concerned with human rights are port the death penalty. Politicians therefore sometimes unfairly accused of supporting State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations tend to view support for the death penalty as criminals and neglecting victims. a vote winner and continue to advocate for Citizen support for punishment is also its return. The absence of the death penalty is manifest in social tolerance for violations of seen by a majority among the populace, the the rights of others, as well as public opinion police and politicians as an element in a per- about the treatment of criminals by govern- missive environment in which lawlessness and ments. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey criminality are allowed to thrive.31 The major- 2010 asked respondents if they agreed that ity Caribbean opinion matches that in other human rights are obstacles to more effective Commonwealth countries. A 2010 Angus crime control. Across the Caribbean-7, about Reid Global Monitor found that 62 percent 43.2 percent of respondents agreed. This of Canadians and 67 percent of British favour ranged from a low of 34.2 percent in Guy- the death penalty for homicide convictions.32 ana to a high of 62.8 percent in Saint Lucia. The Angus Reid poll found that 84 percent With the exception of Saint Lucia, the extent of respondents in the United States favoured of variation in the responses was fairly nar- the death penalty for homicide. However, a row. What accounts for the relatively high review of information of the US Bureau of proportion of respondents from Saint Lucia Justice Statistics shows that, between 1953 who viewed human rights as an impediment and 2010, the highest level of support for to crime control? The most likely explanation the death penalty in the United States was 80 is a recent outbreak of violent crime in Saint percent in 1994. Since 2003, the support has Lucia against which the government has indi- been around 64 percent.33 cated its intent to “get tough”.36 Theextent to which the death sentence is possible varies across the Caribbean. Some Social Tolerance and Ideals of Justice countries have a de facto ban; others require Overwhelmingly, survey respondents agreed constitutional reform to carry out executions; with the statement, “criminals are a threat to and some have not carried out an execution in our way of life” (83.3 percent); it is not sur- more than 10 years. Many countries continue prising, then, that 82.9 percent agreed that to pass sentences of death in anticipation of criminals should be more harshly punished. being eventually able to carry out the penalty. However, respondents were less supportive of Trinidad and Tobago, however, successfully the police being given a free hand to kill crim- carried out executions in 1999 and is among inal gunmen. Among respondents, 30 percent countries pursuing constitutional reform to agreed, and 20 percent strongly agreed that it

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 155 is acceptable for police to break the law to eroded by fear of crime and victimization, as 6 control violent crime more effectively. well as by contempt for individual rights. These esponsesr should be viewed as op- Across the Caribbean-7, 14.3 percent of portunities for intervention. They indicate a the respondents to the UNDP Citizen Secu- high level of punitiveness, as well as a lack of rity Survey 2010 supported the use of dons support for the rule of law, but they also indi- as agents of crime control.38 That more than cate that sections of the population are con- 1 person in 10 support a phenomenon that temptuous of criminals and criminal behav- is confined to socially excluded communities iour. This opposition to criminality should indicates the extent to which some citizens be channelled into more law-regarding and have lost confidence in the government. En- socially constructive directions. dorsement of informal social control mecha- There is a disconnection in the support nisms, including vigilante justice, is also an for human rights practice and the principle indicator of the erosion of the rule of law and of the rule of law. Thus, there is advocacy for the perception of the state’s weak capacity to the harsher treatment of criminals, but citi- provide protection. zens are less inclined to allow the police to The urveys contained one question about break the law to control crime or kill gunmen. the level of agreement of respondents with a State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations This finding mirrors the findings of Powell policy that would allow citizens easier access to and Lewis (2011) in Jamaica, where there is firearms to reduce crime. Across the Caribbe- strong support for the rule of law, but failings an-7, only about 17.9 percent of the respond- in the observance of civil and human rights in ents agreed. (The range was from 6.6 percent areas such as law enforcement and prison sys- in Barbados to 25.9 percent in Suriname.) Al- tems, in the increasing incidence of vigilante lowing people to arm themselves in the name attacks, and in the excessive and sometimes of crime prevention does not appear to be a deadly use of force by the police in their treat- favoured policy option in the Caribbean. ment of offenders. The extent to which a society is viewed as In general, Caribbean societies have been just is integral to perceptions of security. Jus- judged to possess a strong belief in basic rules tice encompasses economic practices, cultural and values of democracy, especially the right to attitudes, and social and personal relation- due process, respect for the rule of law, the de- ships, privileges and networks.39 Across the fence of civil liberties and the political freedom Caribbean-7, 40.0 percent of the respondents of citizens. Nonetheless, as the dissatisfaction felt their societies are fundamentally unjust.40 of citizens with escalating crime rates grows, Also, 52.5 percent of the respondents indi- more people are registering support for un- cated that politically connected criminals are democratic alternatives such as a willingness to likely to go free; 47 percent felt that powerful support the police in the violation of rights. criminals are likely to go free; and 41.8 per- Support for the rule of law is a crucial cent reported that suspects who are poor are component of democracy. Where the securi- not likely to be treated fairly. This captures the ty situation has deteriorated, support for the sense of unfairness people are perceiving. Re- rule of law has also declined. Crime victimi- gionwide, only 34.2 percent of the respond- zation and the perception of insecurity both ents rated the courts fair, although one person negatively impact the level of support for the in four believes the courts are more fair today rule of law.37 Indeed, as more citizens experi- than they were five years ago. ence crime and the level of insecurity and fear Meanwhile, 43 percent of the respondents increases, citizen attitudes towards the rule of perceived society as fundamentally law-abid- law has become cavalier, thus increasing the ing. A law-abiding society is one in which citi- willingness to accommodate violations. Con- zens voluntarily defer to legal authority and sequently, high crime rates have the potential adherence to laws regardless of a police pres- of jeopardizing democracy directly and indi- ence or absence or a threat or lack of sanctions rectly, and support for the rule of law can be by the courts. It reflects a general belief in the

156 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 legitimacy of the law; rule breakers are in the justice institutions, particularly in the police, minority. The view that a society is just is an is an important precursor of citizen security. 6 expression of an attitude towards and confidence in the justice system; the view that a so- Public Opinion on Mechanisms for ciety is law-abiding is an expression of an at- Preventing and Controlling Crime titude towards and confidence in the citizens. Two survey questions measured the views of Differential police treatment, perceptions respondents towards military involvement in of partiality in the application of the law, or crime control regionwide (chart 6.4). First, politicians who act without regard for their the survey asked respondents to indicate their responsibilities can create an impression of a level of agreement with the idea that “only a society that is fundamentally unjust. Conse- military government can effectively combat quently, an effective police force and confi- crime”. Across the Caribbean-7, only about dence in the criminal justice system are essen- 15.3 percent of the respondents agreed. The tial for creating the perception of a society as range was from 9.7 percent in Barbados to fundamentally just and for safeguarding the 23.5 percent in Jamaica. These rather low lev- rule of law. As insecurity increases, citizens els of agreement, with only minor variations more willingly endorse greater levels of rights across countries, show that Caribbean citi- violations, including support for authoritar- zens are not in favour of establishing military State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations ian measures. Thus, confidence in criminal governments to facilitate crime control.

Chart 6.4 Respondents Who Agree the Military Should Control Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010

70 65.0

60 53.0 50 44.8 44.4 43.6 43.5 40 Percent 30 25.3 23.4 20.8 20 17.0 14.8 14.9 15.3 13.3 11.8 10 9.7

0 Tobago Guyana Jamaica Barbuda Suriname Antigua & Barbados Trinidad & Saint Lucia Caribbean-7

Only a Military Government Rely More on the Military

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “In order to reduce crime, the government should rely more on the military.” “Only a military government can effectively control crime.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Strongly agree“ or “Agree”.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 157 The second question in this area assessed cate the extent to which they trusted 15 in- 6 the support of respondents for reliance on stitutions.43 Among the 15, the defence forces the military to help control crime. Across ranked second; the Supreme Court, third; the Caribbean-7, about 43.5 percent of the the attorney general, fifth; the justice system, respondents agreed that government should ninth; and the police force, fourteenth. Final- rely more on the military to reduce crime. ly, a 2010 opinion survey in Suriname asked The range was from a low of 25.5 percent in respondents to indicate the extent to which Barbados to a high of 65.1 percent in Jamaica. they trusted 16 institutions.44 Among these, Overall, only about two citizens in five in the the armed forces ranked fifth; the Court of Caribbean-7 appear to view the military as an Justice, sixth; the attorney general, seventh; option for crime control. and the police, ninth. In every case in which Here, the pattern of outliers at the upper we were able to find opinion data ranking the end of the distribution is a little clearer. The degree of trust in institutions, the military two nations with the highest homicide rates, ranked higher than the components of the Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, also show justice system (excluding the police), which the highest level of citizen support for mili- outranked the police. tary involvement in reducing crime. We envi- A loss of confidence in criminal justice in- State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations sion several explanations for this finding. stitutions may lead to greater support for mil- First, in both nations, there appears to be a itary involvement in crime control. However, common sentiment that the police and other the militarization of policing raises concerns criminal justice agencies are unable to keep up about the suspension of personal rights in with the challenges of fighting crime, particu- support of crime control, fears about due pro- larly violent crime carried out by street gangs cess guarantees and questions about the ero- and organized crime groups. Second, since sion of democratic values. Citizen support for none of these nations are currently at war, the military involvement in crime control signals military is likely perceived as a slack resource a weakness in criminal justice institutions that that is on the payroll, armed and ready to de- ought therefore to be remedied by consistent ploy at a moment’s notice. Third, in nations reform efforts. in which the armed forces are viewed with Despite a general lack of confidence in and significantly more confidence than the police, criticism of the criminal justice system across the military may be viewed as a more viable the Caribbean-7, respondents were in support option for containing crime and violence. of building capacity in the police: 74.8 percent The astl explanation above is supported by agreed that the government should invest more scattered evidence from public opinion polls in the police force (chart 6.5). However, there conducted in four nations: Guyana, Jamaica, was a 25 percentage point difference between Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Thus, a the regional average and the share in Suriname, 2005 opinion survey in Trinidad and Tobago where there is a perception that the police have found that 26 percent of respondents had “a been more effective at the community and lot of faith” in the armed forces, a figure sec- country levels in the last few years. ond only to the church among the 14 institu- Except for Barbados and Saint Lucia, which tions listed. By comparison, only 13 percent have new correctional facilities, overcrowding of the respondents had a lot of faith in police and the condition of prisons remain a regional or judges.41 A 2010 opinion survey carried problem. Nonetheless, in the Caribbean-7, in- out in Jamaica examined public trust in 11 investment in prisons is among the crime control stitutions. On a scale with a potential range of options that is less well supported: only 26.7 0 to 100, the army came in first, with a score percent of the survey respondents agreed that of 65.9. The Supreme Court ranked fourth, this option was a priority (chart 6.5). The outli- with a score of 51.3; and the police ranked ers are Barbados, at 11.7 percent, and Guyana, last, with a score of 32.6.42 A 2010 opinion at 40.9 percent. Built in 2007, Dodds prison survey in Guyana asked respondents to indi- in Barbados has a capacity of 1,250 and was

158 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Chart 6.5 Citizen Support for Institution Building in Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010 6

100 93.7 90 89.3 89.2 87.4 85.7 86.1 83.6 80 76.4 76.7 77.0 74.8 71.8 72.5 70 71.1 66.3 60

50 49.0 40.9 Percent 40 33.7 30 28.5 26.1 26.7 21.7 24.3 20 11.7 10

0 State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations Antigua & Barbados Guyana Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Caribbean-7 Barbuda Tobago Build More Prisons Build Police Capacity Reduce Corruption

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “In order to reduce crime, the government should build more prisons.” “In order to reduce the crime rate, the government should invest more in the police force/service.” “In order to reduce the crime rate, the government should invest more in reducing corruption.“ The chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered “Strongly agree“ or “Agree”.

designed to meet modern international stand- the problem of crime can be contained. Less ards. The 2010 Human Rights Report on Guy- than 30 percent of the respondents felt that ana identifies deteriorating prison conditions nothing could be done about crime. and overcrowding as major issues.45 According to Transparency International’s Balancing Crime Prevention and Corruption Perceptions Index, public sector Crime Control corruption is at a high level across the region. Commensurate with the optimism about the Although the ranking of each country sur- possibility of turning around the crime envi- veyed in the Corruption Perceptions Index ronment was general support for social inter- in 2009 and 2010 improved, Barbados is the vention through education initiatives, youth only CARICOM country ranking above 5 on programmes, job creation, poverty reduction, a scale from 1 (‘highly corrupt’) to 10 [‘very and programmes for the urban poor (chart clean’).46 6.6; see also chart 5.2). Among the crime control responses advo- The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 cated by survey respondents, there was over- demonstrates that, despite the ambiguities in whelming support for reduction in corruption: public opinion, support for crime prevention 86.1 percent across the Caribbean-7. Jamaica, policies such as increased investment in edu- which registered the highest support for cor- cation, youth development, job creation and ruption reduction, was also the only country poverty reduction is fairly universal across in which respondents said that corruption was the Caribbean-7. Although there are minor among the top three national problems.47 fluctuations among respondents across na- Despite increasing levels of insecurity, the tions, the level of support for these initiatives response was unambiguous regionwide that is strong in every country: an average of 89.9

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 159 6 Chart 6.6 Support for Investment in Social punished more harshly. Thus, citizens do not Interventions as a Means of Crime Control, appear to view crime prevention and crime Caribbean-7, 2010 control as an either-or proposition. They want governments to do both.

93 92.5 The Implications of Policy Responses The findings of the UNDP Citizen Security 92 91.7 Survey 2010 show that, despite a desire to see perpetrators punished, citizens also expressed 91 strong support for methods that emphasize social intervention. Meanwhile, the public 90 outcry over the problem of rising crime has 88.8 elicited rhetoric and legislation from the po- 89 litical directorate that too often ignores the social conditions that facilitate crime. Further- Percent 88 87.7 more, even as the region has embraced crime 87.1 control policies, these policies have generally State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations 87 had little long-term impact in reducing crime rates.48 Some gaps in legislation, such as laws 86 to control organized crime more effectively, need to be filled and have been filled by some 85 countries. However, rather than addressing the crime problem in more profound ways, the policies serve mainly to calm public anxieties, Education Programmes Job Programmes Poverty to reassure the public that steps are being taken for Young Creation for Urban Reduction and to win public support for the policies.49 People Poor For example, in several instances, political campaigns have rallied populations in the region with promises to facilitate the death Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Questions: “In order to reduce the crime rate, the go- penalty largely to appease public concern, vernment should invest more in education.” “In order to reduce the crime rate, the government should invest more in programmes for young people.” “In order to reduce the crime rate, the with scarce regard for the many constraints government should invest more in job creation.” “In order to reduce crime, the government should that would limit the implementation of such invest more in the communities of the urban poor.” “In order to reduce crime, the government should invest more in reducing poverty.” The chart shows the percentage of respondents who a policy. The incidence of crime and the pub- answered “Strongly agree” or “Agree”. lic’s fear of crime have been so overwhelming that governments have been pressed to declare policies on crime and punishment percent of the survey respondents favour such without much concern for policy coherence approaches. or long-term effectiveness. Political exigen- According to a popular view, people are cies of the day and the need to show quick either tough on crime or soft on crime. The results have often dictated policy initiatives. evidence presented above suggests that this A review of party manifestos and electoral view is overly simplistic and does not capture campaign information shows that, across the the reality of people’s opinions on crime pre- region, crime features prominently (box 6.3). vention and crime control in the Caribbean. Beyond making campaign declarations, For instance, on average, 89.9 percent of the however, Caribbean states have also ad- survey respondents endorsed soft crime pre- dressed the crime issue by legislative means. vention approaches such as increased funding As above, the legislation is often more sym- for education, youth programmes, job crea- bolic than substantive in its effects. Jamaica’s tion and poverty reduction. Yet, at the same passage of six anti-crime bills in 2010 (see the time, 82.9 percent believe criminals should be section Explaining the Policy Shift above), for

160 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Box 6.3. Manifesto of the Democratic Labour Party, Barbados, 2008 6 Royal Barbados Police Force • Review and simplify the procedures dealing with pensions • Provide better remuneration for police officers • Provide new options within the pension plan for soldiers • Improve or build new police stations in designated areas that would allow better provision to be made for the sur- • Permit the police force to function free of political inter- viving spouse of a soldier who dies after retirement ference • Improve the intelligence and security information-gather- • Increase the ranks in the police force and create more pro- ing capabilities of the Barbados Defence Force and forge motion opportunities closer ties with the Royal Barbados Police Force • Upgrade the government forensic sciences centre to help Social Services solve outstanding crimes and restore confidence in law • Convert Glendairy Prison into a modern, publicly fund- enforcement agencies ed drug treatment and rehabilitation centre Barbados Defence Force Address the following issues • Expand the career prospects, training opportunities, and • The trade in illegal drugs counselling and welfare services available to all ranks • Escalating crime and violence • Develop a scheme of resettlement training for persons • The threat of terrorism leaving the force • Preparation for and appropriate response to natural dis- State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations asters

Source: Extracted from ‘Law and Order’, DLP (2008, 49).

