Finalizing the Meaning of Autonomist and Consequentialist Jeffrey Hopkins

Finalizing the Meaning of Autonomist and Consequentialist Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 6

Jeffrey Hopkins

Dual language edition by Craig Preston

UMA INSTITUTE FOR TIBETAN STUDIES

Finalizing the Meaning of Autonomist and Consequentialist

Website for UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies (Union of the Modern and the Ancient: gsar rnying zung `jug khang): uma- tibet.org. UMA stands for “Union of the Modern and the Ancient” and means “Middle Way” in Tibetan. UMA is a non-profit 501(c)3 organization.

Finalizing the Meaning of Autonomist and Consequentialist Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight and the Four Annotations: Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 6

Jeffrey Hopkins

Dual language edition by Craig Preston

UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies uma-tibet.org UMA Great Books Translation Project Expanding Wisdom and Compassion through Study and Contemplation Supported by generous grants from the Pierre and Pamela Omidyar Fund the Silicon Valley Community Foundation and a bequest from Daniel E. Perdue Translating texts from the heritage of Tibetan and Inner Asian Bud- dhist systems, the project focuses on Great Indian Books and Ti- betan commentaries from the Go-mang College syllabus as well as a related theme on the fundamental innate mind of clear light in Tantric traditions. A feature of the Project is the usage of consistent vocabulary and format throughout the translations. Publications are available online without cost under a Creative Commons License with the understanding that downloaded material must be distributed for free: http://uma-tibet.org. UMA stands for Union of the Modern and the Ancient (gsar rnying zung ’jug khang). The UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies is a non-profit 501(c)3 organization. Mailing address: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies 4109 SE Howe St. Milwaukie, Oregon 97222 USA Version: ISBN: Library of Congress Control Number: Hopkins, Jeffrey. Finalizing the meaning of autonomist and consequentialist: tsong-kha-pa’s great exposition of special insight and the four annotations: compatibly appearing subjects, 6 / by Jeffrey Hopkins. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN: 1. Tsoṅ-kha-pa blo-bzaṅ-grags-pa, 1357-1419; Lam rim chen mo: lhag mthong chen mo. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1722; mchan ’grel gser kyi ’khor lo. Bra sti/pra sti dge bshes rin chen don grub, 17-18th century. 2. Dge-lugs-pa (Sect)-- Doctrines. 3. Lam rim chen mo: lhag mthong chen mo: chos can mthun snang ba. 4. Wisdom—Religious aspects--Buddhism. I. Lo-sang-gyal-tshan, 1966- II. Title. Contents

Preface 7 The author: Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa 7 The text: The Great Exposition of Special Insight 15 Editions consulted 21

Part One: Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight: Compatibly Appearing Subjects with Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s Annotations 23 2' Indicating that due to this previously expressed fallacy [with regard to the subject] the reason also is not established {2 parts} 25 B) How those fallacies are not the same for us {6 parts} 44

Part Two: Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight: Compatibly Appearing Subjects 89 2) Indicating that due to this fallacy [with regard to the subject] the reason also is not established 91 b. How those are not the same for us 102 Abbreviations 127 Bibliography 128 1. Sanskrit and Tibetan Works 128 2. Other Works 146

Preface

THE AUTHOR: TSONG-KHA-PA LO-SANG-DRAG-PA The Ge-lug-pa order of Tibetan Buddhism was founded by the yogi- scholar Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-paa (1357-1419), the fourth in a fam- ily of six sons in the Tsong-ka region of the northeastern province of Tibet called Am-do.b He took layperson’s vows at the age of three from the Fourth Karma-pa Röl-pay-dor-jec and novice monastic vows at seven. He studied and practiced in Am-do until age sixteen, when he left for central Tibet, never to return to Am-do. There, Chö-je Don-drub-rin-chend a d - vised him to study the Five Great Books of Indian Buddhism, which became the basic curriculum of sūtra study in the monasteries that Tsong- kha-pa and his followers established. From childhood, his study and practice were interlaced with tantra, and thus it is only a misimpression outside of Tibetan, Mongolian, and Chinese circles that he was not deeply in- volved with tantrism. He studied a great deal with masters of the Ka-gyue and Sa-kyaf orders. As Stephen Batchelor says in The Tibet Guide: g Tsongkhapa was born in 1357 in Amdo, the northeastern province of Tibet. During the time of the Third Dalai Lama his birthplace was marked by the erection of the Kumbum Jampa Ling Monas- tery near Xining. While still very young he was recognized as possessing unusual spiritual qualities and as a young man was sent to Central Tibet to further his understanding of Buddhism in the more cultured region of the country. The first monastery he visited was that of Drigung, where he studied medicine and the doctrines of the Kagyu lineage. From here he proceeded to Netang, Samye, a tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa. b a mdo. c karma pa rol pa’i rdo rje (1340-1383). d chos rje rin chen don grub. e bka’ brgyud. f sa skya. g Stephen Batchelor, The Tibet Guide: Central and Western Tibet (Boston: Wisdom, 1998), 129-131. For a short biography, see Geshe Ngawang Dhargey, “A Short Biog- raphy,” in Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa, ed. Robert A. F. Thurman, trans. mainly by Khamlung Tulku (Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1982), 4-39. For an inspired and inspiring account, see Robert A. F. Thurman, Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 65-89. 8 Preface

Zhalu, and Sakya monasteries. He met his main teacher Rendawa at Tsechen Monastery just outside Gyantse. For many years he studied the full range of Buddhist philosophy, including the more esoteric tantric systems. He then retreated to Olka, north of the Brahmaputra downstream from Tsetang, and spent the next four years in intense retreat. Upon returning to society he found himself much in demand as a teacher. One place where he taught was the hill in Lhasa on which the Potala was eventually built. To- gether with Rendawa he stayed for some time at Reting, where he composed his most famous work, The Great Exposition of the Stages on the Path to Enlightenment. After another meditation and writing retreat at Chöding Hermitage (above where Sera monastery now is), he founded, in 1409, the famous annual Mönlam (prayer) festival in Lhasa, which, after a twenty-five-year hiatus, was reinaugurated in 1986. (In the political unrest that followed the demonstrations of 1987 and 1988, it was canceled in 1989 and by 1994 had not been resumed.) After the prayer festival Tsongkhapa decided to found his own monastery. He selected Mt. Drokri, a mountain upstream from Lhasa, and called the monastery “Ganden,” Tibetan for “Tushita,” the pure land where the future Buddha Maitreya resides. Within a year seventy buildings had been completed, but it was not until 1417 that the main hall of the monastery was consecrated. Tsongkhapa died at Ganden two years later, in 1419, and shortly before his death passed the mantle of succession to Gyelt- sab Je, one of his two chief disciples. Gyeltsab Je held the position of Ganden Tripa (Throne Holder of Ganden) until his own death twelve years later, when it passed to Tsongkhapa’s other chief dis- ciple Khedrup Je. The post of Ganden Tripa was later given to the senior Dharma Master of one of the two main Ganden Colleges, Jangtse and Shartse. It was a five-year post for which to qualify one must first have obtained a geshe degree with highest honors (lharampa), proceeded to the abbotship of one of the two Lhasa tantric colleges, and from there been appointed Dharma Master of either Jangtse or Shartse college. The tradition has been continued in India. It is the Ganden Tripa, not the Dalai Lama, who heads the Gelukpa order. During his lifetime Tsongkhapa was regarded as a remarkable spiritual figure whose genius and saintliness held him above the sectarian differences of his times. Although greatly inspired by the example of Atisha, to the point of attributing authorship of his own Preface 9

major written work to him, and by the spirit of the Kadampa tradition, Tsongkhapa nonetheless studied widely with representa- tives of all the major orders in Tibet and assimilated their lineages. It is uncertain whether he intended to form his own order, though he must have realized it was liable to happen. He could not have foreseen, though, the dimensions this order (the Gelukpa) would eventually assume and the political power it would wield. Over the following centuries Ganden Monastery grew to the size of a small township, delicately perched along the high shel- tered slopes of the mountain. By 1959 this calm, secluded center of learning and contemplation housed more than five thousand monks, but with the Chinese occupation the monks were forced to scatter, and by the mid-sixties the monastery was nearly deserted. The final blow came with the cultural revolution. Coerced by the Chinese and caught up in the frenzy and terror of the times, the local Tibetans demolished the buildings. For many years only jag- ged ruins remained. The greater religious freedom permitted after the death of Mao allowed the laborious and gradual reconstruction of the monastery to begin. One by one the buildings emerged from out of the rubble and monks trickled back to their former home. Yet, perhaps because of its symbolic power as the stronghold of the previous spiritual rule as well as its distance from the capital, Ganden has been rebuilt largely through private funds and has received scant support from the government. Four hundred monks are officially allowed to live here now, although there are around six hundred actually in residence. It strikes me that the construction of seventy buildings in one year and Tsong-kha-pa’s later instruction to two students to build other monastic universities in the Lhasa Valley—Dre-punga coming to have 2,000 monastic residents one year after commencement of constructionb—suggest that he did indeed intend to form a new order. In any case, the writings of his immediate followers, such as Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen,c Khay-drub

a ’bras spungs. b Stephen Batchelor, The Tibet Guide (London: Wisdom, 1987), 145. c rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432.

10 Preface

Ge-leg-pal-sang, a and the latter’s brother Ba-so-chö-kyi-gyal-tshan, b clearly indicate the raising of Tsong-kha-pa to the status of saint and founder of a new religious order. His followers eventually came to have great influence throughout a vast region stretching from Kalmuck Mongolian areas, where the Vo l g a empties into the Caspian Sea (in Europe), to Outer and Inner Mongolia, and the Buryat Republic of Siberia, as well as to most parts of Tibet and Ladakh. Tsong-kha-pa established a system of education centered in large monastic universities—eventually in three areas of Tibet which became some of the prime centers of religious education. The form Buddhism took in Tibet was greatly influenced by the highly developed form of the religion present in India through the twelfth century and even later; the geographic proximity and perhaps relatively undevel- oped culture of the region provided conditions for extensive, systematic transfer of highly developed scholastic commentaries and systems of practice. Unlike many of its East Asian counterparts, Tibetan Buddhism is centered not on Buddha’s word as found in sūtras and tantras but on Indian commentaries, many of which never made their way to East Asia. Scho- lasticism, therefore, often (but not always) occupies a more central place in aspects of Tibetan culture than it does farther east. These Ge-lug-pa colleges came to share a curriculum that is based on Five Great Books of Buddhist Indiac —a program of study that begins around age eighteen and lasts for about twenty-five years—but they use different textbooks that are commentaries on those Great Books. To pre- pare students for study of these texts, the curriculum begins with a class on introductory debate that serves to establish the procedure of outwardly combative but inwardly probing analysis used throughout the course of study. The debate format is at once individualistic, in the aim to win one- on-one debates, and group-stimulated, in the sense that information and a mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, 1385-1438, born in the western province of Tibet, gtsang, in ldog gzhung; see José Ignacio Cabezón, A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotated Translation of the stong thun chen mo of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), 14. b ba so chos kyi rgyal mtshan, born 1402. c In his condensation of Tsong-kha-pa’s biography, Geshe Ngawang Dhargey (“A Short Biography,” 9, 11) speaks of the Five Great Books as if the category with this name predates Tsong-kha-pa; this is possible, although it necessary to pursue whether Geshe Ngawang Dhargey is overlaying a system of education that developed based on Tsong- kha-pa’s advice or a system that his successors founded. For a list of the seventeen texts that Tsong-kha-pa taught in a three-month teaching, see Geshe Ngawang Dhargey, “A Short Biography,” 13-14.

Preface 11 positions are acquired from fellow debaters in an ongoing network of com- munication and shared appreciation of insight. As further preliminaries, the classes study Awareness and Knowledge,a which is basic psychology, and Signs and Reasonings,b which is basic reasoning. Then begins the first of the Five Great Books: the coming Buddha Maitreya’s Ornament for the Clear Realizations,c a rendering of the hidden teaching on the path structure in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, which, according to the tradition, were spoken by the Buddha of this age, Shākyamuni. In the standard Ge- lug-pa educational curriculum, six years are spent studying Maitreya’s Or- nament for the Clear Realizations—a highly elaborate compendium on the paths that is not practiced in Tibet in its own form; rather, the long period of study is used to enrich understanding of a complex structure of spiritual development that provides an all-encompassing worldview daunting in its intricacy. Though the structure of the path, as it is presented in this text, does not provide the rubric of contemporary practice, much of its import is brought over to “stages of the path” literature, the practical implemen- tation of which is certified by the great number of short texts in this genre aimed at daily meditation. The more complex system is dauntingly elaborate, such that it provides a perimeter within which the more practical teachings can be implemented. Classes on Maitreya’s text (and the others) meet with a teacher for about two hours daily and then for two sessions of debates, each about two hours. Every year throughout the twenty-five-year program, time is taken out for pursuit of the second of the Great Books, Dharmakīrti’s Commen- tary on Valid Cognitiond—largely, though not only, epistemological and logical studies. Having settled the path structure through the study of Maitreya’s Or- nament for the Clear Realizations, the class passes on to the third Great

a Translation of a typical text with commentary can be found in Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper, Mind in Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider, 1980; Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1986). b Translation of a typical text with commentary can be found in Katherine Rogers, A Tibetan Manual of Logic: An Introduction to Reasoning in the Ge-lug-pa Monastic Edu- cational System, (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1993). c mngon rtogs rgyan, abhisamayālaṃkāra; Peking 5184, vol. 88. A notable exception is the curriculum at the monastery of the Paṇ-chen Lama, Tra-shi-lhun-po Monastic Uni- versity (bkra shis lhun po), where Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika is the topic of this initial long period of study. d tshad ma rnam ’grel, pramāṇavarttika; Peking 5709, vol. 130.

12 Preface

Book, Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Mid- dle,” a to explore for two years the emptiness of inherent existence. Emp- tiness is the primary content of path consciousnesses and is the explicit

a dbu ma la ’jug pa, madhyamakāvatāra; Peking 5261, Peking 5262, vol. 98. Since Chandrakīrti often refers to Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle (dbu ma’i bstan bcos, madhyamakaśāstra) merely by the appellation madhyamaka, the madhyamaka of “madh- yamakāvatāra” is held to refer to a text propounding the middle, specifically Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle. My translation of avatāra (’jug pa) as “supplement” is controver- sial; others use “introduction” or “entrance,” both of which are attested common translations in such a context. My translation is based on the explanation by Tsong-kha-pa that Chandrakīrti was filling in holes in Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle; see Tsong-kha-pa, Kensur Lekden, and Jeffrey Hopkins, Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1980), 96-99. Among the many meanings of the Tibetan term for avatāra, ’jug pa can mean “to affix” or “to add on.” To summarize the oral teachings of the late Ngag-wang-leg-dan: Avatāra means “addition” in the sense that Chandrakīrti’s text is a supplement historically necessary so as to clarify the meaning of Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle. He wanted to make clear that the Treatise should not be interpreted according to the Mind-Only system or according to the Middle Way Autonomy School (dbu ma rang rgyud pa, svatantrikamādhyamika), the founding of which is attributed to Bhāvaviveka. During Nāgārjuna’s lifetime, Bhāvaviveka had not written his commentary on the Treatise, nor had he founded his system; therefore, it was necessary later to supplement Nāgārjuna’s text to show why it should not be interpreted in such a way. Moreover, it is said that Chandrakīrti sought to show that a follower of Nāgārjuna should ascend the ten grounds by practicing the vast paths necessary to do so. This is because some interpret the Middle Way perspective as nihilistic. They see it as a means of refuting the general existence of phenomena rather than just their inherent existence and conclude that it is not necessary to engage in practices such as the cultivation of compassion. There- fore, in order to show that it is important to engage in three central practices— compassion, non-dual understanding, and the altruistic mind of enlightenment— and to ascend the ten Bodhisattva grounds, Chandrakīrti—in reliance on Nāgār- juna’s Precious Garland—wrote this supplementary text. See Jeffrey Hopkins, Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland: Buddhist Advice for Living and Lib- eration (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion, 1998), p. 9 note b. This Tibetanized reading of ’jug pa as “supplement” accords with the Tibetan term rtags ’jug (liṅgāvaṃtāra [Sarat Chandra Das, A Tibetan-English Dictionary (Calcutta: 1902; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969, 1970; compact reprint, Kyoto, Japan: Rinsen Book Company, 1981), 535) “the affixing of gender,” referring to the usage of letters—identified by gender in Tibetan grammar—in various positions in a syllable. It also perhaps accords with the fifth meaning given in Vaman Shivaram Apte, Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Poona, India: Prasad Prakashan, 1957), 163, “Any new appearance, growth, rise,” though it seems that not much of a case can be made from the Sanskrit. Of course,

Preface 13 teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. The next Great Book is Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Manifest Knowledge,a a compendium of the types and natures of afflicted phenomena and their causes as well as the pure phenomena that act as antidotes to them and the states of cessation brought about by these antidotes; this takes two years. The last Great Book is Guṇaprabha’s Aphorisms on Discipline,b again studied for two years. At the end, there are several years for review and preliminary rounds of debate in preparation for the yearly debate com- petition. Tsong-kha-pa wrote commentaries on Maitreya’s Ornament for the Clear Realizations and Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle,” and his two main students, Gyal-tshab and Khay-drub, wrote commentaries on Dharmakīrti’s Commentary on Valid Cognition. Gyal-tshab also wrote a commentary on Maitreya’s text, which is said to reflect Tsong-kha-pa’s more mature thinking later in his life. These commentaries by Tsong-kha-pa and his two chief disciples are used by the colleges, along with Tibetan commentaries by Chim Jam-pay- yangc and the First Dalai Lama, Gen-dün-drub,d on Vasubandhu’s Treas- ury of Manifest Knowledge and Tso-na-wa’se and the First Dalai Lama’s commentaries on Guṇaprabha’s Aphorisms on Discipline, but Tsong-kha- pa’s works are not the chief textbooks in the monastic colleges. Given that the basic structure of the monastic university is to divide into camps that stimulate intellectual exchange, the main textbooks are sub-sub-commentaries written by prominent scholars, which present the aforementioned commentaries in a clearer format and attempt to resolve issues unclear (or confused) in those texts. These commentaries, called the college’s “textbook literature,”f are the main focus, elevated even to a status of primary concern and adherence. Despite my dubbing them “sub-sub-commentaries,” their significance in the community is focal. (Perhaps due to Protestant emphasis on early Christianity, we often unwarrantedly assume that the focus of religious systems is on their founder and early history, whereas the focus in this such a supplement also serves as an introduction, or means of entry, to Nāgārjuna’s Trea- tise. a chos mngon pa’i mdzod, abhidharmakośa; Peking 5590, vol. 115. b ’dul ba’i mdo, vinayasūtra; Peking 5619, vol. 123. c mchims ’jam pa’i dbyangs. d dge ’dun grub; 1391-1475, retrospectively called the First Dalai Lama when Sö-nam- gya-tsho, the reincarnation of his reincarnation, received the title of Dalai. e mtsho na wa rin chen bzang po. f yig cha.

14 Preface system is on the thought of the author of the textbook literature, perhaps as a door to the thought of the founder of their sect but more likely as the embodiment of his thought appropriate to one’s own time. I do not deny that the “door analogy” leads back eventually to Shākyamuni Buddha; rather, it seems that the focus is on the more current.) In general, Ge-lug-pa doctrinal training can be divided into two types based on a division of texts into sūtra and tantra—both attributed to be Shākyamuni Buddha’s teachings that were committed to writing even many centuries later. The term “sūtra” can be used to refer to tantras, but here in the division of all of Buddha’s scriptures into the mutually exclu- sive categories of sūtra and tantra, it refers, roughly speaking, to those texts that are not based on the practice of deity yoga.a “Tantra,” on the other hand, refers to texts and systems whose main practitioners can employ deity yoga. In deity yoga, practitioners meditate on themselves as having the physical form not of an ordinary person but of a supramundane deity, an embodiment of the highest levels of wisdom and compassion. Training in the systems that formed around sūtra-style teachings can be further divided into more practically oriented and more theoretically oriented modes of study. Both modes are concerned with both theory and practice, but the style of the former directly addresses particular meditation practices and behavior modification, whereas the style of the latter is primarily concerned with countering wrong ideas with scholastic argu- ments that, although they can be employed in meditation, are framed around critiques of issues often in the format of debate—refuting others’ a Here I am following Tsong-kha-pa’s presentation of the difference between sūtra and tantra in his Great Exposition of Secret Mantra (sngags rim chen mo) as found in H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tsong-kha-pa, and Jeffrey Hopkins, Tantra in Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977; reprint, with minor corrections, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987). Tsong- kha-pa presents the difference between the Great Vehicle sūtra system (called the Perfec- tion Vehicle) and the tantra system in terms of what the four classes of tantra (Action, Performance, Yoga, and Highest Yoga) present as the path for their main intended trainees. In this way, Tsong-kha-pa is able to posit deity yoga as the central distinctive feature of tantra, even though a majority of the tantras included in the class of Action Tantra do not involve deity yoga, since, as he puts it, those Action Tantras that do not involve deity are not intended for the main intended trainees of that class of tantra. One would expect that the majority of Action Tantras would be for the main intended trainees of Action Tantra, but in Tsong-kha-pa’s presentation the majority of Action Tantras are not intended for the main intended trainees of Action Tantra. Therefore, the mere presence and absence of the practice of deity yoga cannot serve as the feature distinguishing a particular text as tantra or sūtra, for the mere presence and absence of the practice of deity yoga serves only to distinguish tantra or sūtra in terms of the practices of their main intended trainees. This is why I have used the qualification “roughly speaking.”

Preface 15 mistakes, presenting one’s own view, and then dispelling objections to it. Both systems are based on focal Indian books and Tibetan texts, the latter being either explicit commentaries on the Indian texts or expositions of their main themes or of issues that arise when juxtaposed with other material. The more practical system of study is aimed at making coherent and accessible the plethora of practices that were inherited from India and are the topics of critical study in more theoretical texts. In the Ge-lug-pa sect, the more practical system of study centers on: 1. Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path,a which modestly calls itself a commentary on the Lamp for the Path to En- lightenment b by the eleventh-century Indian scholar Atisha (who spent the last twelve years of his life in Tibet) but is much more, and 2. a commentary by one of Tsong-kha-pa’s two chief disciples, Gyal- tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen,c on the Indian text Engaging in the Bodhi- sattva Deeds by the eighth-century scholar-yogi Shāntideva.d

THE TEXT: THE GREAT EXPOSITION OF SPECIAL INSIGHT The present book is the fifth of seven volumes presenting Tibetan views on the controversy that arose in Buddhist India over how to refute production from self: 1. Buddhapālita’s Refutation of Production from Self, Bhāvaviveka’s Criticism, and Avalokitavrata’s Commentary: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Conse- quences, 1 2. Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka: Jam-yang- shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 2 3. Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, a lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa; Peking 6001, vol. 152. b byang chub lam gyi sgron ma, bodhipathapradīpa; Peking 5343, vol. 103. c rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432. d byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa, bodhicāryāvatāra; Peking 5272, vol. 99. Gyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen’s commentary is his Explanation of (Shāntideva’s) “Engag- ing in the Bodhisattva Deeds”: Entrance of Conqueror Children (byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad rgyal sras ’jug ngogs).

16 Preface

Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 4. Decisive Analyses concerning the Refutation of Production from Self: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, 4 5. What is a Consequentialist? Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Spe- cial Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations: Compatibly Ap- pearing Subjects, 5. 6. Finalizing the Meaning of Autonomist and Consequentialist: Tsong- kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight with the Four Interwoven Annotations, 6. 7. Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Presentation of Compatibly Appearing Subjects in The Essence of Eloquence, 7. The controversy revolves around the opening phrase of the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom”: Not from self, not from others, Not from both, not causelessly Are any things Ever produced anywhere. Uncharacteristically, Nāgārjuna says nothing more about the first leg of this reasoning—that things are not produced from self; rather, he immediately proceeds to the reasoning proving that things are not produced from other by examining the four types of conditions. His principal Indian commentators, however, explain the refutation of production from self in varying detail, the differences engendering the split between what came to be called the Autonomy School and the Consequence School. Buddhapālita’s (c. 470-540?) commentary on the refutation of production from self provoked Bhāvaviveka (c. 500-570?) into extensive criticism and hence into a demonstration of his own preferred style of commentary. The first volume provides two Tibetan explanations of the controversy, shorter and longer, by the Tibetan scholar Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü (1648-1721/1722). Included also in first volume are translations of Buddhapālita’s and Bhāvaviveka’s commentaries as well as the first translation into English of Avalokitavrata’s (flourishing mid- seventh century) extensive commentary on Bhāvaviveka’s presentation, his minute examination allowing Bhāvaviveka’s terse text to be seen in high relief. The second volume provides Jam-yang-shay-pa’s shorter and longer explanations of how Chandrakīrti defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka’s criticisms of Buddhapālita’s refutation of production from self. The third volume provides Jam-yang-shay-pa’s explanation of how Preface 17

Chandrakīrti tears apart Bhāvaviveka’s own refutation of production from self; the shorter version is just an abbreviated citation of Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, but the longer version provides Jam-yang-shay-pa’s usual extensive elaboration. It is concerned with compatibly appearing subjects, Ge-lug-pa scholars seeing this discussion as the prime, but not only, source showing that Bhāvaviveka accepts that phenomena are conventionally established by way of their own character. This complex topic is used in Tibetan monastic colleges to draw students into fascinating reflections about how phenomena appear and thereby to explore the nature of the reality behind appearances. The first three volumes in this series are in the style of theoretically oriented modes of study in the form of general-meaning commentaries, whereas the fourth volume, still within the style of the theoretically oriented mode of study, moves out of a general-meaning commentary and into a decisive analysis commentary on those three volumes including and all of their sources, taking on the sole format of debate in order to refute others’ mistakes. As Jam-yang-shay-pa’s fourth volume, it is slated for translation after the three volumes of Tsong-kha-pa’s works on these topics. The two volumes on Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special In- sight, completed in the current book, could be said to be in the style of more directly addressing particular meditation practices and behavior modification since they are in stages-of-the-path literature, being a major part of Tsong-kha-pa’s Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings. However, the style is more of a theoretically oriented mode of study in the manner of a general-meaning commentary, even also refuting others’ mistakes though not in the formal format of debate—refuting others’ mistakes, presenting one’s own view, and then dispelling objections to it. Let us just say that we can see the importance Tsong-kha-pa places on theoretical study for the process of meditation. Tsong-kha-pa’s focus in the Great Exposition of Special Insight begins with the material in the final phase of the controversy between Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Chandrakīrti on the topic of compatibly appearing subjects. Hence, his analysis of that phase appears here in volumes five and six, utilizing at least the three general-meaning volumes as introductions. I have embedded Tsong-kha-pa’s presentation with two commentaries to enhance its accessibility:

• Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations, the longer title being Precious Golden Wheel of Annotations to the Great Exposition

18 Preface

of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenmenta • and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations to Tsong-kha- pa’s Great Expostion of Special Insight. Both of these are included in the Four Interwoven Annotations to (Tsong- kha-pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path.”b In the Delhi edition of this text the four sets of annotations are identified as having been written by:c 1. Ba-so Chö-kyi-gyal-tshan (ba so chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1402-1473) 2. De-drug-khan-chen Kha-rog Ngag-wang-rab-tan (sde drug mkhan chen kha rog ngag dbang rab brtan, seventeenth century) 3. Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-dru (’jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson ’grus, 1648-1712) 4. Dra-ti (or, Pra-ti) Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub (bra sti [or, par sti] dge bshes rin chen don grub, 17-18th century). At this point in the Four Interwoven Annotations relevant to volumes five and six, there are only two sets of annotations,d not four, those by Jam- yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub. Since the annotations by Jam-yang-shay-pa, abbot of Go-mang College from 1700 to 1709, in the Four Interwoven Annotations are slightly more extensive in his separate text, the Golden Wheel of Annotations, I have drawn his annotations from the Golden Wheel of Annotations. Jam-yang-shay-pa’s intricate, embedded outline of Tsong-kha-pa’s text is particularly helpful because it details the topics that Tsong-kha-pa often moves through quickly, thereby providing clarity by pre-announcing Tsong-kha-pa’s points. Jam-yang-shay-pa also occasionally provides longer explanatory notes as well as several shorter ones, all of which appear in the translation and in the Tibetan in yellow highlight to match the color of his title, Golden Wheel of Annotations. a mchan ’grel gser kyi ’khor lo / byang chub lam gyi rim pa chen mo mchan ’grel gser kyi ’khor lo rin po che, digital edition supplied by Drepung Gomang Library, Mundgod, Karnataka, India, 2017. To date I have not found this text in an edition of Jam-yang-shay- pa’s Collected Works. b lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma/ mnyam med rje btsun tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa’i byang chub lam rim chen mo’i dka’ ba’i gnad rnams mchan bu bzhi’i sgo nas legs par bshad pa theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron; see the Bibliography. c The source is Elizabeth Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness (London: Wis- dom, 1989), 219; for a thorough discussion of the four annotators and how the annotations fit together with Tsong-kha-pa’s style see her discussion, 219-227. d The single exception is noted below in the translation.

