NATO’s Eastern Flank

do not see – at least in the short term – EU’s financial and political assistance Poland must now turn its attention to much room for defining a substantially to Kiev in the wake of the October the two main instruments for achieving different policy. parliamentary elections, which proved this goal: the quick implementation However, it would be premature a success for Ukraine’s pro-European of the NATO summit’s conclusions to expect that Poland’s interest in the forces. It will also continue to make and progress towards establishing an EU’s Eastern policy will diminish sure that the free-trade agreement is EU energy union, both of which are or be abandoned entirely. Rather, its not derailed due to a Russian strategy essential to ensuring that Western efforts will focus on securing the EU’s of postponing its implementation Europe can meet the Russian challenge. long-term engagement in Ukraine and and watering down its provisions. in other EaP countries, as well as on The overall priority of Polish policy Piotr Buras helping to preserve its association with will thus remain the same: preserving Head of the Warsaw Office of the the EU and follow the European path Western Europe’s cohesion in the face European Council on Foreign Relations. of modernisation. Warsaw will certainly of dramatic geopolitical changes in the continue to support and orchestrate the Eastern neighbourhood.

Estonia: The Next Flashpoint in Russia’s Anti-Western Drive?

James Rogers and Olavi Jänes

Recent skirmishes between and Russia suggest that the former’s security concerns should be taken seriously, with a threat to this frontier state representing a threat to the European liberal order.

n many ways, as Stephen Fry recently occupation thereafter, which crippled became the first nation in the so-called Iargued in the Independent, Estonia its economy and standards of living and ‘post-Soviet’ space to legalise civil is ‘one of the miracles of the modern polluted its natural environment. partnerships. The technology of the world’. With just 1.3 million people, it is However, Estonians are no Information Age – like wifi and high- a small country on the southern shore of victims. Since the restoration of their speed mobile broadband – is available the Gulf of Finland, at the confluence independence in 1991, they – along with almost everywhere: for over a decade, between the Baltic and Nordic zones. their Baltic cousins, Latvia and Lithuania Estonians have enjoyed a variety of Its population is concentrated in four – have risen up to forge a successful, public and private e-services, making key cities, namely Tallinn, , Pärnu modern, liberal and democratic nation, Estonia the exemplar of an ‘e-state’. and . Approximately 25 per with some of the highest levels of Yet despite Estonia’s miraculous cent is Russian-speaking, spread out economic growth in the EU. Shiny recovery over the past two decades, primarily along the nation’s industrial new apartment blocks, office towers, there remains a certain trepidation about corridor between Tallinn and Narva shopping malls, dual carriageways the future, particularly regarding the in the northeast. Throughout much of and railways are being built at a rapid intentions of the country’s large eastern the twentieth century, the country was pace. And progressive legislation is neighbour, Russia, whose population, caught in the crosswinds of geopolitics, being proposed and enacted by the economic heft and military capability with Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany – the Estonian parliament – are vastly superior to its own. Given both stomping over the country, leaving to make this small nation a beacon of Moscow’s recent actions in Georgia devastation in their wake. Estonia was liberty in the Eastern neighbourhood. and Ukraine – and some of the major forced to endure four decades of Soviet Indeed, in early October, Estonia Western powers’ lacklustre responses

November 2014, Vol. 34, No. 6 3 countries – including Tallinn’s Baltic and Nordic partners, Germany, the UK and the US, as well as the EU – for the immediate release of the Estonian agent, Russia’s Federal Security Bureau (FSB) has proceeded to prosecute him under Russian criminal law. Kohver is now being held at the infamous Lefortovo Prison in Moscow under conditions that raise concerns about due process. Surprisingly, he has relinquished two well-known Russian defence lawyers commissioned by the Estonian state, and is now being defended by a Russian-appointed defence lawyer who is – according to Eesti Päevaleht, one of Estonia’s leading daily newspapers – purportedly associated with the FSB. Although likely falling short of an ‘act of aggression’ in the light of the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 3314 of 1974, Russia’s behaviour cannot be described as anything other than a violation of international law – as an illegal incursion into the sovereign territory of another country – as well as a violation of Eston Kohver’s human rights. The kidnap of an Estonian Personal reassurance: US President Barack Obama greets Estonian schoolchildren on a visit to Tallinn, September 2014. Courtesy of AP Photo/Mindaugas Kulbis. citizen on Estonian territory by Russian state agents, lacking both personal and – it is no surprise that many Estonians border guard had not previously been territorial jurisdiction, qualifies as a still see Russia as a threat. Indeed, aware of the Russian special operation violation of Kohver’s right to liberty although Estonia was granted a reprieve and, during the joint investigation and security under Article 5 of the throughout much of the 1990s, as Russia by the two countries’ border guards, European Convention on Human dealt with its own internal difficulties, filled out a document attesting to the Rights. The situation became even more such as rampant corruption and even fact that a crossing had taken place strained at the end of September, when the risk of the secession of certain from the Russian side to Estonia, and two former KGB majors were arrested oblasts, that period is now understood back. However, the document was not by the Estonian border guard. They are to be over. Today, Vladimir Putin’s iron subsequently signed off by Russian suspected of having illegally crossed the first has successfully crushed almost officials. Russia later claimed that Estonian border at the Narva River, and all opposition to Moscow’s writ within Kohver had been captured while spying resisted legitimate arrest. Russia. Allied to a revanchist foreign- somewhere in Russia’s Pskov Oblast. But the situation is not all bad. To policy agenda and high energy prices, this some extent, the recent ‘reassurance has provided the determination, means measures’ adopted by NATO have and revenue for the Kremlin to project The bilateral relationship assuaged Estonian fears. NATO’s power far beyond Russian borders. air policing mission, the decision to Worse, the bilateral relationship between Russia and generate a NATO ‘Spearhead Force’ between Russia and Estonia has Estonia has deteriorated and the establishment of pre-positioned deteriorated in recent times, particularly military equipment in Eastern Europe since the kidnapping of Estonian have all – in Estonian eyes – been steps security-service agent Eston Kohver Russia also refused to grant, within in the right direction. In addition, the in early September. According to the seventy-two hours of his capture, 10,000-strong, British-led Northern Estonian authorities, Kohver was consular access to Kohver, constituting Expeditionary Force initiative and the engaged in an anti-smuggling operation a violation of the respective bilateral visit of US President Barack Obama to in the vicinity of the Estonian-Russian agreement between the two countries. Tallinn prior to the NATO summit in border when he was threatened with Access was eventually granted, but early September have both provided a firearms and taken against his will requests for further contact were denied supplemental layer of reassurance. from Estonian territory into Russia. for many weeks. Despite Tallinn’s However, Estonians’ overall security Significantly, officials from the Russian protests and calls from twenty-one concerns remain. These revolve around

