U.S. TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity

TRISA Red Diamond

Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate Fort Leavenworth, KS Volume 4, Issue 6 JUN 2013

IRREGULAR OPPOSING FORCES COMING SOON! TC 7-100.3 INSIDE THIS ISSUE by Jon H. Moilanen, TRISA-CTID Operations, BMA Ctr

Anti-Access OPS ...... 4 Know the Threat Multi-IED Attacks .....7 Know the Enemy OPFOR ST 7-100 ...... 9

Fire as Weapon ...... 10 TC 7-100.3 Criminals & SPF ..... 13 Insurgents OEA: ...... 16 Guerrillas RAFTE-Africa ...... 17 Terrorists Criminals in an HT .... 18 Affiliates TC 7-100.3...... 22 Adherents CTID Review ...... 27

Training Circular 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, addresses irregular opposing TRISA Red Diamond forces (OPFOR) for Army training, education, and various leader development is published monthly venues, and represents a composite of actual threats and enemies that by TRISA at CTID. comprise irregular forces. Three primary categories of irregular forces portrayed Send suggestions to by the OPFOR are insurgents, guerrillas, and criminals. Other irregular OPFOR CTID actors in a complex operational environment (OE) include affiliates and ATTN: Red Diamond adherents, and/or other willing, coerced, passive, or unknowing supporters. Dr. Jon H. Moilanen Some irregular OPFOR can be independent, non-aligned individuals. CTID Operations, BMA These actors may operate with regular military forces as a Hybrid Threat (HT) for and training. All of these actors may employ acts of terrorism. (continued at p. 22) Mrs. Angela Wilkins Chief Editor, BMA Irregular Forces Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2013)

TRISA-CTID NEWSLETTER DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST by Dr. Jon H. Moilanen, TRISA-CTID Operations and Chief, Red Diamond Newsletter, BMA Ctr

This issue of Red Diamond begins with a spotlight on insurgents attempted multiple, nearly-simultaneous the pending summer 2013 publication of Army Training improvised explosive device (IED) bombings against a Circular 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces. This TC governing authority and population. Less than half of focuses on irregular Threats of insurgents, guerrillas, the IEDs exploded due to the insurgents’ poor bomb criminal organizations, and terrorists as well as active making skills, the vigilance of several civilians, and the and passive supporters in complex and uncertain conditions skill of government explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) of a dynamic operational environment. The variables of teams to deactivate the IEDs before they detonated. an OE evolve with the interaction among diverse TRISA-CTID published Student Text (ST) 7-100, The combatant and noncombatant state and non-state OPFOR Battle Book for the Operational Environment actors. (OE) v1.0. (2013). ST 7-100 provides a student with an The TRISA Wargaming, Experimentation, Test, and overview of the the Decisive Training Environment Evaluation Directorate (WETED) provides insights on (DATE); operational and tactical level Hybrid Threat (HT) anti-access operations in its participation as a Red doctrine; types of HT organizations, and characteristics Team with robust and adaptive Threat capabilities in of key weapons and equipment found in those regular wargames, experiments, tests, and other related Army and/or irregular forces. and joint evaluation requirements.

The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by “Know the Threat—Know the Enemy!” Threats can incorporate fire as a weapon in adaptive Email your topic recommendations to: ways. Whether a simple diesel-fuel initiated fire or a Dr. Jon H. Moilanen, CTID Operations, BMA CTR fuel-air explosive or thermobaric weapon warhead, [email protected] awareness and understanding of tactical options is one and of several ongoing research projects at TRISA-CTID. Mrs. Angela M. Wilkins, Chief Editor, BMA CTR A TRISA Threat Report, Series of IED Attacks in Pattani, [email protected] Thailand, assesses a 20-hour period in early 2013 when

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Director’s Corner: Thoughts for Training Readiness CTID

by Jon Cleaves, Director, Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

Our Hybrid Threat Train-the-Trainer is set for 23-27 September 2013 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This annual resident training focuses on those that have roles and responsibilities in portraying a challenging and realistic Threat in Army training, professional education, and leader development venues. The profile of our attendees is purposely varied due to the many different types of activities, organizations, and institutions that require and use a credible Threat in their missions. In many instances, a Hybrid Threat provides the diverse and dynamic capabilities to exercise doctrine and tactics at all echelons of the Army. Previous attendees include observer-controllers (O/Cs), scenario developers, Army leaders in an opposing force (OPFOR) at our Combat Training Centers (CTC); staff officers and Threat subject matter experts from Army schools and Centers of Excellence (CoE); and other unit planners, exercise action officers, and Threat operators from the Active Component, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard, as well as multinational partners. Your five-day session emphasizes practical exercises to plan and conduct small group experiences in tactical operations in complex operational environments. Preliminary topics include the contemporary strategic environment, Threat designs and systems warfare, Threat Force structure, and overviews of insurgent cells, guerrilla units, criminal organizations, noncombatants, and the pervasive use of information warfare (INFOWAR). Problems presented in small group seminars allow you to examine and learn the functional tactics and techniques of the Hybrid Threat in offensive and defensive missions as described in the Army’s TC 7-100 series on Threats. This year we are training in our new TRISA facilities on post at Ft Leavenworth. Using a revised small group seminar learning model, we are capping attendance at 80 students. Prioritizing who attends may be required but I will determine that no later than early August. Interested? Motivated? Need to register for the DL course? My primary POC is Mr. Walt Williams at: 913-684-7923 or email at: [email protected] The Hybrid Threat Train-the-Trainer coordinator is Mr. Pat Madden (CTR) at: 913-684-7997 or email at [email protected] Jon [email protected]

What is the Hybrid Threat (HT) for training? (TC 7-100.2) In training exercises, the Opposing Force (OPFOR) HT is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects—realistic and representative of actual threats.

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CTID Red Diamond Disclaimer The Red Diamond presents professional information but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official U.S. Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material that they reference. The Red Diamond staff reserves the right to edit material. Appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the U.S. Army for information contained therein.

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WETED RED TEAM ANTI-ACCESS OPERATIONS OPFOR TTP in Wargaming, Experimentation, Testing, and Evaluation by Mike Sullivan, TRISA-WETED Red Team, ThreatTec LLC Ctr

WETED Red Team TRISA

Anti-Access Operations: Opposing Forces (OPFOR) TTP in Wargaming, Experimentation, Test, and Evaluation

Last month I offered an overview of the typical “STARTEX conditions” that WETED supports in experiments, exercises, tests, and training events. My intent was and is to lay the foundation for a series of discussions of how Red Team- directed opposing force (OPFOR) tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) contribute to achieving the stated objectives of those events. The implied mission for the RED TEAM is to ensure those objectives are met irrespective of constraints on “Soldier,” leader, weapon system, and other equipment performance by the Model and Simulation environment at the foundation of those efforts. The TRISA WETED Red Team has earned a sterling reputation for consistently accomplishing that mission. At the core of the effort there will be those experiment, exercise, or training objectives and learning demands that must be addressed by all “players.” Typically, the objectives aim at facilitating a detailed examination of the validity of and potential risks inherent in a concept, technology, weapon system, or doctrinal assumption being considered by the Army or Joint community. The Red Team is specifically responsible for analyzing the objectives and finding ways to use perceived and demonstrable gaps in Blue Force organizations and behaviors in order to project useful data and findings into the reports generated by the experiment, exercise, or training. Conditions can change rapidly when confronted by an adaptive adversary or enemy. As a refresher on the typical starting conditions for a WETED supported event, let me offer the following. These descriptions are examples of the conditions that can shape an experiment, exercise, test, or other type of training event: --It is after 2020, the Blue Force receives a mission to seize and occupy territory defended vigorously by an adversary with WMD potential threatening its neighbors and Blue National interests. The Blue Force is already deployed in at least a brigade-size infantry heavy formation and a forward operating base (FOB) is in place and “secure.” Blue Air is dominant, as is the Blue Navy. There is little if any Coalition support by ground forces.

Note. Both sides in the “fight” are embedded in a Model/Simulation Federation with extremely limited capacity for operational environment (OE) fidelity outside of Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AAMSA) and Contemporary Operational Environment and Threat integration Directorate (CTID) validated kinetic capabilities. The Blue Force always has at least a five-year advantage in technology and weapons effects. Red Force, as a term, is used occasionally in the capabilities development communities to describe an adversary or enemy, but is not an approved term in US Army opposing force (OPFOR) doctrine.

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The major Red intent and posture in most of these events is to conduct a robust and relentless economy of force defense featuring an aggressive, creative, agile, and passionate anti-access effort. Red advantages include ample preparation time, decentralized command and control (C2), a supportive civilian population that can mask movement by both regular and militia forces, special purpose forces (SPF) that are embedded in the area and population, and the typical Blue Force gaps in intelligence, security, logistics handling capacity, et al. The Blue Force will typically be very dependent on digital technology for C2, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) distribution and fires delivery. All of these functions can be exploited in both kinetic and “soft” dimensions of tactical and strategic engagement.

