Multidisciplinary Approach to EOD in the Light of NATO EOD Demonstrations and Trials 2018

A Book of Papers The NATO EOD Explosive Ordnance Centre of Excellence (NATO EOD COE) supports the efforts of the Alliance in the areas of training and education, information sharing, standardization, doctrine development and concepts validation.

Published by NATO EOD Centre of Excellence I. Olbrachta 5, 911 01 Trenčín, Slovak Republic tel.: +421 960 333 500, 502, fax +421 960 333 504 www.eodcoe.org

NOTE: The material submitted by authors has not been revised. All terms, definitions and text are the original property of the authors.

A Book of Papers - Multidisciplinary Approach to EOD in the Light of NATO EOD Demonstrations and Trials 2018

This project was managed by Colonel Róbert Császár, SVK Army, Director of the NATO EOD Centre of Excellence e-mail [email protected]

ISBN 978 - 80 - 89261 - 77 - 2

The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors of the articles and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of NATO. The designations employed and the presentations in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion concerning the legal status of any country, territory or area, or its authorities or armed groups or concerning the delimitations of its frontiers or boundaries. i

Table of Contents

Preface 1 Executive Summary 5 Colonel Robert Császár Director, EOD Centre of Excellence, Slovakia EOD Support to Joint Operations - New Challenges 35 LTC Olaf Fischer Army Concepts and Capabilities Development Centre, Germany

Integration of the Exoskeleton in the Battlefield 43 LTC Constantin Efrim EOD Centre of Excellence, Slovakia

Developments in Bomb Suits Testing and Standardization 57 Dr. Aris Makris, Ph.D. Med-Eng, Canada

Dual Sensor “ALIS” for Humanitarian Demining 65 Prof. Motoyuki Sato Tohoku University, Japan

The Understanding of Military Engineering 73 within NATO LTC Wolfgang Bayer MILENG Centre of Excellence, Germany ii

Strategic Insight to Route Clearance: 77 Efforts by MILENG COE LTC Serdar Genc MILENG Centre of Excellence, Germany Military Search Developments 85 MAJ Soren Schwartz-Petersen MILENG Centre of Excellence, Germany

Table of Acronyms 89 iii

ANNEXES

Annex 1 Joint EOD Battalion in Homeland Operations LTC GS Guy DE DECKER, BEL(A) Capability joint Force Protection, Belgium Annex 2 EOD COE Contribution to EOD Community of Interest LTC Constatntin EFRIM, ROU(A) EOD Centre of Excellence, Slovakia Annex 3 EOD Support to Joint Operations LTC Olaf FISCHER , DEU(A) Army Concepts and Capabilities Developments Centre, Germany Annex 4 EOD and the Current Security Challenges in NATO COL Bert KEIJ, NLD(A) SHAPE JENG/NATO, Belgium Annex 5 EOD vs C-IED CDR Wiggo KORSVIK, NOR(A) Norwegian Joint Headquarters Annex 6 Current and Future Trends and Methods in IED Identification and Neutralization Marc CUMO US Army International Technology Center Northern Europe Annex 7 Autonomy as Desired Capability Supporting EOD Missions Charles DEAN, Vice President Endeavor Robotics, United States iv

Annex 8 Integration of the Exoskeleton in the Battlefield - NATO Project LTC Constatntin EFRIM, ROU(A) EOD Centre of Excellence, Slovakia Annex 9 Developments in Bomb Suit Testing and Standardization Dr. Aris MAKRIS Med-Eng, Canada Annex 10 GARANT - EOD/IEDD Protection SPS-15 Latest Improvements & Innovations Mark O. MILEWSKI GARANT Protection, Germany

Annex 11 Dual Sensor “ ALIS” for Humanitarian Demining Prof. Motoyuiki SATO Tohoku University, Japan

Annex 12 Assessment of Detection Technologies for Military Search Dr. Arnold Schoolderman, Daniela DEIANA MSc Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)

Annex 13 Cost Effective Aerial Survey Solutions Wolfgang SÜSS SENSYS Magnetometers & Survey Solutions, Germany

Annex 14 Chemical and Biological Munition Disposal Peter WHITE Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, United Kingdom v

Annex 15 EOD within the MILENG Function LTCl Wolfgang BAYER MILENG Centre of Excellence, Germany

Annex 16 Route and Area Clearance - Ongoing and Future Activities LTC Serdar GENC MILENG Centre of Excellence, Germany Annex 17 Military Search - Where are we, where are we going MAJ Søren SCHWARZ- PETERSEN, NOR(A) MILENG Centre of Excellence, Germany Annex 18 MNCNE Thoughts on EOD in a NATO art. 5, Scenario on NATO Soil WO-II Jes HAFERBIER, DNK(A) Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast, Poland Annex 19 VIP Protection against IEDs and Emerging Terrorist Improvised Threats MAJ Cristian ADASCALITEI, ROU(A) Presidential Guard and Protection Srvice, Romania Annex 20 Technical Exploitation in Support to Attack the Criminal Network MSGT Oscar FERNÁNDEZ ALONSO, ESP(A) C-IED Centre of Excellence, Spain Annex 21 Improvised Explosive Device (IED) - Threat Update LTC Gonzalo MARTIN NIETO C-IED Centre of Excellence, Spain vi 1

Preface

“At the Wales Summit in 2014, Allies affirmed the critical role that investment in innovation and technology plays in addressing current and future security challenges, and in that context, NATO is paying more attention to modern defence technologies”, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in his 2017 Annual Report and he emphasised that by investing in science and technology NATO is able to improve and develop its knowledge and capabilities in support of Alliance objectives. The eruption of low intensity conflicts and terrorism waves at the beginning of the 21st century forced further development in the techniques and methods of explosive ordnance disposal. EOD operators and technicians have to adapt to rapidly evolving methods of constructing improvised explosive devices. Globally, increasing terrorism activities is one of the major factors expected to drive the demand for explosive ordnance disposal equipment. Keeping in touch with recent technologies development is essential and in this context the NATO EOD Centre of Excellence along with C-IED and MILENG Centres of Excellence organized the NATO EOD Demonstrations and Trials in September 2018. The event sponsored by the NATO HQ Emerging Security Challenges Division is as one of the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work supported cooperative initiatives. The theme for the 2018’s event was “Multidisciplinary Approach to EOD“ with the primary aim to provide a forum for exchanging information on new developments and trends in the EOD and C-IED areas and discussing the programmes of cooperation in years ahead. It is 2

beneficial that the discussion brought together not only technological and scientific experts but also EOD personnel with hands-on experience from ongoing operations. In front of you is a book of papers “Multidisciplinary Approach to EOD in the Light of the NATO EOD Demonstrations and Trials 2018” with the achievements from research, industry and military experts presented to a broad EOD society and other attendees in the course of event. I am convinced that all valuable results and achievements of their work have been significant and beneficial for enhancing counter-IED and explosive ordnance disposal activities. Colonel Róbert Császár 3

Acknowledgement I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all contributors to this publication who generously gave their time and shared their experience. I would like to extend my personal gratitude to all of my team who gave a hand in coming of this publication to the light I thank all of you for your time and efforts.

Róbert Császár 4 5

Executive Summary

Colonel Róbert Császár Director, EOD Centre of Excellence, Slovakia

During his military education he completed several international courses such as BMATT, JSOC and he distinguished graduated Captain Career Course of engineer officers at Fort Leonard Wood, USA. He started to carry out his duties as engineer officer at the Engineer Bde, then at the Land Forces HQ. In December 2006, he deployed to ISAF as Engineer Company Commander. In 2011 as Senior Engineer Officer to Operations Branch, JENG at Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples, Italy and in 2013 he was transferred to JFC Brunssum, the Netherlands. In August 2014, COL Császár was assigned as the Commander of National Centre for EOD and CBRN, Novaky. On 1st March 2018 he assumed the command of the NATO EOD Centre of Excellence in Trenčín, Slovakia.

NATO EOD Demonstrations&Trials 2018 (later as “D&T18) took place in Bratislava, Slovakia on 19 SEP - 20 SEP 2018. The D&T series facilitates multinational cooperation on capabilities development through Defence against Terrorism Programme of Work. The main topic of the 2018 year’s event “Multidisciplinary Approach to EOD” as a challenge for EOD/IEDD experts, scientists, producers, industry and subject matter experts involved in the fight against terrorism. As the EOD Demonstrations and Trials is open also to Partner countries, the event facilitates practical dimensions of cooperation and partnership. 6

A. SUMMARY

The NATO EOD Demonstrations and Trials 2018 (D&T18) took place in Bratislava, Slovakia from 19 – 20 September 2018. The purpose of D&T18 was to develop experience and broaden knowledge among EOD, C-IED and MILENG communities of interest. Organizing this event once every two years is already a tradition and one of the successful projects of DAT POW. This time, the event was organized by NATO EOD COE, Slovakia, in cooperation with NATO MILENG COE, Germany and NATO C-IED COE, Spain under the auspices and sponsorship of the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division, supported by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) of the Slovak Republic and Counter- IED Report as a media partner.

Opening Ceremony (from left) -H.E. Radovan Javorčík, Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to NATO, Peter Gajdoš, Minister of Defence (SVK), LTG Daniel Zmeko, Chief of Defence (SVK), COL Róbert Császár, Director of NATO EOD COE

The leading theme of 2018 year’s event was “Multidisciplinary Approach to EOD” as a challenge for the NATO and Partners Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) coming from various EOD and related domains, academia, industry and other organizations involved in the fight against terrorism. Bringing together all these important security providers is 7

considered as a receipt for success of the DAT POW. Equally important is the fact that it provided the favourable organizational framework to discuss, deepen and clarify certain aspects, identify possible gaps or threats related to the specific EOD activities and to foresee future evolution. D&T18 was organized as a two-day event. All activities during D&T18 took place at the INCHEBA EXPO Centre, Bratislava, Slovakia. After the opening ceremony, the first day offered to visitors and guests an opportunity to visit the booths of various exhibitors from industry and academia. These have been complemented by live or video demonstrations of the latest technological achievements. The second day was dedicated to the conference, to initiate discussions with focus on Multidisciplinary approach to EOD. Participants had the opportunity to familiarize with nowadays capabilities of the EOD, C-IED and MILENG equipment, including new techniques, procedures and technologies developed to protect the forces and population. The scientists, producers and experts also presented the current and future trends and their elaboration into new EOD, C-IED and MILENG devices/tools. More than 150 experts (SMEs, guests) from 15 countries (Bel- gium, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the USA) took part in D&T18. Over 200 visitors witnessed static exhibitions and live demonstrations performed by exhibitors from 17 Welcoming address - H.E. Radovan Javorčík, Ambassador of NATO and Partner the Slovak Republic to NATO countries. 8

A.1. Background The NATO Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence provides expertise in the field of EOD to NATO and Partner countries and also: • Supports NATO operation in the field of explosive ordnance disposal by improving interoperability and cooperation between NATO member countries, Partner countries, international organizations and NATO entities from NCS, NFS, schools, ... • Trains and educates staff officers and specialist in the field of EOD • Offers recognized expertise and experience Therefore, as a logical consequence, the NATO EOD COE has taken over the responsibility for organizing the series of NATO EOD Demonstrations and Trials since 2010. Later on, in 2016, NATO C-IED COE was invited to co-organize the seminar within DandT. This year NATO MILENG COE joined the two Centres of Excellence in co- organizing the MILENG dedicated seminar. The first NATO EOD Demonstration and Trials was organized in Trencin, Slovakia. Since then the event has been organized every second year under different topics: Detection – a unified effort of involved parties to defeat new emerging threats and protect human life and environment in 2012, New technologies – assistance and limitation of the EOD in post-ISAF era in 2014, Protection as complex and composite responses to terrorist threat in 2016, and Multidisciplinary approach to EOD in 2018. Since 2015, the D&T has been arranged in harmonization with C-IED Technology Workshop, the DAT POW project, led by NATO C-IED COE. Organizing of biennial events for experts from industry and military such as EOD and C IED conferences, demonstrations and trials have become an excellent tradition which helps entire EOD and C-IED related community to better understand each other, exchange the latest information and increase the cooperation. 9

Thanks to these activities we are able to define new possible ways of progress, especially via new research focused on EOD and C-IED technology development and later through the integration of new EOD and C-IED TTPs in training and operations.