example, conforms to this practice. Thus, not- form is on the agenda and where complimen- withstanding concerns about their constitu- tary initiatives, including social interventions, tionality, the bills were passed on the premise are increasingly regarded as part of the policy that there was a need to “get on top of this mix, appealing to the emotions of the public crime problem” and that desperate times call may prove counter-productive. for desperate measures.50 However, less than Second, because of continuing pressures a year later, the constitutional court entirely to respond to public anxieties about crime, struck down one bill and revised most of the the policy process tends to produce ‘feel provisions of a second, while a third, the Con- good’ anti-crime initiatives. Such measures stabulary Force (Interim Provisions for Arrest offer little substantive hope of addressing the and Detention) Act of 2010, expired, thus re- root causes of crime and thus permanently requiring an extension.51 ducing crime. While not every policy initiative met this An unfortunate outcome of excessive re- fate, the emphasis on crime control indirect- liance on symbolic reassurances is a growing ly reinforced the primary causes of crime in disconnect between the expressed policies certain instances. Indeed, research on the ef- and actual programme implementation. This fectiveness of crime control measures across implementation gap can cause the public to the region discloses worrisome aspects of the lose faith in the effectiveness of crime policy. policy process that has led to a number of un- Bold declarations such as ones on the helpful policy outcomes. death penalty imply that perpetrators will be First, the policy process often caters to the apprehended swiftly and promptly adjudicat- public attentiveness and understanding of ed and sentenced. However, because of con- punishment. Within the Caribbean context, straints and shortcomings in judicial systems, crime is increasingly used to mobilize the the clearance rate for serious crimes is gener- populace to support state programmes. How- ally low and alarmingly low for homicide. Be- ever, the public is not always fully informed cause these constraints are hardly ever men- about the issues. In a region where policy re- tioned in the cut and thrust of public debate

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 161 on crime, militant advocacy for delivering the international community. The concerns 6 harsh punishment to perpetrators invariably are evident, for example, in the submission founders on the state’s organizational inabil- on Jamaica of the United Nations special rap- ity to deliver the promised results. porteur, who recommends that police be more Third, within the democratic countries of well trained so as to reduce extrajudicial kill- the Caribbean, police personnel have been ings.54 identified as major violators of human rights. Fifth, because of activism on behalf of hu- Despite such vulnerabilities regarding the man rights in the region, there is a perception lack of respect for rights, legislation and anti- among the public that the criminal justice sys- crime policies still depend on a heavy police tem is skewed in favour of protecting suspects presence in the streets matched by tough and defendants rather than the victims of anti-crime rhetoric. This has increased con- crime. This weak public support for the rights cerns about the violation of rights and poses a of defendants also creates an environment in significant challenge to the struggle for social which the police may feel that they have pub- justice. lic support for violating the rights of criminal Fourth, the police disregard of the rights of suspects. suspects highlights a related problem: the in- Sixth, because of the region’s overempha- State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations sufficiently robust protection of human rights sis on law enforcement, social interventions by governments. Despite an admirable record have been given minimal attention in the of political democracy, the region has been fight against crime. However, this imbalance faulted by international human rights agencies in policy-making in favour of the law enforce- for neglecting these rights. Indeed, for the Car- ment approach has not reduced violent crime ibbean as a whole, the annual Country Reports to a level that might be considered a normal on Human Rights Practices have called atten- range or closer to the world average. This tion to the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of shortcoming suggests the need not only for life, as well as police killings, as the primary vi- more social interventions, but also for a care- olation of human rights within the region.52 In ful assessment that looks at the policy mix in the Jamaican case, the United Nations special terms of effectiveness in reducing crime. rapporteur on extrajudicial, arbitrary and sum- Seventh, crime control initiatives are usu- mary executions noted an apparent “section of ally tailored to suppressing violent crime, and influential public opinion that sanctified every this bias has sometimes compromised the action by the police, regardless of its violent di- physical safety of citizens and the region’s mensions, on the grounds that the first prior- democratic ideals. Coupled with the tough ity is to wipe out crime.”53 In this regard, Belur stance on crime and the zero tolerance ap- (2010) points out that police officers are more proaches, this bias poses significant challeng- likely to use force if they perceive a social con- es to the struggle for social justice, as well as sensus supporting police use of deadly force to human rights. Thus, not addressing the ten- eliminate ‘criminals’. sion between the norms of social justice and The high incidence of extrajudicial killings the dictates of law enforcement efficiency ap- in the region emphasize the risks associated propriately generates problems in protecting with simultaneously trying to control crime, physical safety and democratic ideals. while assuring social justice. Crime fighting Eighth, crime and criminal victimization in the Caribbean has involved securing the are social ills that also threaten the basic hu- former at the expense of the latter. Achieving man rights of citizens. This is particularly so justice for the population at large is difficult in among socially excluded communities across such circumstances, but social justice remains the region where citizens are criminally vic- even more elusive for vulnerable persons who timized by groups that act with impunity be- experience discrimination and socio-econom- cause of weak criminal justice institutions. ic inequities. This lack of respect for rights These citizens are doubly victimized: first, has raised concerns across the region and in by the neglect of the state, which results in

162 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 social exclusion and marginalization, and, meanwhile, integral to citizen security. Citi- then, by confinement in environments that zens are likely to feel not only secure, but also 6 are significantly underdeveloped. The social to have confidence in a state that includes the conditions in many of these environments safety of the public and respect for the rights create vulnerabilities to victimization by both of citizens among its central goals and estab- the state and criminally inclined members of lishes relevant laws, personnel, procedures society. This illustrates how the lack of ap- and infrastructure to achieve these goals. propriate interventions by the state can fa- To reduce the risk of victimization and cilitate disparate outcomes. Transitioning to restore a sense of security among citizens will citizen security therefore requires critical, but require building material infrastructure and constructive assessments of public policy and normative and technical capacities in weak systematic evaluations of programmes to pro- institutions. Weak institutions include the duce more effective policy outcomes. primary socialization institutions, such as the Crime policy should reflect an awareness home and school, and the criminal justice of the complex determinants that influence system: the police, the courts and correction the commission of crime and the sense of facilities. insecurity felt by citizens. Citizen insecurity Enhancing the capacity of Caribbean is one consequence of the state’s inability to states to foster an environment free of fear State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations cope with the challenges facing society in and want among citizens requires policies general. Therefore, central to the transition that shore up human development resources, to greater citizen security is the need to make material infrastructure and normative and institutions more responsible and account- technical capabilities in criminal justice sys- able. The need for advocacy for institutional tems. Improvements in state capacity can en- reform is adequately covered elsewhere in this able the region to achieve progress towards report. The emphasis here is on the state’s ca- the goal of citizen security. pacity to effect the transformation to more Several Caribbean states are making well integrated societies and to adopt social strides in these areas. Guyana, for example, crime prevention measures that are linked to has created commissions charged with pro- sound development policy. tecting human rights and the rights of ethnic communities. Equally important for capac- State Capacity and Citizen Security ity development has been the introduction of citizen bills of rights and the adoption of Capacity is established in an enabling envi- civil service reform measures throughout the ronment that sets the scope for development. region. Criminal violence disrupts development. However, more needs to be done. The Consequently, the quality of life that Carib- human, political, social and economic costs bean citizens enjoy and the sense of security of crime and violence are high, and the insti- they possess depend on the effectiveness of tutional capacity to achieve citizen security state institutions in dealing with crime and is weak. Insecurity, especially violence, con- violence. This effectiveness is dependent, in tinues to erode the economic landscape. The turn, on the adequacy of the state’s resources, economic impact of crime has been estimated the competence of its personnel and the pos- at 5 to 25 percent of GDP, while every three session of an institutional culture oriented to years that a country is affected by major vio- ongoing improvements in delivering quality lence represent a 2.7 percentage point poten- public goods to citizens. tial loss in poverty reduction.55 The more resources, competence and positive institutional culture a state enjoys, Institutional Capacity the more capacity it possesses. A lack of these With some exceptions, the public security advantages weakens the state’s ability to func- problems identified in the region have been tion effectively. The capacity of the state is, attributed at least in part to inadequate train-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 163 ing among police personnel. A well-trained, provisions, or a culture of mediation. Police 6 efficient and effective police force is necessary and justice sector reform processes have been to address crime. The efficiency and effec- designed to rectify these problems or fill these tiveness of crime policy are impacted by the gaps. scope of police responsibilities. In some juris- Except in Barbados and Saint Lucia, dictions, the scope is wide-ranging; in others, which have new facilities, correctional facili- policy and operational mandates have been ties are overcrowded and in various stages of separated. In some jurisdictions, there is no disrepair. They require new programmes to independent police oversight authority, and, ensure the successful reintegration of released in others where it exists, the effectiveness of prisoners into society. Capacity development oversight has been minimal. in the correctional system should improve the Moreover, across the region, the continu- ability of personnel to promote rehabilitation ation of colonial era practices associated with among former inmates and, hence, reduce disrespectful treatment of citizens has con- recidivism and other negative outcomes. Pro- tributed to a general distrust of the police gress is being made in this area in countries in among citizens. Consequently, regionwide, which restorative justice and rehabilitation there is advocacy for police reform to con- policies have been introduced. State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations front the organizational weaknesses that are The shift towards policies more favourable hindering the ability of the police to meet to rehabilitation began with changes in 1975, their responsibilities. when components of the correctional system Caribbean states have responded to calls in Jamaica were reorganized into the Depart- for changes in law enforcement by undertak- ment of Correctional Services. This reform ing reform in police forces. States across the altered the emphasis on punishment and region have been modernizing their police adopted rehabilitation as a mandate. Several forces, attempting to establish a culture of laws were amended or newly implemented, professionalism and enhancing the institu- including the Criminal Justice Reform Act tional capabilities of the police. However, (1978) and the Criminal Records (Rehabili- regionwide, there is also a need to equip the tation of Offenders) Act (1988). The former police to address issues such as extrajudicial also made provision for alternatives to incar- killings, which are contributing to citizen ceration.56 insecurity and vulnerability. The efficiency In short, several states across the region and effectiveness of the police have a positive have moved successfully in recent years to impact on the performance of other agencies implement policies that add to their capacity in the criminal justice system, the confidence in ways that enhance citizen security. More of citizens and the willingness of citizens to needs to be done, however, in strengthening contribute to and participate in the judicial capacity. This requires a combination of ap- process. proaches, including building the capacity for Caribbean courts must also be reformed. development by adopting social crime preven- Within the courts, capacity development tion measures, as identified by respondents to involves establishing procedures to achieve the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. speedy trials without compromising the rights of citizens, while the correctional arm Building the Human ought to have the capacity to implement a Capacity for Development range of options in addressing violations of Policies that generate more inequality result the law. However, the region suffers from a in marginalized groups and less cohesive shortage of personnel, out-of-date systems, populations and societies. Lack of respect for and inadequacies in case management tech- human rights, institutional discrimination nologies. Not all jurisdictions have alterna- and neglect of citizen security undermine the tive dispute resolution mechanisms, separate capacity for the development of populations specialty courts, a choice across sentencing and nations. Governments must be alerted to

164 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 these problems and issues so that they can es- cies and programmes should address individ- tablish sound, sustainable and holistically im- ual risks and environmental conditions. To 6 agined development plans to promote more be successful, violence prevention strategies well integrated societies. must be targeted to specific developmental Sustainable human development may be stages and ecological contexts and must be achieved more readily if the structure, policies based on evidence.59 Tightly focused pro- and procedures that help determine effective- grammes to address the marginalization of ness are deliberately pursued and if individu- the urban poor and the problem of youth un- als are provided with the skills, experience and employment are crucial. knowledge that allow them to exercise their However, because the Caribbean response capabilities. This approach to human devel- to crime and violence has been centred pre- opment presupposes a population that is em- dominantly on law enforcement, the reha- powered, secure, treated fairly, and provided bilitative policies and social interventionist with opportunities to participate and cooper- measures that could be used to address the ate in the quest for the full exercise of human problems of unemployed youth have been capability. As UNDP makes clear, eliminating minimized. As emphasized by numerous re- poverty, expanding access to education and search findings and the experiences of many creating meaningful employment are critical countries in all regions, states cannot arrest State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations to sustainable human development. their way out of the problem of crime, vio- Since independence, the Caribbean has lence and citizen insecurity. Policies to ad- realized improvements in health, education, dress the complex causes of insecurity should infrastructure and other areas. However, these recognize the immediate manifestations of advances are being challenged by inequality crime and violence, while reducing the likeli- and social deprivation. Recent global trends hood of future recurrence. It is also important have also stalled development. Assessments to achieve this end without diminishing indi- show that the region’s progress towards the vidual rights and freedoms. Millennium Development Goals has been un- Much can be done to reduce violence even.57 among youth. A broad range of viable strat- Two factors impeding the spread and egies for preventing and reducing youth vio- potential for economic growth and develop- lence already exist and have been tested. For ment across the region are inequality in the example, social and developmental crime distribution of income and wealth and the prevention efforts are most effective if the -in high rates of income and non-income pov- tervention occurs early and if multiple inter- erty. First, income poverty, which is related ventions can be sustained. Social factors that to economic deprivation, is based on the in- work to reduce crime include the attachment, ability of a household to access the resources commitment and involvement of males in required to maintain a basic standard of liv- supportive networks and in local community ing. Inability to meet this standard is typically institutions especially when these young peo- measured based on income by assigning an ple are in their crime-prone years. Interven- indigence poverty line of US$1 per day and tions that may reduce the incidence of crime an absolute poverty line of US$2 per day. Sec- include providing youth with education and ond, non-income or non-economic poverty employment and recognizing their need for refers to individual or group loss of self-es- justice and equity, including by addressing teem, lack of confidence and lack of access to the perception that ‘they don’t care about us’, political power and other public goods. This a sentiment poignantly captured in Horace deficit in social and public power is an impor- Levy’s (1996) book, They Cry Respect! tant indicator of material deprivation.58 Across the region, crime and violence oc- Policy awareness and appropriate policy cur mainly in urban areas and are mainly ex- design in this domain can make a difference pressed as male-on-male violence. However, in outcomes. The most highly effective poli- the confinement of the violence to poor ur-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 165 6 Box 6.4. Inner City Basic Services for the Poor, Jamaica

Background munity capacity development, skills training and related The Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project was fi- social services (US$3.9 million) nanced through a World Bank loan and was implemented The final objective on public safety was divided into five by the Jamaica Social Investment Fund. It was a five-year core social prevention areas, as follows: programme (May 2006–June 2011) and had a budget of • Mediation and conflict resolution US$32.8 million. • Alternative livelihoods and skills development Programme Design • Family support programmes The programmes’s objective was to improve the quality of • Youth education and recreation life in 12 Jamaican inner-city areas and poor urban infor- • Capacity development among community-based organ- mal settlements through the following: izations • Increase access to and improve the quality of water, sani- The project relied on community liaison officers in each tation, solid waste collection systems, electricity, roads, target community; these were generally of high quality and drainage and related community infrastructure for over established good relationships with the communities in 60,000 residents of poor urban informal settlements which they worked.

State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations through capital investments and innovative arrange- Impact on Security and Crime Reduction ments for operations and maintenance; infrastructure The removal of zinc fences in one community was a vis- work was intended to reflect principles of crime pre- ible infrastructure intervention with a potential impact vention through an environmental design approach on crime and violence. The zinc fences were targeted for (US$21.9 million) removal to reduce barriers between community members • Facilitate access to microfinance for enterprise develop- and increase security. According to one child, “gunmen ment and incremental home improvements among en- used to hide behind the fences, but now they can’t.” A com- trepreneurs and residents in the project areas (US$1.3 munity leader commented that removing the fences “has million) given the community a moral lift”. The contrast in the look • Increase security of tenure for eligible households in the and feel of the streets where the zinc fences have been re- project areas (US$0.6 million) moved and streets in which the fences have not been re- • Enhance public safety through mediation services, com- moved was surprising and stark to survey team members.

Source: Extracted from ‘Law and Order’, DLP (2008, 49).

ban neighbourhoods and to males has done Over the past two decades, socio-eco- little to reduce the sense of insecurity that nomic constraints, including mounting do- pervades the entire society. The regional mestic debt, have contributed to the growth problem of crime and violence requires a of inequality across the region. Wage con- range of responses, including socio-econom- trols, price increases, layoffs, cutbacks in gov- ic measures. ernment spending, and unemployment and Such measures include enabling the sus- underemployment have all contributed to so- tained economic participation of youth. They cial inequality in the region. The brunt of this must be able to obtain meaningful work at economic hardship has been borne by vulner- liveable wages. If this economic participation able and disadvantaged groups, especially job- is to be sustained over the long run, a stable less youth who often experience higher rela- formal economy that facilitates job creation tive rates of poverty. and increased employment opportunities Relative deprivation and the inequality it will have to be established. However, recent represents may increase the risk of criminality developments in the global economy have among jobless youth, particularly in contexts weakened Caribbean economies and, thus, in which the dignity of the youth is impugned. the prospects for jobless youth. However, the relationship between inequal-

166 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 ity and crime is often indirect. The propen- velopment might have components addressing sity to commit crimes may be enhanced if it sub-standard housing and low levels of fam- 6 is accompanied by poverty, social isolation ily income and education. They might involve and marginalization. Robotham (2003), dis- improved urban amenities, projects to foster cussing the Jamaican environment, has char- social inclusion and reduce risk factors, and acterized the issue in the following manner: programmes to improve access to the justice the persistence and increase in inequality, ac- system. An example is the five-year Inner City companied by severe impoverishment among Basic Services for the Poor Project (box 6.4). the majority, along with their sense that elite wealth represents ill-gotten gain, are risk fac- Youth Unemployment and tors for crime and need to be addressed. Social Prevention Caribbean states are aware of these issues, The crime prevention strategy must deal with and governments in the region have taken the problem of youth unemployment. Re- steps to address them. Various approaches gionwide, youth typically exhibit low labour to crime prevention from which these gov- force participation rates; young women show ernments can draw include social crime pre- lower labour force participation rates than vention that is focused on socio-economic young men (table 6.2). factors, community crime prevention that The roblemp of unemployment in the Car- State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations targets the local community and situational ibbean is complex because of the large num- crime prevention strategies that try to alter bers of long-term unemployed and because the environment to reduce the physical op- most unemployed youth are clustered at the portunities for offending and increase the bottom of the labour market in low- or semi- chance of an offender being caught. Each ap- skilled work. Unemployed youth in the Car- proach embodies different assumptions about ibbean also tend to be poorly educated and the causes of crime. Situational approaches as- have only rudimentary levels of literacy and sume that reduction can be effected through numeracy. These disadvantages lead to chron- changes in the immediate situation in which ic unemployment and underemployment and offenses occur. Another, the social develop- increase the propensity for crime among the ment approach, assumes that crime is reduced young. Thus, programmes to address youth by changing the offender’s disposition, mo- unemployment must include education as a tive, knowledge and skills. The assumption is core dimension. This is required to give youth that personal development reduces the pro- the basic literacy they need and upgrade the pensity to commit crime. group from their low- or semi-skilled profile Development and social crime prevention to a higher skill set that will enable them to work in tandem. Thus, relevant social pro- move into well-paying jobs. grammes address the social causes of delin- Across the region, governments have ac- quency and criminality. Models of social de- knowledged the need to make distinctions

Table 6.2. Youth Labour Force Participation Rates, by Gender, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000–2015: History, Estimates and Projections

Indicator 2000 2010 (estimate) 2015 (projection)

Total 54.2 52.1 51.4

Male 66.5 61.3 59.3

Female 41.7 42.7 43.5

Source: ILO (2010).

