CEU eTD Collection 17.245 2007 International Relations and European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirementsfor the degree of Master of Department of International Relations and European Studies Central European University Ilir Kalemaj Serbia andAlbania Sources of Irredentist Foreign Policy: Word Count Supervisor: Professor Erin Supervisor: Professor Jenne Budapest, Hungary Submitted to By CEU eTD Collection not have been possible. patience,their understanding,Without support, andKalemaj. most of all love, the completionDallendyshe and of this work Flamur would my parents to thesis this dedicate I this andsupportthroughout year.their challenging academic help,encouragement In addition, I would also like to thank all the faculty and administration staff at CEU, for which andI aspire. to andemulate me words help in of amodel hasoffered every step Dr.Jenne to this thesis. inspiring for herandher true for Kristen support, thank trust I would Jenne Erin like to Acknowledgements ii CEU eTD Collection only only someat periods, butnotin others? Second, ethnicborder. happensforeignthis whydoes policy acrossthe with regard to kin shape and institutions interest ideas, societal these how do is: answer to seeks thesis interests andinstitutions infomentingirredentist policies. Hence, question the thisthat ideas, societal intermediate role of the focuses on that builds uponarationale research in aftermath the of Communism, Albania refrained while following from up.The incountries provide both and to Serbiabecameirredentist answer of an increasingly why up. the when countries inboth processes historical the examine critically to allows method tracing process While the similarities. shared otherwise the given cases, the between variable differing for the account to of Difference Method onMill’sit draws firstcase, In the methods. tracing process and controlled comparison the both employs The thesis eachcase. of characteristics Serbia and allowsthat Albania,- for an examination variousof variables and juxtaposing study,- case comparative a on based is thesis The policies. foreign irredentist of sources and conditions background the discusses This thesis literature. IR in the field Irredentism in foreign policy an interestingconstitutes butnotquite developed The main aim of the thesis is to discuss the patterns of foreign policy toward kin toward policy foreign of patterns the discuss is to thesis the of aim main The Abstract windows ofopportunity for irredentist policies open iii CEU eTD Collection 2. Theory andhypotheses 1. Introduction...... 1 3. Serbia`s Irredentism inforeign policy 4. Albania’s Absent Irredentism Bibliography Appendix 1 Albania versus Serbia policies: irredentist F.P. Assessing 5. 6. Conclusion 1.2 Literature ...... 7 Review 1.1 Research Question ...... 4 and Importance 2.2 Case selection and Methodology...... 17 2.1 ‘Social informed’ irredentism and foreign ...... 14 intervention 3.2 Foreign intervention: ‘Sticks’ or ‘Carrots’?...... 29 3.1 Domestic factors influencing irredentism...... 20 4.3 Albania in transition and its lack ...... 41 of irredentism 4.2 Communist Albania and the ...... 39 end of Nationalism 4.1 Historical Overview...... 37 5.2 Why the two cases differ?...... 50 5.1 Factors influencing irredentism...... 49 ...... Table of contents ...... 14 20 58 57 37 55 49 iv CEU eTD Collection Analyses from 1980s the and 1990s,” Logit Irredentism: of Causes the “Determining Ayres, William R. and M. Saideman Stephen forthcoming; Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, William R. and Saideman M. Stephen in Dynamics, Domestic versus Pressures International absence: its and Irredentism Saideman. M. Stephen 1998; Donald L. Horowitz. Competition, Ethnic Ties, and the ForeignPolicies of Somalia and Serbia,” Publishers; London: Admantine Press, 1991; StephenM. Saideman. “Inconsistent Irredentism? Political 3 forthcoming. institutions [that] influenceinstitutions behavior [that] state preferences byshapingis state that the and interests “ideas, role the of to hasgiven been attention nosystematic or little influences it, and what politics irredentistlead to that causes the of explanation different Policies of Somalia and Serbia,” 1 annexing neighboring territories inhabited by ethnic kin” favorit. supportconditions Irredentism be for seem would can as“state apt to defined success, while Albania has failed tobehave in a similar fashion, although initial the led periodthe that dissolution tothe although of Yugoslavia, degrees various with of their Serbia kin inneighboring irredentist supported states. has policiesactively during in Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, William R. and Saideman M. Stephen in 2 neighboring states whose lands are sought.” are lands whose states neighboring as “any to (re)unify effort inhabited byethnickin territories certainly will antagonize be costly, believed to iswidely timeacross both andspace.Irredentism varying degrees, serve electoral Ithasbeenpurposes. in salient especially Serbian albeitpolitics, to to byshrewd politicians instrument an infeatureas used the Balkans, been a persistent actual or alleged historical possessions of a territory that needs to be redeemed. It has See forexample,Naomi Chazan (ed.), Irredentism and InternationalPolitics, Boulder, CO:L.Rieener Stephen M. Saideman. “Inconsistent Irredentism? Political Competition, Ethnic Ties, and the Foreign Stephen M. Saideman. “Irredentism and its absence: International Pressures versus Domestic Dynamics,” Domestic versus Pressures International absence: its and “Irredentism Saideman. M. Stephen This thesis seeks to analyze Serbian and Albanian foreign policy with regard to regard with policy foreign Albanian and Serbian analyze to seeks thesis This Ethnic groupsEthnic inconflict Security Studies 1. Introduction The Journal of Politics , Vol.7, No.3, 1998. p.53. War and Peace in the Aftermath of Communism War and PeaceintheAftermath ofCommunism . London: University of California Press, 2000; Press, California of University London: . 2 Although many have authors offered , Vol.62, No.4. (Nov.,2000), pp.1126-1144. 1 and basedis often on prior Security Studies , Vol.7, No.3, 1 3 , , CEU eTD Collection helped incite such irredentism in the first place. Thereafter, it turns its attention toward attention its it turns Thereafter, place. first the in irredentism such incite helped have that factors the and communism of aftermath in the in Serbia policies irredentist angle; from institutionalan vantage point. Itdoes so by exploringcauses the root of a different from it at looking by policy, foreign in irredentism as such phenomenon, and helpin turn transform nationalism into irredentism during critical moments. nationalism foster that institutions domestic of strength the on focuses that explanation an well, given the otherwise similarities between these two countries. This thesis develops why provideindeveloped asatisfactory irredentismanswer as did not to this country as donot explanations in these policy, foreign of irredentism arelative lack by characterized impacting policy-makers` agendas. in Moreover, Albanian the hascase, which been in has environment societal the that role salient the overlooking by irredentism, Serbia`s shaping political leaders` agendas.shaping political 5 p.514. A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” aspect of international relations: studythe of irredentism in foreignpolicy. “Taking Preferences Seriously: Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory, althoughI use Moravscik insights to point out atsomewhat different 4 own political ends, or a generally, either a why happensthis only someat periods, butnotin others. andinstitutions shapeforeign policy with ethnicregard to kinacross border.the Second, interest ideas, societal these how iswith Iam concerned that question primary Hence, the fundamental social thepurposes strategicunderlying governments.” calculations of Ifurther elaborate this point at the literature review section. Here I use a definition first elaborated by Andrew Moravscik. I see this paper as fitting with Moravscik`s Hence, the significance of this paper lies in the treatment of of a well-studied in thetreatment lies paper this of significance the Hence, The arguments that account for irredentism in the existing literature, take literature, intheexisting irredentism for account that The arguments top-down bottom-up approach, when the elites instrumentalize the people for their approach that emphasizes the role of constituencies in constituencies of role the emphasizes that approach 5 But these approaches fail to tell the whole story of International Organization , Vol.51, No.4. (Autumn, 1997), (Autumn, No.4. Vol.51, , 2 4 CEU eTD Collection the aftermath of the communist system in system Yugoslavia. aftermath of communist the the in the Serbian case, but that fail to do the same in Albania. in same dothe to fail that but case, Serbian the in failed to materialize. Sucha time frame is important to account forthe factors that were fueling irredentism policy, toward irredentism inSerbia, while nevertheless the same condition and initial rhetoric inAlbania, period, upto 1998. Thisisadecade accounts abrupt that from change the for non-nationalist the foreign 6 right sensebelonging of critical that proved futurefor developments. Itwaited onlyfor the literacy establishedand epic and myths toasense rise gave nationalist of anda pride independence Ottoman from in 19 Empirethe the gainingup. Serbiannationalism started especially strength Serbia winning with a when moments, incritical only irredentism fueled has it Albania. in development nationalist linear a of absence the to due mostly is neighbors- Balkan its more recenthistory. Albania’s Iarguethat surprisinglack ofirredentism- in to contrast inAlbania’s irredentism have of absence that ledtothe factors analyze the beto able pastthe that havehelped shapeAlbaniannationalism. tracingimportant Thisprocess is to period, transition Albanianof foreign itspolicy with kin regard to during the Communist and democratic ‘constraining’follow Albania toproceed with In anon-nationalist to order path. study the initAlbania analysesand in thefactors that worked Albanian thus case the reverse, country, neighboring small Serbia`s in phenomenon same the of absence relative the This paperonly looks at the last years of the Communist regime in bothcountries and the post-communist catalysts In contrast, nationalism has been persistently present in Serbian politics, although politics, in Serbian present persistently been has nationalism contrast, In to be transformed in a modern-day irredentism that we came to witness in we came to in that irredentism tobe transformed amodern-day 6 Ifirst give a brief account of Albania’s most salient historical events of th Century. This coincided with awell- with Century. Thiscoincided window opportunity of opens 3 CEU eTD Collection 11 Horowitz. L. Donald 1972; Societies: aTheory ofDemocratic InstabilityColumbus territories of Moldova and Georgia or the ‘Greater Somalian’ case in Africa, to mention just but a few. a but just mention to Africa, in case Somalian’ 10 ‘Greater the or Georgia and of Moldova territories Hungarian-speaking population,Russiansupported Transdnistria, Ossetia Abkhazia, and respectively in 9 8 1998. p.53. politicians when Meanwhile,MorganandBickers faced NATO bombing. arguethat with cohesion.” internal increases out-groups with “[c]onflict writes: he when element this captures Cose Lewis enemy. foreign a common internal problems of They state. the helpedare inthis bythe process public perception of follow aggressive foreigntheories of war, whichsuggests when that politicians` positions arethreatened,they will policies to divertAnother the attention explanation electorate. the vis-à-vis of their rhetoric radicalizes race that competition in ethnic enter an their constituency used theethnicplaying in fromcard politics. domestic the to explainargument, which basically stressespolitical that leaders try to outbid while other, each theoutbidding’ ‘ethnic the on centers caseexplanation One policy. foreign irredentist for of Serbia agendasfalls with regard to their neighbors` territory. underphenomenon in today’s world, many with pursuing states actively passivelyor irredentist the diversionary 19 during the of Trentino occupiedregion Italian Competition, Ethnic Ties, and the ForeignPolicies of Somalia and Serbia,” neighboring territories inhabited by ethnic kin”. StephenM. Saideman. “Inconsistent Irredentism? Political 7 from the Italian word Importance and Question 1.1 Research Such examples may include, may examples Such Here I rely on a definition from Saideman, who has defined irredentism as “state support for annexing Terra irredenta Terra Quoted in Saideman, “Inconsistent Irredentism…,” p.54. For more on Formore ethnic outbidding, see Aluinyand Rabushka and KennethA. Shepsle. Irredentism, , in a literal translation from Italian means: ‘unredeemed territory’. 7 which is a feature of identity whichitmeaning is of identity draws and ethnicpolitics, afeature Ethnic groups in conflict irredenta inter alia inter 8 , referring to Italy’sfor , referring Austro-Hungarian the quest to , the Rumanian region of Transilvania, which is inhabited by a . London: University of California Press, 2000; 11 10 This was for example the case of Serbia to endeavor politicians that means This 9 , OH: E. Merrill Charles Publishing Company, There are several different explanations different There several are th century. It is awidespread It century. Security Studies Politics in Plural , Vol.7, No.3, 4 CEU eTD Collection Organization Politics,” ofInternational Theory A Liberal Seriously: Preferences “Taking Moravscik. see Andrew it, of view elaborated more a For groups. interest ofconcrete terms in I use more which nationalist ideas that provide the ground for irredentist policies. Also, Ido the same thing with the interests,Intergovernmentalism. However, Inarrow Moravcsik`s vague ofconcept ideas,byout pointing solely the 14 Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. p.109 13 12 governments.” of calculations the strategic underlying state behavior by shaping state preferences, that is the fundamental social purposes“influences that level domestic the on institutions and groups interest ideas, nationalist specifically state irredentism,little or no systematic attention has been given to the role of Box. and openaPandora’s haveaspill-overeffect can boundaries existing own territory. It has been totheir threats irredentist or secessionistlead mightit to fear that becausethe of mostly especially the case withpursue irredentist their to themselves. policies is are more reluctant own This territory Africa, where the questioning of the responding interests to of whosea group support is necessary for retaining power. plans, irredentist and agendas nationalist their constructing when selective often are lack irredentism.produce interact to might influences andexternal factors explore how societal to made been has effort little Furthermore, policy. foreign irredentist fomenting in played have society of the segments different that the haverole overlooked mostauthors of Yugoslavia, of literature neighbors,Serbia`s irredentist vis-à-viswhich led policies its breakup tothe Here I rely on a definition provided by Andrew Moravcsik when he formulates his theory ofLiberal theory his formulates he when Moravcsik Andrew by provided definition a on rely I Here For a similar argument see I. William Zartman. William seeI. argument a similar For Ibid. ofirredentism in neighboringthe state of Albania during the same period is largely This will be furtherelaborated in the literature review section. Although many haveauthors offered different explanationsirredentism, for and The While much has been said aboutSerbia’s irredentist foreign policy, relative the , Vol.51, No.4. (Autumn, 1997), p.514. vulnerability theory stresses that states that are prone to irredentist claims in claims irredentist to areprone that states that stresses theory International Relations intheNew Africa 14 Notwithstanding the vast the Notwithstanding 13 International . Englewood 12 5 CEU eTD Collection toward kin. toward when conditions the wouldforeign general suggest samethe way conductingof policy patterns differencesprovide anthe for Serbia inirredentistbetween answer Albania, and in Hence,not but paper seeksto this foreignsomeothers. emergesduring periods, policy policy isin more some prevalent societies others,andthan why further, this of type kin across the border. I hope to address the more general puzzle of why irredentist foreign ethnic andinstitutions shapeforeign regardto ideas,with policy interests nationalisthow foreign Thisnot. answer policy Albaniadid paperwhile this seeksto puzzle by showing both countries. Nevertheless, as will be shown in this thesis, Serbia pursued an aggressive from behavior policy foreign of pattern same the expect naturally would one countries, two the between otherwise similarities the Given puzzle. address this interesting casesforeign ofAlbanian in andSerbian comparing Ihopeto two the the1990s, policy aggressive in foreign policy in Albania,whichstands markedtoSerbia. contrast By of absence interesting the on done been has work substantial No granted. for taken 6 CEU eTD Collection 18 17 University Press, 2004. p.87 16 54. Irredentism…,” “Inconsistent Saideman explanation, detailed more a for See varies).” that something explain cannot (a constant irredentism aggressiveness overtime, suggesting ethnicthat identity their in vary or nationalism, by and themselves, cannot explainothers, ignoring while territories certain seek frequently states “Irredentist policies. 