A.2. Static exhibition One of the event objectives was to provide a forum for producers of equipment to meet with end-users and to get the direct feedback. The experts had opportunities to check similar equipment and exchange personal experience from their testing in different conditions and at work. The static exhibition reflected the main idea and a leading motto of NATO EOD Demonstrations and Trials 2018. The exhibitors presented their products in the complexity of the approach in: • ROVs • Detectors • Devices for neutralization and disposal of hazardous materials • Heavy demining machines • Devices for personal protection of EOD personnel During the static exhibition following thirty-nine companies presented sophisticated and high-tech equipment: 10 11

The static exhibition proved that permanent technical development of engineering technologies and related procedures are the driving force in seeking better solutions related to detection, neutralization and removal of all types of explosive hazards. 12

A.3. Live Demonstrations Live demonstrations are an integral part of the exhibition. It gives the producers/companies the opportunity to present the functionality of their products in simulated/real life conditions. Due to the limitations at the INCHEBA EXPO, the exhibitors could only use the indoor area to demonstrate their product’s capabilities. Therefore, several functionalities of EOD equipment were not performed as designed. There was no possibility to use any pyrotechnical tools and no possibility to “shoot” live X-ray images. Despite these limitations, 15 companies from 10 countries participated in the live demonstrations and introduced their latest product developments.

The presented products can be split into following categories:

A.3.1. Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) The ROV is an essential part of the EOD operator tool kit. However, the year 2018 was relatively modest in terms of ROV demonstrations. Only 3 companies presented their products. When we compare the ROVs that performed their live demonstrations in 2016, we see improvements in flexibility (ROVs compatible with larger spectrum of EOD/CBRN tools), battery operation time and user friendliness towards the operator. We could also see a unique feature on Caliber MK3 made by ICOR which has a separate arm for disruptors (dual arm configuration). 13

A.3.2. Detection and Identification Tools/Devices The ability to detect threats is absolutely vital to any force facing IEDs in their area of operations. Further identification of IED’s composition is extremely valuable to the EOD operator, in order to plan his neutralization procedure/method. Altogether, nine companies demonstrated their latest tools that can aid the operator to detect and identify explosive or CBRN threats in the operational environment. We could see improvements in the already well developed technologies (X-Ray, spectroscopy, mass spectrometry, magnetometry). The new tools are faster, more flexible, accurate, sensitive, user friendly and multipurpose. There were also some innovative solutions. Sensys Sensorik has shown how to utilize Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to obtain a very accurate magnetometric survey without any danger to personnel and EBINGER presented a detector that prevents triggering IEDs with magnetic switches (a switch which is initiated when approached by a common metal detector).

A.3.3. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) The bomb suit is another crucial piece of equipment for protection of the EOD operator. The latest suits presented by the exhibitors are considerably lighter and provides more flexibility, while ensuring required level of protection for the operator. We also recognized improvements in the cooling system, communication system and other accessories 14

(e.g. voice command activation, battery pack durability/interchangeabil- ity). Another form of PPE we saw during the live demonstrations was presented by SAFER. They developed a system combining a metal detector and electric stimulation that prevents a person from stepping on a buried mine or IED with a metal content.

A.3.4. Training Enhancement Realistic training can greatly improve performance in real life situations. During the live demonstrations two companies addressed this aspect of EOD operator’s preparation. DSA Detection emphasized the need to train with accurate ordnance replicas, as they make the training realistic and affordable. The progress in virtual reality and its potential utilization in training was presented by VRAI.

A.3.5. Summary The live demonstrations had shown a steady progress in technology applicable to the field of EOD. While there were no groundbreaking technologies, that would revolutionize the EOD approach, we could see several innovative ideas on how to merge existing technologies in order to maximize their effectiveness. Even small improvements in speed, ergonomy, reliability or user friendliness will improve the performance of the EOD operator and at the end might save human lives.

The following table shows the list of companies with short identification of their products. 15

Company Demonstration Website NOVO DR, Extremely lightweight system www.novo-dr.com Israel (starting from 5.6 kg) with unparalleled penetration Med-Eng, EOD Robot capabilities - Avanger www.med-eng.com Canada EOD 10 Bomb Suit Logos Imaging LLC, MONOS flat panel X-ray system www.logosimaging.com United States ICOR Technology, MK4 and mini-CALIBER EOD robot www.icortechnology.com Canada DSA Detection, Material discrimination with www.dsadetection.com United States portable X-rays Advanced tactical training system (accurate ordnance replicas) BAS Rudice, Seeking hidden explosives with www.bas.cz Czech Republic backscatter and its identification by Raman Spectrometer EBINGER Pruf- und Magnetometer/metal detector https://ebingergroup.de Ortungstechnik, systems Germany System MAGNEX(R) 120L2 Active TFEM System UPEX 745 DF PIAP, EOD PIAP robots capabilities https://piap.pl Poland GARANT Protection, GARANT Bomb Suit SPS-15 www.garant-protection. Germany com SAFER, Security equipment which prevent www.safer-innovation.com France activation of traps (IED) or mines Scanna Msc Ltd, Use of portable X-ray in C-IED www.scanna-msc.com United Kingdom operations RMI, s.r.o., Handheld FT-IR/Raman www.rmi.cz Czech Republic spectrometer Gemini-reliable identification of different types of explosives Sensys Sensorik, UAV survey kit MagDrone R3 https:// Germany sensysmagnetometer.com/ XRIS X-Ray Imaging UP (Ultra portable series) X-ray www.xris.eu Solutions, imaging systems for EOD&C-IED Belgium cases VRAI, Using virtual reality for training and https://vrai.ie Ireland developing skills and understanding of situation 16

B. Senior Military Leaders Seminar The Senior Military Leaders Seminar (SMLS), was organized for the first time as a part of the event, dedicated to national, NATO and Partners senior military leaders/commanders with focus on key aspects of the EOD role in joint operations. The SMLS commenced during the first day of D&T18 and it attracted not only senior military leaders, but also EOD SMEs. The main aim of SMLS was to inform senior military leaders about the EOD role within Joint Military Operations, including: • NATO Doctrines and EOD recognition within • EOD role in joint operations (including Article 5 Operations) • EOD COE support to EOD COI (including future security challenges)

Taking into consideration that organizers succeeded to attract the custodian of NATO EOD Doctrine – AJP-3.18, Allied Joint Doctrine for EOD Support to Operations (LTC Olaf FISCHER) to cover first part of SMLS and SHAPE ACOS JENG (COL Bert KEIJ) to cover the second part. The SMLS proved to be an excellent opportunity to provide senior military leaders with distinguished knowledge about the key aspects of the EOD role in the phases of Joint Military Operations. Third part of the SMLS, EOD COE support to EOD COI, was successfully covered by LTC Constantin EFRIM, Head of Transformation Support Department, EOD Centre of Excellence. 17

Other speakers informed senior military leaders about their national approach to EOD and MAJ Marco APPODIA, Head of Education and Training Branch, introduced to the audience the capabilities of the new European Centre for Manual Neutralization (ECMAN), supported by the European Union. The organization was officially inaugurated at the beginning of 2018 in Vienna, Austria.

C. Conference The second day of D&T18 was dedicated to the conference, to enhance international collaboration with EOD partners from civilian and military sectors, keeping the overall theme of D&T18 - Multidisciplinary Approach to EOD. The conference provided an excellent opportunity for discussions, information and experience sharing. It provided also a possibility to explain perspectives from academic, military, SMEs and producers’ points of view.

The conference had three topic oriented panels:

EOD Technology Seminar focused on technological advances in the area of EOD with following subtopics: • Current and future trends and methods in the identification and neutralization techniques • Autonomy as desired capability supporting EOD mission • Exploiting the training and modelling methods to enhance the capabilities of EOD operators • Testing and standardization of ROVs capabilities to improve their performance • Integration of the Exoskeleton in the Battlefield – the EOD perspectives 18

MILENG Panel • EOD within the MILENG Function • The MILENG Function • EOD within MILENG: ○○ The role of EOD according to doctrine ○○ Command and Control ○○ Reports and Returns • From Security Operations to Warfighting • Route Clearance and Military Search

C-IED Panel • Current threat and possible short-term IED development • Technical exploitation in support to attack the criminal networks

Many presentations and discussions reflected the expertise contribution of 18 speakers from 12 countries representing NATO, EU, international and national institutions, agencies, academies, companies and others, who took advantage of the opportunity to present new and visionary/innovative ideas. 19

D. SOME CONSIDERATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF D&T18 All sub-activities and contributing SMEs from various fields and entities of expertise provided priceless food for thought about the future operational environment and EOD requirements. The EOD Centre of Excellence (EOD COE) brainstormed the gained contributions during the D&T18 as well as some other strategic considerations (e.g.. Strategic Foresight Analyses Report) and several technological studies. The analyses are summarized in these Some Considerations in the Light of D&T18“. Following considerations are not a kind of the EOD destiny but can provide certain views on possible impacts forming the EOD capabilities in medium and long-term perspectives.

D.1. The Presence of EOD Prior to thinking about the EOD future, there is a need to describe the presence of EOD in general and to understand real levels of EOD capabilities, which vary from nation to nation. In a very generic way, the situation in relation to the EOD operators and technologies is depicted in the picture: The first responders report on a potential threat via communication channels (incl. satellite).

Then it is necessary to dispatch the EOD operator with his equipment to the scene. Over there, either he can deploy some EOD remotely controlled (RC) technologies (mainly robots) or he decides to take a long walk to the explosive ordnance (EO) directly (e.g. protected by a bomb suit). 20

The EOD operator is the decision-maker and the responsible person for a choice of the proper Render Safe Procedure (RSP). Generally, we can summarize the EOD presence as follows: • The EOD operator must be on the scene. • Only some remotely controlled technologies are available for the EOD operator´s duties. • The EOD operator is the decision maker

D.2. The EOD in the Far Future Within the EOD COE, we believe that the future of EOD will be different from the presence due to many current and future influences/ changes. One of the crucial impacts will be the new technologies to enable advanced EOD operations. Our dream vision of the far future is described in the following picture: The first responders report on the potential threat via future communication lines. It is not necessary to dispatch the EOD operator to the scene. The operator with assistance of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies analyses received information. Upon this analysis, additional data could be required. Autonomous systems (including AI) on the spot collect/harvest extra requested data. The EOD operator makes the final decision on solutions to be applied. Then AI technologies ensure deployment of appropriate technologies (including swarming) to the scene and performance of selected RSPs without a human physical involvement on the spot. 21

Generally, we can summarize our vision for the future of EOD: • The EOD operator acts as the final decision-maker although some particular sub-decisions are delegated to AI sub-parts of the system. • Advanced AI and autonomous technologies support the EOD operator situational analysis. • Autonomous technologies perform the selected RSP on spot without the physical presence of the EOD operator on the scene. Only the future will confirm how close we are to our dream vision. Definitely, we expect that the shift from the EOD presence (the EOD operator with RC technologies on the spot) to the far EOD future (AI, no human physically on the spot only technologies) will be incremental. It means that each technological advance will gradually reduce a need for the presence of the EOD operator on the scene. On the other hand, more and more incidents will be controlled and solved by exploitation of new technologies (with gradual autonomizing). It is expected that such progress towards to the dream vision will be rather an evolutionary than revolutionary process (although any revolutionary technology change is not excluded). Definitely, steady technological progresses in several areas (e.g. new materials, enhanced detection) and their cumulative effects will result in new solutions for EOD activities. Whatever we project or expect from the future, there will be still a great number of various drivers, factors and processes influencing future EOD capability developments. Based on the DaT2018 contributions and following EOD COE analyses, we turn our attention to: 1. Threat evolution 2. Involvements, cooperation, communication 3. Technologies 4. Education and training 5. Render Safe Procedures (RSPs) and equipment 22

