1 Introduction Since the 1960S, Colombia Has Endured a Protracted

Introduction Since the 1960s, Colombia has endured a protracted civil war. Fought between the government of Colombia (GOC), their paramilitary allies and various left-wing guerrilla groups, the conflict has claimed the lives of scores of Colombians and led to acute suffering for millions of people. The GOC and the country’s largest and longest-lasting insurgent group, the left-wing Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC), began negotiations to end the decades-long conflict on August 27th, 2012,1 after sixth months of exploratory dialogue. These talks began October, 2012 in Havana, Cuba and, after rejection in a national referendum, a revised landmark peace deal was signed by both parties in November 2016. The six-point GOC-FARC deal constitutes a comprehensive peace agreement addressing key areas of the conflict and formally marks the end of the conflict between the GOC and the FARC. At the time of writing (April 2018), there is substantial optimism surrounding the implementation of the agreed terms as the FARC complete the process of disarmament and transition to a political party, the Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (same acronym – FARC). Yet significant concerns remain regarding the challenges to the peace deal.2 For example, there are concerns regarding the GOC’s ability to implement the terms of the agreement.3 Many other observers and commentators have focused on FARC dissidents’ refusal to join the peace process and demobilise. An estimated 800 to 1,000 former FARC members have not demobilised and it is hitherto unclear if these groups will continue to espouse a left-wing political platform similar to the FARC or if they will concentrate on criminal activities such as the illegal drug trade.4 However, another central concern that has emerged is the continued presence and expansion of Colombia’s right-wing paramilitary groups. Reports have warned that paramilitary groups (so-called BACRIMs, discussed below) may spoil Colombia’s current 1 peace attempts by disrupting the implementation of the peace agreement, for instance, by directly targeting FARC members or by deterring people from getting involved in politics in Colombia’s marginalised regions.5 Up to this point, there has been a lack of academic research into the spoiler potential of Colombia’s new paramilitary groups. By drawing on the spoiler literature, this article aims to investigate these spoiler claims. The analysis in this article, on the one hand, shows that successor paramilitary groups pose a direct spoiler threat to the peace process by intentionally challenging the peace deal. On the other hand, this article attempts to provide a deeper understanding of the paramilitary threat by discussing indirect spoiler activity. Little attention has been given to the less obvious (yet no less significant) threat of potential indirect spoiler actions in the wider spoiler literature, as well as in the specific case of the Colombian peace process. We highlight two ways in which paramilitary violence could serve to indirectly spoil peace. First, the analysis shows that paramilitary groups still represent a powerful fighting force. They have expanded their presence and levels of violence in many regions of Colombia, including those contested by warring parties. The data suggest that successor paramilitary violence threatens the ability of the GOC to address issues of victims of political violence and to effectively terminate the conflict.6 Secondly, paramilitary groups continue to violently acquire land through forced displacement and have resisted land restitution efforts, obstructing the implementation of the GOC-FARC agreements on land reform, as well as exacerbating the root causes of the conflict (land inequality and issues pertaining to access to land). The following analysis consists of fieldwork in Colombia, primarily focused on in- depth interviews and questionnaires with FARC members (20 respondents) across three demobilisation camps or transition zones (Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización) in April and July 2017, before and during the disarmament process (see Appendix 3). We also interviewed former paramilitary AUC leaders (see Appendix 3). The analysis further employs 2 a uniquely-coded dataset on political violence in western Colombia (discussed in more detail below and in the Appendices). The data support claims made by respondents. While much of this information from interviews and corresponding datasets help support our arguments and observations about Colombia, we unpack some of the theoretical-empirical implications of our analysis in the conclusion to provide possible generalisable areas for future research into how inter-field rivalries between actors such as insurgents and pro-government militias may shape peace processes. Spoiling peace Peace processes are notoriously precarious affairs. A key obstacle to peace negotiations is the effect of ‘spoilers’, groups that seek to challenge peace processes. In his seminal article, Stedman defines spoilers as ‘leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it in the context of peace processes.’7 Spoilers may operate inside or outside negotiations and use a variety of tactics to spoil peace attempts including violent and non- violent tactics.8 In addition to this, scholars have noted a distinction between direct and indirect spoiling activity.9 Direct spoiling actions constitute intentional challenges to peace attempts. Indirect spoiling refers to violence that ‘may be directed towards seemingly non-political objectives and yet have very real political consequences as a by-product.’10 Spoiling behavior can thus include violent activities that are not directly aimed at undermining peace attempts but that nevertheless negatively affect the prospects for peace. Spoilers can be particularly salient in conflicts with multiple warring parties. Research has shown that the presence of many actors at the bargaining table makes it more difficult to reach an agreement.11 Similarly, Nilsson argues that warring parties excluded from peace processes often continue violence and increase the likelihood of spoiler activity.12 In addition, 3 continued violent rivalries between sub-state armed groups can contribute to these groups’ longevity and potentially serve to spoil peace processes. Phillips argues that ‘interfield’ rivalries (when competitors espouse substantially different political goals) have greater impact on actor longevity than ‘intrafield’ rivalries (when rivals are from the same broader movement).13 Indeed, inter-group violence and interactions between sub-state forces have often proved difficult to manage and overcome in peace processes around the world. Where peace processes have been successful in the presence of anti-insurgent militias, for example, peace negotiations were further complicated. For instance, in Northern Ireland, substantial coordination was required between all armed actors, but particularly between the IRA and loyalist paramilitary groups, before the decommissioning of arms was possible.14 In the Sudan, pro-government militias continued to attack oppositional forces in spite of a government- insurgent ceasefire, culminating in a re-ignition of conflict.15 Paramilitary-insurgent inter-field rivalry and spoiling previous peace processes The presence of multiple armed groups has complicated Colombia’s conflict and many of the country’s previous attempts at peace. Numerous powerful left-wing guerrilla organisations such as the FARC, ELN (Ejercito Liberación Nacional), and M-19, among many others, have often competed among one another despite relatively similar objectives (i.e. intrafield rivalry). However, the rise of paramilitary groups has had a significant effect on conflict dynamics. Modern paramilitarism developed as an anti-insurgent movement connected to the state’s counterinsurgency efforts and interests of large landholder property owners and drug traffickers.16 Furthermore, in contrast to the FARC’s objectives, the paramilitaries have aspired to ‘defend the interests of powerful domestic and international economic actors’ and espouse a ‘fiercely anti-communist’ ideology.17 Paramilitarism has represented part of a larger right-wing political force that infamously manifested itself in the form of the ‘para-politica’ scandal.18 4 These sets of interests and corresponding worldview contribute to a powerful inter-field rivalry between the paramilitaries and the FARC over the direction of Colombian politics.19 The emergence of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), the right-wing pro-government militia paramilitary umbrella organisation in the 1990s, epitomised the anti-insurgent and anti- subversive nature of these forces. The AUC had well-documented unofficial and clandestine links with Colombia’s armed forces and the country’s political establishment in an alliance against the FARC, other insurgent forces, and progressive social movements.20 The FARC and other insurgent movements have, in turn, considered paramilitary forces among their greatest enemies and have often violently retaliated against them, their supporters and benefactors. As a consequence of this insurgent-paramilitary rivalry, Colombia’s paramilitary groups have acted as spoilers during multiple previous GOC-insurgent peace attempts. For instance, paramilitary forces challenged the GOC-FARC peace process during the

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