THE EVIDENTIAL FORCE OF MIRACLES

Abstract: Historically, miracles have been held in high esteem for their testimony to the Christian message. Yet, the rise of modernism has influenced a decline in the use of miracles for Christian apologetics. In fact, their evidential value is now questioned altogether. It is precisely this question that I intend to address by way of two great thinkers – and . By critically analyzing Hume’s famous argument against miracles through the lens of Newman’s response, I propose an evaluation of the evidential force that miracles exercise today.

1 1. Introduction

In his seminal novel, The Brothers Karamasov, Dostoevsky writes,

The genuine realist, if he is an unbeliever, will always find strength and ability to disbelieve in the miraculous, and if he is confronted with a miracle as an irrefutable fact he would rather disbelieve his own senses than admit the fact. Even if he admits it, he admits it as a fact of nature till then unrecognized by him. does not, in the realist, spring from the miracle but the miracle from faith. If the realist once , then he is bound by his very realism to admit the miraculous also.1

As great literature so often does, this passage articulates with elegant simplicity a philosophical issue of Dostoevsky’s time. Yet it is one that remains relevant today. While miracles have historically been considered a great testimony to Christian claims, the onset of modernism, with the corresponding dominance of materialism, has largely set miracles aside as pious foolery.

What is the relationship between miracles and faith? If, as Dostoevsky claims, miracles presuppose faith, why were they historically so central to Christian apologetics and can they be used as evidence today? These are the question I would like to take up through a discussion between David Hume and John Henry Newman.

According to Hume, miracles are coherent within a Christian worldview, but unconvincing to an atheist or agnostic who always has two lines of defense: “one is to say that the event may have occurred, but in accordance with the laws of nature… the other is to say that this event would indeed have violated natural law, but that for this very reason there is a very strong presumption against its having happened, which it is most unlikely that any testimony will be able to outweigh.”2 Newman is certainly sympathetic to this point, for he concedes that, “a

1 Dostoevsky, Fyodor, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. by Constance Garnett (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1990), p. 11. Emphasis added. 2 J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the existence of God, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 26. 2 miracle is no argument to one who is deliberately, and on principle, an atheist.”3 Nonetheless, he retains hope that one whose mind is blunted by habituation to the regularity of nature may, by miracles, be roused to reflection and the realization of a Supreme Power is involved in his creation.4 Thus, we shall consider, following Newman’s arguments, whether reflection on miracles can penetrate these two lines of defense to arrive at consideration of God.

2. The First Line of Defense

As previously stated, the first line of defense is to claim that the alleged miracle can be attributed to natural causes. Newman grants that there are plenty of cases where this is true and these, he agrees, are not authentic miracles. In fact, he goes beyond merely mentioning the point about natural causes by considering several ways of mistaking the natural for the supernatural.

He even goes so far as to list reasons to be suspicious of an alleged miracle that does not yet have an identified natural cause. It certainly seems arguable and worth considering whether each of

Newman’s criterion is valid and whether he has not set the standard to high, but it suffices for the current investigation to note that he has undoubtedly given a sympathetic consideration to this objection.5 For Newman, taking this objection seriously helps us throw out many alleged miracles that are not legitimate, yet he thinks that even with this higher standard there remain

3 John Henry Newman, Two Essays on Biblical and on Ecclesiastical Miracles, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), p. 11. 4 Ibid. 5 In Newman’s defense, he is in this essay considering what can be known from reason alone. It makes sense that there are restrictions placed on what a person can responsibly claim to know through reason that are removed by the light of faith. Considering the context of Newman’s argument, it seems plausible that he would advocate accepting a wider range of miracles with the inclusion of faith. 3 miracles that must be taken seriously due to their “publicity, clearness, number, instantaneous production, and completeness.”6

As a point of clarification it ought to be noted that Newman is not yet claiming that these miracles have been positively proven to be genuine; he is only saying that they merit further consideration because there is not yet sufficient reason to claim that they have a natural cause.

For some cases, it is easy to claim a natural cause and end the debate there. Others (he uses the example of bring the dead back to life) cannot so easily be attributed to nature and must, therefore, employ the second defense. Before addressing this second defense, we must consider another aspect of the first defense.