Preface 19

The interlinear notes of Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub, a scholar from Se-ra Jey College, provide very helpful additional phrases that smoothe the way through Tsong-kha-pa’s sentences. I have liberally drawn from his annotations which appear in the translation (but have not been added to the Tibetan) in aqua highlight. It is my hope that the combination of these two sets of annotations will enrich the bare translation of Tsong- kha-pa’s text at the end of each of these two volumes and enrich even annotated translations such as that by the New Jersey group headed by Joshua Cutler and Guy Newland.a Tsong-kha-pa composed five expositions on the view of emptiness:b 1. In 1402, at the age of forty-five, he published the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path,c which has a long and complicated section on special insightd into emptiness. 2. Five years later, when he was fifty, he began writing a commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle,e called Ocean of Reasoning,f at Chö-dingg Hermitage above what became Se-ra Monastic University on the northern outskirts of Lhasa, but in the midst of explicating the first chapter, he foresaw that there would be interruptions if he stayed there. Thus, he left Chö-ding Hermitage for another hermitage at Se-

a See Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, vols. 1-3, trans. and ed. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2000-2004). b My brief rehearsal of his works on the view of emptiness is drawn from Elizabeth Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness (London: Wisdom Publications, 1989), 6-7. c lam rim chen mo; P6001, vol. 152. For a translation into English, see Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, vols. 1-3, trans. and ed. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2000-2004). For a translation of the part on the excessively broad object of negation, see Elizabeth Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, 153-215; for a translation of the part on the excessively narrow object of negation, see William Magee, The Nature of Things: Empti- ness and Essence in the Geluk World (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1999), 179- 192. d lhag mthong, vipaśyanā. e dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba, prajñānāmamūlamadhya- makakārikā; P5224, vol. 95. f dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba’i rnam bshad rigs pa’i rgya mtsho; P6153, vol. 156. For a translation of the entire text, see Geshe Ngawang Samten and Jay L. Garfield, Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). g chos sdings.

20 Preface

ra, Ra-ka Precipice,a where he wrote the Treatise Differentiating In- terpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence.b (I imagine that he felt the need to compose his own independent work on the view of emptiness in the Great Vehicle schools as background for his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s treatise. If this is so, he wrote The Essence as an overarching structure in which that commentary could be understood.) 3. After completing The Essence in 1408,c he returned to commenting on Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle, completing the Ocean of Reason- ing. 4. At age fifty-eight in 1415, he wrote the Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path.d 5. At age sixty-one, one year before his death, he wrote a commentary on Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Mid- dle,” e called Illumination of the Thought.f Tsong-kha-pa’s longest treatment of “compatibly appearing subjects” is in the “Great Exposition of Special Insight” in the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path. Six years later, he published a slightly different reading

a rva kha brag; perhaps the meaning of the name is Goat-Face Crag. b drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par phye ba’i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po; P6142, vol. 153. The Prologue and Mind-Only section are translated in Jeffrey Hopkins, Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). For a translation of the entire text, see Thurman, Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence, 185-385. c For the date, see Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp, “Apropos of a Recent Contribution to the History of Central Way Philosophy in Tibet: Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold” in Ber- liner Indologische Studien 1 (Reinbek, Germany: Verlag für Orientalistische Fachpublika- tionen, 1985), 68, n. 2. d skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa; P6002, vols. 152- 153. A translation of the section on special insight is included in Jeffrey Hopkins, Tsong- kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 2008), 25-179. The Fourteenth Dalai Lama gave an expansive series of lectures on Tsong-kha-pa’s Medium- Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment in 1972 in Dharmsala, India. For a book largely based on those lectures, see His Holiness the Dalai Lama, How to See Yourself as You Really Are, trans. and ed. by Jeffrey Hopkins (New York: Atria Books, 2006). e dbu ma la ’jug pa, madhyamakāvatāra; P5261, vol. 98 and P5262, vol. 98. f dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal; P6143, vol. 154. Trans- lations of the sections on the object of negation in the doctrine of emptiness and on the two truths are included in Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 181-213 and 215-262, respectively.

Preface 21 in The Essence of Eloquence. At the end of his still later treatment of “opposite of the consequences” and “compatibly appearing subjects” in the Ocean of Reasoning,a he refers readers to the discussion in “The Essence of Eloquence and so forth” for these topics. Mention is made only in pass- ing in his later Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Illumination of the Thought, and no mention at all is made in the still later “Medium-Length Exposition of Special Insight.” This sixth volume contains Part Two of the translation of compatibly appearing subjects in the “Great Exposition of Special Insight” begun in volume five. The seventh volume is Tsong-kha-pa’s treatment of compatibly appearing subjects in the later work, The Essence of Eloquence. The nearly world-wide attention by scholars that these issues in the first chapter of Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words have received has been brilliantly documented in Anne MacDonald’s magnificent In Clear Words: The Prasannapadā, Chapter One.b

EDITIONS CONSULTED Two basic editions of the Four Interwoven Annotations to (Tsong-kha- pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path” were consulted: 1. BDRC format: blo bzang grags pa'i dpal. "mnyam med rje btsun tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa'i byang chub lam rim chen mo'i dka' ba'i gnad rnams mchan bu bzhi'i sgo nas legs par bshad pa theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron/(mchan)." In lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma/ (bla brang bkra shis 'khyil par ma/). BDRC W29037. 1: 3 - 978. [s.l.]: [bla brang bkra shis 'khyil], [1999?}. http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1LS875|O1LS8751LS958$W29037. Also: The Lam rim chen mo of the incomparable Tsong-kha-pa, with the interlineal notes of Ba-so Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, Sde-drug Mkhan-chen Ngag-dbang-rab-rtan, ’Jam-dbyangs-bshad-pa’i-rdo- rje, and Bra-sti Dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub. Reproduced from a print of the corrected tshe-mchog-gling blocks of 1842 by Chos-’phel- legs-ldan, vol. 2, New Delhi, 1972. BDRC W00KG09355- I00KG09378-3-872. a Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, n.d., 52.2-57.13; also, Mundgod, Karnataka, India: Drepung Gomang Library, 2002, 46.9-51.2; Samten and Garfield, Ocean of Reasoning, 60-66. b Vienna: Verlag der Österreichishen Akademie der Vissenschaften, 2015.

22 Preface

Abbreviated reference: “Delhi edition,” so named because of being printed in New Delhi. 2. BDRC format: blo bzang grags pa'i dpal, chos kyi rgyal mtshan, ngag dbang rab brtan, 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje, rin chen don grub. "byang chub lam gyi rim pa mchan dang bcas pa las lhag mthong gi skabs/(ca mchan)." In lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma/ (bla brang bkra shis 'khyil par ma/). BDRC W29037. 2: 165 - 1002. [s.l.]: [bla brang bkra shis 'khyil], [1999?}. http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1LS875|O1LS8751LS974$W29037. Also: BDRC W29037-5048-3-1002. Abbreviated reference: “BDRC bla brang,” so named because of being printed in bla brang. The digital Tibetan text of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations provided in this book was supplied by the Drepung Gomang Library in Mundgod, Karnataka State, India. PART ONE: Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight: Compatibly Appearing Subjects with Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s Annotations Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings ེས་་གམ་གྱི་ཉམས་་ང་བའི་རིམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཚང་ བར་ོན་པའི་ང་བ་ལམ་གྱི་རམ་པ།ི ། Four Interwoven Annotations to (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path” ལམ་རམ་མཆན་བཞི ི་གས་མ། ། Precious Golden Wheel of Annotations to (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment” ང་བ་ལམ་གྱི་རིམ་པ་ཆེན་མོ་མཆན་འགྲལ་གསེ ེར་གྱ་འཁི ོར་ ལོ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ། །

Craig Preston inserted the Tibetan text for Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposi- tion of Special Insight into the translation by Jeffrey Hopkins, who inserted Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations into both the Ti- betan text and his translation in yellow highlight and inserted Dra-ti Ge- she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations into only his translation in aqua highlight.

2' Indicating that due to this previously expressed fallacy [with regard to the subject] the reason also is not established {2 parts} གཉིས་པ་ན་དོ ེས་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱང་མ་བ་པར་བན་པ་ལ་ This has two parts: (1) the fallacy that the sign is not established in the proof—by the sign of existing—that eyes and so forth are not produced from self and (2) indicating how Bhāvaviveka asserts this fallacy and therefore that all signs of existing—whether positive or negative—are not established for him.a ཡོད་པའི་གས་ཀྱིས་མག་སི ོགས་བདག་ེ་མད་པར་བ་པའེ ི་ གས་མ་བ་པའི་ན་དང་།ོ ན་དོ ེ་ལེགས་ན་གྱིས་ཁས་ ངས་ལ་དང་། དེས་ན་བ་པ་དང་དགག་པའི་ཡང་ཁ་བོ ོ་ལ་ ཡོད་པའི་ཁྱབ་པའི་གས་ཀུན་མ་བ་པར་བན་པ་གཉས།ི a' The fallacy that the sign is not established in the proof—by the sign of existing—that eyes and so forth are not produced from self {2 parts} དང་པོ་[ཡོད་པའི་གས་ཀྱིས་མིག་སོགས་བདག་ེ་མེད་པར་བ་པའི་གས་མ་ བ་པའི་ོན་]ལ་ This has two parts: citing the scripture and explaining the meaning. ང་དགོད་པ་དང་། དན་བཤད་པ་གཉོ ིས་ལས།

a The texts of the Four Interwoven Annotations (Delhi, 560.1/280b.1; bla brang, 636.4/237b.4) take this annotation as having not just two divisions but a third division des na (dper na in bla brang) sgrub (bsgrub in bla brang) pa dang dgag pa’i yang kho bo la yod pa’i khyab pa’i rtags kun ma grub par bstan pa even though it never appears later. However, Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations takes the passage, as here, as only two divisions.

1” CITING THE SCRIPTURE དང་པོ་ང་དགོད་པ་ནི། It is indicated by this statement in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words: Just this mode of expressing the fallacy of the position, or proposition, which is that the substratum, that is, the subject, is not established is to be applied similarly also in expressing the fallacy of nonestablishment with respect to this master Bhāvaviveka’s stated reason—“because of existing.”a ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། གཞི་མ་བ་པའ་ི ོགས་ཀྱི་ཉེས་པ་བད་པའོ ི་ ལ་གང་ཡན་པ་འདི ི་ཉིད་ནི་ཡད་པའོ ི་ིར་ཞེས་་བའ་གཏན་ི ཚིགས་འདི་ལ་མ་བ་པའི་ོན་བོད་པ་ལའང་ར་བར་འོ། ། ཞེས་གངས་པ་འདས་བན་པ་ཡི ིན་ནོ། །

2” EXPLAINING THE MEANING གཉིས་པ་དན་བཤད་པ་ོ This mode of expressing the fallacy of the position which is that the substratum is not established is to be applied also to expressing the fault of nonestablishment with respect to the reason. With respect to this,

• since earlier when indicating the fallacy of the position in that the substratum is not established, there did not exist a valid cognition establishing [that is, confirming] a subject established as compatibly appearing in the systems of the two disputants—the system of the former disputant,b the Proponent of the Middle who asserts the emptiness of inherent existence, establishment by way of [the object’s] own entity, and the systems of the Autonomists and the Proponents of [Truly Es- tablished] Things who assert non-emptiness of such [establishment by way of the object’s own entity], a Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan ends his commentary at this point. b Correcting lnga rgol in the Delhi edition (kha, 280b.4/560.4) to snga rgol in accordance with the TBRC bla brang edition (238a.2/637.4).

• then also by just that reasoning explaining that the position, or proposition—the combination of the two, (1) the autonomous sign’s basal subject, “form sense-spheres,”a and (2) the predicate “not produced from self”—does not exist, you should know, in accordance with the earlier explanation, how the sign also is not established, since there also does not exist a valid cognition establishing [that is, confirming] a basal subject established as appearing compatibly in the systems of those two disputants for the reason, “because of existing.” Due to the nonexistence of such compatibly appearing subjects, establishment of any of the two—(1) the proposition to be proved with respect to that substratum and (2) the sign, or reason, proving that proposition—does not occur. དེ་ལ་ར་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་རང་བཞན་གྱི ིས་ང་མོ ི་ོང་ གི་ོལ་བ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་གས་ལ་མན་ང་་བ་པའི་ཆས་ཅན་ོ བ་ེད་ཀྱ་ཚད་མ་མི ད་པས།ེ རང་ད་གས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ཅན་ གགས་ཀྱི་ེ་མཆད་དང་བདག་ལས་ེ ེ་བ་མད་པའེ ི་ཆས་གཉོ ིས་ བོམས་པའི་ོགས་སམ། བབ་་མེད་པར་བཤད་པའི་རིགས་ པ་དེས་ཡོད་པའི་ིར། ཞེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱང་དེ་གཉས་ཀྱི ི་ གས་ལ་མན་ང་་བ་པའི་བ་ེད་ཀྱ་ཚད་མ་མི ད་པས་ེ

a The syllogism that Bhāvaviveka states is: Ultimately the internal sense-spheres are not produced from self because of existing, like intelligence.” na paramārthata ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyamānatvāt cai- tanyavad// (the Sanskrit is from Chandrakīrti’s citation) don dam par nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa’i phyir shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no// It is unclear to me why Tsong-kha-pa switches from Bhāvaviveka’s “internal sense- spheres” (eye sense powers and so forth) to “form sense-spheres,” which are visible forms; it may be for brevity.

1” CITING THE SCRIPTURE དང་པོ་[ང་དགོད་པ་]ནི། Furthermore, about this Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says: With respect to how the fallacy that the reason is not established is indicated in this way, the way of putting it together thus is as follows: For, this logician, the master Bhāvaviveka himself, has just come to have asserted the points as explained earlier, the mode of the non-establishment of the subject and the non-establishment of the reason. How has he come to do so? Through the master Bhāvaviveka’s description of how to refute a proof stated by an opponent, this master himself has come to assert such. Another, an opponent, stated this proof: Causes and so forth producing the internal sense-spheres just exist because the One-Gone-Thus said accordingly that they just exist. Whatever the One-Gone-Thus said abides in fact that way since he is not mistaken in another way, as, for example, is the case with the statement by the One-Gone-Thus that nirvāṇa is peace, which is established by valid cognition itself and abides so in fact. The master Bhāvaviveka, having examined this proof in the following way, refuted it, propounded this fallacy with: What are you, the stater of the proof who is a Proponent

of [Truly Established] Things, asserting as the meaning of the reason? Are you saying “because the One-Gone-Thus said such in terms of conventional existence” or “because the One-Gone-Thus said such in terms of ultimate existence?” Thus he inquires whether the objects—that the One-Gone-Thus said just exist—exist conventionally or exist ultimately. If the meaning stated as the reason is conventionally existent, the meaning of the reason is not established for the system of yourself, a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things, for you just assert that the causes producing the internal sense-spheres, such as eyes and so forth, ultimately exist. and [Bhāvaviveka continues]: If it is in terms of ultimately existing, then because we Proponents of the Middle assert that the conventions of what is establisheda and the establisherb do not ultimately exist, this reason is just nonestablished for a Proponent of the Middle if the referent is to ultimate existence, and it is just contradictory because this ultimately existent reason is very contradictory with a predicate of the proposition that is a conventionality. འདིར་ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། དེ་་་དེ་ནི་འདི་ར་ཡིན་ཏེ། གང་གི་ ིར་ཇི་ད་བད་པའ་དི ོན་འདི་ནི་ོག་གེ་པ་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་ ཀྱིས་ཁས་ངས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། ཇི་ར་ཞེ་ན། ནང་གི་ེ་མཆེད་ མས་ད་པར་ེ ེད་པ་་ལ་སོགས་པ་ནི་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡན་ཏི ེ། དེ་ར་དེ་བཞིན་གཤགས་པས་གངས་པའེ ི་ིར་རོ། ། གང་དེ་ བཞིན་གཤགས་པས་ཇེ ་ད་་གངས་པ་དི ་ནེ ི་དེ་བཞན་ཏི ེ། དཔེར་ན་་ངན་ལས་འདས་པ་ན་ཞི ི་བའོ་ཞས་་བ་བཞེ ན་ནི ོ། ། ཞེས་་བ་གཞན་གྱིས་བཀོད་པའི་བ་ད་འདེ ི་ལ་འདར་ཁྱི ོད་

a That is, that which is created, an effect. b That is, the creator, a cause.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} 30 Four Interwoven Annotations ཀྱིས་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་དན་་འདོ ད་པ་གང་ཡོ ན།ི དེ་བཞན་ི གཤེགས་པས་ཀུན་བ་་དོ ེ་ད་གངས་པའི་ིར་རམ། འོན་ ཏེ་དོན་དམ་པར་གངས་པའི་ིར། གལ་ཏེ་ཀུན་ོབ་་ན་ནི་ རང་ལ་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱ་དི ོན་མ་བ་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ། ཞེས་དང༌། དོན་དམ་པར་བབ་པར་་བ་དང་བ་པར་ེད་པ་ཉད་མ་ི བ་པའི་ར་གཏན་ཚི གས་མ་བ་པའི ི་དོན་ཉིད་དང་འགལ་ བའི་དན་ཉོ ད་དི ོ། ། ཞེས་འདིས་ན་འདོ ི་ས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། What happens due to propounding such? About this the master Chandrakīrti sets forth the following refutation: Because this one Bhāvaviveka himself has come in this way of refuting the reason stated by the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things—from demonstrating the fault of the nonestablishment of the reason upon performing examination of the two truths—to assert that the reasons that the master Bhāvaviveka himself stated are also not established since he must assert that his reasons such as “because of existing” are not established in the systems of both his own and the other’s systems when they are refuted upon being examined as to whether they are conventional in that they are found by mere mistaken consciousness or they are ultimates in that they are objects found by nonmistaken consciousness. Therefore, in all inferences, that is, syllogistic statements, a in which this master Bhāvaviveka states phenomena that are actuali- tiesb—these being objects established by way of their own character that are asserted as found by unmistaken direct perceptions such as eye consciousnesses—as reasons, the reason, subject, and so forth are not established for him, a

a sbyor ba’i ngag. b dngos po’i chos, vastudharma; Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub (Delhi, 569.5) later identifies this term as meaning “that which is substantially established in the sense of being established by way of its own character” (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa’i rdzas grub).

Proponent of the Middle, whereby all proofs stated by the master Bhāvaviveka himself are destroyed and under- mined by the master himself. གང་གི་ར་དི ེ་ར་འདིས་རང་ཉད་ཀྱི ིས་ལ་འདིས་གཏན་ ཚིགས་མ་བ་པར་ཁས་ངས་པ་དའེ ི་ིར་དངས་པོ ོའི་ཆས་ོ གཏན་ཚིགས་་བཀོད་པའི་ེས་་དཔག་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་རང་ལ་མ་བ་པའ་ི ིར་བ་པར་ ེད་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་མ་པར་འཇག་པར་འར་རི ོ། །ཞེས་ གངས་པ་

2” EXPLAINING THE MEANING གཉིས་པ་དན་བཤད་པ་ལ་ོ This has two parts: refuting mistakes by others and explaining our own system. གཞན་གྱིས་འལ་པ་དགག་པ། རང་གས་བཤད་པ་གཉས་ལས།ི

A” REFUTING MISTAKES BY OTHERS {2 PARTS} དང་པོ་[གཞན་གྱིས་འལ་པ་དགག་པ་]ལ་ This has two parts: expressing [others’] assertions and refuting them. འདོད་པ་བོད་པ་དང་། དེ་དགག་པ་གཉིས་ལས། 1* Expressing [others’] assertions དང་པོ་[འདད་པ་བོ ོད་པ་] With respect to the meaning of this, some Tibetans who assert themselves

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} 32 Four Interwoven Annotations to be followers of the master Chandrakīrti say that [Bhāvaviveka’s] explicit words are self-defeating: When the master Chandrakīrtia refutes statements by the master Bhāvaviveka in treatises composed by him such as in the Blaze of Reasoningb and so forth: Earth is not ultimately an entity of hardness because of being an element—like, for example, wind. if the reason stated, “because of being an element,” is stating “because of being an element ultimately,” it is not established for the master [Bhāva- viveka] himself, and also if otherwise it is stating, “because of being an element conventionally,” it is not established for the opposing party,c the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things. If the reason is not posited as not established due to its not being established in this way for [one of] the two parties, well then it would contradict the master Bhāvaviveka’s own assertion that whatever is a nonestablished reason from the viewpoint of those two modes of establishment for oneself and the other from the approach of the two truths is necessarily a nonestablished reason. ཚིག་ཟིན་ག་ཆོད་ཡན་པ་ནི ི་འདའི ི་དོན་ལ་་བ་གྲགས་པའི་ ེས་་འང་བར་འདད་པ་དག་ན་རོ ེ། ས་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་་ བའི་ངོ་བོ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འང་བ་ཡན་པའི ི་ར།ི ང་བཞིན་ནོ་ ཞེས་ག་གོ ་འབར་བ་སེ གས་་བཀོ ད་པ་ལ།ོ དན་དམ་་འང་ོ བ་ཡིན་པའ་ི ིར་ཞེས་འགོད་ན་རང་གིས་མ་བ་ལ། ཀུན་ོབ་ ་འང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ིར་ཞེས་འགོད་ན་ི་ོལ་དངོས་པོར་་ བ་ལ་མ་བ་བོ། ། དེས་གས་མ་བ་པར་མ་འཇི ོག་ན་དེ་གཉས་ི ཀྱི་ོ་ནས་མ་བ་པ་ལ་གས་མ་བ་པས་ཁྱབ་པར་རང་གིས་ ཁས་ངས་པ་དང་འགལ་ལོ་ཞེས་ཟར་ལ།ེ a Correcting slob dpon zla ba grags par (564.1) in the Delhi edition to slob dpon zla ba grags pas in accordance with the TBRC bla brang (611.4). b Blaze of Reasoning, Commentary on the “Heart of the Middle” (dbu ma’i snying po’i ’grel pa rtog ge ’bar ba, madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarkajāvlā, P5255, vol. 96). c phyi rgol/ phyir rgol; literally, “latter disputant,” the opposing disputant.

And although that was rashly propounded, someone says [adding]: If “a mere element without qualifying it with the two truths” is stated as the reason, then since when it is analyzed with a rational consciousness, it is not established [that is, is not confirmed] by that reasoning consciousness, it is not logically correct to state “a mere element” and thus is refuted.a བབ་ཆོལ་་ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་འང་བ་ཙམ་ཞིག་འགད་ན་རོ ིགས་ཤེས་ ཀྱིས་མ་བ་པས་འགག་པ་ཡོ ིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ། ། 2* Refuting those assertions {5 parts} གཉིས་པ་ད་དགག་པ་ལ་ེ This has five parts. ་ལས། A: Brief indication དང་པོ་མདར་བན་པ་ནོ ི། Repudiation of the master Bhāvaviveka by the master Chandrakīrti in such a manner, that is, in the system explained by these Tibetans is utterly not the thought of the Clear Words, whereby it is also not the assertion of the glorious Chandrakīrti and it is also utterly not the case that the master Bhāvaviveka asserts such—namely, that having stated as a reason “an element and so forth without qualifying it with the two truths,” and having stated a reason “an element and so forth without qualifying it with the two truths,” if the exampleb is not established for oneself or the other, then the reason is necessarily not established, and so forth, due to which [these Ti- betans] are speaking erroneously about both systems of those two masters. འདི་འ་བའི་ལ་གྱས་ན་འི ིན་པ་ནི། ཚག་གསལ་གྱི ི་ དགོངས་པ་གཏན་མ་ཡན་ཅི ིང་བ་དཔོ ོན་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ར་་ a Correcting ’gog pa min (564.5) in the Delhi edition to ’gog pa yin in accordance with the TBRC bla brang (612.2). b Both editions read “example” (dpe), but in accordance with the preceding explanation this perhaps is a mistake for “reason.”

a Poussin, 31.1.

C: How, therefore, compatible appearance relative to an object found [by a consciousness] mistaken or nonmistaken about establishment by way of its own character is not established གམ་པ་དས་ན་རང་མཚན་གྱེ ིས་བ་པ་ལ་འལ་མ་འལ་ཏེ་ ེད་དན་ལ་ོ ོས་ནས་མན་ང་མ་བ་ལ་ནི། Thus, it being the case that “as explained” (ji skad bsyad pa, yathokta) is to be taken as the statement to apply the earlier the mode of nonestablishment of the subject to the reason, the meaning is as follows: From among the valid cognitions establishing the subject and the reason, the likes of direct perception do not pass beyond the two, either the mistaken or the nonmistaken. If objects found, or established, by mistaken direct perception are posited as reasons, subjects, and so forth, they would not be established for the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things, but also if objects found, or established, by nonmistaken direct perception are posited as those reasons and so forth, they would not be established by valid cognitions in our Middle Way system. Hence, autonomous signs, subjects, and so forth are not established, and the earlier explanation above that they are not established in this way is the meaning of “as explained” (ji skad bsnyad pa, yathoktaa). དེ་་ན་འདིར་འར་ཏེ་ཆོས་ཅན་དང་གཏན་ཚིགས་བབ་པའི་ མངོན་མ་་་དེ་འལ་མ་འལ་གཉས་ལས་མི ི་འདའ་ ལ།འལ་པས་ེད་པའ་དི ོན་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་སོགས་པར་འཇོག་ ན་དངས་པོ ར་་བ་ལ་མ་བ་ལ།ོ མ་འལ་བས་ེད་པའ་དི ོན་ དེ་དག་་འཇོག་ན་རང་གི་ཚད་མས་མི་འབ་པས་རང་ད་ཀྱི་ གས་དང་ཆོས་ཅན་ལ་སོགས་པ་མ་བ་པར་ོན་་བཤད་པ་ ནི་ཇི་ད་བད་པ་ཞས་པའེ ི་དན་ནོ ོ། །

a Poussin, 31.1.

D: A source that this is asserted by Bhāvaviveka བཞི་པ་དེ་ལེགས་ན་གྱིས་ཁས་ངས་པའི་ཁུངས། The indication that how the master Bhāvaviveka himself asserts the positing of nonestablishment by way of such an above-explained mode of nonestablishment of the sign and so forth is what is said in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words to be his examination—by way of the two truths, conventional and ultimate —of the sign “because the One-Gone-Thus said so.” དེ་འ་བའ་ི ོ་ནས་མ་བ་པར་འཇོག་པ་དེ་ལེགས་ན་འེད་ ཀྱིས་ཇི་ར་ཁས་ངས་པ་ོན་པ་ནི་དེ་ར་དེ་བཞན་གཤི ེགས་ པས་གངས་པའི་ིར། ཞེས་པ་ལ་བདེན་གཉས་ཀྱི ི་ོ་ནས་ བག་པ་མཛད་པ་ལ་ཟར་བ་ཡེ ིན་ནོ། ། E: How this is not a case of [examining whether the One-Gone-Thus] speaks ultimately or conventionally ་པ་ཀུན་ོབ་འམ་དོན་དམ་་གངས་པ་མིན་ལ་ནི། With respect to the meaning of such examination, the meaning is utterly not at all as [those] other Tibetans assert it, namely, that [Bhāvaviveka] is examining whether that set as the reason, “because the One-Gone-Thus said so,” is asserted as that “because the One-Gone-Thus said so conventionally” is set as the reason or “because the One-Gone-Thus said so ultimately” is set as the reason. The evidence why it is nota is that, as was stated earlier (above, 28 and 92) when [Chandrakīrti] brought up, that is, stated, the other party’s, [that is, Bhāvaviveka’s,] assertion, a compatibly appearing subject without qualifying it with either truth or falsity must be posited. Otherwise—that is to say, if [Bhāvaviveka] did not posit the compatibly appearingb but posited what is qualified with either truth or falsity as the subject—then while this very master [Bhāvaviveka] asserts that it

a Correcting ma min pa'i rgyu mtshan in the Delhi edition (566.4) to ma yin pa'i rgyu mtshan in accordance with TBRC bla brang (644.4). b Correcting mthun snang ba la bzhag par in the Delhi edition (566.5) to mthun snang ba la ma bzhag par in accordance with the TBRC bla brang (644.5).