D.2.1. Threat Evolution The EOD, in its nature, is a responsive tool on appeared or emerging threats. Therefore, to capture some new warning signs for threat and understanding of threat evolution is crucial for being prepared to respond adequately. We believe that security threat in Europe will go through several evolving phases. It seems that future potential adversaries will become better educated, will have better access to the latest technologies, and may easily adopt the extremist values (e.g. own children sacrificed for suicide attacks). Such a situation may result in a kind of the war mentality against traditional and settled cultures. These changes will lead to hardly predictable actions against majorities and there will be no limits for the enemy to target anything or anyone (not saying that targeting will be always successful). In line with it, we believe that the enemy (especially in Europe) will be balancing between two principles: • Simplicity • Sophistication

a. Simplicity is enemy´s main approach nowadays and in the close future. The focus of this tendency is and will be to launch: • The significant number of simple attacks by other means than explosives (e.g. driving a truck killing people in the cities, driving trucks into potable water reservoirs, injuring train/bus/UBER passengers by knives, deliberately causing fires in populated areas) • Simple attacks (from time to time) by using EO to show off their growing capabilities and to shape their operational environment (e.g. spreading fear and undermining trust in governmental capabilities) 23

These actions will be: ○○ relatively small (although with very huge psychological effects) ○○ misusing simple and available technologies ○○ poorly planned and coordinated ○○ hardly supported by their “spiritual leaders“ and ○○ conducted against vulnerable targets

b. Sophistication will be enemy´s approach in the medium-term future (within 20 years). In order to sophisticate striking capabilities, the adversaries will focus on recruiting and mobilizing selected individuals and groups of new generations (grown up, integrated and better-educated children of current migrants mainly). Then, the future enemy´s objectives can be described as: • Big scale attacks (i.e. either a bigger amount of explosives or chemicals/biological payloads involved or a large number of small coordinated attacks affecting more people) • Better planned and coordinated actions (to declare their ability of long-term planning and solid control over their structures when coordinating such a large operation) • Assured support from their spiritual leaders and their connections to many entities within respective nations or organizations/agencies • Exploitation of sophisticated technologies (to demonstrate their progress and pose extra challenges for the EOD to neutralize them, e.g. new smart materials, 3D printing, unmanned commercial cars, new capable multi-sensors and electronics, or new anti-handling devices against the EOD specialists) 24

• Selected/precise targeting (including the first responders) will ensure that anyone or anything can be targeted (showing that nobody is safe; even well protected targets could be killed or destroyed). We believe that balancing between simple and sophisticated attacks will be turning closer to those sophisticated (in medium-term future). At the same time, simple attacks will be used by individuals or small groups just for particular objectives (e.g. to cover their progress in sophistication of their methods, to undermine trust in national governments continuously, to spread overall depression, etc.).

D.2.2. Involvements, Cooperation, Communication Efficient cooperation plays a significant role in the history of mankind. This cooperative approach will be even more crucial in the future due to further globalization and growing interdependence within all strategic dimensions (including military, humans, politics, technology, economy, and environment). Although the one man risk principle is applied during the execution of EOD tasks, we believe that no EOD operator is an island or, as stated during the D&T18, “EOD expertise will stay essential working independently, but not being disconnected.” EOD assets are incorporated in or to contribute to operations of Land, Maritime, Air or Special Forces components, either for non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO) or Article 5 operations. This results in EOD being essential to supporting freedom of action at all levels. The particular EOD responsibilities (within Deployment, Training, Equipment, Information sharing, and Support) will grow and require adequate interactions with other disciplines (within military structures, e.g. C-IED, CBRN, MS, Route Clearance) and agencies (non-military entities, e.g. IOs, NGOs, commercial producers, researchers, simulation/training centres). These interactions are already very complex. This cooperative networking includes a wide number of players, many various tasks and 25

negotiations to be conducted during particular phases of solutions seeking. Just as an example: EOD expertise contributions to producers during developments of a new EOD equipment, then support from the producers to the EOD experts during their training with the new equipment, later on support during deployments and finally getting feedback from deployments. Based on our analysis of these interactions and in the light of D&T18, the future cooperation will require further enhancement and improvements in: a. Multidisciplinary approach b. Technological cooperation a. Within multidisciplinary approach this should be considered for the future: • Development of new communication platform(s) for EOD COI (e.g. reporting, catalogues, historical records) • Broadening of external/internal cooperation within EOD COI (e.g. national/international, international organizations, non-governmental organizations) • Improvement of cost effectiveness in EOD equipment acquisition/development • Development of common EOD databases (e.g. common EOD activities calendars, incidents, technologies) b. Within technological cooperation this should be considered for the future: • Improvements in feedback/mutual communication in relation to new TECH developments • Proactive EOD approach in setting technological requirements (e.g. new virtual TECH for EOD training,) 26

• Stimulation of cooperation between the researchers and producers for the benefit of EOD • Improvements in information flows from producers towards the EOD COI (e.g. on fuses, EO,) • Designing communication platforms between producers and end users

D.2.3. Technologies Our history even confirms that new technologies have been influencing each civilization and more, technological progress was one of the decisive factors in the most of weaponized conflicts. Today it is not different and it does not matter so much, what kind of the armed clash it is or will be. The main topic of NATO EOD Demonstrations and Trials 2018 was Multidisciplinary Approach to EOD. However, it did not exclude a great deal of contributions related to technological solutions and perspectives not only for the EOD but also for MILENG and C-IED COIs. Especially nowadays, we speak about our own technological dependence and misuse of the latest technologies by many extremist groups or individuals. As depicted on the picture, new technologies have a significant impact on our own military capabilities across all disciplines and hierarchy structures. However, no potential adversary is out of the technological influence circle, so new technologies will be misused in a wide range. Simultaneously, potential adversaries will still use any applicable cheap old techniques and tactics in some hostile actions. These classical procedures will allow the adversaries to save their resources and, on the other hand, sometimes it will force us to maintain our own old fashioned solutions and skills. 27

Overall, new technologies will be forming the future conducts and areas of operations, and shaping capabilities (although indirectly) on both sides, our own and potential adversaries as well. As aforementioned, we believe that the EOD capabilities are incrementally forwarding to the autonomous technologies (steadily excluding humans from the physical actions in the incident). During particular EOD capability development phases, some technological improvements and progress may play crucial role in following areas: A. Detection – improved detectability and recognition based on: ○○ New sensors for augmented reality in various environments (including urban areas, construction materials…) ○○ Continuous miniaturization of sensors (supporting possibility to use very small drones for detection, e.g. robotic flies…) ○○ New detection methods (including e.g. olfactory detection) with enhanced accuracy of detection/positioning, improved 3D mapping, ability to recognize precise compositions of materials ○○ Advanced multisensory or new sensors with a possibility of fast reprogramming capability, or mission tailored sensors (including sensors swarming) to enhance quality and quantity of detection data in various terrains/environments (e.g. minimum requirements for ground penetrating detection - at least 0.5m) ○○ Implemented real time/layered data processing while compatible with commercial devices ensuring higher compatibility ○○ Enhanced capabilities in risk assessments (e.g. sensors capable to detect too hot/cold environment for their own operation prior to being affected (kind of self-protection features)) 28

B. Mobility – improved mobility of any EOD sub-parts (sensors, RC devices, EOD operators,...) based on: ○○ Innovated air transportation technologies (including autonomous drones capable to fly with huge payloads in any weather conditions and posing minimum distortion effects on surroundings or, on the contrary, very small particular task tailored drones (e.g. flying bugs capable of multisensory) ○○ Progress in robotization (walking/chasing/flying robots and their protections...) ○○ Headway in human augmentation (e.g. Exoskeletons for Human Performance Augmentation (EHPA)...) C. Analysis – improved analytical capabilities not just because of the enhanced detection capabilities but also due to: ○○ New analytical software enabling real time data processing (complex analyses on a spot) ○○ Artificial intelligence processing/learning ○○ Human augmentation (e.g. artificial analytical abilities/virtues) D. Manipulation – extended and more precise handling based on: ○○ Improved manipulation capabilities (e.g. advanced haptics for RC devices, more durable and efficient semi-autonomous robots, etc.) ○○ New neutralization methods (RSPs) E. Support – enhanced efficiency and effectiveness in support based on: ○○ More effective energy sources (low power consumption and longer life cycles) ○○ Progressive exploitation of 3D printing ○○ Improved electronic countermeasures (ECM), frequency management (FM), communication technologies and processes (e.g. a bomb suit with real-time internet access) 29

Although there are many evolutionary steps to be reached for full autonomy (in relation with artificial intelligence), this issue has already triggered several questions and considerations to be taken into account : • Decision making ethics (e.g. who is making decisions and at what level/scope? Which phase of the EOD operation humans should do? Who is responsible when autonomous robot´s decision is not correct/proper? Who is leading the EOD mission when autonomous robots or AI make majority of decisions?) • Motivations for full autonomy (e.g. some pros: Higher safety not only for the EOD personnel, minimizing human mistakes, keeping technological levels with potential adversaries,... some cons: Lost overall control, unexpected consequences, natural human fear of full autonomy...) • Acceptable levels/forms (some acceptable levels/forms e.g. autonomy in EO detection, robot/drone mobility, some technical modules within the EOD systems, ...) • Limitations for full autonomy (some researchers and producers consider aforementioned issues and limited resourcing as the main road blocks for faster progress in autonomy; also more intense progress to full autonomy within the EOD might require several breakthroughs in other technologies... )

D.2.4. Education and Training As already mentioned, a steady progress in technologies will be influencing both sides, our own EOD capabilities and potential adversaries as well. It means that a technological cloud (including various technologies) will bring following challenges and opportunities:

• Imposes new security threats • Provides new EOD solutions • Provides new training tools/ methods 30

• Supports further info sharing/analyses • Stimulates doctrines development The EOD training will have to respond to those challenges and opportunities either on national or international levels. It implies that training and EOD education systems should: • Be ready to respond to more complex security threats (e.g. sophisticated IEDs, new ammo, technologically sophisticated enemy tactics and techniques including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards (CBRN), EHPA, cyber aspects), while maintaining a proper balance between EOD and IEDD training and capabilities • Implement mechanisms for permanent monitoring of new available technologies (used for own or adversaries’ benefits) • Develop procedures for the fast implementation of new technologies (e.g. laser disruptors, 3D scanners, chemical de-compositors, new visual recognition technologies...) into EOD education and training (including full exploitation of new training tools/methods as new interactive modules, real situation simulators, e-learning packages) • Be very flexible and adaptable to any changes in relation to new technologies (e.g. adaptable study curricula and tailored supplementary trainings reflecting even indirect impact of technologies) • Minimize growing pressures on EOD operator´s abilities, versatility, responsibilities, and awareness. These pressures are expected because of: ○○ Misuse of new technologies will widen the range of required responses, resulting in some pressures on the EOD to widen their responsibilities. ○○ New technologies might require extra technical knowledge and educational background, therefore the EOD personnel may feel additional pressure on their mental abilities and preparation times due to extended study curricula. 31