15 Review 1.2 Literature or economicor transition. of political context inthe increases to theirposition threat internal asthe power political maintain explainedof partbySerbelites aggression to a strategy as pursued Serbian to their in domestic foreign regard given policy priority anaggressive producing factors with to kin abroad;explain itsused causes. Some have approaches underlying different of to these authors others have emphasized external factors. V.P.Gagnon Jr. has the risk of being voted out in the face of collapse. facein of economic out the beingvoted riskthe of reduce in to and order terms inethnic of supporters opponents their redefine the interests gaining power or wealth.gaining or he the ethnic Serbian power believesthat provoked Inthisway, elites ‘instrumentalize’ mind: the masseswith ina single retainingtheir goal positions and/or to in advantageof who theirpower position take actors asrational,elites calculating interests. private their suits it when them misleading or leading elites approach Gagnon massesby by influence that takesatop-down thus arguing realm.” public from the excluded marginalized, and become silenced, mobilized, whohad previously been politically mobilized,who or werein of process the being strategy has“demobilization,” which Gagnon of described as“a process by which people See for a more elaborated account of this “demobilization” strategy at Gagnon’s Introduction. Gagnon’s at strategy “demobilization” of this account elaborated a more for See 88. Gagnon, V. P. Gagnon, Jr. foreign of states`s direction and strength the in inconsistencies for account to terms these uses Saideman Serbian irredentism has been both selective and inconsistent, and selective both been has irredentism Serbian Gagnon’s approach is in line with the general conventional wisdom is approach Gagnon’s inline sees that generalconventional with the wisdom The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia inthe 1990s. 16 He argues that Milosevic and the ruling conservatives tried to 17 To do so, they pursued a 15 and scholars have scholars and Ithaca, NY: Cornell 18 7 CEU eTD Collection foreign policy, foreign irredentist in variation predict not does irredentism of account Gagnon’s that notes who and other societal factors. Another shortcoming of his theory is pointed out by Saideman, behavior; variablescandidate include domestic constituencies, interventions third-party elite and irredentism both triggered have not might variable a third whether explore not politicians` agendas. 21 20 Security 19 shoreconflict up to their in face positions the of domestic challenges. agendawould that haveseize enabledhim in to power place, first the while the of support OrthodoxChurch.the Without the first, Milosevic would have probably lacked apolitical include theAcademy in or such institutions Science of demonstrated chapter, second the be In aswill caseof the Serbia, vice-versa. and arena, political the into ‘ideas’ societal actors. My view is that certain institutions play a crucial role in transmitting these used by political apparently elites unconstrained byintermediary institutions orother claims irredentist fomenting in have instrumentally use the through of emotional appeals to masses. the foreign in policy. Moreover, both Kaufman andGagnon’s view, elites pursue theirgoals Kaufman and Gagnon highlight the causal impact of Both position. rationalist a straight-forward in taking Gagnon, with assumptions and views his of most share to seems Kaufman fact, In ends. political their serve to use they which masses, laden’ ‘emotionally in these soil’ ‘fertile a find politicians that argues he For the 60. purposesIrredentism,” “Inconsistent Saideman, of my paper, I classify V.P. Gagnonjr., “Ethnic nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” such myths and symbols under the ideas, which often affect 19, (winterno.3 1994/95):135-137. p.135 Kaufman, too, takes Kaufman, instrumentalist too, takes in an itself is position that While I concur with KaufmanmythsWhile concerning Iconcurwith that the relevance symbols and 20 whichin has been Serbia considerable. 21 , I depart with him when he argues that they are power-seeking elites power-seeking 19 However, he does rationalist on irredentist on International , when 8 CEU eTD Collection New York: Columbia University 2001.Press, pp.22-25. Ties,” Ethnic Versus 24 case. common interest in this case, does not explain why states would not choose free to ride, like the Somalian revisionof the a seeks state African one if that is Herbst), (i.e. authors by many expressed fear The realities. political existing or conditions geographical ethnic, to regard little with there, borders the draw powers colonial 23 International Organization 22 retaliation. to vulnerable are ifthey in irredentism engage not will states that means simply of irredentism,potential arelesswillingtopursue irredentist It agendas themselves. inAlbania. irredentism of lack the explains Science-- of Academy Albanian the asin caseof the ineptitude-- their institutions or intermediary such lackof the Similarly, essay. this in shown be as will periods, critical in regime his for support external Powerful interestmeanwhile, groups like theSerbian helpeddiaspora, in securing administration. for hisirredentist secondserveda the as crucial legitimacy seal of 25 determining policy-makers agendas. policy-makers determining territory. own totheir irredentistthreats or face secessionist they although irredentism, pursue to chosen have which world in the countries many are There case. failurePoliticiansfail not in grasp suchdo turn from ‘signals’ theirto because constituencies, to do so country and push therefore politicians inundertaking policies ontheir behalf. might ina neighboring kin their with empathize ofa country particular constituents is that result attachmentto constituencies,the in influence who turn politicians. Thelogic behindin this their replacement. Therefore, politicians support Stephen M. Saideman. “Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability former the because case, interesting an is Africa Africa. in Somalia instance, for is country a Such Africa,” in Boundaries ofNational Maintenance and Creation “The Herbst. Jeffrey example, for See Stephen M. Saideman. M. Stephen The vulnerability theory, on the other hand, stresses that states that are object the that states that hand,stresses other the on theory, vulnerability The Saideman on the other hand, emphasizes the preeminence of ethnic ties in ties ethnic of preeminence the emphasizes hand, other the on Saideman 22 The problem with this theory is that empirically this was not proven the status-quo International Organization The TiesThatDivide: EthnicPolitics, Foreign Policy, andInternational Conflict. 43(4), 1989. pp.673-692. and becomes irredentist; other states might soonfollow up. Nevertheless, 24 These ethnic ties have in a way a primordial 51,4, (Autumn 1997),pp.725-726. 23 25 9 CEU eTD Collection Bruce Bueno de Mesquita etal. Mesquita de Bueno Bruce Zagreb. to back going Croatians or Belgrade, 28 to going Serbs or Sarajevo, to going Muslims with and abused psychologicallydown looked from theirthemselves ethnic found brethren,surprise with whom their to they and share ethnic homelands ties. This their was at the case refugee find to went homes, their 27 26 According Saideman, tendbeif to to aggressive hawkish politicians more the camp, may which ‘upgrade’its agenda,better satisfy to voters` these demands. main becomes goal oneof then from the opponents`preventing constituents defecting to The politicians’ constituencies. preferencesofthese the reflect because they undertaken policies are therefore irredentist and elites the of decision-making the influence politicalin Saideman party power. interests thatthe argues of salientconstituencies these “selectorates,” include These vice-versa. of andnot theelites actions influence electoral heconstituencies arguesthat views. shapeconstituents’ might interests that ideas or different influenceof asthe variables, such intervening influence of their ethnic kin acrossfeelings views rescue with the byconstituents` andregard to their kin.taking Second, the borders as inherentlyethnically not to chose andyetAlbania abroad, Serbs just as as threatened were abroad given, Saideman and national Albanianswere threatenedby groups Albanian kin governments. their fails Serbian both towhen theirs- recognizeabout do Albanians than brethren ethnic their about more care the in ethnic voters First,problematic main ties explainwhy forreasons. Serbia two cannot politician’s sincerity on ethnic issues at home.” a for test “litmus a as serve they because kin, their of behalf on policies intervention Saideman and Ayres, forthcoming. 3-4. * See for a more elaborated view on the concept of “selectorate,” concept the on view elaborated a more for * See 3-4. forthcoming. Ayres, and Saideman from away driven refugees, kin ethnic of flows when be seen, can interests and/or ideas intervening Such Ibid Furthermore, in contrast to Gagnon,Furthermore, in to bottom-up Saideman contrast a takes when approach is interests other all over ties kin value that constituents of argument Saideman’s The Logic of Political Survival. 28 which in democracies are the electoral base the for electoral arethe in which democracies 27 26 Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003 . 10 CEU eTD Collection foreign policy. foreign ethnic acountry’s on constraint key a is intervention party third that conclude they Thus, have achieved.”couldnot compromise, not beenbroken Dayton and subsequently, the stalemate “the Bosnia, in intervention NATO for not it were that point the make authors process seriously and also get try to them bargaining toreach a peace deal. Moreover, the preliminary use of ‘air asa strikes’ way of convincing negotiation Serbstotake the the acting on the presumption that one can deal with Serbia only through force, advocated the bargaining table.” the Serbsto force the Bosnia, was there supportalways much greater touse airstrikes as anegotiating “tool” to 31 p.30. minorities abroad. They They note, abroad. minorities Serbian tone its toward moderate to seemed inleast discourse, official the policies at and irredentist Belgrade of lesssupportive internationalbecame from actors, credible threats by backed increased, coercion external of level the When policy. foreign Serbian on impact had acrucial intervention of external threat in credible the variation that arguing interventions. such factors, as third-party external importance of the the alsorecognizes Saideman although irredentism, causes of Serbian on focus both that is common in have Saideman and Gagnon what differences, cooperative” more become will policy foreign politicians, abandon 30 29 defect. to threaten constituents Carment, 63. Irredentism,” “Inconsistent David Saideman, and Frank Harvey. Ibid Other authors, such as Carment and Harvey, focus more on external factors, external on more focus Harvey, and Carment as such authors, Other inter alia While,“[i]f, Using Force toPrevent Ethnic Violence 30 , that This means that the international community, international the that means This instead, more dovish supporters to threaten “ [s]ince the outbreak of the conflict in conflict of the [s]ince outbreak the . London: Praeger, 2001. 29 But despite their domestic 11 31 CEU eTD Collection contribution is significant, because is atcontribution looks it significant, rootcauses the of this lack irredentism,of especially engagedirredentism.Serbia, virulent in periodically in light,my Seen this Albaniafailed irredentist tofollow an track,while of most itsmost Balkanneighbors, Kosovar [Albanians’] nationalist feelings.” Albania, “preoccupied with its own formidable domestic problems, was not playing on communist that similarly Albanian out points another topic, prominentthis on scholar “may, indeed, overtake Albania as the hub of development.” nationalist hub Albania asthe of indeed,“may, overtake Kosovo that tangentially adding Tirana…,” in policy official been never has Albania’ during the communist andpost-communist arguesthat“the periods, creation ‘Greater of to any great degree. Paulinin Kola, his historical overview of Albanian foreign policy p. 112. 33 authors writing on theissue. 32 neighbors its toward pacifism Albania’s on literature the all almost Second, Albanian. entirely lackhas been literature on inirredentism written Thescanton of this Albania. topic is doNor they explain irredentism the differentdegree of inAlbanian and Serbia. irredentist agendas. explain emergenceof failthe to authors the However, compromise. a brokered third-party to have Serbs the is agreed itwould that unlikely paramilitaries, deter Serbian andits associated the army bombing and sanctions to use of actual the of the threat credible the Without table. negotiating the to combatants in getting plays, 34 Paulin Kola. This literature is mainly authored by Albanian scholars and publicists, withonly a handful of foreign Elez Biberaj. Elez Although fewanswer would argueagainstthis, thequestion Iseekto of Carment and Harvey correctly identify the role that international intervention international that role the identify correctly Harvey and Carment While much of this literature above draws on the case of Serbia, relatively little relatively onthecaseof Serbia, above literature draws this While muchof 32 is descriptive; it does not seek to explain The Myth of Greater Albania Albania: A SocialistAlbania: A Maverick . New York: New York University Press, 2003. p.394. . Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1990. Press, Westview Oxford: and Francisco San Boulder, . 