REDFOR DECISION “Trigger”― BLUE Homeland announces BLUFOR Deployment

APOE REDFOR AOR APOD

BLUFOR SPOE SPOD Homeland SPF Afloat-Piracy-Fish Fleet ISR Assaults-SVIEDs/VBIEDs Labor Unrest/Strike-Sabotage Sabotage-A2C2 Jamming Missile-Mortar- ATKs Missile-FA-Sniper ATKs

REDFOR Actions REDFOR Actions Ambushes-Raids-VBIEDs in Anti-Access Concept: Sabotage-Rockets/FA ATKs Regular-Militia-UAV ISR BLUFOR Homeland: Constant Information Attack Creative Perception Management Adaptive Terror Attacks Robust Reachback Infrastructure Sabotage Unconstrained Labor Force Resistance Adaptive Hybrid Threat Academia Perspectives Regular Forces FOB International Org Actions Irregular Forces NGO-PVO Agendas Criminal Orgs Political Group Support Terrorist Cells-Actors

Figure 1. WETED Red Team anti-access operations (example) The Red anti-access campaign begins well before the first Blue Force combat system arrives in the theater and operational area. Red forces, supplies, decoys, weapons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, tactical rehearsals, and hardened C2 systems are emplaced and constantly expanded, refined, and reinforced. If “low-tech” niche technology devices and capabilities can be procured and fielded, they augment ongoing Red force preparations. Every major Blue Force movement is closely tracked. If designated capabilities can be economically attacked even in the Blue Force Homeland, Red Force senior leaders decide when and where to attack high value targets (HVTs). A corresponding use of information warfare (INFOWAR) attempts to manipulate regional and global media affairs in favor of Red Force objectives. The Red WMD capability is exploited in every dimension of political influence as a potential “first use” threat in defense of the Red Homeland. Once the Blue Force is “ashore” at the seaport of debarkation (SPOD) and airport of debarkation (APOD) the Red anti- access campaign typically becomes a combination of multiple types of offensive actions that can be nearly simultaneous, overlapping, and/or continuous throughout the Blue Force area of responsibility and against each echelon of unit commander. Harassment and disruption characterize every Red action. Lines of communication (LOC) become ever- lengthening target arrays for Red militia, SPF, criminal organizations, and active or passive supporters in the civilian population. Red capabilities range from small arms fire or sniper attack in ambushes to mortar fire, IEDs, rocket

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propelled grenades (RPGs), and artillery. The PODs are attacked with direct and indirect fires at unpredictable times and places. Critical C2 nodes are located and attacked. Other HVTs such as Patriot radars, low density material handling equipment (MHE), rocket systems, and theater lift assets are attacked while other attacks continue to harass and disrupt Blue Force actions. When HVTs are damaged or destroyed, Red INFOWAR assets use perception management techniques to encourage a sympathetic international audience to Red Force defensive actions against an extra-regional Blue Force aggressor. As the LOCs and FOBs are harassed, Red Forces seek opportunities to engage and destroy small Blue Force main combat units with “peer” Red regular military units. These engagements are at carefully chosen times and places that mitigate typical Blue Force advantages such as weapon systems range, speed, and night vision capability. Examples include well- designed Red helicopter ambushes that destroy one or more Blue Attack helicopters responding to a motor convoy or dismounted patrol ambush. When possible, responding follow-on Blue Forces are attacked with mortars and long range artillery fires, as well as with snipers and multiple IEDs. The “message” is clear to the Blue Force leadership—there are no such things as secure PODs, LOCs and FOBs, and the Blue Force will have to commit significant combat forces to protecting its expanding sustainment operations while concurrently conducting offensive and stability operations. The SPOD and APOD are target-rich environments for Red SF and Militia. These Red Forces reside within the surrounding civilian population and support themselves from caches emplaced well before the Blue Force arrived. The civilian fishing and commercial “fleets” mask Red Force reconnaissance and surveillance. These elements also support occasional attacks by IEDs, suicide bombers, and even anti-ship missile attacks. Mortars, rockets, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and snipers make the APOD a high-risk area for Blue Air component use. The MANPADS threat and sniping slow the Blue sustainment effort into and out of the major airport facility. In each case of Blue Force overreaction to an attack that damages critical civilian infrastructure and/or injures or kills “innocent” civilians, the Red force exploits the mishaps in its INFOWAR campaign to obtain support for the Red Homeland and discredit the announced intention of the Blue Force presence. Seen as a whole, the Red anti-access campaign can and usually does frustrate any Blue Force claim that their lines of effort objectives are succeeding in the short term. The global media and Internet images of smoking Stryker hulks, mounting casualty figures, exploding munitions and plumes of dark smoke drifting over the FOB, and hull damage in the side of a roll on/roll off (RORO) vessel indicate a Red Force defense that is successfully disrupting the Blue Force deployment. The WETED Red Team provides the robust and adaptive Threat conditions required to stress and challenge the expectations of data collectors and analysts supporting an experiment, exercise, training, or test to make informed findings credible and relevant. In the opening paragraph, I mentioned that the Red Team had earned a reputation for consistent “Mission Accomplished” credit in ensuring experiment, training, and exercise objectives are met. Over time, those objectives become decision support findings as Army leaders carry out their responsibilities in keeping the Nation’s Army— the US Army—equal to its global requirements. WETED and its TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) partners contribute significantly to helping the Army with the “hard decisions” involving future combat system (FCS), niche technologies, fielding the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, and investing heavily in tactical unmanned aerial systems (UASs). The Red Team is currently engaged in several Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC)-supported activities designed to examine how current and projected Army doctrine and organizations can close gaps and minimize risk in known challenges with mine/countermine warfare, short- and medium-range air defense, ISR analysis, fusion and distribution, and degraded digital C2 environments. In the Joint/Combined arena, “Air Sea Battle” concepts and doctrine are under intensive analysis and review. WETED and CTID are, as always, making sure the Red Team has the “right tools for the job.” In the next Red Diamond we will see how a “swarm” of Red Force effects can be built and then sent after a Blue Force High Value Target (HVT) despite intensive efforts on the part of a Blue Force to protect its high value target.

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Militia (Opposing Force) An organization which generally refers to citizens trained as soldiers (as opposed to professional soldiers), but applies more specifically to a state-sponsored militia that is part of the state’s armed forces but subject to activation only in an emergency. To avoid confusion, the TC 7-100 series uses militia typically in the latter sense. Irregular forces might be referred to or declare itself as a “militia;” however, the term militia is not typically used to describe guerrillas, insurgents, or criminals associated with opposing forces. TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics

IED ATTACKS IN PATTANI Irregular forces with multiple improvised explosive devices in an urban OE by H. David Pendleton, OE Assessment Team, ISC-CG Ctr

Within a 20-hour period on 16-17 February 2013, From about 1640 hours local time on 16 February 2013 insurgents against the ruling Thai national government when the first IED exploded until about 1300 hours the attempted 11 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks following day when the final bomb was found, first in Pattani, Thailand—possibly as retaliation against the responders—police officers, firemen, and EOD government for the death of 16 of their fellow Islamist experts—stayed extremely busy with at least 11 insurgents the week before elsewhere in Pattani documented incidents. EOD personnel disarmed six of Province. Less than half of the IEDs exploded due to the the IEDs while five exploded, but not always with as insurgents’ poor bomb making skills, the vigilance of much force and damage the insurgents expected. several civilians, and the skill of government explosive The damage would have been much greater without the ordnance disposal (EOD) teams to deactivate the IEDs audacity of several local civilians. Two shopkeepers, before they detonated. The Threat Report, Series of IED who found IEDs in their businesses, courageously picked Attacks in Pattani, Thailand (FOUO), provides a up the IEDs without regard to their own safety and summary of each of the 11 IEDs that exploded or the carried them outside to avoid the blast and fire damage EOD teams made safe. Due to the photographs and to their stores. One proprietor placed the IED in the details of the IED attacks, this Threat Report has been middle of the street in front of his shop and the other labeled For Official Use Only (FOUO). positioned the IED in a local park across from a police The city of Pattani is located about 1,044 kilometers station. EOD personnel disabled both bombs before (km) south of Bangkok in a province of the same name. they were detonated. A third business owner put out a Pattani is one of Thailand’s three southernmost fire caused by an IED explosion in his store, but before provinces where the Islamist separatist movement is the fire could spread to do much damage. most active. Since 2004, over 5,000 people have died Figure 1 for the sites of several of the IED incidents and due to the insurgency, most of them innocent civilians. explosions in Pattani noted in the Threat Report.