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 167 Box 6.5. Special Youth Employment and Training Project, Jamaica that address youth development issues. The 6 Commonwealth Youth Programme assists governments in developing and implement- Aim: To train and employ 10,000 unskilled youth over the course of four ing programmes, supports youth and acts as a years repository for information on youth. Target: Young people 18 to 25 years old The trategics importance of youth to the Implementing partners: The HEART Trust/National Training Agency development of the Caribbean is also evident screens and assesses candidates. The Jamaica Foundation for Lifelong in a number of recent reports, including ‘Eye Learning provides training in basic numeracy and literacy skills. Around on the Future: Investing in Youth Now for 25 private sector companies have committed to the programme so far. Tomorrow’s Community’, a 2010 report by the CARICOM Commission on Youth De- Source: Extracted from ‘Law and Order’, DLP (2008, 49). velopment; the UNICEF 2006 regional assessment, ‘Violence against Children in the Caribbean’; and the 2003 World Bank report, ‘Caribbean Youth Development: Issues and The Barbados Youth Business Trust Policy Directions’.60 has continued to grow, and the net- As the foregoing account of state inter- State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations work was able to support over 8,500 ventions in the area of youth programming new entrepreneurs during 2009 attest, Caribbean states share a growing con- through our proven model of ac- cern about the importance of youth to the cess to credit, volunteer mentors and region’s future. In addition to being signato- business start-up services. ries to international conventions on youth, —Andrew Devenport, Chief Execu- all countries have established ministries or tive Officer, Youth Business Interna- departments with responsibility for youth. tional (BYBT 2011) Similarly, a range of governmental, non-governmental and civil society organizations also provide programmes for youth. Still, because among youth who are underemployed or em- many youth-related programmes have not ployed in low-skilled jobs and youth who have been evaluated, the extent of their effective- never worked. They have also recognized the ness cannot be verified. Nonetheless, pro- challenge of restructuring the education sys- grammes exist in various thematic areas such tem to take into account people who have left as education, training and skill development, school, but are in need of numeracy and lit- community sports and leisure, national youth eracy skills. The Special Youth Employment services, national youth councils, and micro- and Training Project in Jamaica is an example enterprise development. Trinidad and To- of a programme that seeks to address crime bago’s prime minister, Kamla Persad-Bissesar, and education together (box 6.5). Employ- has recently announced a special commission ment programmes also exist that are geared to to examine youth issues. In Jamaica, the prob- youth who are neither in school nor working. lem has been more acute and prolonged and, The outhY Business Trust operates in Bar- hence, has benefited from more plans and bados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. As programmes. a youth development agency, it focuses on As the World Development Report 2011 helping unemployed youth start new busi- highlights, significant social stresses and weak nesses. It has been in existence in Barbados institutions increase the risk of violence.61 since 1996. In Barbados, it is an extension States with weak institutions run the greatest of the focus of the government and other risk of extreme levels of criminal violence. stakeholders on entrepreneurship as a growth Governmental capacity to implement so- strategy for the country. cial and development policies is affected by There are also regional programmes, such a range of issues. Capacity is limited in some as the Commonwealth Youth Programme, instances, and, in others, there are blockages.

168 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Across the Caribbean, obstacles to capac- corruption legislation and, in Jamaica, the ap- ity development and, thus, to a transition to- pointment of a contractor general to look into 6 wards citizen security are governance related. the awarding of contracts (box. 6.6). Among the practices identified by respond- Despite the handicaps, there are hopeful ents to the UNDP Citizen Security Survey signs, including the public support for social 2010 that impede governmental capacity and developmental crime prevention meas- are corruption, lack of respect for the rule ures. The region’s leaders have shown a will- of law, and the absence of a just and rights- ingness to pursue alternative policies. Among observing society. Among the requirements these alternatives are integrative policy re- for capacity development are competent and sponses that are multisectoral, regional and well-resourced institutions, leadership, access international in scope. Nonetheless, the key to knowledge, and public accountability. to effective crime prevention is implementa- In general, Caribbean states have enacted tion at the local government level. measures that both empower citizens and Moreover, developing the capacity for make governments more accountable. How- good governance requires participatory and ever, there is still a high level of corruption. transparent systems that are consensus orient- Mechanisms for addressing corruption include ed and respect the rule of law.62 This means systems of accountability and people participa- that the decision-making environment must State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations tion. Among other responses, this has involved include the voices of all categories of citizens the appointment of ombudsmen to address and that there must be a free flow of informa- public complaints, the introduction of anti- tion, aided by a free media.

Box 6.6. Anti-Corruption: The National Integrity Action Forum, Jamaica

Character, Objective, Achievements The National Integrity Action Forum has also commis- The National Integrity Action Forum was launched in sioned and produced training manuals, including ‘Best January 2009 to promote more effective outcomes in com- Practices in Prosecuting Anti-Corruption Cases’ and bating corruption in Jamaica. Towards this end, it seeks to ‘Strengthening Jamaica’s Conflict of Interest Regime’. provide a mutually reinforcing network of public sector The organization’s lobbying and advocacy have contributed anti-corruption champions and to associate these cham- to legislative initiatives such as the passage of the Whistle pions with leaders of the private sector and civil society Blower Protection Act. through forums on anti-corruption issues. The forums have The Future achieved an initial purpose by clarifying the impediments To sustain its network within the highly competitive politi- to a more effective engagement with corruption and, on cal environment in Jamaica, the forum has established and this basis, developing an agenda of urgently needed leg- maintained its non-partisanship in all areas of its activity. islative and administrative measures. Several outreach fo- For this reason, because of its ties to the public sector, the rums have been held to open a dialogue between the anti- forum decided to create a companion non-profit NGO, Na- corruption champions and opinion shapers in the media, tional Integrity Action Limited. The purpose of this NGO religious leaders, researchers in various anti-corruption is to build public awareness of the need to combat corrup- agencies, and international experts at the World Bank In- tion in Jamaica. National Integrity Action Limited does stitute and Transparency International. The advocacy and this by enhancing the advocacy for effective anti-corruption communication activity that has emerged from this effort legislation, by facilitating capacity-building through train- has significantly influenced the governance reform agenda ing aimed primarily at key anti-corruption officials, and by of the government, helped sustain the attention of the me- building relationships with civil society. dia on corruption issues and contributed to reductions in Together, the National Integrity Action Forum and National victimization through corruption in Jamaica. Integrity Action Limited are challenging political corruption and its impunity in Jamaica’s governance arrangements.

Source: Information from the National Integrity Action Forum, University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 169 There is also the need to strengthen Conclusion 6 policy-making capacity in national security institutions and youth and education min- Transitioning to citizen security requires a istries and other ministries that have portfo- change in thinking about the security issues lios involving youth and, by extension, crime in the region. Innovation and change typi- and crime control. cally occur in times of crisis or after a long Capacity development is the engine of hu- period of difficulties. In the absence of such man development and necessary for sustain- conditions, innovative proposals often do not able (long-term) change. UNDP (2009b, 5) gain serious consideration or may be vigor- defines capacity development as “the process ously opposed. Thus, the transition to citizen through which individuals, organizations and security, though necessary, will need policy societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the entrepreneurs who are interested in seeking capabilities to set and achieve their own de- to achieve long-term outcomes rather than velopment objectives over time.” short-term gains. Thegoal of governance initiatives should A shift to social prevention has occurred be to encourage the capacities that are needed at the level of ideas, but this is not sufficient- to realize development.63 Hence, it is impor- ly reflected in planning, programmes and State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations tant to promote state and societal capacities budget support. There must be more mean- to implement strategies that minimize the ingful engagement and prioritization. The impact of impediments to development, in- network of policy actors must be strength- cluding crime and violence. ened to reflect more meaningfully the sup- While crime prevention as a distinct pol- port for social and developmental crime pre- icy focus has been part of the region’s policy vention. landscape for more than a decade, there has As the evidence in this report indicates, been an evident implementation deficit. citizens are optimistic and hold positive views Thus, advocacy for prevention as a core com- about the transition to greater citizen security. ponent of a policy framework for transition- They have identified social interventions that ing to citizen security should call for funding can significantly propel the shift to citizen for the design, implementation and evalua- security, and they are willing to be engaged. tion of relevant policies and initiatives. There is considerable optimism that social in- Central to successful transformation are tervention can make significant inroads into consensus-building, financial support, public the incidence of crime and violence. There is support and coordination mechanisms. Be- a sense that change is possible and that there cause of the impact of violence on develop- is a capacity for change. In policy parlance, a ment, the reestablishment of security can lead policy window has been opened. It is time to to significant development progress. The time undertake the transition to a safer, more just to start is now. Caribbean society.

170 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 CHAPTER Conclusions and 7 Recommendations Security thrives when communities bond – engage, empower and embrace all citizens

Communities are their own first line of defense; government must engage, not impose

Everyone can be an agent of security: government, police, social institutions and citizens – everyone has a part to play CHAPTER Conclusions and Recommendations 7 7

Introduction The central message of this report is that change aimed at greater effectiveness is es- This chapter presents the general conclusions sential if Caribbean societies are to become and recommendations of the report. The rec- safer and more just. There must be a shift in Conclusions and Recommendations ommendations are organized according to thinking and practice towards citizen secu- the themes that are the subjects of the chap- rity. The report finds that, despite the severity ters. They are grounded on the evidence gen- and complexity of the problem of insecurity erated by the research process described in in the countries of the region and the even the respective chapters. They are not the ideas greater complexities that are involved in ef- only of the authors of the report. Many of the fecting a transformation, there is considerable recommendations reflect the thinking and evidence that an optimistic outlook exists on shared experiences of the hundreds of practi- the problem and the prospects for change in tioners, advocates and experts in law enforce- this direction in the region. ment, the judiciary, corrections institutions, People have the power to change their con- crime prevention and state administration ditions, including their security situation. Or- who, in one way or another, have participated dinary citizens are central to solving the prob- in the research process. They also reflect the lem of insecurity. Their participation through demands for change by Caribbean citizens stable and open channels can help bring about that were expressed during the many consul- positive change in the philosophy, policy and tations that served as an essential part of the governance of security. This report provides research. ample evidence that this commitment to participation is not unrealistic, unproductive, or Conclusions unlikely to have an impact on the pressing problems associated with intentional violence The evidence presented in this report suggests and the developmental drag of high levels of that crime has become an important social crime. Ample evidence has been presented to problem in the region. Not only is the effect show that change favouring the treatment of of crime of considerable social, economic and people as co-producers of security, as valuable political significance, but majorities of the sources of problem-solving knowledge, and as populations of the region regard crime as an sovereign partners of the state agencies that important problem worthy of policy, plan- are accountable to them is also more likely to ning and programme focus. For the people of yield effective crime control and prevention. the region, crime, violence and insecurity are profoundly linked in various ways to key de- Existing Efforts velopment issues such as freedom of choice, During the process of preparing this re- equality of opportunity, increased life chanc- port, we observed a clear acknowledgment es, especially for the most vulnerable, and the of the seriousness of the problem of insecu- greater responsiveness of state institutions to rity among members of governments in the the needs of people. The solution to the prob- region. We also noted signs of the sorts of lem of insecurity is tied to a process of change changes in policy that will be required to ad- and enhanced social justice. dress the problem effectively. These are not

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 173 reliable predictors of changes in practice, but be corrected as a means of encouraging more 7 they are a source of a measure of optimism innovation and more effective action. Some about the prospects for change in the region. of these experiences underline the creative The evidence presented in this report problem-solving capacity of the people and demonstrates the imperative that the police the potential of citizen security. Additional and other institutions of criminal justice sys- channels of participation need to be opened tems must serve the public and promote non- so that citizens may become more actively in- violence and justice. This is a condition for volved as co-producers of security. their success in dealing with crime. The need The shift in ideas must find representa- for a comprehensive reform of police services tion in sound policies, and, even more impor- is recognized in several countries. There is a tant, it must become associated with more similar recognition concerning justice sector effective programme designs and changes in Conclusions and Recommendations reform, although the recognition in this case resource allocations that reflect the new pri- is driven by administrative problems rather orities. With few exceptions, the countries than by an understanding that the relation- of the region have only limited resources. ship of these institutions with the people Nonetheless, through innovation, it is possi- must be reviewed, that is, there must be a ble to achieve progress even with limited re- change in the way people are treated by jus- sources. This is being demonstrated by poor tice systems, especially people who have been countries elsewhere in the greater region and victimized by criminals or otherwise brought in other parts of the world. The successes of into contact with these institutions without the Nicaraguan police in establishing a close having committed crimes. Re-engineering partnership with communities to lower crime this relationship means making the system rates have been documented, for example. more open. It also means that these institu- Countries can solve critical problems and tions must offer a wider range of services and make good progress by encouraging human decriminalize some behaviours, particularly creativity. This applies to people working in the problematic behaviour of young people. It institutions such as the police, the courts and means improving the access to justice. Some corrections facilities, as well as people in com- countries are attempting to undertake these munities who may be suffering relatively more steps. Their attempts should be encouraged from crime and the abuse of rights. and reinforced. There is also a recognition that security The Demand for Change cannot reliably rest only on the capabilities Despite the efforts of governments to bring and the performance of law enforcement the crime problem under control, the inse- agencies. The Caribbean Community (CAR- curity levels remain high. The insecurity has ICOM) has, for example, elaborated a social roots partly in a lack of confidence that the crime prevention plan that represents a shift institutions of the state, especially the police, in the way security problems are addressed. can protect citizens and treat them fairly. The Indeed, some countries are seeking to ensure lack of trust is contributing to the demand for that national security policies conform with change being expressed by the populations of and are informed by long-term development the region. The demand is for a reform that is policies. not narrowly administrative or technical. It is Governments have led in establishing causing these institutions to become more re- crime and violence prevention plans and sponsive and fair in their treatment of people. programmes, but NGOs and community It is a demand for greater attention to crime groups have also contributed. The region is as a social problem and for programmes that not barren of innovation. There are promis- promote greater social justice by targeting the ing practices. However, they have not been roots of crime in social inequalities and the carefully tested and evaluated; many are not inequitable distribution of opportunities in even documented. This shortcoming should society.

174 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 This demand for change is supported by This report is intended to reinvigorate the a willingness to participate with the state in discussion on citizen security among policy 7 activities that are designed to bring about the makers and citizens across the region. The change. If the proposals in this report are to discussion has been moving in the right direc- be implemented effectively, the impediments tion. It is hoped that the report will help focus to change must be understood and overcome. the discussion and, beyond this, lead to action These impediments include problems asso- that is consistent with the new ideas. The time ciated with the institutional capacity of the to act is now: the trajectory of violence can state to undertake the desired programmes be interrupted; insecurity can be diminished. successfully, the limited human and material Success has been achieved elsewhere and can resources and the substantial claims on these be achieved in the countries of the region. It resources, which often lead to a focus on im- may be achieved now by a more vigorous pur- Conclusions and Recommendations mediate challenges rather than viable long- suit of citizen security. term solutions. In such a setting, if accountability is weak, then little can be accomplished. Recommendations Better systems of accountability must therefore be crafted, and, more generally, systems The true value of this report will lie in its even- of governance must be improved. These out- tual impact on people’s lives, that is, in its con- comes will require more advocacy and more tribution to making citizens more secure. It is active and engaged populations. likely that the recommendations of the report will exercise the greatest impact, particularly Directions for Future Efforts if they lead to a renewed energy and fresh It is expected that some of the main ideas and initiatives in the effort to enhance citizen se- proposals that are presented elsewhere in this curity. The recommendations are grounded report and collated below will find expres- in the analysis of the data that were collected sion in national policies and programmes, as during the research process, the accumulated well as in the projects and activities of various experience of the experts and practitioners groups that will take from this report what is from across the region who participated, and most relevant for their countries. In some in- the inputs of the consultations held among stances, this may occur because of the appeal hundreds of high-level institutional actors of the ideas. In any case, more advocacy will from the state sector, NGOs, universities and be required. elsewhere. Even during the consultative processes Some of the recommendations are new. associated with the research for this report, Others are old, but worthy recommendations voices called attention to the following: that have not yet been realized. Still others • The need for focused work on juvenile are embodied in ongoing projects and pro- justice reform and the creation of a wider grammes, and we note them in the report and range of options for dealing with youth here to draw attention to their value so that and children in conflict with the law. they may gain wider support. All are includ- • The need for more effective responses to ed because we consider them important and the problem of domestic violence, partic- have examined their feasibility and appeal. ularly early or primary intervention pro- We hope that they will attract sufficient inter- grammes. est to be tested through practical applications. • The design of new mechanisms for the par- Therecommendations are grouped ac- ticipation of citizens in governance and for cording to the themes of each chapter. These systems of direct accountability to citizens. themes are as follows: reducing criminal vic- • The need for an aggressive and transparent timization, especially the victimization of response to corruption in state agencies. the groups that are most at risk; enhancing • The need to strengthen advocacy for inno- social crime prevention; improving the effec- vative policies aimed at citizen security. tiveness, accountability and legitimacy of the