34 why Albania has not been irredentist been not has Albania 33 Elez Biberaj, Elez why 12 CEU eTD Collection outlining theoretical and policy implications. policy and theoretical outlining Albania. encapsulates from most the conclusion salient The analysis, this drawn points in factors thatexplaindelineates in ofirredentism absence and the thepresence Serbia which will my hypothesestest of modern Albania’s lack of irredentism. Chapter5 therelative demonstrate as irredentism. of This absence serves Albanian a framework, the with a shortinChapter 4focusespolicies, era. post-communistthe Albanian beginningthe on case, overview for irredentist Serbia`s havethat factors accounted and theexternal domestic discusses of the 3 Chapter selection. case usedfor criteria the and methodology the outlines chapter Albanianirredentism in foreign and alsopolicy myinitial hypotheses. presents In addition, this most salientaccountfor of thesources model I useto introduces the that 2 policies. Chapter historical Serbia. periods, in irredentism of presence the understanding of revaluate our may usto which cause in order to This thusthesis develops anew explain model to rootthe causes for irredentistof 13 CEU eTD Collection underlying Serbian foreign include policy-making shaped byideas and interests. interests sinceideasinstitutionsother, institutions,in often and while create turn are for They example,inextricablyeconomy, ethnic are linked toeach toward scapegoating. of the state the with dissatisfaction popular in converting serveascatalysts because they Thisis cases. foreign andacross time over policy in irredentist variation the affecting in crucial are andinstitutions interests ideas, nationalist role of the that argues thesis this intergovernmentalism, liberal Moravcsik`s on Drawing policy. foreign Serbian of course the have influenced may also that literature in existing the overlooked havebeen that many factors are thatthere other demonstrate I seekto Rather, actions. say in politicians` 2 policy. foreign states` on influence their and actors of societal interaction the see us help and state the of “black-box” the open which assumptions, behavior.” state See determines Moravcsik, preferences pp.517-520.state However,of interdependent for configuration the purposes“The of that: this states thesis,of theory LI I rely onlyassumption on the first two final The politics.” world in purposively act and preferences state define officials state interests’ “States (orother is: politicalassumption institutions) second The represent influence.” some societal subset in of domestic variations and society,values, onthe basis ofconflicting whosescarcity, material by imposed constraints under interests differentiated promote to action collective a exchange and organize who and risk-averse and rational average the on are who groups, private and individuals are relations focuses onprimacy the of societal actors in international politics: “The fundamental actors in international 1 (or constituencies roots grass large, where at masses’ of the of nor ‘dictate makers, the of decision of group leaderan oligarchic or of a single product intervention foreign and irredentism informed’ 2.1 ‘Social Interests here can be seen as embedded in various societal actors that have a stake in policy-making. in astake have that actors societal various in embedded as be seen can here Interests of these first The Intergovernmentalism. Liberal ofMoravcsik`s assumptions core the on draw I Here What this paper argues is that Serbian irredentist foreign policy issole the neither foreign policy irredentist Serbian is that argues thisWhat paper 2. Theory and hypotheses and Theory 2 In Serbian politics, thefoundational national ideas inter alia, the Nacertanije draft of of the draft Nacertanije the selectorates ) have the final the have ) 14 1 CEU eTD Collection Carole Roger. Carole Understanding the Balkan Wars 1990s of the University Press, 2001. p.179. Norman M. Naimark and Holly Case (eds.) 160; Stuart J. Kaufman. Yale University Press, 1997.p.59; 4 Paulin Kola. 3 19 publicly becauseendorsed, failuretodosowouldin result a breakdown “winningof their have they acommitment on through follow to but choice little have may in turn, elites, Political policy-makers. and leadership political the for agenda policy foreign the setting (individuals,actors institutions),lobbies ethnic policyor shape toward kinabroadby societal proposition: following the make I insights, intergovernmentalism liberal the on setting is first mechanism the irredentism. The produce ideas and interests nationalist groups. mafia and diasporas are these of important most two the thesis, this of purposes the For influence politicians`being agendas, without officially mechanisms part of the power. of is mean here, What these that groups in I actively decision-making. participating without centers, power to are close that are groups these case, in Serbian the groups interest decision-making bysometimes the pushing itright to on issues. nationalist As regards the Belgrade’s influenced greatly has that institution such another is Church Orthodox The times. most at officials government than issues ethnic on position radical more a taken andthathas had influenceonBelgradepolitics generally aconsiderable consistently has that period modern in the institutions main the of one is Academy the institutions, 1987 Memorandum of For viewa detailed onMemorandum the anditseffects onpolicy-making agenda, see others, SeeTim Judah. among th Century, outlined by the Foreign Minister at the time, Ilija Garasanin, roleinstitutions that have andinterest groups onthepolitical outcomes. Drawing This aretwomainpaper arguesthat there by institutions, mechanisms which The MythofGreater Albania The Breakup ofYugoslavia and itsAftermath Modern Hatreds: TheSymbolic Politics of EthnicWar 4 authored by As for Arts authored and Academy Sciences. Serbian the of The Serbs:History, MythandDestruction the ofYugoslavia Misha Glenny. Misha . New York: New York University Press, 2003. p.11. . Stanford:. Stanford University pp.174-175;Press,2003. The Fall Yugoslaviaof . London: Greenwood2004. Press, pp.16-17. . London: Penguin Books: 1992; Yugoslavia and ItsHistorians: . Ithaca and London: Cornell 3 and the recent the and inter alia . New Haven: . agenda- , Judah, 15 CEU eTD Collection at a common ground in the course of their negotiations. of their course the in ground common a at include military oreconomic sanctions, or at least a credible threat of using them, if the parties fail to arrive 5 of degree wasaconsiderable there argues that paper interveners. This yielded by threats the benefits or degreeof the according to change course the leadership in itsof policy,political to foreign a given country both. The efficient use of these two mechanisms translates into powerful leverage on the coercive‘carrots’) useofincentivesor useofforcecooperative (the or (the or‘sticks’) or maybe this agenda; pressure either degree of pressureonagovernment’s foreign be introduced: may logic,my of Basedonthis version now coalition.” apreliminary hypotheses working testable hypotheses: testable following atthe arrive we foreign policy, state’s a significantly alters intervention with the dictate of the international community. Thus, assuming that the degree of foreign Albania, beAlbanian where the asit demonstrated, will complied government quickly bombing,it wellin rather failed deliver toNATO results, worked leadingthereafter to whilein initial coercion andcountries wasthat was usedatthe stage Serbia this soft two the between difference only The case. Albanian the and Serbian in both community, This can be defined as rhetorical pressure that lacks enforcement mechanisms. Such mechanisms may mechanisms Such mechanisms. enforcement lacks that pressure rhetorical as be defined can This The second causal mechanism is external to the state and has to do with the with do to has and state the to is external mechanism causal second The institutions and interests promoting nationalist causes are either weak ormissing. Hypothesis 1b:Astatetends to beless irredentist overall ifnationalist ideas, ideas, institutions,and interests radicalize. ifnationalist tobemoreirredentist state governmenttends Hypothesis 1a:A soft coercion 5 from international from 16 CEU eTD Collection have had on both Serbian and Albanian stances toward their ethnic kin. ethnic their toward stances Albanian and Serbian both on had have actors external and institutions domestic that effect independent the examine to attempt actingof ininfluences. factors, I domestic with light, conjunction Seeninexternal this importanteffects societal the account withoutinto taking be understood policies cannot foreign irredentist moreover, and, cases Serbian and Albanian the between differences explain ex-Yugoslavia they the policies, cannot Serbia`s irredentist aggressive and number factors of wouldthat seem predictirredentismto in case. this respect, the Albanian case isilluminating givenits notable lack ofirredentism, despite a and implications future the thatitholds future for irredentism in region.the In this from Serbia), (particularly agendas irredentist open of of the pursuit Yugoslavia, because ex- in happened has that destructiveness the of in light important, is a comparison foreign policies of these two countries with regard to purposestheir of this study. First, there iskin an absence of a acrosssystematic, comparative study of statethe borders. Such for the cases thesetwo have chosen I why reasons several are There cases. Albanian Methodology and selection 2.2 Case from influentialfrom societal groups or institutions. an away from irredentist position,even when positions enjoy such strong support or shy down likelytoback theyaremore behavior, their incentives tomoderate orpowerful withcredible are threats politicians faced Hypothesis 2b:If agenda-setting pressures powerfulof domestic subsets of society. strong incentives to moderate their willbehavior, they bemore vulnerable to the Hypothesispoliticians are with 2a:If faced external ‘weak’ or threats of lack Second, although many theoretical althoughSecond, many seek toexplain approaches theoretical brutal the wars in and Serbian the of analysis across-case and over-time on consist will research My 17 CEU eTD Collection case. Inconductingfocus analysis, in I this on degree the shifts of Serbian irredentism irredentism inthis led to that process of gain cause-effect the afullerpicture reader to overview of Serbian irredentist policy,focusing on those features and events that help the initial case conditions by which process inthenational exploration of decision-making chain the events of were translatedpreceded shifts in foreignthe policy within bothcountries. This isimportant for the into policy outcomes. irredentism. of lack relative To do so, I start bya Albania borders, hasbeen characterized state with outsidetheir official kin co-ethnic an toward course policy foreign more aggressive has a pursued while Serbia Nevertheless, they have lost a significant part of their natural territory due to historical circumstances. been quite andboth thein similar countriesis history of awaywritten suggeststhat that have transition and economic democratic of legacy, processes the share aCommunist foreign countriespolicy. Both have incommon kinsignificant theirborders, both outside ofirredentist depart matter the on but havemany similarities, Balkan that two cases, these methods. In the first case, I use John Stuart Mill`s “method of difference” to examine factors that explain thatabsence. relative its factors research seeks to addressinexplicable in lightof current understandings of causes what irredentism.state This this issue Albania isjust such a case inand which lack government’s the of irredentism is seemingly will try to demonstrate anirredentist oughtthat tohavea givendidat adopted position not. butthat time, in a coherent way the At the same time, process tracing is necessary for pinpointing the conditions that conditions the pinpointing for necessary is tracing process time, same the At Third, the existing literature on irredentism tends to ignore “non-events”—states ignore to tends irredentism on literature existing the Third, I test my theory through both through my theory I test controlled comparison and process tracing 18 CEU eTD Collection at the materials referred in the text. in the referred materials the at documents in Foreign Ministry and Iwas able to obtain a special permission from the Minister to look only 6 already a vast existing literature on the topic, which I draw on to testmy hypotheses. is fact the is information. that dueto This and empirical fortheoretical both publications, use mainly includingsecondary sources, books,academic journals and internet I case, Serbian the On irredentism. of (lack) Albania’s influenced have may that factors of of a number importance relative metoassessthe enable will civil society members of and academics Policy, Foreign of Ministry Albanian in policy-makers Albanian with of 1982-1997. in Kosovo Albanian speechestowards declarations and of period the government official look press conferences, only at to allowed because Iwas research inthis limitations the Albanian of andthestances Kosovo focusing primarily on its kininex-Yugoslavia, stance toward governmentresearched 1979-1997archivesthe of Foreignthe Ministry in regardtoAlbanian official toward AlbanianAlbanian foreign communism, specifically policy, particularly during arescarce.Ihave minority sources on in foreign sincesecondary shiftspolicy, occurred Albanian the have that there. However, relative the explain there are also can in Serbia irredentism ledto havehad appear to that elements whether those some determine case,Itry Albanian to the preceded these In shifts. time,over what and This happened because there is a is there because happened This The be sources used in to informationfor my include analysis account archival to 6 The analysistext and of such primary sources interviews the conducted lack of irredentism inAlbania. irredentism of twenty-five years prohibition for the general public on the latest the on public general the for prohibition years 19 CEU eTD Collection as the Orthodox Church. such asthe Academy of Science or institutions that have played aprominent role in distributing them, such Memorandum more of the memorandumrecent 1937 or of from that institutions 1987 have produced them, 2 1 andinterests, institutions ideas, role of atthe look case,wewill Serbian domestic makingenvironment, them to certainsubject ‘rules of game’.the Turning now tothe their within work to but choice little have politicians web’, ‘societal a institutions to serve their own ends. Nevertheless, wemight also argue that caught in such make of how to use well aware of are players, asrational politicians, One mayarguethat interests, by taking them as either given or constant. These interests arise from: political agendas have coursethe dictated of Serbia`s irredentism bysetting, shaping andinfluencing the of elites. Some authors irredentism influencing factors 3.1 Domestic tend to have a kind of primordial view of the reign of Dushan Mugosha. As Tim Judah writes: Nacertanije foreignirredentist policy to hypotheses.intest our order Iammaking thispoint, because itisoftento separate hard ideassuchas Nacertanije, Cubrilovic`s Peter Gourevitch. “Domestic Politics and IR,” in IR,” and Politics “Domestic Gourevitch. Peter institutional pattern that increases their chances of victory. that institutional arrangements influence outcomes, everyone will work to get the preferences, which in turn drive the creation of institutions: since everyone understands derivesome logicstructural of a situation, usually economic, butinterests can also from beliefs, which shape a preference,Ideas, interests and institutions are oftenlinked inextricably with andone another thus an interest. Interests drive In the case of Serbia, the role of ideas is mostly connected to the variations of idea that has always been a feature of Serbian identity politics starting with starting politics identity Serbian of feature a been always has that idea 3. Serbia`s Irredentism in foreign policy Handbook IRof , p.312. 