Workplan 2019/2020

PUBLIC VERSION

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

Contents

Foreword from President and CEO ...... 5

1 Introduction ...... 7

2 Regional Program Overviews ...... 9 2.1 Africa ...... 9 2.2 Asia ...... 10 2.3 Europe and Central Asia ...... 11 2.4 Latin America and the Caribbean ...... 12 2.5 Middle East and North Africa ...... 13 2.6 United States ...... 14

3 Gender ...... 15

4 From Early Warning to Early Action ...... 16

5 Cross-cutting Work Streams ...... 17 5.1 Jihad in Modern Conflict ...... 17 5.2 Economics of Conflict ...... 17 5.3 Climate Change and Conflict ...... 18 5.4 Technology and War ...... 18

6 Communications and Advocacy ...... 19 6.1 Communications and Advocacy ...... 19

7 Setting Priorities ...... 21 7.1 Strategic Prioritisation ...... 21 7.2 Monitoring and Evaluation ...... 21 7.3 Partnerships and Collaboration ...... 22

8 Summary of Expected Work ...... 23

9 Annexes ...... 24 9.1 Breakdown of Issues by Region ...... 24 9.2 Crisis Group’s Coverage Worldwide ...... 53

Foreword from President and CEO

Much has remained the same in the almost 25 years since Crisis Group was founded. We began our first quarter-century in the shadow of calamities in Rwanda, Somalia and the Balkans. We embark on our second haunted by more than a half-million dead in Syria, conflicts ravaging, among a depressingly long list, in Afghanistan, Nigeria, South Sudan and Yemen, and record numbers of people displaced by war.

Amid the proliferation of conflict, we have not altered our mission or core methodology. We start with rigorous fieldwork in the war zones. We talk to all parties to the conflict in question so as to understand – and fairly portray – their interests and motivations. We develop sound, practical policy advice for resolving conflicts. And we depend on our credibility with and access to decision- and opinion-makers across the globe to help translate those recommendations into reality. Throughout, we strive to be unconstrained by politics or ideology, to serve no single country but rather an international public good, to represent conflict victims worldwide and to offer transparent analysis grounded in the facts. These are the habits honed over a quarter-century of experience on the front lines and the hall- marks of a tradition to which we shall remain faithful.

The conflict landscape has changed a great deal, however, and we must make our own adjustments. The West, once predominant, has seen its relative influence fade and its willingness – or ability to – resolve conflicts erode. China and Russia have grown more assertive. International polarisation has diminished the (already questionable) effectiveness of multilateral institutions. Uncertainty as to the global balance of power has encouraged regional actors to stoke, perpetuate and manipulate conflicts to their advantage or their ri- vals’ detriment. Social media as well as new technologies have revolutionised how wars are covered and how they are waged.

The Workplan before you will show you the ways in which we are adapting. It flows from our new 2019-2024 Strategic Framework. The fruit of eight months of study and consulta- tion, the Framework charts an ambitious course for the next five years to meet our objective – that policymakers and opinion-shapers around the globe turn to Crisis Group as the world’s premier conflict prevention organisation – and to fulfil our mission of preventing, mitigating and resolving deadly conflict.

The Framework rests on three pillars.

First, we must maintain and sharpen our research and analytic capacity. To address growing demand for our work from governments, non-state actors, civil society, the business community and the media alike, we are recruiting additional staff to deepen our expertise with regard to both existing and emerging conflicts. We also have taken initial steps to launch initiatives on Climate Change and Conflict as well as on Technology and War, Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 6

complementing our existing cross-cutting work on Gender, Economics of Conflict and Ji- had in Modern Conflict. Another novelty – our Dialogue Initiative – is a demand-driven effort to bring conflict stakeholders together.

Secondly, we must enhance our advocacy. The most insightful analysis is only as good as its impact. Accordingly, we must be creative in developing ways to shape stakeholders’ understanding and policy, particularly at a time when power is more diffuse. As this Workplan illustrates, we are appealing to new audiences by balancing long-form reports with shorter, more targeted outputs. We also are bolstering our use of videos, infographics and interactive web content.

Thirdly, we must invest in strategic communications. Facing greater competition for policymakers’ time and attention, we are working to raise our visibility so that those we wish to influence know they can and should turn to Crisis Group for the most reliable, up-to-date field-based knowledge and analysis and the most incisive policy recommendations regarding conflict resolution. So, too, with media: in order that our ideas might carry weight with decision-makers, we are bolstering our efforts to ensure that both the traditional press and social media feature our output prominently.

Crisis Group is a collective enterprise – a collective comprising our richly diverse and ded- icated staff, but also our consumers. We cannot succeed unless those we want to reach find us credible, reliable, timely and useful. We are looking forward to your feedback on this Workplan, which, as always, will remain flexible and adaptable in response to new demands or unexpected crises.

Finally, I cannot conclude without highlighting the plight of our colleague Michael Kovrig. As this Workplan goes to press, he has been wrongfully imprisoned in China for over 200 days. He is a pawn in a game that others are playing. Our every thought is with Michael and his family. We will continue to fight for his release, relentlessly and without fail, until he is at home, surrounded by his many loved ones. We will count on the help of all who support our work to make that day come soon.

Robert Malley President & CEO 1 Introduction

This Workplan describes what Crisis Group intends to do between 1 July 2019 and 30 June 2020. It is based on and reflects the priorities of our new Strategic Framework (2019-2024), which details how Crisis Group will advance its mission to prevent, resolve and mitigate deadly conflict while adapting to changes in the conflict landscape. Our Strategic Frame- work has several objectives, including maintaining and sharpening our research and analysis as well as bolstering our impact on those who make and influence policy.

Our plans to boost our research and analysis form the core of this Workplan (Sections 2-5). We will complement conflict-specific analysis with a robust cross-cutting research agenda. As the concerns of policymakers and other conflict actors shift, we will strive to stay on top of global conflict trends and incorporate cutting-edge methods into our field-based analysis.

Toward this end, we will deepen our efforts to integrate gender analysis in our work (Sec- tion 3). We aim to understand the distinct roles of men and women in both sustaining and ending conflict; to recommend paths toward increased women’s participation in the peace and security realm; and to propose policy prescriptions that take account of conflict’s dif- ferential impact on men and women.

We also will sharpen our focus on early warning (Section 4). We will alert policymakers to developments that could portend new or accelerating conflict. CrisisWatch, our monthly global tracker, which monitors 70-80 conflicts and crises around the world, and points to trends, risks of escalation and peacemaking opportunities, will enter its sixteenth year, and remains one of our most popular publications. Our President’s widely read Foreign Policy article “Ten Conflicts to Watch” – an annual curtain raiser on threats and recommendations for the year to come – will next be published in January 2020. Throughout the year, we will continue to convene workshops close to conflict locations involving representatives from conflict parties, aimed at developing ideas for effective early action.

We are expanding our other thematic focuses as well (Section 5). This year’s Jihad and Modern Conflict outputs will explore the state of Islamist militant groups in countries that have undergone counter-ISIS operations, and countries that are peaceful but fragile. We will also assess the dangers posed by jihadist fighters re-turning to their home countries and continue our cutting-edge work on talking to militant groups. Our work on the Eco- nomics of Conflict will concentrate on deepening understanding of the role of economic dynamics in instigating, perpetuating or resolving conflicts. As noted in our Strategic Framework, we will start new cross-cutting work in the areas of Climate Change and Con- flict and Technology and War.

The Workplan also discusses our ideas for enhancing advocacy and strategic communications, our five-year strategy’s second and third objectives (Section 6). These include mixing long-form reports with shorter, quick-reaction pieces timed to coincide with policymaking opportunities. We will coordinate our advocacy and communications activities more effectively. With their help, we will carry out a range of advocacy-related activities, public and private, to complement our written outputs. We will mount full-fledged campaigns in a Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 8

handful of cases chosen because the stakes are especially high, our capacity is particularly strong and the policy objective clearly defined. We will strive to ensure ever-more timely publications, to synchronise our messaging with events and surges of mainstream news interest in the conflicts on which we work. We will strengthen our communications, including through our website, traditional and social media engagement, podcasts, videos and interactive visuals. We will look for opportunities to organise dialogues with conflict actors, including across conflict divides, where conflict parties express a desire for our neutrality, credibility and expertise and where we are convinced we can have value-added. We will use our research and analysis as the basis for discussion and, wherever possible, partner with organisations with relevant experience.

Since no one power or even set of powers holds the key to resolving all the world’s conflicts, we will continue to cast a wide net with our research and advocacy. As always we will engage heavily with Western powers via our Brussels and Washington offices and monitor both great-power and multilateral dealings at the UN in New York. At the same time, we will maintain our presence in Russia and invest more resources in understanding perspectives from, inter alia, the AU, various African capitals, ASEAN countries, Istanbul, Bogotá, Latin American regional organisations and the Arab Gulf states.

Finally, we know that we will be best positioned to meet our goals if we have strong monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems in place for assessing and measuring our progress (Section 7.2). In 2019/20 we will continue to build on the solid foundation of a new framework, introduced in 2017, for identifying goals and strategies for each conflict we cover, recording our work’s impact; and integrating lessons learned into future activities. This framework, praised in independent evaluations of Crisis Group’s work over the last couple of years, helps us offer more detailed reporting of our impact. We will continue to deepen our M&E efforts in the coming year, recognising that they serve not only to document our work for partners but also to help us continually adapt in service of Crisis Group’s mission. 2 Regional Program Overviews

The following is a summary of the planned work in our regional Programs. Details of the Programs’ conflict priorities and proposed outputs are in Annex 9.1.

2.1 Africa Overview Africa faces all-too-familiar peace and security challenges: low-intensity insurgencies that create humanitarian crises; tense elections that risk provoking violence; authoritarian drift that erodes institutions and sparks rebellions; and unfinished peace processes that plunge fragile states in and out of conflict.

Resolving the continent’s conflicts is ever-more complex because an increasing number of external actors are seeking to promote their national interests and exert influence on Afri- can states. China has added a growing military presence – notably, a naval base in Djibouti but also troops in UN peacekeeping missions – to its long-established economic ties in Africa. It has stepped up its political influence and diplomatic engagement (in the Horn and East Africa but increasingly in West Africa, too). Russia has returned to Africa and is weighing in on peace and security matters (particularly in the Central African Republic and Burundi, as well as Sudan), motivated by access to resources, new alliances and the satisfaction of thumbing its nose at the West. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains ambivalent: its long-awaited new Africa strategy features traditional priorities like countering the jihadist threat and maximising the efficiency of foreign aid, but seems to lack the resources required to make Washington the dominant player in those areas. Meanwhile, the strategy betrays an obses- sion with checking China – in an extension of the global trade war – and, to a lesser degree, Russia. Europe is distracted (in particular by Brexit) and at its core remains concerned chiefly with migration and counter-terrorism. At the same time, newer players, such as the Gulf states and Turkey, are exercising influence in the Horn and West Africa. Africa’s leaders are not passive victims of global intrigues, of course: governments and elites (including those in the diaspora) actively seek to manipulate and benefit from external interventions. The sheer multiplicity of interests at play, however, makes the search for durable peace more difficult.

Responding to the agility and resilience of jihadist and other violent non-state groups, particularly in the Sahel, but also in the Lake Chad basin and Somalia, remains key. Jihadist violence is intensifying in East Africa, with new attacks in Kenya, and is spreading to Mozambique and Tanzania. In the Sahel, it now threatens Burkina Faso, while in the Lake Chad basin, the Boko Haram faction known as Islamic State in West Africa Province continues to launch bold attacks against the region’s military forces. Reaching consensus on how best to respond to jihadist insurgencies continues to be a dilemma for African states and their international partners. None of the three major military responses – the joint G5 force established two years ago to curb the Sahel’s jihadist threat, the multinational joint task force created to combat Boko Haram and the AU Mission in Somalia deployed to defeat Al-Shabaab – has changed dynamics on the ground. Insurgents are able to adapt to military pressure. A strategic adjustment is necessary that makes more room for Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 10

political initiatives alongside military action, particularly in the Sahel, including potential dialogue with militant groups. But getting international actors to agree to this shift remains difficult, given the need to find common ground among divergent national security interests.

Averting violence in difficult leadership transitions, particularly in Ethiopia and Sudan, but also in Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC and Zimbabwe, remains a challenge. Fraught elections loom in 2019/20 because leaders refuse to exit, violence and social unrest is mounting, polls are taking place in fragile post-conflict environments or governments are closing democratic space. But citizens, particularly youth, will continue to push back, both despite and because of the combined pressures of socio-economic decline and heightened repression. Indeed, protesters are increasingly confident in taking to the streets to demand better government despite harsh crackdowns. An urgent dilemma is how to encourage transitions that fulfil protesters’ well-grounded desire for change without yielding to chaotic collapse of entrenched regimes. And while the possibility of transformation is evident, transitions are never smooth. Consolidation after controversial votes is also a perennial challenge. The risk of greater conflict remains real if domestic and international legitimacy is hard to attain or if repressive governments pursue hardline policies in the face of deepening ethnic cleavages and spreading instability.

Getting to sustainable peace through dialogue in the continent’s more intractable conflicts will preoccupy international and regional mediators. Better coordination between the AU and UN has enabled the signing of important peace agreements, but increased diplomacy and rigorous monitoring of hard-won deals will be crucial to prevent a relapse.

The AU, which seeks a prominent political role in shaping peace processes, needs to more actively safeguard these peace deals, preventing looming crises and taking decisive action, especially where it is a guarantor of the peace. The AU Peace and Security Council’s resolute communiqué of 15 April 2019 in response to the Sudanese military’s seizure of power, and its subsequent suspension of Sudan following the Transitional Military Coun- cil’s failure to hand over power to civilians, sent an important message about the unconsti- tutional change of government. But it will be particularly important for the AU to balance its November 2018 reaffirmation of the “principle of subsidiarity”, which grants a primary peacemaking role to regional bodies even when they have proven ineffective, with the need to take concerted steps to avert conflagration.