B” EXPLAINING OUR OWN SYSTEM {4 PARTS} གཉིས་པ་རང་གས་ལ་བཞི་ལས། 1: The question—Which of the two truths is it?— needs to be applied to the meaning spoken དང་པོ་གངས་པའི་དན་བདོ ན་གཉེ ིས་གང་ཡན་ི ིས་པ་ལ་ར་ དགོས་པ་ན།ི The mode of analysis is not such, and the master [Bhāvaviveka] is a skilled scholar; therefore, the meaning of that passage is as follows: The master

Bhāvaviveka asks the other party, “As which of the two truths, conventional or ultimate, is the meaning of that sign ‘because the One-Gone-Thus said so,’ which the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things stated as a proof, existent?” Hence, when such is asked, if that sign is said to be conventional, such a sign is not asserted in that way to exist conventionally by Proponents of [Truly Established] Things themselves, due to which it is not established for the other party themselves, and if that sign is said to exist ultimately, since we Proponents of the Middle refute that any existent, nonexistent, or both [existent and nonexistent] effects, such as the internal sense-fields, are ultimately produced from causes, it is not established for us Proponents of the Middle, and an object that is neither of the two truths, conventional or ultimate, does not occur and is not asserted by either of us [that is, Proponent of (Truly Established) Things or Proponents of the Middle]; therefore, it is not necessary for the master Bhāvaviveka to make a clarifying refutation of this. དེས་ན་དེ་བཞིན་གཤགས་པས་གངས་པའེ ི་ིར། ཞེས་པའི་ གས་ཀྱི་དན་དོ ེ་བདན་གཉེ ིས་གང་ཡིན་ཞེས་འི་བ་ཡན་པས་ི ཀུན་བ་པ་ཡོ ིན་ན་ནི་རང་ཉད་དི ་ར་མེ ི་འདོད་པས་རང་ལ་ མ་བ་ལ། དོན་དམ་པར་ཡིན་ན་ངེད་ཀྱས་དི ན་དམ་་འས་ོ ་ཡོད་པ་དང་མད་པ་དང་གཉེ ས་ཀ་་ལས་ི ེ་བ་བཀག་པས་ ངེད་ལ་མི་འབ་ཅིང༌། བདན་གཉེ ིས་གང་འང་མད་པའེ ི་དོན་ ནི་མི་འདད་པས་དོ ེ་གསལ་བར་མཛད་མི་དགས་སོ ོ། ། 2: How distinctions are needed in terms of applying the question in that way to other signs གཉིས་པ་ད་བཞེ ིན་་གས་གཞན་ལ་དེ་ར་ི་བ་ར་ལ་ གྱིས་ཞིབ་ཆ་དགོས་ལ་ནི། Concerning the master Bhāvaviveka’s mode of questioning examining the opposing party: When [Bhāvaviveka himself] states “because of being an element” in “earth is not ultimately an entity of hardness because of being an element,” if [one holds that Chandrakīrti] is asking which of the two

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} Four Interwoven Annotations 39 truths, ultimate or conventional, is the elementa that is stated as the sign, this is logically feasible like what was [correctly] explained earlier as our own system, but if one were to propound that [Chandrakīrti] is asking, “Which element of the two truths, conventional or ultimate, is being stated as the sign?” then [Chandrakīrti] would have utterly not understood the master Bhāvaviveka’s assertion, the opponent in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words. Moreover, having asked thus in accordance with the above mode of examination questioning, “Which of the two truths is the element that is stated as the sign?”b how would it be suitable [for Bhāvaviveka] to say— that is, it would not be suitable to say—“If that element is ultimate [that is, ultimately established], it is indeed not established for us Proponents of the Middle Way, but if that element is conventional [that is, conventionally established], it would not be established for the other, the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things.” For, if it were not unsuitable [for Bhāva- viveka] to speak thus, well then since even the internal sense-fields posited as subjects by the opponent exist conventionally, they would be unestablished [that is, unconfirmed] by those opponents, the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things. དེ་ལ་འང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པ་ན་གས་་བཀོད་ པའི་འང་བ་དེ་བདན་གཉེ ིས་གང་ཡིན་ཞེས་འི་ན་་མ་དང་ འ་བ་ཡན་གྱི ི། བདན་གཉེ ིས་ཀྱི་འང་བ་གང་གས་་འགོད་ ཅེས་་ན་ོགས་་གཏན་མ་གོ་བའོ། ། དེ་ར་བདེན་གཉིས་ གང་ཡིན་ས་ནས་དི ན་དམ་ཡོ ིན་ན་རང་ལ་མ་བ་པ་ཡིན་ ཀྱང༌། ཀུན་ོབ་པ་ཡིན་ན་གཞན་ལ་མ་བ་ཅེས་ཇི་ར་བོད་ ་ང་།ེ དེ་་མ་ཡན་ན་ཆི ོས་ཅན་་བཞག་པའི་ནང་གི་ེ་ མཆེད་ཀྱང་ཀུན་བ་་ཡོ ོད་པའི་ིར། ར་ི ལ་དོ ེ་དག་གིས་མ་ བ་པར་འར་བའི་ར་རི ོ། །

a That is, “Is this element ultimately established or conventionally established?” b That is to say, “Is that element an ultimate truth or a conventional truth?”

3: The wrong idea wondering whether [Bhāvaviveka] explicitly asserts this གམ་པ་ད་དངེ ོས་་ཁས་ང་ངམ་མ་པའ་ལི ོག་ོག་ནི། Therefore, one should not say such. One might wonder, “Well, in what way does Bhāvaviveka come to assert the mode of investigating the second party’s sign in terms of the two truths, the non-establishment of the reason and so forth as expressed above?” འོ་ན་ཇི་ད་བད་པ་དེ་ལེགས་ན་འེད་ཀྱིས་གས་ལ་ བདེན་གཉས་ཀྱི ི་བག་པ་ས་པ་དེས་ཁས་ངས་གས་ཇི་ར་ ཡིན་མ་ན། 4: How although [Bhāvaviveka] does not assert it explicitly, the consequence is flung that he asserts it བཞི་པ་དངས་་ཁས་མ་ངས་ཀྱང་ང་བར་ཐལ་བ་འཕང་ོ ལ་ན།ི Here I will explain how it is [that Bhāvaviveka comes to assert this]. Here the master Chandrakīrti, thinking that an object found by a nonmistaken consciousness is an ultimate and an object found by a mistaken consciousness is a veiling (kun rdzob pa), questions, “Which of the two truths is it?” He asks this thinking that this question must go to the same point as the question,a “By which of the two, a mistaken consciousness or a nonmistaken consciousness, is it found?” the evidence for which is as follows: If the meaning stated as the sign is neither a veiling (kun rdzob pa) nor an ultimate, then that sign must be nonestablished,b and also if the meaning stated as the sign is notc an object found by either of those two, a mistaken or a nonmistaken consciousness, then the a That is, “means the same as the question.” b This is the type of reasoning that Bhāvaviveka used against the Proponents of Truly Established Things. c Correcting don yin na in the Delhi edition (kha, 285a.2/569.2) to don ma yin na in accordance with the TBRC bla brang (243a.5/647.5).

meaning stated as the sign must be nonestablished. The two necessary nonestablishments are similar in terms of the evidence, and within being logically forced by [Chandrakīrti’s] reasoning of a simi- larity of evidence, it is said in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words that this Bhāva- viveka himself has come to assert that the sign—“because of existing”— and so forth are not established, but it is not that the master Bhāvaviveka himself explicitly asserts such. བཤད་པར་་ེ། འདིར་ོབ་དཔན་གྱོ ིས་མ་འལ་བའི་ཤས་ེ པས་ེད་པ་དེ་དོན་དམ་པ་དང༌། འལ་བའི་ཤེས་པས་ད་པ་ེ དེ་ཀུན་བ་པ་ཡོ ིན་པ་ལ་དགངས་ནས་བདོ ན་གཉེ ིས་གང་ཡིན་ ཞེས་པ་ད།ེ དེ་གཉས་གང་གི ིས་ད་པ་ཡེ ིན་ཞས་པ་དང་གནད་ེ གཅིག་་འགྲོ་དགས་པ་ལ་བསམས་པ་ོ ེ། འདི་ར་གས་་ བཀོད་པའི་དོན་དེ་ཀུན་ོབ་པ་དང་དོན་དམ་པ་གང་ཡང་མ་ ཡིན་ན་གས་དེ་མ་བ་པར་འར་དགོས་པ་དང༌། གས་་ བཀོད་པའི་དོན་དེ་མ་འལ་བ་དང་འལ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་གཉིས་ གང་ང་གས་ི ེད་པའ་དི ོན་མིན་ན་གས་་བཀོད་པའ་དི ོན་ དེ་མ་བ་པར་འར་བ་་མཚན་མངས་པ་ལ། འདིས་རང་ གིས་ཁས་ངས་ཞེས་གངས་པ་ཡན་གྱི ་དངི ས་་ཁས་ངས་པ་ོ མིན་ན།ོ ། This master Bhāvaviveka posits objects found by nonmistaken eye consciousnesses and so forth as the meanings that are the signs; therefore, in all syllogisms stated by Bhāvaviveka, phenomena that are actualitiesa— substantially established in the sense of being established by way of their character—are stated as reasons, due to which in that passage in the Clear Words the master Chandrakīrti spoke within specifying phenomena that are actualities, that is, established by way of their own character, saying, “those phenomena that are actualities stated as reasons.” From among a dngos po’i chos.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} 42 Four Interwoven Annotations those signs, such as form sense-fields and so forth, and elements and so forth stated by Bhāvaviveka himself, some signs are indeed asserted as manifestly established by nonmistaken sense direct perception, and for some signs, although not manifestly established by direct perception due to being hidden to the sense powers, the eye and so forth, it is indeed asserted that a valid cognition that is the means of establishing them in the end is posited as a nonmistaken direct perception,a but this master, the honorable Chandrakīrti, denies this nonmistaken direct perception that estab- lishes such. དེའི་ིར་དངོས་པོའི་ཆས་གཏན་ཚོ གས་་བཀི ད་པ་མས།ོ ཞེས་ དངོས་པའོ ི་ཆོས་དམིགས་ཀྱིས་བཀར་ནས་གངས་སོ། ། བ་ོ དཔོན་ལེགས་ན་འད་ནེ ི་རང་གིས་བཀད་པའོ ི་གགས་ཀྱི་ེ་ མཆེད་སོགས་དང་འང་བ་སོགས་ཀྱི་གས་དེ་དག་ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་ དབང་པའོ ི་མངོན་མ་མ་འལ་བས་དངོས་་དང༌། མག་ི སོགས་དབང་པོའི་གས་ོག་ར་ཡིན་པས་མངོན་མ་གྱིས་ དངོས་་མ་འབ་ཀྱང་གས་ཁ་ཅི ིག་ནི་མཐར་གགས་པའི་ བ་ེད་མངོན་མ་མ་འལ་བ་ལ་བཞད་མེ ད་ཀྱང༌།ོ བ་ོ དཔོན་་བའི་ཞབས་འདིས་དེ་འགག་པ་ཡོ ིན་ནོ། ། Therefore, since the master Bhāvaviveka [holds] that “own-powered” (rang dbang), or “autonomous” (rang rgyud), is that, concerning this also, as a proof of the unreasonableness of asserting objects established by way of their own character, like the citation earlier in the passage from Chan- drakīrti’s Clear Words, “whoever is a Proponent of the Middle has no assertion of another position”b [Chandrakīrti] quotes Nāgārjuna’s Refutation

a The subject, the sign, and so forth either are manifestly established by direct perception, or their establishment eventually meets back to direct perception; this is also asserted in the Consequence School according to Tsong-kha-pa. b This is a paraphrase; Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words makes this statement and goes on to cite a stanza from Āryadeva and then an initial stanza from Nāgārjuna which I provide for the sake of more context:

Also, it is not suitable for one who is a Proponent of the Middle to make autonomous inferences because of not asserting other positions [that is, those among the four extremes]. Moreover, Āryadeva explains (Four Hundred, XVI.25; P5246, vol. 95, 140.2.4): Even over a long period of time Censure cannot be expressed Of one who has no position of existence, Nonexistence, or existence and nonexistence. Also Refutation of Objections (stanza 29) says: If I had any [inherently existent] thesis, Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis that there is no inherent existence]. Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis, I am only faultless. ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། ད་མ་པ་ཡིན་ན་རང་ད་གྱི་ེས་་དཔག་པ་་བར་རིགས་པ་ ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ོགས་གཞན་ཁས་ལེན་པ་མེད་པའི་ིར་རོ། ། ཞེས་པ་ནས་[དེ་ད་་ ཡང་འཕགས་པའི་ས། ། ཡོད་དང་མེད་དང་ཡོད་མེད་ཅེས། ། ོགས་ནི་གང་ལ་འང་ ཡོད་མིན་པ། ། དེ་ལ་ན་ནི་རིང་པོ་ནའང༌། ། ཀླན་ཀ་བོད་པར་ས་མ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་ བཤད་དོ། ། ོད་པ་བོག་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་། གལ་ཏེ་ངས་དམ་བཅས་འགའ་ཡོད། ། དེས་ན་ ང་ལ་ོན་དེ་ཡོད། ། ང་ལ་དམ་བཅའ་མེད་པས་ན། ། ང་ལ་ོན་མེད་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན། ། གལ་ ཏེ་མངོན་མ་ལ་སོགས་པའི། །དོན་གྱིས་འགའ་ཞིག་དམིགས་ན་ནི། །བ་པའང་བོག་ པར་་ན་དེ། །མེད་ིར་ང་ལ་ཀླན་ཀ་མེད། ། ཅེས་གངས་སོ། ། Stanza 29; P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.1. See also K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst, The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 23. See Jeffrey Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka: Jam-yang- shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 2 (Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, October 2017: uma-tibet.org), 28. a Stanza 30; P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.1. See also K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst, The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 23. Jam-yang-shay-pa cites only the first line and “and so forth”; I have filled in the rest. The annotations are from Four Interwoven Annotations, 478.1-478.2.

Direct perception and so forth—did observe some inherently established objects of comprehension, Then it would be reasonable to prove those in your own system or refute others, but since observing Objects of comprehension by such valid cognitions does not exist even in conventional terms, there is no chance for you to censure or challenge me. these being for the sake of proving this to the followers of the partisans of the master Bhāvaviveka. དེས་ན་བ་དཔོ ོན་ལགས་ན་གྱེ ས་རང་དབང་ངམ་རང་ད་ི ཡིན་ཞེས་པ་དེ་ཡིན་པས་འདི་ཡང་ར་ངས་པ་ར་ད་མ་པ་ ཡིན་ན་གས་གཞན་ཁས་ངས་པ་མོ ེད་པའི་ར།ི ཞས་རང་གེ ི་ མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བ་པའི་དོན་ཁས་ང་བར་མི་རིགས་པའི་བ་ ེད་། གལ་ཏེ་མངོན་མ་ལ་སགས་པའོ །ི །[དོན་གྱིས་འགའ་ཞིག་ དམིགས་ན་ནི། །བ་པའང་བོག་པར་་ན་དེ། །མེད་ིར་ང་ལ་ཀླན་ཀ་མེད། །] ཞེས་སོགས་ངས་ནས་རང་མཚན་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་མད་པར་ེ གངས་པ་མས་ཀྱིས། ོབ་དཔན་ལོ ེགས་ན་འེད་ཀྱི་ོགས་ འཛིན་པ་ལ་བབས་པའི་ིར་རོ། །

B) HOW THOSE FALLACIES ARE NOT THE SAME FOR USa {6 PARTS} གཉིས་པ་རང་ལ་མི་མངས་པའི་ལ་ལ་ This has six parts: how other-renowned [reasons] are flawless, identifying

a Earlier in the Annotations, 525.2, this heading was announced as: “How that repudiation is not the same for our own system”; see the previous volume, 36. The present annotation (570.5) is, in a sense, more specific.

a That is, the name.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} 46 Four Interwoven Annotations གལ་ཏེ་གཞན་གྱི་ེས་དཔག་ལ་ཆས་ཅན་དང་གས་མ་བ་པ་ོ ལ་སོགས་པའི་ོན་བད་པ་མས་རང་གོ ི་ས་དཔག་ལའང་ེ ོན་་འར་བ་མ་ཡན་ནམ་དི ས་ན་གཞན་ལ་བལ་བར་མེ ི་ འོ་མ་ན། Response: The ensuing of those fallacies expressed above to others— Autonomists and Proponents of [Truly Established] Things—arises through the force of those others’ having asserted autonomous inferences, or syllogisms, whereas we Middle Way Consequentialists do not assert autonomous inferences, or syllogisms, due to which Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says that we do not have those fallacies expressed above. Here—on this occasion—the “inferences” mentioned are to be taken as syllogisms or syllogistic statements.a What is the evidence that those fallacies arise when one asserts autonomous syllogisms and that those fallacies do not ensue when one does not assert autonomy? The Sovereign of Reasoning [Dignāga in his Compilation of Valid Cognition] uses the convention “inference for others” for a syllogistic statement (sbyor ngag) in explaining the two inferences:b Inference is of two aspects—[inference] for oneself Is to see the meaning [that is the probandum] from a sign that is the three modes. Inference for others Makes illumination of meaning seen by oneself. གཞན་ལ་ན་དོ ེ་དག་འོང་བ་ནི་རང་ད་ཀྱ་ི ེས་དཔག་ཁས་ ངས་པས་འང་ལ། ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་ནི་རང་ད་ཀྱི་ེས་དཔག་ཁས་ མི་ལེན་པས་ོན་དེ་དག་མེད་པར་གངས་ཏེ་འདིར་ས་དཔག་ེ མས་ནི་ར་བ་ལ་་ོ ེ་རིག་པའ་དབང་ག་གི ིས། ས་དཔག་ེ

a These syllogisms are speech intended for someone else; they are not actual inferences because inferences are consciousnesses. b Dignāga, tshad ma kun las btus pa (pramāṇasamuccaya), in bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4203), BDRC W23703.174:189-304 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 4a.3.

• if autonomy is asserted, then valid cognition—valid with respect to establishment by way of [the object’s] own character—has been asserted as compatibly appearing for both disputants, • whereupon the proposition must be proven by a reason in which the three modes of a sign—the presence of the sign in the subject, the forward pervasion, and the counter pervasion that are confirmed by such valid cognition as established in compatible appearance for both disputants, • and since the proposition must be established thus by way of such a reason, there utterly does not exist such a valid cognition that is a means of establishing that reason, • whereby the subject, reason, and so forth of a syllogism stated in that manner are only nonestablished. རང་ད་ཁས་ལེན་ན་རང་མཚན་ལ་ཚད་མར་ར་པའི་ཚད་མ་ ོལ་བ་གཉས་ཀའི ི་མན་ང་་ཁས་ངས་ནས་དེས་བ་པའི་ ལ་གམ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་བ་པས་བབ་་བབ་དགོས་ལ། དེ་ ར་ན་ཚད་མ་དེ་མེད་པས་ཆོས་ཅན་ལ་སོགས་པ་མས་མ་བ་ པར་འར་རོ། །

a In the corresponding section in volume three of this series—titled Chandrakīrti Un- dermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3, pp. 97-114—Jam-yang-shay- pa cites among the works of Nāgārjuna’s spiritual sons, Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, Bud- dhapālita’s Commentary, and Āryadeva’s Four Hundred.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} Four Interwoven Annotations 49 the likes of the inference, or syllogism, in the statement in Chapter Three (stanzas 2c-3b) of Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom” that upon taking as the sign “not seeing itself,” proves that the eye itself does not—from its own side—see another, a form: About this seeing by the eye, it does not see The entity of the eye itself because itself acting on itself is contradictory. If it—the eye—does not see its own self, How would it—the eye—from its own side perform the seeing of others, a form? Concerning this syllogism, the sign, “not seeing itself,” is asserted by the opposing party and is also asserted by oneself, a Proponent of the Middle,a and also the thesis—that seeing another, a form, is not established by way of its own entity—is asserted by us Proponents of the Middle, whereby such syllogisms are called inferences renowned for another. དེས་ན་གང་ནས་འང་བའི་ས་དཔག་མས་ཀྱང་གཞན་གྱེ ི་ དམ་བཅའ་བ་འགག་པ་ཙམ་གྱོ ི་དགོས་པ་ཅན་གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་ པའི་ེས་དཔག་ཡིན་གྱ་རང་ད་མི ིན་ན།ོ ། འདི་ནི་དཔར་ན།ེ ་ཤེའི་རབ་ེད་གམ་པ་ལས། ་དེ་རང་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ནི། །དེ་ ལ་་བ་མ་ཡིན་ཉིད། །གང་ཞག་བདག་ལ་མི ི་བ་བ། །དེ་གཞན་ དག་ལ་ཇི་ར་བ། །ཞེས་རང་ལ་མི་བ་བ་གས་་ས་ནས་ མིག་གཞན་ལ་མི་བ་བར་བབ་པ་་འ།ོ །འདི་ནི་གས་ རང་གིས་ཀྱང་འདད་ལ་དམ་བཅའ་གཞན་ལ་བ་བ་རང་གོ ི་ངོ་ བོས་བ་པ་མེད་པའང་ད་མ་པས་འདོད་པས་ོར་བ་འདི་

a Both assert the reason, but a Proponent of the Middle asserts it in a different way in that a Proponent of the Middle does not hold that the reason and so forth are certified by a valid cognition that is valid with respect to establishment by way of the object’s own character.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} 50 Four Interwoven Annotations འ་མས་ལ་གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་པའ་ི ེས་དཔག་ཅེས་ཟེར་བ་ཡིན་ ནོ། ། e' A source that all syllogisms stated are not autonomous as some Indians and Tibetans have claimed, but there are other-renowned syllogisms ་པ་་བད་ཁ་ཅོ ིག་ར་ོར་བ་དགོད་པ་ཀུན་རང་ད་མིན་ ལ་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་ར་བ་ཡོ ོད་པའི་ཁུངས་ན།ི In that way also, Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:a [Proponents of autonomous inferences (rang rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa, svatantra-anumāna) come to have these faults,] but we Consequentialists do not use autonomous inferences because the inferences used by us Consequentialists have the fruit—have the purpose—of only refuting erroneous theses of other opponents. Since the master Chandrakīrti asserts that the syllogisms that we Conse- quentialists state are not autonomous syllogisms and have the purpose of only refuting erroneous theses of other opponents, it is not that syllogismsb are not stated in our own system. ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་ནི་རང་ད་ཀྱི་ས་་དཔག་པ་མེ ི་ ོར་ཏེ། ེས་་དཔག་པ་དག་ནི་གཞན་གྱི་དམ་བཅའ་བ་འགོག་ པ་ཙམ་གྱི་འས་་ཅན་ཡིན་པའ་ི ིར་རོ། །ཞས་ེ ོར་བ་བཀོད་ པ་མས་རང་ད་མན་པ་དང་གཞན་གྱི ི་དམ་བཅའ་བ་འགོག་ པ་ཙམ་གྱི་དགོས་པ་ཅན་་བཞད་པས་ེ ོར་བ་མི་འགོད་པ་མིན་ ནོ། ། a Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam- yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Sub- jects, 3 (Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, August 2018, uma-tibet.org, 139). b Without the qualification of “autonomous.”

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} Four Interwoven Annotations 51 2' Setting out other-renown in scripturea {2 parts} གཉིས་པ་ང་གི་bགཞན་གྲགས་བཤད་པ་ལ་ This has two parts: stating the scripture [setting out other-renown] and identifying a meaning. ང་དགོད་པ་དང་། དན་ངོ ོས་བང་བ་གཉས་ལས།ི a' Stating the scripture [setting out other-renown] དང་པོ་[ང་དགོད་པ་]ནི། ==With respect to how in the Consequentialists’ own system the thesis of another, an opponent, is stated and thereupon eliminated, right after that passage in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, it says:c It is as follows. Others,d opponents, think and assert the thesis that the eye sees: You assert on the one hand (kyang) that this eye has the distinctive attribute of not seeing its own entity and also (’ang) assert the contradiction that if it does not have the distinctive attribute of inherently seeing other forms such as blue, then that the eye sees just does not occur. There- fore—that is, because (1) you assert the sign [which is that an eye does not see itself] and this is established by valid a Earlier, this subdivision was announced as “identifying other-renown through scripture” (lung gis gzhan grags ngos bzung ba). b TBRC bla brang (245b.6/652.6) reads lung gis; the Delhi edition (287.4/573.4) reads lung gi; I prefer the former. c Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam- yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Sub- jects, 3 (Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, August 2018, uma-tibet.org, 139- 140). d La Vallée Poussin (Prasannapadā, 34.6 and n. 5) changes paraś cakṣuḥ to paraṃ cakṣuḥ recognizing that the Tibetan (gzhan) does not confirm the change and preferring that it read gzhan la; however, Dr. Vaidya leaves the manuscript as is, and the Four Inter- woven Annotations (573.5) follows the same reading, identifying the term as referring to other parties who assert that the eye sees. I consider La Vallée Poussin’s emendation to be unnecessary.

cognition; and you assert the general pervasions for which signs proving the pervasions do not require proof, a proof statement such as this is flung in order to negate that [position] as follows:a Whatever substratum does not possess the distinctive attribute of seeing its own entity also does not possess the distinctive attribute of inherently seeing others such as blue and so forth. What sort of example illuminates the evidence for its not being so? For example, like a pot which because of not seeing its own entity does not see others inherently. Also, concerning how to prove the pervasion in the meaning exemplified: An eye, the subject on [this] occasion, possesses the attribute of not seeing its own entity; therefore, this subject, an eye, also does not possess the attribute of inherently seeing others such as forms. Because of that evidence, the assertion of the attribute of inherently seeing others— a This proof statement contains the last four members of the five-membered proof statement that Chandrakīrti favors; the first, the thesis, is implicit in Chandrakīrti’s statement of the opponent’s assertion that the eye sees. 1. Thesis: [An eye consciousness does not (inherently) see.] 2. Pervasion: Whatever substratum does not possess the distinctive attribute of seeing its own entity also does not possess the distinctive attribute of inherently seeing others such as blue and so forth. 3. Example: For example, like a pot which because of not seeing its own entity does not see others inherently. 4. Exemplification: An eye, the subject on [this] occasion, possesses the attribute of not seeing its own entity; therefore, this subject, an eye, also does not possess the attribute of inherently seeing others such as forms. 5. Summary: Because of that evidence, the assertion of the attribute of inherently seeing others—forms such as blue and so forth—which is entirely contradictory with the attribute of not seeing its own entity is cleared away just by inference, an other-renowned proof statement—established for themselves, the opponent, a Proponent of [Truly Existent] Things. For Jam-yang-shay-pa’s lengthy discussion of the five-membered proof statement, see Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 2 (Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, October 2017: uma-tibet.org), 110-117.

forms such as blue and so forth—which is entirely contradictory with the attribute of not seeing its own entity is cleared away by inference, an other- renowned proof statement—established for themselves, the opponents, Proponents of [Truly Exist- ent] Things. ོར་བ་བཀད་ནས་དོ འེ ་དམ་བཅའ་སི ེལ་ལ་ཡང་ང་དའེ ི་ མག་ཉིད་ནས། འདི་ར་གཞན་མིག་བའོ་ཞེས་་བར་ོག་ པ་དམ་བཅའ་ཡིན་དེ་ནི་མིག་ལ་རང་གི་བདག་ཉིད་མི་བ་བའི་ ཆོས་ཀྱང་འདོད་ལ། གཞན་བ་བའི་ཆོས་མད་ན་མེ ི་འང་བ་ ཉིད་འང་འགལ་བ་ཁས་ངས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གས་ཁས་ངས་ ཤིང་ཚད་མས་བ། ཁྱབ་པ་བ་ཀྱི་གས་བ་མི་དགས་ོ འི ི་ ཁྱབ་པ་དའེ ་ི ིར་གང་དང་གང་ལ་རང་གི་བདག་ཉད་བ་བ་ི མེད་པ་དེ་དང་དེ་ལ་ནི་གཞན་བ་བའང་ཡད་པ་མ་ཡོ ན་ཏི ེ་ དཔེར་ན་མ་པ་བཞན་ནི ོ། ། དོན་གྱི་ཁྱབ་པ་བ་ལ་མག་ི ལའང་རང་གི་བདག་ཉད་མི ི་བ་བ་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ་དེའ་ི ིར་ གཞན་ལ་བ་བའང་འདི་ལ་མེད་དོ། ། དེའི་ིར་རང་ག་བདག་ི ཉིད་མི་བ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ན་པོ ོ་ལ་སོགས་པ་གཞན་ལ་བ་ བ་ི་ོལ་རང་ལ་གྲགས་པའི་ས་་དཔག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་ེ ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞས་དེ ེ་ལ་བ་པའི་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱ་ི ེས་་དཔག་ པས་སེལ་བར་ེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། ཞེས་གངས་ཏེ། b' Identifying a meaning གཉིས་པ་དན་ངོ ོས་བང་བ་ནི། Here the two:

• “renowned to oneself,” the latter disputant, (phyi rgol rang la grags pa) and • “renowned to the other,” relative to the former disputant, a Proponent of the Middle, (snga rgol dbu ma ltos te gzhan la grags pa) have the same significance—“renowned to the opponent him/herself” (pha rol po rang nyid la grags pa). ི་ོལ་རང་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དང་་ོལ་ད་མ་ལ་ོས་ཏེ་གཞན་ ལ་གྲགས་པ་གཉིས་གནད་གཅག་གི ོ ། 3' Dispelling objections with respect to the meaning and the conventiona of other-renown {10 parts} This has ten parts. གམ་པ་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་དོན་དང་ཐ་ད་ལ་ོད་པ་ངས་པ་ ལ་བ་ལས། a' Refutation of a mistake about the meaning— how in [Chandrakīrti’s] passage [just above] the meaning of “established for them” (de la grub pa, svaprasiddha), or “other-renown” (gzhan grags, parasiddha), does not mean that Proponents of Middle do not assert the subject, the sign, and so forth དང་པོ་ང་ལས་དེ་ལ་བ་པ་ཞས་སམ་གཞན་གྲགས་ཞེ ས་པས་ེ ཆོས་ཅན་དང་གས་སགས་ད་མ་པའོ ི་མི་འདོད་པ་དའེ ་དི ོན་ མིན་ལ་ཏེ་དོན་ལ་འལ་པ་འགག་པ་ནོ ི།

a That is, the name.

