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Issue No. 1285 13 October 2017 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1285 // Featured Item “Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons”. Written by Richard Speier, George Nacouzi, Carrie Lee and Richard Moore. Published by the RAND Corporation; September 2017 Hypersonic missiles — specifically hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles — are a new class of threat because they are capable both of maneuvering and of flying faster than 5,000 kilometers per hour. These features enable such missiles to penetrate most missile defenses and to further compress the timelines for a response by a nation under attack. Hypersonic missiles are being developed by the United States, Russia, and China. Their proliferation beyond these three could result in other powers setting their strategic forces on hair-trigger states of readiness. And such proliferation could enable other powers to more credibly threaten attacks on major powers. The diffusion of hypersonic technology is under way in Europe, Japan, Australia, and India — with other nations beginning to explore such technology. Proliferation could cross multiple borders if hypersonic technology is offered on world markets. There is probably less than a decade available to substantially hinder the potential proliferation of hypersonic missiles and associated technologies. To this end, the report recommends that (1) the United States, Russia, and China should agree not to export complete hypersonic missile systems or their major components and (2) the broader international community should establish controls on a wider range of hypersonic missile hardware and technology. twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 2 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1285 // TABLE OF CONTENTS US NUCLEAR WEAPONS • Evolving Challenges: Redeploying the Nuclear Tomahawk • U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization • Trump Sees Power as Military Strength — and Nukes as the Apex of that Power • Minuteman III replacement: Key to Deterrence US COUNTER-WMD • Missile Interception from Yemen to the South China Sea • North Korea Might Have One Weapon That America Won't Be Able to Stop • Measuring Radiation Doses in Mass-Casualty Emergencies • Pentagon Shifts $440 Million More to Missile Defense US ARMS CONTROL • Anti-nuclear-weapons Group Wins Nobel Peace Prize • Implement the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) • US-Russia Relations Comparable to ‘Dark Days of Cold War’ – Former Defense Secretary • Gorbachev, last Soviet leader, wants Trump-Putin summit to save arms pact ASIA/PACIFIC • Article 9 and Japan’s Missile Defence Dilemma • The Japan-US Relationship: How Strong is the Glue? • VIDEO: John McCain Says Negotiating with North Korea is ‘Odious Option’ • Nuclear Threat Greater than in Cold War, Paris Conference Hears EUROPE/RUSSIA • Europe Helped Draft the Iran Nuclear Deal. Now Leaders Are Trying to Save It. • Everything You Need to Know: Russia's 'Tactical' Nuclear Weapons • Russia's Formidable S-400 Triumf Air Defense Missile System • UK 'Firmly Committed' to Upholding Iran Nuclear Deal MIDDLE EAST • With Iran Deal in Jeopardy, US Clears Missile Interceptor Sale to Saudi Arabia • Iran Open to Talks Over Its Ballistic Missile Programme: Sources • JCPOA Violators to Face Iran's Firm Reaction: Iran UN Envoy • Report: Iran Tried 30+ Times to Buy Illegal Nuclear Technology in 2016 INDIA/PAKISTAN • India's Nuclear Arsenel • How India Can Go After Pakistan's Nuclear Stockpile • Pakistan Warns India Against Surgical Strikes On Its Soil • Pakistan Building Tunnels to Store its Nuclear Weapons, Just 750 km from Delhi COMMENTARY • Give War a Chance: How to Deal with North Korea • Our Best Hope Against Nuclear War • Trump's Iran Derangement • Nuclear Disarmament and the Search for the Fortunate Islands twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 3 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1285 // US NUCLEAR WEAPONS RealClear Defense (Chicago, IL) Evolving Challenges: Redeploying the Nuclear Tomahawk By Adam Cabot October 4, 2017 In the few years since the United States retired the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear (TLAM- N) from service, circa 2013, the world has been faced with rapidly evolving challenges. Such as a Russia increasing willingness to use force to achieve strategic objectives, the ongoing island building and militarization of the South China Sea by the People’s Republic of China and the nuclear posturing of the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, corresponding with its ongoing development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons technology. With these challenges posing a potential threat to the United States and its allies, perhaps it was a premature decision to retire the TLAM-N from naval service. This non-strategic nuclear weapon would be useful in the current global climate as an additional option in negating evolving threats. Let’s look at Russia first. There is a clear tactical nuclear imbalance between the United States and Russia, both in quality and quantity. While