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 175 state institutions that are responsible for pro- corruption. Firearms acquisition regula- 7 tecting the public and ensuring justice; and tions should be reviewed to ensure that strengthening citizen participation and im- access restrictions appropriately protect proving the capabilities of the actors involved families and the public. in the co-production of security. The recom- • Regarding illegal firearms, in addition mendations are also divided into subgroups to the usual border control and tracing according to whether they are short term or measures, attention should be paid to long term. Short-term recommendations may measures that are simple, but of con- be implemented fairly quickly and are likely siderable symbolic value in mobilizing to show results in the short to medium term. the populations of the region against Long-term recommendations may require gun violence (see box 7.1). An example more time to implement, and their effects might be the periodic public destruc- Conclusions and Recommendations may not be observed for years. The justification of illegal weapons. tions and supporting evidence for each of the 3. Government protection should be en- recommendations and the relationship of the hanced for those most at risk and least able recommendations to the main messages of to protect themselves, especially from vio- this report may be examined within the re- lence by fellow citizens and representatives spective chapters. of the state. Accomplishing this would involve the following: Reducing Victimization • Establishing better monitoring systems The following are general recommendations to prevent child sexual abuse generally, aimed at reducing crime victimization, espe- but also among children in the care of cially among the groups that are most at risk, the state. least adequately protected by the state and • Providing better legal protection for in- least likely to be able to protect themselves digenous persons and sexual minorities. through the justice system. This would include the following: 1. Citizen security, human rights and human ■■ Appropriate national legislation to development are interdependent. The cre- protect human rights. ation of a more secure environment neces- ■■ Support to strengthen advocacy sitates the social, economic and political groups. empowerment of women and other vul- ■■ Reviews of current legislation to nerable groups to counter the decades of eliminate legal provisions that tend deprivation among these groups caused by to discriminate against indigenous poverty and social, cultural, political and persons and sexual minorities or institutional practices. There is also a more facilitate intolerance and violence general need to undertake initiatives to against these groups. promote awareness of and respect for hu- • Establishing or developing capacity of man rights especially within law enforce- gender-based anti-violence units in the ment. police services of the region. 2. Short-term efforts are rightly focused on Theseideas were repeated frequently by mitigating and more effectively managing participants in the multicountry consul- those problems that are the most proxi- tations that were held as a part of the re- mate facilitators of violence of all types. search for this report. Managing the access to legal firearms 4. Long-term efforts to promote awareness and reducing the access to illegal firearms of and respect for human rights should should be important elements in such ef- be undertaken. Appropriate measures forts. could be carried out in partnership with • Regarding legal weapons, firearms ac- ministries of justice, the media and ad- quisition processes should be made vocacy groups. They should include the more transparent, robust and free of following:

176 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Box 7.1. Developing Capacity to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Firearms in the Caribbean 7 The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarma- the Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Ja- ment and Development in Latin America and the Carib- maica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and bean (UNLIREC) is currently implementing an assistance Trinidad and Tobago) with the support of the governments package in nine Caribbean countries (Antigua and Barbuda, of Canada and the United States.

Objectives • Promote the effective implementation of national, regional and international firearms instruments by strengthening national firearms control measures • Reduce the availability and number of firearms in circulation by facilitating the destruction of surplus, obsolete and confiscated weapons and ammunition • Enhance the security and management of national stockpile facilities, thus reducing the risk of diversion to criminal Conclusions and Recommendations networks • Develop the capacity of law enforcement officials to combat the illicit trafficking in firearms, ammunition and explosives

Activities in 2010–2011 • The assistance project was officially launched in Kingston, Jamaica in March 2010 through an awareness-raising workshop. At the workshop, participating member states were informed of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines developed by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the International Small Arms -Con trol Standards being developed by the same office and UNDP. • In December 2010, UNLIREC convened a meeting of participating Caribbean states to review national action plans and outline the implementation process for 2011–2012. During this meeting, Caribbean member states agreed that dumping confiscated, surplus and obsolete firearms into the Caribbean was no longer an acceptable practice. The United Nations offers alternative means of disposal. • During 2010 and 2011, the UNLIREC legal unit undertook detailed studies of national firearms legislation in Belize, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago and examined key recommendations for reform to reinforce the ability of countries to combat illicit trafficking and comply with international obligations. • In October 2011, UNLIREC provided training to officials in the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, Coast Guard, Police Service and Prisons Service in the destruction of nearly 1,200 confiscated firearms that had been tagged for elimination by the courts and 5 metric tons of confiscated and obsolete ammunition using a small arms ammunition burning tank designed by UNLIREC for small-scale ammunition disposal operations based on International Ammu- nition Technical Guidelines.

Next Steps UNLIREC will continue working with the governments in the region in the following areas: • In Jamaica, 30,000 firearms and several tons of ammunition will be destroyed in February 2012. • A UNLIREC flagship inter-institutional training course on combating illicit firearms trafficking will be conducted in Jamaica in February 2012 and in the Bahamas in April 2012. • Technical teams will be deployed throughout the Caribbean to provide training in firearms and ammunition destruction and stockpile management according to established international standards. • Legal advise will be offered to assist governments in producing appropriate national firearms legislation, to promote the harmonization of laws across the region and to foster international legal cooperation in combating illicit firearms.

Source: UNLIREC (2011).

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 177 • Documenting promising practices Reducing Risk and Building 7 among police forces in the Caribbean Youth Resilience and elsewhere and providing assistance Youth are assets in the development process, to police services in implementing these but many are also considered detached and at practices. risk. The risks can be mitigated by supportive • Strengthening support for victims, in- programmes that strengthen the resilience cluding through the training of staff in of young people. The report of CARICOM dealing with various victim situations; (2010f ) contained within the Declaration increasing the relevant budget alloca- of Paramaribo on the Future of Youth in the tions. Caribbean Community is supportive of pro- 5. The knowledge base on social crime pre- grammes that are aimed at mitigating the vention should be expanded. Appropriate risks among youth and empowering youth to Conclusions and Recommendations initiatives should also be launched. These play a role in national and regional develop- steps would include the following: ment processes. The declaration represents a • The assessment and evaluation of job useful guide for prevention programmes and training and employment creation pro- policy development at the national level. The grammes in the Caribbean should be following recommendations are intended to systematic. reduce risk and build youth resilience. • More support should be supplied to 1. Develop programmes to promote ‘pro-so- families, especially families living in cial’ behaviour. The main target groups are areas characterized by high levels of in-school youth and out-of-school, out- violence. This might include the de- of-work youth, particularly new school velopment of nationally and culturally leavers. The targeting of these groups and appropriate parenting manuals and sup- the design of these programmes should be port for children who are at risk so that carried out in a gender-differentiated man- they may remain in school and in stable ner. For the in-school group, comprehen- and supportive home environments. sive after-school programmes should be Such programmes, if they are effec- developed. Some NGOs in some countries tive, are likely to reduce the number of already offer such programmes. For the children admitted to state institutions out-of-school, out-of-work group, some because of neglect or sexual abuse at countries offer national youth service. home. The support should also focus on These national youth service programmes reducing delinquency. should be reviewed to make them more • Social workers should be trained in comprehensive and more effective. the delivery of specialized services for • Structured voluntary community ser- families. The training should involve vice is a good way to promote pro-social instruction in the recognition of the behaviour among young people. Volun- warning signs of child sexual abuse and teerism among youth should be recog- in support services for the families of nized and encouraged. This might take child victims of sexual abuse and other the form of accreditation, which would forms of violence. facilitate the access of youth to other • The budgetary allocation for social educational and training opportunities. crime prevention programmes should • Designing and implementing probe increased, and the capacity of states grammes that support family stability to design and implement these pro- and prevent ‘child-shifting’ are also use- grammes should be improved. Capac- ful investments in promoting pro-social ity can be improved by monitoring and behaviour and reducing delinquency. learning from crime prevention experi- Such programmes should assist needy ences elsewhere in the Caribbean and parents so that they are able to keep abroad (box 7.2). their children in the parental household

178 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Box 7.2. Citizenship Culture in Bogota 7 A key innovation of the local government of Bogota was to individual finds an action morally or culturally acceptable realize that, instead of relying only on law enforcement, it even if it is against the law or if the individual finds an ob- could enhance respect for the law among citizens by exert- ligation under the law morally or culturally indifferent or ing influence on culture and consciousness to alter unde- unacceptable. There is harmony among law, morality and sirable behaviour or encourage desirable behaviour. culture if the individual finds that a legal obligation also Three value systems may help determine and regulate peo- conforms with cultural and moral codes or if the individ- ple’s behaviour as social beings: morality (internalized ual finds that an illegal activity contravenes these codes. principles that provoke guilt), culture (social norms—be- Citizenship education programmes focus on promoting liefs, values and ideals—that, if ignored or flaunted, may security, coexistence, obedience to rules, a sense of belong- open an individual to social sanctions) and the law. Ten- ing, shared responsibility and so on by emphasizing the Conclusions and Recommendations sion among these systems may seriously affect coexist- positive links of these determinants of the well-being of ence and productivity in society. Tension may arise if an society with the three value systems (table a).

Table a. Social Value Systems and Citizenship Education Programmes

Programmes to protect Valuing norms Disseminate norms and facilitate voluntary compliance; demon- life and ensure strate the democratic basis and the benefits of the fulfilment of norms compliance with norms Through public awareness campaigns, emphasize standards of security and coexistence and their significance in public transportation, taxation, urban life, and the environment

Sanctity of life Discourage gun ownership and promote actions aimed at reducing violent deaths Build trust and security so that rights and freedoms may be exercised

Contributing Raise awareness of the collective benefits of taxation out of good will Promote the rejection of unmerited subsidies

Programmes to pro- Decision-making Promote the use of democratic procedures to change laws mote a procedures Broaden public discussion by emphasizing the usefulness of discus- democratic culture sion in clarifying differences, resolving conflicts and reaching agreements

Organize to Recognize organizations and enhance their ability to build links of influence and solidarity and represent citizens in the decisions of the city, town and learn district

Programmes to Communicate Promote art, culture and recreation in public spaces to enhance the encourage life and fair play creative and communicative capacities of cultural actors and citizens communication and and increase the collective enjoyment of the city solidarity through the Expand the social appropriation of the city through research projects use of public spaces and means of mass dissemination

Examples of programmes in Bogota Over 350,000 cards were distributed among the population. One side was red and showed a thumb pointing down; the other side was white and showed a thumb pointing up. Citizens were invited to use the cards to indicate their approval (thumb up) or disapproval (thumb down) of the actions of other citizens. The cards became popular as a good-natured

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 179 7 means of communication especially about the conduct of drivers in traffic. Citizens were thus drawn in to mutual regula- tion. Those who did not participate were considered co-responsible for problems. Mimes in the streets reminded drivers (silently) about proper traffic etiquette. This illustrates that a local government can carry out a teaching function. Citizens were encouraged to ration their use of water. These voluntary water savings avoided months of water shortages, and citizens learned to economize on water. Between 1996 and 2003, household water consumption dropped from 28 to 18 cubic meters per month. Through the 110 percent with Bogota tax programme, 63,000 households or entities agreed to pay an additional 10 percent in property taxes. In exchange, they were given the opportunity to assign the extra 10 percent tax contribution to 1 of 15 public projects. Several studies documented the progress of this citizenship culture in Bogota. Particularly useful were surveys on citizen-

Conclusions and Recommendations ship culture and Bogotá Cómo Vamos (Bogota How are We Doing), a programme that monitors more than 200 indicators quarterly and conducts an extensive annual survey. Among the most dramatic results of these initiatives in Bogota were a reduction in the homicide rate from 80 to 23 per 100,000 inhabitants per year and a reduction in traffic fatalities from almost 1,400 at the beginning of the 1990s to fewer than 600 in 2003. The restriction of alcohol consumption during certain hours at night (the ‘Carrot Law’) was also a key step.

Learning from the experience of Bogota Bogota has documented its experience so that other cities may benefit and adapt suitable features to their own context. The documentation includes descriptions of research methodologies, measurement data, the planning and design of initiatives, the results of monitoring and evaluation, dissemination and communication procedures, and coordination across institutions.

Source: Mockus et al. (2004).

rather than shifting them to relatives for wrongdoing, restorative justice, and and family friends. alternative means for providing care and • Another means of promoting pro-social protection. Existing programmes that conduct is the development of youth- offer offenders viable alternatives to vio- friendly spaces to facilitate the access lent and criminal behaviour should be of youth to services, strengthen their strengthened and provided with more ties to their communities, build their resources. For, example, youth might be relationships with and access to criti- placed in community corrections and cal state institutions, including law en- community service programmes while forcement, and empower them to make in the custody of their parents. Youth contributions to violence prevention in who display violent behaviour deserve a their communities. Youth are willing to second chance. participate in enhancing citizen secu- • Review legislative provisions and repeal rity. They require spaces that build their those that treat running away as an of- resilience to act as agents of change and fence. Youth require support in address- play a role in violence prevention and ing the issues that lead them premature- human development. ly to leave their homes; this support may 2. The institutionalization of youth in con- best be provided by the state. flict with the law should be a last resort. • Systems should be established for the • Greater attention should be paid to the systematic evaluation of the mental development of youth diversion pro- health status of children and youth grammes and non-custodial sentences who are in jails and prisons and who are

180 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 generally in the care of the state. They terrence, it is important to arrest and convict should be provided with any necessary individuals who engage in serious illegal ac- 7 medical treatments and counselling. tivities related to street gangs and organized 3. Develop a regional system for monitoring crime. If formal social control mechanisms youth development, for evidence-based plan- break down, street gangs and organized ning, and for the design and implementation crime can fill the vacuum. Training should be of programmes. This should include the fol- provided to ensure that suppression and in- lowing: telligence activities are carried out effectively, • The creation of a youth development fairly and with respect for human rights. This index, which would be computed an- should include the development of police nually and used as part of the process of service policies that limit officer discretion monitoring the implementation of the and provide the means for transparency and CARICOM Youth Development Ac- accountability in the actions of police per- Conclusions and Recommendations tion Plan, which is now being examined sonnel with respect to the control of street and discussed. gangs and organized crime. Greater police • Initiate a longitudinal study on youth accountability in these matters will enhance development, including youth violence the rule of law and increase the effectiveness in the Caribbean. of the police in their response to gangs and organized crime. Reducing Gang Violence 3. Monitor the impact of existing gang legis- Caribbean governments and populations relation. Propose new legislation where ap- gard violence as a major social problem. Street propriate. Well-trained and well-equipped gangs and organized crime account for much police services should be able to make of this violence, especially the lethal violence. good use of some elements of the gang leg- Violence reduction is thus closely tied to gang islation. The effectiveness of the new legis- reduction. Towards these ends, the following lation, once adopted, should be evaluated steps are recommended: to determine if it is worthy of replication 1. Establish a surveillance system to monitor in other Caribbean nations. Evaluation of street gangs and organized crime in Carib- the legislation should consider any nega- bean nations. The system should focus on tive consequences associated with misuse understanding the phenomena of street or inequities. This evaluation could assist gangs and organized crime. It should seek CARICOM in developing model legisla- to provide information on the prevalence tion on gangs and organized crime. of problems associated with gangs and or- 4. Adopt a balanced response to street gangs ganized crime so as to accomplish the fol- and organized crime. All youth should lowing: be exposed to primary prevention pro- • Gauge accurately the scope and nature grammes that have been proven to be effec- of problems related to gangs and organ- tive at inoculating a significant number of ized crime (locally or regionally). youth from joining criminal organizations. • Prioritize security concerns related to Secondary prevention programmes should gangs and organized crime. be provided for those individuals who are • Assess local and regional trends in gang most at risk of joining a street gang or or- and organized crime activity for the pur- ganized crime group. Intervention propose of planning and resource allocation grammes should be widely available and The gang surveillance system should be administered to those who are actively in- integrated with existing systems used by volved in street gangs and organized crime. law enforcement and gang and violence Suppression strategies should be aimed prevention practitioners. at those who are the most entrenched in 2. Improve the training of Caribbean police street gangs and organized crime and who services. To maintain specific and general de- are frequently involved in violence, intimi-

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 181 7 Box 7.3. The Juvenile Violence Prevention Unit of the National Police of Nicaragua Through its Prevention of Juvenile Vio- ties, vocational training and job placement. lence Programme, the National Police of The police unit receives specific training on Nicaragua is working with state institu- human rights and community mediation tions, local crime prevention committees, and is involved in the social reinsertion of the media, the private sector, and gang ex–gang members. For Independence Day, members to rehabilitate those who leave the police trained and used 800 youths for- gangs. The programme provides psycho- merly belonging to gangs to maintain or- social counselling, educational opportuni- der during the festivities. Conclusions and Recommendations

dation, or corruption. Box 7.3 offers an in- viduals from a relatively early point in their novative example within the police. lives through their 20s, regardless of where 5. Develop plans and programmes to assist they might be. It should collect information gang members to exit from gangs success- on a variety of topics related to human devel- fully and to assist the victims of gang activ- opment, including, but not limited to educa- ity. Research has shown that many of the tion, delinquency and crime, health, work, victims of gang violence are gang members social development, and involvement with and that the act of leaving a gang is often criminal organizations. Official data sources preceded by an incident involving violent are somewhat limiting, and a longitudinal victimization. However, currently, there study of youth would help Caribbean nations are few programmes to assist gang mem- plan and implement effective prevention, in- bers who are interested in leaving gangs or tervention and suppression strategies. the victims of gang-related activity. Pro- grammes that focus on these individuals Transforming the Police might help reduce the amount of time in- The Caribbean police, in general, must do dividuals are associated with gangs. more to facilitate the transition from the state 6. Establish a rigorous research agenda on the security model to the citizen-oriented model causes of street gangs and organized crime of policing. This will require a shift in focus in the Caribbean. Such a research agenda at the highest levels of police administration. is essential for the development of efficient First, there must be dramatic changes in the and effective public policy in the region. leadership styles of top administrators. The Investment in basic research examining traditional leadership styles of ‘steward’ and the impact of social structural factors, the ‘commander’ must be replaced by the ‘execu- community, the family, the school, peers tive’ style.1 The executive style incorporates a and individuals are necessary, along with deep commitment to strategic planning and basic research that examines the unique creative thinking to enhance the organization’s role of gender, age and citizenship in crim- value to the community it serves. For example, inal organizations. The research agenda both strategic planning and creative thinking would include assessments and documen- are needed to determine how best to mould tation on good practices and strategies and the willingness of citizens to help reduce vio- policies in various aspects of gang control, lence into a viable and sustainable police-com- reduction and prevention. munity partnership. In addition, the executive Perhaps most needed, however, is a lon- style views changes in organizational structure, gitudinal study on youth. The longitudi- cultural changes and programmatic changes as nal study should be conducted in nations part of an evolutionary process that is to be em- throughout the Caribbean and track indi- braced rather than avoided, as is traditionally