Legend. IED IED IED IED IED 10 Detonation: Armed:

6 2 IED 3 9 IED IED 1 IED IED IED 8 Scale: 200 m

Figure 1. Multiple IED Employment

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Other businesses targeted by the insurgents suffered significant damage. An IED hidden in a toothpaste box exploded in the Diana Mini Mart and destroyed the entire three-story department store. Another explosion burned down a four- story electrical appliance store. The largest and most deadly of the explosions occurred at about noon on 17 February near the clock tower circle in downtown Pattani. This blast, where only half the explosives actually ignited, killed three volunteer security personnel and heavily damaged a coffee shop/restaurant on the other side of the roundabout. Two of the incidents in Pattani involved dual bombs at the same location, but the EOD teams disabled the second bomb before it could explode, possibly killing the first responders or additional civilians who came to see the damage from the original bomb. See TRISA G2 Handbook No. 1.07 C3, A Soldier’s Primer to Terrorism TTP in Complex Operational Environments, for tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) on the use of multiple bombs or a decoy/primary bomb at a single location. The following diagram shows how a double IED could target a restaurant with outdoor seating similar to the attack that occurred at the karaoke bar in Pattani on 16 February 2013.

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After the fact, police discovered closed circuit television (CCTV) footage that filmed the insurgents as they traveled by motorcycle around the city planting the 11 bombs in a four square mile area in downtown Pattani. Each motorcycle carried a team of two with the passenger sometimes dressed as a female, but possibly male. Tape showed the team as they dismounted the motorcycle to enter shops appearing as interested customers before leaving their IED behind when they departed. The CCTVs also picked up the movement of a motorized tricycle with a large box on the back for movement of goods around the city, but in actuality had a 30 kg IED hidden between the gasoline and the box on the back. The insurgents left the motorized tricycle as the second and larger bomb outside the karaoke bar in an attempt to possibly hit the first responders to the initial explosion hidden in the trash can outside the bar earlier. Alert bar patrons, however, pointed out the motorized tricycle to the police and the EOD team managed to defuse the device before it exploded. Experts contended that between the bomb and the gasoline contained in the box on the back of the motorized tricycle that the blast would have destroyed at least 20 houses in the vicinity before firefighters could have controlled the blaze. While the local police attempted to downplay any connection between the series of IED attacks on 16-17 February 2013 and the death of 16 Islamist insurgents the week before in Pattani Province, others are not fully convinced. Insurgents continue to target government workers including first responders, the military, and civilians with other IED attacks in Pattani Province. In one 24-hour period around 24 February 2013, insurgents conducted 30 minor attacks that injured ten people. In another 24-hour period on the night of 11-12 April 2013, insurgents attempted to explode 36 IEDs including an attack against a police unit in rural Pattani Province that killed two soldiers and wounded six others. The size of the IEDS ranged from 2 kg hidden in a toothpaste box to 50 kg hidden in a pair of fire extinguishers. Many of the items used to assemble the IED were common products easily obtainable. While the harm caused by the series of IEDs in Pattani was substantial and several people were killed, the damage and casualties could have been far worse if all the IEDs had detonated as planned. The vigilance of several civilians, the ineptness of some of the bomb makers, and the rapid response of the first responders all played major roles in the mitigation of the potential damage from the Islamist insurgents’ IED spree on 16-17 February 2013.

STUDENT TEXT 7-100 OPFOR BATTLE BOOK FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Guide for actions on opposing forces (OPFOR) tactics and techniques in an OE by Walter L. Williams, TELD Team Leader

The CTID Training, Education, and Leader Development (TELD) Team recently produced and distributed the June 2013 version of Student Text (ST) 7-100, ST 7-100 Version 1.0 OPFOR Battle Book for the Operational Environment (OE), version 1.0. This student text, using the operational variables of political, military, economic, OPFOR information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT), Battle Book outlines a methodology for integrating a Hybrid Threat into training exercises. for the The June 2013 version of ST 7-100 replaces the June 2005 version of ST 7-100. Operational ST 7-100 provides a student with an overview of information contained in Environment several CTID publications: the Strategic Environment out to 2028; the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) and OE assessments; operational and June 2013 tactical level Hybrid Threats doctrine; a guide to the types of organizations U.S. Army TRADOC G-2 found in the Hybrid Threats force structure, and characteristics of key weapons TRADOC-Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) – Threats and equipment found in those organizations. It supports operational missions, Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) institutional training, and professional military education for US military forces. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: This student text is a supplement to the TC 7-100 series of Hybrid Threats Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. documents and is not designed as a replacement document. Each of the student text chapters contains specific information designed to assist the

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student in developing a realistic and challenging OPFOR. Links within the student text provide expanded information and ease of use. The current version of ST 7-100 may be viewed and/or downloaded from the School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics (SALT) Common Core STAFFEX Working Group milBook site and the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) TRISA-Threats page. As a living document, TRISA-Threats CTID updates this student text as necessary to ensure it remains a current and relevant resource. The next review and update of ST 7-100 is scheduled to occur circa August 2014.

THE THREAT OF FIRE-PRODUCING TTP AND WEAPONS Fire as a weapon in complex operational environments by Jennifer Dunn, Threat Integration Team, DAC

Fire-Producing Weapons: Old and New

Simple Fuels to Thermobaric Warheads

Fire-producing weapons have a long history on the battlefield. From flaming arrows that date back to ancient and medieval periods to the emergence of the first modern flamethrower system during World War I, the threat has utilized tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); weapons; and munitions to produce fires in order to destroy materiel and personnel.1 Despite this long history, TRISA’s Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) has come across recent products from the homeland defense community that indicate a general consensus of fire being an often overlooked threat on the battlefield.2 Many of these products were created in response to recent articles published by al-Qaeda’s Inspire propaganda that espouses the benefits of fire as a tactic and teaches readers how to conduct attacks using fire-producing TTP. Contrary to the concern found in these products that fire is an overlooked threat, Army soldiers are training against these types of TTP and weapon systems.3 As part of CTID’s mission to ensure that the Hybrid Threat is a representative composite of the threat, CTID has ensured that all OPFOR doctrine sets the proper conditions for effective training. As a result, many, if not most, CTID Hybrid Threat products and force structures include fire-producing weapons and TTP.4 The aggregate effect of these products from the homeland defense community implies that the various departments and agencies responsible for homeland defense are dismissing the threat of fire-producing weapons and TTP. As noted, from the Army training community standpoint, this implication is invalid. It did however cause CTID analysts to conduct further research to ensure current OPFOR doctrine still remains relevant. The result of this research is that the threat of fire-producing TTP and weapon systems is more relevant than ever. Not only are fire-producing TTP being actively used on the battlefield, but the threat is increasingly gaining access to fire-producing weapon systems through arms proliferation. Below are real-world, recent vignettes of representative elements of the Hybrid Threat (irregular forces, regular forces, and criminal elements) utilizing fire-producing TTP and/or weapon systems.

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Irregular Forces Irregular forces are using fire-producing TTP around the world. The most recent example of this is the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, on 11 September 2012. In the evening of 11 September, approximately 150-200 armed irregular forces attacked the consulate compound. In addition to carrying RPGs, grenades, AK-47s, mortars, and mounted heavy machine guns, these armed men also carried diesel fuel containers.5 The purpose of the diesel was to set the compound ablaze. After blockading the main streets leading to the compound, the attackers assaulted firing heavy machine guns, RPGs, and grenades. Reportedly after fifteen minutes, the attackers gained access and immediately began setting the compound on fire.6 Four Americans died during this attack. What’s relevant for this article is that despite the compound being under attack from a multitude of weapon systems, two of the four deaths were caused by the fire (smoke inhalation), not by the wide ranging weapon systems at the disposal of the attackers. This incident demonstrates that fire plays a significant, dangerous role on the battlefield even when the typically more lethal weapons of machine guns, mortars, grenades, and RPGs are involved. This tactic is of particular concern because it is an extremely cheap, easy tactic that causes significant damage and destruction of personnel and materiel. For more information on how the OPFOR can exploit fire-producing TTP, see the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) 2012, Volume 1 Ground Systems, Chapter 13 “Obscurants and Flame.”

vulnerable.8 In the exercise conducted by the Russian Regular Forces unit, there was no blast or shrapnel upon impact of the During February and March of 2013, the Eastern rockets, rather a 300 square meter area of absolute Military District of conducted a live-fire exercise destruction caused by the extremely high pressure and of the TOS-1, a heavy flamethrower system, for the first temperature. The TOS-1 can range its destructive fire up 7 time. The TOS-1 is a Russian multiple rocket launcher to about 3,500 meters. More information on thissystem mounted on a T-72 chassis that fires 220 millimeter can be found in the 2013 edition of the WEG, scheduled rockets. This is an extremely significant exercise to be published later this year. because while the TOS-1 has been tested in the past, it This exercise of the Russian military is not the only has never before been used in a live-fire exercise. recent example of regular forces using fire-producing weapon systems. In 2012, the Syrian military escalated fighting by implementing the use of a barrel bomb, an incendiary bomb that contains flammable materials.9 Barrel bombs are in essence improvised explosive devices.