the U.S. currently deploys 150 B-61 tactical nuclear gravity bombs, Russia has at its disposal, approximately 1850 non-strategic nuclear weapons capable of being fitted to a diverse range of platforms including the Iskander short-range ballistic missile, the sea-based Kalibr cruise missile and the A-135 missile defense system to name a few. Redeploying the TLAM-N to a select number of naval units would close this gap without breaching the INF treaty. While the B-61 needs to rely on the combat range of aircraft such as the F-16 and runs the gauntlet of avoiding surface to air missile defenses, the TLAM-N would have a significantly increased range, accuracy and ability to avoid ground-based air defense. If deployed on nuclear attack submarines such as the Los Angeles, Seawolf or Virginia class, the TLAM-N could potentially be launched from an undetected position within range of targets, as opposed to the aircraft carrying the B-61 which must contend with a greater risk of being detected well in advance of reaching its target. If Russia chose to invade the Baltic States, the currently deployed B-61s in Western Europe and Turkey would be unable to be deployed effectively due to limited range and penetration ability. The TLAM-N would circumvent this limitation, providing NATO with a viable strike option. China is currently in the process of fortifying the South China Sea. In the case of war, China could effectively close this major shipping choke point and destabilize the global economy. In addition to this, China is not subject to the INF Treaty and has deployed a diverse group of land-based ballistic missile variants such as the DF-21D MRBM believed to be designed to destroy U.S. aircraft carriers. This has been classed as an Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) weapon as it would potentially limit the ability of U.S. aircraft carriers to operate within the South China Sea region. If China were to close the South China Sea to shipping, there would be significant challenges to dislodging their forces. Redeployment of the TLAM-N opens the door to military and coercive options, from a reactive angle to combat Chinese forces already in position in the event of war and from a deterrence angle to prevent any Chinese aspirations to close South China Sea shipping lanes. At this point, the U.S. has no tactical nuclear option deployed in the Asia region. Redeploying the TLAM-N to naval units in the region could counter Chinese A2/AD weapon systems. North Korea has made no secret of its desire to be able to reach the continental United States with high yield nuclear weapons. If it does not have this capability already, it appears to be on the way there. Currently, the only nuclear counterforce option available for dealing with North Korea is the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. This would potentially take time to reach targets in North Korea twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 4 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1285 // depending on which of the triad is utilized and depending on from where the missiles are launched, they could be mistaken by Russia and China as a First Strike attack against their forces. These problems can be overcome by deploying the TLAM-N on vessels within the U.S. Seventh Fleet. If intelligence was obtained that North Korea planned an imminent nuclear attack on South Korea, Japan or the United States, multiple TLAM-N cruise missiles could be launched directly at targets within North Korea with the ability to penetrate through ground-based air defense. Although deploying B-61 tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea is a potential future option that should not be discounted, the TLAM-N is a far superior option due to the B-61 carrying aircraft being vulnerable to surface to air missile batteries as discussed. Deploying the TLAM-N within this region may also have political benefits as South Korea would not necessarily need to base nuclear weapons in their territory. Another crucial advantage to redeploying the TLAM-N is the reassurance it would provide to U.S. allies. In the current geopolitical landscape of multidimensional challenges and threats, redeploying tactical nuclear cruise missiles would send a message to nations both within and outside the U.S. extended deterrence umbrella that the U.S. is serious about increasing its options at a tactical level beyond conventional force projection. Opponents to this outlook will evidently argue that this is a step backward for nuclear arms control and disarmament. This argument is often based on blind ideology. The U.S. made a decision to drastically reduce its tactical nuclear weapons force to the current point where only a handful of barely effective gravity bombs remain, yet all of the nuclear powers continue to modernize their arsenals and Russia retains a massive non-strategic nuclear weapons capability. A case in point is North Korea which pushes ahead at an alarming pace with nuclear warhead and ballistic missile advancement regardless of any non-proliferation efforts made by global powers and sanctions imposed.

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