Newman’s definition of a miracle is not a causeless event. It is not enough to say that a miracle cannot be adequately accounted for through natural causality. For Newman, we must also show that there is good reason to attribute the event to God. Failure to do this, he thinks, is a mistake that Hume makes.7 J.L. Mackie, adapting the Humean argument, accepts Newman’s definition of a miracle, but finds this more of a burden rather than a problem-solving blow.8 Now we must show both that the alleged miracle is not sufficiently explained by the laws of nature

6 Newman, p. 68. 7 “It derives its force from the assumption, that a Miracle is strictly a causeless phenomenon, a self-originating violation of nature; and is solved by referring the event to divine agency, a principle which (it cannot be denied) has originated works indicative of power at least as great as any Miracle requires.” Newman, p. 15. I do not think he does justice to Hume in this regard because Hume does say in a footnote, “A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent” Hume, p. 77 (italics as in original). Hume is not denying God as the efficient cause of a miracle. His argument is that the nature of a miracle, as a violation of nature, regardless of how it comes about is such that “mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity” Hume, p. 90. Nonetheless, Newman proceeds to address Hume’s actual argument, so this mistake, though it oversimplifies the real objection that Hume sees, is not fatal to his overall argument. 8 “However, the full concept of a miracle requires that the intrusion should be purposive, that it should fulfill the intention of a god or other supernatural being” Mackie, p. 22. 4 and serves a divine purpose. This second part he sees as nearly impossible to prove because traceability is lost. We are claiming that an immaterial being is somehow affecting the material world.

Newman addresses this objection by reframing the question. If we attribute an alleged miracle to God, it is sufficiently accounted for as far as power is concerned. Certainly, it is not a problem for He who created all things to influence them directly in whatever manner He wishes.

The real question is a matter of final causality not physical causality.9 Is this the kind of thing that God would do? It is only considered in the context of his whole argument, that the significance of this statement becomes clear. If we already know that there is a God who has the power to act independently of the laws of nature and that the laws of nature are at the service of a higher moral law, it does not seem impossible or even unlikely that God might occasionally intervene in a supernatural way (that is, in a manner more direct than natural causality) for a reason of the moral order. Thus, a miracle is not, in itself, unlikely for Newman. The real question is whether an alleged miracle is an instance of this phenomenon and final causality is the evaluating criterion to answer it.10

9 “Now the Miracles of the Jewish and Christian Religions must be considered as immediate effects of Divine Power beyond the action of nature, for an important moral end; and are in consequence accounted for by producing, not a physical, but a final cause” Newman, p. 18. 10 Patrick Nowell-Smith says that, “the problem is not whether science can explain everything in current terms, but whether the explanation of miracles requires a method quite different from that of science. Unless this latter thesis is proved, it is hard to see why miracles should be called ‘supernatural’.” His argument assumes the empiricist premise. Thus, for him there is a dilemma. If miracles cannot be known under the methodology of science, we cannot really know them at all. If we do in fact know them, then they are known by science and there is no reason to call them supernatural. Newman’s present point responds to this assertion. The difference in method involves seeking final causality rather than the physical causality to which science is limited. Patrick Nowell-Smith, “Miracles,” in New Essays in Philosophical Theology edited by Antony Flew and Alasdair Macintyre, (Macmillan Company, 1980), pp. 243-253. 5 Before moving on to the second objection, let us summarize what has been argued thus far. The objection is that an alleged miracle has a natural cause. First, we must examine whether there is reason to attribute the event to a natural cause. Second, we must examine whether there is reason to attribute the event to a supernatural cause. This is more than a mere lack of natural explanations. It is done positively by investigating patterns of final causation, which I will expand on in a later section. Only after considering both the positive and negative dimensions can may we proceed to a judgment, which could affirm or deny the alleged miracle with varying certitude or suspend judgment. By following this procedure, we will have fairly addressed the possibility of a natural cause without the unwarranted assumption that a supernatural intervention is not a real option. Now, we must consider that most of the time alleged evidence is mediated by people who may be deceived or dishonest.

3. The Second Line of Defense

The second Humean line of defense asserts that the unlikelihood of a miracle actually occurring cannot outweigh the likelihood of the testifier being deceived or dishonest. Given the preceding discussion, it is not clear that there is an intrinsic unlikelihood attached to a miracle.