182 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 done in the Caribbean. Finally, the executive strengthen the quality of their service de- style highly values input not only from sub- livery to enhance the trust and confidence 7 ordinates, but also from external groups and among the citizenry for the police. individuals who have a stake in the security of 3. All police services in the region should es- communities and the nation as a whole. The tablish properly resourced gender-based vi- community is viewed as a major resource in olence units. Promising approaches to this terms of input and support, as well as a valuable issue have been adopted in, for example, and necessary partner in reducing violence and Barbados, Dominica and Jamaica. They increasing citizen security. involve building partnerships between 1. Change in leadership style at the top of the the police and other agencies and NGOs organization is only part of the reform that that are working on these problems. In must take place if an effective community Jamaica, Woman Inc. provides assistance and police co-productive alliance is to be and guidance to victims of rape, incest, do- Conclusions and Recommendations established. The rank-and-file of the po- mestic violence, and sexual harassment at lice organization must also be convinced the workplace since its inception in 1984. that it is in their best interest to support The organization conducts sensitization reform and to work with the community training among members of the Jamaica to increase security. The job satisfaction Constabulary Force. Woman Inc. also has of constables is key to their embracing or- a legal reform committee that constantly ganizational changes such as community lobbies for legislative changes. These units policing. Research indicates that job sat- should meet the following requirements: isfaction is heightened if the rank-and-file • Be trained to process and support vic- have a role in management decisions that tims of sexual violence affect their conditions of work.2 Participa- • Be supported by appropriate legislation tory management is also a hallmark of the • Be subject to oversight bodies or con- executive leadership style. sultative committees that include child 2. Caribbean nations and, especially, their and women’s rights advocates. police forces need to take advantage of the 4. Responsive police services tend to pay con- public’s willingness to cooperate by devis- siderable attention to crime prevention ing and implementing co-production ac- programmes. The development of such pro- tivities jointly with citizens so everyone in grammes that target youth populations is each nation can experience a higher level of especially urgent (see chapter 2). The Royal security free from crime, thereby realizing Barbados Police Force provides a good ex- more fully their human potential. At the ample of one such promising programme, same time, the police should continue to the Juvenile Liaison Scheme (box 7.4).

Box 7.4. The Juvenile Liaison Scheme, Barbados

The Juvenile Liaison Scheme was estab- titioners, entrepreneurs, or victims who lished in 1983 by the Royal Barbados Po- have been affected by the youth. The pro- lice Force with the goal of diverting juve- gramme is staffed by police officers espe- niles aged 7 to 16 years from the criminal cially trained in social work, mental health justice system. The programme is located and issues related to adolescent and family at the Central Police Station in Bridge- functioning, as well as community devel- town. Youth enter the programme through opment. Since its creation, the programme referrals that originate with parents, police has supported over 3,000 youth and their officers, school officials, social service prac- parents or guardians.

Source: Royal Barbados Police Force.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 183 If the transformation of the police ser- cient way that is respectful of human rights 7 vices is to be successful, more robust systems and engages the local community. of police accountability are required. These systems must include elements that are inter- Reforming the Justice System nal to the police forces and elements that are The recommendations in support of the re- external, as well as formal and informal ele- form of the justice system include manage- ments. The internal systems should include ment and capacity development, issues of the following: access, measures indicating how people are • Capable and credible departments of pro- treated by the system and methods to make fessional responsibility that possess the the system more fair and equitable. authority and the capability to investigate 1. Develop rational court scheduling strate- corruption effectively and to prevent it in gies that minimize delays and backlogs and Conclusions and Recommendations all its forms. do not place undue strain on criminal jus- • External units charged with investigating tice personnel. The strategy would include use-of-force violations by the police, espe- minimizing delays that originate outside cially those violations that have resulted the criminal justice system. Delays im- in death. An example in Jamaica is the re- posed by witnesses could be corrected by cently created Independent Commission better witness management systems that of Investigations, which should serve as a are able to provide needed supports to wit- model for police services in other Carib- nesses such as cost of travel. The strategy bean nations. would also aim at reducing delays caused • External informal systems of police ac- by incompetence, such as poor case prepa- countability include an alert press and ac- ration by criminal justice practitioners. tive, credible and organized human rights Finally, the strategy would reduce delays groups that are focused on the issue of po- caused by the corrupt practices of court ad- lice misconduct. Efforts should be made to ministrative personal, lawyers who double- improve the capacity of the media to play book cases and other institutional actors. its role as a vital element in the system of 2. Introduce criminal justice planning coun- accountability. cils that would coordinate the work of • The public is also an important element in the various institutions within the system the process of informal accountability. The and ensure proper staffing to accommo- small police forces of the region tend to be date changes in workloads. These councils responsive to public pressures. Measures should accept inputs from representatives should therefore be adopted to change the of the people. strongly held belief in some nations that 3. Establish a well-run, well-protected re- extrajudicial killings of offenders are useful gional witness protection programme to in reducing crime. This could be done by improve the level of witness cooperation enhancing the capabilities of human rights with police and prosecutors. The small and police-affiliated citizens’ groups to size of most Caribbean countries presents conduct appropriate awareness campaigns. many difficulties for such programmes. A 5. Reform may also be encouraged through renewed effort should be undertaken to incentives. An innovative programme in explore the possibilities for such a project Brazil offers a rare example of an external at the regional level. There are two groups motivating force for good police behaviour.3 that should be considered: the protection The Citizen Police prize was created by an of witnesses who are criminal informants NGO dedicated to public security, disar- and the protection of witnesses who are mament and human rights. The prize, con- victims of serious crimes. The second group sisting of cash or a university scholarship, is should be treated not merely as witnesses, awarded to police officers who have solved but also as victims. They should therefore public security problems in a creative, effi- also have access to victim support services.

184 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 4. Review sentencing policies to remove in- victories. Every justice agency should es- consistencies in punishments. Alternative tablish a sound public relations and com- 7 punishments should be devised especially munications strategy that seeks to instil for persons imprisoned because they are public confidence. unable to pay fines. This area should be a 10. Improve access to the justice system by re- focus of sentencing reform. ducing the costs to court users, promoting 5. Ensure that juveniles and adults are housed lower cost alternatives such as mediated separately in prisons and jails. Ensure that settlements, and expanding restorative juveniles detained for non-criminal rea- justice programmes. Access to the police sons are housed separately from juveniles may be improved by controlling corrup- charged with or convicted of criminal acts. tion more effectively and by enhancing the 6. Adopt selective incarceration strategies systems for reporting crimes to the police. that minimize the use of incarceration for Conclusions and Recommendations all but the most serious offenders. Opt for Developing Capacity for alternative sanctions unless the offender Evidence-Based Policy is violent or is deemed to have a high-risk This report and the recommendations listed of recidivism. Alternatives include drug in the sections above emphasize the im- courts and drug treatment centres that portance of shifting policy so that there is a would be introduced in countries in which greater emphasis on social crime prevention, there are high prevalence rates in drug institutional transformation, human rights, use. These measures would require the the rule of law, youth empowerment and gen- strengthening of probation departments. der equality. During the research stage of this 7. Establish rehabilitation strategies and al- report, there was also significant advocacy ternative sanctions that encourage juvenile, aimed at prioritizing gender-differentiated or first-time, older and non-violent offenders gender-sensitive responses. to live non-criminal lives. An entry point for increased social inter- 8. Reduce prison overcrowding and improve vention and greater emphasis on social crime conditions of confinement. Reducing over- prevention is the Caribbean Community Ac- crowding can be accomplished in three tion Plan for Social Development and Crime ways: minimize the proportion of pre-trial Prevention (2009–2013). The action plan detainees, adopt selective incapacitation acknowledges the importance of national, re- strategies based on risk assessments of of- gional and international networks cooperat- fenders, or build new prisons. Only build ing to ensure a coherent and consistent crime new prisons as a last resort after the first prevention response to the region’s crime two steps have been taken. problem. It provides a framework to help 9. Put in place measures to enhance public countries in the region achieve balance be- confidence in the criminal justice system. tween the justice system’s approach to crime This should include better systems of ac- and a preventative approach. The action plan countability and the elimination of abuses reiterates the need for a sustainable crime pre- of power by state agencies. A new system vention framework that is empirically based. of oversight for prosecutors and the courts The design and implementation of effec- should be considered. As with new police tive policies rest, however, on the capacity oversight bodies, civil society representa- to conduct policy-relevant research and to tives should be included. More open in- evaluate existing policies, programmes and formation systems account for another projects rigorously. In most Caribbean coun- approach to enhancing public confidence. tries, this capacity is inadequate and ought to Police services could, for example, appoint be strengthened. professionally trained public information In the short to medium term, there should officers to work closely with the media, be greater support for developing the capacity minimize misinformation and celebrate for evidence-based policy. Towards this end,

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 185 efforts should be made to accomplish the fol- en and support policy research and evalua- 7 lowing: tion outside the state sector. It is important • Work with researchers to test the effective- to identify expertise inside and outside ness of strategies in reducing crime, disor- government. Policy design, research and der and fear and to establish a culture of evaluation within the region calls for re- experimentation and constant improve- search capacity that does not presently ex- ment. A starting point could be the assess- ist within the region. ment and documentation of promising The above recommendations can be real- crime prevention and control practices ized only if there is increased budgetary sup- in the Caribbean. These practices should port for these measures. Many Caribbean include, for example, mentorship pro- governments are restricted by budgetary con- grammes, after-school programmes, entre- straints. Nonetheless, new priorities mean Conclusions and Recommendations preneurship and job creation programmes shifts in allocations. for youth at risk, the use of music culture These ecommendationsr will have a better among youth at risk, reentry programmes chance of being implemented properly if there for prisoners and deportees, exit strategies is more sustained advocacy on the part of civil for gangs, community violence reduction society groups and a greater commitment to programmes and proper case management citizen involvement by the governments of to avoid court delays. the region. Participation is a principle of citi- • Strengthen the capability of regional insti- zen security. It is also of great instrumental tutions to measure crime and other threats value. It facilitates successful outcomes. to human security and to study the capac- People are resources, and they are the crea- ity of governments to prevent and alleviate tors of change. Effective implementation of these threats. the many recommendations in this report • Establish a regional crime observatory will require the participation of youth organi- that would provide crime mapping and zations, women’s rights groups, victims’ rights other evidential, monitoring and evalua- groups, and human rights groups. It will re- tion support for promising practices and quire action and commitment by officials in policies. The observatory would seek to fill the state systems of the region, as well as those existing data gaps in areas such as gender- in the regional civil service or CARICOM based violence. It would design and imple- structures, and it will require the support of ment frameworks for analysis that would regional organizations such as the Associa- be comparable across territories. It would tion of Caribbean Commissioners of Police monitor vulnerable populations and pro- and CARICOM Youth Ambassadors. Edu- vide data that can be used to directly in- cational institutions that are involved in the form policy. training of social workers and other service The definitions of rape, domestic vio- professionals must ensure that the competen- lence and other gender-based violence cies and skills that will be needed are instilled need to be regularized across the legal through the schools and through the educa- systems of the Caribbean so that data col- tion and training of professionals. lection systems parallel each other more Urgent, but well-considered, well-planned closely. This would require coordinated ac- and sustainable action is required. It is not tion by several governments over the long beyond the inventiveness and innovation term. characteristic of the Caribbean people to deal • Connect regional professional bodies with with the problem of insecurity more effec- their international counterparts to ensure tively and to meet the requirements of citizen a continuous flow of fresh ideas from insecurity so that the region will become a safer side and outside the region. and more just place to live and work. • Strengthen policy-design and policy-evaluation units within government. Strength-

186 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 Notes

Overview 10. This has its origins in the 1968 27. For a full description of the Caribbean Free Trade Association sample design and discussion of 1. See Lewis (1955), page 420. negotiations. The use of the term other technical issues, see the 2. Guyana and Suriname may be LDC in this contest should not be methodological note on the regarded as exceptions because of confused with its use in the United report website, http://www. their larger territories and relative Nations system, where it means regionalcentrelac-undp.org/en/ abundance of natural resources. least (not less) developed countries. hdr-caribbean. 3. Grenada (1978) and Suriname 11. Some of these recommendations are (1980) have experienced regime revisited in chapter 7. changes by force of arms. 12. In 2002 the OECS sub-regional 4. Here, there is a distinction Chapter 1 HDR on ‘Building Competitiveness between violent behaviour that is in the face of Vulnerability’ was 1. WTTC (2011). http://www. criminalized and punishable by wttc.org/research/economic- the state, such as murder and rape, produced 13. See UNODC and World Bank impact-research/regional-reports/ and violent behaviour that is not caribbean/ so criminalized and that may even (2007). 2. CARICOM is composed of 15 enjoy the approval of large sections 14. See Ayres (1998); Francis et al. member states: Antigua and of the population. Examples of the (2009). Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, latter include child-beating in some 15. Crime control refers to the use of Belize, Dominica, Grenada, settings, intimate partner violence, political, legislative and (reactive) Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint and fighting. Although, in some law enforcement methods to reduce Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint jurisdictions, these forms of violence crime in a society. According Vincent and the Grenadines, are not explicitly criminalized, there to Schmallager (2011), crime Montserrat, Trinidad and Tobago, are usually laws that allow the police prevention is the anticipation, to charge offenders who engage recognition, and appraisal of a crime and Suriname. in them. However, such laws may risk and the initiation of action to 3. See appendix 1 on the website not be applied because these types eliminate or reduce this risk. of this report, http://www. of violence are not socially defined 16. See UNODC and World Bank regionalcentrelac-undp.org/en/ or regarded as crimes and the laws (2007). hdr-caribbean. do not draw direct attention to 17. See Powell and Lewis (2011). 4. See appendix 1 on the report website, them as specific problems of great 18. Powell and Lewis (2011). http://www.regionalcentrelac- seriousness. 19. Speech before the Second Ministerial undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean. 5. UNDP (2010a, vi). Conference on the Geneva 5. UNDP (2010a). 6. For a comprehensive discussion of Declaration, Geneva, 31 October 6. Reproductive health is measured by deportees in the region, see Barnes 2011. maternal mortality and adolescent and Seepersad (2008). 20. United Nations (2010a), page 1. fertility rates. Empowerment 7. 1821 is the year of the independence 21. See UNDP (2006). is measured by the share of of the Dominican Republic from 22. IACHR (2009). parliamentary seats held by Spain. The country also uses 1844 23. IACHR (2009). each gender and attainment in to mark its independence from 24. IACHR (2009). secondary and higher education Haiti. 25. World Bank (2011a). by each gender. Economic activity 8. These statistics have been computed 26. For details on the report methodology, is measured by the labour force using data from the most recent the results of the consultations, and the participation rate for each gender. national censuses. participants, see the report website, 7. Antigua and Barbuda (2007) 9. See the most recent national censuses http://www.regionalcentrelac-undp. and Saint Lucia (June 2005) for the respective countries. org/en/hdr-caribbean. have recently been the subject of

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 187 Country Poverty Assessments; 14. Homicide is used to describe all cases of mass destruction. There is also however, CARICOM (2010a) is of suspected murder. Suspected the gun-marking and gun tracing more recent. murders are classified as killings prior programme under the auspices of 8. See IFAD (2002). to the discovery of proof or disproof the Committee of the Organization 9. In 2010, the share of women aged of murder. Murder is defined as the of American States on the Inter- 25 or older who had attained at unlawful killing of a person with American Convention against Illicit least secondary education reached intent. This definition applies in all Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 89.5 percent in Barbados, 42.6 the English-speaking countries in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives percent in Guyana, 74.0 percent our study. Among all crimes rates, and Related Materials. in Jamaica, and 67.6 percent in the homicide rate most closely 21. Guyana aggregates robberies and Trinidad and Tobago. With the approximates the true rate. Police extortion. However, the incidence exception of Guyana, these values reports may be compared with data of extortion is not statistically are above the LAC average of 50.5 from ministries of health on the significant. percent. (No data are available on discovery of bodies associated with 22. UNODC and World Bank (2007). the other Caribbean-7 countries.) suspected murder. In Caribbean 23. Burglary usually has a time In 2009, female labour force countries, the discrepancies are requirement that includes night participation rates in Barbados typically insignificant. hours. Jamaica specifies that night (65.8 percent), Jamaica (56.1 15. De Albuquerque and McElroy begins at 7 pm; in Trinidad and percent) and Trinidad and Tobago (1999); Harriott (2002). Tobago, night begins at 8 pm. In (55.1 percent) were higher than the 16. See Buvinic, Morrison, and Shifter both countries, it ends at 5 am. The LAC average (51.7 percent), while (1999); UNODC and World Bank exception to the night requirement they were lower than the average in (2007). is Barbados, where burglary may Saint Lucia (51.7 percent), Guyana 17. See Francis et al. (2009); Bennett, occur at any time of day or night. (44.7 percent), and Suriname (38.5 Shields, and Daniels (2007); This means that the burglary rates percent). (No data are available on UNODC and World Bank (2007). for Barbados are less comparable Antigua and Barbuda.) In 2011, 18. See ‘The Balance in Balance: with rates in the other jurisdictions. women’s political participation Exports and Imports of Small Arms Consequently, for comparability, as measured by the share of seats and Light Weapons (SALW), break-ins and burglaries are in national parliaments held by Parts and Ammunition in Latin combined in the chart and in the women was higher than in the LAC America and the Caribbean 2000– discussion. region (18.7 percent) in all the 2006’, En La Mira: The Latin 24. Acquisitive crime covers crimes Caribbean-7, with the exception of American Small Arms Watch, involving items that are stolen or Suriname (9.8 percent). See Human 3 (23) (August), 2008, http:// acquired fraudulently. This includes Development Reports (database), www.humansecuritygateway. theft, burglary, vehicle crime, and UNDP, New York, http://hdr. com/documents/LASAW_ fraud; see ‘Tackling Acquisitive undp.org/en/statistics/data/; also BalanceOfBalance_SmallArms. Crime’, Local Government see ECLAC (2010); Robinson pdf. Improvement and Development, (2005); World Bank (2011b). 19. UNODC and World Bank (2007). London, http://www.idea.gov.uk/ 10. The relationship between poverty 20. These ncludei the regional Citizen idk/core/page.do?pageId=8790065. rates (absolute and relative) and Security Programme of the Inter- 25. With the exception of Jamaica, crime rates is a complex one. It is not American Development Bank, the there have been no studies on the suggested that poverty universally World Bank–funded Programme relationship between economic and always directly accounts for all for Violence Prevention, conditions and crime in individual types of crime. The effects of poverty CARICOM initiatives, and countries in the Caribbean since are often indirect and vary with the collaboration and partnerships 1996. different categories of crime. to build capacity and greater 26. See United Nations (1993). 11. See CARICOM (2002). compliance with the reporting Subsequent reiterations are 12. See Deosaran (2000). requirements under United Nations contained in the Convention on 13. Both Barbados and Saint Lucia Security Council Resolution 1540 the Elimination of All Forms of categorize robberies as property crimes. on the non-proliferation of weapons Discrimination against Women