D.2.5. Render Safe Procedures and Equipment Up to now, the EOD RSPs and equipment have mirrored current technological levels. However, the exponential evolution of some technologies will challenge the EOD COI to keep the forthcoming pace with technology progress (as some commercial researches and productions are already challenging governmentally supported technological progress based on military requirements). In every case, the technological progress will be affecting EOD RSPs and equipment very significantly and continuously. In line with that, following aspects should be taken into consideration in the future: • Further need for cost effectiveness (e.g. many new technologies will become hardly affordable for particular nations, therefore lowering cost and equipment sharing should be stimulated; reasonable prolongation of life cycles of some equipment could reduce costs; development of cheap upgrades could also decrease prices, etc.) • EOD proactivity in technological developments with focus on RSPs (e.g. to face growing technological tempo of any adversaries, the EOD COI should become more proactive in requirement/criteria specifications for development of new adequate affordable technical solutions and RSPs (e.g. many former disposal methods related to CBRN EOD are currently forbidden due to legal/human conventions) • Flexible implementation of new technologies (to maintain old fashioned EOD skills and RSPs will be needed in the future as well. However, the main emphasis should be on fast implementation of the latest technological solutions and RSPs as any gaps in keeping the pace of technological progress might grow exponentially. 32

At the same time, new technologies will challenge any current standards, so development of progressive standardization could be supportive in these areas: • Technologies (e.g. ROVs, De-armers, safety equipment, including stimulated certification of future technologies for avoidance of low quality or fake devices) • Capabilities (e.g. development of criteria for particular EOD capabilities in detection) • Interoperability (as variability and much broader scale of new technologies/standards will bring extra burden to maintain high interoperability levels) • Training (as the continuous challenge to implement new technologies and update training standards appropriately) Related to protective equipment the NATO EOD D&T18 paid attention to the further developments of EOD bomb suits. Based on that, two main challenges are foreseen in the close future: • Set up categorization for the EOD bomb suits • Develop updated requirements for EOD bomb suit with inclusion of: ○○ Requirements reflecting real situation feedbacks, training experience, logistic lessons (e.g. from life cycles), and changes in security environment (e.g. CBRN aspects) ○○ Increased safety (e.g. level of blast effect protection, ECM, heat protection, ...) ○○ Enhanced mobility (active/passive exoskeleton, exosuits) ○○ Real time monitoring of EOD operator´s vital functions ○○ Real time information flow (internet, video-recording, data processing, head-up display, 360 grade visibility/3D, virtual and augmented reality) ○○ Improved modularity 33

E. fINAL WORDS NATO EOD COE, NATO C-IED COE and NATO MILENG COE expressed their strong belief that the D&T series is an excellent tool providing great opportunities for military community, academics, and producers. All use these events to discuss requirements, needs and directions for development of products, share current information during the static exhibitions, live demonstrations, the Senior Military Leaders Seminar and the conference. Organizing of the D&T event traditionally brings together senior leaders from across the complete EOD community to gather and discuss strategic, operational and technical considerations to tackle EOD across all sectors. The benefits of D&T18 were highly appreciated by all EOD, C-IED and MILENG communities and all three Centres of Excellence are committed to serve as the main propelling force to transform these goals into reality. Support of the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) to the D&T series is crucial as without it there would not be such an excellent and successful event beneficial for the EOD, C-IED and MILENG communities and, at the end, for the whole NATO. According to the number of visitors, producers, academia and SMEs regularly participating to the D&T and based on the anonymous after action feedback conducted by the EOD COE, it is clear that D&T, held every two years, has become a valuable cyclic event. This conclusion is supported by the fact that majority of the exhibitors have already confirmed their interest to participate in the next NATO EOD Demonstrations and Trials 2020. Special appreciation goes to the NATO ESCD for its sponsorship, NATO C-IED COE and NATO MILENG COE for co-organizing and Counter-IED Report Magazine for advertising of the NATO EOD Demonstrations and Trials 2018. 34 35

EOD Support to Joint Operations - New Challenges

LTC Olaf FISCHER Army Concepts and Capabilities Development Centre, Germany

LTC Olaf Fischer after his studies at NVA Air Force Academy. As a Chief of MN EODCC he was deployed in SFOR mission in the former Yugoslavia (2003) and at the RC North in ISAF, Afghanistan (2008). Later he served at the Joint Support Command in Cologne, Germany, currently at the Army Concepts and Capabilities Development Centre, Germany. Since 2009 LTC Fischer is also a Chaiman odf DPP Panel EOD WG and a custodian of AJP-3.18 and ATP-3.18.1 documents.

The Wales NATO Summit 2014 and the consequences for EOD

The Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the NATO agreed on changing the Alliance main focus on collective defence. They stated in a Transatlantic Declaration that they are committed to further strengthening the transatlantic bond and to providing the resources, capabilities, and political will required to ensure our Alliance remains ready to meet any challenge. (1) What are the consequences of this shift for Alliance explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capabilities? NATO EOD force elements supported Allied missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and in other areas. The main task was to counter the threat caused by improvised explosive devices (IED) and IEDs remain the main threat at current missions. However, following the Wales NATO summit declaration, EOD has to be ready to meet any challenge. Collective defence requires beside the capability for disposal of IED (IEDD) capabilities for conventional munition disposal and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) EOD. Conventional munitions available today range widely in both technology and quantity. Many types of munitions can now be delivered over long ranges, either to wide area or to precise targets. Their effects can both destroy and disrupt, and they present different EOD challenges depending on their targets. These may include operating airfields, naval operations, combat and/or supporting troops, lines of communication and non-military infrastructure. In addition to hostile forces munitions targeted at our own forces, EOD planning should also take account of the threat to friendly forces by own ordnance that fail to function. (2) Intelligence-based threat assessments at national, allied and international levels all indicate an increased likelihood of terrorist organisations, including state sponsored terrorism, and insurgencies using EO or dispersal devices associated with CBRN payloads against both military and civil targets. Many of these aggressors no longer consider themselves constrained by international conventions, nor by commonly 37

held moral beliefs in terms of endangering civilian populations. Allied forces are considered likely targets and measures must be considered to protect against these threats. (3)

Figure 1: The explosive ordnance threat (4)

The EO threat is relevant for all Allied missions on land and at sea and it is not a secret that EOD force elements are always a limited resource. Countering the explosive ordnance threat requires for all EOD teams appropriate: • personnel, • equipment, • standards, • intelligence, • training, • exercises and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). 38

EOD teams have to provide the whole range of EOD capabilities but EOD teams are not the only source to counter the explosive ordnance threat. Basic explosive ordnance awareness skills help to protect against the threat of explosive ordnance and enable personnel to operate and accomplish their tasks in environments where there is an EO threat.

Figure 2: EO awareness skills and EOD capability subsets (6)

These basic skills include the ability to detect, mark and report explosive ordnance, as well as to carry out a threat analysis; all at tactical level. The personnel have to be trained to produce EO warnings and to minimize the risk to both themselves and others. A training of basic EO awareness skills should be included in all military training, pre deployment training and in-theatre training. Failure to properly train personnel could cause injuries or death. Military leaders should be trained, during general leadership training, how to conduct operations under the EO threat when commanding a military unit. (5) 39

EOD linkages EOD is closely linked to other activities such as:

• Countering IED (C-IED) • Force protection • Military Engineering (MILENG) • CBRN Defence • Electronic warfare, • Intelligence and Medical support.

I want to look closer at the relations to C-IED and MILENG. The task of EOD is to counter the explosive ordnance threats and the task of C-IED is to defeat the IED system. These related tasks cause often confusion for non-involved personnel. The crucial aspect for EOD is, that EOD contributes to all 3 pillars of C-IED. The main contribution is the reconnaissance and disposal of explosive ordnances (defeat the device pillar). Technical exploitation and intelligence of explosive ordnances contributes to the attack the network pillar; explosive ordnance awareness training to the prepare the force pillar. On the other hand, all C-IED activities support the mitigation of risk for EOD activities. There are manifold arears of common interest for EOD and C-IED. 40

The focus of C-IED in these areas is limited on IED. Collective defence requires for EOD the redirection also on the conventional munition and CBRN explosive ordnance threat. MILENG is a function in support of operations to shape the physical operating environment. MILENG incorporates areas of expertise such as Engineering, Explosives Ordnance Disposal, Environmental Protection”, military search and management of infrastructure, including contracted civil engineering. (7) The new MC 560/2 brought an essential change for EOD but not only for EOD also for MILENG. MILENG is not a solely engineer task. MILENG activities are also conducted by other personnel than engineers, e.g. EOD divers and logistic personnel. EOD operators may be engineers or not. A consequence for EOD is that EOD staff elements (Combined Joint EOD Cell, EOD Coordination Cell and EOD Cell) are integrated in MILENG staffs at strategic, operational and tactical level. The Chief of Military Engineering (C-MILENG) is the principal advisor to the Joint Force Commander on all MILENG issues, inclusive EOD. EOD has got a fixed position within a joint staff and is able to promote EOD aspects via the C-MILENG.

EOD challenges Examples for future fields of EOD activities are: • Provide a coherent explosive ordnance situational picture, • gain modern conventional munition information/intelligence, • gain CBRN weapons information/intelligence, • conduct explosive ordnance awareness, • explosive ordnance protective measures, • analyse modern forces TTPs and the consequences for EOD, • develop and integrate EOD TTPs for modern explosive ordnances. 41

The EOD operator is in the centre of these activities. He has to conduct all EOD action in order to counter the explosive ordnance threat. He has to apply the changes. This means he has to: • conduct appropriate training, • possess the minimum EOD proficiencies, • have EOD equipment available, • know the national regulations and NATO EOD standards, at some missions UN standards, • use agreed EOD terms and definitions, • comply with information security and • act as an warfighter. All these demands have to be respected when developing future EOD capabilities. The person who has to conduct EOD tasks, the EOD operator, must always be in the centre of all efforts in order to enable him to fulfil EOD tasks on an acceptable risk.

References [1] Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales 05 Sep 2014 [2] NATO Allied Tactical Publication for Explosive Ordnance Disposal - ATP- 3.18.1, April 2017, p 1-1 [3] NATO Allied Tactical Publication for Explosive Ordnance Disposal - ATP- 3.18.1, April 2017, p 1-2 [4] Allied Joint Doctrine for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support to Operations - AJP-3.18, March 2017, p 1-3 [5] NATO Allied Tactical Publication for Explosive Ordnance Disposal - ATP- 3.18.1, April 2017, p 2-1 [6] Allied Joint Doctrine for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support to Operations - AJP-3.18, March 2017, p 1-4 [7] MC 560/2 Military Engineering, October 2017 42 43

Integration of the Exoskeleton

LTC Constantin EFRIM, ROUA EOD Centre of Excellence, in the BattlefieldSlovakia LTC Constantin Efrim, ROUA started his military career in 1992 after the graduation of the Military Engineer Officer’s Institute in Romania. He has occupied various functions from a platoon leader to an acting commander of engineer battalion. Operational deployments includes Bosnia (2003), EUFOR Althea Operation (2008) and Iraq. He has a Bachelor Degree in International Relations and European Studies and a Master Degree in Management and Technology. At the EOD Centre of Excellence, Slovakia LTC Constantin EFRIM assumed the position of the Deputy Head of the Development Department in 2016. Since 2017 he has served as the Head of the Transformation Support Department. The EOD profession is considered one of the most dangerous occupations in the world, probably the most dangerous in the military. Unfortunately, IEDs become the weapon of choice for terrorist attacks on civilian and army personnel almost everywhere in the world. This proliferation of use of such a weapon led to an increased role for EOD operators in the search, neutralisation and clearance of IEDs. In order to protect themselves against the effects of blast (overpressure, fragmentation, impact and heat) or to minimize the risks of blast exposure, EOD personnel is wearing special protective equipment. Due to the materials used to ensure minimum ballistic protection, the bomb suit is extremely heavy (average weight more than 30 kg) which normally leads to increased energy consumption and consequently to the impossibility of performing long-term actions. 44

Introduction

Observing historical sources and the related material evidence it can be argued that the development of protective equipment evolved in close connection with the evolution of the offensive weapons and the effects obtained through their use. Protection against weapons has been a constant concern over the centuries, the oldest armours known being developed in ancient China. The oldest known Western armour is the Dendra panoply, dating from the Mycenaean Era around 1400 BC (figure 1). In European history, the armours were used in different configurations even during the era of gunpowder. Modern Era comes with advanced weaponry, which somehow discontinued the use of heavy armour, but not entirely. Some cavalry troops wearing armour fought in the early start of the First World War. Probably inspired by them, armies explored the possibility of providing more protection to their troops by experimenting and producing different body armours (figure 2).