Figure 1. TOS-1 Heavy Flamethrower System Figure 2. Suspected Military Barrel Bomb and Shrapnel The rockets fired by a TOS-1 carry a fuel-air explosive, or They are constructed from a cylindrical object like a thermobaric, warhead. This type of warhead releases a used artillery shell or oil drum and filled with explosive cloud of flammable gas and causes extremely large material, oil, and shrapnel. The weapon is loaded into explosions. The warhead creates a massive helicopters and pushed out of the helicopter over the overpressure in the target area for which there is no designated target area. has been reportedly using practical defense, making dismounted units particularly these improvised incendiary devices since August of 2012.

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Videos of this new tactic and weapon being used by the meters and can affect a target area of several meters in Syrian military can be found anywhere on the Internet.10 diameter. More information on this system can be found in the WEG 2012, Volume I Ground Systems, Criminal Elements Chapter 2 Infantry Weapons. Criminal elements have favored various forms of fire-

producing TTP and weapons over history, but the most commonly used seems to be the Molotov cocktail. Molotov cocktail is a generic name that refers to an improvised fire-producing weapon made from a breakable glass bottle containing a flammable substance and a source of ignition like a cloth wick. For use in an attack, the wick is lit and the bottle is thrown at a target. The intent of using this weapon is more

about the fire than about the destruction. Criminal Figure 3. RPO-A Infantry Flame-Thrower System elements typically use this type of weapon to make a statement more than to actually cause lethal effects. In 2012, Lebanese forces seized an arms shipment headed to Libya from Russia. This shipment contained Recent examples of Molotov cocktails include use by 12 protestors in , , and Tunisia and extremists the RPO-A flamethrower system. Given Russia’s in Palestine. history of weapons sales, it is extremely likely that this trend will continue and that at some point US forces Proliferation may be faced with a threat that is equipped with this Fire-producing TTP can proliferate very easily because system. The proliferation of this system presents a these TTP are simple, cheap, and extremely effective. significant threat because it can proliferate to both state Additionally, terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda use and non-state actors as opposed to the TOS-1 system, their propaganda machines to ensure that these TTP which will likely only proliferate to other state actors. reach the widest audiences possible. While it is more Training Implications difficult to proliferate fire-producing weapon systems, there is strong evidence that it is occurring. In 2011, • New fire-producing TTP and weapon systems will received a number of the TOS-1 systems continue to appear as globalization and from Russia.11 While Kazakhstan is believed to be the technological advancements continue. first export customer of this system, there is potential • The entire spectrum of the hybrid threat – irregular for Russia to arrange sales with other interested states. forces, regular forces, and criminal elements – has While proliferation of the TOS-1 system is limited, there access to fire-producing TTP and weapon systems. is a smaller manportable flamethrower system, the • Proliferation of fire-producing weapon systems is RPO-A, that is actively being sold by Russia. The Shmel increasing, ensuring that US soldiers will encounter RPO-A, aka ‘bumblebee,’ is a Russian made infantry these systems on the battlefield. rocket-propelled incendiary projectile launcher. The standard projectile fired is thermobaric. On impact, the For more information on fire-producing TTP and fuel from the projectile is dispersed, mixed with oxygen weapon systems, please contact the CTID Threat from the air, and ignited, which results in high pressure Integration Team at 913-684-7962. and temperatures. The RPO-A can range up to 1,000

Endnotes 1 While this article focuses on the lethal effects of fire, fire and smoke are commonly used by the Threat for other purposes such as its psychological effects and obscurant properties. See Chapter 13 of the Worldwide Equipment Guide on “Obscurants and Flame” for more information. 2 See: Scott Stewart, “Fire the Overlooked Threat,” Stratfor Security Weekly, 28 February 2013; California State Threat Assessment Joint Bulletin, 1 June 2012; Department of Homeland Security Note, 31 May 2012; FBI Situational Information Report, 7 May 2012. 3Staff Sgt. Cody Harding, “525th BfSB prepares for unique mission in Kosovo,” www.army.mil, 23 May 2013. This unit used simulated Molotov cocktails in their training. 4See TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics, December 2011. 5“US 'had no actionable intelligence' over Benghazi attack,” The Telegraph, 10 October 2012.

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6Paul Schemm and Maggie Michael, “Libyan Witnesses Recount Organized Benghazi Attack,” Associated Press, 27 October 2012. 7Robert Beckhusen, “So Russia Has an Upgraded Flamethrower Tank Now,” Wired, 05 April 2013. 8 “GUP TOS-1 220 mm (30-round) rocket system,” IHS Jane’s, 6 March 2012. 9 “Syrian Army Using Missles, Barrel Bombs,” News 24, 12 December, 2012; “Improvised Syrian ‘Barrel Bombs’,” RAPID, 10 December 2012; Rick Francona, “The Syrian ‘Barrel Bomb’ – A Terror Weapon," Middle East Perspectives, 27 October 2012; Damien McElroy, “Syrian Regime Deploys Deadly New Weapons on Rebels,” The Telegraph, 31 August 2012. 10 See: Al-Arabiya Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M95ta3_mZBA&feature=player_embedded Video Pictures are derived from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Bn57Id00nDI Inside a barrel bomb: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wv7-cPLmfjM&feature=player_embedded Shrapnel from barrel bomb: http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=cLwtxvDxjDg Bomb dropped from helo: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YtOPwm9JTTA&feature=player_embedded 11 “Kazakhstan,” IHS Jane’s, 23 May 2013. 12 Jeremy Binnie, “Igla-S missiles found in Libyan arms shipment,” IHS Jane’s, 18 April 2013.

THE CRIMINAL ELEMENTS WITHIN THE HYBRID THREAT AND TRAINING INTEGRATION Criminal organizations operating in complex operational environments by Kristin Lechowicz, Threat Integration Division (DAC)

The majority of the time, answering two-thirds of an equation leaves an individual with two-thirds of a wrong answer and at the very least an incomplete picture. The US Army has adopted the concept of the Hybrid Threat that has three distinct elements; however, in many training exercises the criminal element, which is 1 of the 3 elements, has been somewhat neglected by the training community. This article discusses the criminal element and cites the potential execution of the concept within the US Army’s training community. The Hybrid Threat In 2010, the Complex Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) published Training Circular (TC) 7-100 Hybrid Threat in order to provide threat doctrine that would prepare the US Army for the next military engagement. The hybrid threat construct allowed for a dynamic, real-world composite that included lessons from the counterinsurgency – irregular and criminal – fight that the US military was engaged in the past nine years in Iraq and . The hybrid threat concept also addressed the regular forces element. According to doctrine, TC 7-100 describes the hybrid threat as a “diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.” Criminal Organizations Doctrine (TC 7-100) TC 7-100 states that there is no part of the world that is criminal free. Therefore, there will always be criminal elements present in any operational environment (OE) and should be represented in the training environment. The only question is whether criminal organizations will find it in their best interests to become part of a hybrid threat and to perform some of the functions required to achieve common goals and objectives with the enemy. This statement reflects the true training objective for units with regards to the criminal element. Following are criminal elements’ characteristics from TC 7-100 on criminal entities: • Criminal organizations are often independent of nation-state control. • Large-scale criminal organizations often extend beyond national boundaries to operate regionally or worldwide and include a political influence component (much like the drug cartels in Mexico and ’s Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC]). • Large-scale criminal organizations can challenge governmental authority with capabilities and characteristics similar to a paramilitary force (much like the drug cartels in South America during the 1980s). • By mutual agreement or when their interests coincide, criminal organizations may become affiliated with other actors such as insurgents (much like the and the drug trade in Afghanistan). • Criminal elements can provide capabilities similar to a private army for hire. Insurgents or guerrillas controlling or operating in the same area as a criminal organization can provide security and protection to the criminal

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organization’s activities in exchange for financial assistance, intelligence, arms and material, or general logistical support. • Criminal elements can conduct money laundering, smuggling, or transportation for irregular and regular forces. • Mutual interests can include preventing US or government forces from interfering in their respective activities (these organizations are mostly driving by financial motivation). • Criminal networks tend to create violence that degrades the social contract and affects the political environment. • Criminals may seek to neutralize or control political authority in order to improve their ability to operate successfully and discourage rival criminal enterprises. • Criminal elements can possess a great deal of wealth and may be able to purchase niche technology and afford superior training that is comparable to or rivals the host country’s military forces.