2.2 Asia

Overview Asia is marked by a significant diversity of types of actual and potential conflict, with distinct sets of drivers in each situation. In general terms, conflict drivers in the region include jihadism, use of militant proxies, ethnic and sectarian marginalisation, geopolitical tension, persistent consequences of historical conflict (eg, the Korean War, partition of the Indian subcontinent and the Sri Lankan civil war), and poor governance and authoritari- anism (eg, the Philippines and Thailand). There are some intersections within Asia – such as the triangular intersection of conflict dynamics among Afghanistan, Indian and Pa- kistan, and the spillover of Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis into Bangladesh – but these are specific to those situations rather than a regional theme. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 11

Afghanistan remains key because of both the conflict’s deadly intensity and the opportunity for conflict resolution that current U.S.-Taliban negotiations – and potential broader peace talks – present. The extraordinary magnitude of risk posed by North Korea’s growing nuclear capability keeps the Korean peninsula on the radar.

In Myanmar, prospects are not bright for either resolution of the Rohingya refugee crisis or the moribund peace process involving a variety of ethnic armed groups. Nevertheless, it is crucial to mitigate the risk that Rohingya displacement metastasises into an even graver problem; to dampen the possibility of additional Rohingya flight; and to revive the peace process when the time is ripe (likely after national elections in 2020).

China is now a regional hegemon, at least with respect to its nearest neighbours, and a growing driver of political, economic and security trends throughout Asia (and beyond). Although China obviously presents geopolitical challenges, the areas where it exerts its greatest direct influence are those closest to and most reliant upon it (North Korea, Southeast Asia, Myanmar and Pakistan). China-India contestation is another dynamic of considerable regional importance.

Meanwhile, Muslim Mindanao in the southern Philippines has reached a critical juncture. Prospects for peace are the best in decades, but political dysfunction and threats from armed groups remain. The success of the new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao depends on inclusivity, security and the new regional government’s performance in delivering social services. Expectations are high, as is the potential cost of failure.

The Philippines reflects China-related dynamics. President Rodrigo Duterte’s effort to shift Philippine foreign policy toward closer ties with China and away from the U.S., its treaty ally, sits uneasily with the reality of conflicting claims in the West Philippine/South China Sea. Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea may incite popular pressure for a more confrontational approach to China and other countries with competing claims.

2.3 Europe and Central Asia

Overview Europe and its neighbourhood, including the Caucasus, Russia, Turkey and Central Asia, present a diverse tapestry of conflict and political change. The next year holds potential for shifts large and small as war in Ukraine enters its sixth year and stalemate over Nagorno- Karabakh its 26th. In Georgia, frustration with the slow pace of political change overshad- ows a stagnant peace process regarding the de facto independent regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In Turkey, the governing party must respond to a population that has ex- pressed discontent through municipal elections, even as the nation as a whole copes with an influx of refugees from Syria and migrants from around the world. The government also continues to clash violently with Kurdish separatists. Balkan politics simmer below the boil- ing point, but the prospect of unrest remains. Throughout the region, governments struggle to define effective policies toward jihadist fighters and their families returning or relocating from Syria.

All this takes place as tension spirals between Russia, on the one hand, and the U.S. and its allies, on the other. Russia is an important factor in all the conflicts on its periphery. In Ukraine any progress toward ending that war depends on its willingness to make peace. For Moscow, Ukraine is part and a parcel of a standoff with the West, which complicates its choices as well as those of Kyiv. Turkey’s effort to improve ties with Russia while Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 12

maintaining its membership in the NATO alliance adds complexity to its domestic challenges. Meanwhile, the conflict in Syria cannot be resolved without Moscow; in Afghani- stan, too, Russia is an important player. Russian actions in Africa, Asia and Latin America need to be understood from Moscow’s perspective if the Kremlin is to help mitigate conflicts there. The outlook is not entirely bleak. A small opening for Nagorno-Karabakh, driven in part by Armenia’s change of government, has appeared. Similarly, if Ukraine’s new president, Vo- lodymyr Zelenskyy, reaches out to the population in the eastern territories his government does not control, he could lay the groundwork for eventual reunification, though Crimea will likely remain in Russian hands for the foreseeable future. In Georgia, it is difficult to see clear paths toward conflict resolution but shifts in power in Tbilisi may yet illuminate them.

2.4 Latin America and the Caribbean

Overview Latin America has much to worry about in 2019/20. Many citizens in the region are disil- lusioned with their democracies and angry at political elites whom they view as incapa- ble of reversing economic decline and chronic violence. The discontent creates fertile ground for charismatic and potentially authoritarian leaders of the sort elected in Brazil and Mexico in 2018. Regional organisations are under immense strain due to deepening political polarisation among countries, generating a leadership and coordination vacuum at a time when Latin America’s peace and security challenges are worsening – with Vene- zuela’s crisis in particular taking a deadlier turn. Meanwhile, rising violence in Mexico, Bra- zil and parts of post-conflict Colombia, as well as the difficulty of sustaining a long-term fall in murder rates in Central America, reflect a growing number of micro-territorial battles among armed groups or criminal gangs that are often linked to competition over international trafficking routes. Draconian iron fist responses to deteriorating law and order in a number of countries could make matters far worse.

Two flashpoints now stand out in the region. While many governments in the region are acutely concerned by Venezuela’s crisis and the resultant migrant exodus – over four million have fled the country, with well over a million now living in Colombia alone – they have collectively proven unable to forge a peaceful, negotiated solution. Divisions among Latin American states, a belligerent U.S. stance against President Nicolás Maduro, and growing Chinese and Russian influence have hindered an effective, united response. As the struggle persists between Maduro and National Assembly chair Juan Guaidó, who has asserted his claim to the interim presidency, the risks of some form of military confrontation, breakdown in public order and mass humanitarian emergency have never been higher. In Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega has engaged once again in negotiations with the opposition movement that rose up against his rule in 2018 and then faced an implacable crackdown from state security forces in which it suffered the loss of hundreds of lives. A sharp economic contraction and deep mistrust between the sides make stronger regional backing essen- tial to the survival of the peace process.

Across the most violent areas of Latin America, tough law enforcement remains the stand- ard response of most governments. In El Salvador and Honduras, source of a rising flow of migrants and refugees to the U.S. border, these approaches have achieved a precarious reduction in murder rates, but they have not diminished the power of gangs over people’s Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 13

lives. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s moves to make it far easier to own guns could worsen violence in a country that saw over 60,000 murders in 2017. In Mexico, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has vowed to end the “war on drugs”, which is producing record murder rates in the country, but plans to continue relying on the military to tackle cartels via the creation of the National Guard. Colombia’s coca boom, meanwhile, has brought growing domestic and U.S. pressure on the government to prioritise forced eradi- cation of the crop and killing or capturing criminal leaders. This course of action would risk undermining the 2016 peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia insurgency at a time when the guerrilla National Liberation Army appears set on violent ex- pansion, seemingly with support from parts of the Venezuelan security establishment. One of the region’s rare success stories in curbing judicial impunity and violent crime, the UN Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, faces dismantlement by its host government.

2.5 Middle East and North Africa

Overview Destabilised by the Trump administration’s bellicose maximum pressure campaign against Iran, unfinished or aborted political transitions and shifting intra-regional alliances, the Middle East and North Africa could see fresh rounds of social upheaval, an intensifica- tion of proxy violence and possibly even a direct confrontation between the U.S. and its allies and Iran. Civil wars with regional dimensions continue in Syria and Yemen; another has restarted in Libya; and Iraq and Lebanon, under external pressure, remain dangerously fragile. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains tense; Gaza and Jerusalem are the main flashpoints but an explosion is always possible in the West Bank as frustration grows. In Syria, Israel and Iran are involved in a dangerous standoff that could trigger a wider conflict.

Elsewhere in the region, though populations may be wary of mass mobilisation after the violent reactions to the 2011 uprisings, the conditions that led to the original wave of protests – high-level corruption, repression and lack of economic opportunities and political inclusion – are still there, now in augmented form. There is reason to worry about the state of Egypt. Algeria is in the throes of a popular uprising against autocratic rule; its outcome is unclear, but whatever happens there will affect the surrounding countries. Tunisia, often labelled the only success story of the 2011 uprisings, is entering a period of potential instability as its leadership, which oversaw a peaceful political transition, passes from the scene. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have worked hard to forge alliances throughout the region, including in North Africa and the Horn, but are facing competition from Qatar and Turkey, with deeply polarising – and, in Libya, violent – effects.

The increasingly intersecting nature of the region’s conflicts is a particular worry: addressing one conflict driver could well aggravate another, thus altering a conflict instead of ending it. With grand-bargain solutions unlikely, the way forward should focus on two separate but simultaneous tracks: continued efforts to end individual conflicts, while exploring ways of bringing relevant domestic, regional and global stakeholders to the table in order to minimise risks of renewed escalation and lay the foundation for a lasting settlement. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 14

2.6 United States

Overview U.S. foreign policy is too often characterised by searches for military solutions to complex crises without a clear understanding of the risks, a set of achievable goals or a well-defined exit strategy. The result has been costly and unsuccessful interventions in Iraq and Libya, an eighteen-year war in Afghanistan, seemingly open-ended support for Saudi Arabia’s brutal campaign in Yemen, and a widening and insufficiently transparent war on terror from the Arabian Peninsula to the Sahel. Perhaps of greatest immediate concern, the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action exacerbates the risk of a major conflict with Iran.

The public’s growing fatigue with wars that seem endless, and concern about the possibility that President Donald Trump’s hawkish advisers could take the U.S. to war in Iran or elsewhere (notwithstanding his own wariness about foreign entanglements), have prompted members of Congress to begin flexing muscles on matters of war and peace. Legislators thus reversed or at least slowed a decades-long trend which had seen them become more deferential to the president. In early 2019, both chambers of Congress passed war powers legislation that (had he not vetoed it) would have forced Trump to direct the withdrawal of U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen. And in the summer of 2019, draft legislation that would withhold funding for unauthorised war in Iran was making its way through Congress. 3 Gender

As Crisis Group’s work across the globe illustrates, we are determined to deepen our understanding of the role of gender in conflict and its resolution. Forging inclusive and sustainable peace agreements requires that women as well as men should play their full role in all aspects of conflict prevention, peace negotiations, and post-conflict reconstruction and governance.

In line with our Strategic Framework 2019-2024, we will deepen the integration of gender considerations into report planning, field research and policy development. We will focus on the different experiences of women and men in conflict; the ways in which conflict actors, states and armed groups use gender to mobilise their constituents; and the distinct contributions women and men make in peacemaking. We will also highlight the gender-differentiated impact of conflict on local populations, including widespread sexual and gender-based violence in conflicts across the world. This work will help policymakers – local, regional and international – as well as civil society actors to take gender into account as they work to prevent, mitigate and resolve deadly conflict. 4 From Early Warning to Early Action

Early warning, combined with early action, is key to preventing or at least managing the spread of conflict. Preventing conflict is much less costly than extinguishing it or dealing with its consequences. For the most part, the longer a crisis lasts, the worse the political fragmentation, social grievances, transnational spillover and mass displacement that fol- lows. Conversely, the earlier the potential for conflict is identified, the broader the range of policies that might stop an explosion.

Monitoring dozens of possible conflict situations worldwide, with an established track record in early warning, we will continue to advise on how to address causes of conflict and shape protagonists’ behaviour. Building on our July 2016 report Seizing the Moment: From Early Warning to Early Action, which lays out a preventive diplomacy framework, we will produce reports, briefings, commentaries, conflict alerts and statements, monthly in- stalments of CrisisWatch, briefings on priorities for the African Union (AU), the UN Secu- rity Council and the EU, and the widely read annual article “Ten Conflicts to Watch” (to be published next in January 2020).

CrisisWatch, our monthly global conflict tracker, is entering its sixteenth year. It remains a widely read early-warning bulletin among policymakers, journalists, businesspeople, civil society activists and the general public. The publication provides updates on political and security developments in some 70-80 conflicts, crises and vulnerable countries, and assesses in each case whether the overall situation has, over the previous month, deteriorated or improved, or on balance remained unchanged. For the full list of countries or conflict situations we currently monitor, see Annex 9.2. 5 Cross-cutting Work Streams

5.1 Jihad in Modern Conflict

From 2014 until recently, the Islamic State (ISIS)’s organisational core in Iraq and Syria has been the chief global counter-terrorism challenge. But ISIS’s fortunes have changed dramatically. In March 2019, a U.S.-led coalition and the Syrian government recaptured the last territorial vestige of its border-spanning “caliphate”. Now, the question is whether the victory over ISIS is sustainable. In both Iraq and Syria, the organisation has reverted to insurgent warfare. Many of the drivers of instability and conflict in both countries have been inadequately addressed, if at all, and international assistance to stabilise and rebuild post- ISIS countries remains uncertain. Farther afield, ISIS’s global “provinces” have emerged as capable, autonomous militant organisations, even as they look to ISIS’s “caliph” (likely in Iraq or Syria) for guidance.

Meanwhile, al-Qaeda – notably its most prominent affiliates – has re-emerged from ISIS’s shadow. Some policymakers fear that the focus on ISIS has allowed al-Qaeda and those affiliates to develop into something more intractable and dangerous. Despite ISIS’s defeat, jihadism appears to retain some appeal across parts of the Muslim world. Protracted conflicts offer such groups opportunities to put down roots, control territory and win new re- cruits. Notwithstanding the increased U.S. emphasis on great-power competition, transnational jihadism and counter-terrorism appear likely to continue commanding an out- sized share of its attention and resources – and those of other Western powers as well. As the almost two decades since 9/11 illustrate, these states’ policies frequently make things worse.

5.2 Economics of Conflict

The Economics of Conflict initiative explores the economic forces behind political violence and promotes use of cutting-edge quantitative techniques to understand and address them. Building on years of Crisis Group field reporting, this effort integrates economic expertise and new data sources into our traditional fieldwork approach in order to reach new audiences and deepen our impact.

As part of this work stream, we will continue to partner with the Empirical Studies of Con- flict (ESOC) collective, a network of political scientists and economists at top U.S. univer- sities, to establish a two-year postdoctoral fellowship for the next generation of conflict scholars: recent PhDs in economics, political science, public policy and related fields. These fellows will work in Crisis Group offices and will be mentored by senior Crisis Group staff as well as ESOC scholars. The fellows will contribute analysis and writing to Crisis Group reports and other publications, while developing their own long-term research projects. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 18

5.3 Climate Change and Conflict

In 2019/20, we will start investigating the potential for new work on Climate Change and Conflict by considering the following question: how does climate change provoke, perpetuate and shape conflict?