Since this system of bringing about the overcoming of the wrong views of the opponents, the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things, through stating other-renowned syllogistic statements by Consequentialists ourselves, is very important, on this occasion let us explain this way of overcoming wrong conceptions in detail. The meaning of “established for them” in this text is not that:

• the subject on this occasion, an eye, • the subject of the example, a pot, • the sign—the attribute that is the means of proof—does not see itself, and • the predicate of the proposition, does not inherently see others, such as blue and so forth, are not asserted in our Consequentialists’ own system and are only asserted by the others, the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things, and hence it does not mean such a sign, pervasion, and so forth must be established for only the opponents, the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things. རང་གིས་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་ོར་ངག་བཀོད་ནས་ལོག་ོག་བོག་ གས་འདི་གལ་ཆེ་བས་ཞིབ་་བཤད་ན་དེ་ལ་བ་པ་ཞེས་པ་ ནི་ཆོས་ཅན་མིག་དང་དཔེ་མ་པ་དང་གས་རང་ལ་མི་བ་བ་ དང་བབ་འི་ཆོས་ན་པོ ོ་ལ་སགས་པ་ལ་མོ ི་བ་བ་མས་ རང་གས་ལ་ཁས་མི་ལེན་ཅང་གཞན་གྱི ས་ཁས་ལི ེན་པ་ཙམ་ ཡིན་པས་གས་དང་ཁྱབ་པ་ལ་སགས་ཕ་རོ ལ་པོ ོ་ཁོ་ན་ལ་བ་པ་ ཞེས་་བ་ནི་དོན་མན་ནི ོ། ། b’ The way the convention “other-renown” is imputed in reliance upon establishment by way of its own character གཉིས་པ་རང་མཚན་གྱས་བ་པ་ལ་བི ོས་ནས་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་ ཐ་ད་བཏགས་ལ་ན།ི

Well then how is the meaning of the text “established for them”? It is as follows: Indeed, in our own Consequentialist system we also assert those—the above two subjects, the proof, the predicate of the proposition, and so forth—but with respect to valid cognitions confirming those two subjects and so forth, such valid cognitions that according to the assertions of the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things must comprehend an object of comprehension established by way of its own entity do not exist even in conventional terms in our own Consequentialist system. However, for the Proponents of Inherent Existence—namely, Autonomists and Pro- ponents of [Truly Established] Things—valid cognition confirming those two subjects and so forth definitely rely on the establishment of such valid cognition comprehending establishment by way of [the object’s] own entity, which for the systems of both the Consequentialists and the Propo- nents of Inherent Existence is on the one hand a compatibly established valid cognition and also a valid cognition comprehending establishment by way of [the object’s] own entity; but it does not at all exist. Hence, that is to say, by reason of subjects and so forth being confirmed by those valid cognitions [this is called] “not confirmed for both systems”—the Conse- quentialists and the Proponents of Inherent Existence; and by reason of being established for others, the Proponents of Inherent Existence, from the approach of these opponents’ having asserted compatible appearance of the subjects and so forth, [the conventions] “renowned to others, the Proponents of Inherent Existence,” (gzhan la grags pa) or “established [that is, confirmed] for others, those Proponents of Inherent Existence,” (gzhan la grub pa) are so called. འོ་ན་ཇི་ར་ཡིན་མ་ན་དེ་དག་རང་གས་ལའང་ཁས་ལེན་ མོད་ཀྱང་ད་དག་བབ་པའེ ི་ཚད་མ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་ གཞལ་་འཇལ་བ་ནི་རང་གས་ལ་ཐ་ད་འང་མེད་ལ། རང་ བཞིན་ཡད་པར་་བ་ལ་དོ ེ་དག་འབ་པ་ནི་ཚད་མ་དེ་བ་པ་ ལ་ངེས་པར་ོས་པས་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་མན་ང་་བ་པའི་རང་ གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པ་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་མེད་པས་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་བ་ པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་པའམ་གཞན་ལ་བ་པ་ཞེས་ ཟེར་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} Four Interwoven Annotations 57 c’ Refuting the mistake thinking: If the subject and so forth in the proof of something are established by valid cognition even for a Proponent of the Middle, what use is the convention “other- renown”? གམ་པ་ད་བ་ཀྱེ ི་ཆས་ཅན་སོ གས་ད་མ་པ་ལའང་ཚད་མས་ོ བ་ན་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱ་ཐ་ད་ཅི ི་་མ་པའ་འལ་པ་དགག་ི པ་ Others object: Well then, since such a valid cognition which is established in compatible appearance does not exist even in conventional terms, it is not logically feasible to assert that the subjects and so forth are confirmed by that valid cognition, for such a valid cognition is harmed by reasoning with respect to the object of its mode of apprehension in accordance with how ignorance superimposes inherent establishment, due to which how could the view of the Middle be found in dependence upon those valid cognitions which are the means of proof! That is, it could not be found! For, if the unmistaken view were found in dependence upon that very evidence of harm by valid cognition, the unmistaken view would be found even through all the erroneous tenets of the Diverged Afara [Nihilists] and so forth! འོ་ན་དེ་འ་བའི་ཚད་མ་ཐ་ད་འང་མེད་པས་དེས་བ་པར་ འདོད་པ་ན་རང་བཞི ན་ི ོ་འདོགས་པ་ར་རགས་པས་གནི ོད་ པས་ན་བ་ེད་དེ་དག་ལ་བེན་ནས་ད་མའི་་བ་ཇི་ར་ ེད་ཚད་མས་གནད་པའོ ི་་མཚན་ལ་བེན་ནས་་བ་མ་ནོར་ བ་ེད་ན་ནི་བ་མཐའ་ིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱས་ཀྱང་ི ེད་ པར་འར་བའི་ིར་རོ་ཞེ་ན་ a rgyang phan, āyata.

Response to the objection: a The objects—eye, form, pot, and so forth—of awareness that these opponents, the Proponents of Inherent Ex- istence, apprehend as existing:

• the subject on this occasion, an eye, • the sign, does not see itself, • the subject of the example, a pot, • and the predicate of the proposition, does not inherently see others, such as blue and so forth are asserted as existing in conventional terms even in our system of the Proponents of the Middle, whereby these objects are not harmed by reasoning. However, concerning the mode of other-renown:

• these opponents, the Proponents of Inherent Existence, do not differentiate individually between the two, the existence of those objects by way of their own entity (rang gi ngo bos yod pa) and existence (yod pa) in general;b • hence they have the conceit that those objects exist confirmed by valid cognitions comprehending objects of comprehension established by way of their own entity in accordance with the measure of how they appear to them. • Reasoning damages the objects posited in their own system, • but how could what is confirmed by conventional consciousnesses unharmed by superficial causes of mistakes, such as eye consciousness and so forth in the continuums of those Proponents of Inherent Exist- ence be refuted by reasoning! They are not refuted! Therefore, in the systems of the two—theirs the Proponents of Inherent Existence and ours the Consequentialists—an assertion of compatible confirmation by valid cognitions comprehending an object of comprehension established by way of its own entity utterly does not occur, whereby without being proven by means of an autonomous sign, a mere demonstration

a If the Proponents of the Middle also assert the subject and so forth, why are these called “renowned to others”? Hence, it would seem that the Proponents of the Middle should not assert the existence of these. Therein is the need for Tsong-kha-pa to say that the Proponents of the Middle do not refute the existence of these objects; Tsong-kha-pa is saying that the term other-renown does apply to eyes, pots, and so forth. b This differentiation cannot be done before gaining the view of emptiness of inherent existence.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} Four Interwoven Annotations 59 of a contradiction in their assertions by way of a reason renowned to themselves, the Proponents of Inherent Existence, is made. [What is said about] this syllogistic statement is permissible to be applied to a consequence. ོད་ལན། ི་ོལ་འདས་ཆི ོས་ཅན་མིག་དང་གས་རང་ལ་མི་ བ་བ་དང་དཔེ་མ་པ་དང་ཆས་ོ ོན་པོ་སགས་ལ་མོ ི་བ་བ་ ཡོད་པར་འཛིན་པའི་ལ་མས་ན་རང་གི ི་གས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་ཐ་ ད་་ཡད་པར་འདོ ད་པས་དོ ེ་དག་ལ་རིགས་པས་གནད་པ་མ་ོ ཡིན་ནོ། ། འོན་ཀྱང་གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་ལ་ན།ི ི་ོལ་དས་དེ ེ་ དག་རང་ག་ངི ོ་བོས་ཡད་པ་དང་ཡོ ོད་པ་གཉས་སི ོ་སོར་མ་ི ེད་ པས་དེ་མས་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་གཞལ་་འཇལ་བའི་ ཚད་མས་བ་པར་ོམ་པའི་ལ་ལ་རིགས་པས་གནོད་ཀྱང་ཁོའི་ ད་ཀྱི་ཐ་ད་པའི་ཤས་པ་གནེ ད་པ་མོ ེད་པ་མས་ཀྱིས་བ་པ་ རིགས་པས་ག་ལ་འགགོ ། དེས་ན་ཁའོ ི་གས་དང་རང་གི་གས་ གཉིས་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བས་བ་པའོ ་གཞལ་་འཇལ་བའི ི་ཚད་མ་ མན་ང་་བ་པ་ཁས་ངས་མ་ང་བས་རང་ད་ཀྱིས་མི་ བབ་པར། ཁོ་རང་གི་ཁས་ངས་ལ་འགལ་བ་ོན་པ་ཙམ་ེད་ པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། འདིའི་ར་ངག་ཐལ་འར་ལ་ར་ཆོ ོག ། d’ If, without it being thus, everything renowned to those [opponents] was refuted by valid cognition, how could they generate the view of the Middle? བཞི་པ་དེ་ར་མ་ཡན་པར་དི ེ་ལ་གྲགས་ང་ཀུན་ཚད་མས་ ཁེགས་ན་དས་ད་མའེ ་་བ་ཇི ི་ར་བེད་པ་ནི། With respect to how to demonstrate such a contradiction, let us illustrate it

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} 60 Four Interwoven Annotations with the above other-renowned syllogistic statement: An eye does not by way of its own entity see others, forms, because of not seeing itself, like a pot. (mig ni gzhan gzugs la rang ngos nas mi lta ste/ rang gi bdag nyid la mi blta ba’i phyir dper na bum pa bzhin no//) The attribute of “not seeing itself,” stated as the sign, exists in the substratum subject, the eye, in conventional terms, but the attribute of “seeing others, blue and so forth, that is established by way of its own entity,” does not exist even in conventional terms in that subject, the eye, whereby the former attribute in the substratum subject, “not seeing itself,” is suitable as a means of refuting the latter attribute, “by way of its own entity seeing others, forms.”a However, if it were the case that those two, the sign, “not seeing itself,” and the predicate of what is negated, “by way of its own entity seeing others, forms,” existed, they would equally exist, and if they did not exist, they would equally not exist, then how would it be suitable to posit those two, the sign and the predicate of what is negated, as means of damage, the sign, and the damaged, the predicate of what is negated! དེའི་ལ་ན་ར་བཀི ད་པའོ ི་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་ོར་བ་དེ་ལ་ མཚན་ན་ཆས་ཅན་མོ ག་དི ེ་ལ་རང་ལ་མི་བ་བའི་གས་ནི་ཐ་ ད་་ཡད་ལ།ོ ོ་སོགས་ལ་བ་བ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པ་ནི་དེ་ ལ་ཐ་ད་འང་མེད་པས་་མ་དེ་ི་མ་འགོག་ད་་ང་གེ ི་ མིག་ལ་གས་དེ་དང་དགག་འི་ཆོས་དེ་གཉས་ཡི ོད་ན་ཡོད་ མཉམ་དང་མེད་ན་མད་མཉམ་་སེ ོང་ན་དེ་གཉིས་གནད་ོ ེད་ དང་གནོད་ར་ག་ལ་ང་།

a This also shows that the Proponents of Middle do not refute everything conventionally because the one existing conventionally is needed to demonstrate that the other does not exist even conventionally.

a This point cannot be carried over to all consequences. b Proponents of the Middle could prove the existence of the subject and so forth if they had to, but in this case the opponent already asserts them.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} 62 Four Interwoven Annotations g’ If knowing [the subject and so forth are established, opponents] deny it, then it is not reasonable to debate བན་པ་རང་གིས་ཤས་ཀྱང་བེ ན་ན་ོ ོད་མི་རིགས་པ་ནི། If [opponents,] despite asserting those, make a pretension of the opposite and say, “Since those subjects, the eyes and so forth, are not established, you Proponent of the Middle, prove them!” then since this is not at all not a false pretension, debating with these pretending deniers has no fruit or purpose at all. Hence, who with a mind would partner to debate with these makers of false denials! These are unfit to act as debating partners! གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ལའང་བན་ནས་ཁོ ོ་བོ་ཅག་ལ་མ་བ་པས་བས་ ཤིག་ཅས་ཟེ ེར་ན་ནི་མི་བོན་པ་འགའ་ཡང་མད་པས་དེ ེ་དག་ དང་བད་པ་ལ་འས་་མེད་པས་དེའི་་བ་་ཞོ ིག་གས་ི ེད། h’ Objection that the convention “other-renown” is not feasible བད་པ་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་ཐ་ད་མི་འཐད་པའི་ོད་པ་ནི། On this occasion someone objects: If you are to demonstrate the contradiction between the two assertions by the opponent, the Proponent of In- herent Existence, 1. the assertion of the attribute “not seeing itself” with the subjects, the eye and so forth, and 2. the acceptance that “the seeing of others, blue and so forth, has an inherent nature, that is, establishment by way of its own entity,” well then you must tell by what evidence will this opponent know those two assertions as contradictory? If those two assertions are established by the opponent’s valid cognition as being contradictory, then that contradiction must be established for the systems of both the Consequentialist and the opponent; therefore, do not use the expression “other-renowned inference” when other evidence does not exist for calling this syllogistic statement demonstrating that contradiction an “other-renowned inference”!

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} Four Interwoven Annotations 63 འདིར་ཁ་ཅག་ན་རི ེ་གལ་ཏེ་ཕ་རོལ་པོས་རང་ལ་མི་བ་བ་དང་ ོ་སོགས་ལ་བ་བ་རང་གི་ངོ་བས་བ་པའོ ་རང་བཞི ན་ཡི ོད་ པར་འདད་པ་ལ་འགལ་བ་ོ ོན་ན་འགལ་བར་ཅིས་ཤེས་འགལ་ བ་ཡིན་པར་ཚད་མས་བ་ན་ནི་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་འབ་དགས་པས་ོ གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་པ་ཞས་མེ ི་འོ། ། i’ Avoidinga a very absurd consequence if other- renown is accepted due to assertion དགུ་པ་ཁས་ངས་ཀྱས་གཞན་གྲགས་འདི ད་ན་ཧ་ཅང་ཐལ་བ་ོ ང་bབ་ནི། [objection continued] If the demonstration of contradiction is posited by way of the opponent’s having asserted that those two are contradictory, then since the opponent asserts the two, the attribute “not seeing itself” and “the seeing of others by way of its own entity,” as only not contradictory, it is not logically feasible to posit a demonstration of contradiction by way of that opponent’s assertion. And also if the demonstration to the opponent of the contradiction is posited by way of oneself, the Consequentialist, having asserted those two as contradictory, it would be very absurd! For, in this case, since you would necessarily be demonstrating contradiction to the opponent saying, “It is unreasonable for you to assert these two attributes as noncontradictory because we assert these two attributes as contradictory,” how would it be suitable for you to propound this way to an opponent! That is, it is not suitable!

a The Delhi edition (kha, 290b.1/580.1) and the TBRC bla brang (249b.4/660.4) as well as the 2016 Go-mang mchan bzhi (468.19) and the recent digital edition by the Mundgod Go-mang College Library of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations read spang ba. It seems to me that it should be corrected it to ’phang ba (“fling”) for the sake of the meaning. b See the previous note. {KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} 64 Four Interwoven Annotations ཁས་ངས་པས་འགལ་བར་འཇག་ན་ནོ ི་རང་ལ་མི་བ་བ་དང་ གཞན་ལ་བ་བ་གཉས་ཕ་རི ོལ་པོས་ནི་མི་འགལ་བར་འདད་ོ པས་དེའི་ཁས་ངས་ཀྱས་འགལ་བར་འཇི ག་པ་མོ ི་འཐད་ལ། རང་གིས་འགལ་བར་ཁས་ངས་པས་འཇག་ན་ནོ ི་ཧ་ཅང་ཐལ་ ཏེ། ི་ོལ་ལ་ཁྱེད་ཀྱས་འདི ི་མི་འགལ་བར་འདོད་པ་མི་རིགས་ ཏེ། ཁོ་བོས་འདི་འགལ་བར་ཁས་ངས་པའི་ར་རི ོ། ། ཞེས་ཇི་ ར་ར་ང་མ་ན། j' Response {two parts} བ་པ་ལན་ This has two parts: the actual answer and dispelling objections. དངོས་དང་། ོད་ང་གཉིས་ལས།

1” ACTUAL ANSWER དང་པོ་[ལན་དངོས་]ནི། The fallacy you have expressed in this manner does not exist for us; since the contradiction—that if the eye’s seeing does not see itself, it is contradictory that its seeing has the nature of being established by way of its own entity—is in general established by valid cognition, the contradiction is not posited as demonstrated merely through having been asserted by the opponent. ོན་དེ་ནི་མེད་ད།ེ རང་ལ་མི་བ་ན་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་ རང་བཞན་ཡི ོད་པར་འགལ་བ་ནི་ཚད་མས་བ་པས་ཁས་ངས་ ཙམ་གྱས་མི ་འཇི ོག་གོ །

2” HOW TO CHERISH CHANDRAKĪRTI’S SYSTEM CLEARING AWAY SUCH AN OBJECTION གཉིས་པ་ད་པ་དོ ེ་འ་བ་བསལ་ཏེ་་བའི་གས་གཅས་ལ་ེ ནི། About this one might think: Well then, the opponents’ having ascertained the contradiction upon having demonstrated this valid cognition to them is indeed sufficient, but what is the need for depending on their having asserted it? འོ་ན་ཚད་མ་དེ་ཕ་རལ་པོ ོ་ལ་བན་ནས་འགལ་བ་ངས་པར་ས་ེ པས་ཆོག་མད།ོ ཁོའི་ཁས་ངས་ལ་བེན་པ་ཅི་དགས་མ་ན།ོ Response: With respect to establishing this valid cognition as a valid cognition proving contradiction for the opponents, the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things, this valid cognition must definitely rely on having established that this valid cognition comprehends an object of comprehension established by way of its own entity, and if moreover this comprehension which is established for them, the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things, does not exist, how will the Consequentialists ourselves prove this contradiction to the opponents upon having asserted this comprehension of such an object of comprehension [established by way of its own entity since Consequentialists do not assert it]! We cannot prove it! Although the object of comprehension of that valid cognition does not have the nature of being established by way of its own entity, nevertheless, if—upon the meaning of the noncontradiction of positing this valid cognition itself as a valid cognition has already been established for those Pro- ponents of [Truly Established] Things—one works at proving this contradiction to them through such a valid cognition already established in that way for them, then since they have found the view realizing the absence of inherent existence of all phenomena, what need is there for oneself to prove the contradiction: “It is contradictory for whatever does not see itself to have seeing established by way of its own entity”! From this evidence, if you want to realize the system of the master, the honorable Chandrakīrti, examine in detail the essentials of those points above, and understand those essentials.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} 66 Four Interwoven Annotations དངོས་་བའི་ངོར་འགལ་བ་བ་ད་ཀྱེ ི་ཚད་མར་འབ་པ་ནི་ རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་གཞལ་་འཇལ་བ་བ་པ་ལ་བོས་ ཤིང་དེ་ཡང་མེད་ན་རང་གིས་དེ་ཁས་ངས་ནས་ཇི་ར་འགལ་ བ་བབ་aགཞལ་་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་རང་བཞན་མི ེད་ ཀྱང་། ཚད་མར་འཇོག་པ་མི་འགལ་བ་ཁོ་ལ་བ་ཟིན་ནས་དེ་ འ་བའི་ཚད་མས་བབ་ན་ནི་ཆས་མས་རང་བཞོ ན་མི ད་པར་ེ ོགས་པའི་་བ་ེད་པ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་ལ་རང་ལ་མི་བ་བ་ཡིན་ ན་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་་བ་ཡོད་པར་འགལ་བ་ཡན་ནི ོ། ། ཞེས་བབ་ཅི་དགས།ོ དེས་ན་་བའི་ཞབས་ཀྱ་གས་ི གས་ོ པར་འདད་ན་དོ ེ་དག་ལ་ཞིབ་་དོད་ལ་ཁང་་ད་པར་གྱོ ིས་ ཤིག ། 4' The need for other-renown along with a source {7parts} བཞི་པ་གཞན་གྲགས་དགོས་ལ་ཁུངས་དང་བཅས་པ་ལ་ This has seven parts. བན་ལས། a' Ascertaining the general pervasion in terms of an example from Buddhapālita’s commentary དང་པོ་་པ་ལི་ཏ་ལས། དཔེ་ེང་ནས་ི་ཁྱབ་ངེས་ལ་ནི། a The digital Unicode version of Tsong-kha-pa’s text has a preferred reading with a shad after bsgrub: འགལ་བ་བབ། གཞལ་་ {KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} Four Interwoven Annotations 67

You might wonder: Well then, how is the pervasion—namely, that in what does not see itself, seeing others is necessarily not established by way of its own entity—demonstrated in dependence on what is renowned to Pro- ponents of [Truly Established] Things themselves? འོ་ན་ཁོ་རང་ལ་གྲགས་པ་ལ་བན་ནས་རང་ལ་མེ ི་བ་བ་ལ་ གཞན་ལ་བ་བ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པ་མད་པས་ཁྱབ་གས་ཇེ ི་ ར་ོན་མ་ན། [I] will set out a response to this in accordance with the Buddhapālita Commentarya as follows: For example, [from the fact] that moisture is observed and exists in earth due to its possessing water, and that heat is observed and exists in water due to its possessing fire, and that fragrant odor is observed and exists in clothes due to their possessing [or being infused with] nutmegb flowers, it is seen that the three, moisture and so forth—heat and a fragrant odor—must definitely rely on observation of the three, water and so forth—fire and nutmeg flowers—and you yourself also assert this. Likewise, on the occasion of the exemplified meaning,c if some nature established by way of its own entity exists in things, initially upon such a nature a The Buddhapālita Commentary itself says: Due to observing a nature of things in their own entities, [such] is also observed in the entities of others that possess it; for example, when moisture is perceived in water, then due to possessing it [water, moisture] also is observed in earth, and when heat is perceived in fire, then due to possessing it [fire, heat] also is observed in water, and when just a fragrant odor is perceived in nutmeg flowers, it is also observed in clothing possessing [or infused with] them. How could a thing that does not appear in its own entity be observed in others! For instance, since a foul odor is not observed in nutmeg flowers, it is also not observed in clothing [suffused with them]. Therefore, if the seer sees its own entity, then due to its seeing forms it would be feasible that it sees. However, the seer does not see its own entity. How could what does not see its own entity see others! See also the annotated translation and edited Tibetan text in the Ph.D. thesis by Akira Saito, “A Study of the Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti,” Australian National University, 1984, 51. b Or, jasmine. c don gyi skabs su.

having been observed in a thing, then it must be observed in other phenomena due to their possessing this thing. If that nature which is established by way of its own entity is not initially observed in the thing itself, then how would it further be seen in others possessing it? It would not. For example, if an unfragrant odor is not observed and does not exist in nutmeg flowers, a foul odor, an unfragrant odor, will not be observed and will not exist in clothes possessing [or infused with] those nutmeg flowers. ་ཱ་ལི་ཏའི་འགྲེལ་པ་བཞིན་བཤད་པར་འོ། །དཔེར་ན་་ དང་ན་པས་ས་ལ་ན་དང་མེ་དང་ན་པས་་ལ་ཚ་བ་དང་ ་མའི་མེ་ཏོག་དང་ན་པས་གས་ལ་ོ ི་ཞིམ་པ་དམགས་པ་ནི ི་ ་ལ་སོགས་པ་གམ་པོ་དེ་ལ་ན་ལ་སོགས་པ་གམ་པོ་དེ་ དམིགས་པ་ལ་ོས་དགས་པར་མཐོ ང་ཞོ ིང་། ཁྱད་རང་ཡང་ེ འདོད་པ་ད་བཞེ ིན་་དངོས་པོ་མས་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་ པའི་རང་བཞིན་འགའ་ཞིག་ཡོད་ནའང་རང་བཞིན་དེ་རང་ལ་ དམིགས་ནས་དེ་ནས་དེ་དང་ན་པས་གཞན་ལ་ཡང་དམིགས་ དགོས་པ་ཡན་ནི ོ། ། གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ཐོག་མར་རང་ལ་མ་དམགས་ན་ི དེ་དང་ན་པ་ན་གཞན་ལ་ཡང་ཇི་ར་མཐང་བར་འར་ཏོ ེ། དཔེར་ན་་མའི་མེ་ཏོག་ལ་ི་མི་ཞིམ་པ་མ་དམིགས་ན་དེ་དང་ ན་པའི་གས་ལ་ཡང་ོ ི་ང་བ་མི་དམིགས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} Four Interwoven Annotations 69 b' Source demonstrating the two pervasions of the exemplified meaning subsequent to ascertaining the two general pervasions through three examples གཉིས་པ་་ཁྱབ་གཉི ས་དཔི ེ་གམ་གྱིས་ངེས་ེས་་དོན་གྱི་ aཁྱབ་པ་གཉས་ི ོན་པའ་ཁུངས་ནི །ི Thus, [this passage] indicates that: Having caused the opponents, the Proponents of [Truly Estab- lished] Things, to ascertain the modes of the forward and counter pervasions in accordance with the demonstration above through the two, the examples and the exemplified meaning, by the approach of logical feasibility renowned to them, then the way of applying this to the meaning in the relevant context is: Because of this above evidence, although if an eye also had a nature of seeing established in its own right, then upon being initially observed seeing the eye itself, it would be logically feasible to observe also its seeing forms and so forth when it comes together with objects, forms and so forth, but because an eye does not have seeing itself, it does not by way of its own entity have seeing others, forms. ཞེས་ི་ལ་རང་ལ་གྲགས་པའོ ི་འཐད་པས་ས་་འགྲེ ོ་ོག་ ངེས་་བག་ནས་དེ་ནས་བས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལ་ོར་བའི་ལ་ནི། དེའི་ིར་མག་ལའང་་བའི ི་རང་བཞིན་ཡད་ན་ཐོ ོག་མར་རང་ ལ་བ་བ་དམིགས་ནས་དེ་ནས་གགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་ཚགས་ པ་ན་གགས་ལ་བ་བ་ཡང་དམགས་པར་འཐད་པ་ཞི ག་ན།ི

a Correcting don gyis khyab pa in the Delhi edition (kha, 291b.6/582.6) and the TBRC bla brang (251a.4/663.4) as well as the 2016 Go-mang mchan bzhi (470.22) and the recent digital edition by the Mundgod Go-mang College Library of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations (260.6) to don gyi khyab pa in accordance with dbu ma la ’jug pa’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang ’jug ngogs, Published at Go-mang College, Lhasa, Tibet, date unknown (170a.1).