Figure 1. Drug Money and Weapons Seized by the Mexican Police and the DEA The Neglected Criminal Element The criminal element in military training is often an afterthought that gains little attention in most training arenas. The US Army is in the process of transitioning from the counterinsurgency (COIN) mission for exercises, or mission rehearsal exercises (MREs), to decisive action exercises (DAX) and in the process has for the most part, unintentionally left the criminal element out of the training equation. At times the criminal element is overlooked with the topical training focus on regular forces due to lack of familiarity and compressed timelines for most training scenarios. An individual within a training unit made a statement during a recent DAX: “Forget the criminal and irregular…We need to stay focused on the regular element.” This statement may have merit depending on the current situation, stage within unified land operations, and the statement’s durational time period. Granted, the Commander must prioritize assets and accept risk during any military operations (whether on the battlefield, or in training). It is difficult to argue with the rationale that if a T-72B maneuvers through a tactical operational center (TOC), it can be incredibly disruptive for operations! However, using the analogy in the first paragraph, the reader can hopefully deduce that answering only two thirds of a problem can disrupt or obscure the Commander’s mission intent. Example of Integrating the Criminal Element into Training An excellent example of the utilization of criminal elements took place during a recent DAX at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany. The Threat developed a creative manner in which to blend the criminal elements into training, which created a very complex OE for the training unit. The OPFOR started the exercise with a limited amount of funds and the organization had to procure weapons from a criminal element (arms traffickers). Intelligence reporting inundated the S-2 section of the training unit with cross border operations on criminal and irregular elements.

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The reporting appeared very similar to examples of ongoing, real-world operations from the Mexican drug cartels and lethal aid into Syria. Targeting the criminal element or SPF support would have limited the irregular element’s force projection capabilities.

Not for Targeting Purposes

Support N Element Observer

1

Support Element Observer DRUG 1

Support Element Logistics Mission SPF Support Site Support I Weapons 2 1 Element Transfer Point Observer

Legend Ariania Atropia Border: DRUG Bridge: Sequence of Events 1 Criminal Smuggling element moves Vegetation- weapons across border to mission Woodland: support site. 1 Observers act as early warning detection Urban Area: for Atropia or coalition forces. SPF Advisors SPF & Insurgents: I 2 Special Purpose Forces (SPF) working with Criminal: DRUG insurgent elements take custody of the (smuggling) weapons and plan exfiltration route

Figure 2. Irregular OPFOR and Special Purpose Forces in Smuggling Operations The diagram demonstrates a basic clandestine cross border logistical transfer of lethal aid from Ariana to Atropia (for more information on logistics see TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics or the Decisive Action Training Environment [DATE]). The special purposes forces (SPF) and insurgent elements wait at the covert mission support site for the criminal element to deliver the weapons. A mixture of criminal and SPF elements scan sectors to proved early warning for the logistical elements. After the weapons are transferred to the SPF and insurgent elements, the weapons are redistributed to other irregular forces on the battlefield. What are the benefits of targeting the criminal network? • Hinder logistical operations (ratlines) and weapons proliferation on the battlefield (for a time period) • Potential sources for counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) • JMRC (like the real world) has a number of files ready upon request of criminal profiles that can potentially link into irregular forces’ networks. (Hint: use liaison officers (LNOs) and request information from higher headquarters). During a DAX, the US training unit was tasked to support the Atropian government (which was not a failed State) from Ariana’s aggression. This statement implies that Atropian law enforcement agencies were still functioning and many had records of criminals that potentially linked the irregular forces and/or special purposes forces (SPF) through numerous nefarious activities including weapons trafficking and financing. The criminal element of a hybrid threat remains a viable danger to the US military’s, United States’, and partners’ corresponding interests. The successful integration of all pieces within a hybrid threat into training is important to

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mission success in future military campaigns. CTID is publishing TC 7-100.3 Irregular Forces (summer of 2013) that has an entire chapter dedicated to the criminal elements for the joint training community. The criminal element can be an important element in answering priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and can greatly shape the outcome of conflicts in the training arena as well as on the future battlefield.

OE THREAT ASSESSMENT: IRAQ by Rick Burns, OE Assessment Team, (BMA Ctr)

The Operational Environment Assessment (OEA) Team constitution, which proclaims Iraq to be republican, produced Operational Environment (OE) Threat representative, parliamentary, and democratic. The Assessments on several OEs in December 2012. One of government is composed of executive, legislative, and the OEs is Iraq, an increasingly volatile and strategically judicial branches, with numerous independent important country. The assessment includes all eight commissions. The legislative branch is composed of the PMESII-PT variables (political, military, economic, social, 325-person elected Council of Representatives and a information, infrastructure, physical terrain, and time) Federation Commission representing citizens from the and offers valuable insights into the operational areas and the governorates that are not organized in a environment in Iraq. region. The executive branch consists of the president, the prime minister, and the Council of Ministers. The Iraq has a history of political repression and instability, federal judiciary has the Higher Judicial Council, the aggravated by ethnic and religious divisions and Supreme Court, the Court of Cassation, the Public regional rivalries involving non-Arab Kurds in the north, Prosecution Department, the Judiciary Oversight a minority Sunni Arab ruling elite, and a majority Shia Commission, and other federal courts that are regulated Arab population concentrated in the south. Iraq was by law, such as the Central Criminal Court. created after World War I from the three Ottoman Empire provinces Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. The Sunni The current political environment is strained and minority maintained power, dating from the Ottoman tenuous, at best. A power-sharing accord was agreed Empire, until Saddam Hussein was ousted from power in 2003. Saddam Hussein took power in 1979 as the head of the Baath party and survived rebellions, coup plots, and international sanctions until 2003 by a complicated configuring and re-configuring of tribal alliances, often incorporating Shia into his confederations. In 2003, a coalition of countries led by the US invaded Iraq and assumed responsibility for administering the country until sovereignty was transferred to an Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004. In 2009 coalition forces withdrew from Iraqi cities, and their numbers were reduced to below 50,000 in August 2010. In December 2011, the US withdrew the last of its combat troops after failing to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

Iraqis elected their first post-Saddam government on 15 December 2005 and a cabinet was formed in May 2006. upon in late 2010 after nine months of political The second parliamentary elections took place on 7 wrangling. The agreement stated that Nouri al-Maliki, a March 2010, and the current government was formed Shia, remain the prime minister, Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, in December 2010. On 15 October 2005, the people of would assume the mostly ceremonial post of president, Iraq voted via a referendum to approve the current and a Sunni would hold the position of Speaker of the Parliament. Fears among opposition parties are that Red Diamond Page 16

Maliki is consolidating and concentrating power in his elements. The air force has been moving to develop a Shia party. Adding to the tension endemic in Iraqi strike capability and the potential to guard Iraq’s large politics is the conviction in absentia of the Sunni vice borders. The navy, while small, is seen as having a president, Tariq al-Hashimi, for ordering assassinations crucial role in defense strategy as its mission involves of political enemies. He is currently on the run with the protection of Iraq’s only deep sea port at Umm Qasr rumors that he may have found refuge among the Kurds and the country’s offshore oil platforms. Iraq has a in the north. significant special operations element. In 2007, several regional operational commands were activated by The Iraqi military has been focused primarily on internal Prime Minister Maliki to enhance coordination between security and countering insurgencies. The Iraqi armed the and National Police. forces are made up mainly of the land army, with a small air force and a small navy. The army is largely View the OE Threat Assessment: Iraq for more details composed of light infantry, with mechanized and armor on the operational environment in Iraq.

RAFTE-AFRICA PUBLISHED BY TRADOC G2-TRISA JUNE 2013 Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment for Africa plans, training, and exercises by Angela Wilkins, OEA Team Leader, BMA Ctr

TRISA-CTID published the Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment (RAFTE)-Africa this month. A RAFTE is a supplement to the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE), and in this case it is to be used by units training for deployments to an African operational environment (OE). RAFTE-Africa is the first in what will likely be a series of DATE supplement training documents for each combatant command, with PACOM up next. While DATE already allows trainers to create scenarios to meet almost any Threat, a RAFTE enables details of a specific OE to be brought into the training environment, whether at a CTC, home station, or virtual.

Figure 1. RAFTE-Africa is a SUPPLEMENT to the Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) The document was designed to be easy to use, yet it’s important to understand that it must be used in conjunction with DATE; it is not stand alone. Both DATE and RAFTE-Africa will be updated regularly to ensure the most current OE conditions are present for use in training. RAFTE-Africa is available on AKO and ATN. Please direct any comments or questions to the CTID OEA Team at 913-684-7929 or [email protected].)