1 2 inshaping 20 CEU eTD Collection and Stepjan G. Mestrovic (eds), New York: New York University Press, 1996. pp.39-40 Cubrilovic, one of the oldest and more persistent Serbian of nationalists. Cubrilovic, one oldest andmorethe persistent giving this judgment automatic legitimacy. charges…,” Academy made such respected the that fact the“the Serbian was public now.” are they as asthreatened been have never in Croatia Serbs regime], [Ustasha NDH of the existence genocidefor in Kosovo,” andthat“but of Serbian the population periodthe of the 7 6 University Press, 2001. p.179 5 poli.vub.ac.be/publi/orderbooks/secession/secession-05.pdf from: Retrieved 2002. Press, and the Social Sciences asserted Memorandum The since. ever in politics refrain Serbian has beenarepeated history, which nationalism. Serbian toward communism Yugoslavian from movement the possible made latter pressonlyayear the leakedin to 1985 and Serbiangovernment the to presented nationalistpolitics with notoriousthe Memorandum 1987 servedof that as fora blueprint Serbian politicians for years to come. The Memorandum, which was drafted and 4 Press, 1997. p.59 3 ideas to similar times, In more recent Philip J. Cohen. “The Complicity of SerbianIntellectuals,” in Stuart J.Kaufman. Robert Stallaerts, “The Disintegrationof the Yugoslav Intellectual Community,” in Tim Judah. Tim Ibid One of Onefiguresbehindinfamous inspiringthe of Memorandum the 1986 wasVasa of epic poetry and formulates them into a statement of modern nationalism. modern of statement a into them formulates and poetry epic the documentsynthesizes that centuries ofSerbian dreams aspreserved by the church and Nacertanije nationalism, Serbian contemporary by behind left wreckage ofthe wake In the The Serbs:History, Myth andtheDestruction of Yugoslavia 4 The Memorandum argued that the Serbs have been victimized throughout victimized been have Serbs the that argued Memorandum The 5 Modern Hatreds: The SymbolicPolitics of EthnicWar is acrucial link in understanding the developmentof nationalthe idea. Itis What made the Memorandum particularly credible in the eyes of the of intheeyes credible particularly made Memorandum What the . Bruno Coppietiers and Michel Huysseune eds., Brussels: VUB Brussels University inter alia that a “there was an anti Serb conspiracy causing conspiracy Serb was ananti a “there that Nacertanije have gained inSerbian prominence This Time We Knew . New Haven: Yale University . Ithaca and London: Cornell , in Thomas, in Cushman 7 3 Cubrilovic, an Cubrilovic, Secession, History 21 6 CEU eTD Collection 12 2003. p.174 and ItsHistorians: Understanding the Balkan Wars ofthe 1990s Greater Serbia.” Greater multi-national Yugoslav state to fulfill the old historical goal and national ideal’ of a 11 such viewsin with public,although contrast Marxist were and instark they Communist Cosicsuch as persecuted or Cubrilovic and werenotpurged, forimprisoned expressing Yugoslavia, inechelons throughout prominentSerbian intellectuals, of the highest power represented Serbsfactthat weredisproportionately the despite wasthat period communist nation.” Serbian the biased against Serbs, the Cosic “turned then unifying his Serbianto emphasis culture and 10 9 8 nationalities.” Yugoslav by other anddenigrated “Serbs the exploited that werebeing claiming Serbianpeople, the longand of suffering Dobrisa Cosic, who backin the 1960swasamongarticulate first to the the enduring pain Serbian Academy of Arts and Science at the time. regime.” communist the of flexibility moral the to testimony remarkable “a is which regime, Communist emulate.” to Serbia for asexamples others and Jews inexpelling success andStalin’s Hitler’s cited which authored 1937officialthe memorandum, government Albanians’, ‘TheExpulsion the of he position, From this government. the royal Yugoslav to reemergedas an advisor inearly “conspirator Austrian Archduke 1914assassination the of Franz Ferdinand…, Ibid Ibid Quoted in Cohen, 40. Thomas A. Emmert, “A Crisis of Identity,” in Norman M. Naimark and Holly Case (eds.) Quoted in Sabrina P. Ramet. Another distinguished member who fervently advocated a Greater Serbia aGreater was fervently advocated member who distinguished Another 12 What is especially puzzling about this kind of duringrhetoric this the is of about Whatkind especiallypuzzling 8 Cubrilovic important held several governmental duringposts Tito`s 9 11 ButCubrilovic wasnottheonly in leaderdistinguished opinion the In this context, he called for the Serbs to “rise and destroy the Balkan Babel . Cambridge: Westview Press, 2002. p.19 10 Believing that the present regime was regime present the that Believing . Stanford: Stanford University Press, University Stanford Stanford: . Yugoslavia 22 CEU eTD Collection nationalistic rhetoric. See Ramet, 35. Yugoslavia, but Milosevic proved himself abler inseizing up the political opportunity for radicalizing ambitions. the political his forward push to agenda made 16 aready found who of Milosevic goals opportunist 15 14 Keg,” Powder Balkan Lit Author “Serb ratherthana “Serbo-Croatia” dictionary wasfor reasonimprisonment inYugoslavia. See Roy Gutman, Communist Yugoslavia. Roy Gutman argues 13 ideology. aggressive policy toward Serbianaggressive policy toward nationals A abroad. critical the link between goals of incitingpursue irredentist supportiveincreasingly of an Milosevic policies, to Serbian directly. constituency orinfluence hisdomestic threaten not him the headCommunist Ivan Party, by‘ethnically Stambolic, ableoutbidding’ oust the of to Hewas itspelled out. program the carry out to forward step would Milosevic later, year Croatia ascompensation.” to of Bosnia-Hercegovina part would cede most and of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, wouldbut exclude Croatia, Serb areasof muchwould include predominantly the Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, of known Serbianto the This all public. changed with demisethe of Tito. views make their Titoist to the regime under get mediaenough coverage not they could established “a role awaiting a leader, a program awaiting aleader,established “arole anexecutor,” awaiting aprogram Memorandum. Memorandum the The careeron goals outlinedin rhetoric future and Milosevic, basedhispolitical who agenda itfurnishedto importantly, aready-made mainstream andpolitical discourse the course of policy-makingin Most Serbia. influenced the which a new societal discourse, to rise gave and a newclimate political Stambolic was the first that had argued that a “unified the describe to Nasser, andPresident Egyptian strongby coined first aphrase Serbia”uses Ramet Here, 20. Ramet, was a prerequisite for a strong Saideman, forthcoming. P.56 the for abnormality an were public in leanings nationalist their expressing freely of freedoms The 16 and gain a strong foothold in Serbian politics because of kin-related issues thatdid becauseof politics footholdkin-related and inSerbian astrong gain In the meantime, the mood of Serbian elites and various segments of society were The “drewMemorandum upablueprint of Yugoslaviaa Serb-dominated that 13 These individuals have been persistent in their nationalist rhetoric, although rhetoric, nationalist in their persistent been have individuals These Newsday inter alia , June , 28, 1992, 1. , that the mere possession of a “Croatian” dictionary- “Croatian” of a possession mere the that , 14 Hence, it Hence,created 15 and almost a 23 CEU eTD Collection 1999. pp.125-126. involved in West,demonizing the nationalisticthe takenby tone Church history,the itinthroughout the more hasbeen past shrewdly use of madesuch ready agendas. in made ‘national such in a Milosevic turn, the as leaders, relation Political question’. to aggressive politics toward discontent channel popular of society to the selective subsets events happened simultaneously. appears Their convergence tobea effortfrom concerted disconnected and salient three these that is unlikely it speculative, sound may it Although government.” Serbian raised the fordemand “their province…, with autonomous encouragementthe of the 20 19 18 17 else.” anybody exploited or never conquered Kosovothe andSerbian ‘cause’ by “the that: Serbsthroughouttheirproclaiming history defeat by the Turks at Kosovo Polje. On this date, Milosevic’s showed his commitment to simultaneously.irredentism can be seen for example, on June 28, 1989, when threeThis main events happened was the powerfuloccasion of institutionsthe six in Serbia, such as the Orthodox Church, and Serbian state-led Branimir Anzulovic. Branimir 41. Cohen, Ibid Ibid The role of the Orthodox Church in the early wascrucial. Notwithstanding 1990s Church inthe the early Orthodox The of role Serbia. against wrongs historical alleged the right to beginning for Milosevic Slobodan church document portrayed an aggrieved and oppressed and Serbia, it further praised Vojvodina Kosovo. and theme Restating the Academy’sa central memorandum, of the National Program,” praised Serbia`s decision to unilaterally terminate the autonomyof the Yugoslav state apparatus. Thismanifesto, knownasthe Serbian “Proposed Church Academy of Science and Arts, as well as officialissued officialits national program, which echoed the 1986memorandum of the Serbian documents of the Communist Party and Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide 18 On the same day the Serbian Orthodox Church: Orthodox Serbian the day same the On 20 rather inthan irredentisttaking public the lead 17 Also, on the same day, the Krajina Serbs Krajina the sameday, the on Also, hundredth hundredth anniversary Serbs`the of . New York: New York University Press, 19 24 CEU eTD Collection “a reinterpretation of Serbia`s history in history pain, and of exploitation, of suffering, “aterms Serbia`s reinterpretation tobecome started Church, focusmain of the the ethnic The ones. toward issues economic opportunity opportunity structure,” societal discourse. ) discourse. societal emerging new this with accordance in act to ‘constrained’ a way in are then politicians The irredentism. the Orthodox Church, to seize the moment and shape the political discourse, especially in regard to purpose, meaning the creation of a totally new structure that creates the opportunity forinstitutions such as (Acknowledging that Jenne uses the term to refer to ethnic bargaining, Iuse it here with aslightly bargaining: theparadoxdifferentofminority empowerment Jenne. K. Erin concept: the on view elaborated an for See goals.” their pursue can “actors” informing not only the legitimate forms of political organization, but also the means by which these 23 22 21 ethic.” Kosovo of the road well-traveled the along and tradition” “Western-Roman the from away path own their Church cautiously Orthodox andby itsSerbian follow wereencouraged intellectuals, to inparticular This direction. all changed early “led Serbs,the 1990s, when bya the a in them influence to try than rather policies, state support often to obliged in away was already diminishing prestige advocateto a ‘Greater Serbia’. Seen in this light, the Church use its into tryingChurch wasdefensive, Communistthe during ratherthan period Orthodox The Church. the of role the completely almost neutralized had climate clerical an anti- create helped that long communism five-decade the Moreover, statements. Erin K. Jenne has defined Emmert, 173 this term as “long-lasting, malleable and adaptable to a range of settings, Ibid Seen in this light, the Church seems tohave created an altogether new “discursive Serbia. greater of a creation the and dissolution Yugoslavia of the supported finally and II, War in World of Serbs “martyrdom” the revisited in force Serbian society, the Church presented effective itself asthedefenderan of inthe Serbs as Kosovo, revival own its for theme a as Kosovo in crisis evolving the Using 23 that enabled it to transform most of the domestic debate from 21 As Thomas Emmert notes: Emmert AsThomas . Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007. 22 Ethnic 25 CEU eTD Collection 28 operandi 27 26 Mandarin Paperbacks, 1994. p. 198. children in Kosovo would be entitled to receive.” See Mark Almond. See Mark to receive.” be entitled would Kosovo in children Serbia, was to introduce25 a medal,Economics, and Culture in a Shattered“the Community ‘Majka Jugovica’ which any Serbian mother bearing four or more foreign Whatpolicy sought goals. these groups in exchange for this ‘service’ was providedto political critical support andgenerally elites pushedhawkish or radicals 24 of paper,this I emphasizesuch diasporas and mafia two groups: groups. to view their own interests as undistinguishable from those of the state. For the purposes ‘cluster groups’ certain therewere argue that I justice.” institutions that influence nationalist politics and irredentist policies. For example: policies. For andirredentist politics influence nationalist that institutions influencing foreign irredentist can policy.ideasbe linked Interests closely also to and internal stability. of means their effective securing politicspopularirredentism of dissatisfaction saw ethnicity toward and astheonly channeled which environment, domestic nationalistic fervent a to rise gave it however, meantime, the In Communism. during wasshattered which influence, and importance Church gained foothold a strong in Serbian post-communist society and re-establishedits Orthodox linkages,the ethnic identity issuesand of economic toward acute problems The mafia groups were often part of government structures as well, as will be further argued below. argued be further will as well, as structures ofgovernment part often were groups mafia The By this I mean 39. Cohen, groups, whose members join together in pursuing similar interests and have a Among many other concrete steps that the Orthodox Church undertook to increase nationalist feelings in feelings nationalist increase to undertook Church Orthodox the that steps concrete other many Among Sabrina Ramet, “the Serbian Church and the Serbian Nation,” in Nation,” Serbian the and Church Serbian “the Ramet, Sabrina Serbia once the war began. war the once Serbia memorandum helped standardize the the which rhetoric emigrationby theSerbian would defend rally to terms, practical In hands. Serbian at groups national of other sufferings the Serbs` alleged victimization in Yugoslavia, while making no mention of the mobilized their forSerbia`s national support goals,were justified and territorial which by In 1987, the Memorandum was circulated worldwide to Serbian émigré communities;it in salient equally are society in Serbian groups different of The interests that distinguishes them from the society at large. at society the from them distinguishes that 24 By seizing this opportunity Byseizing thisopportunity andnational transforming from the moredebate 26 . Boulder: Westview Press, 1995. p.103. 