5.4 Technology and War

In 2019/20, we will start exploring the potential for new work on Technology and War, considering the following question: what is the impact of new technologies, including arti- ficial intelligence, cyberwarfare and social media, on the instigation, conduct and resolution of deadly conflict? 6 Communications and Advocacy

6.1 Communications and Advocacy

We will be focusing on Crisis Group’s 25th anniversary in 2020 and beefing up our communications staffing. These activities will build on strong rises in all our main metrics for traditional and social media visibility for three straight years: website page views, media citations, Twitter impressions, translations and videos. Our actions are supported by the second year of a two-year start-up investment, a Challenge Fund to which a number of donors have committed.

In 2019/20, we will seek to scale up our advocacy across our regional Programs, including by identifying key levers of influence beyond traditional power centres and engaging with a wide array of stakeholders including in Addis Ababa, Abuja, Nairobi, Pretoria and Can- berra. We will seek to strengthen our responsiveness to events at an early stage, before a crisis erupts or as it is unfolding, to influence crucial decisions. As appropriate, we will rely on a mix of public and closed-door advocacy to achieve our policy objectives. To enhance our reach, we will seek to make better use of our trustees and, where advisable, partner with outside stakeholders including think-tanks and civil society organisations (see Sec- tion 6.3). Lastly, we will continue to broaden our range of written outputs, combining our long-form, in-depth reports with shorter, timelier and livelier interventions. (For detailed plans, see Annex 9.1.)

An important element of our revitalised approach to advocacy and strategic communications will be to ensure that our advocacy efforts worldwide are coordinated so that all our work is geared toward influencing key decision- and opinion-makers. A Latin America Advo- cacy and Communications Officer started work in 2018/19, and a similar officer will join the Africa program in 2019/20. Our goals will be to fully integrate the goals of our regional projects, and the relevant advocacy and communications plans, to maximise our impact. We will strive to ensure ever-more timely publications, to synchronise our messaging with events and surges of mainstream news interest in the conflicts on which we work. We will also build alternative, self-standing platforms to deliver our analysis and policy recommendations in the form of social media threads, Instagram stories and long-form documentaries.

Podcasts will be another area of experimentation. In September, we will air three trial epi- sodes of a “War and Peace” podcast featuring ECA Program Director Olga Oliker, her co- host and guests looking at conflicts in and around Europe, Crisis Group’s Europe-related work, and European views and actions in conflicts elsewhere. We will also pursue further progress in the strong rise in citations of our work and analysts in global media since 2017, especially visible in leading publications like The New York Times and Washington Post. Updates to our expanding database of reporters will continue, and we will seek to do even more of the “push quotes” that we inaugurated in 2018/19, sending our senior staff’s rapid reactions to events to top reporters. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 20

We will continue to press forward with the 2018 Digital Media Audit’s advice to build visibility by putting out more visual products. The hiring of a full-time videographer and photogra- pher, and activation of a new photo storage and sharing system, has bolstered our ability in this regard and allowed us to highlight our field research and high-level advocacy. Photo essays and illustrated “Our Journeys” travelogues have become regular features in our publications line-up and we will develop them further in 2019/20. We will likewise continue support for Crisis Group’s new photography-led Instagram feed, launched in 2018/19. 7 Setting Priorities

7.1 Strategic Prioritisation

With strong demand for our work and a more diverse range of outputs than ever before, prioritisation is critical. As we conduct our work in 2019/20, we will seek to ensure prioritisation according to the following three dimensions:

1. Conflict coverage In choosing the conflicts we cover and those we will drop, we will weigh the impact we could have on a conflict and its victims, the feasibility of the work required and Crisis Group’s unique value-added against the likely investment required, in terms of staff time, capacity and finances.

2. Thematic coverage We will assess thematic issues along largely the same lines, prioritising those with the greatest impact, feasibility and value-added; those we can best integrate into our analysis of specific conflicts; and those that lend themselves to practical policy recommendations.

3. Written outputs vs. other deliverables Analytic conclusions and major policy lines flow primarily from our long-form reports, briefings and other written products. These are the bedrock of our reputation and will remain our primary outputs. At the same time, we need to be responsive and concise, and engage policymakers in more varied ways. When considering whether to trade off writing against other means of communicating our analysis, we will prioritise those methods that we believe will have the widest and greatest impact in the case in question.

7.2 Monitoring and Evaluation

We are committed to the monitoring and evaluation of our work, using both qualitative and quantitative approaches, in order to clearly assess and enhance our impact, and in order to learn and adapt so that we continue to contribute effectively to the prevention, mitigation and resolution of deadly conflict.

In 2019/20, we plan to build on the findings of independent evaluations conducted for our funders in March 2019. We will also further engage with peer organisations to strengthen our M&E processes.

Our M&E strategy, endorsed in 2017, is built on five elements: 1) affirming and nurturing a commitment by all staff to support M&E best practices, and pursuing these practices within resource constraints to the greatest extent possible; 2) reviewing regularly and adapting strategic planning processes and content in light of lessons learned from M&E; 3) refining tracking and evidence gathering in order to strengthen the quality of M&E; 4) integrating lessons learned systematically across the organisation; and 5) articulating impact and relevance discovered through M&E both internally and externally. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 22

7.3 Partnerships and Collaboration

In an era of fragmented conflicts, transnational threats, and increased connectivity and civil society activism, Crisis Group recognises the need to reach out to prospective partners. Our partners will include other international non-governmental organisations with expertise complementary to our own field-centred research, as well as local groups with which we team up to broaden our networks and build our capacity to shape the debate. We will also collaborate with other organisations in the conflict response field with a focus different from ours – for example, human rights, mediation, peacebuilding, gender, economics or the environment.

Crisis Group’s work has long included relationships with a range of governments and inter- governmental and non-governmental organisations. We will continue to strengthen those ties. These relationships are reflected in both our field research, which is strongly in- formed by consultations with local and international stakeholders, and our advocacy and engagement, which relies on constructive dialogue with conflict parties and interlocutors in governments, international organisations and civil society.

Additionally, we occasionally join NGO networks in which several organisations share common policy objectives. We are, for example, an active and longstanding member of the Eu- ropean Peacebuilding Liaison Office. We also belong to the Crisis Action advocacy network. A number of senior staff serve on advisory boards. We will continue this approach where it advances our strategic interests. 8 Summary of Expected Work

We intend to publish between 75 and 85 detailed reports or briefings, along with full translations of select pieces into languages other than English, covering dozens of conflicts and crises worldwide, as well as cross-cutting issues, containing among them several hundred separate policy recommendations.

We also will produce:  Some 200 commentaries, op-eds, statements, alerts, Q&As, photographic essays, podcasts and videos. Op-eds are published under the names of Crisis Group staff and/or Board members in leading news outlets, including locally or regionally influential media, with more than one third in languages other than English.  Twelve issues of CrisisWatch, our monthly global conflict tracker summarising the state of play in some 70 situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world and identifying risks of deterioration and opportunities for progress.  Up to 20 EU Watch List entries highlighting conflict situations we believe threaten to worsen significantly unless remedial action is taken, including ten entries in an annual early-warning report and up to five in each of the two Watch List Updates.  Some 2,000 written and oral briefings for senior officials, diplomatic representatives, lawmakers and others, in both Program countries and key capitals, as a means of drawing attention to and engaging in discussion about our research findings and policy recommendations; these will include regular roundtable meetings and policy seminars in both Program countries and key capitals at which Crisis Group’s analysts formally present their views and engage in dialogue with policymakers.  More than 2,000 original tweets and postings on our main Crisis Group social media accounts on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram, designed to generate coverage in influential outlets and forums of our key findings and recommendations on particular conflicts or crises or cross-cutting issues.  More than 2,000 citations from interviews with Analysts in major publishing outlets. 9 Annexes

9.1 Breakdown of Issues by Region

Africa Security Threats in the Greater Sahel Since the Malian crisis erupted in 2012, the central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) has suffered growing insecurity and political instability. States have launched military operations, including the G5 Sahel Joint Force comprising units from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, to curb several insurgencies, some of which were mounted in the name of jihad. But the insurgencies have become deadlier and geographically more dispersed. The instability has disturbed local economies and facilitated the rise of illegal and sometimes violent trafficking in gold, and drugs and other commodities. State authorities continue to lose ground in rural areas, as insurgents take control and locals increasingly distrust national security and defence forces.

Supported by international partners, Sahelian states have tried to stabilise the region primarily through military action. But these deployments have not succeeded in stemming violence and often have been counterproductive, notably in stoking intercommunal tensions in rural areas. Meanwhile, jihadist groups continue to expand across the region despite the presence of the French-led counter-terrorism operation (Barkhane) and the UN peacekeeping operation (MINUSMA). The latter is the most dangerous UN mission of its kind. The G5 Sahel Joint Force, meanwhile, is hampered by funding delays. The G5 Sahel secretariat, the Sahel Alliance – a donor coordination group – and the EU have been mar- shalling financial resources to complement security operations with development projects. Yet ongoing shortfalls and insufficient efforts at reforming governance have thus far thwarted efforts to create a security-development nexus.

Six years after the first international troops deployed and four years after warring Malian parties signed the Algiers peace agreement, strategies are ill adapted to realities on the ground, which require a better balance between military operations and dialogue initiatives.

In 2019/20, our efforts in the central Sahel will focus on pushing Sahelian states and their international partners (EU institutions and member states, notably France, Ger- many, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries, as well as Algeria, the U.S., the Economic Community of West African States and the AU) to reconsider how they deal with insurgencies. In particular, and under the right conditions, we will encourage dialogue between Sahelian states and armed groups, including those fighting in the name of jihad. We will also shed light on other neglected sources of conflict, notably related to the local exploitation of resources.

At present Sahelian governments generally reject dialogue with insurgents on the grounds that they are “terrorists”. We will seek to engage with civil society actors, including inter- faith leaders, to identify new avenues of discussion with armed groups that might over time persuade governments to soften their attitude. Overall our aim is to encourage Sahelian governments and their international partners to view dialogue as part of a comprehensive Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 25

plan for the region, involving, inter alia, military pressure, development aid and efforts to disarm armed groups rather than a narrower approach of seeking to defeat militancy by force of arms.

Boko Haram and the Lake Chad Area With field-based expertise on all four countries caught up in the insurgency, we are uniquely placed to analyse Boko Haram’s impact. In 2014, the four Lake Chad basin countries set up the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency. Financed with bilateral contributions and EU funds channelled through the AU, the MNJTF was an important vehicle of cooperation among countries involved in operations that required cross-border deployments. In 2015-2016, the MNJTF staged an offensive that helped compel Boko Haram to split in two. One faction, the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), developed a more lenient attitude toward civilians and runs a quasi-state drawing upon Lake Chad’s resources. It launches large attacks on military forces with frequent success. It has rebuilt influence in areas the unified Boko Haram had previously lost and forged closer ties with the Islamic State, or ISIS. The other faction, still under the command of Abubakar Shekau, is once again on the offensive – including with suicide attacks.

In 2019/20, we will recommend steps that the Lake Chad states (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) and international actors (especially EU institutions and member states, the UK, the U.S. and the AU) can take to adapt their responses to the new challenge posed by ISWAP, so as to reduce violence in Boko Haram-dominated areas and eventually help end the insurgency. We will look at the MNJTF to improve the force’s effectiveness while retaining its flexibility. Material from this research will also inform work on prospects for reintegrating former Boko Haram fighters, a key element of any strategy for tackling the insurgency. We will consider how to return of hundreds of former male fighters to civilian life. While substantial negotiations with ISWAP are not yet on the table, we will also encourage Lake Chad authorities to reflect on the sort of demobilisation package that they could offer to Boko Ha- ram affiliates.

We will seek to engage with influential Nigerian federal and state representatives. We will raise our policy recommendations with Nigeria’s international partners inside and outside the country, especially with EU institutions and member states, the UK, U.S. and the AU as well as national and international civil society organisations.

Somalia Presidential elections to be held in 2021 are already dominating Somalia’s political landscape, but ahead of those are parliamentary elections scheduled for 2020. President Mohamed “Farmajo”, who goes up for re-election in 2021, faces a slew of challenges. Chief among them are the increasingly strained ties between federal member states and the federal government in Mogadishu. The leaders of several member states likewise face re-election campaigns and are likely to meet stiff competition from candidates said to be sponsored by Farmajo. The upcoming national and member state elections have already fuelled tensions between parties and laid the groundwork for potentially toxic politics ahead of these elections.

Al-Shabaab continues to launch regular attacks against civilians and security forces in the capital and outlying areas. The fraught political situation, slowdowns by Somali security forces to protest delayed pay and uncertainty over plans for phased withdrawal of AU Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 26

Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) troops have contributed to a worsening overall security climate. Locals have formed militias to support the Somalia National Army in the fight against Al-Shabaab. Authorities have repeatedly promised to provide military backing to Ma’awisley, the most prominent of these vigilante groups, but it has been slow in coming.

Meanwhile, relations with Kenya, a major troop contributor to AMISOM in south-central Somalia, have taken a nosedive. President Farmajo and his Kenyan counterpart Uhuru Kenyatta were unable to agree on how to settle the maritime dispute between the two countries. The presumption is that Kenya has begun to retaliate by threatening to close down the Dadaab refugee camp in northern Kenya, which authorities say is a “terrorist training ground” for Al-Shabaab (see also the section on Kenya below).

Relations with Gulf States, notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qa- tar, as well as Turkey continue to influence Somali politics. President Farmajo has declined to take an official side in the Gulf dispute, but neutrality has not insulated the country from Turkey’s and the Gulf states’ ambitions. Tensions between Somalia’s federal government and federal member states have fed into and shaped Gulf states’ and Turkey’s political affiliations, with Abu Dhabi aligning itself with the periphery while Doha and Ankara carve out influence in Mogadishu.