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HYBRID THREAT SNIPERS (PART 1) Sniper TTP in complex operational environments by Mike Spight, TELD Team, ISC Ctr

Figure1. Kazakh Troops from Company 5, Armed with a Dragunov Equipped with a PSO-1 and a PKM GPMG perform Check Point Overwatch Operations during Situational Training Exercise

The Hybrid Threat For the purposes of this article, we will use the term “Marksman” to describe non-Sniper qualified HT The Hybrid Threat (HT) understands the value of personnel. As you will see, the HT Marksman is very Snipers, when used properly by HT unit commanders, similar to the Designated Marksman that the US that they can achieve significant military impact at the Army brought into service during both OEF and OIF. tactical, operational, and even strategic levels of warfare. Additionally, they understand the value of The HT Marksman’s mission is to extend the reach of Marksmen and the impact they can have at the the organic, individual weapons carried by other tactical level. Infantrymen in his squad. Depending on conditions, the expected maximum effective range for the HT Soldier is First, let’s set the stage and the terminology that will be approximately 300 yards, and the HT Marksman can fill used in this two-article series. Part 1 will cover the the gap with precision, effective fires between 300-500 tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by yards. Beyond 500 yards, you enter the realm of the Snipers and Marksmen. Part 2 will go over the trained, HT military Sniper. organization and equipment typically used by both TC 7- 100.2 (OPFOR Tactics), Chapter 16 provides the To fill this gap, the HT Marksman is equipped with a following definition of a Marksman: scoped, semi-automatic rifle. Typically, this is the ubiquitous SVD (Dragunov) chambered in 7.62x54 R. “A Marksman is normally a skilled rifleman Capable of adequate accuracy out to 600 yards in skilled assigned to and providing direct support to hands, the SVD is particularly suited for urban a military organization—usually an infantry engagement where ranges are much less (often less squad. Using his assigned, specially than 100 yards) and targets are often fleeting and prepared (usually scoped) weapon, he multiple. That is when the magazine-fed, semi- engages and dispatches targets at a greater automatic SVD can display excellent performance in distance than the infantry rifleman.” that role. But the SVD will also provide adequate “The terms marksman, designated accuracy in open, rural areas as well, when in marksman, and sharpshooter are generally capable hands. interchangeable. While some of their In terms of specific mission sets for HT Marksmen, they missions may overlap those of a sniper, customarily support their squad and/or by these shooters are completely different providing overwatch covering fires as their from a military sniper.” squad/platoon maneuvers, and by standing security

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post overwatch and providing counter Designated • Enemy leadership (Officers, Warrant Officers Marksman/Sniper support. These roles of providing and NCOs) close, direct support to the squad/platoon are the • Other key personnel (radio operators, medical majority of the missions performed. However, when or religious personnel, couriers, reconnaissance operating in an urban, complex terrain, the HT may opt troops, etc.) to have its Marksmen operate as part of a Hunter Killer • VIPs who may be visiting the front (HK) team(s). HK teams proved to be very effective • Crew served weapons and their crews when employed by Chechen insurgents against Russian • Vehicle crewmen mounted/dismounted Infantry and against Russian • Enemy positions (bunkers, fighting positions, Armor during a series of conflicts in the 1990s through etc.) 2000. Typically, HK Teams will consist of HT military or • Enemy Soldiers manning security posts insurgent Marksmen supported by a machine gunner • Objects identified as possible landmines or IEDs (LMG or GPMG), an anti-armor element (RPG 7V or • Enemy armored vehicles (intent is to force them some variant of a disposable tube RPG such as the RPG to “button up” and greatly reduce visibility) 28), and an RPO-A gunner. Note that the RPO-A is a • Vulnerable areas of enemy armored vehicles thermobaric Fuel-Air Explosive rocket launcher. This, (periscopes, infrared and thermal systems, too, is configured as a compact, one shot, disposable external fuel ); other material targets launcher that is incredibly effective against enemy (radar dishes, communications systems, etc.). troops in buildings, bunkers or other structures. Its effect has been likened to the detonation of a high When the HT Marksmen is not performing specific explosive round fired from a 122-mm howitzer. Marksman duties, he serves as a regular Infantryman in his unit, and will typically arm himself with the HT’s Other personnel assigned to the HK team provide issue or other Infantry weapon system, as support as ammo bearers, security, and as assistant directed by his leaders and mission requirements. machine gunners, etc. The main effort is to support the Marksman, to protect him, and to provide all the The Hybrid Threat Sniper support necessary to win the urban fight. HK teams The HT Sniper, unlike the HT Marksman, is a highly work together in a mutually supportive fashion when trained, experienced Soldier who has received months possible. They will often team up and multiple HK teams of specialized training that focuses on the successful will attack lone enemy tanks or Infantry Fighting conclusion of infiltration, the stalk, and exfiltration after Vehicles in order to ensure a quick, lethal end to the the shot. A skilled HT Sniper or team of HT Snipers can engagement. And although the above description shows have an effect on the operational and even strategic a fairly robust HK team, they can operate with as few as conduct of military operations by an opponent. Field three personnel. The bare bones three-man team would craft, stalking the target, proper use of camouflage consist of the Marksman, a LMG/GPMG gunner, and an (urban and open country), infiltration and exfiltration, RPG gunner. Favored locations for operations in an and the skill sets that enable the Sniper to make shots urban/complex environment include basements and the in excess of 600 or 1,000 + yards (depending on the upper floors of tall buildings. This is due to the limits of weapon system being used) in all conditions of lighting, main battle tanks and IFVs with regard to depressing weather, and wind, are what set these HT Snipers apart and elevating their main guns or heavy machine guns. from the HT Marksman. Alternate positions and escape routes for the HT Marksman and other team members are carefully In terms of employment, the HT Sniper operates identified and established before the fight commences, primarily alone, separated from his parent unit, and if at all possible. conducting missions as directed by his Commander. Occasionally, the HT Sniper will work as part of a Sniper Target sets for the HT Marksman, other than the team, depending on the tactical situation. In some obvious when supporting his squad/platoon via cases, the HT Sniper will work with a spotter who also overwatch, are typically tasked by the Marksman’s provides security for the Sniper team (this is the Platoon Leader or Company Commander. Those sets primary technique in which US and some other nations may include: employ their Sniper assets).

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The HT Sniper’s mission is to engage targets with support. Along with TTP, equipment, and training, this is precision, long-range fires in all weather and one of the primary differences between the HT illumination conditions, produce casualties, damage or Marksman and Sniper. destroy critical equipment and material, influence the The HT Sniper can, like the HT Marksman, be employed enemy’s actions and decisions (to get inside and with great flexibility in multiple ways. The HT Sniper can influence the enemy commander’s decision cycle), operate alone, act as his own spotter, and is responsible lower morale, and disrupt the tempo of the enemy for his own security. The single HT Sniper must be able operations. to blend in with the local populace in more urban Specific HT Sniper missions are not limited in their locations, if necessary, and may choose to wear clothing scope and may include the following types of that is common to the locale. He will, most likely, cache operations: his weapons, ammunition, and other equipment at a secure location, and return there only when ready to • Counter Sniper commence operations again. Of course, the Single HT • Overwatch security of unit movements, Sniper may operate in rural, open environment, where checkpoints, and/or roadblocks he can infiltrate, ID the target, stalk, make the shot, • Overwatch avenues of approach then exfiltrate before returning to his unit or moving to • counter enemy reconnaissance missions and a predetermined extraction point. support HT reconnaissance units • Target enemy leadership/VIPs both military and At other times, the HT Sniper will operate as part of an political HT Sniper Team. The composition of HT Sniper Teams is • Religious and medical personnel determined by the mission, as there is no set, fixed • Target, damage/destroy enemy number for a team. The two-man HT Sniper team is the equipment/material most typical arrangement for HT Sniper operations. The • Besides shooting, provide forward observer, team consists of a team leader/spotter/recorder and a CAS controller and terminal guidance support (if sniper/shooter/target designator. These positions are team equipped with Laser Designator) interchangeable as both men will be qualified HT Snipers. • Block enemy movement/screen HT unit movements A third HT Soldier may be added to the team in certain • Support/conduct raids, ambushes and patrols circumstances. The three-man HT Sniper team focuses • Support HT INFOWAR efforts on long range missions deep into enemy territory when additional equipment and supplies are required due to With regard to INFOWAR support, HT Sniper cumulative the extended infiltration and exfiltration/extraction effects, over a period of time, may produce a significant plan. The third member of the team provides security psychological impact on the enemy. Successful for the Sniper and spotter, and also carries radios, extra engagement of an enemy unit by HT Snipers can cause ammunition and batteries, water, rations, and tremendous psychological damage to individual enemy additional mission essential equipment. Soldiers and to their units. After seeing their fellow Soldiers killed or wounded from long range, equipment In some cases, HT Sniper teams may consist of four or damaged or destroyed, they can become tentative in more Soldiers. In those cases, the two or more their operations. Demoralization and negative influence additional men provide security and support by carrying on their planning and conduct of operations is a additional equipment. In these cases, the other team common effect. In the case of a civilian population, HT members will typically be armed with assault rifles and Soldier or insurgent Sniper targeting of civilian LMGs or GPMGs. Under barrel grenade launchers may personnel who have been seen as supporting the also be present on the team’s assault rifles, and enemy or “sitting on the fence” can bring about a disposable tube RPGs may be carried. As in all cases, the change in attitudes. It convinces them that the enemy mission will drive what equipment is carried and what is cannot protect them from the HT, and that the HT can left behind. dominate the enemy force at will. Often, an HT Target sets for HT Snipers and teams will normally be videographer/video team will accompany the HT set by their Unit Commanders, and may be driven by Sniper/Sniper team in order to obtain video footage of orders from higher headquarters. Targets will not be successful engagements for use in HT INFOWAR significantly different from the possible target sets Red Diamond Page 20