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} 70 Four Interwoven Annotations མིག་ལ་རང་ལ་བ་བ་མེད་པའི་ར་གཞན་ལ་བ་བ་ཡང་མི ེད་ དོ། ། ཞེས་ོན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། c' Āryadeva also says such གམ་པ་ད་ར་འཕགས་པ་ས་ཀྱང་གངས་པ་ནེ ི། It is as Āryadeva’s Four Hundred also says: If the nature established in its own right of all things Initially is perceived and observed in the things themselves, Well then, why does even the very eye not Apprehend the eye itself! It would! བཞི་བ་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་། དངོས་པོ་ཀུན་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་ནི། །ཐོག་ མར་བདག་ལ་ང་འར་ན། །མག་ཉི ིད་ལ་ཡང་མིག་གིས་ ནི། །ཅི་ཡི་ར་ན་འཛི ན་མི ི་འར། ། ཞེས་གངས་པ་ར་ར།ོ ། d' Explaining that such contradiction cannot be dispelled བཞི་པ་དེ་འའི་འགལ་བ་ོང་མི་ས་པར་བཤད་པ་ནི། Someone might think: Just as although fire does not burn itself, it burns others, fuel (bud shing), so it is not contradictory that although an eye also does not see itself, it sees others, forms. Response to that: Here it is not being refuted merely that in general fire burns fuel and an eye sees forms. Well then, what is being refuted? That an eye’s seeing forms exists by way of its own entity is being refuted. གལ་ཏེ་མེས་རང་མི་བེག་ཀྱང་གཞན་བག་པ་བཞེ ིན་་མིག་ གིས་རང་ལ་མི་བ་ཡང་གཞན་ལ་བ་བ་མི་འགལ་ལོ་མ་་ སེམས་ན་ར་མི ེས་ད་ཤིང་བག་པ་དང་མེ ག་གི ིས་གགས་ལ་

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} Four Interwoven Annotations 71 བ་བ་ཙམ་འགོག་པ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། མིག་ལ་གཞན་ལ་བ་བ་ངོ་ བོས་ཡོད་པ་དེ་འགོག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། e' How within inherent existence, this distinction is not suitable ་པ་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་བ་ན་ཁྱད་པར་དེ་མི་ང་ལ་ན།ི It is thus, that is to say, when here burning of fuel by fire established by way of its own entity must be taken as the example, then the example also is not logically feasible just as the proposition—seeing by an eye established by way of its own entity—is not logically feasible, the evidence for the lack of logical feasibility being as follows: If the two, fire and fuel, have natures that are established by way of their own entity, these two do not pass beyond one or different natures, whereby from those two, one or different natures, which is it? If they are one nature, even fire would burn fire itself. དེ་་ཡིན་དང་མས་ད་ཤེ ིང་བག་པ་ངེ ོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱས་བ་པ་ི དཔེར་ད་དགེ ོས་པས་དེའི་ཚ་དཔ་ཡང་བབ་་བཞེ ིན་་མི་ འཐད་དེ། འདི་ར་མ་དང་ད་ཤེ ིང་གཉིས་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་ བ་པའི་རང་བཞན་ཡི ད་ན་རང་བཞོ ིན་གཅག་དང་ཐ་དད་ི གཉིས་ལས་མི་འདའ་བས་དེ་གཉས་གང་ཡི ིན། གཅིག་ཡན་ན་ནི ི་ མེས་རང་ཉད་བི ེག་པར་འར་ལ། f' A very absurd consequence upon reversing [object and agent] ག་པ་བག་ོ ེ་ཧ་ཅང་ཐལ་བ་ནི། Furthermore, if fire and fuel are one nature, how would fire be the burner and fuel be the burned! It would not be! If they were thus, well then if I reversed them and proposed “Fire is the burned, and fuel is the burner,”

a The words of Āryadeva’s stanza are in red; the Tibetan of Pa-tshab’s alternative translation of Āryadeva’s stanza, extracted from the commentary is: ཚ་བ་མེ་ཉིད་་འར་ཏེ། །ཚ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ཇི་ར་ེག །དེས་ན་ད་ཤིང་ཞེས་་ བ། །ཡོད་མིན་དེ་མེད་མེ་ཡོད་མིན། ། I find it helpful to read the two translations of the stanza together with Tra-ti Ge-she Rin- chen-dön-drub’s commentaries. b That is, Chandrakīrti's commentary translated by Pa-tshab.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} Four Interwoven Annotations 73 interpolate here in accordance with it; hence, [I] have explained it in accordance with that [separate] translation. The former translation accords with Chandrakīrti’s commentary and accords with its rhythm, but it is ev- ident that the thought of those two are not contradictory in thought. གཞན་ཡང་མེ་ེག་ད་དང་ད་ཤེ ིང་བག་ར་ཇེ ི་ར་འར། འར་ན་ན་ཁི ོ་བོས་ཀྱང་མེ་ནི་བེག་འ།ོ །ད་ཤང་ནི ་ི ེག་ ེད་དོ། །ཞས་ས་ན་ལན་ཅེ ི་ཞག་ཡི ོད་གལ་ཏེ་རང་བཞན་སི ོ་སོ་ བ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་ད་ཤང་མི ེད་པར་ཡང་མེ་དམགས་པར་འར་ཏི ེ། ་མེད་པར་བ་གླང་དམིགས་པ་བཞིན་ན།ོ ། བཞི་བ་པ་ལས་ ཀྱང་། མེས་ནི་ཚ་བ་ཉད་ི ེག་།ེ །ཚ་བ་མ་ཡན་ཇི ི་ར་ ེག །དས་ན་ད་ཤེ ང་ཞི ེས་་མད།ེ །དེ་མ་གཏོགས་པར་མེ་ཡང་ མེད། ། ཅས་གངས་པ་ར་རེ ོ། ། g' When there is inherent establishment, that damage is incurred བན་པ་རང་བཞན་གྱི ས་བ་ན་གནི ོད་ེད་དེ་འག་ལ་ནི། In accordance with the explanation above, if it is to be asserted that a nature that is established by way of its own entity exists in burning by fire, then if that fire does not burn itself, it also would not burn others, firewood (bud shing) and so forth; so, likewise, if it is asserted that seeing exists in an eye as a nature that is established from its own side, then if an eye does not see itself, the eye, it must be asserted that it also does not see others, forms, whereby one has not passed and moved beyond the earlier fallacy. དེ་ར་བག་པ་དེ ེ་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་རང་བཞན་ཁས་ི ལེན་ན་ནི་རང་མི་བག་ན་གཞན་ཡང་མེ ི་བེག་པར་འར་བ་ ར་མག་ལ་བ་བའི ི་རང་བཞན་ཁས་ལི ན་ནའང་རང་ལ་མེ ི་

a phyi rgol, now no longer in the opposition since they have realized what the Conse- quentialists have propounded.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} Four Interwoven Annotations 75 and nonexistence in general. Thereby doing such, they will also differentiate the distinction between the two, inherent existence and existence in general, due to which those opponents also will realize presentations of comprehending objects of comprehension without inherent existence by valid cognitions without inherent existence, and so forth. དེ་ར་རང་བཞིན་ཁས་ངས་པ་ལ་གནད་ོ ད་བན་པ་མས་ེ མཐོང་བ་ན། རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་རང་བཞན་ཡི ོད་པར་ འཛིན་པའི་བ་མཐའ་འདོར་བར་འར་ལ། དེ་ནས་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པ་ལ་་ད་འཐད་པ་ཡང་ེ ོགས་པར་ས་པས་ རང་བཞན་མི ེད་པ་དང་མེད་པ་སོ་སོར་ེད་པར་འར་ལ། དེའི་ ིར་རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་པ་དང་ཡོད་པ་ཡང་སོ་སོར་ེད་པར་ འར་བས་རང་བཞན་མི ེད་པའི་གཞལ་་ལ་རང་བཞན་མི ེད་ པའི་ཚད་མས་འཇལ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཡང་གས་པར་འར་བ་ོ ཡིན་ནོ། ། b' Since among the supports of inference there exist the two, reasons and consequences, how there are signs [reasons] having the three modes གཉིས་པ་ས་དཔག་གེ ་ི ེན་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་ཐལ་འར་ གཉིས་ཡད་པས་ལ་གམ་པའོ ི་གས་ཡོད་ལ་ནི། About this, others think: Well then, if when these opponents realize fire and fuel as without inherent existence, the valid cognition in their continuums realizing such is not logically feasible as a direct perception, it must be asserted as an inference, that is, it must indeed be asserted as an inference. Thus, this valid cognition must have a supporting reason from which this valid cognition is generated; hence, what sort of supporting reason is it?

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} 76 Four Interwoven Annotations འོ་ན་འདས་མི ེ་དང་ད་ཤིང་རང་བཞིན་མད་པར་ེ ོགས་པའི་ ཚད་མ་དེ་མངོན་མ་་མི་འཐད་པས་ེས་དཔག་་འདོད་ དགོས་ན། དེ་་ན་དའེ ི་ེན་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཇ་ར་ཡི ིན་མ་ན། The answer to this is as follows: The opponents see that what inherently exists does not pass beyond being either inherently one or inherently different, whereupon when in their perspective inherently established one and different are blocked, they will see that whatever is not existent as either inherently one or inherently different is necessarily not inherently existent. Thereby, at that time the two modes—unmistaken forward pervasion and counter pervasion with respect to the two, the absence of inherent existence and the absence of inherently established oneness and difference—are established for them, and the ascertainment by them that [the subject] does not have either the nature of oneness and difference that is established in its own side is ascertainment of the mode of the presence of the sign in the subject. Hence, a sign having the three modes to be ascertained in this way exists, and ascertainment by them—generated in dependence on such a sign—thinking, “The basal subjects, fire and fuel, are not inherently established,” is an inference. རང་བཞན་ཡི ོད་ན་གཅག་དང་ཐ་དད་ལས་མི ་འདའ་བར་ི མཐོང་ནས། གཅིག་ཐ་དད་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་ཁགས་པ་ན་རང་ེ བཞིན་མེད་པས་ཁྱབ་པར་མཐང་བས།ོ ལ་གཉིས་འབ་ལ་ གཅིག་དང་ཐ་དད་པའ་རང་བཞི ན་མི ེད་པར་ངེས་པ་ན།ི ོགས་ ཆོས་ཀྱི་ལ་ཡིན་པས་ལ་གམ་པའི་གས་ཡོད་ལ། དེ་ལ་ བེན་ནས་མེ་དང་ད་ཤིང་ལ་རང་བཞན་མི ད་དེ ོ་མ་་ངེས་ པ་ནི་ེས་དཔག་གོ །

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} Four Interwoven Annotations 77 c' A similar way also of generating an inference by an other-renowned sign གམ་པ་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་གས་ཀྱས་ི ེས་དཔག་ེ་ལ་ཡང་ འ་བ་ན།ི Through this system of generating ascertainment of fire and fuel as without inherent existence, you will understand the three modes and how to generate an inference also with respect to the other-renowned syllogism stated earlier: “An eye does not see forms inherently because of not seeing itself, like, for example, a pot.” འདིས་ནི་ར་བཀོད་པའི་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་ར་བ་ལའང་ལ་ོ གམ་དང་ེས་དཔག་ེ་ལ་ཤས་པར་འེ ོ། ། d' How to generate the view by a consequence བཞི་པ་ཐལ་འར་གྱས་་བ་ི ེད་ལ་ན།ི The application of this mode to a consequence is as follows: “If fire and fuel have inherent existence, that is, establishment from their own side, they would be either inherently one or inherently different,” and “Also, if those two are inherently one, fire would burn itself,” and so forth. Such flingings of the opponent’s nonasserted as predicates of consequences, having stated as the sign the other’s, the opponent’s, own assertions themselves, are [how to apply this mode in consequences]. Therefore, illustrating it with these consequences, you will realize also other consequences. Let us render this in easily understandable ways according to current conventions: “It follows that the subjects, fire and fuel, are either inherently one or inherently different because of being inherently established,” and “It follows that fire burns itself because fire and fuel are inherently one,” and “It follows that the conventions of burned and burner are confused because those two are inherently one,” and so forth. You should know the systems of putting these together. ཐལ་འར་ནི་མེ་དང་ད་ཤང་ལ་རང་བཞི ན་ཡི ོད་ན་རང་ བཞིན་གཅག་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ང་་འར་རི ོ། ། ཞེས་པ་དང་

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} 78 Four Interwoven Annotations གཅིག་ཡན་ན་མི ེས་རང་ཉིད་བག་པར་འར་རེ ོ་ཞེས་སགས་ོ གཞན་གྱིས་ཁས་ངས་པ་གས་་བཀོད་ནས་ཕ་རོལ་པོ་མི་ འདོད་པ་འཕེན་པ་འད་འ་མས་ཡི ིན་པས་དེས་མཚན་ནས་ ཐལ་བ་གཞན་མས་ཀྱང་ོགས་པར་འོ། ། e' The two, how by such consequences inference is generated and how the propounding of thingness [true existence] is forsaken ་པ་དེ་འའི་ཐལ་འར་གྱིས་ས་དཔག་ེ ད་ལ་དང་།ེ དངོས་་བཏང་ལ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ In accordance with the explanation above, as long as those opponents mentioned earlier have not forsaken the tenets of a Proponent of [Truly Estab- lished] Things, the valid cognitions of their system are established as valid cognitions confirming the factualities (don) of the subject and so forth of their system, upon having definitely relied upon comprehension—by those valid cognitions of their system—of objects of comprehension established by way of their own entities,a but beginning from the time when they realize with valid cognition something as not established by way of its own entity, they give up the tenets of a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things. དེ་་ན་ི་ོལ་དས་ཇེ ་ི ིད་་དངོས་པོ་་བའི་བ་མཐའ་མ་ དོར་བ་དེ་ིད་་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་གཞལ་་འཇལ་བ་ བ་པ་ལ་ོས་ནས་དན་འབ་ོ ད་ཀྱེ ི་ཚད་མར་འབ་པ་ཡིན་ ལ། གང་གི་ཚ་དངས་པོ ་འགའ་ཞོ ག་རང་གི ི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པ་མེད་

a For the opponent, a consciousness becomes a valid cognition with respect to the members of a syllogism within the context of the opponent’s believing that this valid cognition comprehends its object as being established in its own right, that is, established from its own side or established by way of its entity or inherently established.

a Jam-yang-shay-pa’s commentary on this says: About that, [hypothetically] Bhāvaviveka says: It follows that although the two—Chandrakīrti and another party—without having a compatibly appearing mode of establishing the subject, nevertheless have signs damaging [the other party’s wrong positions] due to [the subject’s] being validly established for either of the respective parties because your other-approved signs are such. དེ་ལ་ལེགས་ན་ན་རེ། ་གྲགས་ི་ོལ་བ་གཉིས་ལ་ཆོས་ཅན་བ་ལ་མན་ང་ བ་མེད་པར་ོལ་བ་རང་རང་གང་ང་ལ་ཚད་མས་བ་པས་ཀྱང་གནོད་ེད་ཀྱི་ གས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་གས་དེའི་ིར་ཟེར་ན། Answer: That there are such is very much accepted because a reason validly established for the other party is what is damaging, whereas it is not necessary for it to be established in compatible appearance for the contender oneself because, for example, it is seen in the world that sometimes [in a dispute] one prevails and the other is defeated through the word of a judge and sometimes by the word of the two disputants themselves. [That, for example, it is seen in the world that sometimes (in a dispute) one prevails and the other is defeated through the word of a judge and sometimes by the word of the two disputants themselves] entails [that a reason validly established for the other party is what is damaging, whereas it is not necessary for it to be established in compatible appearance for the contender oneself] because how things are in the world is appropriate also for treatises. It follows [that how things are in the world is appropriate also for treatises] because the Supramundane Victor says, “What is true in the world I also treat as true,” and so forth, and Āryadeva says: Just as a barbarian cannot be Approached with another language, So the world cannot be approached Except with the worldly.

Others say: “Even if the subjects and so forth do not need to be established for both parties [in a debate], is there damage to the opponent by an inferential syllogistic statement even from the approach of an inferential syllogistic statement established for either of the two parties? ཚིག་གསལ་ལས་ཀྱང་། ཡང་ཅི་གང་ཡང་ང་བ་ལ་བ་པའི་ ེས་་དཔག་པའི་ོ་ནས་ཀྱང་ས་་དཔག་པས་གནེ ད་པ་ོ ཡོད་དམ་ཞ་ན་ེ [Answer:] Such exists. It is as follows: This damage moreover is damage to the Proponent of Inherent Existence just by a reason renowned and established to that opponent him/herself, but is not damage to that opponent merely by what is established for the other—the stater, the system of the Proponent of the Middle—because an example illuminating this manner of damage is seen in

དེ་ཡོད་པར་ཤིན་་འདོད་དེ། ི་ོལ་རང་ཉིད་ལ་ཚད་མས་བ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ གནོད་ེད་ཡིན་གྱི་་ོལ་ལ་མན་ང་་བ་པ་མི་དགོས་པའི་ིར། དཔེར་ན་ འཇིག་ེན་ན་རེས་འགའ་དཔང་པོའི་ཚིག་གིས་ལ་ཕམ་དང་རེས་འགའ་ོད་་ གཉིས་རང་རང་གི་ཚིག་གིས་ལ་ཕམ་འེད་པ་མཐོང་བའི་ིར། [དཔེར་ན་འཇིག་ེན་ན་ རེས་འགའ་དཔང་པོའི་ཚིག་གིས་ལ་ཕམ་དང་རེས་འགའ་ོད་་གཉིས་རང་རང་གི་ཚིག་གིས་ལ་ཕམ་ འེད་པ་མཐོང་ན་ི་ོལ་རང་ཉིད་ལ་ཚད་མས་བ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གནོད་ེད་ཡིན་གྱི་་ོལ་ལ་མན་ ང་་བ་པ་མི་དགོས་པས་]ཁྱབ་ེ། འཇིག་ེན་ན་ཇི་ར་ཡིན་པ་བན་བཅོམ་ལ་ཡང་ བས་་བབས་པའི་ིར། [འཇིག་ེན་ན་ཇི་ར་ཡིན་པ་བན་བཅོམ་ལ་ཡང་བས་་བབས་ པ་]དེར་ཐལ། བཅོམ་ན་འདས་ཀྱིས་འཇིག་ེན་ན་གང་བདེན་པ་དེ་ང་ཡང་བདེན་ པར་ེད་སོགས་དང་། འཕགས་པ་ས། ཇི་ར་ཀླ་ཀློ་ད་གཞན་གྱིས། །བང་བར་མི་ ས་དེ་བཞིན་། །འཇིག་ེན་པ་ཡི་མ་གཏོགས་པར། །འཇིག་ེན་བང་བར་ས་མ་ ཡིན། ། ཞེས་གངས་པའི་ིར། Quoting the third volume in this series, Jeffrey Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāva- viveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 [Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, August 2018, uma-tibet.org, 109.

the world.a Example: How is it seen? In the world, sometimes [one party] prevails and [the other] is defeated by the word of a judge from the approach of the two disputants having taken the judge as valid for differentiating truth and falsity, and sometimes victory or defeat comes about only by the words of the assertions uttered by the two disputants themselves, but the defeat or victory of one of them does not come about by the words asserted by the other one from among the two disputants. Scriptural sources: Just as the mode of the victory or defeat of two disputants is in the world, so it is also said to be on the occasion of analysis by reasoning because making presentations of analysis by reasoning from the approach of assertions of only un- deniable meanings renowned in the conventions of the world is said also to be appropriate in treatises teaching presentations of reasoning, as is explained by Āryadeva:b Just as a barbarian cannot be Approached with another language, So the world cannot be approached Except with the worldly. and also Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle:c Without depending on conventionalities, One cannot realize the ultimate. Without realizing the ultimate One cannot attain nirvāṇa. and the Buddhapālita [Commentary]:

a This is the way the world operates. b Four Hundred (bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa, catuhśa- takaśāstrakārikā), VIII.19. For the context, see Karen Lang, Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka: On the Bodhisattva’s Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge. Indiske Studier, 7. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986. See also the Four Interwoven Annotations, 590.2; the passage is cited in Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, 837 n.458. c Translation as in Jeffrey Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 758. In Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Decisive Analysis (2011 TBRC bla brang, 5b.2; 2015 Go-mang Lhasa, 5a.2; and 2007 Taipei codex reprint, 7.8) the third line reads dam pa'i don la ma brten par, whereas the sde dge bstan 'gyur (TBRC W23703-1412, 15a.2; sde dge 3824, vol. 96, 15a.2) has dam pa'i don ni ma rtogs par, which agrees with this translation.

[The Supramundane Victor said, “I] also accept what exists in the world.” ཡོད་དེ། དེ་ཡང་རང་ཉད་ལ་བ་པའི ི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ ཡིན་གྱི་གཞན་ལ་བ་པས་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་འཇག་ི ེན་ཉད་་ི མཐོང་བའི་ིར་རོ། ། དཔེར་ནི།a འཇག་ི ེན་ན་ནི་རེས་འགའ་ དཔང་པ།ོ b ོལ་བ་དང་ི་ོལ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་ཚད་མར་ས་པའི་ ཚིག་གས་ལ་བའམ་ཕམ་པར་འར་ལ།ི རེས་འགའ་ནི། རང་གི་ ཚིག་ཁོ་ནས་འར་གྱི་གཞན་གྱི་ཚག་གི ིས་ནི་ལ་བའམ། ཕམ་ པར་འར་བ་ནི་མ་ཡན་ནི ོ། ། ཤས་ེ ེད་འཇག་ི ེན་ན་ཇི་ར་ ཡིན་པ་དེ་བཞིན་་རགས་པ་ལའང་ཡི ིན་ཏེ། འཇིག་ེན་པའི་ཐ་ ད་ཁོ་ན་རིགས་པའི་བན་བཅས་་ཡང་གངས་ཏོ ེ་འཕགས་ པ་ས་ཀྱང། ཇི་ར་ཀླ་ཀློ་ད་གཞན་གྱིས། །བང་བར་མི་ས་ དེ་བཞན་།ི །འཇིག་ན་པ་ཡེ ིས་མ་ོགས་པ། །འཇིག་ན་ེ བང་བར་ས་མ་ཡན།ི ། ཞས་དང་།ེ ད་མ་ལས་ཀྱང་། ཐ་ད་ ལ་ནི་མ་བེན་པར། །དམ་པའི་དན་ནོ ི་ོགས་མི་འར། ། [དམ་ པའི་དོན་ལ་མ་བེན་པར། །་ངན་འདས་པ་ཐོབ་མི་འར། །] ཞེས་སོགས་ དང་། ད་དྷ་ཱ་ལི་ཏ་ལས། འཇག་ི ེན་ན་གང་ཡོད་པ་[དེ་ ང་]ཡང་བཞད་པར་བཤད་པ་ར་བས་་བབ་པ་ཡེ ིན་པའི་ ིར་རོ། །

a dper na in the Delhi edition (kha, 295a.4/589.4) and c as well as the 2016 Go-mang mchan bzhi (475.1), but dper ni in the recent digital edition by the Mundgod Go-mang College Library of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations (262.17). b Correcting dbang po in the Delhi edition (kha, 295a.4/589.4) to dpang po in accordance with the TBRC bla brang (284b.4/670.4).

a In the third volume in this series (112), Jam-yang-shay-pa identifies this as Dignāga.

together inferences in agreement with our Consequentialist system in dependence upon the world’s presentation, as described above, that one also definitely should assert just this manner of putting together other-renown syllogisms as propounded by us. ཞེས་གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་པ་གས་་ང་བའི་དཔེ་དང་ཤས་ེ ེད་ མས་གངས་ཤང་ི ག་གོ ེ་པ་མས་ི་ལ་ལ་ཚད་མ་གང་ོ གིས་ལ་གམ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བ་པའི་ཚད་མ་དེས། ་ལ་ལ་ོ ཡང་བ་དགོས་པས་ལ་ོ ི་ོལ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་བ་དགས་པར་ོ འདོད་པ་འགོག་པའང་གངས་ཏེ། དེ་ཉིད་ལས། གང་ཞག་གང་ི གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་ངེས་པ་བོད་པ་དེ་ནི་བ་པའམ་ན་འན་པ་ི ཡིན་གྱི་གང་ཡང་ང་བ་ལ་ལ་བ་པའམ་ཐ་ཚེ མ་ཟ་བ་་བ་ནི་ མ་ཡིན་ནོ་མ་་སམས་པ་དེ ེས་ཀྱང་འཇིག་ེན་གྱི་མ་པར་ བཞག་པ་ལ་བེན་ནས་ེས་་དཔག་པ་ལ་ཇི་ད་ས་པའི་ ལ་འདི་ཉད་ཁས་ང་བར་འི ོ། ། h' Very hidden phenomena need not be established by scriptures [accepted] by both but are established by that renowned to the second party him/herself བད་པ་ཤན་ི ོག་ལ་ང་གཉིས་ཀས་བ་མ་དགི ོས་པ་རང་ གྲགས་aཀྱིས་བ་ལ་ན།ི a Correcting grogs in the Delhi edition (kha, 296a.4/591.4), the 2016 Go-mang mchan bzhi (477.14), and the recent digital edition by the Mundgod Go-mang College Library of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations (263.10) to grags in accordance with recent digital edition by the Mundgod Go-mang College Library of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations (262.17) and in accordance with the next heading in all these editions.

For, damage through scripture is not from the approach of only scripture established for both disputants. Through what approach is the damage? It is also from the approach of scripture established for the opponent him/herself. Therefore, with respect to scriptural damage, there is damage from the approach of what is established for both disputants and also damage from the approach of what is what is renowned to only the opponent. འདི་ར་ང་གིས་གནད་པ་ནོ ི་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་བ་པའི་ང་ཁོ་ ནའི་ོ་ནས་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འོ་ན་ཅི་ཞ་ན་རང་ལ་བ་པའེ ི་་ནས་ོ ཀྱང་ཡིན་ན།ོ ། i' In signs or inferences on an occasion for one’s own sake, renown to oneself is sufficient དགུ་པ་རང་དོན་བས་ཀྱི་གས་སམ་ེས་དཔག་ལ་རང་གྲགས་ ཀྱིས་ཆག་པ་ནོ ི། [Furthermore] in inference for oneself, unlike in scripture, at all times just what is established for oneself is weightier with respect to clearing away wrong conceptions from the viewpoint of greater capacity and more stability. Establishment in compatible appearance for both disputants is not weighty like that. རང་གི་དན་གྱོ ི་ེས་་དཔག་པར་ནི་ཐམས་ཅད་་རང་ལ་བ་ པ་ཉིད་བང་བ་ཡི ིན་གྱི། གཉས་ཀ་ལ་བ་པ་ནི ི་མ་ཡན་ནི ོ། །

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} 86 Four Interwoven Annotations j' How compatibly established definitions for signs and so forth having the three modes in accordance with the Logicians is at all times not needed བ་པ་ག་གོ ེ་ར་ལ་གམ་གྱ་གས་སི གས་ལ་མན་བ་ོ ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉད་ས་ཀུན་་མི ི་དགས་ལ་ནོ །ི Because of that evidence, expression of the definitions of the reasons and so forth of logic that are renowned among the Autono- mists and below is not needed because the Buddhas gradually help beings—who are trainees not knowing the suchnessa of phenomena—providing whatever serves the purpose by the approach of just those tenables, or reasonings, in accordance with what are renowned and appropriate to those trainees themselves. A scripture from the Shāriputra set describes this: If the leaders of the world Do not operate in accordance with the world, No one would know the doctrineb Of the Buddha or the Buddha. and so forth. དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ིར་ོག་གའེ ི་མཚན་ཉད་བི ད་པ་ནོ ི་དགོས་པ་མེད་ པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སངས་ས་མས་ཀྱིས་རང་ལ་ཇི་ར་གྲགས་པའི་ འཐད་པས་དེ་ཁོ་ན་མ་ཤེས་པའི་གལ་འི་་བེ ོ་ལ་ཕན་ བཏགས་པའི་ིར་རོ། ། ་རིའི་འེ ི་ང་ལས། གལ་ཏེ་འཇིག་ ེན་མ་འེན་མས། །འཇག་ི ན་མན་པར་མེ ི་འག་ a With respect to “who do not know suchness” the Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Prasan- napadā, 36.1) is merely tadanabhijña “who do not know that [or those, which could refer to ‘definitions’]” whereas the Tibetan reads de kho na mi shes pa’i “who do not know suchness.” I have followed the Tibetan as it presumably reflects the translators’ reading of tad as meaning tattva (see La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 36, n.3). b chos nyid, taken here as meaning chos.

{KEY: Text without highlight = Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight. Yellow highlight = Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations. Aqua highlight = Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen-dön-drub’s annotations. Magenta highlight indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.} Four Interwoven Annotations 87 ན། །སངས་ས་ཆོས་ཉད་གང་ཡི ན་དང་།ི །སངས་ས་ས་ཀྱང་ ཤེས་མི་འར། །ཞེས་སགས་ཀྱོ ིས་བཤད། ཞས་གངས་སེ །ོ ། 6' Explanation of the meaning established, the meaning of Autonomist and Consequentialist ག་པ་བ་དོན་ཐལ་རང་གི་དན་བཤད་པ་ནོ ི། As explained earlier, this: 1. describes as an “autonomous sign” such a sign—proving a proposition—asserted as established compatibly for both disputants by the approach of valid cognition like described above, comprehending an inherent nature in accordance with the appearance of things, and 2. posits as Consequentialists those who—without the establishment of own-character by that [autonomous sign]—assert proving a proposition through merely the three modes of a sign whose own-character appears, or is renowned, to the awareness of the other disputant. Therefore, that the former mode of positing is refuted and that the latter abides in fact—emerges very clearly as the thought of the master Chan- drakīrti through his statements in the Clear Words and so forth. དེ་ར་ན་ར་བཤད་པ་་འི་རང་བཞན་ལ་ཚད་མས་ི ོལ་བ་ གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་བ་པའི་གས་ཀྱིས་བབ་་བ་པར་aའདད་ོ པའི་གས་དེ་འ་བ་ལ་རང་ད་ཀྱི་གས་ཞེས་བཤད་པ་དང་ རང་མཚན་ལ་དེ་ར་དེས་མི་འབ་པར་ི་ལ་གཞན་ལ་རང་ོ མཚན་ོ་ལ་ང་བའམ་གྲགས་པའ་ལ་གམ་གྱི ིས་བབ་་

a Correcting sgrub pa rang ’dod in the Delhi edition (kha, 296b.5/592.5), the TBRC bla brang (286a.6/673.6), and the 2016 Go-mang mchan bzhi (478.19) to sgrub par ’dod in accordance with the recent digital edition by the Mundgod Go-mang College Library of Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations (264.1).

Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teaching All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings ེས་་གམ་གྱི་ཉམས་་ང་བའི་རིམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཚང་ བར་ོན་པའི་ང་བ་ལམ་གྱི་རམ་པ།ི །

Key: Magenta highlight in the Tibetan indicates the ellipsis has been filled in.

2) INDICATING THAT DUE TO THIS FALLACY [WITH REGARD TO THE SUBJECT] THE REASON ALSO IS NOT ESTABLISHED གཉིས་པ་ན་དོ ེས་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱང་མ་བ་པར་བན་པ་ནི། It is indicated by this statement in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words: Just this mode of expressing the fallacy of the position which is that the substratum is not established is to be applied also in expressing the fallacy of nonestablishment with respect to this reason—“because of existing.”a ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། གཞི་མ་བ་པའ་ི ོགས་ཀྱི་ཉེས་པ་བད་པའོ ི་ ལ་གང་ཡན་པ་འདི ི་ཉིད་ནི་ཡད་པའོ ི་ིར་ཞེས་་བའ་གཏན་ི ཚིགས་འདི་ལ་མ་བ་པའི་ོན་བོད་པ་ལའང་ར་བར་འོ། ། ཞེས་གངས་པ་འདས་བན་པ་ཡི ིན་ནོ། ། With respect to this,

• since earlier there did not exist a valid cognition establishing [that is, confirming] a subject established as compatibly appearing in the systems of the two disputants about the emptiness of inherent existence— establishment by way of [the object’s] own entity—and non-emptiness, • then also by that reasoning explaining that the position, or proposition—the combination of the two, (1) the autonomous sign’s subject, “form sense-spheres,” b and (2) the predicate “not produced from a Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan ends his commentary at this point. b The syllogism that Bhāvaviveka states is: Ultimately the internal sense-spheres are not produced from self because of existing, like intelligence.” na paramārthata ādhyātmikānyāyatanāni svata utpannāni vidyamānatvāt cai- tanyavad// (the Sanskrit is from Chandrakīrti’s citation) don dam par nang gi skye mched rnams bdag las skye ba med par nges te yod pa’i phyir shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no//

92 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight

self”—does not exist, you should know, in accordance with the earlier explanation, how the sign is not established, since there also does not exist a valid cognition establishing [that is, confirming] the reason, “because of existing,” established as appearing compatibly in the systems of those two disputants. དེ་ལ་ར་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་རང་བཞན་གྱི ིས་ང་མོ ི་ོང་ གི་ོལ་བ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་གས་ལ་མན་ང་་བ་པའི་ཆས་ཅན་ོ བ་ེད་ཀྱ་ཚད་མ་མི ད་པས།ེ རང་ད་གས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ཅན་ གགས་ཀྱི་ེ་མཆད་དང་བདག་ལས་ེ ེ་བ་མད་པའེ ི་ཆས་གཉོ ིས་ བོམས་པའི་ོགས་སམ། བབ་་མེད་པར་བཤད་པའི་རིགས་ པ་དེས་ཡོད་པའི་ིར། ཞེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱང་དེ་གཉས་ཀྱི ི་ གས་ལ་མན་ང་་བ་པའི་བ་ེད་ཀྱ་ཚད་མ་མི ད་པས་ེ གས་མ་བ་པར་འར་ལ་མས་ར་བཤད་པ་བཞན་་ི ཤེས་པར་འོ། ། About this Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says: For, this logician [Bhāvaviveka] himself has asserted the points as explained earlier. How? Another stated this proof: Causes and so forth producing the internal sense-spheres just exist because the One-Gone-Thus said so. Whatever the One-Gone-Thus said is that way, as, for example, is the case with his saying that nirvāṇa is peace. To this [Bhāvaviveka] propounded this fallacy with: What are you asserting as the meaning of the reason? “Be- cause the One-Gone-Thus said conventionally”a or “be-

It is unclear to me why Tsong-kha-pa switches from Bhāvaviveka’s “internal sense- spheres” (eye sense powers and so forth) to “form sense-spheres,” which are visible forms; it may be for brevity. a The bracketed material in this sentence is from the Four Interwoven Annotations, 561.4ff.

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 93

cause the One-Gone-Thus said ultimately?” If conventionally, the meaning of the reason is not established for yourself[.] and [Bhāvaviveka continues]: Because what is established [that is, effects] and estab- lishers [that is, causes] do not exist, this reason is just nonestablished, and it is just contradictory. འདིར་ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། དེ་་་དེ་ནི་འདི་ར་ཡིན་ཏེ། གང་གི་ ིར་ཇི་ད་བད་པའ་དི ོན་འདི་ནི་ོག་གེ་པ་འདིས་རང་ཉིད་ ཀྱིས་ཁས་ངས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། ཇི་ར་ཞེ་ན། ནང་གི་ེ་མཆེད་ མས་ད་པར་ེ ེད་པ་་ལ་སོགས་པ་ནི་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡན་ཏི ེ། དེ་ར་དེ་བཞིན་གཤགས་པས་གངས་པའེ ི་ིར་རོ། ། གང་དེ་ བཞིན་གཤགས་པས་ཇེ ་ད་་གངས་པ་དི ་ནེ ི་དེ་བཞན་ཏི ེ། དཔེར་ན་་ངན་ལས་འདས་པ་ན་ཞི ི་བའོ་ཞས་་བ་བཞེ ན་ནི ོ། ། ཞེས་་བ་གཞན་གྱིས་བཀོད་པའི་བ་ད་འདེ ི་ལ་འདར་ཁྱི ོད་ ཀྱིས་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་དན་་འདོ ད་པ་གང་ཡོ ན།ི དེ་བཞན་ི གཤེགས་པས་ཀུན་བ་་དོ ེ་ད་གངས་པའི་ིར་རམ། འོན་ ཏེ་དོན་དམ་པར་གངས་པའི་ིར། གལ་ཏེ་ཀུན་ོབ་་ན་ནི་ རང་ལ་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱ་དི ོན་མ་བ་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ། ཞེས་དང༌། དོན་དམ་པར་བབ་པར་་བ་དང་བ་པར་ེད་པ་ཉད་མ་ི བ་པའི་ར་གཏན་ཚི གས་མ་བ་པའི ི་དོན་ཉིད་དང་འགལ་ བའི་དན་ཉོ ད་དི ོ། ། ཞེས་འདིས་ན་འདོ ི་ས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། Through this way this one himself has asserted the nonestablishment of reasons in all inferences in which he states phenomena

94 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight

that are actualitiesa as reasons; therefore, the reason and so forth are not established for him, whereby all [his] proofs are destroyed. གང་གི་ར་དི ེ་ར་འདིས་རང་ཉད་ཀྱི ིས་ལ་འདིས་གཏན་ ཚིགས་མ་བ་པར་ཁས་ངས་པ་དའེ ི་ིར་དངས་པོ ོའི་ཆས་ོ གཏན་ཚིགས་་བཀོད་པའི་ེས་་དཔག་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་རང་ལ་མ་བ་པའ་ི ིར་བ་པར་ ེད་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་མ་པར་འཇག་པར་འར་རི ོ། ། ཞས་ེ གངས་པ་ With respect to the meaning of this, some who assert themselves to be followers of Chandrakīrti say: When in Bhāvaviveka’s Blaze of Reasoningb and so forth it is stated: Earth is not ultimately an entity of hardness because of being an element—like wind. if it is being stated “because of being an element ultimately,” it is not established for himself, and if it is being stated, “because of being an element conventionally,” it is not established for the opposing party,c the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things. If the reason is not posited as not established due to this, it would contradict his own assertion that whatever is nonestablished from the viewpoint of those two is necessarily a nonestablished reason. འདིའི་དོན་ལ་་བ་གྲགས་པའི་ས་་འང་བར་འདེ ད་པ་ོ དག་ན་ར།ེ ས་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་་བའི་ངོ་བོ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འང་ བ་ཡིན་པའ་ི ིར། ང་བཞིན་ནོ་ཞས་ེ ོག་གེ་འབར་བ་སགས་་ོ བཀོད་པ་ལ། དོན་དམ་་འང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ིར་ཞེས་འགོད་ན་ a dngos po’i chos, vastudharma; the Four Interwoven Annotations (569.5) identifies this term as meaning “something substantially established in the sense of being established by way of its own character” (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa’i rdzas grub). b Blaze of Reasoning, Commentary on the “Heart of the Middle” (dbu ma’i snying po’i ’grel pa rtog ge ’bar ba, madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarkajāvlā, P5255, vol. 96). c phyi rgol/ phyir rgol; literally, “latter disputant,” the opposing disputant.

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 95 རང་གིས་མ་བ་ལ། ཀུན་ོབ་་འང་བ་ཡན་པའི ི་ར་ཞི ེས་ འགོད་ན་་ི ོལ་དངས་པོ ོར་་བ་ལ་མ་བ་བོ། ། དེས་གས་མ་ བ་པར་མ་འཇི ོག་ན་དེ་གཉས་ཀྱི ་ི ོ་ནས་མ་བ་པ་ལ་གས་ མ་བ་པས་ཁྱབ་པར་རང་གིས་ཁས་ངས་པ་དང་འགལ་ལོ་ ཞེས་ཟེར་ལ། And someone says [adding]: If “a mere element” is stated as the reason, then since it is not established, it is refuted. ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་འང་བ་ཙམ་ཞིག་འགད་ན་རོ ིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་མ་བ་ པས་འགག་པ་ཡོ ིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ། ། Repudiation in such a manner is utterly not the thought of Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words, and it is also not the case that the master [Bhāvaviveka] asserts such, due to which [these Tibetans] are speaking erroneously about both systems of those two masters. འདི་འ་བའི་ལ་གྱས་ན་འི ིན་པ་ནི། ཚག་གསལ་གྱི ི་ དགོངས་པ་གཏན་མ་ཡན་ཅི ིང་བ་དཔོ ོན་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ར་་ བཞེད་པའང་མ་ཡིན་པས་གས་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་ིན་ཅི་ལག་་་ོ བ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། Well then, how is it? In the passage above, “For, this [logician Bhāva- viveka] himself has asserted the points as explained earlier,” “as explained” (ji skad bsnyad pa, yathoktaa) is: the statement of the mode of the subject’s not being established and the application of it also to the reason that were explained earlier, because this text was stated immediately after it.

a Poussin, 31.1.

96 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight འོ་ན་ཇི་ར་ཡིན་མ་ན། གང་གི་ིར་ཇི་ད་བད་པའ་དི ོན་ འདི་ནི་འདས་རང་ཉི ད་ཀྱི ིས་ཁས་ངས་པ་ཡན་ནི ོ། ། ཞེས་ གངས་པའི་ཇི་ད་བཤད་པ་ན་ར་བཤད་པའི ི་ཆོས་ཅན་མ་ བ་པའི་ལ་དང་དེ་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལའང་ར་བར་གངས་པ་ོ དེ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེའི་དེ་མ་ཐག་་གང་དེ་གངས་པས་སོ། ། Thus, it is as follows: The likes of direct perception that establish the subject and the reason do not pass beyond the two, the mistaken or the nonmistaken. If objects found by the mistaken are posited as reasons and so forth, they would not be established for the Proponents of [Truly Estab- lished] Things, but if objects found by the nonmistaken are posited as those, they would not be established by valid cognitions in our system. Hence, the earlier explanation that autonomous signs, subjects, and so forth are not established is the meaning of “as explained” (ji skad bsnyad pa, yathokta). དེ་་ན་འདིར་འར་ཏེ་ཆོས་ཅན་དང་གཏན་ཚིགས་བབ་པའི་ མངོན་མ་་་དེ་འལ་མ་འལ་གཉས་ལས་མི ི་འདའ་ ལ།འལ་པས་ེད་པའ་དི ོན་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་སོགས་པར་འཇོག་ ན་དངས་པོ ར་་བ་ལ་མ་བ་ལ།ོ མ་འལ་བས་ེད་པའ་དི ོན་ དེ་དག་་འཇོག་ན་རང་གི་ཚད་མས་མི་འབ་པས་རང་ད་ཀྱི་ གས་དང་ཆོས་ཅན་ལ་སོགས་པ་མ་བ་པར་ོན་་བཤད་པ་ ནི་ཇི་ད་བད་པ་ཞས་པའེ ི་དན་ནོ ོ། ། The indication that Bhāvaviveka asserts the positing of nonestablishment by way of such is said to be his examination—by way of the two truths—of “because the One-Gone-Thus said so.” དེ་འ་བའ་ི ོ་ནས་མ་བ་པར་འཇོག་པ་དེ་ལེགས་ན་འེད་ ཀྱིས་ཇི་ར་ཁས་ངས་པ་ོན་པ་ནི་དེ་ར་དེ་བཞན་གཤི ེགས་

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 97 པས་གངས་པའི་ིར། ཞེས་པ་ལ་བདེན་གཉས་ཀྱི ི་ོ་ནས་ བག་པ་མཛད་པ་ལ་ཟར་བ་ཡེ ིན་ནོ། ། The meaning is utterly not that [Bhāvaviveka] is examining whether “because the One-Gone-Thus said so conventionally” is set as the reason or “because the One-Gone-Thus said so ultimately” is set as the reason. As was stated earlier (above, 28 and 92) when [Chandrakīrti] brought up the other party’s, [Bhāvaviveka’s, assertion], a compatibly appearing subject without qualifying it with either truth or falsity must be posited. Otherwise, while asserting that it would not be established for either the disputant or the other party, [Bhāvaviveka] would also assert such with respect to the reason, example, and so forth; hence, on this occasion how could this thoroughly versed paṇḍita be mistaken about such a gross self-decapitation! དེའི་དན་ནོ ་དི ེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པས་ཀུན་བ་་གངས་པའོ ི་ ིར་ཞེས་གས་་འགད་དམ།ོ དན་དམ་་གངས་པའོ ི་ིར་ ཞེས་གས་་འགོད་ཅས་བག་པ་ེ ེད་པ་ནི་ཡེ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ར་ོགས་་བངས་པ་ར་ཆས་ཅན་བདོ ན་བན་གང་གེ ིས་ ཀྱང་ཁྱད་པར་་མ་ས་པར་བཞག་དགས་ཀྱོ །ི གཞན་་ན་ོལ་ ི་ོལ་གང་ང་གཅག་ལ་མ་བ་པར་འར་བར་འདི ད་པ་ོ བཞིན་་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་དཔེ་ལ་སོགས་པའང་དེ་ར་འདོད་ པས་རགས་པ་དེ་འ་བའི་ག་ཆད་ལ་ཡོ ོངས་་ོགས་པའི་ པྜི་ཏ་འད་འལ་བ་ག་ལ་ི ིད། Therefore, it is being asked, “Which of the two truths is the meaning of that sign ‘because the One-Gone-Thus said so’?” Hence, if that sign is said to be conventional, it is not asserted in that way by themselves, due to which it is not established for themselves, and if it is ultimately, since we refute that existent, nonexistent, or both [existent and nonexistent] effects, such as the internal sense-fields, are ultimately produced from causes, it is not established for us, and an object that is neither of the two truths is not asserted; therefore, it is not necessary to make a clarification of this.

98 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight དེས་ན་དེ་བཞིན་གཤགས་པས་གངས་པའེ ི་ིར། ཞེས་པའི་ གས་ཀྱི་དན་དོ ེ་བདན་གཉེ ིས་གང་ཡིན་ཞེས་འི་བ་ཡན་པས་ི ཀུན་བ་པ་ཡོ ིན་ན་ནི་རང་ཉད་དི ་ར་མེ ི་འདོད་པས་རང་ལ་ མ་བ་ལ། དོན་དམ་པར་ཡིན་ན་ངེད་ཀྱས་དི ན་དམ་་འས་ོ ་ཡོད་པ་དང་མད་པ་དང་གཉེ ས་ཀ་་ལས་ི ེ་བ་བཀག་པས་ ངེད་ལ་མི་འབ་ཅིང༌། བདན་གཉེ ིས་གང་འང་མད་པའེ ི་དོན་ ནི་མི་འདད་པས་དོ ེ་གསལ་བར་མཛད་མི་དགས་སོ ོ། ། Concerning this, when [Bhāvaviveka] states “because of being an element” if [one holds that Chandrakīrti] is asking which of the two truths is the elementa that is stated as the sign, this is like what was [correctly] explained earlier, but if it is propounded that [Chandrakīrti] is asking, “Which element of the two truths, conventional or ultimate, is being stated as the sign?” then [Chandrakīrti] would have utterly not understood the opponent. Having asked thus, “Which of the two truths is it?”b how would it be suitable [for Bhāvaviveka] to say, “If it is ultimate [that is, ultimately established], it is not established for us [Proponents of the Middle Way], but if it is conventional [that is, conventionally established], it would not be established for the other, [the Proponent of Truly Established Things].” For, if it were not thus, since even the internal sense-fields posited as subjects would exist conventionally, they would be unestablished [that is, unconfirmed] by those opponents the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things. དེ་ལ་འང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པ་ན་གས་་བཀོད་ པའི་འང་བ་དེ་བདན་གཉེ ིས་གང་ཡིན་ཞེས་འི་ན་་མ་དང་ འ་བ་ཡན་གྱི ི། བདན་གཉེ ིས་ཀྱི་འང་བ་གང་གས་་འགོད་ ཅེས་་ན་ོགས་་གཏན་མ་གོ་བའོ། ། དེ་ར་བདེན་གཉིས་

a That is, “Is this element ultimately established or conventionally established?” b That is to say, “Is that element an ultimate truth or a veil truth?”

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 99 གང་ཡིན་ས་ནས་དི ན་དམ་ཡོ ིན་ན་རང་ལ་མ་བ་པ་ཡིན་ ཀྱང༌། ཀུན་ོབ་པ་ཡིན་ན་གཞན་ལ་མ་བ་ཅེས་ཇི་ར་བོད་ ་ང་།ེ དེ་་མ་ཡན་ན་ཆི ོས་ཅན་་བཞག་པའི་ནང་གི་ེ་ མཆེད་ཀྱང་ཀུན་བ་་ཡོ ོད་པའི་ིར། ར་ི ལ་དོ ེ་དག་གིས་མ་ བ་པར་འར་བའི་ར་རི ོ། ། One might wonder, “Well, in what way does Bhāvaviveka assert the investigation of the reason in terms of the two truths, as expressed above? འོ་ན་ཇི་ད་བད་པ་དེ་ལེགས་ན་འེད་ཀྱིས་གས་ལ་ བདེན་གཉས་ཀྱི ི་བག་པ་ས་པ་དེས་ཁས་ངས་གས་ཇི་ར་ ཡིན་མ་ན། I will explain. The master [Chandrakīrti], thinking that what is found by a nonmistaken consciousness is an ultimate and what is found by a mistaken consciousness is a veiling (kun rdzob pa), questions, “Which of the two truths is it?” He asks this thinking that this question must go to the same point as,a “By which of the two, a mistaken consciousness or a nonmistaken consciousness, is it found?” as follows: If the meaning stated as the sign is neither a veiling (kun rdzob pa) nor an ultimate, then that sign must be nonestablished,b and if the meaning stated as the sign is notc an object found by either of those two, a mistaken or a nonmistaken consciousness, then the meaning stated as the sign must be nonestablished. The nonestablishments are similar in terms of the evidence, within which it is said that this one himself asserts it, but it is not that he explicitly asserts it.

a That is, “means the same as the question.” b This is the type of reasoning that Bhāvaviveka used against the Proponents of Truly Established Things. c Correcting don yin na in the Delhi edition (kha, 285a.2/569.2) to don ma yin na in accordance with the TBRC bla brang (243a.5/647.5).

100 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight བཤད་པར་་ེ། འདིར་ོབ་དཔན་གྱོ ིས་མ་འལ་བའི་ཤས་ེ པས་ེད་པ་དེ་དོན་དམ་པ་དང༌། འལ་བའི་ཤེས་པས་ད་པ་ེ དེ་ཀུན་བ་པ་ཡོ ིན་པ་ལ་དགངས་ནས་བདོ ན་གཉེ ིས་གང་ཡིན་ ཞེས་པ་ད།ེ དེ་གཉས་གང་གི ིས་ད་པ་ཡེ ིན་ཞས་པ་དང་གནད་ེ གཅིག་་འགྲོ་དགས་པ་ལ་བསམས་པ་ོ ེ། འདི་ར་གས་་ བཀོད་པའི་དོན་དེ་ཀུན་ོབ་པ་དང་དོན་དམ་པ་གང་ཡང་མ་ ཡིན་ན་གས་དེ་མ་བ་པར་འར་དགོས་པ་དང༌། གས་་ བཀོད་པའི་དོན་དེ་མ་འལ་བ་དང་འལ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་གཉིས་ གང་ང་གས་ི ེད་པའ་དི ོན་མིན་ན་གས་་བཀོད་པའ་དི ོན་ དེ་མ་བ་པར་འར་བ་་མཚན་མངས་པ་ལ། འདིས་རང་ གིས་ཁས་ངས་ཞེས་གངས་པ་ཡན་གྱི ི་དངས་་ཁས་ངས་པ་ོ མིན་ན།ོ ། Therefore, phenomena that are actualities a are stated [by Bhāva- viveka] as reasons; [hence, Chandrakīrti] spoke within specifying phenomena that are actualities, saying, “those phenomena that are actualities stated as reasons.” Among those signs, stated by Bhāvaviveka himself, some are indeed asserted as nonmistaken direct perception, and for some, it is indeed asserted that the means of establishing them in the end is posited as a nonmistaken direct perception,b but this master denies this. དེའི་ིར་དངོས་པོའི་ཆས་གཏན་ཚོ གས་་བཀི ད་པ་མས།ོ ཞེས་ དངོས་པའོ ི་ཆོས་དམིགས་ཀྱིས་བཀར་ནས་གངས་སོ། ། བ་ོ དཔོན་ལེགས་ན་འད་ནེ ི་རང་གིས་བཀད་པའོ ི་གས་དེ་དག་

a dngos po’i chos. b The subject, the sign, and so forth either are manifestly established by direct perception, or their establishment eventually meets back to direct perception; this is also asserted in the Consequence School according to Tsong-kha-pa.

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 101 ཁ་ཅིག་ནི་མངོན་མ་མ་འལ་བས་དངོས་་དང༌། ཁ་ཅག་ནི ི་ མཐར་གགས་པའི་བ་ེད་མངན་མ་མ་འལ་བ་ལ་བཞོ ེད་ མོད་ཀྱང༌། ོབ་དཔན་འདོ ིས་དེ་འགོག་པ་ཡན་ནི ོ། ། Concerning this also, as a proof of the unreasonableness of asserting objects established by way of their own character, like the citation earlier, “whoever is a Proponent of the Middle has no assertion of another position”a [Chandrakīrti] quotes Nāgārjuna’s Refutation of Objections that a This is a paraphrase; Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words makes this statement and goes on to cite a stanza from Āryadeva and then an initial stanza from Nāgārjuna which I provide for the sake of more context: Also, it is not suitable for one who is a Proponent of the Middle to make autonomous inferences because of not asserting other positions [that is, those among the four extremes]. Moreover, Āryadeva explains (Four Hundred, XVI.25; P5246, vol. 95, 140.2.4): Even over a long period of time Censure cannot be expressed Of one who has no position of existence, Nonexistence, or existence and nonexistence. Also Refutation of Objections (stanza 29) says: If I had any [inherently existent] thesis, Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own thesis that there is no inherent existence]. Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis, I am only faultless. ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། ད་མ་པ་ཡིན་ན་རང་ད་གྱི་ེས་་དཔག་པ་་བར་རིགས་པ་ ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ོགས་གཞན་ཁས་ལེན་པ་མེད་པའི་ིར་རོ། ། ཞེས་པ་ནས་[དེ་ད་་ ཡང་འཕགས་པའི་ས། ། ཡོད་དང་མེད་དང་ཡོད་མེད་ཅེས། ། ོགས་ནི་གང་ལ་འང་ ཡོད་མིན་པ། ། དེ་ལ་ན་ནི་རིང་པོ་ནའང༌། ། ཀླན་ཀ་བོད་པར་ས་མ་ཡིན། ། ཞེས་ བཤད་དོ། ། ོད་པ་བོག་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་། གལ་ཏེ་ངས་དམ་བཅས་འགའ་ཡོད། ། དེས་ན་ ང་ལ་ོན་དེ་ཡོད། ། ང་ལ་དམ་བཅའ་མེད་པས་ན། ། ང་ལ་ོན་མེད་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན། ། གལ་ ཏེ་མངོན་མ་ལ་སོགས་པའི། །དོན་གྱིས་འགའ་ཞིག་དམིགས་ན་ནི། །བ་པའང་བོག་ པར་་ན་དེ། །མེད་ིར་ང་ལ་ཀླན་ཀ་མེད། ། ཅེས་གངས་སོ། ། Stanza 29; P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.1. See also K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst,

102 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight there is no valid cognition comprehending what is established by way of its own character:a If the factualities of Direct perception and so forth did observe some, Then [it would be reasonable] to prove or refute, but since [Observation] does not exist, there is no chance to censure me. these being for the sake of proving this to the partisans of the master Bhāvaviveka. འདི་ཡང་ར་ངས་པ་ར་ད་མ་པ་ཡིན་ན་ོགས་གཞན་ ཁས་ངས་པ་མེད་པའ་ི ིར། ཞས་རང་གེ ི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱས་བ་ི པའི་དན་ཁས་ང་བར་མོ ི་རིགས་པའི་བ་ད་།ེ གལ་ཏེ་ མངོན་མ་ལ་སོགས་པའི། །[དོན་གྱིས་འགའ་ཞིག་དམིགས་ན་ནི། །བ་ པའང་བོག་པར་་ན་དེ། །མེད་ིར་ང་ལ་ཀླན་ཀ་མེད། །] ཞེས་སོགས་ངས་ ནས་རང་མཚན་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་མེད་པར་གངས་པ་མས་ ཀྱིས། ོབ་དཔོན་ལགས་ན་འེ ེད་ཀྱི་ོགས་འཛིན་པ་ལ་ བབས་པའི་ིར་རོ། ། b. How those are not the same for us གཉིས་པ་རང་ལ་མི་མངས་པའི་ལ་ན།ི You might think: Is it not that the fallacies of the nonestablishment of the subject and the sign that you expressed with respect to the other’s inferences are also fallacies of your own inferences?! Therefore, do not dispute with others.

The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 23. See Jeffrey Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka: Jam-yang- shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Opposite of the Consequences, 2 (Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, October 2017: uma-tibet.org), 28. a Stanza 30; P5228, vol. 95, 15.1.1. See also K. Bhattacharya, E. H. Johnston, and A. Kunst, The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 23. Jam-yang-shay-pa cites only the first line and “and so forth”; I have filled in the rest. The annotations are from Four Interwoven Annotations, 478.1-478.2.

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 103 གལ་ཏེ་གཞན་གྱི་ེས་དཔག་ལ་ཆས་ཅན་དང་གས་མ་བ་པ་ོ ལ་སོགས་པའི་ོན་བད་པ་མས་རང་གོ ི་ས་དཔག་ལའང་ེ ོན་་འར་བ་མ་ཡན་ནམ་དི ས་ན་གཞན་ལ་བལ་བར་མེ ི་ འོ་མ་ན། The ensuing of those fallacies to others arises through having asserted autonomous inferences, whereas we do not assert autonomous inferences due to which [Chandrakīrti] says that [we] do not have those. Here inferences are to be taken as syllogisms.a གཞན་ལ་ན་དོ ེ་དག་འོང་བ་ནི་རང་ད་ཀྱ་ི ེས་དཔག་ཁས་ ངས་པས་འང་ལ། ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་ནི་རང་ད་ཀྱི་ེས་དཔག་ཁས་ མི་ལེན་པས་ོན་དེ་དག་མེད་པར་གངས་ཏེ་འདིར་ས་དཔག་ེ མས་ནི་ར་བ་ལ་འོ ོ། ། If autonomy is asserted, then valid cognition—valid with respect to [the object’s] own character— has been asserted as compatibly appearing for both disputants, whereupon the proposition must be proven by the three modes that are confirmed by valid cognition as established for both, and thus this valid cognition does not exist, whereby the subject and so forth are only nonestablished. རང་ད་ཁས་ལེན་ན་རང་མཚན་ལ་ཚད་མར་ར་པའི་ཚད་མ་ ོལ་བ་གཉས་ཀའི ི་མན་ང་་ཁས་ངས་ནས་དེས་བ་པའི་ ལ་གམ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་བ་པས་བབ་་བབ་དགོས་ལ། དེ་ ར་ན་ཚད་མ་དེ་མེད་པས་ཆོས་ཅན་ལ་སོགས་པ་མས་མ་བ་ པར་འར་རོ། ། If autonomy is not asserted, establishment by way of such valid cognition for the opponent, the Proponent of [Truly Established] Things a These syllogisms are speech for someone else; they are not actual inferences because inferences are consciousnesses.