188 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 and the Beijing Declaration and www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ 37. Discussions of the measurement Platform of Action (see below). NACJD/NCVS/), data from problems as evident in the 27. ‘Convention on the Elimination the Rape and Sexual Assault: differences between official rates of All Forms of Discrimination Reporting to Police and Medical and the results of surveys are long against Women’, Division for Attention 1992–2000 database standing and widely accepted. For the Advancement of Women, (see http://www.bjs.gov/index. example, see Skogan (1975). Department of Economic and cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1133), and 38. UNICEF (2011). Social Affairs, United Nations, data of the National Center for 39. CARICOM (2010b); World Bank New York, http://www.un.org/ Policy Analysis (see Reynolds 1999), (2003). womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/ estimate that 15 of 16 rapists walk 40. Baumgartner et al. (2009). econvention.htm. free. Based on these sources, RAINN 41. This applies to differences in the 28. See Russo and Pirlott (2006). estimates that, if a rape is reported, victimization rates for people of 29. Paragraph 118, Beijing Plan of there is a 50.8 percent chance of an East-Indian and African descent Action, ‘Beijing Declaration and arrest. If an arrest is made, there is a in Guyana and in Trinidad and Plan of Action’, Fourth World 80 percent chance of prosecution. Tobago. Based on data of the Conference on Women, Beijing, If there is prosecution, there is a 58 UNDP Citizen Security Survey 4–15 September 1995, http:// percent chance of conviction. If 2010, t-tests suggested there were www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ there is a felony conviction, there is no significant differences in the beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf. a 69 percent chance the convict will rates of victimization among these 30. See Robinson (2005). spend time in jail. So, of 39 percent groups. 31. This definition is common in most of attacks reported to the police, 42. van Dijk, van Kesteren, and Smit jurisdictions. There are, however, there is only a 16.3 percent chance (2007). differences in age requirements. In that the rapist will go to prison. 43. Lee, Kotch, and Cox (2004). Guyana, the victim must be 13 years Factoring in unreported rapes, 44. O’Leary (1999); Sims (2008). of age or older; in Barbados and in RAINN concludes that only about 45. See Multiple Indicator Cluster Trinidad and Tobago, 14 or older; 6 percent of rapists will ever spend Surveys–MICS3, Childinfo in Jamaica, 16 or older. In Saint a day in jail. See ‘Statistics’, RAINN, (database), United Nations Lucia, there is no age stipulation. All Washington, DC, http://rainn.org/ Children’s Fund, New York, http:// intercourse (consensual and non- statistics. See also ‘Violence against www.childinfo.org/mics3_surveys. consensual) with a female under the Women’, UN Women, Bangkok, html. ages stated above is defined as rape http://unifem-eseasia.org/ 46. ‘Model Legislation on Issues Affecting or carnal abuse. These differences are Violence_Against_Women/index. Women’, CARICOM, Georgetown, within the limits of comparability. html. Guyana, http://www.caricom.org/ 32. For example, in Guyana, the 35. Of reported rapes and sexual jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/ category ‘sex crimes’ includes assaults in Trinidad and Tobago, model_legislation_women_issues. attempted rape, carnal knowledge 18.4 percent occurred in the jsp. of girls between 12 and 13 years of northern police district. Amnesty 47. ‘CARICOM Model Legislation on age, rape, indecent assault, buggery, International (2008), Ustanny Domestic Violence’, CARICOM, abduction, incest, attempted incest, (2006), and Country Reports on Georgetown, Guyana, http://www. acts of gross indecency, and bigamy. Human Rights Practices (see http:// caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_ 33. Prior to 1991, the enumerated www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/) instruments/model_legislation_ female population was not identify vulnerabilities to sexual domestic_violence.jsp. available; as a result, rape rates prior violence among women residents of 48. Trinidad and Tobago Domestic to that time were calculated on the Jamaica’s inner-city communities. Violence Act, 1999, http://www. entire population rather than on the 36. Concerns have been raised in the ttparliament.org/publications. population of females. United Kingdom by the Stern php?mid=28&id=461. 34. The Rape, Abuse & Incest National Review that the conviction rate 49. Le Franc et al. (2008); Pottie Bunge Network (RAINN), using 2005 has taken over the debate and that and Locke (2000). data from the US National Crime a primary outcome is the impact on 50. See Le Franc et al. (2008); Inter- Victimization Survey (see http:// reporting rates. See Stern (2010). Agency Campaign on Violence

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 189 against Women and Girls (1999). set forth in subparagraph (a) of this 66. Jackson and Gray (2010). Among the organizations and article; (d) ‘Child’ shall mean any 67. CARICOM (2007a) data show that initiatives are the following: person under eighteen years of age” women comprise half the region’s Antigua and Barbuda Directorate (UNODC 2004, 42–43). population; however, poverty is high of Gender Affairs; Saint Lucia 52. SAP-FL and ITUC (2007). within this group. The feminization Department of Gender Relations; 53. IOM (2010a). of poverty refers to the fact that Centre for Investigation of Sexual 54. IOM (2010b). women, who represent half the Offences, the division of the Jamaica 55. Ribando (2005). global population, receive only a Constabulary Force responsible 56. Ribando (2005). 10th of the world’s income, own less for sexual offences against women 57. IOM (2010b). than a 10th of the world’s property, and children; Trinidad Rape Crisis 58. IOM (2005). and, increasingly, are living below Society; Help and Shelter Guyana; 59. Coffey (2004). the poverty line. Despite a rise in Women Crisis Centre, Jamaica; 60. IOM (2005). women’s labour force participation, Crisis Centre of Barbados; and 61. Thomas-Hope (2002). the poverty rate among women Caribbean Association for Feminist 62. Ratification status as of October continues to increase. Woman- Research and Action, Suriname. 2011; see United Nations Treaty headed families and women living 51. Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Collection (database), United alone comprise a disproportionate Suppress and Punish Trafficking Nations, New York, http://treaties. share of the individuals living in in Persons, Especially Women and un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src poverty. Women who must support Children (2000) defines trafficking =UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtd themselves and their families are in persons as “(a) . . . the recruitment, sg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18& becoming the majority of the poor. transportation, transfer, harbouring lang=en#Participants. Women are often unable to escape or receipt of persons, by means of the 63. As of October 2010, only the poverty after the loss of a husband. threat or use of force or other forms Bahamas (2008), Guyana (2005), Moreover, women who have been of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, Jamaica (2007), Saint Lucia (2010) largely confined to the domestic of deception, of the abuse of power and Suriname (2006), among sphere would be poor if they had to or of a position of vulnerability or of the eight countries reviewed, had support themselves. the giving or receiving of payments passed an anti-trafficking law (IOM 68. ECLAC (2010). or benefits to achieve the consent 2010a). 69. This section relies extensively on of a person having control over 64. IOM (2008). UNICEF (2006). See also World another person, for the purpose 65. It is often assumed that gender refers Bank (2003); CARICOM (2010b). of exploitation. Exploitation specifically to women. However, Additional resources on violence shall include, at a minimum, the gender, as defined in The World’s against children include Global exploitation of the prostitution Women: Trends and Statistics Initiative to End All Corporal of others or other forms of sexual (United Nations 2010b), refers to Punishment of Children (2005); exploitation, forced labour or the socially constructed differences O’Donnell (2004); UNICEF services, slavery or practices similar and attributes and opportunities (2000, 2002, 2004). to slavery, servitude or the removal in being female or male and to the 70. See ‘Georgetown Declaration on of organs; (b) The consent of a social interactions and relationships Building a Region Fit for Children victim of trafficking in persons to between women and men. As Ellis for the Survival, Development, Pro- the intended exploitation set forth (2003) puts it, gender is more than tection, Dignity, and Participation in subparagraph (a) of this article understanding masculinity and of Children within the Caribbean shall be irrelevant where any of the femininity: it is about recognizing Community’, CARICOM, George- means set forth in subparagraph (a) the importance of human town, Guyana, 19 March 2008, have been used; (c) The recruitment, relationships; it is about examining http://www.caricom.org/jsp/com- transportation, transfer, harbouring how history has shaped and defined munications/meetings_statements/ or receipt of a child for the purpose both women and men; and it is georgetown_declaration_children. of exploitation shall be considered about how men, as well as women, jsp. See also UNICEF (2011). ‘trafficking in persons’ even if this have assisted in defining male and 71. Maroon are descendants of runaway does not involve any of the means female behaviour. slaves who formed communities.

190 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 An official definition of indigenous according to the socio-psychological as part of the national research for has not been adopted by any function they serve, as follows: (a) this report. United Nations agency. Indigenous experiential: categorizes the reality 7. Deosaran (2007a); De Lisle et al. typically involves self-identification of past interactions; (b) defensive: (2007). by individuals that is accepted by relates to coping with one’s inner 8. Chevannes (2004); De Lisle et the community. It also refers to conflicts and anxieties by projecting al. (2007); Deosaran (2007b); people’s historical continuity with them onto the homosexual persona; Deosaran and Crawford (1996); pre-colonial or pre-settler societies and (c) symbolic: expresses a more Queeley-Roberts (2007). and is associated with strong links to abstract concept of self and one’s 9. Samms-Vaughan, Jackson, and territories and surrounding natural social network and reference group. Ashley (2004); Meeks Gardner et resources. Indigenous groups often 75. World Bank (2011a). al. (2003). rely on distinct social, economic, 76. Felson and Pare (2010). 10. For example, see Madden (2011). or political systems and have 11. Deosaran (2007a); Queeley-Roberts language, culture and belief systems (2007). that are distinct from dominant Chapter 2 12. CARICOM (2010b). social groups. Often, they resolve 13. Carter, R. (2008); Carter, S. (2008). to maintain and reproduce their 1. See UNODC and World Bank 14. Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999); ancestral environments and systems as (2007); ICPC (2010). The term Cunningham et al. (2008). distinctive peoples and communities. youth is reserved for boys, girls, 15. Madden (2011); Levy (2009); See Copabianco, Shaw, and Sagant young men, or young women Chaaban (2009); UNODC and (2009). between the ages of 15 and 24 World Bank (2007). 72. A hydroelectric power plant was built years. In the Caribbean, definitions 16. United Nations (2005a). in Suriname in the 1960s to generate differ according to political, legal 17. See Jacobo (2007); United Nations cheap electricity for the foreign- and sociocultural traditions and (2005a). Youth development controlled bauxite industry (the according to data collection and indices have been constructed in pillar of the Surinamese economy), research needs. Some research on countries such as Cyprus, Brazil, but it did not generate sustainable youth development and youth India, Malaysia, and Nigeria. development for the benefit of the violence may address young people 18. See CARICOM (2010b); Carter, R. local Maroon population. Despite up to 30 years of age (Moser and (2008); Carter, S. (2008). increased economic activity since van Bronkhorst 1999; CARICOM 19. Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999, the 1980s among foreign companies 2010b). However, the United 2). and small local entrepreneurs in gold Nations standard is employed here 20. Constantine, Benard, and Diaz mining, the lumber industry and in an attempt to apply a common (1999); Cunningham et al. (2008); tourism, the Brokopondo district definition across countries. Ungar et al. (2008); UNODC and is characterized by inequalities and 2. CARICOM (2010b). World Bank (2007). widespread poverty, particularly 3. United Nations (1995). 21. In conditions of rapid negative among the local Maroon population. 4. Deosaran (2007a); De Lisle et al. change, they may condition or 73. See ‘Video: An Interview with (2007). even trigger rioting and political Julia Greenberg on HIV in the 5. For Antigua and Barbuda, violence, however. Unemployment Caribbean’, AIDS-Free World, information was provided by the should not be confused with youth Brooklyn, 30 September 2009, Royal Police Force and the National unemployment. The latter is more http://www.aidsfreeworld.org/ Youth Intervention Unit. For directly associated with violent Our-Issues/Homophobia/Video- Jamaica, see ‘Gangs in Schools’, crime. An-Interview-with-Julia-Greenberg- Go-Jamaica, 22 July 2008, http:// 22. UNODC and World Bank (2007). on-HIV-in-the-Caribbean.aspx. go-jamaica.com/news/read_article. 23. Harriott (2008a); UNODC and Greenberg is associate director of php?id=2832. For Trinidad and World Bank (2007). AIDS-Free World, a global advocacy Tobago, see Lall (2007). See also 24. CARICOM (2010b); ICPC group tackling HIV/AIDS. Deosaran (2007b). (2010); Cunningham et al. (2008). 74. Herek proposes a model that 6. Focus group session conducted in 25. The eportsr are cited in CARICOM distinguishes three types of attitudes Suriname with youth representatives (2010b, 37–39).

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 191 26. The veragea of the Caribbean 51. CARICOM (2010c). 16. Katz and Choate (2006); OAS Examinations Council pass rates 52. Wandering is a legal category in (2008a). across six countries: Antigua and Barbados that applies to minors 17. Allan Goodridge, ‘Gangs in Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, only. It involves being absent from Barbados’, presentation at a Parent- Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad home without the consent of Teacher Association Meeting, and Tobago. parents or guardians. Elsewhere Bridgetown, Barbados, 24 March 27. ICPC (2010). in the Caribbean, the category is 2010, cited in ‘Parents in Barbados 28. CARICOM 2010b; Carter, R. simply running away from home. Placed on Gang Alert’, Daily Herald 2008; Carter, S. 2008; Joseph, (Bridgetown), 26 April 2010. Holder, and Alexis (2009). 18. Mogensen (2005). 29. For example, note the difference Chapter 3 19. Harriott (2008b). between Moser and van Bronkhorst 20. Townsend (2009). (1999) and HHS (2001). 1. UNODC and World Bank (2007); 21. Walker, R. ‘Profile: Jamaat al 30. Blum et al. (2003). Harrendorf, Heiskanen, and Malby Muslimeen’, BBC News, 3 June 31. Hernandez-Ramdwar (2008). (2010). 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 32. De Lisle et al. (2007); Deosaran 2. van Gemert (2005, 148). americas/6716765.stm. (2007b); Deosaran and Chadee 3. van Gemert (2005). 22. Katz (2008). (2007); Queeley-Roberts (2007). 4. Harriott (2011, 6). 23. OAS (2008a); Wilkinson, B. ‘11 33. Levy (2009). 5. Harriott (2008b). Slain in Guyana Coastal Village: 34. Evans, quoted in Chevannes (2004, 6. UNDP (2009). Gang Leader Blamed’, Associated 9). 7. All three data source have their Press (27 January, 2008). 35. Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999). respective problems and sources 24. Maxson and Klein (1990); Katz 36. Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999); of error. Citizen perception (2003). Cunningham et al. (2008). data may not be reliable because 25. Katz and Choate (2006). 37. Brathwaite (2008). various self-definitions of gangs 26. Katz, Choate, and Fox (2010). 38. CARICOM (2010b). may be operative and may inflate 27. Katz, Choate, and Fox (2010); 39. Blum et al. (2003). the problem. Self-report surveys Wells, Katz, and Kim (2010). 40. UNODC and World Bank (2007). may understate the problem 28. ‘Guyana Ups Drugs Trafficking Fight’, 41. Madden (2011); Crawford-Brown because of poor sample frames Weekend Mirror (Georgetown, (2010). and the reluctance to reveal gang Guyana), 3 December 2010. 42. “In many Caribbean countries the membership. Police statistics are 29. Granger (2010). onset of sexual activity is occurring often rough estimates because 30. Granger (2010). at young ages and early sexual various definitions of gangs and 31. Granger (2010). initiation has been positively gang-related violence may be 32. United States of America vs. Samuel correlated with child abuse” operative, at times even within Knowles (2010) D. C. Docket (Ruland and Finger 2004, cited in the same police force. However, 00–00425-CR-JIC; also see Paulin Jones and Trotman Jemmot 2009, researchers have to make the (2010). 18). best of the sources that exist and 33. US State Department (2011a). 43. Queeley-Roberts (2007). try to minimize errors through 34. Data of the Immigration 44. UNODC and World Bank (2007). triangulation of the available data. Enforcement Department, Antigua 45. Deosaran (2007b). 8. Katz, Webb, and Schaefer (2001); and Barbuda. 46. Ungar et al. (2008, 168). Katz (2003). 35. ‘Woman Falls Victim to Jamaican 47. See Joseph, Holder, and Alexis 9. Webb, Katz, and Decker (2006). Sweepstakes Scam’, Jamaica (2009). 10. Meeks Gardner, Katz, and Observer (Kingston, Jamaica), 8 48. Blum et al. (2003). Rosenblatt (2008). May 2010. 49. Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999). 11. Wortley (2009). 36. Townsend (2009). 50. Cunningham et al. (2008); 12. Katz and Choate (2006). 37. UNODC and World Bank (2007); Constantine, Benard, and Diaz 13. OAS (2008a). Solis and Aravena (2009). (1999); Ungar et al. (2008); Madden 14. Katz and Choate (2006). 38. UNODC and World Bank (2007). (2011); Levy (2009). 15. Katz (2008). 39. Katz and Schnebly (2011).