In 2019/20, we will advance recommendations to maximise chances of a peaceful election season, due to begin with parliamentary elections in July 2020 and to culminate in the presidential election in February 2021. Through new research on relations between the federal government and member states, we will seek to highlight the need for key partners (the AU, UN, U.S., EU institutions and member states, including Ireland, the Netherlands, France and Germany), regional countries (especially Kenya, Ethiopia and the Gulf states) and other actors (the UK) to support the electoral process through funding and technical assistance, and more importantly to encourage candidates to see elections not as winner-take-all con- tests but as avenues for compromise.

Nigeria In addition to the Boko Haram insurgency (see the section on Boko Haram above), Nigerian security forces face several other challenges that are stretching their capacity. These include heavily armed rural bandits in the North West; herders and farmers fighting each other in the Middle Belt; militants and criminals targeting oil and gas facilities in the Niger Delta; and Igbo secessionists agitating for restoration of the short-lived Republic of Biafra in the South East.

If the Boko Haram insurgency drags on, it will continually pose security and humanitarian challenges in the North East. If banditry in the North West escalates further, it could cause a humanitarian emergency and open a new frontier of rebellion. If herder-farmer violence continues, it could further undermine Nigeria’s political cohesion. If oil production is sab- otaged, President Muhammadu Buhari will be unable to fund rehabilitation of the North East and sorely needed infrastructure development nationwide.

In 2019/20, we will seek to draw attention to the deepening chaos in the North West, which militants could exploit, and to sustain our advocacy on ways to address the herder-farmer conflict, which has already claimed hundreds of lives. Regarding the herder-farmer conflict, we will continue to monitor progress made since the Nigerian government announced a National Livestock Transformation Plan in June 2018. We will also encourage policymakers, especially the government at state and federal levels and international partners

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(ECOWAS, EU institutions and member states, the UK, U.S. and the UN), to strengthen community protection arrangements in line with pledges made by President Buhari during his election campaign, by tackling corruption and launching much-needed development schemes in the country’s poorest regions.

Chad Chad faces multiple threats. All its borders are unstable. Chadian armed opposition and, to a lesser extent, jihadist movements are sheltering in neighbouring countries. More importantly, over recent months, struggles within the president’s family and Zaghawa ethnic group have become a major source of concern. Early in February 2019, an incursion by the Union of Resistance Forces (URF), a Zaghawa-dominated rebel group, from Libya prompted the president to call for help from France.

Violence is rising, including in Tibesti, where Tebu self-defence groups are fighting the army. Boko Haram recently killed dozens in attacks on the Chadian side of Lake Chad. In the meantime, intercommunal violence, especially in the east, has led to numerous casualties among civilians.

This situation is compounded by growing social unrest resulting from years of economic mismanagement and then the fall in oil prices. The state’s fiscal problems reduce the scope for the president to buy off dissent. Nonetheless, the regime shows no signs of openness to dialogue. Chad is part of the broader Sahel and Lake Chad basin, which face multiple jihadist and criminal threats, exacerbated by weak public institutions. (See the sections on the Sahel and Boko Haram above.)

In 2019/20, our efforts will focus on improving the state and Chadian partners’ responses to threats in fragile areas, especially in the east and north and, more generally, encouraging Chad’s international partners to use their influence on the government to open political space and strengthen national institutions. Through research on the north and east we will seek to make inroads with Chadian politicians, senior officers and international donors (supporting training programs or the MNJTF’s deployment) in order to advocate for improved management of communal relations.

Ethiopia Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has broken the mould with a number of significant reforms. He has made peace with Eritrea, declared a wide-ranging amnesty, restructured security institutions and ordered the prosecution of officials accused of abuses. While Ethi- opians and others praise these changes, considerable challenges lie ahead. Insecurity has proliferated across the country, with millions uprooted from their homes. Regional state leaders have taken advantage of greater political space to demand more power. The economy, battered by years of political unrest but also deep structural problems, remains weak. Amid this churn, the new administration needs to advance preparations for what Abiy promises will be the first genuinely competitive election in Ethiopian history. He must also cultivate a consensus in the political class, and beyond it, on how to hold together a multinational federation.

In 2019/20, we will seek to reduce the risk of spreading violence – including intercommunal strife – by outlining pathways to lowering ruling coalition rifts and ensuring peaceful, credible elections, currently scheduled for May 2020. We will cover Ethiopia’s major inter- and intra-regional fault lines and offer suggestions for how to ease Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) tensions and move toward a new political Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 28

compact. Crisis Group simultaneously will continue its focus on the Southern Nations region to try to prevent its disorderly fragmentation, advocating patience on the part of ethnic communities pursuing their own regions and encouraging transparency from regional and federal authorities, as well as financial and technical support from international actors, including the EU.

In foreign relations, we will press parties to bring the Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement to fruition, pursuing the buy-in of authorities in Mekelle, capital of the Tigray region on the Eritrea border. We will also monitor preparations for pivotal elections scheduled for May 2020 and the danger of disputed or violent polls.

Sudan On 11 April, security forces ousted President Omar al-Bashir, following protests that culmi- nated in tens of thousands of demonstrators sitting outside the military headquarters in Khartoum. Sudanese and outsiders alike welcomed Bashir’s ouster – he had been in power for three decades – but key risks remain. Gulf powers, notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), backed by Egypt, appear determined to help the transitional military council prevent a full transition to civilian rule, even as coordinated Western-Gulf pressure helped produce an emerging power-sharing deal between the military council and the opposition. To consolidate his hold on power, Bashir created multiple security forces, all headed by competing figures. Now that he is gone, these forces could fight each other to protect their positions. If the power-sharing deal is not finalised or fully implemented, protests may continue, hobbling an economy already in deep distress. Meanwhile, rebellions in key peripheries, including the Nuba mountains and Darfur, while much quieter than in the past, could erupt again amid the push and pull in Khartoum, partly because the government never addressed these areas’ underlying grievances.

In 2019/20, we will encourage diplomats with access to Khartoum to press for implementation of the power-sharing deal and the eventual transition to civilian rule, including a broad-based interim government that can preside over reforms leading up to elections.

Burundi Since April 2015, when President Pierre Nkurunziza decided to run for a third term, spark- ing opposition protests and violent repression, Burundi has witnessed low-intensity conflict. Almost 400,000 Burundians are refugees in neighbouring countries. The economy is on its knees, and the government is piling pressure on the population to contribute to state coffers and help finance forthcoming elections. Political and ethnic polarisation have sapped the army’s integrity. In mid-2018, the government pushed through a new constitution that would allow Nkurunziza to seek re-election in 2020, though he has since repeatedly stated that he will not stand.

The East African Community dialogue conducted by former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa has failed (as he himself acknowledges), leaving no clear way forward for mediation between the government and opposition, whether exiled or internal. The coalition of opposition exiles set up to participate in talks is falling apart. The government has continued to isolate itself, closing down the UN Human Rights office in Bujumbura, forcing some NGOs to leave the country and allowing diplomatic relations with Rwanda, European countries and the AU to deteriorate. Burundi’s contribution of around 5,000 troops to the AU mission in Somalia, a vital foreign currency earner, has been reduced by 1,000, much to the authorities’ chagrin. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 29

In 2019/20, our efforts will focus on reducing risks of violence around the 2020 elections, including by encouraging specific steps by international actors, notably the AU.

Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Other Coastal States In November 2020, tense presidential elections will take place in Côte d’Ivoire. Numerous indications suggest that the vote could trigger a new round of violent political competition and an electoral crisis.

This turn of events would have immediate negative effects in adjacent countries, particularly Burkina Faso. More than three million Burkinabè live in in Côte d’Ivoire, and a crisis there could push hundreds of thousands back to their homeland. Instability before and during the Ivorian elections could also disrupt the voting of thousands of Burkinabè living in Côte d’Ivoire who will, for the first time in history, be allowed to cast ballots for a new president in their country, also in 2020. Thousands of Malians also live in Côte d’Ivoire, and their return would add to the many problems of their already fragile country.

In Guinea, President Alpha Condé plans to run for a third term in 2020. His willingness to do so in violation of the constitution is very dangerous and could trigger social turmoil, violent street protests and ethnic clashes. Additionally, coastal countries, in particular Be- nin, Ghana and Togo, and their partners are very anxious about a possible spread of jihadist groups active in the Sahel to their territory.

In 2019/20, we will seek to contribute to efforts aimed at guaranteeing fair and peaceful elections in both Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea in 2020. Through a watching brief, we will intervene when relevant with appropriate advocacy messages for national, regional and international policymakers, in particular, France, the U.S., the UK, and EU institutions. We will also produce a non-paper on the feared spread of the jihadist threat to coastal West Africa to assess this risk.

We assume that we will continue to have access both to Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea. We also assume that we will have access to the highest authorities in those two countries and to the main figures of the opposition, due to our reputation and past work, as well as to their main foreign partners, France and the U.S.

The Democratic Republic of Congo A largely peaceful political transition away from former President Joseph Kabila took place in January 2019, though many Congolese strongly disputed the preceding month’s election results. Since then, the new President Félix Tshisekedi has undertaken positive actions and a number of armed groups have surrendered either to the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo or to the regular army.

Tshisekedi’s arrival in power is an opportunity to advance peace and reform, but he will be constrained by Kabila’s continued influence, through his entourage and his political alliance, the Common Front for Congo (FCC), which dominates the national and provincial legislatures and retains huge economic clout. Kabila’s allies will likely impede security sector reform and the fight against corruption, and the ensuing struggle between the new and previous presidents could paralyse government initiatives. As regards violence in the worst affected provinces of North and South Kivu and Kasaï-Central, several armed groups (or parts of them) have surrendered following Tshisekedi’s election. But the situation remains unstable because many other armed groups have not surrendered, as they largely pursue Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 30

predatory rather than political ends, and former militia members may take up arms again in the absence of a solid reintegration program.

In 2019/20, we will seek to provide advice for reducing violence in the country, especially in the volatile east. We will look at the challenges facing President Tshisekedi, and opportunities for peace. We will engage with influential stakeholders at the national, regional and international levels.

Zimbabwe The removal of Robert Mugabe in November 2017 and his replacement with a new ZANU- PF administration under the presidency of Emmerson Mnangagwa set the scene for a major shift in domestic and foreign policy, characterised by a drive toward internal reforms and re-engagement with the West.

The new administration’s bona fides have been severely tested by the slow pace and selective nature of reforms, the dire socio-economic situation and a return to violent repression of the opposition and perceived enemies of the state. The more overt role of the military in governance has raised profound concerns that the democratic deficit will deepen and that prospects for building a truly new dispensation, termed “a second republic” by Mnangagwa, are illusory. The reform and re-engagement agenda is under threat.

In 2019/20, we will seek to promote and extend the reforms set out in Zimbabwe’s Transi- tional Stabilisation Program and other policy undertakings, with a focus on peace and security concerns, including governance and institutional reform. We will focus on strengthening prospects for broader reform, including re-engagement with the West and international financial institutions and economic recovery. Specific issues relating to national dialogue, sanctions, corruption and the military’s role provide a set of benchmarks for assessing progress. We will also seek to engage with key policymakers and stakeholders to raise our recommendations.

Kenya Political temperatures are rising in Kenya amid a bitter fight over the succession to Presi- dent Uhuru Kenyatta. Kenyatta is due to retire in 2022 and both he and forces around him appear determined to stop his deputy, William Ruto, from ascending to the presidency. As in the past, Kenya’s leaders have neglected to strengthen election management institutions ahead of the electoral calendar. Several electoral commission officials were forced out of office in 2018 amid corruption allegations but have not been replaced. Meanwhile, politicians show no sign of building consensus on how to manage the succession.

In foreign relations, meanwhile, Kenya is locked in a confrontation with Somalia over a maritime dispute. At the same time, Al-Shabaab continues to pose a threat to security in Kenya and, in a break from past practice, it has recruited an increasing number of Kenyans from outside the north and the coast. (See also the section on Somalia above.)

In 2019/20, we will seek to warn national authorities that schisms in Kenya’s ruling Jubilee party may revive ethnic tensions in different parts of the country. Absent an elite consensus on how to manage the succession, Kenya could hurtle into conflict before the next election. Waiting until election eve will render consensus difficult to achieve and set up yet another disputed election. We will also sound the alarm should Kenyan authorities decide to close Dadaab refugee camp in the north, home to over 230,000 refugees from neighbouring So- malia. Monitoring developments in Dadaab will enable us to pursue advocacy with Kenyan

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authorities, the UN, AU, EU and influential Western diplomats (especially the UK and U.S.), outlining the dangers of a sudden repatriation of refugees to Somalia. Large parts of south-central Somalia, where most of the refugees in Dadaab come from, are still under Al- Shabaab rule.

Cameroon The situation in Cameroon, for years a point of stability in a troubled region, has declined along lines that Crisis Group has long warned about. It now faces a Boko Haram insurgency in the Far North (see the section on Boko Haram above) and an armed conflict in the English-speaking north west and south west.

This precarious security situation is worsened by a political crisis following the October 2018 presidential election, the results of which the opposition rejected, leading to protests. Since the end of January 2019, the state has imprisoned the de facto leader of the opposition, Maurice Kamto, who claimed victory and declared a “national resistance plan” for achieving it, for threatening insurrection. President Paul Biya’s government has previously favoured co-option of dissidents, and its unprecedented reaction to Kamto shows a serious repressive shift, raising the possibility of violence between citizens and security forces coun- trywide.

This combination of security threats with political crisis and ethnic cleavages could further weaken and destabilise the country. The instability could also spread to neighbours, particularly Nigeria, which already hosts 32,000 Cameroonian refugees, the Central African Re- public and Chad, which partly depend on Cameroon economically. It could also impede the fight against Boko Haram.

In 2019/20, we will promote dialogue between the ruling party and opposition, and between Anglophones and local authorities, to help calm the political and social climate at the national level and find a sustainable solution to the Anglophone conflict. Through briefings, combined with timely advocacy meetings with relevant stakeholders, we will continue to draw the world’s attention to the Anglophone conflict. We will also continue to advocate for improvements in dealing with former Boko Haram fighters in the Far North, based on published materials.