discussed for HT Marksmen, except that ranges are additional clarification regarding anti-personnel and often longer, and the HT Sniper’s target may well have anti-materiel missions. significant operational or even strategic importance. Note. Although Hybrid Threat (HT) regular and The real difference is that the HT Snipers will focus only irregular/insurgent units may have both Marksmen and on these types of missions, as they do not serve as Snipers assigned, the focus of this article is on regular Infantrymen in their unit when not performing Marksmen and Snipers assigned to ht regular units. In Sniper duties. general, it can reasonably be assumed that the skill sets The HT, both regular and irregular/insurgent units, and equipment of HT regular unit Marksmen and make heavy use of Marksmen and Snipers. The Snipers greatly exceeds the capability and quality widespread coverage of the Russian Army’s experiences present in HT irregular/insurgent units, even though with Chechen Marksmen/Snipers, and the experiences mission sets may be similar. Additionally, we must of the US military and its coalition partners with remain cognizant of the fact that in many cases, an HT insurgent Marksmen/Snipers in OIF and OEF have, like Marksman or Sniper may be a female. the effectiveness of IEDs, shown our potential enemies the significant impact that skilled riflemen can have on a Note. “In World War II, the had over battle. 100,000 snipers, the top 20 of whom accounted for over 7,400 confirmed kills. In 1943, it had over 2,000 women Part 2 of this article will appear in a subsequent issue of snipers, 1,000 of whom accounted for over 12,000 the Red Diamond newsletter. It will focus on the confirmed kills." (TC 7-100.2, Chap 16, para. 16-24, page organization and equipment of HT units with regard to 16-5). Marksmen and Snipers. It will also provide some

THREAT —OPFOR TTP INSIGHTS COMING SOON!

A new section in the TRISA Red Diamond will address “hip-pocket” examples of tactics and techniques that can be applied in training programs, professional education, leader development, and self-development. Concise descriptions and simplified incident and/or maneuver graphics to assist in small unit and Soldier-leader learning. Coming soon!

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IRREGULAR OPPOSING FORCES COMING SOON! LOOK FOR ARMY TC 7-100.3 OPFOR TTP in Urban or Rural Operational Environments by Jon H. Moilanen, CTID Operations and Threats Terrorism Team (BMA Ctr)

Irregular Opposing Forces Coming Soon! TC 7-100.3

(continuedfrom p.1) Do YOU know the Threat? Do YOU know the Enemy? Are YOU trained and ready?

Training Circular (TC) 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, as part of the U.S. Army TC 7-100 series, addresses irregular opposing forces (OPFOR). In Army training, professional education, and leader development experiences, irregular OPFOR represent a composite of actual threats and enemies that comprise irregular forces. Irregular OPFOR are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. However, the distinction of being armed as an individual or group can include a wide range of people who can be categorized correctly as noncombatants or be mistaken as irregular forces. Excluding members of regular armed forces, police, or internal security forces from being considered irregular forces may appear to add some clarity. Nonetheless, such exclusion is inappropriate when a soldier of a regular armed force, policeman, or internal security force member is concurrently operating in support of insurgent, guerrilla, or criminal activities.

? W C DRUG ? IED I G

Insurgents Passive Terrorists Criminals Guerrillas Supporters Active Supporters Independent Actors

Figure 1. Irregular OPFOR Actors Irregular forces can be insurgent, guerrilla, or criminal organizations or any combination of these forces or elements. Any of those forces can be affiliated with each other, mercenaries, corrupt governing authority officials, compromised commercial and public entities, active or covert supporters, and willing or coerced members of a populace. Chapter One. Irregular Opposing Force Fundamentals This chapter describes fundamental characteristics of the irregular opposing force (OPFOR). This TC portrays three main categories of irregular OPFOR as insurgents (Chapter 2), guerrillas (Chapter 3), and criminals (Chapter 4). Other actors present in an OE can be noncombatants (Chapter 5) and innocent of any connection to irregular OPFOR. Other noncombatants may be unwitting or unknowing participants in irregular OPFOR activities.

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Irregular OPFOR find vulnerabilities in an enemy across the eight operational variables of PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time) and coordinate to optimize their own advantages in overt and covert actions. Interaction among variables adds to the complexity of an OE and creates multiple opportunities for irregular OPFOR to apply its capabilities against an enemy. Irregular OPFOR can use terrorism as a tactic (Chapter 6) in addition to military-like functional tactics and techniques (Chapter 7). A table in Chapter 1 compares and contrasts the capabilities and limitations characteristic of a guerrilla force, an insurgent organization, and a criminal organization. Irregular OPFOR principles and particular capabilities and limitations of the various irregular OPFOR are explained in more detail in subsequent chapters of the TC.

Objective Ends in order to achieve Results Perseverance with resolute Adaptability Concentration Mobility Means Actions Surprise Deception Protection that applies Initiative

Ways focuses leader Concept Grievance

Figure 2. Relation of Irregular OPFOR Principles to Achieving the Objective Chapter Two: Insurgents The insurgent irregular OPFOR is representative of threats in a resistance movement and/or insurgency that can exist in various OEs. In addition to functional tactics, insurgents can use acts of terrorism to intimidate or influence a governing authority or a relevant population. Insurgents are armed and/or unarmed individuals or groups who promote an agenda of subversion and violence that seek to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. They can transition between subversion and violence dependent on specific Multifunction conditions. Both types of action intend to disrupt and/or defeat an enemy with which I Cell irregular OPFOR are in conflict. Incidents gradually undermine the confidence of a relevant population in a governing authority’s ability to provide and justly administer civil law, order, and stability. Insurgents can sometimes achieve their aims without extensive violence, but this is not the norm. Chapter Three: Guerrillas Training conditions presented by this type of OPFOR are a composite of real-world guerrilla forces and indicate guerrilla capabilities and limitations that may be present in particular OEs. Guerrilla combat power can be enhanced by possible affiliations with other combatants such as insurgents, criminal elements, special-purpose forces (SPF) of a nation-state, or regular military G forces. Passive or active civilian supporters can expand guerrilla capabilities. A guerrilla force is a group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory (JP 3-05). Guerrilla units are irregular OPFOR structured similarly to regular military forces in their command and control (C2) and use of military-like tactics and techniques. Guerrillas normally operate in areas occupied by an

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enemy or where a hostile actor threatens the guerrilla’s intended purpose and objectives. Guerrillas do not necessarily comply with international law or conventions on the conduct of armed conflict between and among actors. Chapter Four: Criminals Criminal elements exist at every level of society in an OE. Their presence, whatever their level of capabilities, adds to the complexity of any OE. They may be intertwined with irregular OPFOR and possibly with OPFOR regular military and/or paramilitary forces of a nation-state. However, they may also pursue their criminal activities independent of other actors. Some individuals, groups, GANG and activities are criminal or illegal because they violate laws established by a recognized governing authority. Others may violate moral or ethical standards of a given society or of an international community.

Note. In some OEs, the threat is more criminal than military or paramilitary in nature. Insurgents, guerrillas, or other armed groups often use or mimic established criminal enterprises and practices to move contraband, raise funds, or otherwise further their own goals and objectives.

Criminal activity is a category of violence that is enmeshed in the daily life of most people of urban and rural areas. Criminal activity thrives in areas where there is instability and lack of government control or law enforcement. The actions of insurgents and guerrillas further erode stability and effective governance and create more opportunities for criminal pursuits. Sometimes, given those opportunities, insurgents or guerrillas themselves turn to crime—either to sustain influence or for personal profit. It may be difficult to distinguish crime from ethnic feuds, ideological and theological extremism, or other elements of a culture that can incite insurgency or guerrilla warfare. Chapter Five: Noncombatants A host of diverse noncombatants adds complexity to any OE. One description of a noncombatant is an individual who is not armed and is not participating in any activity in support of factions or forces involved in combat. Notwithstanding, defining a noncombatant involves legal issues and may be further complicated by the type of conflict ongoing in a particular region between and/or among two or several entities. A noncombatant in some cases can be either armed or unarmed. An example is a private citizen authorized Private to own and use weapons for sport-recreation. Another example could be a private PSC Security security company with civilian contractors authorized to carry weapons for security of a Contractor transnational corporation facility. Irregular OPFOR may attempt to manipulate these Example: noncombatants in ways that support its goals and objectives. In other situations, Noncombatant irregular OPFOR may ignore and/or abuse the relative protections that noncombatants are entitled to from international conventions and/or law of war protocols on armed conflict. Many noncombatants are completely innocent of any involvement with irregular OPFOR. However, irregular OPFOR will seek the advantage of operating within a relevant population of noncombatants whose allegiance and/or support can be swayed in its favor. Actions can include clandestine yet willing or coerced active support, support through passive or sympathetic measures, and/or unknowing or unwitting support by noncombatants.

Note. From a US viewpoint, the status of noncombatants may be typically friendly, neutral, or unknown. Conversely, noncombatants could typically view US and/or local governing authority forces as friendly, neutral, or enemy in regard to them. For the sake of consistency throughout the chapters of this TC for training, a governing authority and associated US or coalition forces are referred to as enemy of the irregular OPFOR but not necessarily as enemy of noncombatants.