27 within the Serbian society which tended 25 Europe’s Backyard War Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, 28 These groups . London: modus 26 CEU eTD Collection adding legitimacy to Milosevic’s nationalistic regime. Thus, “the Orthodox Church and Church Orthodox “the Thus, regime. nationalistic Milosevic’s to legitimacy adding the Orthodox Church had on influencethe of the diaspora, by blessing their activities and importantAnother elementwas reinforcingthe thatpre-existing role institutions such as hand andtherising Serbian irredentism onthe other. Bentley. was organizediaspora quick itself, theHelen leadershiparound of to Senator Delich in “had they aggression of little Serbian tradition Yugoslavia, political the organization,” itinfluencehad, that astheyformed their Although lobby Serb tothe prior groups. 31 Press, 1996. p.196 Time We Knew high American politician with30 Serbian origin.political system allows See and encourages. for more, Brad K. Blitz.29 “Serbia`s War Lobby,” in States. in United the especially prominence quickly,to inrose Croatia, Bosnia and aggression political shaping the discourse. accommodation in the highest echelons of the society and a position of prominence in Senator Bentley was at the time, the most prominent Serbian diaspora In my leaderopinion, this is mostly indue to thethe flexibilities US of the andlobbying opportunitiesalso thatthe the Americanonly Ibid 29 Yugoslavia. so successfully marshaled the Serbian public behind the nationalist agenda in Milosevic’s diasporawasmobilized through similarcommunity institutional and structures that had Yugoslavia. former the and America North between traveled who emissaries and was politicians first The carriers. principal two through States United the to exported Belgrade and were Pale in leaders of Serbian sentiments xenophobic and ultranationalist The The second was the Serbian Orthodox Church. In effect, the Serbian The Serbian diaspora was at firstinThe but quiescent, wasat Serbian diaspora contextof the Serbian Brad K Blitz gives a colorful and lively picture ofandthe BradK Serbian acolorful the lively Blitzdiaspora gives and picture 30 Blitz draws a parallel between radicalization of the diasporas` language on one , in Thomas Cushman and Stepjan G. Mestrovic (eds), New York: New York University 31 This 27 CEU eTD Collection 35 34 (accessed April3, 2007). Sesejl found themselves in position of power. However, their relationship has never been never has relationship their However, power. of in position themselves found Sesejl Vojislav and Arkan like leaders criminal infamous soon and well as elites ruling Serbian interests of waging irredentistwere freely wars to increase and they considerable wastherefore crime organized of groups these well. power The pursuing their illicit theirgovernment profits suitedinterest the of structures, part were Legija, or Arkan like file, and Milosevicrank their of members prominent working andunder on the meantimethearms, people.” and state’sto put forward theiractivitiesinclude and and “crimes also thesmuggling kidnapping,murder, cigarettes, of arm. own interestsIt just asillicit their a from in Milosevic; They “free hand were often given trafficking” drug happened Kosovo.”that their fought criminal forclan Serbianof the underworld “includesmany former paramilitaries who the nationalist Milosevic in the Balkan wars of Croatia, Bosnia, and roundup,” 33 32 down. its power tocrack he tried Djindic,Zoran when Prime Minister, is havebeenbehindinfamous widely ‘Zemun believed theassassination gang’ to of the linked duringMilosevic’s ‘reign anditterror’ of was distinguish difficultto them. The united.” in Serbianthe polity,both the former firmly in and Yugoslavia were Diaspora, the For references to this, Blitz, 202 see, for example John Philips, “In Serbia, prime minister’s slaying triggers mafia Ibid Ibid The underworld crime figures and state security apparatus were inextricably security often figures andstate apparatus The underworld crime 32 34 The Christian Science Monitor 35 They also strongly influenced the Belgrade’s policy design and design policy Belgrade’s the influenced strongly also They , March25, 2003. 33 This dominant 28 CEU eTD Collection http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr3/bcr3_200303_418_2_eng.txt Reporting BalkansCrisis Report 38 October 5 involved. parties and third interestthe of determination on timing, a country, depending or‘Carrots’? ‘Sticks’ intervention: 3.2 Foreign no surprisingly coincided with the end of irredentist foreign policy of Serbia. of violence and use prospect of the forcethat clear is excluded; made have they Tadic, will President rely only like in diplomatic leaders, political means frommain Serbian now on.Kosovo, for even But Serbia. from sovereignty separate a have (yet) not does Kosovo where borders, recognized international (which is currently under international supervision), they maintainthat this is just to preserve the 39 37 36 tribunal.” crimes withthewar ofcooperation andits policy democratization arrest thecountry's attempt to Slobodan presidentMilosevic, and murdered which on March 12 Djindic inadesperate former lobby’ surrounded thatonce ‘war “mighty decisive take action triedagainst this to Prime Minister, Zoran Djindic. Nevertheless, the new government that succeeded Djindic intimidating threatening, suchasSerbian politicalprominentandkilling even figures, in fiercelylords by actions, the new military turned government’s crimeresisted officers, these crime, ex- and organized fighting ofsubmittingwarcriminals Western the demands the opposition.support to useintimidationthe through shifted andcoercion,loyalties of and critical their they gave endinfluence, their to a liability, tried andhis authority becoming way were restraining embarrassing be further becameto too crimes sustained. and atrocities a linear,forward straight one. Milosevic and backtracked denounced them, when their Bojan Dimitrijevic and Daniel Sunter, “Serbia: Red Berets Disbanded,” Red Berets “Serbia: Sunter, Daniel and Dimitrijevic Bojan Although post-Milosevic Serbian leaders still advocate the return of Kosovo under Serbia`s jurisdiction, Serbia`s under of Kosovo return the advocate still leaders Serbian post-Milosevic Although Radonavic. Ivan and Bujosevic Dragan 130; Gagnon, others among See Kaufman, 192. Foreign intervention can have a direct or indirect impact on the foreign policies of policies foreign the on impact indirect or direct a have can intervention Foreign But, when Milosevic, fearing the consolidation of these crime groups that in a th Revolution. 38 The end of directinfluence that these interest groups once enjoyed has New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN,2003. pp.27-30. 37 After the opposition came to power in 2000 and tried to meet , March27, 2003. (accessed 4, April 2007). International War andPeace The Fall ofMilosevic: The 36 39 29 CEU eTD Collection be further elaborated below,furtherbe international elaborated the increased,pressure culminating with the Scwebach text (reference above). (reference text Scwebach 42 degree of too much of its own credibility at stake, following thus a in this framework, my understanding is that the international community chose not torisk work.” would they that chance fair is a “there when only sanctions strong impose should sanctioners these where game, bargaining is a result The increases. sanctions such impose that parties of the costs if the mightdecrease, hand, other the on which sanctioner enjoys, the that advantage the supporting Serbian in paramilitaries Bosnia and Croatia. This,notexclude however, does be in deterrent to astrong prove Serbia’, by stoppinga ‘Greater Milosevic’s pursuitof the because force.” useof to resort tothe having a favorable outcometo without by leading sanctioner the to bargaining advantage a provide sanctions “economic that: note they when well element this capture Schwebach and Morgan Clifton costs. andeconomic political bear they different andtherefore nature in aredifferent asthey sanctions, military and economic between distinction the note first International Crises,” 41 40 instruments.” military and diplomatic, political, rangeof afull “includes “coercive diplomacy,” which effectsof to the and point Harvey Carment outcomes. policy desirable influencing in mechanisms coercion or cooperative Two of the most common policy tools that states or international organizations use, are T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach. “Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in Sanctions UseofEconomic The Gladly: Suffer “Fools L.Schwebach. Valerie and Morgan Clifton T. Carment and Harvey, 25. Ibid. For a well-argued view on the effectiveness of the use of sanctions, see Clifton Morgan and Morgan see Clifton of sanctions, use the of effectiveness the on view well-argued Fora soft coercion soft economic International Studies Quarterly sanctions, most importantly those of the UN embargo, did not . However this was only in the initial stage, because laterasitwill initial because . However in the was only this stage, 42 If If internationalwe discusstheof interventionpatterns inSerbia 41 Nevertheless, the Serbian case does not follow this pattern, , Vol.41, No.1. (March., 1997). P.30 40 Before proceeding further, I want to want I further, proceeding Before via media , while using limiteda 30 CEU eTD Collection over the federation. the over his leadershipMilosevichegemony wasbasing entire on Serbian andagenda political given that longer realistic, wasno by States, by latter andUnited EC, the advocated was that federation Yugoslav the maintaining of principle The contradictions. inner by halted Community were European of the efforts the anagreement, toreach Yugoslavia association.” “closer exchange, and European the apromise economicCommunity benefits promised also of several key conditions: was based on incentives democracy, offering of to Yugoslavia ifcooperation “could country meetthe free market reforms, human rights, and unity.” 45 44 43 “use identities gainandmaintain of ethnic hisposition.”to elites in only 1991,after Milosevic had radicalized already hisin political rhetoric his of Unitedthe States), which sought tobring the conflictto an endby various means. leadership (underthe United Nations of efforts the from concerted came the intervention positionbodies, in suchimportant such theas UNSecurity Council. third The Russia’s considering significant, was which intervention, Russian the was second The andCroatia. of international early the Slovenia ledrecognition to in which region, the interests strong Germany’s by driven mostly intervention, Union European the was One governments tried topreventand punish the theirSerbs for aggressiveirredentist policies. Kosovo. inNATObombing, both 1995 against Serbsin the Bosnia and Croatia and 1999in Kaufman, 195 Saideman, “Explaining the International Relations…,” 741. Ibid The conflictYugoslav gained salience in theeyes of foreign European policy as Western in conflict, interventions Yugoslav the significant There arethree 45 Although persuade this promisesounded enough plausible to 43 First, the European policy European First, the 44 In 31 CEU eTD Collection 51 50 49 New York: Columbia University 2001.Press, pp.122-123. not intervene in anywayin “any civilYugoslav war.” decision of as theirwithdrawing well. troops Great Britain and Francenot only critical of United States` policy,but also affected their for them,itsupport was still to send reluctant into ground conflict,which the troops made continuesStates torecognize and support territorialthe integrity Yugoslavia.”of trip to Yugoslavia, James Baker, the U.S. Secretary of State made it clear that “the United for his republics. independentcondemnation newly the 1991 Serbsandsupport of In the vocal toward only maintenancegradually federal of shifting system, the the in United States, maintained meantime,the had anambivalent supporting first position, and Slovenes. of Catholic Croats historically looked uponastheprotector andwas Germany had biasparticular, beenseenashavingSerbs since the against always a strong made of theSerbsincreasingly suspicious European the in Union andgeneral Germany in military military inability react isto Serbaggression to equaledby put inability its lifethe to a of “The West’s when that: hewrites byJean Baudrillard iscaptured well body coherent metwithwere of led enthusiastic support European the Union,the by Germany. European Union, because of Greece’s strong opposition of its name. of its 48 opposition strong Greece’s of because Union, European 47 46 secede in to June 1991. Almond, 48. Almond, For more on this issue, see Ramet, 214. 49. Almond, StephenM. Saideman. Only Macedonia’s paradoxically peaceful secessionwas met withskepticism and not recognized by the Saideman, 741. Even when the U.S. openly condemned Serbian atrocities and Serbian state Serbian and atrocities Serbian condemned openly U.S. the when Even Milosevic’s rhetoric served to fuel the fears of Croatia and Slovenia, which chose The Ties ThatDivide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy & International Conflict 46 In declaringtheir to road independencefrom Yugoslavia, they 50 Moreover, NATO made it clear that would 51 The West’s failure to act as a 49 47 48 This The 32 . CEU eTD Collection 57 56 55 54 Policy Foreign 53 Press, 1996. p.87 Genocide in Bosnia sanctions.” of threats credible sufficient backedwith up not they were Bosnia: and Croatia aggression against Denitch out“thatpoints alone protests not could stopSerbian inrepression Kosovo or 52 Russia, lack of international coercion, and material support from traditional allies such as the ofinternal In vulnerable influences. domesticaddition, andmorethe become politics, warmademorethe toignore willing Milosevic on instead the West’s turning demands, ambivalence of the West in imposing sanctions and using of coercion in the first stages of block to anyproposedU.N.military Bosnianaction Serbs.” against 1993 adoption of “a resolution calling on use its governmentthe to Security Council veto impositionthe of economic sanctions against in Serbia 1992 andthe Russian parliament’s risk.” at soldier single rooted affinity for Serbs.” the rooted itsand confessionally West with the relationship its rewarding reinforce to “the desire critical Serbs.Russia’sthe of foreign policy in thisperiod was deeply divided between they were actually case, theCroatian In in war Bosnia. to the with regard especially meant “saving failed states.” in under human ensuring which people,- “state-centric terms,” security still operated Denitch, 210 For an estimate of Russian military help, see for example, Ramet, 215. Forelaborated an discussion of this issue, see Gerald Halman and Steven Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” Jean Baudrillard. “When the West Stands Infor the Dead,” in Ibid Ibid 56 Russia’s position vis a vis their Serb ‘protégées’ was ambivalent as well, as ambivalent was ‘protégées’ Serb their vis a vis position Russia’s made Milosevic more determined to pursue mademoreBogdan irredentist agenda.his determined Milosevic to 89(winter 1992-93): 3-20. , Thomas Cushman and Stepjan G. Mestrovic (eds.), New York: New York University New York New York: (eds.), Mestrovic G. Stepjan and Cushman , Thomas 57 52 While the UN,- which was committed to provide security for the 53 54 In may light,we this both interpretRussian supportfor This Time We Knew: Western Responses to We Responses TimeKnew: This Western 55 The seeming 33 CEU eTD Collection which finally made it clear that the days of which finally days madeit the wereover,” that clear of bluffing, possible by NATO“against bombing communicationsthe of centers Bosnianthe Serbs, 63 MinnesotaPress: 1997. p.208 posturing aboutdefying an and unjust worldanti-Serbian community finished.”was almost no lossesCroatian and Bosnian “NATOcounter-offensive againstSerbiantroops. the suffered and