South Sudan Since the September 2018 peace agreement, South Sudan has witnessed an overall decrease in violence thanks to a fragile ceasefire between the two main camps in the five-year civil war. But the parties remain at odds over critical issues. Regional diplomacy is in disarray with key countries unable to muster a united front to drive forward reforms and external actors either absent or loath to throw their weight behind a peace deal they view sceptically. The ceasefire’s fragility and the lack of coordinated diplomacy point to a larger dilemma: the lack of a long-term strategy for resolving South Sudan’s conflict.

In 2019/20, our aim is to consolidate the ceasefire and to press for a long-term strategy aimed at a comprehensive political settlement. We will encourage a dual policy track – avoiding a breakdown of the existing peace deal while building the long-term strategy. In light of the U.S. retreat from the diplomatic lead, we will engage with a range of influential regional and international actors involved in South Sudan. In addition, we will seek to influence the UN debate in New York and use our contacts to pass messages to national governments. We will also retain our high media profile via Twitter and frequent comments in prominent outlets. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 32

Central African Republic In the Central African Republic (CAR) lethal clashes – both among armed groups and between them and UN peacekeepers – persist in provincial towns, along cattle routes and, to a lesser degree, in the capital Bangui. Neither the large UN peacekeeping force nor the national army, which is slowly deploying across the country following several years of EU and now Russian training, is able to constrain armed groups’ predation. The violence results in mass displacement and malnutrition.

AU-led international mediation produced agreements on paper, but so far with little impact on the ground, where the balance of forces leaves little incentive for armed groups to change their behaviour. Improvements will require strengthening the country’s security sector, putting pressure on armed groups, and forging political agreements between Bangui and neighbours.

In 2019/20, we will aim to support implementation of the February peace agreement, through advocating for increased collaboration between power holders at the local, prefec- tural and national levels to encourage decisions that reflect local perspectives. We will analyse the political scene in Bangui, relations between Bangui and the regions, and government policies in the lead-up to the 2020 elections. We will also assess local peace commit- tees’ role and engage with stakeholders to anticipate and manage electoral tensions.

South Africa The new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, has committed to a broad renewal program that in- cludes reinvigoration of foreign policy. South Africa is well positioned to advance important policies in the peace and security realm, but it punched below its weight during the presidency of Jacob Zuma. The reasons why included ruling-party factionalism, acute resource constraints and problems translating strategic priorities consistently and coherently.

South Africa is keen to move forward, however, using its positions as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2019-2020) and vice chair and chair of the African Union (in 2019 and 2020, respectively). General elections were held on 8 May 2019. The government is undertaking a major foreign policy review and has demonstrated an unprecedented openness to the input of external actors.

In 2019/20, we will advocate our policy recommendations with respect to the Africa Pro- gram’s priority conflict concerns. We will engage with a range of policymakers in South Africa. We will also seek to promote South Africa’s own priority on the role of women and youth in conflict prevention.

Asia Afghanistan Afghanistan faces a constellation of challenges: an intensifying Taliban insurgency that is killing more soldiers and police than at any time since 2001; chronic violence, including by transnational jihadist groups such as the local Islamic State, or ISIS, franchise; flawed power-sharing arrangements; widespread corruption; persistent obstacles to economic growth; and growing political fragmentation along ethnic, tribal and regional lines. The armed forces remain unable to hold territory on their own as the insurgency gains ground. Direct contacts between the U.S. and Taliban have generated some momentum in the peace process but have yet to lead to inclusive intra-Afghan talks. The presidential election scheduled for September 2019 and potential challenges to President Ashraf Ghani’s Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 33

legitimacy in light of his term’s expiration in May could increase political instability, thus further weakening the government’s security posture.

Coordinated efforts to bring peace and stability need to include a comprehensive approach to creating conditions for broadening the current talks with the Taliban to include all important parts of Afghan society and to ensure sufficient regional cooperation. In the unlikely event that elections are held as scheduled, their results are likely to be disputed, provoking some form of crisis that could complicate peace talks; international partners must be pre- pared to mediate in the highly plausible event that election results are contested. U.S. policy, in the past characterised by muddled thinking on peace, is now more firmly focused on negotiating a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan but remains uncertain on the linkage between its objective and intra-Afghan dialogue, as well as on its post-peace deal military and political objectives and willingness to support implementation with assistance and continued engagement.

In 2019/20, we will seek to support efforts by the main parties to the conflict – the Afghan government, the Taliban and the U.S. – to engage in substantive peace talks and improve conditions for stability and durable peace. We will help them bridge the gaps, take into account the other parties’ interests, and achieve realistic compromise.

By looking at the Taliban’s approaches to peace, combined with advocacy activities in Washington, Brussels, Kabul and the region, we will highlight obstacles in the way of negotiations. Our mapping of narratives and interests at elite levels among Afghan parties to the conflict will allow us to better identify the parties’ threat perception and critical political fault lines but also areas of mutual interest and potential cooperation. We will also identify prospects for consensus among Afghan and international actors about the way forward in Afghanistan, and delineate new approaches to a negotiated settlement with the Taliban including on the issue of women’s political participation.

North Korea North Korea made the strategic choice to further develop its nuclear deterrent capacity during 2016-2017, then turned toward dialogue in early 2018. Dialogue continued into 2019, but hopes for genuine progress toward a negotiated settlement have been largely dashed as the U.S. and North Korea failed to narrow their differences at summits in Singapore (June 2018) and Hanoi (February 2019). It remains to be seen if a planned third summit will revive those hopes.

There remains little doubt that the leadership in Pyongyang would like, in an ideal scenario, to improve economic conditions, keep on side elites and its new middle class, and reduce its heavy political and economic reliance on China. But these are not small matters to accomplish given that, on the one hand, Pyongyang views nuclear arms as intrinsic to national security, and, on the other, Washington so far has insisted that it will not tolerate a nuclear North Korea. In Hanoi, in particular, it became obvious that there is a chasm between the U.S. position – North Korean denuclearisation before removal of economic sanctions – and that of North Korea, which demanded that five packages of UN sanctions be lifted at a stroke.

Though diplomatic conditions are subject to periodic swings, both sides are willing in principle to talk, as seen in the made-for-television meeting between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un on 30 June 2019. With the possibility of a third summit ahead, there may be a chance that 2019-2020 could bring concrete opportunities for moving toward a Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 34

negotiated settlement between the U.S. and North Korea, thus also opening space for inter- Korean dialogue and practical engagement.

In 2019/20, we will seek to encourage North Korea and the U.S. to abandon maximalist policy positions that have a low likelihood of success and to adopt more realistic positions. Our efforts will focus on mitigating the risk that the U.S. and North Korea will return to mutually hostile rhetoric or even military conflict, promoting a deal that benefits all parties without recklessly undermining such gains as have been made since 2017 in pushing North Korea to move toward shedding key elements of its nuclear and missile capabilities.

There is a pressing need to place dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea on a more solid footing. North Korea has given the U.S. a deadline – perhaps rhetorical, perhaps not – of December 2019 to take a different, more productive path for dialogue than the one it is on. Pyongyang has not specified what would flow from U.S. failure to do so, and the threat in itself lacks credibility given Pyongyang’s propensity not to follow through on past warn- ings. It is important to push for dialogue while the opportunity is there.

At the same time, it is important to enhance understanding of how North Korean society functions and the implications of state-society and state-party-military relations for North Korea’s external posture and approach to talks and relations with the U.S. To that end, we will look at the evolution of the North Korean market economy, including, to the extent feasible, the different roles of men and women therein. Introducing into policy analysis a clearer understanding of the changes occurring inside North Korea and their influence on the regime’s decision-making will enable the U.S. and its allies in Europe and elsewhere to formulate more precise policy options to help mitigate the risk of returning to hostile rhetoric or even military conflict.

Myanmar (Priority) Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy is very likely to win 2020 elections. It remains extremely popular with the ethnic majority Burman electorate despite its general ineffectiveness.

The Rohingya refugee crisis has no resolution in sight, though its international media profile has declined, and with no good options available, so the attention of Western policymakers has drifted. The expulsion of Rohingya has deeply damaged Myanmar’s broader transition, though it has not hurt the domestic political fortunes of the government. The powerful military still calls the shots in many critical areas, and though its relations with the civilian government are frosty, military and civilian leaders appear ideologically and politically broadly aligned on many issues, from the peace process with various rebels to the future of Rakhine State and the Rohingya, and seem to have similar instincts on political freedoms as well. The country is struggling to end 70 years of ethnic conflicts, and the peace process started by the previous government in 2011 is moribund. Meanwhile, disputes over land tenure across the country remain an important driver of conflict. In addition, the Arakan Army insurgency in Rakhine State continues to represent a serious threat to peace prospects. Beijing is Naypyitaw’s most important international partner. It has the influence to help reduce internal armed conflict in Myanmar, if it deems that doing so would serve its interests.

In 2019/20, we will seek to improve the prospects of resolving the Rohingya crisis, advanc- ing the peace process and ensuring the peacefulness of democratic elections. Through research in-country and advocacy, we will leverage our significant credibility and expertise

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on Myanmar to inform domestic political actors’ calculations and outside actors’ pressure and messaging to the government and others. We will focus on ways to de-escalate armed conflict, mitigate underlying political and political-economy drivers, and improve conditions for the Rohingya in Rakhine State and the refugee population in Bangladesh. We will also seek to improve the conditions for displaced Rohingya, who may be vulnerable to militancy, and to mitigate the risk of further displacement by advocating for improvement of conditions within Myanmar for Rohingya who remain there. In particular, we will argue that addressing the Rohingya situation within and outside Myanmar would open space for increased or renewed international support toward Myanmar.

Thailand After five years of military rule, Thailand is no closer to bridging the social and political divisions that have driven conflict in the country since 2006. The March 2019 general elections appeared to reveal persistent polarisation among the electorate. It remains to be seen how the political order constructed by the junta to preserve its prerogatives will func- tion once a new government is seated. King Rama X’s political vision, if any, is still opaque, even as his influence on the bureaucracy and society is increasingly apparent. The Malay- Muslim separatist insurgency in the southernmost provinces persists, though levels of violence have decreased for several years running. The peace-dialogue process between Bangkok and an umbrella group of putative separatist organisations is suspended.

In 2019/20, we will monitor Thailand’s political transition and pursue a negotiated end to the separatist insurgency, based on political decentralisation and preservation of Thai- land’s territorial integrity. We will raise awareness of the conflict and the costs of various courses of action, introduce constructive proposals into public and private discussions, and discreetly push for their adoption by concerned parties.

The Philippines Prospects for peace in Muslim Mindanao in the southern Philippines are the best in decades, but political dysfunction and threats from armed groups remain. The signing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law in July 2018, and its subsequent ratification by plebiscite in early 2019, marked the culmination of two decades of talks between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The 80-member Bangsamoro Transition Authority will govern until an election in June 2022, which will pit the MILF’s United Bang- samoro Justice Party against the powerful political clans, which control government at the local level.

The success of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, which encom- passes the former Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and seven additional towns in North Cotabato, depends on inclusivity, the new regional government’s performance in delivering social services and preservation of security. Expectations are high, as is the potential cost of failure.

Armed groups outside the peace process, some of which have pledged allegiance to the transnational jihadist network, ISIS, continue to operate in Muslim Mindanao. Martial Law in Mindanao, introduced in May 2017, has been extended three times, until 31 December 2019. Military offensives against ISIS-inspired armed groups since late 2017 have put the militants on the back foot, but there is no peace process for the recalcitrant BIFF or the Abu Sayyaf Group. Local forms of violence such as feuding and criminality are also durable threats to lives and livelihoods in the area. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 36

Nationally, President Rodrigo Duterte’s effort to shift the Philippines’ foreign policy toward closer ties with China and greater distance from the U.S., its treaty ally, sits uneasily with the reality of conflicting claims in the West Philippine/South China Sea. Duterte has not brought public opinion or the Armed Forces of the Philippines in line with his geopolitical reorientation. Beijing’s assertive role in the South China Sea may incite popular pressure for a more confrontational approach to China and other countries with competing claims.

In 2019/20, we will seek to highlight new flashpoints, including the role played by groups that claim ISIS affiliations in the southern Philippines and potential impediments to implementation of commitments made under the peace process. We will promote strategies designed to limit the space for jihadist recruitment and advance a cogent approach to carrying out the peace agreement. Using a mix of low-key meetings, reports and targeted advocacy at the local, regional and international levels, we will also highlight the risks of a slowdown in the peace process and develop strategies for bringing it back on track.

Indian-administered Kashmir Pakistan and India are once again mired in confrontation because of ongoing militant attacks. The February 2019 attack on Indian security personnel in Jammu and Kashmir, conducted by a local but claimed by a Pakistani anti-India jihadist group, sparked the first aer- ial engagements between the two countries across the international border and Kashmir’s Line of Control since the 1971 India-Pakistan war. Though domestic calculations of the costs of conflict and international, particularly U.S., intervention prevented further escalation, clashes continue between Indian and Pakistani forces along the Line of Control, claiming scores of military and civilian lives. Yet in Jammu and Kashmir itself, domestic factors, including the forcible suppression of dissent, also heighten conflict risks.

In 2019/20, we will seek to analyse developments related to militancy in Indian-administered Kashmir and related security responses to ultimately inform Pakistan and India, along with their international diplomatic and development partners, regarding effective strategies for countering instability and jihadist violence in the region. As part of this work, we will engage a range of national officials and other influential actors in Islamabad and New Delhi. We will also brief diplomatic actors in Pakistan and India and in Western capitals (Washington and Brussels).

Pakistan In Pakistan, a strategically uneven response to militancy risks yet again sacrificing internal security and regional peace for short-term domestic and external gain. Continued efforts to either condone or support the presence and activities of militant and jihadist groups, seen by Pakistan’s military establishment to promote what it perceives as national security interests, pose threats to domestic security and regional stability.

Despite an unprecedented third phase of a democratic transition following elections in mid-2018, the civilian government, lacking a stable parliamentary majority, is dependent on the military’s support for its political survival. Retaining control of internal security as well as foreign policy, particularly with regard to India and Afghanistan, the military appears disinclined, despite heightened international pressure, to dismantle militant and jihadist proxies. Instead, it is making new efforts to mainstream militant groups. Counter- productive and selective counter-terrorism policies increase conflict risks with India. They also bear security implications for Pakistani women, long targeted by militants with an Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 37

overt agenda of gender repression. Women are increasingly raising their voices and de- manding a role in counter-insurgency policies that affect their lives and livelihoods.