The circumstances and details of an alleged miracle may give us an inclination toward accepting or rejecting it, but these are already evidence and we must aim to weigh them fairly. Since concrete alleged miracles always come with a set of circumstances, it is easy to miss the fact that our initial response to a miracle is towards the details and circumstances of that event not the abstract nature of a miracle. Thus, it is not the intrinsic unlikelihood of a miracle, which ought to be weighed against the likelihood of the testifier being deceived or dishonest; rather, it is circumstantial evidence (keeping in mind that we must consider positive evidence for and against

6 not the mere lack of positive evidence against) which is weighed against the possibility of the testifier being deceived or dishonest.11

Having made this point, we must, as Newman does, learn what we can from this objection. Certainly, the character of the witness, by which we consider the likelihood of their being dishonest, and the competency of the witness, by which we consider the likelihood of their being deceived, are quite relevant.12 Thus, he spends a considerable portion of his Two Essays on

Biblical and on Ecclesiastical Miracles examining several reasons to question the character or competency of a witness. Nonetheless, it may be the case that a witness seems to be of good character and competency. Hume presented the dilemma of two conflicting elements: there is no previous experience of the alleged event and this person says it happened. Newman is effectively adding a third complication: there is no good reason to think that this person is deceived or lying.

There is an interesting dynamic implicit in this conundrum: to say that it is more likely that this person is deceived or deceiving, when there is no evidential reason to think that either is the case, than that our own understanding (perhaps even our ability to understand) is lacking is pride not evidential probability.

Let us return to the second line of defense. The argument runs thus: A miracle is by nature as improbable as anything can be. There is some degree of probability that the witness is deceived or deceiving. Therefore, it is more likely that the witness is wrong than that the miracle be true. Following Newman’s thought, the first proposition is false, the second needs a caveat, and thus, the conclusion does not follow. First, a miracle is not, by its nature, improbable; rather,

11 This line of argument is implicit at best in Newman’s argument. It seems possible that he thought of it since it merely follows his ideas to their conclusions, but I think his argument benefits from drawing them out explicitly. 12 “The credibility of testimony arises from the we entertain of the character and competency of the witnesses” Newman, p. 72. 7 its concrete details and circumstances weighed with possible natural and final causes make it more or less probable that the alleged miracle really occurred. Second, that people are able to deceive and be deceived is not reason to assume it likely that a particular person is either in a given circumstance. Mackie critically accepting Hume’s argument concedes that, “the inductive argument from ‘x per cent of observed As have been Bs’ to the statistical generalization ‘x per cent of As are Bs’ is far from secure, so that we cannot say that ‘x per cent of observed As have been Bs’ even probabilifies to the degree x per cent the conclusion ‘This as yet unobserved A is a

B’”.13 Thus, we cannot securely make the generalized statement that in any given miraculous claim it is more likely that a witness is wrong than that the miracle really happened.

4. Key Principle: Concreteness

The responses to Hume’s objections that have been discussed thus far are really applications of a critique that can be stated more generally. Here, I shall quote Newman at length.

The question is not about miracles in general, or men in general, but definitely, whether these particular miracles, ascribed to the particular Peter, James, and John, are more likely to have been or not; whether they are unlikely, supposing that there is a Power, external to the world, {307} who can bring them about; supposing they are the only means by which He can reveal Himself to those who need a revelation; supposing He is likely to reveal Himself; that He has a great end in doing so; that the professed miracles in question are like His natural works, and such as He is likely to work, in case He wrought miracles; that great effects, otherwise unaccountable, in the event followed upon the acts said to be miraculous; that they were from the first accepted as true by large numbers of men against their natural interests; that the reception of them as true has left its mark upon the world, as no other event ever did; that, viewed in their effects, they have-that is, the belief of them has-served to raise human nature to a high moral standard, otherwise unattainable: these and the like considerations are parts of a great complex argument, which so far can be put into propositions, but which,

13 Mackie, p. 24. 8 even between, and around, and behind these, still is implicit and secret, and cannot by any ingenuity be imprisoned in a formula, and packed into a nut-shell.14

The general principle being articulated here is that we must not disregard the concreteness of miracles. Consider the following questions: Can miracles in principle occur? Can we know whether miracles can in principle occur? Was X an authentic miracle? Can we know whether X was an authentic miracle? The first of these is an abstract-ontological question. Can miracles in principle occur? The second is an abstract-epistemological question. Can we reasonably answer the first question? In contrast the third and fourth questions are concrete-ontological and concrete-epistemological respectively. The problem with Hume’s argument is that it blurs the two epistemological questions. He asks if we can know whether any X was an authentic miracle and answers negatively. On the one hand, this appears abstract. He intends to show that something applies to all concrete situations because it follows from the very nature that they share in common. Namely, we cannot know concrete miracles because the nature of miracles precludes knowing them. On the other hand, by consenting to the possibility of miracles in principle and only objecting to our ability to verify alleged miracles, the question is necessarily concrete. So long as we are asking about the veracity of concrete miracles, even if we asked about every concrete miracle ever purported, we must consider the details and circumstances that make up their concreteness. Further, these concretizing factors must be included in an accurate abstract notion of miracles albeit it in an indeterminate or unspecified manner, because it belongs to the nature of a miracle to be in a network of systems (natural and supernatural). To consider miracles in ontological isolation is to oversimplify the situation and so to attack a straw man.