could clearly bomb at will. force them Bosnian the Serbs to in table.”the against sanctions to Therefore, overblown rhetoric and 62 61 60 59 58 barrier,” insurmountable almost faced an acompromise tobroker efforts “[w]estern making them moredomestic dependenton agendas. Therefore, asKaufman argues: because compromise compromise,” war to preferred all andMilosevic “Kucan,because Tudjman, relations, would show them to be ‘weak’ in the eyes of electorate, thus increasingbuild-up offoreign intervention became unbearable, “Miloševi inWhenminimize toethnic the Croatia the costof Bosnia. kin its and support opposing and irredentist rhetoric its down scale seriously, these threats take to tended leadership way,in actingSerbian the acoherent from community international credible the threats nothave helped.” incentives could and economic encouragement verbal of policy western the that clear isit obstacles, fundamental these “[g]iven that: of failure the made they hands, their tying Bodgan Denitch. Bodgan Saideman and Ayres, 58 Kaufman, 196 Ibid Ibid Ibid Furthermore, there was already a deep-seated suspicion in the intra-Republics` in the suspicion a deep-seated wasalready there Furthermore, On the other hand, when the threat of forceful intervention was backed by backed was intervention forceful of threat the when hand, other the On Ethnic Nationalism: theTragic Death of Yugoslavia soft coercion soft inevitable. Kaufman concurs . Minneapolis: University of 60 62 andmade a possible 61 Thismade was ü even even engaged 63 59 by 34 58 CEU eTD Collection Milosevic started pursuingwho irredentist policies and waging warsonthe neighbors, by policy. irredentist domestic subsets foreign from when backelitesaggressive even policy-making, in down to Serbia of the society persuadehim were enough to sanctions,of ruling wereconvincing and the steady, resolute clearly in favor of a continuance of the present 66 65 64 while that point makethe we can table.” bargaining the force Serbsto the to tool “negotiation seenasa often said. once Allbright Madeleine State Secretary of U.S. negotiations. the armyandstart withdraw the to andaccept back down inflicted theafter cost bombing by became continuous the insupportable, didMilosevic continuing strength invigorated with ethnicthe cleansingof Albanians. Kosovo the Only least in the international community. rally bombing seemed tohis In addition, the to support side, at initial stage,position which ofhis to threat facing imminent an wasnot leader first, whentheSerbian At escape hatch. hardenedpower from Milosevic thatprove Milosevic backed from down irredentisthis position facedonly when with nothe NATO bombing and made of him1999, more he resoluteseemed eager in to defy the impact of sanctions over the courseaccrue. Threats by themselves were unableof to ‘shake’ Milosevic;time instead, it was the actual that wore him down.” costs whenactual “only matter pressures international that point the Ayres make and Saideman and Ayres, 76. Carment and Harvey, 30. Quoted in Carment and Harvey, 32. This chapter demonstrated that contrary to the common beliefs that it was Later events, like the seventy-eight days intervention of 1999 in Kosovo, also Kosovo, in 1999 of intervention days seventy-eight the like events, Later This shows that Milosevic could understand “only the language of force,” as ex- soft coercion failed to work in Serbia’s case, the impact 64 This is why air strikes were 66 Inthis perspective, 65 Saideman 35 CEU eTD Collection groups had,groups in strongly influencing Serbian irredentism. infamous Memorandum 1987 andsocietal of likeorganized ormafia groups diaspora such as the Academy of Science and Arts and Orthodox Church, nationalist ideas,like the 68 ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1998. 67 Milosevic.” Slobodan to [wrongly] irredentism,thiswasascribed ledstate later“but to expansion that as a national expansionist.” Milosevic misread have start the from “…foreigners it: puts Jovanovich William writer, it. As at look Serbian to perspective is adifferent also there please constituencies, its to justimposing its will on the society at large, or that he was just acting out of his way only See the Introduction by William Jovanovich in Alex N. Dragnich. Alex in Jovanovich by William Introduction Seethe Ibid 68 A close analysis of the chain of events emphasizes the role that institutions, 67 Rather it was the Academy which pushed for anationalist pushed which it Academy the Rather was Serbia and Yugoslavia . New York: 36 CEU eTD Collection 1 1912. newthis which state, was achievedintheConference Ambassadorsin of the London, in only was itsecure aninternationallything do recognized of independence could which to powerful defendenough to include Albanian and all in the The asingle state. territories would loose. However, the finally new Albanian emergedthat government wasnot stay would the arm, would Ottomans been to when under Ottoman have chose worse Albanian further inevitable and was demisethe Empire of Ottoman the was realizedthat leadership former was minister, Ismail Qemali. Ottoman of itThis step only taken when birth to the ‘Albanian League for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nation’.” held in June 1878, where theAlbanian from representatives Albanian lands,all “gave Prizren, of town Kosovo in the a meeting from derives name Its League’. ‘Prizren called most important other momentin Albanian national awakening history, hasbeen sothe which then wereup in Ottomanvassals,- Turks,the to acommon the struggle against feudals,-Medieval Scanderbeg, hero, whenAlbanian national the couldtimes, unite belongingnational in could abrief for emerge.Despite independentAlbanianstate of sense common a which from symbols and myths common in developing neighbors Balkan country gainindependence to it, from Albania behind lagged ofmost of its Overview 4.1 Historical Derek Hall. Only in 1912, wouldAlbania finally itsproclaim independence, under the last the and years five-hundred than more for Empire Ottoman the of part Being Albania and the Albanians 4. Albania’s Absent Irredentism Absent Albania’s . London and New York: Pinter Reference, 1994. p.9. 1 37 CEU eTD Collection 6 99. Vickers, more, for See movement.” liberation asanational- Albanians bythe and organization outlaw an as Serbs bythe to referred was and Kosovo, 5 confusion.) avoid to name, his 4 Noli. 3 Press, 2004. p.241. Century Southeastern Europe kachak an endthe put Serbs to andevenhelpedthe Kosovars the toward his stance radicalize 2 he saw their leaders as themost dangerous adversaries to his power. His fear, in fact, was rescue itsto ethnic“leaving kininKosovo, theAlbanians to ofKosovo theirfate,” more from concern Tirana, as andjudged Zogu pro-Yugoslav.” His power was mainthreatto ledan whoexpected Kosovars by“disgruntled opposition oftheAlbanian territory. domestichelphe rewardedwith Yugoslavs,the parts whom of hissupport to who adversary,forced AhmetZog, him out. Kosovar uprisinghim leaders earned hislent enmity the neighbors, whoof Yugoslavian Albanians.” It sought Kosovo.all national the aggressive unification of Albanian policy on membership from both sides of was border,the formed in promote amore1918 to “whichits drew aclandestine This organization Committee. Committee, Kosovo especiallysupporters, inpower, the revolution him weredrawnfrom brought to that the his of bulk the that fact the by explained is position Noli`s forums. international in raise theissue to and tried Kosovo of fate the for concerns voiced only who one Vickers, 101. Vickers writes that “the Kachak movement was made up predominantly of Albanian emigrants from Austin, 241. ‘u’ (The in Zogu isa here definite article in Albanian. Ihave omitted itin my mentioning of Zog Ahmet was oustedfirst fromInternal the Ministry whichwas he by heading, led by a Revolution Robert C. Austin. “Greater Albania,” in Albania,” “Greater Austin. C. Robert uprising Of the early Albanian leaders, the Harvard-educated bishop, Fan Noli, was the Zog, whoZog, maintained for thenext power fourteen years, relied thus on crucialthe 2 However, not only did Noli fail to reverse the borders, but his support for 5 that was taking place in Serbia at the time. Not only did Zog not bother . John R. Lampe and Mark Mazower eds. Budapest and New York: CEU Ideologies and National Identities: The case ofTwentieth- 3 4 Thisled Zog to 6 but 38 CEU eTD Collection University Press, 1995. pp.59-60. 9 himself. as anadviser andsupporterof founding the members of Albanian Communistthe Party, asa not founder 8 7 ideology. determination, basedon impliedMarxist-Leninist This Yugoslavs and Albanian communists offered Kosovoapotential perspective ofself- its inception. Nonetheless, in order to draw the Kosovars in the Communist side, both Popovic. andMiladin Dushan Mugosha was establishedwith helpYugoslav emissaries, the of of Nationalism end the and Albania 4.2 Communist national rather crushing theKosovo back movement, than it up. in with Yugoslavs cooperate to chose hishe Hence, to rule. threat wereadirect leaders agents on his orders. failed.”Thus, Zog saw Kosovobut Tirana government, the overthrow leader, to Kachak tried an important Elez Isufi, as a hub of nationalist and Hasan Prishtina “March Curri, Bajram further1922 that not because well-grounded, movement, whose between Yugoslav and Albanian government. Enver Hoxha, the AlbanianprimerAlbanian EnverHoxha,the between Yugoslav andgovernment. collaboration of the local Albanian inhabitants. supportivegain Albania, of asaway to claims the and sympathies the possibleGreater very been hasfact whoin aggressor, German common the against Communists secede. Only under such conditions, would Kosovars be willingfight to on the side of the Fora similar argument see Nicholas J. Costa. Nevertheless Hoxha disputes this, by writing that Mugosha had no role atall, while Miladin served only Vickers, 100. 7 The Communist regime that took hold of power after the end of WarWorld II endthe after the of holdpower took of regime that The Communist As soon as war ended, the Kosovo question was never brought up in talks Later on, all these prominent Kosovo Albanian werekilled all Zog`s Kosovo on, leaders Later by prominent these 8 Therefore, it refrained from any openly irredentist policy toward Kosovo, from Albania: AEuropeanEnigma. 9 inter alia New York: Columbia , the right to 39 CEU eTD Collection negotiations on the future of its people.” Quoted in Kola, 219. Kola, in Quoted people.” ofits future the on negotiations the from and Yugoslavia on conference peace the from excluded be way in no can Yugoslavia in people Albanian the of representatives that holds ofAlbania Republic “The New York: in warned even had time, tandem with the new geo-political circumstances. Muhamet Kapllani, the AlbanianForeign Minister at the important to note that the Albanian government gave12 a greater support thanthis point. previously Interview with the author, April 12. to the Kosovars, in am indebted to RemziI Lani, the executiveAssembly. UNGeneral directorthe of in the Albanian discussed Institute while of Mediasupported or for elucidating me beforwarded onto request areasonable as seem precedencethe and that itmightcamp serve Eastern fora possiblethe and reunificationUnion Soviet of with the Albanian nationat relations a later stage, would deteriorating the of face in the which Germanies, 11 10 wouldconvince behardto the understand.” not “whowould Serbs, appropriate, because thetimingnot sounded all it was right, repliedwhile request that the issuementioned Kosovo the only and of toTito according hismemoirs,once to Tito question in forums, international likein the NationsUnited hisafter breakwith inYugoslavs he1948. Furthermore, never brought Kosovo the issue Kosovo the he press didnor be, to claimed he later leader that nationalist the not BujarKosovo prime Bukoshi,minister in exile, visited Tirana in 1991. irredentism. for support public accompaniedany with wasnot deteriorated Kosovars situation the of While inAlbania,therise nationalistof some voices, especiallyin late1980s,when the consciousness, helped by rolethe of ledsocietal catalysts, supported tostate irredentism. raisingnationalist the demonstrated, was already asit case Serbia`s In nationalism. and the non-nationalist paradigm started to be replaced with overt or covert forms of did not raise the issue up, even in bilateral talks. promised that Albanianpromised was that government consideringfor three mainoptions Kosovo, At this time, the Communists were still in power, althougha coalition government was June 4, 1991. It is Moreover, Hoxha remained adamantly opposed atsuch potential moves, like the reunificationof the two Enver Hoxha. Nonetheless, a formal state support for Kosovo was for instance exercised, when change to started situation the 1980s, in Hoxha and Tito both of death the After Titistet [The [The Titoites]. Tirana: “8 Nentori”, 1982. p.260. 11 and evidence shows that it that shows evidence and 10 Hoxha in fact was 12 Bukoshi was Bukoshi 40 CEU eTD Collection 16 p.282. Kola, ofpower.” exercise the of subject recognized the as Ian Brownlie: “…recognition of recognizea state the sovereignty orof governmentanotherstate. As Kola argued,has citing specialists must of international come law, such fromnot bindingthe in any governmentway forAlbania, since legally speaking of the governmenta country, only has the right to formally as 15 14 Albania join to “Kosovo (3) if the outside existing change.” borders of to Yugoslaviawere changed.” ofYugoslavia borders domestic the if Republic Kosovo a of sovereign state, with the right to jointhe other Yugoslav states ina loose confederation.” (2) “The creation 13 future policy forwhich asgrounds serve potentially action. could have with them. Criticizing the Serbs for the growing repression in Kosovo, he once he Kosovo, in repression growing the for Serbs the Criticizing them. with have future he Albanians relationship Albaniawould that inKosovo and theenvisaged that of the fate the with concerned wasespecially strongman, Party’s Democratic the emerge as to soon who was Sali Kosovo. Berisha, to reference with particularly question, pluralism,made possible adiversification views of regarding theAlbanian national ofirredentism lack and its transition in 4.3 Albania Party. Democratic opposition the party, and ofthe first communist the emergence protests student of anti- changing,the start with the in Albania atthetime wasfast landscape political Kosovo1991, on Septemberindependence of 28, did Bukoshi forthe was recognizeto government, thenewly self-proclaimed inforward itsinternationalput agenda. The only infact whichTiranadoand thing could of forfellTirana options nevertheless anythese pressing short governmentof that proved significantas it seems, given lacked itthat bindingany legaleffects. such countries failingother toreciprocate a move.even move But wasnot this that The party was on formed 12Decemberof 1990. was parliament of the recognition the that governments Albanian by successive maintained later was It 1991. 