Chapter Six: Terrorism Terrorism is a tactic. Acts of terrorism demonstrate an intention to cause significant psychological and/or physical effects on a relevant population through the use or threat of violence. Terrorism strategies are typically a long-term commitment to degrade the resilience of an enemy in order to obtain concessions from an enemy with whom terrorists are in conflict. Red Diamond Page 24

Whether acts of terrorism are deliberate, apparently random, and/or purposely haphazard―the physical, symbolic, and/or psychological effects can diminish the confidence of a relevant population for its key leaders and governing institutions. Social and political pressure, internal and/or external to a relevant population and governing authority, is frequently exploited by IED terrorists with near real-time media coverage in a global information environment. The local, regional, international, and/or transnational attention on acts of terrorism by state and/or non- state actors can often isolate an enemy of irregular OPFOR from the relevant population and IED foster support of organizations, units, or individuals who feel compelled to use terror to Detonation achieve their objectives. The themes and messages promoted by terrorists can accent anxiety, demoralize the resolve of a relevant population and its leaders, and eventually defeat an enemy. Chapter Seven: Functional Tactics Insurgents and guerrillas, as part of the irregular OPFOR, employ adaptive functional tactics. When planning a tactical action, an irregular OPFOR commander or leader determines what functions must be performed to accomplish the mission. Then he allocates functional responsibilities and tasks to his subordinates and synchronizes the effort. An irregular OPFOR commander or leader specifies the initial organization of forces or elements within his level of command according to the specific functions he intends his various subordinates to perform. At brigade level (when that exists in guerrilla units), the subordinate units performing these functions are referred to as forces. At lower organizational levels of irregular OPFOR, subordinate echelons are called elements. Ambush Position Functional tactics provide a common concept and language for clear understanding of how Engaging Target the commander or leader intends his subordinates to functionally fight. Subordinates that perform common tactical tasks such as disruption, fixing, assault, exploitation, security, deception, or main defense are logically designated with those descriptive terms. The use of precise functional designations for every force or element involved in a particular tactical action allows for a clear understanding by subordinates of the distinctive functions their commander or leader expects them to perform. This knowledge facilitates the ability to make quick adjustments and to adapt very rapidly to shifting tactical situations Appendix A: Information Warfare

Irregular OPFOR use information warfare (INFOWAR) and adaptive techniques as a combat power multiplier to defeat an enemy. INFOWAR is constantly evolving due to the exponential growth of local, regional, and global networking and information technology. Increased INFO accessibility to the Internet and mass media provide irregular OPFOR with an ability to focus WAR its INFOWAR activities in a continuous global news cycle. Notwithstanding, INFOWAR techniques can be very simple and local in action and effectiveness. The OPFOR defines information warfare as specifically planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. Conducted in conjunction with offensive or defensive actions, INFOWAR exploits the weaknesses of the opponent’s information systems and influences the enemy’s decisionmaking through information-based processes that are manipulated by the OPFOR to its own advantage. Training Impacts of Irregular Opposing Forces One recurring threat in US Army training is irregular OPFOR impact on accomplishing a unit mission. Irregular OPFOR are versatile in use of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in order to achieve their specified objectives. Whether training at home station, institutional locations, or exercises in live, virtual, constructive, or gaming (LVCG) environments―the US Army Soldier and leader must be ready to apply disciplined initiative within a commander’s intent to counter threats such as irregular OPFOR and achieve his or her mission tasks. The US Army Soldier and leader must know the threat and know the enemy for training readiness. (Note. TC 7-100.3, Irregular Opposing Forces, is currently at the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) for final review and comment. TRISA-CTID will announce TC 7-100.3 when published in summer 2013.)

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THREAT PRODUCTS FOR COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS by CTID Operations Sampler of Products:

TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat

TC 7-101 Exercise Design

TC 7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics

DATE v. 2.0 Decisive Action Training Environment

RAFTE-Africa Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment

Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)

COMING in 2013:

TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces

For documents produced by TRISA’s Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) of U.S. Army TRADOC G2, with Army Knowledge Online (AKO) access, see https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/11318389

Q: Where do I go to e-retrieve TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics?

A: With AKO access, see https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/30894352

Q: Do you have a question on a Threat or Opposing Force (OPFOR) issue that CTID can assist you with in identifying a solution? A: Send us a request for information (RFI).

Q: Do you need a copy of the Regionally Aligned Force Training Environment-AFRICA?

A: With AKO access, see RAFTE-Africa https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/40395392

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THREATS TO KNOW—CTID DAILY UPDATE REVIEW by Marc Williams, Training and Leader Development Team/JRTC LNO (ISC-CG CTR)

CTID analysts produce a daily CTID Daily Update to help our readers focus on key current events and developments across the Army training community. Available on AKO, each Daily Update is organized across the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). This list highlights key updates during the month.

U.S. Army TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity

TRISA CTID Daily Update

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Selected Topics: 03 June. Al Qaeda: Al Nusrah Front members in Turkey planning sarin gas attacks Paraguay: Paraguay launches anti-guerrilla offensive after rancher assassination

05 June. U.S.: U.S. offers rewards for Boko Haram, African Al Qaeda leaders Mexico: U.S. Marine, relatives kidnapped from Mexico border ranch

07 June. Lebanon: Salafists engage pro-Hezbollah fighters in Tripoli Syria: Two UN troops injured as Syrian regime regains control of Golan crossing

17 June. : Lord’s Resistance Army raid leaves at least 16 dead Syria: Syrian rebels unleash unprecedented six-ton car bomb, killing 60

19 June. Pakistan: Suicide blast at Mardan funeral; death toll rises to 34 South Sea: sends fresh troops to Second Thomas Shoal

21 June. Al Qaeda: Taliban wants release of five Al Qaeda-linked commanders in exchange for captured U.S. Soldier Syria: Syrian, Hezbollah forces launch offensive on rebel strongholds near Damascus

24 June. U.S.: U.S. charges Snowden with espionage Iraq: Ten car bombs in Baghdad kill 39

26 June. Afghanistan: Afghan bomb makers shifting to new explosives for IEDs China: Uighur mobs attack police in Xinjiang, 27 killed, three injured

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CTID Points of Contact CTID Mission Director, CTID Mr Jon Cleaves DSN: 552 [email protected] 913.684.7975 CTID is the TRADOC G2 lead to study, design, document, validate, and apply Hybrid Threat in complex operational Deputy Director, CTID Ms Penny Mellies [email protected] 684.7920 environment CONDITIONS that support all U.S. Army and

Liaison Officer (UK) joint training and leader development programs. [pending arrival] Operations -CTID Dr Jon Moilanen [email protected] BMA 684.7928

Threat Integration Team Leader 684.7960 • Determine threat and OE conditions. Mr Jerry England [email protected] • Develop and publish Threat methods. Threat Integration Team Ms Steffany Trofino [email protected] 684.7960 • Develop and maintain Threat doctrine. Threat Integration Team Mrs Jennifer Dunn • Assess Hybrid Threat tactics, techniques, and [email protected] 684.7962 procedures (TTP). Threat Integration Team Mr Kris Lechowicz [email protected] 684.7922 • Develop and maintain the Decisive Action

Worldwide Equipment Guide Mr John Cantin Training Environment (DATE). [email protected] BMA 684.7952 • Develop and maintain the Regionally Aligned

Train-Educ-Ldr Dev Team Leader 684.7923 Forces Training Environment (RAFTE). Mr Walt Williams [email protected] • Support terrorism-antiterrorism awareness. TELD Team/RAF LNO COL Tom Georges [email protected] 684.7939 • Publish OE Assessments (OEAs). • TELD Support Threat exercise design. [pending replacement] • Support Combat Training Center (CTC) Threat TELD Team/JRTC LNO Mr Marc Williams ISC accreditation. [email protected] 684.7943 • Conduct “Advanced Hybrid Threat Tactics” TELD Team/NTC-JMRC LNO Mr Mike Spight [email protected] ISC 684.7974 Train-the-Trainer course.

TELD/MCTP LNO Mr Pat Madden BMA • Conduct “Hybrid Threat” resident and MTT COE [email protected] 684.7997 Train-the-Trainer course. • OE Assessment Tm Leader BMA 684.7929 Provide distance learning (DL) COE Train-the- Mrs Angela Wilkins [email protected] Trainer course. OE Assessment Team Mrs Laura Deatrick • Respond to requests for information (RFI) on [email protected] ISC 684.7925 threats and Threat issues. OE Assessment Team Mr H. David Pendleton [email protected] ISC 684.7946 YOUR Easy e-Access Resource OE Assessment Team Mr Rick Burns [email protected] BMA 684.7897 With AKO access--CTID products at: OE Assessment Team Dr Jim Bird [email protected] Overwatch 684.7919 www.us.army.mil/suite/files/11318389

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