192 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 40. The community cohesion scale was people in this community generally the people in this country mean a lot constructed by applying principal very trustworthy?’ to me’, (b) ‘I like to think of myself components analysis using 14 41. The nformali social control scale was as similar to the people who live in variables. The component used had constructed by applying principal this country’, (c) ‘to what extent do an eigenvalue of 5.7 and accounted components analysis using three people in your country have similar for 40.7 percent of the variance variables. The component used had values as yourself?’ in the original 14 variables. A an eigenvalue of 2.2 and accounted 44. The societal cohesion–participation standardized variable was used to for 74.3 percent of the variance scale was constructed by applying represent this component. The in the original three variables. A principal components analysis using variables included in the component standardized variable was used to two variables. The component were as follows: (a) ‘living here gives represent this component. The used had an eigenvalue of 1.8 and me a sense of community’ (reverse variables included in the component accounted for 89.8 percent of the coded); (b) ‘the associations/ were as follows: ‘What is the variance in the original two variables. relationships that I have with the likelihood that people from your A standardized variable was used people in this neighbourhood/ community would intervene in a (a) to represent this component. The community mean a lot to me’ suspected case of domestic violence, variables included in the component (reverse coded); (c) ‘I like to think (b) fight breaking out in front of were as follows: ‘to what extent of myself as being in many ways your house with someone being would you be willing to work similar to the people who live in beaten, (c) stranger is suspected of together with others (a) to reduce this neighbourhood/community’ stealing from someone?’ violence in the country?, (b) on (reverse coded); (d) ‘I like to think 42. Thesocietal cohesion–belonging something to improve this country?’ of myself as being in many ways scale was constructed by applying 45. The societal cohesion–legitimacy similar to people of other ethnic principal components analysis using scale was constructed by applying groups who live in this country’ four variables. The component principal components analysis using (reverse coded); (e) ‘to what extent used had an eigenvalue of 2.5 four variables. The component do you feel like you belong in this and accounted for 62.6 percent used had an eigenvalue of 2.6 neighbourhood/community?’; (f ) of the variance in the original and accounted for 65.5 percent ‘to what extent do you feel loyal to four variables. A standardized of the variance in the original the people of this neighbourhood/ variable was used to represent four variables. A standardized community?’; (g) ‘to what extent this component. The variables variable was used to represent this would you prefer to live somewhere included in the component were component. The variables included else rather than continue to live in as follows: (a) ‘I feel like I belong in the component were as follows: this neighbourhood/community?’ in this country’, (b) ‘I feel loyal to (a) ‘the police force deserves my (reverse coded); (h) ‘to what extent the people of this country’, (c) ‘to support’, (b) ‘the court system are you proud of being in your what extent are you proud of your deserves my support’, (c) ‘to what neighbourhood/community?’; nationality?’, (d) ‘I would prefer to extent do you think that the courts (i) ‘to what extent do you work live in another country’ (reverse of this country guarantee a fair together with others to reduce coded). trial?’, (d) ‘to what extent are your violence in your community?’; 43. The societal cohesion–inclusion rights protected regardless of which (j) ‘to what extent do you work scale was constructed by applying party is in power?’ together with others to improve principal components analysis using 46. The societal cohesion–respect scale your community?’; (k) ‘to what three variables. The component was constructed by applying principal extent do you participate in used had an eigenvalue of 2.2 components analysis using three community activities?’; (l) ‘how and accounted for 71.9 percent variables. The component used had involved are you in community of the variance in the original an eigenvalue of 2.2 and accounted organizations and activities such three variables. A standardized for 72.6 percent of the variance as the church, sports, community variable was used to represent this in the original three variables. A centres, cultural activities?’; (m) ‘I component. The variables included standardized variable was used to feel respected by the people who in the component were as follows: represent this component. The live in this community’; (n) ‘are (a) ‘the associations that I have with variables included in the component

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 193 were as follows: (a) ‘I feel respected 56. For example, see Matthews (2011); 14. Skogan and Hartnett (1997); Strobl by (most of ) my fellow citizens’, (b) see also ‘More on the Decline (2011). ‘I am respected by most citizens of in Jamaica’s Crime’, Go-Jamaica 15. Tyler (2004, 2011); Skogan and another race/ethnicity’, (c) ‘I am (Kingston, Jamaica), 7 April 2011, Frydl (2004). respected by persons who earn a http://go-jamaica.com/news/ 16. Herrmann, MacDonald, and higher income than me’. read_article.php?id=27841. Tauscher (2011). 47. Leslie (2010, 22). 57. Spohn and Katz (2008). 17. Harriott (2000). 48. Harriott (2008b, 2009); Leslie 58. Katz and Webb (2006). 18. Hall (2011). (2010). 59. Simon (2010a, 2010b). 19. See CARICOM Implementation 49. Katz (2007). 60. Fahim (2010); see also ‘Examining Agency for Crime and Security, 50. Blum et al. (2003). the Tivoli Gardens Gang Bust in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 51. Hawkins et al. (1999). Jamaica’, PRI’s The World (Boston), http://caricomimpacs.org/impacs. 52. Human beings constantly interact 21 December 2011, http://www. 20. Bennett (1991a, 1991b). with each other. They must therefore theworld.org/2011/12/gang-tivoli- 21. Tyler (2004, 2011); Sunshine master rules of interaction if they gardens-jamaica/. and Tyler (2003); Bayley (2006); are to live peacefully together and 61. Spohn and Katz (2008). Skogan and Frydl (2004). accomplish worthwhile aspirations. 62. Burch and Chemers (1997). 22. Factor analysis is a statistical Observance of these rules of 63. Wyrick (2006). technique that identifies common interaction may be broadly regarded features or similar underlying as pro-social behaviour. Antisocial concepts in a group of items or behaviour stands in contrast to pro- Chapter 4 variables by analysing the extent to social behaviour. Broadly, antisocial which items cluster around a central behavior is behavior that is harmful 1. Bayley (2006) identifies four essential concept and can be treated as a to others. Such behaviour patterns characteristics of a democratic, conceptual unit. are usually carried out in violation of citizen-oriented law enforcement 23. Bennett (2004). social norms or the law. Individuals agency, as follows: (a) police must 24. Skogan (2006). are socialized, consciously or be accountable to the rule of law 25. Peak, Bradshaw, and Glensor subconsciously, about societal values and not the government; (b) (1992). as reflected in customs, norms and police must protect human rights; 26. Bennett and Wiegand (1994). mores. Individuals learn or are (c) police must be accountable to 27. Van Dijk, van Kesteren, and Smit socialized through official or formal people outside their organization; (2007). control exercised through the state and (d) top priority must be given 28. Van Dijk, van Kesteren, and Smit or informal control mechanisms to servicing the needs of individual (2007). exercised by non-state agents such as citizens and private groups. 29. Worrall (1999). families or other persons on whom 2. Tyler (2004); Skogan and Frydl 30. Terpstra (2008). power has been conferred or who (2004). 31. Ren et al. (2006). are able to exercise control or impose 3. Sunshine and Tyler (2003); Tyler sanctions. The internalization (2011); Engel (2005). of social norms serves to ensure 4. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990). Chapter 5 conformity and can become 5. Cordner (2001). oppressive to minorities that engage 6. Collier (2005); Harriott (2000); 1. Rowat, Malik, and Dakolias (1995). in norm-violating behaviour that Palmer (1988). 2. Antoine (2008). may not be harmful to others. When 7. Palmer (1988). 3. Antoine (2008). such tensions rise, they typically lead 8. Harriott (2000); Dookhan (1975). 4. Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, to conflict and change. 9. Collier (2005); Harriott (2000). Guyana, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad 53. Sinclair (2004a, 2004b). 10. Quoted by Critchley (1967, 54). and Tobago use the term supreme 54. For example, see Barrett (2011). 11. Miller (1973); Critchley (1972). court to describe the entity that 55. For instance, see Sinclair (2011). The 12. Fridell and Wycoff (2004); Skogan comprises both the high court and Proceeds of Crime Act makes it a (2004). the court of appeal. The Supreme crime to profit from criminal activity. 13. Greene (2000); Skogan (1990). Court of Jamaica is the official term

194 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 used to describe the high court 1st Session of the 9th Parliament, 43. Webster’s New World Law in that nation, while the court of Parliament of the Republic, Dictionary (Wild 2006) defines appeals acts as the highest local Port of Spain, http://www. pre-trial detention as “the detaining appeals court. ttparliament.org/publications. of an accused person in a criminal 5. Antoine (2008). php?mid=28&id=355. case before the trial has taken 6. See Guyana, Supreme Court of 22. For more information on the place, either because of a failure Judicature (2009). issues outlined in this section, see to post bail or due to denial of 7. United Nations (2004a). 2010 Country Reports on Human release under a pre-trial detention 8. In addition to Antigua and Barbuda Rights Practices (database), Bureau statute.” Black’s Law Dictionary and to Saint Lucia, the ECSC of Democracy, Human Rights, (Black 1910) defines remand as member states are Anguilla, British and Labor, US State Department, follows: “to remand a prisoner, after Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Washington, DC, http://www. a preliminary or partial hearing Montserrat, Saint Kitts and state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/. before a court or magistrate, is to Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the 23. The absence of bail in Suriname, send him back to custody, to be kept Grenadines. as well as the possibility of lengthy until the hearing is resumed or the 9. Antoine (2008). pre-trial detention, can be traced to trial comes on.” 10. See the ECSC website, http:// the Netherlands. The Netherlanders 44. Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, and www.oecs.org/. have been criticized for their pre- Finckenauer (2000). 11. Of the Caribbean-7, Antigua and trial detention practices in the 45. Maguire and Bennett (2008). Barbuda, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Netherlands and in the Netherland 46. The risonsP After Care Programme Trinidad and Tobago continue to territories in the West Indies. was introduced in Barbados in 1977, use the Judicial Committee of the 24. Jamaica, Ministry of Youth and but has since undergone scrutiny Privy Council as a final appellate Community Development (1969, because of its limited effectiveness. court (JCPC 2009). 1). 47. ‘Case Study: Resolving Disputes 12. United Nations (2003a). 25. Lum and Yang (2005); Sherman through Alternative Means; Court 13. Saunders (2010). (2003); Weisburd, Lum, and Yang Mediation Process in Guyana Helps 14. Bernard (2009, 223). (2003). in Reducing Case Backlogs’, United 15. ‘Our Mission, Our Vision’, 26. See Maguire and Bennett (2008); States Agency for International Caribbean Court of Justice, Port of Maguire et al. (2008). Development, Washington, DC, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, http:// 27. See Holdip (2010). http://www.usaid.gov/stories/ www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/. 28. Maguire and King (2011). guyana/cs_guyana_law.html. 16. Bernard (2009, 220). 29. Spohn and Denholm (2008, 9). 48. ‘21,366 Civil Matters Pending 17. Antoine (2008). 30. King and Maguire (2006). at the End of 2007’, Kaieteur 18. US State Department (2010b, 4). 31. See Maguire et al. (2010). News (Georgetown, Guyana), 19. For more information on the issues 32. Nelson (2011). 14 March 2009, http:// outlined in this paragraph, see 33. World Prison Brief (database), www.kaieteurnewsonline. 2010 Country Reports on Human International Centre for Prison com/2009/03/14/21366-civil- Rights Practices (database), Bureau Studies, London, http://www. matters-pending-at-the-end- of Democracy, Human Rights, prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/. of-2007/. and Labor, US State Department, 34. US State Department (2010e). 49. Guyana provides the following Washington, DC, http://www. 35. GINA (2006). example: “Section 17 of the state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/. 36. Guyana, Supreme Court of Juvenile Offenders Act identifies 7 20. DFC (2004). Judicature (2009). instances whereby a juvenile can be 21. The homicide rates are based on data 37. GINA (2006, 7). brought before the Courts: begging presented in chart 1.4, chapter 1. 38. Spohn and Denholm (2008). or receiving alms; wandering; For background on the bail reform, 39. US State Department (2010f, 6). destitute; under the care of a parent see Trinidad and Tobago, Office of 40. Spohn and Denholm (2008). or guardian who by reason of the Parliament (2008), ‘The Bail 41. Spohn and Denholm (2008, 4). criminal or drunken habits, is unfit (Amendment) Bill, 2008: An Act 42. National Task Force on Crime to care for the child; is the daughter to Amend the Bail Act, Chap. 4:60’, Prevention (2005). of a father who had been convicted

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 195 of incest; or frequents the company 2009), http://www.ipsos-mori.com/ 82. ‘Caribbean Prisons Urged to Be Part of any reputed thief, or common or researchpublications/researcharchive/ of Crime Solution’, Bahama Islands reputed prostitute. These instances poll.aspx?oItemId=2504. Info (Freeport, Grand Bahama), 22 are not seen as criminal conduct 60. See Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin June 2010. by a juvenile but rather as the State (1978). acting in the best interest of the 61. See Cohen-Cole et al. (2009). child by removing that child from 62. See Cochrane, Chamlin, and Seth Chapter 6 a vulnerable situation and placing (1994). him/her in the care of a relative or 63. Gifford (2009). 1. Brown (2010). institution.” (Guyana, Office of the 64. US State Department (2010b, 2). 2. For example, see ‘Clash between President 2008, 1–2) 65. US State Department (2010f, 3). Police and Residents, Laventille, 50. Deosaran and Chadee (1997). 66. Amnesty International (2009). Trinidad and Tobago’, CNC3News 51. United Nations (1985, 8). 67. See Amnesty International (2011). video, 4:10, 16 May 2009, uploaded 52. For example, see Jordan (2009). 68. Amnesty International (2011). to YouTube, 18 March 2011, http:// Also see ‘Police Probing 69. Maguire (2010). vodpod.com/watch/5788670- Allegations of Ranks Having 70. Fyfe (1988). trinidad-war-in-laventille; Sex with Female Prisoners’, 71. Guyana, Ministry of Home Affairs ‘Jamaican Police Kills Man’, TVJ Kaieteur News (Georgetown, (2011, 22). News video, 2:24, 31 July 2010, Guyana), 18 November 2011, 72. Guyana, Ministry of Home Affairs uploaded to YouTube, 10 August http://www.kaieteurnewsonline. (2011, 28) 2010, http://www.youtube.com/ com/2011/11/18/police-probing- 73. Transparency International (2010, 4). watch?v=eWHSOdVN97Q. allegations-of-ranks-having-sex- 74. Heritage Foundation and Wall 3. An example is the Governance with-female-prisoners. Street Journal (2011). and Accountability Framework 53. Guyana is the poorest of the seven 75. Chabrol (2010). established as part of Jamaica’s nations, with a 2010 annual GDP 76. Integrity in Public Life Act, Public Sector Modernization per capita of about US$6,800. Government of Antigua and Programme. The framework Suriname ranks fifth out of the Barbuda, No. 23 of 2004, Official allows for public involvement in seven nations, with a 2010 GDP per Gazette 44 (95), 30 December, the government decision-making capita of about US$9,900. http://www.laws.gov.ag/ process. A Consultation Code of 54. See Rountree and Land (1995); acts/2004/a2004-23.pdf. Practice for the Public Service is Warr (1987). 77. ‘History of the Caribbean among the initiatives introduced 55. Norris and Chadee (2001), Community (CARICOM)’, through the framework. The code 56. Norris and Chadee (2001, 69). CARICOM, Georgetown, Guyana, establishes guidelines that require 57. Guyana was once a colony of the http://www.caricom.org/jsp/ public consultation on all policies Netherlands, but it then became a community/history.jsp. Current that affect the population. This British colony for 151 years before member states are Antigua and requirement of accountability and achieving independence in 1966. Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, citizen participation facilitates 58. For example, see article 7, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, debates on new laws, for example. ‘Extradition Treaty between the Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Thus, through open debates or United States of America and the Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, legislative submissions, civil society Kingdom of the Netherlands’, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, has participated in the drafting of signed at The Hague on 24 June Suriname, and Trinidad and anti-gang legislation, the Terrorism 1980 and entered into force 15 Tobago. Associate members are Prevention Act (2005) and the September 1983, https://www. Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Sexual Offences Act (2009). unodc.org/tldb/showDocument. Islands, the Cayman Islands, and 4. Private sector initiatives included the do?documentUid=6086&country Turks and Caicos. creation of a 12-point declaration =NET&language=ENG. 78. CARICOM (2007b). and establishment of an anti-crime 59. ‘Survey for Channel 4 on Attitudes 79. Coward (2011). fund. For example, see ‘PSOJ towards the Death Penalty’ (database), 80. Antoine (2008). Turns Up “Dudus” Heat’, Jamaica Ipsos Mori, London (28 October 81. Byron and Dakolias (2008, 93). Observer (Kingston, Jamaica),