29, September ipopullit,” “Zeri newspaper the See AlbanianForeign Ministry Archives (1991). These options were: (1)“Kosovo to be an independent and The end of Communistthe system in Albania and the emergence of political 16 14 albeit the only country to do so, with 15 13 However, the However, Later events 41 CEU eTD Collection 20 19 18 17 party.” a was state Albanian the which to law international of norms the by abide to need the dictated which theoffice, of responsibilities “the realize to hecame because goals, from stated these later backtrack to was Berisha rhetoric, electoral the Notwithstanding comestrue.” nation Albanian the uniting of dream her fighting great stop until living in their territories “Our Berisha followingelectoral made the speeches in1992,when brothers promise: in former Yugoslavianational unity.” and wherever and progress for rights realize their to inEurope integration of processes of the context they are: the DP will notAlbanian nation as eternal;it therefore, will struggle by meanspeaceful and within the the of division accept the Albania cannot of Party “The Democratic that: declared and he stated: “Albania has not sought, does not seek and will not seek any change in seek any change not will and doesnot seek sought, not has “Albania he stated: and cause,labeling asnaïve those who in believed a possible unification Albanian landsof Austin, were: these to According country. of the President became he after rhetoric nationalist from withdrawal Berisha`s Austin, 244. Quoted in Kola, 223. Quoted in Biberaj, Ibid 19 An observer noted that as early as 1993, Berisha took a as early U-turn nationalist the on that An as 1993,Berisha took noted observer softened his line on Berisha Kosovo once he wasresult, in a As power. life. political Albanian poisoned that Party Socialist opposition the Finally, Berisha years. many so sacrificed for world almost all outside his the programsfrom off infavor cut ofand adevastating slogans with battle up with fed a population among useless especially was it and voters, Albanian unified that something not was avoid borderadvocating he changes. Secondly, thatnationalism realized pan-Albanian Firstly, hewas inno doubtwarned Albania’sby patrons in Washington and Europe to Robert Austin identifies three core reasons that might have had an impact on impact an had have might that reasons core three identifies Austin Robert 17 His nationalist rhetoric was even more explicit at another of his pre- his of another at explicit more even was rhetoric nationalist His Albania in Transition , p.66. 20 42 18 CEU eTD Collection complied with such requests. Without any apparent threat of sanctions, be they economic ormilitary, itissuprising how Berisha duly should step back from advocating border changes, in order to maintain the good terms with the West. 22 1998. p.251. 21 any to by hisresistance tolerance Western “Berisha earned that wrote London Guardian, Western toattractorder and sympathies support.This British daily, iswhy, the the in issues nationalist on asmoderate be seen to keen was Berisha Thus, donors. Western proved vulnerable togain backcapitalizeexplains ontheWestern support Berisha home. That why strength even he show neededfrom particularly to hadstrongWest, support hopped to the US;he the in theBerisha Therefore, right. not was something face that signaled which elections, local the of some short, months after bylargemargins winning in lost Democratic the March the Party elections, but significantunpopular with majority the Albanians,the of shortly comingpower.after to Only seven harsh and quick inreforms Albanian and remarkseconomy state structures, which made it from the existing borders.” down down in response to ifhecommunity nationalistcontinue the with weretobackedmy view, In talk. Berisha evidence suggests that Berisha wasfacing material any from sanctions international a country,landslide having scored victory in the Marchno Furthermore, 1992 elections. soproved vulnerable inamoment whenhe most wasthe successful inpolitician the leader. Considering this shift of rhetoric, one rightly might be tempted to ask why Berisha vulnerable inexperienced and tobean him andshowed circumstances facethe of present By Elez Biberaj. Elez soft coercion First, the new democratic government was in was the new processof the First, some undertaking democratic government Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy. I refer here to the warning that his outside patrons gave him when they suggested that he that they suggested when him gave patrons outside his that warning the to here Irefer 21 Thischange abrupt in political Berisha`s wasunexpectedrhetoric, in soft coercion by the international community international bythe Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Westview Colorado: Boulder, 22 for twomain reasons. 43 CEU eTD Collection 27 26 25 24 I.B. Tauris, 2007. p.11. 23 Macedonia.” Western pan-Albanianmight in Kosovo problems andadd tothe in which tendency Serbian “[they] made it clear that Greater Albanian was not on on their Albanianwasnot agenda.” Greater itmade that clear “[they] ofKosovofate and Albanians.Moreover, Kosovo when the Socialists succeededBerisha with the main opposition party,- the Socialist party,- not voicing any concern at all for the suddenly. toward a mild summarize vulnerable even Hence, the leadershipproved toAlbanian argument, the degree of other ethnic Albanians in the territories of Albanians ethnicother in ex-Yugoslavia. of territories the southern Albania hashad that littleand historical roots connections Kosovarsand with from mostly came leadership Socialist the that fact the of in terms this explained have from the border town of Tropoja, northerner a himself being Berisha with north, the from followers its of most draws Party Tropoja lays in the border that Albania shares with Kosovo. Austin, 245. Kola, 309 Quoted in James Pettifer and Miranda Vickers. Miranda and Pettifer James in Quoted Ibid Second, therewas akind of ethnic underbiddinginAlbanian atthetime,politics borders. of international regardless Europe, to in integration direct facilitate would mid- by that, 1993,much so rhetoric, its down tone to pressured been has Berisha Tirana documents, international in Serbia of part being Kosova`s to references had onremoving insistence Albania’s 1992 since fact, In come region. the and Kosova vis-à-vis him of uprequired restraint and with the state to invited Whitebe House,to the he heassumed had passed moderationofthe testidea of Indeed,a when,in September 1995,President Sali Berisha became Albania’s‘democratic firsthead of space’ in the Balkans that 23 In line with this argument, Kola writes that: soft coercion 27 with family ties in Kosovo. The Albanian ReshapingBalkansthe Question: and backtracked, changing andbacktracked, its policy goals 26 In contrast, the Democratic the contrast, In 25 Some observers . London: 24 44 CEU eTD Collection rather, it is what the author calls ‘lack of Albanianism’ of ‘lack calls author the isit what rather, nationalism; of rise potential the not was concern main the that in1992 wrote poet, and Arapi,a leadingAlbaniawriter Fatos question. the national society civil regarding Albanian national question, Kola writes: Albania’s foreign viewpolicy goals. In of such neglect andmarginalization of the Albania in afuture unified state. Quite on the contrary, was the opinionof media analyst and the directoradvocateof more radical options, like territorial autonomy forAlbanians inMacedonia, or Kosovo joining as falling short of all expectations, because it took aminimalist stance (according to him) and did not 31 30 not legally binding and did not affect inany way the official agenda of Berisha in Washington. 29 28 White House, the opinions of analysts vary in extremes, but join in its condemnation. recommendations intellectuals the Berisha signed that andhandedbeforehis the to to trip question’,” Albanian the of ‘Internalization the on page single a “just yearsgovernance, of three in thefirst Party of Democratic the achievements the inKosovo andethnic in is illustrated Albanians that a 160- pagedocumentgeneral, that its awayfrom concerns shifted democratic government first the demonstrating that of piece evidence Another scene. in Albanian political thereafter was voiced For instance, in an interview that I had with ProfessorHysamedin Ferraj, he denounced this policy paper Fatos Arapi, “Kjo eshte Golgotha,” Kola, 310. The author, being aforeign ministry official at the time, also points out that the documentwas 309. Kola, It is interesting to note, the sentiments of some prominent Albanian voices from voices Albanian prominent some of sentiments the note, to interesting is It the as Albanianswell as of southern Serbia inhabitants (Presheve,Albanian Medvegje, Bujanovc)...”Montenegro’s for autonomy territorial secure issue’);guarantee Macedonia’s Albanians anequal constitutional position in their state; Kosova`s endorse expressed to will for independence seek (‘There should no vacillationbe should on this Balkans the on plan peace US any that ensure to Clinton President mémoire including Mejdani,Rexhepwho was succeed to presidencyto the in 1997, wrote an It is, therefore, notcoincidentalgroup a of that Albanianseventy-six intellectuals, Nonetheless, with Berisha changing its rhetoric and priorities, not much concern to President Berisha ahead of his Washington visit, urging him to: request to: him urging visit, Washington his of ahead Berisha President to Zeri i Rinise , 16 September 1992, p.3. 30 . Regarding policy the 28 29 was reserved among wasreserved 31 aide 45 CEU eTD Collection Press, 173. Press, Vojvodina,” order. and law for regard no or 33 little with Albania, in world,” “Hobessian a to 32 governmentthe at the time. Interviews- April, 2007. some “short-sighted radicals,” and was considerate of the fact that it was not takeninto consideration from Institutethe of Media, Mr. Remzi Lani. Lani dismissed this policy paper as“superfluous” andwritten by opportunity schemes, pyramidal these of fall the Albania, In border. the collapse of pyramidal schemeslike occurrences, some dramatic in Kosovo, NATO of intervention the with culminated were noteworthy for their1999 hadduring Albanianthat animpactKosovo, on upto that period the event effect on both sides of the election, although he was just recently re-elected and could legally retain power if would claims. Rather, Berisha resigned only facedwhen with a humiliated loss in 1997 the withBerisha substituted Mejdani Mejdani some because make was previously did radical that is noevidence likemore There aspeculation. explanation acausal and sounds fact, in lacks argument This issues. nationalist on radical more was he because Mejdani, with replaced was Berisha imply that to seems happening, was of what Vaknin`s description this, Sam Vaknin notes that: the acquisition of weapons in the black markets, in an Albania in chaos. In relation to Quoted in Erin K. Jenne. “Ethnic QuotedErin Bargaining in inthe Balkans: Secessionist Kosovo IntegrationistVersus In the words of Albania’s justice minister in 1997, Mr. Spartak Ngjela, the fall of pyramidal schemes led Although space does not allow me to comment at length on each particular himself later allowed the KLA to use his propriety, around Tropoja, as staging grounds and supported the cause…unequivocally. staging as Tropoja, around propriety, his use to KLA the allowed later himself Berisha demands. separatist to ear sympathetic more even an had who Mejdani, Rexhep ofled Albania in highto changes places. Berishawas Sali deposed and replaced by from the looted armoires of the Albanian military and police…The convulsive dissolution became was thedisintegration of Albania…The KLA absorbed thousands of weapons What finally transformed the KLA from a wannabe IRA into the fighting force that it Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox ofMinority Empowerment. for the Kosovars to receive a to for theKosovars de facto de 33 from support ‘motherland’ through the Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Cornell NY: Ithaca, 32 created a window of 46 CEU eTD Collection controversial issues. controversial keen towas conduct, policy showforeign in those including prerogatives, more have to Constitution, himself as an able diplomatic player and was soon involved in some much restricted in much itsrestricted of its course with heavily action, behavior from influenced the crises,- not to mention crises, KosovarsandAlbaniawasfacing arefugee whentheSerbswere‘cleansing’ border provocations from Milosevic’s army,-establishing its bases in Albanian territory. Tirana was pretty of refugeethe from flows NATO the andprovided Kosovo with troops access for miniscule. It was mainly his successor Pandeli Majko who shouldered most of the burden was of NATO, intervention the with culminated that events of the on course the impact there, so I do not address the ongoing events in Albanian foreign policy course. policy foreign Albanian in events ongoing the address not do I so there, 37 133-134; Vickers, and Pettifer instance: for see meeting, onthis more For citizens. of matter’ ‘internal an was Serbia, whichKosovo was only that supposedsaid to have comply to with human rightreported laws was intheirNano treatment Kosovo. of Kosovo in Albanian Milosevic to hand’ afterwhich, he was strongly criticized by oppositionat home the and Kosovars forbasically giving a‘free 36 his charges dropped suddenly 1997 in succeededand becoming in the new prime minister. 35 made possible forAlbanian foreign policy to refrain from irredentism. 34 so. made it impossible for him to advocate any nationalist claims, even if would chose to do which design,Constitutional by new1998 the wererather curtailed, particularly powers presidential Party.addition, In Mejdani`s Socialist astheSecretary-General the of status candidate forthe post of based President, on domestic consideration hisand newly gained chose doto so.In contrast, Mejdani was proposed by the Socialistleader Fatos Nano asa The focus of this chapter is up to 1998, before the escalation of war in Kosovo and NATO intervention Nano met Serbian President, Milosevic, in Fatosa summit Nano, the inlong-time the GreekSocialist Island leader that of was Crete serving ina prison November sentence This point is important to showon of corruptionthat there was continuity1997, inAlbanian charges,non-nationalist path, which has saw 34 In any case, the new socialist prime minister prime socialist new the case, any In What is important to note here, is that even during the height of the Kosovo the of height the during even is that here, note to important is What 36 But,because Nano`s lasted only governance for ashortstint, his 37 35 who was allowed under the new 47 CEU eTD Collection Appendix 1 for a full picture of Albanian foreign policy during these years. these during policy foreign ofAlbanian picture full a 1 for Appendix See Europe.” United a into be integrated to Albania of objectives the to contrary and counterproductive simply simply absurd. point. He has written 38 politicians incentive offered NATO noa strong Albanian doubt andUnion tothe European standard rhetoric international The prospect of the of in integration community. potential his Socialist successors later on. successors his Socialist helped it as same the campaigns, electoral previous dismissing in easily Berisha helped havewere infavor anirredentistgroups policy that interest seemed to and/or institutions the In addition, gains. lucrative electoral facedwith Albanian Foreign Albanian Minister during theyears 1998-2002, Mr. Paskal Milo strongly has emphasized this 38 , as did the role of soft coercion in making them quickly backtrack even when “ On the contrary, there have been clear and unequivocal statements that such an idea is idea an such that statements and unequivocal clear been have there contrary, the On inter alia that any reference to Albanian government efforts to promote to efforts government Albanian to reference any that absence of strong nationalist ideas, nationalist strong of irredentism is 48 CEU eTD Collection the case in Serbia, Albania failed to act according to these predictions. Instead, the Instead, actaccording predictions. these to failedAlbania to caseinthe Serbia, wouldpopular attract and support