Figure 1: Figure 2: WWI Body shield Mycenaen armour 1400 BC

Later on, after the Second World War, some new, lighter and efficient materials (Kevlar e.g.) were discovered and used for the production of personal protective equipment. 45

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Personal Protective Equipment

Due the malfunction of a large quantity of fired ammunition, bomb disposal became a formalized practice in the WWI (figure 3). Second World War brought more advanced ammunitions, including the bombs fitted with delayed-action fuzes. Disposing the bombs was one of the most dangerous mission. Even so, there was no specific personal Figure 3: 1918 German UXOs protective equipment (PPE) for the bomb disposal technicians developed or used those times (figure 4). Over the time, the IEDs became the weapon of choice for many terrorist groups in Europe and around the world. In parallel with the evolution of this specific threat, PPE for EOD operators evolved as well. Figure 4: Bomb disposal 1940 However, the biggest steps into the PPE development were made after the beginning of 21st century. The constant growing intensity of conflicts and terrorist attacks led to the evolution, a permanent adaptation and modernisation of the EOD tactics and procedures, to include specific tools and PPE.

If the bomb suits in the beginning were able to provide a very light protection against small metal fragments or shrapnel, without any protection for arms or legs (figure 5), during the years the bomb suits evolved (figure 6) to the nowadays very elaborated ones, offering enhanced protection for head, upper and lower limbs and for torso (figure 7). 46

Figure 5: NYPD Bomb Figure 6: New 8,000 Figure 7: Bomb Suit Squad 1972 suit in January 1987 and (nowadays the old protection gear [4]

The very constant issues of the evolution of PPE in time, including the bomb suit, is the weight and ergonomics. Despite the access to all new materials and techniques, EOD operators still have to deal with problem of heavy weight of equipment, limited mobility and reduced manoeuvrability, outside of tactical conditions, environmental and climate factors, which are negatively influencing as well. The risk of injury to the soldier is higher when carrying heavy loads, as they can also reduce a soldier’s agility, produce premature exhaustion, and increase the likelihood of injury. Most common injuries pertaining to load carriage generally affect the legs joints, the musculoskeletal system and the skin. Any of these can negatively influence soldier’s ability to perform their role on the battlefield. A few nations made studies and launched a program to find a solution to increase the capabilities of ground soldiers beyond that of a human. One of them is Exoskeletons for Human Performance Augmentation (EHPA). 47

Integration of the Exoskeleton in the Battlefield project

The NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) launched the project Integration of the Exoskeleton in the Battlefield (IEB) in 2017 as part of the Defense Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW). The DAT POW is a fast route to capability development and focuses on the most critical terrorist threats through three capability umbrellas: • Incident management, • Force protection and survivability (includes EOD and Consequence Management), • Network engagement. The IEB project was assigned to the NATO EOD COE to be developed in cooperation with the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA). This three-year project will also be beneficiary for other NATO organisation, the Land Capability Group on Dismounted Soldier Systems (LCG DSS). The main aim of this project is to help NATO and nations to understand the technological readiness of exoskeletons for EHPA capabilities, support the formulation of minimum military requirements in this area and refinement of operational concepts.

Exoskeleton systems Exoskeletons is referred to systems that expand or augment person’s physical abilities. They help a person lift or carry heavier loads, run faster, and jump higher. In the military, exoskeletons will help soldiers to fight better for extended time, since they can be better protected, carry more load or even having more strength while consuming a reduced amount of energy. The earliest exoskeleton-like device was developed in 1890 by a Russian named Nicholas Yagn (figure 8). Nicholas Yagn, of St. Petersburg, 48

designed a set of walking, jumping, and running assisted apparatus from 1889-1890. An earlier version used a giant bow spring. The final version used compressed gasbags to store the energy [5]. In 1917 Leslie C. Kelley, USA, invented and patented the Pedomotor (figure 9) that was steam powered. Individuals wore a steam device on their back and it helped them to run by pulling on artificial ligaments! The “Pedomotor” was designed to provide relief of muscles utilized during the running operation, and to increase the speed of the person [6].

Figure 8: Apparatus for facilitating Figure 9: Pedomotor by L.C. Kelley walking, running and jumping

The first experimentations to exploit exoskeleton also for the military purposes are dated to the middle of 20th century. A good example is so called Man Amplifiers (a powered-suit of armour) developed by Cornell Aeronautical Laboratories of Buffalo, New York as early as 1960 (figure 10). In 1961 the Laboratories received a grant to explore these ideas. In later work, Cornell determined that an exoskeleton, an external structure in the shape of human body, which has far fewer degrees of freedom than a human, could accomplish most desired tasks [7]. 49

Figure 10: Man-Amplifier concept

In the military field, the exoskeletons can be divided into the following categories based on their functions [8]: • Full Body Military Exoskeletons They are large, have too many actuators and are difficult to power and control. As a result, many later full body projects have been split in half into separate or modular lower body and upper body wearable robots (figure 11). Figure 11: Full Body Military Exoskeleton

• Lower Body Powered Military Exoskeletons Lower extremities exoskeletons provide assistance to the legs. If the wearable extends all the way down to the ground, it can also be used to transfer loads (figure 12). Figure 12: Lower Body Powered Military Exoskeleton • Passive Military Exoskeletons Do not have any actuators, batteries or electronics. These are able to transfer a percentage of the weight of a soldier’s heavy backpack directly into the ground (figure 13).

Figure 13: Passive Military Exoskeleton 50

• Energy Scavenging Military Exoskeletons The required energy is provided by the user. As the user is walking, the flexion and extension of the knee spins a motor which charges a capacitor that in turn, charges a battery Figure 14: Energy (figure 14). Scavenging Military Exoskeleton

• Stationary Military Exoskeletons Generally, it is an upper body exoskeleton. It is a wearable arm exoskeleton [9], which senses and cancels tremulous motion in the arm of the wearer during an aiming Figure 15: Stationary Military Exoskeleton and firing task (figure 15). MAXFAS

Project development This project focuses on organizing conferences and live demonstrations of EHPA technologies currently available in the market

Figure 16: IEB Project Roadmap 51

in order to update the technological baseline that needs to be considered in the development and maintenance of dismounted soldier capabilities and associated operational concepts, in particular for low level tactical operations to include counter-terrorism. Furthermore, Technology Readiness Level Report (TRLR) and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) are to be produced upon completion of the project (figure 16). The first workshop (WS) was organized on the premises of NATO EOD COE in Trencin, Slovakia in Nov 2017. The aim of the activity was to offer the opportunities to discuss issues related technologies on EHPA currently available in the market as well as on the latest achievements in this field. Various participants from military, academia and industry attended the activity.

The first IEB WS asw focused on the following main pillars: • Latest achievements in the field of EHPA (academia, scientists part) • EHPA technology readiness (industry part) • National operational / testing experience • Preliminary Planning Conference of live demonstration During the workshop, the Canadian Mawashi’s Ultralight Passive Ruggedized Integrated Soldier Exoskeleton (UPRISE™) (figure 17) and the Dutch Laevo exoskeleton were tested with EOD-9 bomb suit. It has been proved that this technology is able to support the EOD operation. It was also found that the Figure 17: Mawashi’ssolution, UPRISETM Mawashi exoskeleton could be used with 52

the bomb suit after minor adjustments. Main outcomes are fully detailed within the Book of Papers that was released after the 1st IEB WS. The first draft of initial minimum military requirements (MMR) for EOD was produced, becoming the foundation for later days’ talks on the military requirements for the concept of an EOD Exoskeleton.

The second IEB WS was organized in March 2018 at the Military Base Maj. Housiau Quartier Peutie, Vilvoorde, Belgium. The main objective of the 2nd IEBWS was to investigate how the exoskeleton technology, currently available on the market, may directly assist in the EOD operations and how it can support and enhance the EOD operator mobility, endurance, precision on target and increase the payload capacity.

It was organized as a three-day event composed of: • Workshop The first day was dedicated to the revision of initial MMR and experience exchange of SMEs and contribution to the development. • Trials Special trials were organized during the second day with the scientific support of NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine (MILMED COE). Scenarios were created in order to identify/measure how much the exoskeleton solutions met initial MMRs. EOD operators performed different IED disposal (IEDD) and conventional munition disposal (CMD) tasks, wearing the bomb suit (GARANT) supported by exoskeleton technology (UPRISE™). For comparison reason, the same personnel performed the same task without bomb suit combined with exoskeleton.

During the trials, a medical team from NATO MILMED COE monitored and measured the performer’s heart rate, body temperature and other statistics (figure 18). 53

Figure 18: Trials during 2nd IEB WS

Special session of the LCG DSS (DV Day) was held in the NATO HQ on the third day of the WS (figure 19).

Figure 19: Aspects from the LCGDSS Meeting

The 2nd IEBWS was an important step in demonstrating how the exoskeleton technology may support the EOD operators. Due to the limited amount of available exoskeleton technologies, the evaluation was conducted on passive exoskeleton category only. According to the interpretation of the data collected by the medical team, we may state that 54

during the two scenarios performed (CMD and IEDD), the physical stress for EOD operator was lower with the exoskeleton support.

Way ahead IEB project continues with the organization of another three workshops, one in 2018 in Prague, the Czech Republic (under the umbrella of the Future Forces Forum event) and the other 2 iterations during 2019, in Trencin, Slovakia (figure 19). More exoskeleton developers announced their participation for the next workshops. New trials and new tests will be run with the support of scientific community from Academia and industry. Brainstorming sessions and writing sessions will complete the activities in order to achieve the final goal, the production of a valuable CONOPS and a supportive TRLR for the benefit of NATO nations.