In 2019/20, we will examine developments related to militancy in Pakistan to inform international diplomatic and development partners’ strategies for countering instability and jihadist violence (see also the section on Indian-administered Kashmir above). We also will examine women’s roles in peace and conflict in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas, now western districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and in other conflict regions of Pakistan to identify opportunities to tackle militancy. We will engage with a range of national officials and other influential stakeholders.

Sri Lanka Following the late 2018 constitutional crisis and President Maithripala Sirisena’s post- crisis sidelining of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, the coalition’s reform program, designed to address Sri Lanka’s legacy of ethnic war and terrorism and strengthen the rule of law and inclusive governance, has run out of steam. Any chance of renewing an agenda of reconciliation and accountability faded further in the wake of the jihadist Easter Sunday bombings in 2019. The resulting public anger and fear has increased the likelihood that the nationalist, authoritarian Rajapaksa-led opposition will return to power in the presidential election due before the end of 2019. The Easter attacks have deepened the already strong undercurrents of Sinhala nationalism and mistrust of Muslims cultivated by six years of militant Buddhist campaigning. The return of emergency law, which the government says is justified to root out jihadist networks and “deradicalise” sympathisers, brings a risk of grave human rights violations and stigma for Sri Lanka’s hitherto moderate and peaceful Muslims. To counter these risks, Sri Lanka needs to protect Muslims against further violence while addressing Buddhist fears and misconceptions, work to protect rights and the rule of law, and take whatever modest steps it can to redress the deep effects of war and political marginalisation in Tamil-majority regions.

In 2019/20, our work will focus on strengthening increasingly fragile inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations and countering a weakening of minority rights. We will seek to better understand the dynamics of anti-Muslim sentiment and growing tensions among other religious groups to help rebuild intercommunal relations and reduce the risk of renewed violence. We will also seek to analyse partisan dynamics and sources of support for Sinhala Buddhist nationalism to inform more tailored and effective efforts – domestic and international – to protect the limited governance reforms achieved since 2015. While doing so, we will engage with a range of policymakers and diplomats to maintain support for inclusive governance reforms in a changing political atmosphere in Sri Lanka.

Europe and Central Asia Ukraine Russia’s annexation of Crimea and undeclared invasion of eastern Ukraine (or Donbas) have shaken Europe’s security architecture and led to a slow-moving but still deadly war between the continent’s two largest armies. The 2014-2015 Minsk agreements outline a path toward integrating the breakaway eastern regions back into Ukraine on a semi-autonomous basis, but their implementation has stalled: Moscow has not withdrawn its troops or proxies; Kyiv insists that it cannot take steps toward granting the breakaway areas special status or prom- ising amnesty to those who took part in unrest and combat, as foreseen under Minsk. Yet

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even if Moscow were to withdraw completely, nationalists in Ukraine, including many active military servicemen and veterans, would oppose these Minsk measures – perhaps violently.

While the Minsk process continues formally in the shape of biweekly working groups mod- erated by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), neither side appears to be making a good-faith effort to push toward its end goals. This semi-paralysis leaves open the prospect of continued war in Donbas that kills soldiers and civilians, crip- ples the post-industrial region’s economic and environmental recovery, and stifles attempts at Russian-Western rapprochement indefinitely. Meanwhile, the fighting fuels the risk of violence and turmoil, including the rise of right-wing movements, within government-controlled Ukraine.

In 2019/20, our efforts will focus on mitigating the risks of continued or increased conflict, including by equipping Ukrainian and Western policymakers with detailed analysis of obstacles standing in the way of Ukraine’s reintegration of territories it does not now control. We will also seek to highlight threats outside Donbas (eg, arising from the rise of the far right) and identify policy recommendations for addressing them.

In our engagement with Ukrainian government officials and Western policymakers (EU, France, UK and U.S.), we will press for dialogue on reintegration and continue to publicise Donbas residents’ grievances, their views of wartime experiences and their hopes for a reu- nited Ukraine, in order to encourage key stakeholders to work toward unity. We will also encourage Kyiv and Ukrainian civil society to facilitate dialogue between Ukrainians living in government-controlled areas, including war veterans, and Donbas civilians in order to find common ground, ease mutual suspicion and prepare the various groups to coexist in a single state. In our engagement with Russian officials, we will press for progress in peace talks and the Minsk agreements’ implementation.

As part of our research on the rise of the far right (including ideologies, goals, recruitment techniques and levels of public support), we will encourage non-violent civic engagement among at-risk groups such as veterans, and we will seek to strengthen the state’s monopoly on violence along with its protection of civil liberties in order to mitigate the risk of civic unrest.

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict The April 2018 change to the Armenian leadership may have created a rare opening for progress in moving toward resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In September 2018, the two sides launched a communication channel between their security personnel, which has helped minimise casualties along the front lines. In March 2019, they reinforced bilateral communication by appointing political representatives responsible for regular contact between leaders and coordination of humanitarian projects, including support for agriculture in conflict-affected regions and family visits to detainees on both sides of the Line of Contact.

Such a positive environment cannot last long, however, absent progress in the peace process, which has been deadlocked for more than five years. Prospects have worsened since the April 2016 escalation. The sides should now launch a difficult review of their core positions on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the fate of adjacent territories and security arrangements. If they cannot reset the peace process, escalation may soon replace calm along the front lines. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is carrying out policies toward returning jihadist fighters that may also negatively affect its security and stability in the long term. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 39

In 2019/20, our efforts will focus on strengthening communication channels and coordination between the conflict parties to help sustain calm along the front lines and ensure better protection of local populations. In particular, we will seek to steer the conflict parties toward cooperation in confidence-building measures and humanitarian aid for conflict- affected populations. We will deepen understanding of the principal actors’ motivations and constraints, in particular by shedding light on domestic affairs in Armenia and Azer- baijan and within de facto Nagorno-Karabakh.

Georgia Strategic interest – rather than the populations’ needs – shapes the policies of Georgia and Russia toward the de facto entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After months of discussions, participants in the Geneva International Discussion failed in the spring of 2018 to adopt a long-awaited joint statement on the non-use of force, leaving foreign mediators struggling to sustain the Geneva format and its security and communications framework on the ground.

Social and economic divides are deepening between Georgian-controlled territory and the breakaway areas, while Russia is increasing its presence in the latter. Tensions between Russia and the West fuel the disparities, limiting space for cooperation on humanitarian issues and resolution of problems for conflict-affected populations. Meanwhile, Georgia is dealing with returning and transiting jihadist fighters. These factors can affect its engagement with both the breakaway regions and neighbouring states and threaten its internal stability.

In 2019/20, our efforts will concentrate on advocating for a sustained Geneva format to support greater cooperation between the conflict parties in the interest of Abkhazia’s population. We will seek to develop a nuanced understanding of dynamics in Abkhazia to recommend policies that respond to needs on the ground. Separately, our work on policy toward returning jihadists will contribute to the formulation of policy recommendations that can help mitigate threats in Georgia and beyond.

Turkey In the March 2019 local elections, the alliance between the ruling AKP and nationalist MHP received 52 per cent of the total vote, but it lost five of the six biggest cities, energising the opposition. Anti-Western sentiment runs high across most of the political spectrum. Sig- nificant challenges lie ahead, from an economy facing recession to the likely impasse regarding the mutually exclusive tracks Ankara has pursued with the U.S. and Russia relating to Syria and missile defence system procurement. With no elections scheduled for the next four years, it remains to be seen whether President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will maintain his hardline nationalist course or assume a more pragmatic stance domestically and in relations with the West.

The PKK conflict remains deadly and a destabilising dynamic for Turkey – both domestically and regionally. But, for now, advocating for a political settlement is risky for all involved and fighting continues.

Turkey continues to host nearly four million Syrian refugees, who have fled their home country as a result of the war. Ankara’s public statements assure the public that the refugees will return to Syria. Yet the government is supplying services to this population through an integrative model, with policies that aim to fold the Syrians into the education system and labour market. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 40

There is little work on how Ankara manages its response to jihadist recruitment efforts in Turkey or how it treats those who return from the fight in Syria (Turkish citizens, Syrians or people of other nationalities). Both Ankara and Western capitals, however, have an interest in preventing a surge of jihadist militancy.

In 2019/20, we will examine how jihadist recruitment in Turkey works, how prevention measures can be more effective and how the state can integrate those who have joined ISIS back into society. We will also continue our work on the PKK conflict, and for EU funding to ensure adequate protection of at-risk Syrian youth with a view to guaranteeing the security and economic well-being of refugees and Turkish citizens alike. We will also start exploring the Turkish government’s policies toward Russian Muslim migrants, to prevent security problems and foster intercommunal relations.

The Balkans The Balkan wars, which shook Europe in the 1990s, are long over. Their legacies, however, continue to shape regional politics. Although a return to conflict seems unlikely, the involvement of a wide range of local and international stakeholders, including the EU and its member states, Russia and the U.S., risks creating a volatile environment. Discussions of land swaps between Kosovo and Serbia have energised a debate in which some parties see solutions of this sort as key tools for sustainable peace, and others see them as precursors to conflict. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a peace created through power-sharing parallel structures has also ensured continuing divides among the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, slowing governance and maintaining tension.

In 2019/20, we will assess ways to prevent the re-emergence of violent conflict in the region and to help define our own future work.

Russia Russia is an important stakeholder and actor in numerous global conflicts and potential conflicts. In Syria, Ukraine, Africa and Latin America, among other places, Russia is sometimes a combatant, sometimes a force behind the scenes. No vision for European security, nuclear or conventional arms control, or East-West stability is imaginable without taking into account Russian interests and actions. In recent years, an increasingly tense standoff between Russia and many Western countries has heightened threats to peace and stability. Meanwhile, around the world, Russian diplomacy and military might influence how conflict and crisis situations evolve. In 2019/20, we will seek to contribute to the resolution of Eurasian regional conflicts where Russia plays a role, including in Ukraine, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and to better understand Russia’s policy responses in relation to returning jihadists to develop relevant policy recommendations that will enable Russian policymakers to mitigate these risks. We will also seek to engage with Russian policymakers in advocating steps to mitigate or de-escalate violent conflict or entrenched political crises abroad, such as in Syria, Africa, the Far East and Latin America. More broadly, we will support efforts to manage the escalation of Russian-Western tensions by advocating for dialogue, arms control and coordination, including in areas of tension. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 41

Latin America Venezuela Venezuela faces a major socio-economic crisis, with hyper-inflation and acute scarcity of food, medicine and other basic goods, as well as one of the world’s highest murder rates. A mass exodus has turned Venezuela’s meltdown into a regional dilemma and threatens to spread disease and violence across borders. There can be no return to stability and pros- perity without a settlement of its chronic political conflict. But the domestic polarisation is mirrored at the international level. Several dozen countries, led by the U.S., have recognised opposition leader Juan Guaidó, president of the National Assembly since 5 January, as interim president. Washington in particular hopes to force President Nicolás Maduro out, banking that key supporters, notably the armed forces, will withdraw their support for him in light of crushing sanctions and the country’s growing isolation. Conversely, Rus- sia, China and Cuba in particular back Maduro. For its part, the EU has set up an Interna- tional Contact Group to build support for a negotiated solution.

Humanitarian aid for those suffering the extremes of hardship in Venezuela or on its borders, stronger and more united outside support for substantive negotiations aimed at a political transition that protects key interests of both sides, and emergency measures to shore up a collapsing economy are all crucial steps to avoid violence and state collapse and restore stability.

In 2019/20, we will seek to prevent an escalation of violence and promote a peaceful, negotiated outcome to the conflict by highlighting the risks of deteriorating political and economic conditions, stressing the threat of worsening armed conflict, exploring how the ne- gotiation process begun in Oslo can be bolstered and finding creative ways around obstacles to such talks. We will inform discussion of possible solutions to the ongoing humanitarian, economic and political crises. We will also engage political and social actors in Venezuela, Latin American governments (particularly Mexico, Colombia and Lima Group members), states outside the region (including the U.S., Canada, Russia, China, Norway and the EU member states) and international bodies (notably the UN and its agencies), to propose ideas for a solution acceptable to both the opposition and chavista movement.

Colombia (Priority) Security conditions in Colombia, having improved for years – especially immediately after the signing of the 2016 peace agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas – have again begun to worsen. Armed group activity, murders in post-conflict zones, killings of community leaders and forced displacement are all up. Meanwhile, in 2017 Colombia’s total coca crop stood at an historic high. Efforts to demilitarise the country’s various armed groups are faltering. Implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC faces various challenges, including the lukewarm commitment to core elements of the accord from senior officials in President Iván Duque’s administration, which assumed power in August 2018. Peace negotiations with another guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), ended in the wake of a car bomb attack in Bogotá by the group in January 2019, while the group has exploited the crisis in Vene- zuela to expand its presence in that country. The Gaitanistas drug trafficking organisation continues to expand, fuelled by the booming cocaine trade. Finally, over twenty FARC dis- sident groups – which broke off from the main movement when its leaders signed the 2016 peace deal – are extending their influence across Colombia’s periphery and across the Ven- ezuelan border, challenging state control over territory vacated by the former guerrillas. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 42

In 2019/20, we will seek to support efforts to stabilise post-conflict territories, reduce rural inequalities, develop alternatives to illicit drug crops and resume the peace process with the ELN guerrillas. By looking at FARC dissidents and the killing of local community activists, combined with advocacy and engagement with stakeholders in the peace process, in particular central government officials, local officials, civil society actors and representatives of foreign states as well as international organisations such as the UN mission and the Organization of American States, we will draw attention to the key issues at stake and press for the actions needed.