104 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight him/herself, is sufficient; establishment by that valid cognition for oneself is not necessary. རང་ད་ཁས་མི་ལེན་ན་ཕ་རོལ་དངོས་པར་་བ་རང་ལ་ཚད་མ་ོ དེ་འ་བས་བ་པས་ཆོག་གི་རང་ལ་ཚད་མ་དེས་བ་མ་དགི ོས་ སོ། ། Therefore, the inferences appearing in texts are inferences renowned to others, which have the purpose of only refuting the theses of another, but are not autonomous. With respect to these, there is, for example, the likes of the statement in Chapter Three (stanzas 2c-3b) of Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom” that upon taking as the sign “not seeing itself,” proves that the eye does not see another: About this seeing, it does not see The entity of itself. If it does not see itself, How would it see others? Concerning this, the sign is also asserted by oneself,a and also the thesis, that seeing another is not established by way of its own entity, is asserted by Proponents of the Middle, whereby such syllogisms are called inferences renowned for another. དེས་ན་གང་ནས་འང་བའི་ས་དཔག་མས་ཀྱང་གཞན་གྱེ ི་ དམ་བཅའ་བ་འགག་པ་ཙམ་གྱོ ི་དགོས་པ་ཅན་གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་ པའི་ེས་དཔག་ཡིན་གྱ་རང་ད་མི ིན་ན།ོ ། འདི་ནི་དཔར་ན།ེ ་ཤེའི་རབ་ེད་གམ་པ་ལས། ་དེ་རང་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ནི། །དེ་ ལ་་བ་མ་ཡིན་ཉིད། །གང་ཞག་བདག་ལ་མི ི་བ་བ། །དེ་གཞན་ དག་ལ་ཇི་ར་བ། །ཞེས་རང་ལ་མི་བ་བ་གས་་ས་ནས་

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 105 མིག་གཞན་ལ་མི་བ་བར་བབ་པ་་འ།ོ །འདི་ནི་གས་ རང་གིས་ཀྱང་འདད་ལ་དམ་བཅའ་གཞན་ལ་བ་བ་རང་གོ ི་ངོ་ བོས་བ་པ་མེད་པའང་ད་མ་པས་འདོད་པས་ོར་བ་འདི་ འ་མས་ལ་གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་པའ་ི ེས་དཔག་ཅེས་ཟེར་བ་ཡིན་ ནོ། ། Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says: [Proponents of autonomous inferences (rang rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa, svatantra-anumāna) come to have these faults,] but we do not use autonomous inferences because oura inferences have the fruit of only refuting others’ theses. Since it is being asserted that the syllogisms stated are not autonomous and have the purpose of only refuting others’ theses, it is not that syllogismsb are not stated. ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། ཁོ་བོ་ཅག་ནི་རང་ད་ཀྱི་ས་་དཔག་པ་མེ ི་ ོར་ཏེ། ེས་་དཔག་པ་དག་ནི་གཞན་གྱི་དམ་བཅའ་བ་འགོག་ པ་ཙམ་གྱི་འས་་ཅན་ཡིན་པའ་ི ིར་རོ། །ཞས་ེ ོར་བ་བཀོད་

a “Our” is missing in the Tibetan. The Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 34.5) has asmadanumānānām. The Four Interwoven Annotations (572.4) glosses this as referring to the inferences appearing in Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words and so forth, thereby reading the statement as referring not to all syllogistic reasoning in general but to those refuting production from self such as those drawn from Buddhapālita’s text. This reading preserves other-approved inferences, or syllogisms, as a means also for positively com- municating one’s own tenets, though the interpolation seems forced. Later in the Four In- terwoven Annotations (573.4), the same passage is glossed this way: “but we [Consequen- tialists] do not use autonomous inferences because inferences [used by us Consequential- ists] have the fruit [or purpose] of only refuting the [wrong] theses of other [parties].” In this version, the added commentary is not aimed at preserving the positive use of syllogisms, but I would add that Ge-lug-pa scholars could still hold that “inferences” here means not all but some inferences stated by Consequentialists. In any case, the Ge-lug-pa position is clear: other-approved inferences are used for both positive and negative purposes. b Without the qualification of “autonomous.”

106 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight པ་མས་རང་ད་མན་པ་དང་གཞན་གྱི ི་དམ་བཅའ་བ་འགོག་ པ་ཙམ་གྱི་དགོས་པ་ཅན་་བཞད་པས་ེ ོར་བ་མི་འགོད་པ་མིན་ ནོ། ། With respect to how their thesis is stated and thereupon eliminated, right after that passage it says:a It is as follows. Othersb think that the eye sees: You assert on the one hand (kyang) that the eye has the attribute of not seeing its own entity and also (’ang) assert that for whatever does not have the attribute of seeing others [seeing] just does not occur. Therefore: Whatever does not possess seeing its own entity also does not possess seeing others, like, for example, a pot. Also, an eye possesses not seeing its own entity; therefore, this also does not possess seeing others. Because of that, seeing others—blue and so forth—which is contradictory with not seeing its own entity is cleared away just by inference established for them. ོར་བ་བཀད་ནས་དོ འེ ་དམ་བཅའ་སི ེལ་ལ་ཡང་ང་དའེ ི་ མག་ཉིད་ནས། འདི་ར་གཞན་མིག་བའོ་ཞེས་་བར་ོག་ པ་དེ་ནི་མག་ལ་རང་གི ི་བདག་ཉད་མི ི་བ་བའི་ཆོས་ཀྱང་འདད་ོ ལ། གཞན་བ་བའི་ཆས་མོ ེད་ན་མི་འང་བ་ཉིད་འང་ཁས་

a Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāvaviveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam- yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Sub- jects, 3 (Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, August 2018, uma-tibet.org, 139- 140). b La Vallée Poussin (Prasannapadā, 34.6 and n. 5) changes paraś cakṣuḥ to paraṃ cakṣuḥ recognizing that the Tibetan (gzhan) does not confirm the change and preferring that it read gzhan la; however, Dr. Vaidya leaves the manuscript as is, and the Four Inter- woven Annotations (573.5) follows the same reading, identifying the term as referring to other parties who assert that the eye sees. I consider La Vallée Poussin’s emendation to be unnecessary.

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 107 ངས་པ་ཡན་ཏི ེ། དེའི་ིར་གང་དང་གང་ལ་རང་གི་བདག་ཉིད་ བ་བ་མད་པ་དེ ེ་དང་དེ་ལ་ནི་གཞན་བ་བའང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ ཡིན་ཏེ་དཔར་ན་མ་པ་བཞེ ིན་ན།ོ ། མིག་ལའང་རང་ག་བདག་ི ཉིད་མི་བ་བ་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ་དེའ་ི ིར་གཞན་ལ་བ་བའང་ འདི་ལ་མད་དེ ོ། ། དེའི་ིར་རང་ག་བདག་ཉི ད་མི ི་བ་བ་དང་ འགལ་བ་ན་པོ ོ་ལ་སགས་པ་གཞན་ལ་བ་བ་རང་ལ་གྲགས་ོ པའི་ེས་་དཔག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་དེ་ལ་བ་ པའི་ེས་་དཔག་པས་སེལ་བར་ད་པ་ཡེ ིན་ནོ། ། ཞེས་ གངས་ཏེ། The two: • renowned to oneself, the latter disputant, (phyi rgol rang la grags pa) and • renowned to the other, relative to the former disputant, a Proponent of the Middle, (snga rgol dbu ma ltos te gzhan la grags pa) have the same significance. ི་ོལ་རང་ལ་གྲགས་པ་དང་་ོལ་ད་མ་ལ་ོས་ཏེ་གཞན་ ལ་གྲགས་པ་གཉིས་གནད་གཅག་གི ོ ། Since this system of the overcoming of the wrong views through stating other-renowned syllogistic statements by us, is important, let us explain it in detail. “Established for them” does not mean that:

• the subject, an eye, • the example, a pot, • the sign, does not see itself, and • the predicate of the proposition, does not see blue and so forth, are not asserted in our own system and are only asserted by the others and hence it does not mean such a sign, pervasion, and so forth are established for only the opponents.

108 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight རང་གིས་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་ོར་ངག་བཀོད་ནས་ལོག་ོག་བོག་ གས་འདི་གལ་ཆེ་བས་ཞིབ་་བཤད་ན་དེ་ལ་བ་པ་ཞེས་པ་ ནི་ཆོས་ཅན་མིག་དང་དཔེ་མ་པ་དང་གས་རང་ལ་མི་བ་བ་ དང་བབ་འི་ཆོས་ན་པོ ོ་ལ་སགས་པ་ལ་མོ ི་བ་བ་མས་ རང་གས་ལ་ཁས་མི་ལེན་ཅང་གཞན་གྱི ས་ཁས་ལི ེན་པ་ཙམ་ ཡིན་པས་གས་དང་ཁྱབ་པ་ལ་སགས་ཕ་རོ ལ་པོ ོ་ཁོ་ན་ལ་བ་པ་ ཞེས་་བ་ནི་དོན་མན་ནི ོ། ། Well then how is it? Indeed, in our own system we also assert those, but valid cognitions that confirm those and that comprehend an object of comprehension established by way of its own entity do not exist even in conventional terms in our own system. However, for the Proponents of Inherent Existence confirming those definitely relies on the establishment of those valid cognitions, but valid cognitions comprehending establishment by way of [the object’s] own entity that are compatibly established for both do not exist. Hence, [this is called] “not confirmed for both,” and [thus the conventions] “renowned to others” (gzhan la grags pa) or “established [that is, confirmed] for others” (gzhan la grub pa) are so called. འོ་ན་ཇི་ར་ཡིན་མ་ན་དེ་དག་རང་གས་ལའང་ཁས་ལེན་ མོད་ཀྱང་ད་དག་བབ་པའེ ི་ཚད་མ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་ གཞལ་་འཇལ་བ་ནི་རང་གས་ལ་ཐ་ད་འང་མེད་ལ། རང་ བཞིན་ཡད་པར་་བ་ལ་དོ ེ་དག་འབ་པ་ནི་ཚད་མ་དེ་བ་པ་ ལ་ངེས་པར་ོས་པས་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་མན་ང་་བ་པའི་རང་ གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པ་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་མེད་པས་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་བ་ པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་པའམ་གཞན་ལ་བ་པ་ཞེས་ ཟེར་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། [Objection:] Well then, since such a valid cognition does not exist even in conventional terms, the assertion that those are confirmed by it is

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 109 harmed by reasoning in accordance with how an [inherent] nature is su- perimposed, due to which how could the view of the Middle be found in dependence upon those means of proof! For, if the unmistaken view were found in dependence upon evidence of harm by valid cognition, it would be found even through all erroneous tenets! འོ་ན་དེ་འ་བའི་ཚད་མ་ཐ་ད་འང་མེད་པས་དེས་བ་པར་ འདོད་པ་ན་རང་བཞི ན་ི ོ་འདོགས་པ་ར་རགས་པས་གནི ོད་ པས་ན་བ་ེད་དེ་དག་ལ་བེན་ནས་ད་མའི་་བ་ཇི་ར་ ེད་ཚད་མས་གནད་པའོ ི་་མཚན་ལ་བེན་ནས་་བ་མ་ནོར་ བ་ེད་ན་ནི་བ་མཐའ་ིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱས་ཀྱང་ི ེད་ པར་འར་བའི་ིར་རོ་ཞེ་ན་ [Response:] The objects of awareness that these opponents apprehend as existing:

• the subject, an eye, • the sign, does not see itself, • the example, a pot, • and the predicate, does not see blue and so forth are asserted as existing in conventional terms even in our system, whereby these are not harmed by reasoning. However:

• these opponents do not differentiate individually between the two, the existence of those by way of their own entity (rang gi ngo bos yod pa) and existence (yod pa) in general;a • hence they have the conceit that those [objects] exist confirmed by valid cognitions comprehending objects of comprehension established by way of their own entity. • Reasoning damages the objects [particularly] posited in their own system, • but how could what is confirmed by conventional consciousnesses in their continuums, unharmed by superficial causes of mistakes, be refuted by reasoning!

a This cannot be done before gaining the view of emptiness of inherent existence.

110 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight

Therefore, in the systems of the two—theirs and ours—an assertion of compatible confirmation by valid cognitions comprehending an object of comprehension established by way of its own entity does not occur, whereby without being proven by means of autonomy, a mere demonstration of a contradiction in their assertions is made. ི་ོལ་འདས་ཆི ོས་ཅན་མིག་དང་གས་རང་ལ་མི་བ་བ་དང་ དཔེ་མ་པ་དང་ཆོས་ོན་པོ་སགས་ལ་མོ ི་བ་བ་ཡོད་པར་ འཛིན་པའི་ལ་མས་ནི་རང་གི་གས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་ཐ་ད་་ ཡོད་པར་འདོད་པས་ད་དག་ལ་རེ གས་པས་གནི ོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ ནོ། ། འོན་ཀྱང་ ི་ལ་དོ ེས་དེ་དག་རང་ག་ངི ོ་བོས་ཡད་པ་དང་ོ ཡོད་པ་གཉས་སི ོ་སོར་མ་ི ེད་པས་དེ་མས་རང་གི་ངོ་བས་བ་ོ པའི་གཞལ་་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མས་བ་པར་མ་པའོ ི་ལ་ལ་ རིགས་པས་གནོད་ཀྱང་ཁོའི་ད་ཀྱ་ཐ་ད་པའི ི་ཤེས་པ་གནོད་ པ་མེད་པ་མས་ཀྱིས་བ་པ་རགས་པས་ག་ལ་འགི གོ ། དེས་ན་ ཁོའི་གས་དང་རང་ག་གས་གཉི ས་ལ་རང་གི ི་ངོ་བོས་བ་ པའི་གཞལ་་འཇལ་བའི་ཚད་མ་མན་ང་་བ་པ་ཁས་ ངས་མ་ང་བས་རང་ད་ཀྱིས་མི་བབ་པར། ཁོ་རང་གི་ཁས་ ངས་ལ་འགལ་བ་ན་པ་ཙམ་ོ ད་པ་ཡེ ིན་ནོ། ། To illustrate how this is with the above other-renowned syllogism: “not seeing itself,” the sign, exists in the subject, the eye, in conventional terms, but “seeing blue and so forth, that is established by way of its own entity,” does not exist even in conventional terms in it, whereby the former is suitable as a means of refuting the latter.a However, if it were the case that those two, the sign and the predicate of what is negated existed, they would a This also shows that the Proponents of Middle do not refute everything conventionally because the one existing conventionally is needed to demonstrate that the other does not exist even conventionally.

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 111

equally exist, and if they did not exist, they would equally not exist, then how would it be suitable to posit those two as means of damage and the damaged! དེའི་ལ་ན་ར་བཀི ད་པའོ ི་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་ོར་བ་དེ་ལ་ མཚན་ན་ཆས་ཅན་མོ ག་དི ེ་ལ་རང་ལ་མི་བ་བའི་གས་ནི་ཐ་ ད་་ཡད་ལ།ོ ོ་སོགས་ལ་བ་བ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པ་ནི་དེ་ ལ་ཐ་ད་འང་མེད་པས་་མ་དེ་ི་མ་འགོག་ད་་ང་གེ ི་ མིག་ལ་གས་དེ་དང་དགག་འི་ཆོས་དེ་གཉས་ཡི ོད་ན་ཡོད་ མཉམ་དང་མེད་ན་མད་མཉམ་་སེ ོང་ན་དེ་གཉིས་གནད་ོ ེད་ དང་གནོད་ར་ག་ལ་ང་། Hence, a subject, a predicate, and a sign which is the means of proof— set in a syllogism renowned to another—existing in conventional terms are needed, but it is not sufficient that it is merely asserted as existing by them. དེས་ན་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱ་ི ོར་བའི་ཆོས་ཅན་དང་ཆོས་དང་གས་ མས་ཐ་ད་་ཡོད་པ་ཞིག་དགས་ཀྱོ ི་ཁོས་ཡོད་པར་ཁས་ ངས་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས་མི་ཆོག་གོ ། Since they themselves assert these subjects, eyes and so forth, as existing, what need is there for Proponents of the Middle to prove those!a ཆོས་ཅན་མག་ལ་སི ོགས་པ་དེ་དག་ནི་ཡོད་པར་ཁོ་རང་གས་ཁས་ི ལེན་པས་ད་མ་པས་དེ་དག་བབ་ག་ལ་དགོས། If [opponents], making a pretension of the opposite even about those, says, “Since those are not established, prove them!” then since this is not at all not a false pretension, debating with them has no fruit or purpose at all. Hence, who would partner with these!

a Proponents of the Middle could prove the existence of the subject and so forth if they had to, but in this case the opponent already asserts them.

112 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ལའང་བན་ནས་ཁོ ོ་བོ་ཅག་ལ་མ་བ་པས་བས་ ཤིག་ཅས་ཟེ ེར་ན་ནི་མི་བོན་པ་འགའ་ཡང་མད་པས་དེ ེ་དག་ དང་བད་པ་ལ་འས་་མེད་པས་དེའི་་བ་་ཞོ ིག་གས་ི ེད། Here someone says: If [you] are to demonstrate the contradiction between the two assertions by the opponent: 1. “not seeing itself,” and 2. the acceptance that “the seeing of blue and so forth has an inherent nature, that is, establishment by way of its own entity,” by what will these be known as contradictory? If they are established by valid cognition as being contradictory, then it must be established for both; therefore, do not use “other-renowned inference”! If the contradiction is posited by way of the opponent’s having asserted it, then since the opponent asserts the two, “not seeing itself” and “the seeing of others,” as only not contradictory, it is not logically feasible to posit a demonstration of contradiction by way of that assertion. And if is posited by way of oneself having asserted those as contradictory, it would be very absurd! For, how would it be suitable for you to propound to a proponent: “It is unreasonable for you to assert these as noncontradictory because we assert these as contradictory”! འདིར་ཁ་ཅག་ན་རི ེ་གལ་ཏེ་ཕ་རོལ་པོས་རང་ལ་མི་བ་བ་དང་ ོ་སོགས་ལ་བ་བ་རང་གི་ངོ་བས་བ་པའོ ་རང་བཞི ན་ཡི ོད་ པར་འདད་པ་ལ་འགལ་བ་ོ ོན་ན་འགལ་བར་ཅིས་ཤེས་འགལ་ བ་ཡིན་པར་ཚད་མས་བ་ན་ནི་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་འབ་དགས་པས་ོ གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་པ་ཞས་མེ ི་འོ། ། ཁས་ངས་པས་འགལ་བར་ འཇོག་ན་ན་རང་ལ་མི ི་བ་བ་དང་གཞན་ལ་བ་བ་གཉས་ཕ་ི རོལ་པོས་ན་མི ི་འགལ་བར་འདད་པས་དོ ེའི་ཁས་ངས་ཀྱས་ི འགལ་བར་འཇོག་པ་མ་འཐད་ལ།ི རང་གིས་འགལ་བར་ཁས་ ངས་པས་འཇོག་ན་ན་ཧ་ཅང་ཐལ་ཏི ེ། ི་ོལ་ལ་ཁྱེད་ཀྱིས་

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 113 འདི་མི་འགལ་བར་འདད་པ་མོ ི་རགས་ཏི ེ། ཁོ་བོས་འདི་འགལ་ བར་ཁས་ངས་པའི་ར་རི ོ། ། ཞེས་ཇི་ར་ར་ང་མ་ན། [Response:] The fallacy does not exist; since the contradiction—that if not seeing itself, it is contradictory to have the nature of being established by way of its own entity—is established by valid cognition, it is not posited merely through having been asserted. ོན་དེ་ནི་མེད་ད།ེ རང་ལ་མི་བ་ན་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་ རང་བཞན་ཡི ོད་པར་འགལ་བ་ནི་ཚད་མས་བ་པས་ཁས་ངས་ ཙམ་གྱས་མི ་འཇི ོག་གོ ། You might think: Well then, the opponents’ having ascertained the contradiction upon having demonstrated this valid cognition to them is indeed sufficient, but what is the need for depending on their having asserted it? འོ་ན་ཚད་མ་དེ་ཕ་རལ་པོ ོ་ལ་བན་ནས་འགལ་བ་ངས་པར་ས་ེ པས་ཆོག་མད།ོ ཁོའི་ཁས་ངས་ལ་བེན་པ་ཅི་དགས་མ་ན།ོ [Response:] Establishment as a valid cognition proving contradiction for the Proponents of [Truly Established] Things relies on having established that it comprehends an object of comprehension established by way of its own entity, and if moreover this does not exist, how will ourselves prove contradiction upon having asserted this [establishment by way of its own entity since Consequentialists do not assert it]? Although the object of comprehension does not have the nature of being established by way of its own entity, nevertheless, if—upon the meaning of the noncontradiction of positing as a valid cognition has already been established for those Proponents of [Truly Established] Things—one works at proving this contradiction to them through such a valid cognition, then since they have found the view realizing the absence of inherent existence of all phenomena, what need is there for oneself to prove: “It is contradictory for whatever does not see itself to have seeing established by way of its own entity”! From this evidence, if you want to realize the system of the honorable Chandrakīrti, examine in detail the essentials of those points above, and understand them.

114 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight དངོས་་བའི་ངོར་འགལ་བ་བ་ད་ཀྱེ ི་ཚད་མར་འབ་པ་ནི་ རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་གཞལ་་འཇལ་བ་བ་པ་ལ་བོས་ ཤིང་དེ་ཡང་མེད་ན་རང་གིས་དེ་ཁས་ངས་ནས་ཇི་ར་འགལ་ བ་བབ་aགཞལ་་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་རང་བཞན་མི ེད་ ཀྱང་། ཚད་མར་འཇོག་པ་མི་འགལ་བ་ཁོ་ལ་བ་ཟིན་ནས་དེ་ འ་བའི་ཚད་མས་བབ་ན་ནི་ཆས་མས་རང་བཞོ ན་མི ད་པར་ེ ོགས་པའི་་བ་ེད་པ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་ལ་རང་ལ་མི་བ་བ་ཡིན་ ན་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་་བ་ཡོད་པར་འགལ་བ་ཡན་ི ནོ། །ཞས་བབ་ཅེ ི་དགས།ོ དེས་ན་་བའི་ཞབས་ཀྱི་གས་ ོགས་པར་འདོད་ན་ད་དག་ལ་ཞེ བ་་དི ད་ལ་ཁོ ོང་་ད་ པར་གྱིས་ཤགི ། You might wonder: Well then, how is the pervasion—namely, that in what does not see itself, seeing others is necessarily not established by way of its own entity—demonstrated in dependence on what is renowned to themselves? འོ་ན་ཁོ་རང་ལ་གྲགས་པ་ལ་བན་ནས་རང་ལ་མེ ི་བ་བ་ལ་ གཞན་ལ་བ་བ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པ་མད་པས་ཁྱབ་གས་ཇེ ི་ ར་ོན་མ་ན། [I] will explain this in accordance with the Buddhapālita Commentary:b a The digital Unicode version of Tsong-kha-pa’s text has a preferred reading with a shad after bsgrub: འགལ་བ་བབ། གཞལ་་ b The Buddhapālita Commentary itself says: Due to observing a nature of things in their own entities, [such] is also observed in the entities of others that possess it; for example, when moisture is perceived

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 115

For example, [from the fact] that moisture is observed in earth due to its possessing water, and that heat is observed in water due to its possessing fire, and that fragrant odor is observed in clothes due to their possessing [or being infused with] nutmega flowers, it is seen that the three, moisture and so forth, must rely on observation of the three, water and so forth, and you yourself also assert this. Likewise, if some nature established by way of its own entity exists in things, upon the nature having been observed in a thing, then it must be observed in others due to their possessing this. If that nature is not initially observed in itself, then how would it further be seen in others possessing it? For example, if an unfragrant odor is not observed in nutmeg flowers, a foul odor will not be observed in clothes possessing [or infused with] those. ་ཱ་ལི་ཏའི་འགྲེལ་པ་བཞིན་བཤད་པར་འོ། །དཔེར་ན་་ དང་ན་པས་ས་ལ་ན་དང་མེ་དང་ན་པས་་ལ་ཚ་བ་དང་ ་མའི་མེ་ཏོག་དང་ན་པས་གས་ལ་ོ ི་ཞིམ་པ་དམགས་པ་ནི ི་ ་ལ་སོགས་པ་གམ་པོ་དེ་ལ་ན་ལ་སོགས་པ་གམ་པོ་དེ་ དམིགས་པ་ལ་ོས་དགས་པར་མཐོ ང་ཞོ ིང་། ཁྱད་རང་ཡང་ེ འདོད་པ་ད་བཞེ ིན་་དངོས་པོ་མས་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་ པའི་རང་བཞིན་འགའ་ཞིག་ཡོད་ནའང་རང་བཞིན་དེ་རང་ལ་

in water, then due to possessing it [water, moisture] also is observed in earth, and when heat is perceived in fire, then due to possessing it [fire, heat] also is observed in water, and when just a fragrant odor is perceived in nutmeg flowers, it is also observed in clothing possessing [or infused with] them. How could a thing that does not appear in its own entity be observed in others! For instance, since a foul odor is not observed in nutmeg flowers, it is also not observed in clothing [suffused with them]. Therefore, if the seer sees its own entity, then due to its seeing forms it would be feasible that it sees. However, the seer does not see its own entity. How could what does not see its own entity see others! See also the annotated translation and edited Tibetan text in the Ph.D. thesis by Akira Saito, “A Study of the Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti,” Australian National University, 1984, 51. a Or, jasmine.

116 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight དམིགས་ནས་དེ་ནས་དེ་དང་ན་པས་གཞན་ལ་ཡང་དམིགས་ དགོས་པ་ཡན་ནི ོ། ། གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ཐོག་མར་རང་ལ་མ་དམགས་ན་ི དེ་དང་ན་པ་ན་གཞན་ལ་ཡང་ཇི་ར་མཐང་བར་འར་ཏོ ེ། དཔེར་ན་་མའི་མེ་ཏོག་ལ་ི་མི་ཞིམ་པ་མ་དམིགས་ན་དེ་དང་ ན་པའི་གས་ལ་ཡང་ོ ི་ང་བ་མི་དམིགས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། ། Thus, [this passage] indicates that: Having caused the opponents to ascertain the forward and counter pervasions by logical feasibility renowned to them, then the way of applying this to the meaning in the relevant context is: Because of this, although if an eye also had a nature of seeing, then upon being initially observed seeing itself, it would be logically feasible to observe also its seeing forms and so forth when it comes together with forms and so forth, but because an eye does not have seeing itself, it does not have seeing forms. ཞེས་ི་ལ་རང་ལ་གྲགས་པའོ ི་འཐད་པས་ས་་འགྲེ ོ་ོག་ ངེས་་བག་ནས་དེ་ནས་བས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལ་ོར་བའི་ལ་ནི། དེའི་ིར་མག་ལའང་་བའི ི་རང་བཞིན་ཡད་ན་ཐོ ོག་མར་རང་ ལ་བ་བ་དམིགས་ནས་དེ་ནས་གགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་ཚགས་ པ་ན་གགས་ལ་བ་བ་ཡང་དམགས་པར་འཐད་པ་ཞི ག་ན།ི མིག་ལ་རང་ལ་བ་བ་མེད་པའི་ར་གཞན་ལ་བ་བ་ཡང་མི ེད་ དོ། ། ཞེས་ོན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། It is as Āryadeva’s Four Hundred also says: If the nature of all things Initially is perceived in itself, Why does even the eye not Apprehend the eye itself!