Conclusion Military exoskeletons are being developed by different countries, just to mention the USA, China, Canada, Great Britain or Russia. As the number of exoskeletons in use by industry is growing, so does the interest of NATO or nations. Military researches focus on the effective use of exoskeletons for combat and non-combat operations, primarily on optimized soldier performance, faster dismounted movement, reducing of energy expenditure and eliminating the musculoskeletal disorders. We may state that the exoskeleton technology will not only conduct soldiers into future, but will also help them accomplish the mission in a safer manner. As major steps are made every day by science, “Iron man” like suits might become reality in a very close time. For EOD operators, merging of exoskeleton with the bomb suit is seen as a natural step for the evolution of this specific protective equipment. 55

References [1] AJP-3.18, Allied Joint Doctrine for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support to Operations, Edition A Version 1, March 2017 [2] Statistics, table Fatalities by year and country, http://www.icasualties.org/ [3] IED Activity Report, Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center 2018, 31 December 2018 [4] David Middlecamp: Before 1987, the county bomb squad’s suit looked like a baseball catcher, The Tribune, September 01, 2017 [5] Yagin, Nicholas. “Apparatus for Facilitating Walking”. U.S. Patent 440,684 filed ebruaryF 11, 1890 and issued November 18, 1890. [6] Kelley, C. Leslie. “Pedomotor”. U.S. Patent 1,308,675 filed April 24, 1917 and issued July 1, 1919. [7] N. J. Mizen: Preliminary design for the shoulders and arms of a powered, exoskeletal structure, Cornell Aeronaut. Lab. Rep. V0-1692-V-4 (1965) [8] Bobby Marinov: 19 Military Exoskeletons into 5 Categories, Exoskeleton report.com, July 5, 2016. [9] Daniel M. Baechle: MAXFAS: A mobile arm exoskeleton for firearm aim stabilization, Spring 2013. 56 57

Developments in Bomb Suits Testing and Standardization

Dr. Aris MAKRIS, Ph.D. Med-Eng, Canada Vice-President, RD&E and Chief Technology Officer, Dr. Makris is VP of Research, Development & Engineering and Chief Technology Officer at Med-Eng. He holds Masters and Ph.D. degrees in Mechanical Engineering, specializing in explosions and protection against blast effects, with over 30 years of related experience. Dr. Makris has been an active member of several equipment performance standards, including the NIJ Bomb Suit standard, NATO & UN working groups and a member of the IABTI Advisory Board. The recently released NIJ 0117.01 bomb suit standard is an essential tool to ensure that bomb suits are properly evaluated and certified by an officially accredited standards organization which oversees comprehensive testing of the suit carried out in approved third party laboratories. The NIJ bomb suit standard outlines in detail a significant list of minimum performance and capability to be expected in a bomb suit along with associated testing methods. In addition to selecting a certified suit, end-users must also consider additional features, which may not be currently outlined within NIJ 0117.01. Further developments in standardized tests are being considered for blast overpressure mitigation, through ASTM. The end-user community, government authorities and industry must continue to improve the standard and test methods, as protective materials and other technologies advance, or threat conditions evolve. The introduction of standard performance requirements and test methods permits for bomb suits to be officially certified, providing a “seal of approval” that the particular product can be trusted to perform according to the standard. 58

Introduction Historically, bomb suit manufacturers relied on a number of performance standards inspired from adjacent technical fields, sometimes customized for EOD applications. Test methods were inconsistent between laboratories and many results could not be consistently reproduced, or trusted. On occasion, bomb suits suppliers made unsubstantiated claims of their product’s performance, or provided questionable test data from laboratories which may not have adhered strictly to approved test methods. End-users were not sufficiently qualified to evaluate the diverse test reports for suitability, adequacy, or accuracy. The release of the US NIJ 0117.01 standard for public safety bomb suits [1] in 2016 bridged this gap in standardized EOD PPE evaluation and is intended to provide objective evidence and confidence in performance of EOD suits, once they are officially certified by the accredited authority. NIJ certification can only be achieved through a third party NIJ-approved certification organization. This organization overviews the entire certification process, including initial and annual testing, as well as audits of the manufacturing facilities where the suits are built. This third-party overview instills confidence in performance claims for certified bomb suits. While a critical step forward for the EOD community, the NIJ 0117.01 remains a “minimum standard”, as its requirements do not address all the possible protection and functional requirements end- users may require. For instance, the current NIJ standard revision does not include quantitative blast overpressure reduction requirements, CBRN compatibility, personal cooling, communications, electromagnetic compliance, power, remote controls, lighting, etc. This paper emphasizes how the NIJ standard can help government agencies in the selection and procurement of EOD PPE, without needing wide ranging technical expertise to assess, evaluate and qualify a bomb suit from all engineering disciplines, i.e., protection against all blast threats, human factors, optics, field of view, electronics, manufacturing quality, labelling, etc. 59

The NIJ 0117.01 standard for Public Safety Bomb Suits In 2016, the US National Institute of Justice released the NIJ 0117.01 standard for public safety bomb suits, which covers a wide range of requirements of direct relevance to EOD threats and operations, such as: • V50 Fragmentation protection (inspired from MIL-STD-662 [2]): Pass/ fail requirements are based on three different fragment simulating projectiles (17, 44, 207-grain, Figure 1). The large 207-grain (13.4 grams) fragment permits reliable V50 rating determinations for highly protective areas of the suit. This eliminates the need for questionable V0 ratings, impossible to obtain based on STANAG 2920 [3], given the requirement to fire fragments at 1.5 times the estimated V0 velocity (no known laboratory can perform this). • Spine Protection: The NIJ standard includes a spine protector test methodology developed specifically for bomb suits with appropriate pass/fail thresholds, addressing the critical need for blunt impact protection when a technician is propelled by the force of a blast. • Head Impact Protection: The NIJ standard includes a very extensive helmet impact attenuation test (72 drop tower impacts on 9 different helmets, Figure 2) The impact energies and pass/fail thresholds are customized for EOD operations, recognizing the importance of head impact protection to mitigate the risk of traumatic brain injury. The tests are conducted at three temperatures (20°C, -10°C and +55°C), as EOD helmets must provide protection in all harsh environments bomb technicians are potentially exposed to. • Flame Resistance: The standard includes flame resistance tests for the suit outer shell materials and the helmet shell, based on ASTM D6413- 99. The pass/fail requirements are customized for EOD applications, ensuring protection against the fire threat from IEDs. • Blast Overpressure: The standard includes the qualitative evaluation of bomb suits against a 0.567 kg C4 charge at a standoff of 0.6 m, with a Hybrid III mannequin in a kneeling position (Figure 3). Many 60

qualitative requirements are included (protection to remain in place, no mannequin parts exposed after a blast, etc.) As the NIJ standard does not currently address quantitative blast overpressure protection requirements, ASTM Working Group WG22759 is currently defining a standardized test method for bomb suit quantitative overpressure evaluation, complementing the NIJ suit blast integrity test.

Figure 1: NIJ 0117.01 Fragment Simulating Figure 2: Helmet drop tower testing Projectiles (17, 44 and 207-grain). The large relevant to traumatic brain injury. 72 drops 207-grain one eliminates the need for V0 conducted at 3 temperatures tests

Figure 3: High speed video images of the NU 0117.01 blast overpressure test (0.567 kg C4 explosive, standoff 0.6 m - kneeling position). Two mannequins used for more data. 61

• Static and Dynamic Field of View (FOV): While the bomb suits’ primary objective is to protect from the main blast threats, EOD ensembles designs must also minimize hindrance to bomb disposal operations. As such, the NIJ standard includes stringent field of view requirements. The static field of view test (Figure 4) is conducted with a headform and a laser system, ensuring objective measurements with thresholds determined based on actual bomb technician requirements (e.g. downward field of view when manipulating devices, horizontal field of view for peripheral vision). The dynamic field of view tests (Figure 5) evaluate the appropriate integration of the helmet with the suit and protective plates. This test ensures that the visual field is not blocked by suit components, such as the collar or frontal plates. Visor optics and visor fogging evaluations are also included in NIJ 0117.01.

Figure 4: NIJ Static FOV apparatus - helmet Figure 5: NIJ Dynamic FOV test - Head and fitte on headform and tested at various Body motion with volunteer angles

The NIJ 0117.01 includes additional requirements related to ergonomics, the number of sizes, maximum weight, label legibility, etc. Certification to the NIJ standard thus provides a clear independent bomb suit model evaluation against test methods relevant to EOD. All tests are conducted only by NIJ approved test laboratories, thereby saving procurement agencies from having to rely on supplier credibility, or being forced to assess diverse test reports and data. 62

Beyond the NIJ Standard: Other relevant Requirements The NIJ 0117.01 for bomb suit being a “minimum” standard, procurement agencies must also take other requirements into account when selecting bomb suits. In addition to quantitative blast overpressure (discussed above), which should be based on sufficient data points and involve head acceleration, ear and chest overpressure, other suit features, not necessarily directly related to protection, should be mandated. For instance, bomb technicians need to communicate remotely in a safe manner. All electronics within the suit and helmet must meet highly stringent military standards for electromagnetic compliance (emissions and susceptibility), as opposed to the less stringent industrial standards. EOD ensembles must provide proper lighting to work in dark areas, and they must fit a wide range of body sizes and shapes (recommended 5th percentile female to 95th percentile male). In addition, there is a need for personal cooling or ventilation, when operating in harsh environments. Ergonomics must also be evaluated beyond the NIJ requirements, which only ensure basic functionality in simulated scenarios. Purchasing agencies must also ensure that bomb suit manufacturers provide long-lasting, high quality and reliable products, with strong customer support. The NIJ manufacturing facility audit plays an important role for this aspect. Other accreditations of the product, such as CE markings, RoHS compliance and some regional standards may also apply for bomb suits to be procured and used in certain countries.

Discussion The release of the NIJ 0117.01 standard for public safety bomb suits in 2016 empowered government agencies and EOD end-users to have confidence in the suitability of bomb suits they may select. Certified bomb suits according to the standard should meet all minimum relevant protection and performance requirements for EOD. Prior to the release of this standard, one had to rely on reports provided by manufacturers based on how they tested their products. Legacy test methods were not standardized and oftentimes not applicable to EOD scenarios. On occasion, some manufacturers often misrepresented the performance of 63

their suit or even manipulated the test data to make favorable performance claims. While NIJ 0117.01 addresses the main blast threats (overpressure, fragmentation, impact and heat), historical focus has been on overpressure and fragmentation, with minimal emphasis on impact, especially for the head. Field experience in recent conflicts has highlighted the need for helmet impact protection to mitigate the very common occurrence of traumatic brain injury (arising from either blast or direct impact). The NIJ 0117.01 standard mandates a stringent set of helmet testing to ensure that EOD helmets provide high impact protection. Purchasing agencies also have to take into account a number of other requirements beyond NIJ 0117.01, as the NIJ is a “minimum” standard, such as, quantitative blast overpressure, CBRN, electromagnetic compliance, personal cooling, communications, lighting, etc.

Conclusion Bomb suit certification to the NIJ 0117.01 standard is the only way to ensure fully independent, comprehensive and reliable testing/validation of bomb suit performance against the most relevant EOD threats, built as per documented manufacturing processes and audited independently on a regular basis by an officially appointed and accredited organization.

References [1] U.S. National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Public Safety Bomb Suit Standard, NIJ-0117.01, 2016 [2] V50 Ballistic Test for Armor, Department of Defense Test Standards MIL-STD-662F, Dec. 1997 [3] NATO Stanag 2920, Edition 2: Ballistic Test Method for Personal Armour Materials and Combat Clothing, July 31, 2003 64 65

Dual Sensor “ALIS” for Humanitarian Demining

Prof. Motoyuki SATO Tohoku University, Japan

Motoyuki Sato received the Dr. Eng. degree in information engineering from the Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan. Since 1997 he is a professor at Tohoku University. His has developed several types of Ground Penetrating radar systems for applications for archaeology and humanitarian demining. Dr. Sato has developed ALIS since 2002, and has deployed ALIS in mine affected courtiers including Cambodia and Croatia.

ALIS is a dual sensor, which combines EMI (Electromagnetic Induction) sensor and GPR (Ground Penetrating Radar), developed for humanitarian demining. This is a hand held sensor, equipped with a position tracking system. ALIS can acquire the EMI and GPR signal together with its position information, while it is scanned on the ground surface by an operator by hand manually. Therefore, the data can be processed using Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) processing (migration) and can reconstruct 3-D subsurface image of buried mines up to 50cm. By deploying the proto-type ALIS in Cambodia since 2009, we found that ALIS is capable for imaging buried mines, and can reduce the false alarm ratio drastically. We detected more than 80 buried land mines in Cambodia mine fields. The commercial type of ALIS, which is compact and weighs only 3.1kg will be deployed in Cambodia from October 2018. 66

Introduction In conventional humanitarian demining operation, landmine detection was carried out by EMI (Electromagnetic Induction) sensors (Metal detector). However, problem of detection of mines by EMI Sensor is large amount of metal debris which have to be removed together with land mines. In order to increase the efficiency of land mine detection, GPR (Ground Penetrating Radar) can be used. A combined sensor of EMI and GPR is called “Dual Sensor” in humanitarian demining. We have developed ALIS (Advanced Landmine Imaging System) dual sensor since 2002 and have deployed it in mine affected countries. In this paper, we introduce the technology used in ALIS and its achievements.