El Salvador and Honduras Despite falling homicide rates, the countries of the Northern Triangle – El Salvador, Gua- temala and Honduras – have been unable to eradicate gangs or other forms of criminal violence. Corruption and lack of resources hamper government efforts to reduce violent crime. The emphasis on “iron fist” strategies, which have led to prison overcrowding, increased police abuses and deepened distrust of state institutions, further distorts the government response. The combination of endemic violence and lack of economic opportunities has displaced hundreds of thousands of Central Americans, generating a regional humanitarian crisis aggravated by an ever-tougher U.S. immigration policy.

In 2019/20, we will aim to encourage politicians in El Salvador, as well as foreign donors and states, to invest more in harm reduction policies toward MS-13 and the two factions of Barrio 18, including reintegration of former gang members into society and design of a dialogue-based approach to diminishing gang violence. By shedding light on criminal violence and political instability in El Salvador, as well as engagement with state and security officials, political actors and civil society, we will strive to persuade actors to adopt preventive policies grounded in social reality and political possibility. We will meet this goal through research combining qualitative and quantitative methods, with the aid of an Eco- nomics of Conflict fellow, as well as partnerships with local organisations (see also Section 5.2).

We will also assess the political and social unrest in the Honduras following months of protests against the president as well as increasing emigration north to Mexico and the U.S. We will offer advice to relevant stakeholders, including donors, regarding improvements to security and trust in public institutions, as well as steps needed to reduce the political polarisation that has blighted the country since its 2009 coup.

Mexico The main problem facing Mexico remains record levels of criminal violence – largely due to the state’s inability to rein in organised crime, police and army collusion, and other state corruption. Other pressing public concerns include the increasing human cost of the crime wave, including internal displacement and disappearances, as well as high levels of judicial impunity and the socio-economic exclusion that allows criminal groups to enlist new re- cruits. Tense relations with the U.S. over border control and migration from Mexico and Central America add additional pressure. New left-leaning president Andrés Manuel López Obrador was expected to open a window of opportunity for comprehensive security policies that do not rely solely on coercion, but his government has so far been unwilling to reduce the armed forces’ role in policing.

In 2019/20, we will seek to identify the main causes of the high tide of criminal violence, assess the feasibility and potential side effects of proposed reforms to security Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 43

and anti-corruption policy, and understand better the blockages that might impede change. We will shed light on the changing dynamics of criminal violence as well as the effects of new state security policies in Mexico’s hardest-hit regions. We aim to persuade officials in the central state, as well as officials in state and municipal governments, civil society activists, representatives of foreign countries (above all the EU and its member states but also the U.S.) and of international organisations, such as the UN High Commis- sion for Human Rights, of the need to refine and deepen reforms to the security sector with a focus on crime prevention and conflict mitigation.

Nicaragua In 2018, Nicaragua experienced the onset of a socio-political crisis after mass protests broke out against the presidential couple of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo. Authorities met protests with a brutal crackdown that led to hundreds of deaths, sowed political ani- mosity and triggered an economic downturn affecting hundreds of thousands of people in the second poorest country in Latin America and the Caribbean. Government and opposition have attempted to find a negotiated way out of the crisis in on-again, off-again talks. These contacts have produced some results, but left unresolved the underlying causes of tension in a country beset with widespread poverty and corruption. In 2019/20, we will focus on supporting agreements between the government and the opposition and informing national and international debate about the characteristics of a more robust political settlement. Our engagement with local conflict actors, as well as with the chief mediators (eg, the papal nuncio) and leading international actors (notably the EU and its member states, the U.S., and the UN and its agencies), will help ensure that all sides value our publications as one of very few efforts to craft an independent, non-partisan approach to resolving the country’s tensions. We will target policy recommendations at the government, the opposition, civil society organisations and the international community, and seek to build the conditions for a negotiated solution to the crisis, as well as shape policies that reduce the risks of further political and criminal violence.

Middle East and North Africa Iran’s Nuclear Deal President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018 presaged a more ambitious strategic objective: to substan- tially recast not only Tehran’s nuclear activities, but its domestic and regional policies as well. Sanctions are the primary means of achieving these maximalist demands, but not the only one. Over the past several months, U.S. officials have sharpened their public relations campaign against Iran, convinced that it can stir up more internal discontent, manifested in protests and labour strikes, through messaging on elite corruption, human rights abuses and environmental malpractice. The White House is also keen on pushing back against Iran in several theatres, from the Gulf to Yemen to Syria to Iraq. For their part, U.S. allies in the region (Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)) see in the Trump administration’s aggressive Iran strategy a unique opportunity to weaken a regional rival that they perceive as ascendant. During the first year of Trump’s maximum pressure campaign, the Iranians settled for a strategy of patience and attrition, with both sides trying to wear down the other. But, one year on, the sanctions’ crippling impact on the Iranian economy led Tehran to start taking retaliatory measures in both the Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 44

region and the nuclear realm. It has begun to roll back its commitments under the JCPOA, threatening to accelerate that process in order to pressure the deal’s remaining signatories to provide it with at least a modicum of economic benefits. In the region, Iran has shot down a U.S. drone and stands accused of having targeted shipping. As a result, tensions have risen sky-high. In 2019/20, we will pursue ways to reduce tensions between Tehran and Washington and proposing options for regional de-escalation. Through advocacy with senior officials in Europe, the U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Oman, and through convening dialogue meetings, we will convey our policy recommendations directly to people who make or influence decisions. We will also meet senior Iranian officials. We will also continue to develop our Trigger List, which highlights flashpoints of possible confrontation between Tehran and Washington, and between Tehran and Washington’s regional allies.

Iraq Iraq is a primary theatre of competition and potentially confrontation between the U.S and Iran, and its one-year-old government could play a major role in either fuelling or preventing escalation. The U.S. withdrawal from the JPCOA and reimposition of economic sanctions on Iran has opened a new chapter of tensions between Washington and Tehran. Iraq is the Middle East country with the largest number of U.S. troops (nearly 5,000), and it also hosts a U.S. military base. From its side, Iran is also heavily invested in Iraq – politically, economically and on the security front; the majority of Iraq’s political leadership have political, economic and military ties with Tehran. Because Iraq imports up to 30 per cent of its energy supplies from Iran, the U.S. is seeking to exert pressure on Baghdad to implement Iran-related sanctions and thus decrease its energy dependence on its neigh- bour, further tightening the economic screws on Iran.

Fifteen years after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, Iraq is at a crossroads. The political class that emerged after 2003 has little legitimacy, and new actors have yet to establish themselves as durable alternatives who could create a new political system. In the absence of effective governance, militias are finding new opportunities to recruit restless unem- ployed youth, and to exploit mass protests over the absence of basic services for political ends, turning them into something far more violent. Iraq’s stability is at risk as long as corruption – Iraq’s number-one scourge – continues to undermine young people’s prospects and regional tensions, stoked by the U.S.-Iran rivalry, continue to rise.

The country faces other problems. One is the struggle over the status of the areas disputed between Erbil and Baghdad, a central issue because it concerns the boundary of federal Iraq with its Kurdish region. Another is that while ISIS has lost its territory, it retains the capacity for resurgence due to the government’s dysfunction and failure to rebuild de- stroyed areas. Thirdly, paramilitary groups, critical in combat against ISIS, threaten the state’s integrity, but the longer the government remains paralysed by the U.S.-Iran competition, the less it will be able to reorganise the security sector and hold these groups accountable. Likewise, the longer the government postpones governance reforms, the more corruption will thrive and jeopardise prospects for stabilising the areas retaken from ISIS, especially in the disputed territories.

In 2019/20, we will focus on proposing a roadmap for the Iraqi government to avoid being caught up in the U.S.-Iran rivalry and to help de-escalate tensions between the two powers Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 45

in Iraq. We also plan to facilitate dialogue on Kirkuk, which has emerged as a key focus for the newly appointed UN special representative for Iraq in light of our longstanding engagement on the disputed territories. And we will look at majority-Sunni provinces, each of which faces a different set of economic and security challenges and all of which are at risk of re- surgent jihadism. Complementary to this agenda, we will seek to identify new ways of addressing Iraq’s crisis of governance, building on our earlier report on Iraq’s rudderless youth.

We will push back against tendencies within the U.S. administration to pull Iraq into the ongoing U.S.-Iran confrontation in order to help mitigate a major conflict driver in the region.

A political settlement between Baghdad and Erbil could help decrease external interference from Iran and Turkey in both the Kurdish region and Baghdad and thus contribute to reducing a debilitating regional power struggle inside Iraq. Our reporting from Kirkuk, as well as participation in mediation efforts (with the Dialogue Advisory Group), will help this process along. We will engage with policymakers from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad, local politicians in Kirkuk and the UN special representative, who is leading a mediation effort on Kirkuk. This work is particularly important at a moment when the political leaderships in both Erbil and Baghdad are weak and fragmented and the UN- led negotiations between the KRG and Baghdad risk being sidetracked by unilateral deals between individual Kurdish parties and powerful Shiite political-military networks that have paramilitary forces deployed in the disputed territories.

In the course of our research, we will explore ways to effect reconstruction, reconciliation and IDP returns that can reduce the conditions that provided fertile ground for ISIS and similar local insurgent groups in the past. We will engage with Iraqi officials at the central and provincial levels in charge of reconstruction/governance, as well as with informal policy actors (militias and civil society organisations). We also intend to engage with EU institutions such as the EEAS and DEVCO, as well as EU member states that are particularly engaged in Iraq (Germany, France and Italy). Our work on ISIS in Iraq and Syria and asso- ciated advocacy will ground the international debate over the ongoing threat posed by ISIS in local reality and identify policies that Iraq can pursue with its international partners toward post-ISIS security, reconstruction and rebuilding social cohesion. We intend to engage with national- and provincial-level Iraqi officials to focus their attention on post-ISIS challenges along the country’s periphery, as well as with officials from the U.S. and other members of the international coalition to combat ISIS.

Arabian Peninsula The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, are no longer shadow actors in the regional turmoil; these countries have become actively involved in numerous conflicts. Gulf entanglements range from military action in Yemen and Libya to political influence in Iraq, Syria and Tunisia to peacemaking efforts in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Afghanistan. Gulf involvement beyond national borders is coloured by two regional cold wars, the first pitting the U.S. and its allies Saudi Arabia and the UAE against Iran, and the second pitting Saudi Arabia and the UAE against Qatar and Turkey. These two struggles shape Gulf countries’ strategic goals, red lines and use of local proxies. Un- derstanding what underlies their competitive thinking has become vital to finding peaceful settlements to a number of regional conflicts, especially in North Africa and the Horn. The Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 46

extent of Gulf involvement also means that these states are important advocacy targets and interlocutors for conflict resolution and prevention.

In 2019/20, our efforts will focus on ensuring better awareness and understanding of Gulf states’ foreign policies in global capitals and in countries where Gulf states are projecting influence. We will seek to map Gulf foreign policy thinking regarding the Horn of Africa, Yemen and Iran to help provide a stronger basis for policymakers looking to prevent and resolve conflict. We will also advocate directly with Gulf officials to influence their thinking. In particular, as Saudi Arabia and the UAE are direct parties to the Yemen conflict, we will seek to facilitate conversations and sharing of messages and impressions between parties who otherwise face obstacles speaking to one another. In this way, we will work toward improving mutual understanding among the various sides of the Yemeni conflict to enable more constructive and concrete negotiations by clarifying parties’ objectives. With regard to the intra-Gulf conflict, we will also try to advance transparency about each side’s perspectives to the other.

Syria In 2018, the Syrian regime recaptured the last enclaves over which it previously had lost control and in which no foreign military forces were present that could meet its assault. The future of the areas that remain outside of regime control is uncertain and entangled in a complex array of interlocking strategic interests involving Russia, Turkey, the U.S. and Iran.

Russia in principle pursues the restoration of Syrian state sovereignty over all of Syria, in the north west (Idlib, Euphrates Shield), as well as in the north east (areas of the Kurd- ish-dominated “autonomous administration”). Yet it has to balance this objective with its strategic relations with Turkey, its goal of gradually increasing European acceptance of the Syrian regime’s political rehabilitation and the high costs and uncertain outcome of any military campaign. This balancing act complicates Russian support for regime offensives, on which the regime depends for victory, in any of these theatres.

If in the north west a regime offensive would involve confrontation with Turkey, in the north east it would entail a direct confrontation with the U.S. Washington wants to pre- empt further gains for Damascus, including by compromise with Kurdish-led forces in this area deemed critical for Washington’s dual objectives to prevent an ISIS resurgence and contain Iran’s regional power projection. How long the U.S. will be willing and able to remain in this area and protect the Kurdish-dominated forces is unclear.

Turkey remains fiercely opposed to the existence of a Kurdish autonomous entity, controlled by the PKK-affiliated YPG, but it must also account for opposition to Turkish military action from both the U.S. and Russia (for very different reasons). The Bashar Al-Assad regime, meanwhile, remains determined to retake the entirety of the country, and will attempt to prevail on Russia to support it militarily, but is also hobbled by increasingly intense sanctions and economic pressure.

At the same time, Israel wants to roll back the Iranian presence in Syria and sees itself backed up by the U.S. in this pursuit. The undermining of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action may bring about increased Israeli-U.S. military coordination against Iran, while raising the prospect that Iran responds to the coercive campaign against it on the regional front. Israel can be expected to conduct further airstrikes against alleged Iranian assets in any part of Syria where it presumes their presence; the border region near the Golan Heights appears

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especially sensitive. Possible retaliation by Iranian-aligned actors in Syria (such as Hizbol- lah) to Israeli strikes carries a significant danger of escalation and spillover into Lebanon.

Except for the Israeli-Iranian angle, the internationalisation of the conflict decreases (but does not negate) the likelihood of major military action. There are no areas left that the regime could retake without immediately running up against the interests of at least one much more powerful external actor. But these remaining areas outside its control have their own inherent vulnerabilities. Even absent external threats, governance and security there remain precarious and contested.

In 2019/20, our work will focus on five interrelated avenues of intervention: (1) analysing the risk attached to attempts to change the status quo through military action (including by Israel), and advocating for steps to reduce the danger of inadvertent escalation; (2) identifying drivers of instability in areas outside regime control, and proposing approaches for stabilisation; (3) proposing ways to move the status quo of relations between the various areas from a confrontational to a co-existential mode, with the mid-term objective of achieving a de facto devolution of power to the local level; (4) shaping the interrelated de- bates on regime rehabilitation and reconstruction, as the Western consensus on these matters erodes; and (5) proposing ways in which armed non-state actors could be included in political talks.