thereby allow retain them while to But power. this was Seen in irredentist countries agendas light,both this shouldactively pursued have that borders. recognized state outside part mostleft of theirthe territories that interventions Power Great of as aresult suffered have countries two the that injustices historical power. to came first they when agenda nationalist repressedthat identities nationalist andappeals, pluralistthatusedtohave and parties a regimes communist grievances, historical same the shared Serbia and Albania neighbors. Greater Albania that their Serb counterparts were already claiming toward their own a for irredentist calls same the topursue Albania for inplace were that circumstances question that logically follows, is why this is the case, given the almost identical set of 2 1 elections. in general threshold parliamentary passedthe if ever, rarely, nationalisminto mild and“avoided adescentparties whileand jingoism,” the nationalist Albania actively wasnot irredentist during thesame TheAlbanianperiod. press has been Yugoslavia, of dissolution and communism of demise the following years in the Croatia toward landsthe inhabited by its kin, especiallyin livingregard toSerbs inBosnia and irredentism influencing 5.1 Factors Albania versus Serbia policies: irredentist F.P. Assessing 5. For more on this view, see Pettifer and Vickers, 190. Austin, 246. Furthermore, the history books in both countries painted rather bleak stories of the As was mentioned,previously while Serbia pursuedan foreign aggressive policy 1 Hence, the 49 2 CEU eTD Collection “nationalism emerges only in only emerges “nationalism Gellner that: out haspointed correctly Ernest futureproved critical developments. for that belonging of a sense and pride nationalist of a sense to rise gave myths, epic and literacy well-established a with coincided which Empire, Ottoman the from sovereignty of andmemoriesconquest the of hadoldfailed disappear. ‘good the days’ acquiring The to political goals. Moreover, Serbia had a tradition of state formation prior to the Ottoman made agendatoshrewd politicians like whowould Milosevic, later useit toobtain their developments, such whenas theMemorandum intellectuals of 1987, aready- Serb gave 5.2 Why the two cases differ. cases two the 5.2 Why on. claims base territorial later Serbia from medieval Albaniatimes, lacked suchnationalist ideas couldthat be used to in foreign inpolicy-making, such designs as ideas hashadof role of atradition the WhileSerbia in countries. leadership these political as well as more current geopolitical implications that affected the decision-making of theforeignyielding countries. different in policy isbecausehistorical, This results two the of nationalistideas, institutions differentlyand interests, operated in Albania and Serbia, intervention, explain these divergent outcomes. The domestic factors, including rhetoric. rhetoric of post-communist politicians and moderated, they from nationalistabstained In Serbia`s case, ideas such as ideas such case, In Serbia`s This in domesticpaper hasarguedthatthe element foreign tandem with milieux in which the existence of the state is already very Nacertanija, Nacertania helped in provoking modern-day , which projected a Greater 50 CEU eTD Collection Dorset Press, 1991. p.152. 4 1983. p.4. society. Milosevic and ruling the elites wereon strong heavily subsets of dependent Serbian the lack credibility, seemed to when suchthreats contrast, policies. In irredentist from their back down to tended they by politicians, Serbian as such perceived was coercion credible of when threat in 2, the Chapter demonstrated Aswas already agendas. nationalist sidestep the from constituencies, while foreign theiraggressive theiristo policy. pursuing This not crucial support aready such found elites Serbian why wonder little is there then roleirredentism, that theinto for transforming Orthodox the Church played the support and that role the internationalidentity religious common the mix the into throw we If ideas. nationalist to ‘receptive’ communitystrong tradition of literary and epic songs, made it possible for the Serbscame to be more in with a conjunction some structures, existencetoTherefore, prior self-governing of the play in affectingSerbs, the days of Dushan are still remembered as the golden days of their nation. 3 luster.” and extent greatest its state Serb the gave who Dushan is Stephen “it noted, has Schevill Ferdinand As reign. Ottoman the of aftermath in the remembered reachedDusan whenand zenith,still state strong (1331-55), its Serbian the were especially underStefan Serbianstate, strong independent, of an collective memories autonomousseparate unitunder the Ottomans, longit it before formally.won The Empire onlyin1830,it ‘taken hadalready for granted’ existencethe itself asa of formuch granted.” taken Ferdinand Schevill. Ernest Gellner. Nations andNationalism A History of the Balkans: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day 3 Although Serbia was granted full autonomy from the Ottoman . Oxford, UK &Cambridge USA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., . New York: 4 For most For 51 CEU eTD Collection Bullatovic,” Berisha- takimin ne grek see “Roli account, latest the For opinion. public Albanian the on fuss a declarationcame right after the publicationof thememories of the ex-President of Montenegro that created illicit trade that was taking place with Serbia in the height of the Bosnian and Croatian wars. His 5 been enthusiastic themost of supporters irredentistany Kosovo, goal potential but toward government because they ifcould breakthisembargo, they were allowed by Albanian the by imposed Thiswas Nations. the United the of embargoespecially the period during in Serbia, state andown relationcounterparts their with Serbian havingthe a good somecontrary, likewere interested of in groups, networks, Albanian criminal these the Albania. On the notion Greater in the of promoting wayinterested in were a particular lackedheed Inaddition,that groups advice the Albaniato also factor. of international the provedstate, enough deter Albanianto politicians from any claim AlbaniaGreater of and Albaniansbasedunifynationalist inasingle thatwould all singlereligion to the serve idea, elaborated by such institutions as the Academy of Science and the absence of a national lacka strong of the Albania. Thus, outside territories Albanian-speaking other or pressured by internationalthe community drop to any claims of Albania joining Kosovo by AlbanianPan-Albanianism. who Thiswaspicked up were rhetorically politicians, population. more The population concernedwas with prosperity and social freedoms than due tothe intransigencies of communistthe left system,deep marks which onthe inits history, from isolations most terrible of the one Albania was suffering For instance, limelight. in the were which factors, political and social economic, different of because The ex-President Berisha in fact, did accept earlier this year that he allowed (or at least did not harass), the harass), not did least at (or allowed he that year this earlier accept did fact, in Berisha ex-President The Nationalismbe could developed not successfully in post-communist Albania Revista Mapo 5 and profits. reapenormous Albanian Only the Diaspora seemedtohave , nr.32. 22May 2007. 52 CEU eTD Collection 7 6 foreignithave of the failed any impact on the real agenda policy intellectuals, to question its remained priority.” Majko government, on “that vergeof the triedtalks inRambuillet, national to the with Kosovo, albeit regard to under of umbrella the internationalthe community. The did a looked morelike wishful thinking than actual inparticipation policy-makingthe process. it Rather, non-existent. say to not miniscule, was policy-making over influence their initiatives, like the like initiatives, policies. government existing the of boundaries the within and minimal was in Albania, cause nationalist way, the role that Albanian institutions like the Academy of Science had in promoting the a different it put To framework. official existing already the beyond go not did action for calls and claims their policy-makers, by the implemented be to policies national on strategy of a in kind envisaging proposals concrete with forward came Science of Kosova.” immediate internationalforce for to intervention recognizeBelgrade the independence to indicatecalling not Albaniaitselfplatform confining does whatandshould to do, could by National worked inAugust 1998;the out Academy the Sciencesof Question’, its “first ever policy platform, namely the ‘Platform on the Solution of the Albanian Kola, 350. Kola, Ibid window opportunity of Only with Pandeli Majko`s government that succeeded Nano as prime minister as prime Nano succeeded that Majko`s government Pandeli Only with On the other hand, even those Albanian intellectuals that took isolated rare, thattook intellectuals Albanian even those hand, On theother of Academy Albanian non-existent almost the when even is that shows this What 7 aide-mémoire seem to open up for Albania totake a more pro-active stance 6 In addition, a big plus for the socialist government was big plus socialist In for the government a addition, provided to President Berisha by a group of of by prominentPresidentBerishaa group to provided 53 CEU eTD Collection support on nationalist or irredentist agendas. nationalistor irredentist support on voting mobilize needno wasto there because partly and community, of international the will the accommodate in such a way,to partly were acting They agendas. their electoral of nationalistfervor from Albania, but on top of that, the Albanian politicians werein a race notcommunity its only foundcontaining veryreceptive any on objectives politicians of international The contrary. the proves that evidence any hardly is There state. Albanian ethnic underbidding on nationalist issues, which excluded nationalist rhetoric from rhetoric nationalist excluded which issues, nationalist on 54 CEU eTD Collection national interests. In addition, the long time that has kept Albanian speaking people speaking Albanian kept has that time long the addition, In interests. national their it against when its went even heeded advice, leaders Albanian thus intervention. strong national institutions,Albania external and religious made vulnerableto andinfluencerecognize had. organized thecritical that support groups in the process of waging irredentistorganized such groups, as the Serbian and Diaspora mafia had groups as outside players wars, seemed that interests The more secure. ‘reign’ make Milosevic’s would goals that irredentist to be equally important, Theif we policyare to platform that tobeneglected. not isfor hisruling Milosevicand elite, provided aready-made agenda the Memorandum of institutions, such as Serbianthe Academy1987 Scienceof whichArts, and tohaveseems outlined was laterpolicies in preceded that turn andled to fallthe of Yugoslavia. Also, therole of other used to achieve nationalistwas Serbian It irredentism. shapingSerbian factors modern-day significant aftermath of communism as a unifyinginstitution for differentsubsets of society,the are Serbia with the with Serbia of case in the like ideas, nationalist such of legacy historical The intervention. third-party a of absence the in particularly change, societal of catalysts as role a crucial play They state’s foreign policy, which for any are important serious study irredentist policies.of centers on rolethe thatnationalistideas,interests and institutions play in constructing a contribution Its literature. existing the in factors overlooked analyzing of aim the with In contrast, the lack of a nationalist ‘grand design’, together with the absence of with absence the together design’, ‘grand lackofanationalist the In contrast, This thesis developed a rather different explanation of irredentist foreign policy, foreign irredentist of explanation different a rather developed thesis This Nacertanije 6. Conclusion idea or the role that the Orthodox Church came to play in the play to came Church Orthodox the that role the or idea 55 CEU eTD Collection pursuing irredentism. instate’s withinterests actors societal powerful idea nationalist and/or articulated awell domestic weakness rather in institutions, thisabsenceof only or thesis, works toward the external pressures. While, the the external toward pressures. elites the of ‘sensitivity’ the higher sanctions, imposing for community international the of will the and involvement of level the higher that means This intervention. foreign varies degreeof the with exertinfluence sources these that the demonstrated thesis This agendas. policy foreign constructing while play they that role critical events outside the country.” the outside events any caseAlbania,more inTirana for evensothan influence past, islargelyunable the to “[i]n that: he stresses when concludes Austin rightly Therefore, factor. international the domestic in influencing factors foreign policy outcomes and its continuous reliability on 2 98. Vickers, and Pettifer See ‘suggestions’. these arrest itsleaders and surprisingly, and without camp the any close sanctionsto community threatening international him the directly, by quickly he pressured been have to complied withwas reported Berisha training. fighting guerilla Kosovo for up set camp a training for reported services intelligence British the when 1 ofhisduring course Presidency. the leaders Kosovar most prominent the jailed of some even issues, has in nationalist strong as to referred been sometimes has who Berisha, but that, only Not claims. irredentist Communism in created, pursuing nationalist which policies, wouldlong in lead the run to irredentist weapon. Albaniagrasp ‘the failed to moment’ golden thethat fall of strong a into transform to use could catalysts societal different which consciousness, a lack from into duringhasdeveloped separated centuries, the each-other, national of Austin, 248 Kosovar prominent leaders, like Adem Jashari, or Hashim Thaci were put to prison by Berisha`s orders, All in all, my contribution rests on analyzing the sources of irredentism and the and irredentism of sources the analyzing on rests my contribution all, in All 2 1 This clearly shows Tirana’s absence of strong soft coercion soft mechanism that I introduced in introduced I that mechanism 56 CEU eTD Collection foreign minister. Albania’s timeAlbanian Affairs,MiloForeign Ministry 2001.Atwriting,was the of of Source and contrary to ofinto objectives the a United beintegrated Albania Europe. to counterproductive is idea an such that statements unequivocal and clear been have there contrary, Albania.”the On “Greater a of creation the anyaimat or to any reference be time. Thisfilledin a short gapcannot in development. also economic have differencesnot onlyin shown background, but and mentality, cultural psychology, duringlast Human the sides on contacts Albanians both decade between of borders the in Euro-Atlanticfuture Albaniaof its developmentthe orientation and structures. towards substance of slogan.the Living in they mother-country, the have conceptualized their and core anti-Albanian the better large. understand They at public the concerning in and culture in education Albania are athigherlevels Kosova than and Macedonia Political platform. the to this attitude connection explain of Anumber reasons no two. the is between There countries. in other compatriots their with relations close want mean that theAlbanians of Albanialess are nationalistic than or others they that notdo Milo Paskal From: Appendix 1 : Paskal Milo, Greater Albania-Between Fiction and Reality. 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