EMI and GPR for humanitarian demining EMI sensors, which is also called as a metal detector, has widely been employed in detection of buried landmines, UXO and explosive substances. EMI sensors can detect only electrical conducting material included in these explosive objects. In contrast, Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) can detect not only metallic objects, but also non-metallic objects. However, GPR is sensitive to even very small targets such as gravels and tree roots, and even inhomogeneous soil moisture. Therefore, if we use only GPR for detecting landmines, we will be confused by numerous images of subsurface material. Therefore the idea of Dual sensor is we use EMI sensor as a primary sensor, and then we use GPR as a secondary sensor for classifying the detected objects. Tohoku University has developed a dual sensor ALIS since 2002 [1]-[8]. The GPR system operates at 1-3 GHz and it can image more than 20cm deep, which is required from UN standards. The GPR data and EMI sensor acquired with the sensor position information are recorded on a PC and are processed simultaneously to visualize the data. One of the unique points of ALIS is that it can use Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) processing for GPR image reconstruction [2]. As far as we were concerned, there is no other dual sensors which can use SAR processing for obtaining GPR images for hand held GPR sensor, which can be used for landmine detection. It should be noted that SAR 67

processing is equivalent to migration processing used in GPR signal processing.

Evaluation test of ALIS The development of ALIS started in 2002, and the first prototype of ALIS was completed in 2004. We conducted field tests of ALIS operation in an evaluation test site prepared in Afghanistan in 2004 [4]. However, the initial test in Afghanistan has to be quitted, because of the unstable political situation, and we continued the test in Cambodia in 2006. Based on the field experiment, we developed the second-generation prototype ALIS, and it was tested in Croatia in 2006 and 2007 at the Test- site Benkovac of the Croatian Mine Action Centre - Centre for Testing, Development and Training (CROMAC-CTDT), as part of the wider joint co-operation project between Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) and CROMAC-CTDT. In 2008, in co-operation with CROMAC and CROMAC-CTDT, it was used as a verifying method of conventional QA/ QC (quality assurance/quality control) procedures that were carried out by QA/QC officers of CROMAC”[5]. We conducted the evaluation test of the prototype ALIS in Cambodia in 2009 together with CMAC (Cambodian Mine Action Centre). Then, CMAC gave the certificate to ALIS for operation for humanitarian demining, and decided to use the prototype of ALIS in mine clearance operation in mine fields. Tohoku University and CMAC agreed to organize a team for ALIS and 2 sets of the prototype ALIS systems have been used in mine fields since 2009. Since 2009, more than 254,867m2 mine area has been cleared, and more than 80mines have been detected by ALIS. Totally 15,621 metal fragments were detected, and demines have judged that 12,081 (77%) detected objects out of them are not mine. There was not case that mine was judged as a fragment. This means, if ALIS is used for mine clearance operation, more than 70 % of detected objects by metal detectors does 68

not have to be excavated as possible mines. We believe this will drastically shorten the time for excavation. ALIS Based on our experience of operation of prototype ALIS in mine affected countries including Croatia and Cambodia, the commercial type of ALIS was completed in 2017 as shown in Figure-1. ALIS is composed from a sensor unit and a remote control unit. The sensor unit includes EMI and GPR sensor head and its electronics and batteries, and the remote control unit is used for SAR processing and data display. Hardware was much developed from the proto-type ALIS system, other technical specifications of ALIS including EMI and GPR performance have not been charged from prototype ALIS. Therefore, we believe that the technical performance of the advanced ALIS has already been validated by ALIS prototype operations in mine fields. The system is powered by Ni-MH rechargeable battery, and works more than 6 hours. The size of the system is not much different from conventional EMI sensors (metal detectors) used for humanitarian demining. The total weight of the equipment including the battery is 3.1kg. Data acquisition starts by pushing a button on the sensor unit, and after finishing the data acquisition by pushing the button again, Synthetic Aperture signal processing automatically starts and the EMI signal and 3-D GPR reconstructed image will be displayed on the window of the remote control 69

unit in a few seconds. The operator can change the depth of the 3-D GPR image and can identify the buried mine and its depth. Semi-automatic landmine detection software will also be implemented for assistance of the mine recognition. We conducted the evaluation test at a test site of CMAC in February 2018. Figure-3 shows on example of the data. Figure-3(a) shows the EMI signal, superimposed with the trajectory of the antenna. The area of survey is 40cm by 40cm in this case. It will be typically around 50cm by 50cm, which a deminer can scan the sensor head without moving. Figure- 3(b)-(d) show GPR horizontal images (C-scan) at different depths. The deminer can change the depth of the C-scan image by sliding the display by a figure, then can judge the shape of the buried objects. After the data acquisition, signal processing takes only a few seconds, and the deminer can judge the images immediately after the scanning.

a) EMI sensor signal b) GPR (ground Surface O cm depth)

c) GPR (8.0 cm depth) d) GPR (11.2 depth cm)

Fig 3: EMI and GPR signal image on the display of ALIS. Type-72 mine buried at 10 cm in sand. 70

The scanning operation of the ALIS antenna is not much different from the conventional EMI sensors. Therefore we believe the introduction of ALIS is easy for deminers who have experience on EMI sensor operation.

Conclusion We described the development of ALIS, which is a dual sensor for humanitarian demining in this paper. ALIS technology has been established based on the evaluation test of operation in real mine fields in Cambodia. 3-D GPR reconstructed image can be shown on the display by Synthetic Aperture Radar processing on the remote control unit, and operators can “see” the shape of the buried mines. We believe ALIS will drastically improve the efficiency of identification of buried mines. ALIS deployment will be started in October 2018, together with CMAC in Cambodia

Acknowledgment This work was supported by the JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A) 26249058.

References

[1] M.Sato, “Evaluation test of ALIS in Cambodia for humanitarian demining,” Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering 7664 · April, 2010. [2] X. Feng, J.Fujiwara, Z. Zhou, T. Kobayashi and M. Sato, “Imaging algorithm of a Hand-held GPR MD sensor (ALIS),” Proc. SPIE 5794, 1192-1199, 2005. [3] M. Sato, J. Fujiwara, X. Feng, Z. Zhou and T. Kobayashi,” Development of a hand-held GPR MD sensor system (ALIS),” Proc. SPIE .5794, 1000-1007, 2005. 71

[4] M. Sato, “Dual Sensor ALIS Evaluation Test in Afghanistan, “IEEE Geoscience and Remote Sensing Society Newsletter, 22-27, 2005. [5] M. Sato, “ALIS evaluation tests in Croatia,” Proc. SPIE.7303, 73031B-173031B-12, 2009. [6] M. Sato, J. Fujiwara and K. Takahashi, “The Development of the Hand Held Dual Sensor ALIS,” Proc. SPIE, 6553, 65531C-1-65531C-10, 2007. [7] M. Sato and K. Takahashi, “The Evaluation Test of Hand Held Sensor ALIS in Croatia and Cambodia, “Proc. SPIE, 6553, 65531D-1- 65531D-9, 2007. [8] M. Sato and K.Takahashi, “Development of the hand held dual sensor ALIS and its evaluation,” Proc. 4th International Workshop on Advanced Ground Penetrating Radar. Pp.3-7, 2007. [9] Riafeni Karlina and Motoyuki Sato, “Model-Based Compressive Sensing Applied to Landmine Detection by GPR,” IEICE Transactions on Electronics, E99-C(1), pp44-51, 2016. 72 73

The Understanding of Military Engineering within NATO

LTC Wolfgang BAYER Concepts and Doctrine Branch MILENG Centre of Excellence, Germany

LTC Wolfgang Bayer is serving as the Senior Officer Concepts and Doctrine at the Military Engineering Centre of Excellence, Policy, Concepts and Doctrine Branch in Ingolstadt, Germany

MILENG has a holistic approach to combine all capabilities and capacities which are essential and are required to shape the physical operating environment in support of operations. It is quite more than a limited view on national Corps of Engineers, EOD or Ordnance Corps. EOD is an equal, essential, ability and power to the MILENG function. 74

The Military Committee MC 0560/2 POLICY FOR MILITARY ENGINEERING (as of 6 September 2017) determines the definition of Military Engineering as a function in support of operations to shape the physical operating environment. MILENG is an inherent aspect of each joint function; at all levels of command, in any mission, campaign or operation, and in all phases. It achieves the desired objectives by enabling or preventing manoeuvre or mobility; developing, maintaining, and improving infrastructure. MILENG incorporates areas of expertise such as • Engineering, • Explosives Ordnance Disposal, • Environmental Protection, • Military search and • Management of infrastructure, including contracted civil engineering. MILENG also makes a significant contribution to • Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED), • Protecting the force; and • Providing life support.

MILENG as a function is coordinated by a senior military engineering advisor and their military engineering staff. • The military engineering advisor, supported by their staff, is the principal advisor to the commander and the HQ staff for all aspects of MILENG function, • They are the coordinating and technical authority over MILENG resources. 75

• They provide clear priorities for generally insufficient MILENG resources to meet the commander’s requirements. EOD is an important part of the Military Engineering Staff which must establish the Combined Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Cell (CJEODC), responsible for coordinating all EOD matters with troop contributing nations, within the JOA, between the component commands and theatre troops, HN and other organizations. The MILENG staff (including the CJEODC) has no tasking authority for any EOD assets, unless these are designated theatre assets. MILENG has a holistic approach to combine all capabilities and capacities which are essential and are required to shape the physical operating environment in support of operations. It is quite more than a limited view on national Corps of Engineers, EOD or Ordnance Corps. EOD is an equal, essential, ability and power to the MILENG function.

76 77

Strategic Insight to Route Clearance: Efforts by MILENG COE

LTC Serdar GENC MILENG Centre of Excellence, Germany

He has been working as Cell Chief Movement and Manoevre at NATO MILENG COE since October 2016. He studied his Bachelor’s Degree on Industrial & Systems Engineering in Turkish Military Academy between 1995 and 1999, completed his MA on `Manpower and System Analysis` in Naval Postgraduate School, CA in 2008 and finished Ph.D. in `Management and Organization` recently.. He served as both Platoon and Company Commander in different combat military engineering units & missions for over 7 years. Also served as Area Chief Engineer Officer in Lebanon between 2013 and 2014. Over his career as Military Engineer officer he specifically gained experience on mine clearance activities.

Increasing importance of RC in last 10 years and requirements to raise the capacity resulted with several attempts to assess RC comprehensively. The scope of this article is to identify the strategical perspectives on route clearance and give some insights on current/future activities specifically from MILENG COE perspective. Three sections of this article include information on `Doctrinal Work`, `RC Project development` and `Support to NATO STO activities` coordinated and conducted by MILENG COE. 78

Although initially considered as a sub-task either to mine clearance or breaching, evolution of warfare caused the concept of route clearance to be addressed separately over time. It has been generally stated that the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan was an effective factor in the emergence of RC concept (US Army TRADOC, 2003). Counter-insurgency operations in conflict regions required the provision of safety movements of troops to the area of operations, thus the need for the route clearance activities have increased steadily. Assessing route clearance solely as part of counter-insurgency operations might not be appropriate due to changing threat environments. Nowadays, as the concept of hybrid warfare is often pronounced (NATO ACT, 2017), the ability of quick and easy adaptation of explosive systems to impede the mobility of friendly forces is more likely than before. On the other hand, as remotely controllable land and air systems gain popularity, threat direction has recently shifted from land to air dimension of battlefield (Zsiros, 2012). These recent changes in operational environment indicates that there is still a need for continued improvement in the development of detection and protective capabilities for route clearance (Pennisi, 2013). Increasing importance of RC in last 10 years and requirements to raise the capacity resulted with several attempts to evaluate the subject more comprehensively. The scope of this article is to identify the strategical perspectives on route clearance and give some insight on current/future activities specifically from MILENG COE perspective. Following sections give information on three subjects which are `Doctrinal Work`, `RC Project Development` and `Support to NATO STO Activities`.