4 RUSI Newsbrief NATO’s Eastern Flank

the fear that, one day, Russia will turn its A further question is what Estonia’s the principal underwriters of European attention firmly back onto the nation, situation means for British policy- security, the UK must therefore take the which will lack the means to resist. makers. It may be that Russia has concerns and needs of its Estonian ally There is also concern that, alternatively, no intention of stirring up further – as well as those of the other two Baltic Moscow will engage in dirtier tactics trouble beyond Ukraine. Furthermore, States – seriously. Helping the Estonians to gradually undermine the Estonian Estonia may have, by itself, the means to deter Russian provocation, whether state, via an incremental, ‘drip-drip’ and resilience to fend off Russian ‘traditional’ or ‘hybrid’, is critical to approach. Estonians have looked on provocations, as it has for many years. maintaining a European system that is as Russia’s so-called ‘hybrid warfare’ – Yet an Estonia that feels threatened firmly in line with British (and Baltic) with its ‘little green men’ and aggressive would not be in the UK’s national values and interests. Thus, so long as disinformation campaign – has been interest: the Baltic States are, in many London continues to support Tallinn used successfully to destabilise and ways, on ‘the frontier of freedom’, to actively, Estonia should not become a cripple Ukraine. The question they ask use a statement made by the Lithuanian ‘flashpoint’ in Russia’s apparent drive to is whether Estonia, or one of the other ambassador to the US in July 2013. vilify the West. Baltic States, will be next. To some Their security signifies the success of extent, the situation is different: unlike the rules-based European liberal order James Rogers and Olavi Jänes in Ukraine, Estonia’s Russian-speaking that the UK has done so much to foster, James Rogers is Lecturer in European minorities are more diverse. And as a build up, support and protect. Security and Olavi Jänes is Senior 2011 study by Marju Lauristin found, At the same time, unless Estonia – Lecturer in International Law at the many, particularly the young, are loyal this ‘miracle of the modern world’ – is Baltic Defence College. to the Estonian nation, which is their allowed to continue to develop, free Twitter: @james_rogers homeland by birth, rejecting Russia’s of Russian interference, others may arch-conservative turn. But the fear in ask questions about the durability of The authors write here in a strictly personal Tallinn nevertheless remains. NATO. Given its position as one of capacity.

NATO and the Security of the ‘Eastern Flank’: A European Perspective

Luis Simón

A better alignment of the defence capabilities and strategic thinking of NATO and the EU will be key to Western efforts to strengthen defence and deterrence in Eastern Europe.

he main takeaway from the NATO Iraq and Syria (ISIS). However, Russia’s Action Plan (RAP). The purpose of Tsummit held in Wales in September annexation of Crimea and its ongoing the RAP is to ensure that the Alliance was the return of defence and meddling in eastern Ukraine have led will be able to react to crises swiftly and deterrence to the European security to a renewed emphasis by the Allies firmly. Its backbone will be a new Very debate. This does not mean that the era on such traditional tasks in relation to High Readiness Joint Task Force or of expeditionary military operations is Eastern Europe. ‘Spearhead Force’ of some 4,000–6,000 over. In fact, NATO’s heads of state Arguably, the best illustration of the troops, which should be able to deploy and government devoted much of their growing importance of defence and to the front line within forty-eight hours. time to discussing how to deal with the deterrence on the ‘eastern flank’ was The viability of the Spearhead Force will threat posed by the Islamic State of NATO’s adoption of the Readiness depend on the existence of appropriate

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