We should remain modest in our expectations of what we can accomplish. The Syrian regime has a track record of resisting even compromise proposals that appear to be clearly in its favour. Russia, the only external actor equipped to wield a moderating influence, has proved reluctant or unable to do so, and the effective decision-makers in Moscow – the Kremlin, intelligence agencies and the defence ministry – are notoriously difficult to speak to. While our analysis suggests that the status quo will prevail, there remains a residual risk of unintended escalation that may lead to significant violence.

Yemen The Yemeni civil war is in its fifth year. The war has fragmented the country along historical divides, upended pre-war power structures, opened space for a thriving war economy and created the world’s largest humanitarian disaster. Pre-war issues that sparked the violence, including disagreements over power sharing in the central government, weak governance, corruption and absence of military/security reform, are now even more difficult to resolve. There is a chance that Yemen will no longer hold together as one state as a result of the accumulated stresses. Moreover, regional dynamics have amplified and reshaped internal challenges.

The 2015 Huthi coup and subsequent Saudi-led war against the Huthi/Saleh forces (now only Huthi forces, as the rebels killed former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in December 2017) elevated an internal power struggle to an indirect regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia and its Western allies, including the U.S. and the UK, accuse Iran of supplying weapons to the Huthis, a claim that the evidence increasingly supports. Yet the Saudi-led military intervention has exacerbated the problem, strengthening the Huthis’ relationship with Iran and allowing Tehran to benefit from a low-cost, high-return investment that keeps Saudi Arabia mired in an unwinnable war. Saudi Arabia is less secure than it was in 2015, with the Huthis launching regular cross-border raids and, especially in 2018, routinely firing ballistic missiles at Saudi cities and military/economic infrastructure. The Huthis have since started to use drones to carry explosives to targets including, they claim, Abu Dhabi International Airport. There is a risk that a Huthi missile or drone attack Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 48

in Riyadh or another Gulf city, or upon commercial shipping in the Red Sea, that hits its target could trigger a wider confrontation with Iran that draws in the U.S.

Despite growing regional and international risks, efforts to end the war have been woefully inadequate. The U.S., the UK and France have taken sides, supplying weapons and logisti- cal support to the Saudi-led coalition, although U.S. lawmakers are challenging their country’s involvement in the war. A 2015 UN Security Council Resolution is outdated and an obstacle to peace, calling essentially for the Huthis to surrender to an internationally recognised government with little to no authority on the ground. Tensions between ostensible allies in the anti-Huthi camp also portend future conflict, with a loose coalition of Saudi- backed figures from the Hadi government and Islah lining up against UAE-backed forces in Taiz, Aden and contested areas along Yemen’s pre-1990 north-south border.

The UN’s appointment of a new special envoy in February 2018 with access to all sides, including the Huthis, coupled with growing pressure in the U.S., the UK and France from legislatures and civil society groups to end support for the war, led to some optimism that a political solution was possible. The combination of international outcry over the murder of the Saudi Arabian journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 and fear concerning the humanitarian fallout of a UAE-planned offensive on the vital Red Sea port of Ho- deida opened political space for the UN to broker the December 2018 Stockholm Agreement. Among other things, parties agreed to a ceasefire in Hodeida and a plan for demilitarising the city and its ports. But implementation has faltered and violence on other front lines has increased. An opportunity, the Stockholm Agreement, is also a critical point of failure, as all sides view it as a litmus test for a pivot to a national peace process. If implementation begins and the UN calls for renewed talks, it will be important for those in charge widen these talks to include a broader set of Yemeni actors. We fear that a narrow political accord that addresses only the interests of the Huthis, on one side, and the Hadi government and their Saudi backers, on the other, will lay the groundwork for a second, even more complex civil war that could only deepen the current humanitarian catastrophe.

In 2019/20, our efforts will focus on supporting implementation of the Stockholm Agree- ment to allow the UN envoy to initiate a national political process, while highlighting the need to expand the peace process to a larger number of actors, either in the next round of consultations or during a transitional period following a peace deal between the Huthis and the Yemeni government. We will also advocate for the acceptance and execution of measures that improve life for the population, regardless of a return to political talks – such as improved access to Hodeida and Aden ports and the opening of Sanaa and other airports.

Libya Recent military escalations in the south and the Tripoli area have highlighted the failure of previous diplomatic approaches to the Libyan conflict and the growing involvement of foreign actors – including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, France, Italy and Russia. The deteriorating security outlook means that there is a growing risk of a wider conflict with a heavier civilian toll. Other possible scenarios include the rekindling of the jihadist threat and a financial collapse that would undermine the livelihoods of thousands of people. The security repercussions of these scenarios could spread to Algeria, Egypt and Tuni- sia and, in turn, exacerbate political, social and economic tensions in these countries. A protracted war would also affect Europe, as Libyan refugees and migrants from sub-Sa- haran Africa could increasingly seek shelter there to escape the fighting. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 49

In 2019/20, we will advocate steps toward an end to the fighting and unification of governments and state institutions, including the military. Building on publications taking stock of the rapidly changing situation, we will seek to engage with both sides of the conflict in Libya: the military coalition led by Khalifa Haftar and the Thinni government, on one side, and the internationally recognised Government of National Accord and its military backers, on the other, in addition to other relevant and influential Libyan stakeholders. The aim would be to persuade both sides to return to the negotiating table and unify state institutions. We will also engage with the UN special representative and his team as well as the principal diplomatic missions active in Libya as well as international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Israel/Palestine Notwithstanding President Donald Trump’s push to get Israeli-Palestinian negotiations off the ground, there is little chance of an agreement – or even a credible process for reaching one – in the foreseeable future. President Mahmoud Abbas’s health is poor and there is therefore likely to be a political transition in the West Bank. The loss of influence and legitimacy among PLO leaders is one factor pushing youth, civil society and sidelined Palestin- ian constituencies toward new paradigms for resolving the conflict, away from the two-state model that has underpinned peacemaking for the past quarter-century. Israelis, too, are moving away from the classic two-state model, toward greater support for various forms of annexation of the West Bank. In Gaza, worsening humanitarian conditions, political dead- lock, severe restrictions on movement and exports, and a growing death toll among un- armed protesters at the border all greatly increase the risk of renewed conflict, which could spread to the West Bank. The situation remains extremely tense. Relatively minor incidents can spark conflagrations, as we have seen in Gaza and on the Holy Esplanade (Haram al- Sharif/Temple Mount).

In 2019/20 our efforts will focus on reducing the likelihood of escalation on the Holy Espla- nade or a new round of fighting in Gaza. We will also seek to help diplomats, Israeli and Palestinian policymakers, and local religious stakeholders to formulate new strategies for resolving the conflict that go beyond the confines of the two-state model in place for the past quarter century, and provide ideas as to how local and international stakeholders can shift from entrenching the status quo to altering it.

We will help the parties navigate a path out of the now decades-long Oslo impasse by exploring new means of resolving the conflict, addressing the needs of core constituencies and employing strategies that could nudge the parties to break with the status quo. One aspect of this work will be continuing to support more inclusive peacemaking by creating relationships – virtually non-existent at present – between diplomats and local religious stakeholders. We will attempt to convince members of the international quartet (the U.S., the EU, Russia and the UN) and Israeli and Palestinian negotiators to incorporate new actors and constituencies (particularly religious communities) and build ties between representatives of these groups and stakeholders in the diplomatic process. We will also help the stakeholders transform their approach to the conflict from one of de facto support for the status quo to changing it. Our analysis will provide diplomats and other stakeholders with the recommendations and analytical framing with which they can pursue an alternative to the current approach, which is widely recognised as having failed. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 50

Algeria Algeria is undergoing dramatic change, but in the summer of 2019 much remains unclear. The end of Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s twenty-year rule augurs a period of uncertainty. The regime so far remains in place and has stepped up repression to persuade protesters to accept a regime-led transition and go home. But protesters distrust the interim leadership’s promises and are clamouring for more fundamental change. Protesters in the street want to see the regime gone. Will the military comply? Or will it seek to retrench amid potential violence? What would the impact be on Algeria’s economy? Its external relations? The stability of its regions? On jihadist groups roaming the Sahel? The Western Sahara conflict?

In 2019/20 we will seek to engage Algerian and key external actors in supporting efforts toward a stable and inclusive political transition from the Bouteflika era. Given the speed of developments, we intend to provide regular updates and suggest policy adjustments accordingly for Algerian as well as external actors. We will supply real-time analysis to facilitate dialogue between the authorities and protest movement representatives to lay the groundwork for a peaceful and inclusive transition; apply lessons learned in Tunisia; enrich Europe’s approach to the transition; and influence the public debate on what kind of Alge- ria should emerge from the Bouteflika era.

Tunisia Reputedly the only success story of the Arab uprisings, Tunisia now faces a reckoning. Will the compromise between Islamists and secularists that ensured eight years of stability sur- vive the passing of its architects, Beji Caid Essebsi and Rachid Ghannouchi? Will Tunisia make progress in addressing its deep economic and social challenges? Will it be able to keep the destructive competition between regional actors (especially the UAE and Qatar) at bay? Will it maintain domestic peace or will it enter a new period of instability? Indeed, the socio-economic situation has gotten worse in recent years. The dinar has depreciated by more than 40 per cent vis-à-vis the euro since 2016.

The informal sector is playing a growing role in the economy. Employment is stagnant, especially among youth. The quality of public services has significantly deteriorated, especially in health, education and transport. Political parties’ inability to halt the decline of living conditions for the majority of the population is encouraging nostalgia for the old regime. The main political and trade union forces have contributed to the fragmentation of the old regime’s clientelist machine. There is increased talk of the state falling apart and belief that only a strong central authority can fight corruption and restore public infrastructure.

In 2019/20, our efforts will focus on helping keep Tunisia stable as it faces new economic and political challenges, and perhaps legislative and presidential elections toward the end of 2019. Through advocacy meetings with international actors (the EU delegation in Tunis, the IMF, the World Bank and the embassies of the U.S., UK, France and Germany) and with national stakeholders (senior executives, officials of main political parties, the presidency of the Republic, the prime minister), we will promote measures to contain polarisation around the elections. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 51

United States The U.S. Program, which was established in 2017, analyses the role of the U.S. in conflicts and crises in North Korea, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia, West Africa and elsewhere. As part of this analysis, and in light of the Trump administration’s “America First” policy, we assess the U.S.’s role in either sustaining or eroding the multilateral frame- works and alliances that have played a substantial part in ordering international relations for much of the post-World War II period. We also consider internal dynamics between the political branches of the U.S. government, and how encouraging a greater role for the U.S. Congress in matters of war and peace might help both officials and the public better consider the costs of conflict and avoid imprudent and unbounded wars.

While the U.S. has not entered into any new major conflicts under President Trump’s administration, its sabre-rattling with Iran has increased the risk of misjudgement or war with potentially enormous regional and global consequences. U.S. support continues for a Saudi-led coalition waging war with disastrous humanitarian consequences in Yemen, and ambiguity about the U.S. posture and objectives in Syria raises concerns about the prospect of escalating engagement there. In Venezuela and North Korea, Washington has shown de- creasing appetite for achieving its objectives through the use of force, but has struggled to develop viable diplomatic strategies to address long-running crises. By contrast, Afghan- istan presents an area of opportunity given Trump’s widely reported desire to bring home U.S. troops and the administration’s new willingness to have direct talks with the Taliban.

With the geographically unbounded “war on terror” that began after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks approaching its 18th anniversary, the U.S. public is increasingly war- weary, and the U.S. Congress increasingly assertive on matters of war and peace. In early 2019, both chambers of Congress took the unprecedented step of passing legislation that invoked the War Powers Resolution of 1973 to direct the president to withdraw U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen. Although President Trump vetoed it, the legislation sent an important message of deepening political frustration to the Saudi-led coalition that the U.S. has been supporting in Yemen. Legislation that would deny funding for the administration to wage war with Iran absent Congressional authorisation is now making its way through Congress and is further evidence of greater war powers activism on the part of the legislative branch.

In 2019/20, we will include U.S. Program reporting in long- and short-form products that originate with the U.S. Program as well as those that originate with other regional programs. We will encourage the formation of U.S. policies that prioritise diplomacy over military solutions to these and other crises, highlight the costs of conflict and present opportunities for conflict resolution.

As members of Congress increasingly focus on the tools at their disposal to constrain executive branch warmaking, there is also growing interest in revisiting the post-Vi- etnam Warj statutory framework that helps to define the respective war powers of Congress and the president. Although the War Powers Resolution of 1973 was intended to restore Con- gressional prerogatives after several decades of erosion, it has over time been interpreted to afford the executive branch considerable unchecked discretion. A revised war powers framework could make it more difficult for the president to use military force without congressional authorisation, and in so doing create greater opportunities for members of Con- gress to consider the costs of conflict and alternatives to the use of force. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 52

We will continue to urge members of Congress to use the tools at their disposal to discour- age U.S. support for the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen and to guide the U.S. away from a disastrous military confrontation with Iran. We will also encourage Congress to revisit the 2001 use of force authorisation that followed the 11 September attacks, and that has been interpreted to apply to theatres and organisations never envisaged at the time. Finally, we will advocate for members of Congress to reform the post-Vietnam war powers framework to make it more difficult for the executive branch to launch or sustain armed conflict without congressional approval, and to help ensure that Congress and the public have an opportunity to receive the information they require to make prudent decisions about the use of force. Crisis Group Workplan 2019-2020 | Public Version 53

9.2 Crisis Group’s Coverage Worldwide

Through field reporting, we will cover the following conflict situations:

Africa: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, South Africa, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Asia: Afghanistan, Kashmir (Indian-administered), Korean peninsula, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand.

Europe and Central Asia: The Balkans, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.

Latin America and the Caribbean: Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Venezuela.

Middle East and North Africa: Algeria, the Gulf states, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen.

Through our global conflict tracker CrisisWatch, we will monitor another 30-40 countries or situations of potential conflict, including: Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cambodia, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India (non-Kashmir), Indonesia, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Western Sahara.