Doctrinal Work The doctrine define RC as `The detection and if found, the confirmation, the identification, marking and neutralization, destruction or removal of explosive ordnance (EO) and non-explosive obstacles 79

threatening a defined route to allow a military operation to continue with reduced risk.` This definition does not limit the scope of work to explosive obstacles, but also extend it to non-explosive obstacles. This is due to a proposal during one of the recent MILENG WG meetings which is still in process in respective terminology office. The proposed definition is expected to be in use in coming year. Though the essential work is currently concentrated only on explosive obstacles, by the implementation of new definition non-explosive obstacles are expected to be considered during planning and execution of RC operations. Conceptual background on Route Clearance (RC) operations in NATO is identified in STANAG 2625. As it is basically serves solely for cover purpose, aspects on theoretical and practical perspectives are mentioned in ATP-3.12.1.3 doctrine. Both cover and the doctrine was promulgated in March 2016 and are still in force. The doctrine which has been the primary outcome of `RC Project` includes four chapters. While fundamentals, principles, functions, elements are described in the first three chapters, planning and execution considerations are mentioned in the last one (NSO ATP-3.12.1.3, 2016). ATP-3.12.1.3 is not the sole publication which addresses route clearance. AJP-3.12 , ATP-3.12.1.1 and AJP-3.15 are the other related doctrines including RC either in a section or sub-section. While describing MILENG tasks, AJP-3.12 discusses Route/Area Clearance as one of the core tasks conducted during `Support to Mobility` mission. ATP-3.12.1.1 discusses the practical application of Route Clearance capabilities. It provides Route Clearance principles and some standards at the tactical level. RC is also mentioned in couple paragraphs in AJP-3.15 within `Engineer Support to C-IED` section. Though periodic revision process is every five year for ATPs, an early revision on the document was proposed and planned at 16th MILENG WG. The intention of the revision proposal was to make it more support to mobility focused as well as adding area clearance as an additional topic. As being the custodian MILENG COE initiated modification proposal to respective NSO body recently. 80

RC Project Development Recently MILENG COE has initiated a new project called `Web Based RC E-Learning Package`. This is due to the need of widening the content of old `Mobility staff Awareness Course` training CD-ROM as well as revising it with updated information. The necessity for this project stems from the fact that Route Clearance has been one of the priorities of NATO for almost two decades yet the number of studies reflecting all technical, tactical and strategical aspects have been limited so far. All aspects of RC are interrelated and needs to be concentrated together. Concentrating on only one aspect might lead to miss the others resulting with seeing half of the picture. Objective of this project is to share knowledge, increase the level of situational awareness and help to train member states personnel effectively. Primary aim of this project is to support both tactical and strategical level SMEs with updated information on the issue and create situational awareness for others, such as academicians and industry specialists for upcoming trends. Secondly, it aims to provide a platform for continuous update on RC related topics. This is substantially important since technological improvements are constant on countering IEDs and a continuous platform is always needed to follow trends periodically. The project is designed to help three target groups. First one is the military specialists who are and will be serving in RC missions on either tactical or strategical level now and then. While tactical level covers duties & responsibilities on field missions in general, strategic ones are mostly related to NATO or national business. Second target group includes researchers in academic and government institutions who dedicate their time and energy to look for alternative ways to create new solutions to the threat by simply employing different techniques for the constantly changing environment. Third group consists of the people working in MILENG industry. These people are the main actors helping both military and academic specialists to turn their dreams into the reality. The more they understand and 81

identify the current problems to improve future requirements the more improved solutions we expect to see in the future. Until now it has been achieved to transfer the old CD-ROM package to NATO Distance learning portal (NATO JADL), make content analysis on it, create new content for upcoming version and combine all in a revision booklet called “Route & Area Capabilities within NATO”. Content of the e-learning package is expected to include the topics in Table-1. As the project is over, e-learning package Figure 1: Route and Area Clearance will be accessible from online resources Capabilities within NATO for both NATO and UN personnel as this project is supported also by United Nations.

S.Nu. Topic 1 Threat Analysis 2 Route/Area Clearance in NATO Publications 3 Research Activities on RC 4 Technical Aspects of an IED System 5 Detection Technologies 6 Current RC Capabilities 7 RC Tactics, Techniques and Capabilities 8 Operational Planning 9 Evaluation Exercise 10 Future Vision

Table 1: Expected Content of RC E-Learning Package 82

NATO STO Activities For almost over 10 years several research task groups (TG) have been formed to search and improve RC capabilities within NATO in support of NATO Science and Technology Organization. While some TGs lasted 2, others extended their work up to 4 years by including indoor and outdoor tests and experiments as well. Considering the final reports of different RC focused TGs, it can be concluded that a big pile of knowledge on detection and neutralization techniques have been accumulated until now. Continuation of the threat keep the topic alive and encourage scientists to propose research on different aspects of the subject. As being the custodian of RC Doctrine, MILENG COE are not only involved in doctrine revision or project development but also to scientific work to find solutions for current and possible future problems. MILENG COE supports the TGs by providing military expertise, identifying future requirements, generating scenarios or making threat analysis. TG activities also provide benefits to our work for RC doctrine revision or matching tactical requirements and technical capabilities and/or increasing knowledge capacity, thus it is mutually beneficial.

Summary As being the only full time body dedicated to NATO Engineering, MILENG COE has contributed a lot for the improvement of RC capability and capacity. Efforts started with RC Project in 2010 and continued with ATP publication and online training material both for NATO and UN troops. The goal of MILENG COE is not to settle with the existing, but help to develop NATO capacity as much as possible with changing technology. Not only for now but for the future the aim will always keep the same as to concentrate efforts to increase the capacity and interoperability of NATO troops. 83

R eferences (1) JM Wightman, SL Gladish, Explosions and Blast Injuries, Annals of Emergency Medicine, 37:6, pp. 664-678, 2001

[1] NATO ATP-3.12.1.1. (2015). Allied Tactical Doctrine for Military Search. Brussels: NATO Standardization Office (NSO). [2] NSO AJP 3-15. (2018). Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices. Brussels: NATO NSO. [3] NSO AJP-3.12. (2014). Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineering. Brussels: NATO NSO. [4] NSO ATP-3.12.1.3. (2016). Allied Tactical Doctrine for Route Clearance. Brussels: NSO. [5] Pennisi, M. (2013). Future Route Clearance Capability Development. National Joint C-IED Center of Excellence. Rome. [6] US Army TRADOC. (2003). Route Clearance Tactics, Technics and Procedures (03-31). Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned. [7] Zsiros, S. (2012). Current and Future Detection Technologies. Counter- IED Report(Autumn), 28-30. 84 85

Military Search Developments

MAJ Soren SCHWARTZ-PETERSEN MILENG Centre of Excellence, Germany

MAJ Soren SCHWARTZ-PETERSEN

is serving as a staff officer at the Mobility and Counter-Mobility section at the Military Engineering Centre of Excellence, Policy, Concepts and Doctrine Branch in Ingolstadt, Germany.

To describe the wider Military Search contribution and its role to future operations, we look to possible future conflicts. In foreseen future operations it is highly likely that NATO will face a combination of state and none state actors, thus constituting a hybrid threat. Some of these actors will likely also act in asymmetric manner to negate the advantages possessed by the alliance. The continuing development of the Military Search capability will only enhance its contribution to operations. Also an increased understanding of the offensive aspects of Military Search could lead to better intelligence and potentially targeting. 86

Introduction Most individuals in the armed forces think of Military Search as an image of mine detector equipped personnel trying to detect improvised explosive ordnance in Afghanistan or Iraq comes to mind. This is a symptom of how Military Search has become linked to out of area operations and specifically to countering improvised explosive devices. To describe the wider Military Search contribution and its role to future operations, we look to possible future conflicts. In foreseen future operations it is highly likely that NATO will face a combination of state and none state actors, thus constituting a hybrid threat. Some of these actors will likely also act in asymmetric manner to negate the advantages possessed by the alliance. An adversary choosing this approach may be difficult to identify and its resources may be hidden. The future conflict will increasingly take place in urban areas. This includes super surface and sub surface areas. Sub surface operations will also increase as the adversary will use these areas to avoid detection and targeting. The combination of the asymmetric threat with a more complex operating environment will make it increasingly difficult to identify and target the non-conventional adversaries. The Military Search contribution to these challenges is best described using the two objectives of search. These are Defensive and Offensive Search. The objectives are linked to the purpose of the search, not whether or not the search activity is linked to offensive or defensive operations. Defensive Search is reactive in nature and covers Force Protection, Protection of Pre-planned events and Protection of Infrastructure. This aspect of Military Search seems quite well understood in most staffs and headquarters, as this has been the main employment of Military Search in operations. This relates especially to the “Defeat the Device” pillar of the C-IED approach and the contribution to Route Clearance. Another aspect is how Military Search can contribute to mobility and force protection in urban and sub terrane environments. These environments include inherent threats and threats emplaced by an adversary. Military Search has developed tactics, techniques and procedures 87

for operating in these environments. These enable Military Search units to provide intimate support to units operating in these environments. The objectives of defensive search will still be valid in future conflicts as there is still a high likelihood of asymmetric threats being present in rear areas. Defensive search activities will assist to mitigate these threats. Offensive Search is characterised as being done to seize the initiative in order to deny resources and opportunity or to secure material for exploitation. The gathering of material is used to feed the intelligence cycle and for exploitation and can be seen as especially relevant in scenarios where an adversary or parts of an adversary is hidden. The material gathered may help identify the adversary which could feed in to the targeting process. Furthermore the denial of resources could deny the adversary the means to mount actions. Offensive Search may be less well understood than Defensive Search as Military Search is widely associated with the latter as the objective. Even though Military Search is primarily an activity that takes place in the land domain, there are links to the maritime domain. Specifically to the boarding of vessels. This link is not described sufficiently in either doctrine and needs to be explored, especially as the littoral environment becomes more and more important. The continuing development of the Military Search capability will only enhance its contribution to operations. Also an increased understanding of the offensive aspects of Military Search could lead to better intelligence and potentially targeting.

References [1] Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (ATP-3.2), 15 Mar 2016 and Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP-3.01) 28 Feb 2017 88 89

Table of Acronyms

AI artificial intelligence ALIS Advanced Landmine Imaging System ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials ATP Allied Technical Publication AJP Allied Joint Publication CBRN chemical. biological, radiological and nuclear CE (marking) Conformité Européenne (European Confirmity) C-IED counter-improvised explosive device CJEODC Combined Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Cell CMAC Cambodian Mine Action Centre CMD conventional munition disposal COE Centre of Excellence COI Community of Interest CONOPS Concept of Operations CROMAC-CTDT Croatian Mine Action Centre-Centre for Testing and Training DAT POW Defence against Terrorism Programme of Work ECM electronic countermeasures EHPA Exoskeletons fro Human Performance Augmentation EMI electromagnetic induction EO explosive ordnance EOC explosive ordnance clearance EOD explosive ordnance disposal EOR explosive ordnance reconnaissance 90

ESCD Emerging Security Challenges Division (NATO) FM frequency management FP Force protection GPR gorund penetrating radar HME home-made explosive IED improvised explosive device IEDD improvised explosive device disposal JST Japan Science and Technology Agency LCG DSS Land Capability Group on Dismounted Soldier Systems MILMED COE Military Medicine Centre of Excellence MMR minimum military requirements NIJ National Institute of Justice (Department of Justice, USA) NCIA NATO Communication and Information Agency PPE personal protective equipment QA/QC quality assuarance/quality control RC route clearance RoHS Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment RSP Render Safe Procedure SME Subject Matter Expert STANAG (NATO) Standartization Agreement STO (NATO) Science and Technology Organization TRLR Technology Readiness Level Report TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures UXO unexploded ordnance WWI World War 1 Annex 1 Multidisciplinary Approach to EOD in the Light of NATO EOD D&T 2018

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