14 Newman, John Henry, Grammar of Assent (New York: The Catholic Publication Society, 1870), Ch. 8, Sec. 2. 9 This significance of this single factor can been seen from the way that Hume and

Newman discuss miracles. For Hume, the epistemological dimension of miracles can be reduced to two propositions: First, miracles are by definition irregular and so unverifiable. Second, people are likely to lie or be mistaken. Newman, on the other hand, spends a large amount of time elaborating the nuances of these two propositions. Why? Because even the abstract discussion of miracles must include concrete elements, though they are presented in abstraction as kinds of miracles or characteristics of people that would be specified in the consideration of a particular miracle.

In this context we can more deeply understand the analysis above. The problem with assuming a natural cause is that it ignores the fact that miracles are not proposed as isolated, arbitrary violations of nature in a materialistic framework but rather as purposeful interventions in a theistic one. The purposefulness of miracles is known with respect to a system of revelation.

They are not at all arbitrary in the context of revelation within which they are proposed. In this context, they may be part of a coherent worldview (this inner coherence is part of judging their validity even within religions). They are only arbitrary and de facto unlikely when stripped of this concrete context. The objection pertaining to testimony has a similar problem. One cannot rightly assume that Peter is lying or mistaken on the grounds that people, in general, frequently lie or are mistaken, particularly when there is no positive reason to suppose that either is the case with Peter. The force of Hume’s argument comes from a weighing of unlikelihood, but again, the a priori unlikelihood of miracles presupposes that they be taken out of concrete context.

5. Conclusions

10 After considering the constructive dimension of Hume’s criticisms, Newman leaves us with a high epistemological standard for justifiably accepting miracles on the basis of reason alone. An miracle worthy of this acceptance must lack reason to assert a natural cause known or unknown, have positive reason to attribute it to God based on final causality, and have no good grounds to assert that the testimony is incredible or incompetent. These acceptance of these criteria, however, require that we first agree with the presuppositions that developed them: there is a God with the power to bypass the laws of nature, that there is a moral order, and that there is reason to think God would interrupt the natural order for the sake of the moral order.15 To accept these principles is to accept key tenants of the Christian worldview.

Newman admits that a miracle “professes to be the signature of God to a message delivered by human instruments; and therefore supposes that signature in some degree already known from His ordinary works.”16 Yet the last part is significant. Yes, the argument presupposes God’s involvement with the world but this, he asserts, can be known from His non- miraculous works. In other words, Newman’s proof does presuppose the Christian or at least a certain kind of theistic worldview, but there is good reason (even before faith) to hold that worldview. Indeed, to properly interpret miracles we must permit them to be understood in the context of revealed faith rather than insisting that they make sense in a foreign worldview. Thus, one could appropriately make the nuanced assertion that certain miracles are coherent within a particular worldview which is in itself coherent, though I do not accept this worldview and miracles are not coherent with the worldview that I do hold. The question at hand would then be which worldview best accounts for reality.

15 Newman argues for these points in his essay. A discussion of them was not included here because treating them fairly would require another paper long assessment. 16 Newman, p. 10. 11 As Thomas Kuhn observed, people will generally hold a certain theoretical paradigm until an unquantifiable threshold of anomalies convinces to them to find a new one. This insight reveals why the apologetic dynamic of miracles differs today from past times. Whereas previous generations evangelized in an environment where theism, albeit not necessarily Christian, was the generally accepted paradigm, the onset of modernism marked a large-scale paradigm shift where atheism and materialism are the default. This is highly significant regarding the evidential force of miracles. In the past, a common paradigm enabled miracles to arbitrate between religious claims. Now, the proposed arbitrating evidence, miracles, does not belong to a common paradigm. Thus, miracles do not generally, in isolation, compel one to embrace the Christian paradigm, but they may contribute to the anomalies that lead one towards a paradigm shift or change in worldview. What, then, could an honest agnostic conclude about miracles? No doubt, there are miracles that one cannot responsibly discard on the grounds of reason alone. At least, he must suspend judgment and hold them to be anomalies. At best (perhaps in combination with cosmological arguments), miracles and their antecedent worldview are to be accepted.

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