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Downloaded 2021-09-25T04:36:11Z Provided by the author(s) and University College Dublin Library in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite the published version when available. Title Natural reason : A Study of the Notions of Inference, Assent, Intuition, and First Principles in the Philosophy of John Henry Cardinal Newman Authors(s) Casey, Gerard Publication date 1984 Publisher Peter Lang Link to online version http://www.peterlang.com/index.cfm?event=cmp.ccc.seitenstruktur.detailseiten&seitentyp=produkt&pk=41455&concordeid=60078 Item record/more information http://hdl.handle.net/10197/5560 Downloaded 2021-09-25T04:36:11Z The UCD community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters! (@ucd_oa) © Some rights reserved. For more information, please see the item record link above. Natural Reason A study of the notion of inference, assent, intuition and first principles in the philosophy of John Henry Cardinal Newman Gerard Casey School of Philosophy University College Dublin Abstract Natural Reason is an examination of the religious epistemology of John Henry Cardinal Newman. Although his epistemology was developed primarily to defend the rationality of religious belief, it is, nevertheless, pertinent to problems of belief in general. The theme of the work is that Newman’s central epistemological notions conceal crucial ambiguities. These are the result of his inheriting an inadequate philosophical tradition whose limitations make it exceedingly difficult for him to give systematic expression to this thought. The clarification of these ambiguities will allow Newman’s thought to reveal itself in all its brilliance. Page | 1 CHAPTER 1 INFERENCE Inference in general is characterised by Newman as the conditional acceptance of a proposition. There are many passages scattered throughout the Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent which serve to make this point. “Inference is conditional because a conclusion at least implies the assumption of premises”; “Inference is in its nature and by its profession conditional and uncertain”; “[I]nference] is an acceptance on the condition of an acceptance of its premises”; “The special characteristic of inference is that it is conditional”; “Inference ...holds propositions conditionally”; “Inference is the conditional acceptance of a proposition.” 1 All these statements as to what inference is imply a contrast of inference with assent, which is characterised as being the unconditional acceptance of a proposition. Inference and assent can thus be defined reciprocally in terms of being or not being conditional. 2 For the purposes of this chapter we can take inference to be synonymous with reasoning. According to Newman we reason when we hold one thing by virtue of another; whether we hold it as evident or as approximating or tending to be evident, in any case we so hold it because of holding something else to be evident or tending to be evident. 3 For Newman, there are three kinds of inference: formal inference, informal inference and natural inference. Formal Inference Reasoning is a very ordinary and common human activity. As it occurs in the state of nature we apprehend it to be more a simple act than a process or series of acts. In the case of natural inference, which is reasoning in the state of nature, the antecedent and consequent are directly associated; there is no recognition of the medium connecting them. Such natural reasoning is effortless and unconscious, rather like the operations of sense and memory. Despite, or perhaps because of, its spontaneity natural reasoning is not without fault. In this it also resembles sense and memory, for as our senses sometimes deceive us and our memory sometimes fails, so too does our natural reasoning capacity lapse from time to time. The melancholy facts are that one man differs from another, one man differs from himself at different times and even when all are agreed and a consensus is reached, it is still possible for the consensus to fall short of the truth. As a result of 1 J.H. Newman An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (London, 1901), p. 8; p. 59; p. 75; p. 172; p. 189; p. 229. Subsequent references to the An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent will be abbreviated to Grammar . 2 Since I shall be discussing the nature of the relationship of inference to assent in the third chapter I shall leave the critical discussion of the nature of ‘conditionality’ until then. Here, I shall be concerned with discovering what inference is when considered in itself. 3 Grammar , p. 259. Page | 2 our individual and communal failings, it is desirable to examine the process of reasoning with a view to discovering a method which may act as a common measure between mind and mind. 4 There is also another factor which leads us to try to develop a canon of reasoning. This is the suspicion, derived from the constructive activities of our minds, that the “summa rerum” is one whole, constructed according to definite principles and laws. If we could gain knowledge of the universal or the general, this knowledge would facilitate our ability to reason about particulars. This canonical method of reasoning, according to Newman, will have two aspects: the investigative and the juridical. By the investigative method Newman simply means that whereas before the possession of this method we were confined to the solo exercise of our reasoning powers concerning the investigation of things, now that we possess this method we may investigate things conjointly with others. Again, by the juridical method Newman is simply pointing out that whereas once we had simply to rely solely on our individual judgement in assessing the success or failure of our undertakings, now we can use the common measure of reasoning as a standard by which to judge along with others. We are thus secured against the more egregious personal blunders and saved from a slavish reliance on “the capricious ipse dixit of authority. 5 Newman points to geometry and algebra as instances of such investigative and juridical methods in specific areas. Within these areas these methods allow us man escape from the limitations of his individuality. According to Newman, logical inference is simply another such method, differing from geometry and algebra not in kind but in degree. Whereas geometry and algebra are limited to specific areas of inquiry, logical inference is more ambitious and is impatient of any restrictions on its subject matter. Now, without external symbols to mark out and to steady its course, the intellect runs wild; but with the aid of symbols, as in algebra, it advances with precision and effect. Let then our symbols be words: let all thought be arrested and embodied in words. Let language have a monopoly of thought; and thought go for only so much as it can show itself to be worth in language. Let every prompting of the intellect be ignored, every momentum of argument be disowned, which is unprovided with an equivalent wording, as its ticket for sharing in the common search after truth. Let the authority of nature, common-sense experience, genius, go for nothing. Ratiocination, thus restricted, and put into grooves, is what I have called inference, and the science, which is its regulating principle, is Logic. 6 This striking passage is worth reflecting on as it contains what Newman obviously considers to be a key element in his account, namely, a sharp distinction between mental and verbal reasoning. Formal inference is verbal. It is “thought arrested in language.” As such, formal inference contrasts with both informal inference and natural inference, both of which are non-verbal to some degree. 4 Grammar , p. 262. 5 Grammar , p. 262. 6 Grammar , pp. 263. Page | 3 It is my contention that Newman is wrong in insisting upon such a sharp dichotomy between types of inference. Indeed, he is close to being inconsistent as one of his goals is to show the complementarity of formal inference and informal inference. Rather than its being the case that inference can be divided along mental/verbal lines, I claim that Newman’s real thesis is that inference is a continuum, with informal inference being its norm and formal inference and natural inference being its limiting cases. What locates a piece of inference at a particular place on the continuum is its degree of consciousness or verbalisabality. Reasoning which is completely explicit or conscious is formal inference (or rather, formal inference is its limiting case): reasoning which is completely inexplicit or unconscious is natural inference (or rather, natural inference is its limiting case). Formal inference is what Newman has in mind in the passage quoted above. What is it that restricts ratiocination and puts it into grooves? Language. “Verbal reasoning of whatever kind, as opposed to mental, is what I mean by inference, which differs from logic only as logic is its scientific form.” 7 It will be remembered that our canonical method of reasoning was supposed to fulfil two functions, namely to provide a common measure by which joint investigation could proceed and to supply a test or standard by which to judge the results of such investigation. Insofar as inference can be expressed fully in language these two goals can be achieved. However, if it is the case that not all inference can be fully verbalised, then we may expect there to be a failure to attain these two goals corresponding to the degree of inexpressibility of the inference. Inference, as conditional, is not so much concerned with propositions per se as with their comparison. Now languages in their natural state are invariably messy, full of idiosyncratic idioms and ambiguous connotations. 8 If our undertaking is to compare propositions then it is of considerable help if the words of the proposition have a simple, definite, and narrow meaning.
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