196 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 11 March 2010, http://www. public services. Nonetheless, we Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit jamaicaobserver.com/PSOJ-turns- maintained our focus on analysis Small Arms and Light Weapons, up--Dudus--heat-3-11-2010#. of direct public expenditure in adopted by the United Nations 5. Harriott (2009). matters regarding security. This General Assembly on 8 December 6. Harriott (2009). has included prevention of armed 2005 (United Nations 2005b). The 7. Schmallager (2011). violence, community-based instrument commits states to mark 8. For Trinidad, see Equal Opportunity solutions, initiatives to limit drug existing stocks of weapons held by Commission, http://www. and alcohol consumption, witness governments, armed individuals equalopportunity.gov.tt/. For and victim protection programmes and security forces. This surveillance Guyana, see ‘Guyana: The Main focused on women and youth, local seeks to reduce the chances of the Human Rights Institutions’, United security management programmes, flow of these weapons to the illicit Nations Population Fund, New and the prevention of human market. By 26 September 2011, York, http://www.unfpa.org/ trafficking. Thus, we did not analyse 14 governments in the greater derechos/guyana_eng.htm. fully even the budgets of ministries region had signed agreements 9. The estimates were calculated of security, government, interior to execute a related Project to based on public information in and justice. Much of the work of Promote Firearms Marking in expenditure reports delivered these ministries also involves other Latin America and the Caribbean: by the treasury departments or matters, including issuance of Barbados, the Bahamas, Belize, ministries of finance of each passports, registries on individuals Costa Rica, El Salvador, Grenada, country. However, these figures are and documentation services. For Guatemala, Guyana, Paraguay, approximations. Despite a rigorous defense expenditures, for example, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, effort to select the budget lines only budgetary activities directly Saint Vicente and the Grenadines, that reflected the real expenditure related to citizen security such as Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay on security, the real total is not arms collection and destruction, (OAS 2011a). Firearms marking fully captured for several reasons. border control, and maritime is also a mandate within the Without deeper involvement in the surveillance were examined. framework of the Inter-American budgetary process, one faces great 10. UNDP (2011b). Convention against the Illicit difficulty in attempting to capture 11. See Christie (2002); Patterson Manufacturing and Trafficking in the values that match some lines, (2004); ‘US Pledges Help to Fight Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives especially in areas such as violence Caribbean Drug Trafficking’, BBC and Related Materials (US State prevention and institutional News, 17 April 2010, http://news. Department 1997). strengthening. Thus, although most bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8626674. 21. See OAS (2010b, 2011b); of the budgetary weight in crime stm. ‘CARICOM Tracking Illegal prevention, for example, falls on the 12. US State Department (2000). Guns in Region’, Jamaica ministries of security, government, 13. Sabatier (1988). Observer (Kingston, Jamaica), or interior, there are also relevant 14. Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl (2009). 11 February 2011, http://www. initiatives in ministries of foreign 15. See the CARICOM IMPACS jamaicaobserver.com/news/ affairs, education, welfare, health, website, at http://www. Caricom-tracking-illegal-guns-in- and so on. Our analysis has caricomimpacs.org. See also region#ixzz1ZEeHRKje. consisted in the identification, CARICOM (2002). 22. ICNL (2001). down to the budget line, of 16. Gordon (1997); Seelke et al. (2011). 23. OAS (2008c). programmes and initiatives directly 17. See CARICOM (2000, 2010d); 24. See US State Department (2011b); related to matters of security. There OAS (2010a); United Nations Narcotics Control Reports is a consensus that well-groomed (1994); Iglesias (2002). (database), US State Department, public spaces, universal education 18. CARICOM (2002). Washington, DC, http://www. and anti-corruption initiatives 19. CARICOM (2010c, 2010e). state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index. influence, in a clear manner, 20. Gun marking and tracing htm; Trafficking in Persons Report success in preventing violence, programmes are in line with the (database), US State Department, building citizenship and promoting International Instrument to Enable Washington, DC, http://www. coexistence, besides improving States to Identify and Trace, in a state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/index.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 197 htm; Human Rights Reports gleaner.com/gleaner/20110117/ and independently adjudicated, (database), US State Department, lead/lead5.html. and which are consistent with Washington, DC, http://www. 32. Angus Reid Public Opinion (2010). international human rights norms state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/. 33. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice and standards. It requires, as well, 25. ‘Caribbean Could See Reduced UK Statistics (database), Section 2 measures to ensure adherence Aid over Anti-gay Laws’, Stabroek ‘Public Opinion’, US Bureau to the principles of supremacy News (Georgetown, Guyana), of Justice Statistics, Hindelang of law, equality before the law, 30 October 2011, http://www. Criminal Justice Research Center, accountability to the law, fairness in stabroeknews.com/2011/news/ University at Albany, Albany, the application of the law, separation breaking-news/10/30/caribbean- NY, http://www.albany.edu/ of powers, participation in decision- could-see-reduced-uk-aid-over- sourcebook/. making, legal certainty, avoidance anti-gay-laws/. 34. The commission reported on of arbitrariness and procedural and 26. See DFAIT (2011); GINA (2006); death penalty–related cases in the legal transparency.” USAID (2004); Rodgers (2011); Bahamas, Belize, Grenada and 38. This use of ‘don’ is derived from a Virtue (2011). Jamaica, where the Commission term of respect in Italian that has 27. See ‘Police Present Seven found government violations been adopted outside Italy to refer to Reasons for 60 Days’, Jamaica and recommended remedies for a high-ranking or powerful member Gleaner (Kingston, Jamaica), 1 violations of inmate rights with of the Mafia. In the Caribbean October 2008, http://jamaica- respect to issues of and treatment context, the term has come to gleaner.com/gleaner/20081001/ with respect to the imposition of prominence as a euphemistic lead/lead2.html; ‘Know Your the death penalty (IACHR 2011). label for a ‘community leader’ in a Crime Bills’, Jamaica Gleaner 35. Some consequences of this socially excluded or marginalized (Kingston, Jamaica), 12 July 2010, backlash include withdrawal of community. http://jamaica-gleaner.com/ ratification of the Inter-American 39. Robotham (2003). gleaner/20100712/news/news3. Convention of Human Rights, 40. Alves and Correia (2010); Lench html. the First Optional Protocol to the (2007); Hellman, Muilenburg- 28. This includes the Latin American International Covenant on Civil Trevino, and Worley (2008). Public Opinion Project’s and Political Rights, and creation 41. Worcester and Gill (2005). AmericasBarometer, Multiple of the Caribbean Court of Justice 42. Powell and Lewis (2011). Indicator Cluster Surveys in Guyana as a court of final jurisdiction. More 43. Latin American Public Opinion and Suriname and National Crime recently, 12 Caribbean countries Project, ‘Guyana’, Vanderbilt Victimization Surveys in Barbados voted against United Nations University, Nashville, http://www. and Jamaica. General Assembly Resolution vanderbilt.edu/lapop/guyana.php. 29. Garland (1990); Costelloe, 63/168 calling for a moratorium on 44. Latin American Public Opinion Chiricos, and Gertz (2009); Baker executions. See Helfer (2002). Project, ‘Suriname’, Vanderbilt and Roberts (2005). 36. ‘Govt. to Get Tough on Crime’, University, Nashville, http://www. 30. ‘St. Lucia’s Crime Plan’, nationnews. Jamaica Gleaner (Kingston, vanderbilt.edu/lapop/suriname. com (Fontabelle, Barbados), 1 Jamaica), 16 February 2011, php. February 2011, http://www. http://Jamaica-gleaner.com/ 45. US State Department (2010f ). nationnews.com/articles/view/st- gleaner/20110216/carib/carib1. 46. Transparency International (2009, lucias-crime-plan/; ‘Govt. to Get html. 2010). Tough on Crime’, Jamaica Gleaner 37. The following definition of the rule 47. Transparency International has (Kingston, Jamaica), 16 February of law has been proffered within the also warned about state capture in 2011, http://Jamaica-gleaner.com/ United Nations (2004b, 4): Jamaica (Salas and Reiter 2009). gleaner/20110216/carib/carib1. “It refers to a principle of governance 48. Edelman (1967, 1971, 1988) html. in which all persons, institutions categorizes policies as instrumental 31. ‘Trinidad and Tobago Bringing and entities public and private, (tangible) or expressive (symbolic). Back Death Penalty’, Jamaica including the State itself, are While instrumental policies actually Gleaner (Kingston, Jamaica), 17 accountable to laws that are publicly address a problem, symbolic policies January 2011, http://www.jamaica- promulgated, equally enforced are adopted by governments to

198 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 appease public concerns; they 54. United Nations (2003b). typically do not create long-term 55. World Bank (2011a). changes or may be enacted, but not 56. Jones (2007). enforced. 57. United Nations (2005c); UNDP 49. See Marion and Oliver (2006, (2010b). 2010), including the references. 58. Thomas and Wint (2002). 50. ‘Support Us to Fight Crime: PM 59. UNODC and World Bank (2007); Golding’, Office of the Prime WHO (2010). Minister, Government of Jamaica, 60. See CARICOM (2010b); Kingston, Jamaica, 18 June 2010, UNICEF 2006; World Bank http://www.opm.gov.jm/news_ (2003). and_public_affairs/support_us_ 61. World Bank (2011a). to_fight_crime_pm_golding. 62. UNDP (1997). 51. Golding (2011); JIS (2011). 63. UNDP (1994). 52. For example, see the report on Barbados, which identifies the occasional use of excessive force as Chapter 7 a human rights problem (US State Department 2010b). 1. Moore and Stephens (1991). 53. United Nations (2003b), paragraph 2. Wycoff and Skogan (1994). 81. 3. Cano (2008).

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 199

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CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 223

Technical Notes

Technical Note 1. National and Regional Consultations

In preparing the first Caribbean Human Development Re- sites for this report1, a purposive sample for both national port (Caribbean HDR) for the English- and Dutch-speaking and regional consultations was developed with input from Caribbean countries, a critical data collection methodology the UNDP Country Office focal points. Sample selection employed—and one which embodies the HDR Corporate for both national and regional consultations was carried Principles of national ownership and participatory and inclu- out in line with the principles of the Framework for Actor sive preparation—was that of a series of national and regional Mapping/Stakeholder Analysis presented in Democratic Di- consultations, the details of which are described in this tech- alogue: A Handbook for Practitioners, which facilitates the nical note. The purpose of these consultations was twofold: analysis of potential actors, their interrelationships and dis- to obtain qualitative data on the views, experiences and pri- tinct perspectives on the issue at hand.2 orities of stakeholders across the region regarding the issue of The eyk actors for a potential dialogue include a variety citizen security, and to promote Caribbean ownership of and of individuals, institutions and interest groups. A thorough buy-in for the report as a means to strengthening its advocacy analysis for determining a valid sample takes into considera- potential. tion not only the identification of major relevant groups and The consultation processes involved extensive and inten- institutions but also the diversity existing within each of these sive one-on-one interviews and focus group dialogues with organizations. The figure below presents the matrix frame- experts, practitioners and institutional actors from across work through which such an analysis was configured. the region. In six of the seven countries selected as research

Figure 1. Framework for Actor Mapping and Consultation Sample Selection

Democratic Dialogue Framework for Actor Mapping Actor Interests/needs/ Perception of/ po- Connections to Openness to/sup- Power/means of goals/ sition on key issues others/ quality of port for a dialogue influence concerns relationships process

A total of 194 actors participated in the national consul- to bilateral meetings and no national consultations were con- tations; 62 percent represented governmental agencies and ducted in Saint Lucia. In total, 92 national consultations were 38 percent represented non-governmental bodies. A total held, 69 (75 percent) of which were bilateral meetings and 23 of 256 actors participated in the regional consultations; 49 (25 percent) of which were group meetings. percent represented governmental agencies and 51 percent represented non-governmental bodies. Table 1 below shows Regional Consultations the breakdown by number and representative percentage of Five group dialogue regional consultations also took place participants by country. in September 2010 in Paramaribo, Suriname; Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago; Bridgetown, Barbados; Castries, Saint National Consultations Lucia; and Kingstown, Jamaica. These meetings involved a For the national consultations, three or more rounds of focus group dialogue sessions were held in Barbados, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. Additionally, national NOTES: researchers held a series of bilateral meetings with key local 1 No consultation has been carried out in Guyana. The data on Guyana have been obtained actors who were unable to participate in the group consulta- through public sources and the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. tions. In Antigua and Barbuda, the consultations were limited 2 IDEA, CIDA, OAS, and UNDP. 2007. Democratic Dialogue –A Handbook for Practitioners.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 225 Table 1. Number and percentage of participants in national and regional consultations, by country

Country Number of Percentage Number of Percentage participants participants in national in regional consultations consultations Antigua & Barbuda 16 8 -- -- Barbados 44 23 47 19 Jamaica 37 19 42 16 Saint Lucia -- -- 46 18 Suriname 61 31 41 16 Trinidad & Tobago 36 19 80 31

Total 194 100 256 100

total of 256 participants from regional organizations such the official crime statistics reported and the representativeness as the Regional Security System (RSS), the Organization of of the findings of the surveyed data, particularly with regard Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the CARICOM Sec- to urban and rural populations and different demographic retariat, among others. The regional consultations provided groups. A call for reformation of the criminal justice system an opportunity to triangulate the quantitative data findings was endorsed in all consultations and proposals were offered from the survey with the experiences of the participants infor alternative penal solutions, different policing models and volved in the consultative process and to solicit feedback on methods, means for reducing youth violence, and strategies to the report presentation. promote wider involvement of the local community. Recommendations offered in the course of these consul- It is important to note that the recommendations present- tations ranged from suggestions for supplementing missing ed during the consultations were either accepted as offered data, revising chapter titles and changing terminology defini- or further researched and developed; a concerted effort was tions to the identification of successful crime prevention pro- made in the report preparation to incorporate all substanti- grammes. Questions were also posed by the participants, spe- ated feedback from consultation participants. cifically on methodology employed as well as the accuracy of

Technical Note 2. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010

The most important methodological tool utilized in the prep- • Policy orientations of the population aration of the first Caribbean Human Development Report • Evaluation of and confidence in police and justice systems was the Citizen Security Survey, which involved over 11,000 • Community and societal cohesion respondents from across the region and contributed the pri- • Informal control of crime and violence mary data for much of the subsequent analysis presented in • Self-reported interaction with the criminal justice system the report. The objective of the survey was to provide empiri- • Demographics cal evidence for the analysis of how, in the context of the Eng- The urveys was conducted in the seven selected territories lish- and Dutch-speaking Caribbean countries and within the that served as sites for the report research--Guyana, Trinidad development context of Caribbean Small Island Developing & Tobago, Suriname, Antigua & Barbuda, Saint Lucia, Bar- States (SIDS), insecurity and violence have negatively impact- bados and Jamaica. The target population of the survey was ed human development. Guided by this central objective, the households with at least one permanent resident 18 years of survey collected data on the following: age or older. In total, 11,155 persons were interviewed.1 • Satisfaction with standard of living/level of human devel- The sample for the survey was designed to reflect key de- opment mographic characteristics of the adult populations in the par- • Actual victimization/Crime at the community level ticipating countries based on the most recent census data. The • Domestic Violence sample was self-weighted by region and gender distributions. • Fear of crime Even though probabilistic procedures were followed to select

226 CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 households, it was expected that at least some of the sample justice system, etc.); and regime commitment (or attitude would present moderate biases in variables not controlled by to regime change or military government). quota. In order to detect and analyze underlying attitudinal ori- Post-fieldwork processing of the data implied control of entations in the population, a cluster analysis was performed all relevant demographic variables for each country against based on a series of 22 items included in the questionnaire. the last available census data to evaluate possible biases and to These measured degrees of support or rejection for different elaborate and apply weighting factors where needed. The vari- statements related to social prevention policies, punitive poli- able distributions controlled for were age, gender, ethnicity, cies, and attitudes of optimism (or pessimism) about whether education level and population by county/area. the crime problem can effectively be solved by the state and The eportr also utilizes a series of surveys conducted by the the society.2 Cluster analysis is a segmentation method that Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Pro- identifies groups of entities or statistical samples (in this case, ject (LAPOP). These datasets were used primarily for their the citizens), intended to identify homogeneous subgroups of data on the justice systems in the countries surveyed. cases in a population. This technique is used to first, establish groups not previously defined but relevant to the study Analysis of policy attitudes in question, and second, analyze the group’s membership and The issues that guided the analysis on attitudes of the popula- characteristics. The specific technique used in chapter 6 of this tion towards policy were based on the following: report was hierarchical clustering. This statistical method al- • The extent to which crime and insecurity is defined by the lows the researcher to select a definition of distance, a linking various populations as a serious social problem in need of methodology for forming clusters, and the number of clusters policy attention. Section 1 of the Citizen Security Survey best suited to the data. questionnaire measures this as the relative seriousness of Lastly, the analysis of confidence in police and justice sys- the problem. tems is based on the construction of simple additive scales. • The specification of policy orientation dimensions and de- Cronbach Alpha coefficients were analyzed in order to test termination of the extent and intensity of support for each. the scales’ reliability. • The patterns of support towards different policy orientations by country, victimization experience, confidence in Use of official crime statistics the criminal justice system, age, gender, income, education The report also relied on secondary data taken from official and area. state sources in the seven countries included in the HDR. Of- • Intensity and coherence of the different tendencies or ori- ficial crime statistics were used for the trend analyses reported. entations. An important condition for comparing crime indicators is • Correlates with perceptions of societal features (for exam- that the compatability of definitions across the range being ex- ple, how just a society is seen to be); law-abiding inclina- amined. For this reason, the categories of crime used in these tion among the populations; perceptions of good govern- analyses were restricted to homicide, rape, and the aggregate ance (control of corruption, confidence in the criminal categories of violent crimes and property crimes.

NOTES:

1 For more details on all technical aspects of the survey described in this note, please refer to the following website: http://www.regionalcentrelac-undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean.

2 The complete English version of the questionnaire is available at http://www.regionalcentrelac-undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean . Questions used for cluster analysis are Q55 a to Q55v.

CARIBBEAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012 227