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 117 བཞི་བ་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་། དངོས་པོ་ཀུན་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་ནི། །ཐོག་ མར་བདག་ལ་ང་འར་ན། །མག་ཉི ིད་ལ་ཡང་མིག་གིས་ ནི། །ཅི་ཡི་ར་ན་འཛི ན་མི ི་འར། ། ཞེས་གངས་པ་ར་ར།ོ ། One might think: Just as although fire does not burn itself, it burns others, so it is not contradictory that although an eye does not see itself, it sees others. Response: Here it is not being refuted merely that in general fire burns fuel and an eye sees forms. Well then, what is being refuted? That an eye’s seeing forms exists by way of its own entity is being refuted. གལ་ཏེ་མེས་རང་མི་བེག་ཀྱང་གཞན་བག་པ་བཞེ ིན་་མིག་ གིས་རང་ལ་མི་བ་ཡང་གཞན་ལ་བ་བ་མི་འགལ་ལོ་མ་་ སེམས་ན་ར་མི ེས་ད་ཤིང་བག་པ་དང་མེ ག་གི ིས་གགས་ལ་ བ་བ་ཙམ་འགོག་པ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། མིག་ལ་གཞན་ལ་བ་བ་ངོ་ བོས་ཡོད་པ་དེ་འགོག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། It is thus, and burning of fuel by fire established by way of its own entity must be taken as the example, whereby the example also is not logically feasible just as the proposition is not logically feasible, as follows: If the two, fire and fuel, have natures that are established by way of their own entity, these do not pass beyond one or different natures, whereby from between those two, which is it? If they are one, fire would burn itself. དེ་་ཡིན་དང་མས་ད་ཤེ ིང་བག་པ་ངེ ོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱས་བ་པ་ི དཔེར་ད་དགེ ོས་པས་དེའི་ཚ་དཔ་ཡང་བབ་་བཞེ ིན་་མི་ འཐད་དེ། འདི་ར་མ་དང་ད་ཤེ ིང་གཉིས་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་ བ་པའི་རང་བཞན་ཡི ད་ན་རང་བཞོ ིན་གཅག་དང་ཐ་དད་ི གཉིས་ལས་མི་འདའ་བས་དེ་གཉས་གང་ཡི ིན། གཅིག་ཡན་ན་ནི ི་ མེས་རང་ཉད་བི ེག་པར་འར་ལ།

118 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight

Furthermore, how would fire be the burner and fuel be the burned? If they were, then if I reversed them and proposed “Fire is the burned, and fuel is the burner,” what answer do you have? If they are individual natures, even without fuel fire would be observed, just as even where there are no horses, oxen are observed by reason of being individual natures. It is as Āryadeva’s Four Hundred also says: Fire burns just heat, Because in what way could fire burn non-heat! Therefore, “fuel” does not exist. Except for this [fuel], fire also does not exist. གཞན་ཡང་མེ་ེག་ད་དང་ད་ཤེ ིང་བག་ར་ཇེ ི་ར་འར། འར་ན་ན་ཁི ོ་བོས་ཀྱང་མེ་ནི་བེག་འ།ོ །ད་ཤང་ནི ་ི ེག་ ེད་དོ། ། ཞེས་ས་ན་ལན་ཅི་ཞག་ཡི ོད་གལ་ཏེ་རང་བཞིན་སོ་ སོ་བ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་ད་ཤིང་མད་པར་ཡང་མེ ེ་དམིགས་པར་འར་ ཏེ། ་མེད་པར་བ་གླང་དམིགས་པ་བཞིན་ན།ོ ། བཞི་བ་པ་ ལས་ཀྱང་། མེས་ནི་ཚ་བ་ཉིད་ག་ེ ེ། །ཚ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ཇི་ར་ ེག །དས་ན་ད་ཤེ ང་ཞི ེས་་མད།ེ །དེ་མ་གཏོགས་པར་མེ་ཡང་ མེད། ། ཅས་གངས་པ་ར་རེ ོ། ། Thus, if a nature that is established by way of its own entity is asserted in burning, then if it does not burn itself, it also would not burn others; so, likewise, if a nature of seeing is asserted in an eye, then if an eye does not see itself, it must be asserted that it also does not see others, whereby one has not moved beyond the earlier fallacy. དེ་ར་བག་པ་དེ ེ་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་རང་བཞན་ཁས་ི ལེན་ན་ནི་རང་མི་བག་ན་གཞན་ཡང་མེ ི་བེག་པར་འར་བ་ ར་མག་ལ་བ་བའི ི་རང་བཞན་ཁས་ལི ན་ནའང་རང་ལ་མེ ི་ བ་ན་གཞན་ལ་ཡང་མི་བ་བར་འདོད་དགས་པས་ོ ོན་་མ་ མི་གཡོའ།ོ །

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 119

When in that way the demonstrated damages to asserting a nature are seen, they forsake tenets holding a nature established by way of its own entity, and then since they are able to realize also the feasibility of activi- ties, objects, and agents within an absence of inherent existence, they differentiate the absence of inherent existence and nonexistence. Thereby, they will also individually differentiate the two, inherent existence and existence, due to which they will also realize the comprehending of objects of comprehension without inherent existence by valid cognitions without inherent existence, and so forth. དེ་ར་རང་བཞིན་ཁས་ངས་པ་ལ་གནད་ོ ད་བན་པ་མས་ེ མཐོང་བ་ན། རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་རང་བཞན་ཡི ོད་པར་ འཛིན་པའི་བ་མཐའ་འདོར་བར་འར་ལ། དེ་ནས་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པ་ལ་་ད་འཐད་པ་ཡང་ེ ོགས་པར་ས་པས་ རང་བཞན་མི ེད་པ་དང་མེད་པ་སོ་སོར་ེད་པར་འར་ལ། དེའི་ ིར་རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་པ་དང་ཡོད་པ་ཡང་སོ་སོར་ེད་པར་ འར་བས་རང་བཞན་མི ེད་པའི་གཞལ་་ལ་རང་བཞན་མི ེད་ པའི་ཚད་མས་འཇལ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཡང་གས་པར་འར་བ་ོ ཡིན་ནོ། ། Well then, if the valid cognition whereby these realize fire and fuel as without inherent existence is not logically feasible as a direct perception, it must be asserted as an inference. Thus, what is its supporting reason? འོ་ན་འདས་མི ེ་དང་ད་ཤིང་རང་བཞིན་མད་པར་ེ ོགས་པའི་ ཚད་མ་དེ་མངོན་མ་་མི་འཐད་པས་ེས་དཔག་་འདོད་ དགོས་ན། དེ་་ན་དའེ ི་ེན་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཇ་ར་ཡི ིན་མ་ན། They see that what inherently exists does not pass beyond being one or different, whereupon inherent one and different are blocked, they see that such is necessarily not inherently existent. Thereby, at that time the two modes [of entailment] are established, and the ascertainment that [the subject] does not have either the nature of oneness or difference is the

120 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight mode of the presence of the sign in the subject. Hence, a sign having the three modes exists, and ascertainment—in dependence on it—thinking, “Fire and fuel do not have an inherent nature,” is an inference. རང་བཞན་ཡི ོད་ན་གཅག་དང་ཐ་དད་ལས་མི ་འདའ་བར་ི མཐོང་ནས། གཅིག་ཐ་དད་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་ཁགས་པ་ན་རང་ེ བཞིན་མེད་པས་ཁྱབ་པར་མཐང་བས།ོ ལ་གཉིས་འབ་ལ་ གཅིག་དང་ཐ་དད་པའ་རང་བཞི ན་མི ེད་པར་ངེས་པ་ན།ི ོགས་ ཆོས་ཀྱི་ལ་ཡིན་པས་ལ་གམ་པའི་གས་ཡོད་ལ། དེ་ལ་ བེན་ནས་མེ་དང་ད་ཤིང་ལ་རང་བཞན་མི ད་དེ ོ་མ་་ངེས་ པ་ནི་ེས་དཔག་གོ ། Through this, you will understand the three modes and how to generate an inference also with respect to the other-renowned syllogism stated earlier. འདིས་ནི་ར་བཀོད་པའི་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་ར་བ་ལའང་ལ་ོ གམ་དང་ེས་དཔག་ེ་ལ་ཤས་པར་འེ ོ། ། The application of this mode to a consequence is as follows: “If fire and fuel have inherent existence, they would be either inherently one or different,” and “If they are one, fire would burn itself,” and so forth. Such flingings of the opponent’s nonasserted, having stated as the sign the other’s own assertions, are [how to apply this mode in consequences]. Therefore, illustrating it with these, you will realize also other consequences. ཐལ་འར་ནི་མེ་དང་ད་ཤང་ལ་རང་བཞི ན་ཡི ོད་ན་རང་ བཞིན་གཅག་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ང་་འར་རི ོ། ། ཞེས་པ་དང་ གཅིག་ཡན་ན་མི ེས་རང་ཉིད་བག་པར་འར་རེ ོ་ཞེས་སགས་ོ གཞན་གྱིས་ཁས་ངས་པ་གས་་བཀོད་ནས་ཕ་རོལ་པོ་མི་

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 121 འདོད་པ་འཕེན་པ་འད་འ་མས་ཡི ིན་པས་དེས་མཚན་ནས་ ཐལ་བ་གཞན་མས་ཀྱང་ོགས་པར་འོ། ། Accordingly, as long as those opponents have not forsaken the tenets of a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things, [their valid cognitions] are established as valid cognitions confirming factualities (don), upon having relied upon comprehension of objects of comprehension established by way of their own entities,a but from when they realize with valid cognition something as not established by way of its own entity, they give up the tenets of a Proponent of [Truly Established] Things. དེ་་ན་ི་ོལ་དས་ཇེ ་ི ིད་་དངོས་པོ་་བའི་བ་མཐའ་མ་ དོར་བ་དེ་ིད་་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པའི་གཞལ་་འཇལ་བ་ བ་པ་ལ་ོས་ནས་དན་འབ་ོ ད་ཀྱེ ི་ཚད་མར་འབ་པ་ཡིན་ ལ། གང་གི་ཚ་དངས་པོ ་འགའ་ཞོ ག་རང་གི ི་ངོ་བོས་བ་པ་མེད་ པར་ཚད་མས་ོགས་པ་ནས་དངས་པོ ོར་་བའ་བ་མཐའ་ི བཏང་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words also says:b a For the opponent, a consciousness becomes a valid cognition with respect to the members of a syllogism within the context of the opponent’s believing that this valid cognition comprehends its object as being established in its own right, that is, established from its own side or established by way of its entity. b Jam-yang-shay-pa’s commentary on this says: About that, [hypothetically] Bhāvaviveka says: It follows that although the two—Chandrakīrti and another party—without having a compatibly appearing mode of establishing the subject, nevertheless have signs damaging [the other party’s wrong positions] due to [the subject’s] being validly established for either of the respective parties because your other-approved signs are such. དེ་ལ་ལེགས་ན་ན་རེ། ་གྲགས་ི་ོལ་བ་གཉིས་ལ་ཆོས་ཅན་བ་ལ་མན་ང་ བ་མེད་པར་ོལ་བ་རང་རང་གང་ང་ལ་ཚད་མས་བ་པས་ཀྱང་གནོད་ེད་ཀྱི་ གས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་གས་དེའི་ིར་ཟེར་ན། Answer: That there are such is very much accepted because a reason validly

122 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight

[Hypothetical rejoinder by Bhāvaviveka:] Is there damage by inference even from an inference established for either [of the parties]?

established for the other party is what is damaging, whereas it is not necessary for it to be established in compatible appearance for the contender oneself because, for example, it is seen in the world that sometimes [in a dispute] one prevails and the other is defeated through the word of a judge and sometimes by the word of the two disputants themselves. [That, for example, it is seen in the world that sometimes (in a dispute) one prevails and the other is defeated through the word of a judge and sometimes by the word of the two disputants themselves] entails [that a reason validly established for the other party is what is damaging, whereas it is not necessary for it to be established in compatible appearance for the contender oneself] because how things are in the world is appropriate also for treatises. It follows [that how things are in the world is appropriate also for treatises] because the Supramundane Victor says, “What is true in the world I also treat as true,” and so forth, and Āryadeva says: Just as a barbarian cannot be Approached with another language, So the world cannot be approached Except with the worldly. དེ་ཡོད་པར་ཤིན་་འདོད་དེ། ི་ོལ་རང་ཉིད་ལ་ཚད་མས་བ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ གནོད་ེད་ཡིན་གྱི་་ོལ་ལ་མན་ང་་བ་པ་མི་དགོས་པའི་ིར། དཔེར་ན་ འཇིག་ེན་ན་རེས་འགའ་དཔང་པོའི་ཚིག་གིས་ལ་ཕམ་དང་རེས་འགའ་ོད་་ གཉིས་རང་རང་གི་ཚིག་གིས་ལ་ཕམ་འེད་པ་མཐོང་བའི་ིར། [དཔེར་ན་འཇིག་ེན་ན་ རེས་འགའ་དཔང་པོའི་ཚིག་གིས་ལ་ཕམ་དང་རེས་འགའ་ོད་་གཉིས་རང་རང་གི་ཚིག་གིས་ལ་ཕམ་ འེད་པ་མཐོང་ན་ི་ོལ་རང་ཉིད་ལ་ཚད་མས་བ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གནོད་ེད་ཡིན་གྱི་་ོལ་ལ་མན་ ང་་བ་པ་མི་དགོས་པས་]ཁྱབ་ེ། འཇིག་ེན་ན་ཇི་ར་ཡིན་པ་བན་བཅོམ་ལ་ཡང་ བས་་བབས་པའི་ིར། [འཇིག་ེན་ན་ཇི་ར་ཡིན་པ་བན་བཅོམ་ལ་ཡང་བས་་བབས་ པ་]དེར་ཐལ། བཅོམ་ན་འདས་ཀྱིས་འཇིག་ེན་ན་གང་བདེན་པ་དེ་ང་ཡང་བདེན་ པར་ེད་སོགས་དང་། འཕགས་པ་ས། ཇི་ར་ཀླ་ཀློ་ད་གཞན་གྱིས། །བང་བར་མི་ ས་དེ་བཞིན་། །འཇིག་ེན་པ་ཡི་མ་གཏོགས་པར། །འཇིག་ེན་བང་བར་ས་མ་ ཡིན། ། ཞེས་གངས་པའི་ིར། Quoting the third volume in this series, Jeffrey Hopkins, Chandrakīrti Undermines Bhāva- viveka’s Assertion of Autonomy: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Compatibly Appearing Subjects, 3 [Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, August 2018, uma-tibet.org, 109.

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 123 ཚིག་གསལ་ལས་ཀྱང་། ཡང་ཅི་གང་ཡང་ང་བ་ལ་བ་པའི་ ེས་་དཔག་པའི་ོ་ནས་ཀྱང་ས་་དཔག་པས་གནེ ད་པ་ོ ཡོད་དམ་ཞ་ན་ེ [Answer:] There is. It moreover is just by a reason established for that opponent him/herself, but is not by what is established for the other [disputant], because such is seen in the world. In the world, sometimes [one party] prevails and [the other] is defeated by the word of a judge that both take to be valid, and sometimes comes about only by their own words, but victory or defeat does not come about by the other’s words. Just as it is in the world, so it is also in reasoning because only the conventions of the world are appropriate in treatises of reasoning. ཡོད་དེ་དེ་ཡང་རང་ཉད་ལ་བ་པའི ི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ ཡིན་གྱི། གཞན་ལ་བ་པས་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འཇིག་ན་ཉེ ད་་ི མཐོང་བའི་ིར་རོ། ། འཇིག་ན་ན་ནེ ི་རེས་འགའ་དབང་པོའི་ ོལ་བ་དང་ིར་ོལ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཚད་མར་ས་པའི་ཚིག་གིས་ ལ་བའམ་ཕམ་པར་འར་ལ། རེས་འགའ་ནི་རང་གི་ཚག་ཁི ོ་ ནས་འར་གྱི། གཞན་གྱི་ཚིག་གས་ནི ི་ལ་བའམ་ཕམ་པར་ འར་བ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། འཇིག་ེན་ན་ཇི་ར་ཡིན་པ་དེ་བཞིན་་ རིགས་པ་ལ་ཡང་ཡིན་ཏེ། འཇིག་ེན་པའི་ཐ་ད་ཁོ་ན་རིགས་ པའི་བན་བཅོས་་བས་་བབ་པ་ཡིན་པའ་ི ིར་རོ། ། Thus, [Chandrakīrti] sets out (1) an example of the suitability as the sign the renowned to the other and (2) scriptural sources and also sets out (3) a refutation of the assertion by Logicians those valid cognitions—by which the three modes and so forth are established for the opponent—must establish also for the contender, whereby these must be established for both disputants. In that very text:

124 Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight

Also, the onea who thinks: That expressing ascertainment for both disputants proves or refutes, but that proposing establishment for either of them or doubt does not. also for inferences should assert—in dependence upon the world’s presentation—just this manner as [I have] propounded. For, damage through scripture is not from the approach of only scripture established for both. Then how? It is also from the approach of what is established for him/herself. [Furthermore] in inference for oneself, always just what is established for oneself is weightier, not what is established for both. Therefore, expression of the definitions of logic is not needed because the Buddhas help beings—who are trainees not knowing suchnessb—with the tenable in accordance with what is renowned to them. ཞེས་གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་པ་གས་་ང་བའི་དཔེ་དང་ཤས་ེ ེད་ མས་གངས་ཤང་ི ག་གོ ེ་པ་མས་ི་ལ་ལ་ཚད་མ་གང་ོ གིས་ལ་གམ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བ་པའི་ཚད་མ་དེས། ་ལ་ལ་ོ ཡང་བ་དགོས་པས་ལ་ོ ི་ོལ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་བ་དགས་པར་ོ འདོད་པ་འགོག་པའང་གངས་ཏེ། དེ་ཉིད་ལས། གང་ཞག་གང་ི གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་ངེས་པ་བོད་པ་དེ་ནི་བ་པའམ་ན་འན་པ་ི ཡིན་གྱི་གང་ཡང་ང་བ་ལ་ལ་བ་པའམ་ཐ་ཚེ མ་ཟ་བ་་བ་ནི་ མ་ཡིན་ནོ་མ་་སམས་པ་དེ ེས་ཀྱང་འཇིག་ེན་གྱི་མ་པར་ བཞག་པ་ལ་བེན་ནས་ེས་་དཔག་པ་ལ་ཇི་ད་ས་པའི་ ལ་འདི་ཉད་ཁས་ང་བར་འི ོ། ། འདི་ར་ང་གས་གནི ོད་ a Jam-yang-shay-pa identifies this as Dignāga. b With respect to “who do not know suchness” the Sanskrit (La Vallée Poussin, Prasan- napadā, 36.1) is merely tadanabhijña “who do not know that [or those, which could refer to ‘definitions’]” whereas the Tibetan reads de kho na mi shes pa’i “who do not know suchness.” I have followed the Tibetan as it presumably reflects the translators’ reading of tad as meaning tattva (see La Vallée Poussin, Prasannapadā, 36, n.3).

Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Exposition of Special Insight 125 པ་ནི་གཉས་ཀ་ལ་བ་པའི ི་ང་ཁ་ནའོ ི་ོ་ནས་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འོ་ན་ ཅི་ཞེ་ན་རང་ལ་བ་པའི་ོ་ནས་ཀྱང་ཡིན་ནོ། ། རང་ག་དི ོན་གྱི་ ེས་་དཔག་པར་ནི་ཐམས་ཅད་་རང་ལ་བ་པ་ཉད་བི ིང་ བ་ཡིན་གྱི། གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་བ་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ིར་ ོག་གའེ ི་མཚན་ཉད་བི ོད་པ་ནི་དགོས་པ་མད་པ་ཡེ ིན་ཏེ། སངས་ས་མས་ཀྱིས་རང་ལ་ཇི་ར་གྲགས་པའི་འཐད་པས་དེ་ ཁོ་ན་མ་ཤས་པའེ ི་གལ་འི་ེ་བོ་ལ་ཕན་བཏགས་པའི་ིར་ རོ། ། ཞེས་གངས་ས།ོ ། Thus, this positing: 1. of a sign proving a proposition—established for both disputants by valid cognition like described above—as an autonomous sign, and 2. of those—who without establishment by that [autonomous sign] prove a proposition through the three modes renowned to the other disputant—as Consequentialists is very clear as being the master’s thought. དེ་ར་ན་ར་བཤད་པ་་འི་ཚད་མས་ལ་བ་གཉོ ས་ཀ་ལ་ི བ་པའི་གས་ཀྱིས་བབ་་བ་པ་ལ་རང་ད་ཀྱི་གས་ དང༌དས་མེ ་འབ་པར་ི ི་ོལ་གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་པའི་ལ་གམ་ གྱིས་བབ་་འབ་པ་ལ་ཐལ་འར་བར་འཇོག་པ་འད་ནི ི་ ོབ་དཔན་གྱོ ི་དགངས་པར་ཤོ ིན་་གསལ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །

Abbreviations “co ne” = co ne bstan ’gyur. TBRC W1GS66030. co ne dgon chen: co ne, 1926. “Dharma” = the sde dge edition of the Tibetan canon published by Dharma Press: the Nying-ma Edition of the sDe-dge bKa'-'gyur and bsTan- 'gyur. Oakland, Calif.: Dharma Press, 1980. “Golden Reprint” = gser bris bstan ’gyur (Sichuan, China: krung go’i mtho rim nang bstan slob gling gi bod brgyud nang bstan zhib ’jug khang, 1989). “Grags pa & rnam rgyal” = Palden Drakpa and Damdul Namgyal. drang nges legs bshad snying po: The Essence of Eloquent Speech on the Definitive and Interpretable, 84.16-103.5. Mundgod, India: SOKU, 1991. “Karmapa sde dge” refers to the sde dge mtshal par bka’ ’gyur: A Fac- simile Edition of the 18th Century Redaction of Si tu chos kyi ’byung gnas Prepared under the Direction of H.H. the 16th rgyal dbang karma pa (Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Chodhey Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1977). “Peking” = Tibetan Tripiṭaka: Peking Edition kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto. Edited by Daisetz Teitarō Suzuki. Tokyo, Kyoto, Japan: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Foundation, 1955-1961. “sde dge” = sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka—bsTan ḥgyur preserved at the Fac- ulty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Edited by Z. Yamaguchi, et al. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1977-1984. The catalogue numbers are from Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons. Edited by Hukuji Ui. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University, 1934. And A Cata- logue of the Tohuku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Bud- dhism. Edited by Yensho Kanakura. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku Univer- sity, 1953. TBRC W23703 (PDF of Delhi, India: Karmapae Chodhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1977). “stog Palace” refers to the Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur (Leh, Ladakh: Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemdzod, 1979). “TBRC” = Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (http://www.tbrc.org).

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French translation (chap. 17): É. Lamotte. “Le Traité de l’acte de Vasubandhu, Karmasid- dhiprakaraṇa.” Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 4 (1936): 265-288. German translation (chaps. 5, 12-26): Stanislaw Schayer. Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasan- napadā. Krakow: Naktadem Polskiej Akademji Umiejetnosci, 1931. German translation (chap. 10): Stanislaw Schayer. “Feuer und Brennstoff.” Rocznik Orjental- istyczny 7 (1931): 26-52. Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” madhyamakāvatāra dbu ma la ’jug pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3861). TBRC W23703.102:403-439 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982- 1985). Peking 5261, Peking 5262, vol. 98. Tibetan: Louis de La Vallée Poussin. Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Bibliotheca Bud- dhica 9. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970. English translation: C. W. Huntington, Jr. The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika, 147-195. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1989. English translation (chaps. 1-5): Jeffrey Hopkins. Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism. London: Rider, 1980; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1980. English translation (chap. 6): Stephen Batchelor. Echoes of Voidness by Geshé Rabten, 47-92. London: Wisdom Publications, 1983. See also references under Chandrakīrti’s [Auto]commentary on the “Supplement.” Dharmakīrti (chos kyi grags pa, seventh century) Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition Three resembling a body 1. Commentary on Valid Cognition / Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cogni- tion” pramāṇavārttikakārikā tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi tshig le’ur byas pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4210). BDRC W23703.174:189-304 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982- 1985). Peking 5709, vol. 130. Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1974. Sanskrit edition of first chapter: Input by Motoi Ono available from http://gretil.sub.uni-goettin- gen.de/gretil.htm; remaining chapters: Dharmakirti: pramāṇavārttikakārikā, chapters 2-4 (without the Svarthanumana-chapter) Input by Motoi Ono. of Y. Miyasaka, Pramanavarttika- karika (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Acta Indologica 2, 1971/72, 1-206 http://gretil.sub.uni-goettin- gen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/6_sastra/3_phil/buddh/dhkprvku.htm; also Digital Buddhist Sanskrit Canon http://www.dsbcproject.org/node/7047 Sanskrit: Dwarikadas Shastri. Pramāṇavārttika of Āchārya Dharmakīrtti. Varanasi, India: Bauddha Bharati, 1968. Also, Yūsho Miyasaka. “Pramāṇavarttika-Kārikā (Sanskrit and Ti- betan),” Acta Indologica 2 (1971-1972): 1-206. Also, (chap. 1 and autocommentary) Raniero Gnoli. The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: The First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960. English translation (chap. 2): Masatoshi Nagatomi. “A Study of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavarttika: An English Translation and Annotation of the Pramāṇavarttika, Book I.” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1957. English translation (chap. 4, stanzas 1-148): Tom J.F. Tillemans. Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārt- tika: An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (parārthānumāna), vol. 1. Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000. English translation: John Donne. The Svopajñavṛtti: Dharmakīrti's Commentary on the Inference

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Chapter (svārthānumānpariccheda) of his Pramāṇavārttika. An English Translation From the Sanskrit with Notes from the Commentaries of Śākya buddhi and Karṇakagomin. Manu- script. Harvard, 1996-1998; translation of the second chapter by Roger R. Jackson, Is Enlight- enment Possible, Ithaca New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1993; Eli Franco, Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth, Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 1997; translation of the last chapter by Tom J.F. Tillemans, Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika: An annotated translation of the fourth chapter. Wien: Verlag der Österreischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000. 2. Ascertainment of Valid Cognition pramāṇaviniścaya tshad ma rnam par nges pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4211). BDRC W23703.174:305-462 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982- 1985). Peking 5710, vol. 130. 3. Drop of Reasoning nyāyabinduprakaraṇa rigs pa’i thigs pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4212). BDRC W23703.174:463-477 In bstan 'gyur (sde dge). BDRC W23703.174:463-477 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5711, vol. 130. English translation: Th. Stcherbatsky. Buddhist Logic. New York: Dover Publications, 1962. Four resembling limbs 4. Drop of Reasons hetubindunāmaprakaraṇa gtan tshigs kyi thigs pa zhes bya ba rab tu byed pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4213). BDRC W23703.174:477-511 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982- 1985). Peking 5712, vol. 130. 5. Analysis of Relations sambandhaparīkṣā ’brel pa brtag pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4215). BDRC W23703.174:513-523 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982- 1985). Peking 5713, vol. 130. 6. Proof of Other Continuums saṃtānāntarasiddhināmaprakaraṇa rgyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba’i rab tu byed pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4219). BDRC W23703.175:712719 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5716, vol. 130. 7. Reasoning for Debate vādanyāya rtsod pa’i rigs pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4218). BDRC W23703.175:654-712 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982- 1985). Peking 5715, vol. 130. Auto-Commentary on the “Commentary on Valid Cognition”

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tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi ’grel pa pramāṇavārttikavṛtti Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4216), BDRC W23703.174:523-732 (Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Dignāga (phyogs kyi glangs po, sixth century) Compilation of Valid Cognition pramāṇasamuccaya tshad ma kun las btus pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4203). TBRC W23703.174:3-29 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5700, vol. 130. English translation (partial): M. Hattori. Dignāga, On Perception. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968. Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan (sgom sde nam mkha’ rgyal mtshan, 1532-1592) Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences: Key to (Chandrakīrti’s) “Clear Words,” Written by Jam-pay-yang Gom-day Nam-kha-gyal-tshan thal bzlog gi dka’ ba’i gnas gtan la ’bebs pa ’jam pa’i dbyang sgom sde nam mkha’ rgyal mtshan gyis mdzad pa’i tshig gsal gyi lde mig in The Obligatory Texts (Yig-cha) for the Study of Madhyamika of Byes Grwa-tshan of Se-ra Monastery, Madhyamika Text Series, vol. 4 New Delhi: Lha-mkhar yoṅs-dzin bstan-pa-rgyal-mtshan, 1973. Gung-thang Lo-drö-gya-tsho/ A-khu Lo-drö-gya-tsho (gung thang blo gros rgya mtsho/ a khu blo gros rgya mtsho, 1851-1928/1930) Day-making Illumination Clarifying the Meaning of the Thought of (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Deci- sive Analysis of the Middle: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning” dbu ma’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod kyi dgongs don gsal bar byed pa’i nyin byed snang ba zab lam lta ba’i mig ’byed Tibetan digital reprint edition: BDRC W140-l1KG15988 (PDF of Lhasa: Ser gtsug nang bstan dpe rnying 'tshol bsdu phyogs sgrig khang, 2009.) Gyal-tshab-dar-ma-rin-chen (rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432) Explanation of (Dharmakīrti’s) Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition”: Unerring Illumination of the Path to Liberation / Illumination of the Path to Liberation tshad ma rnam ʼgrel gyi tshig leʼur byas paʼi rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa / rnam ʼgrel thar lam gsal byed Tibetan editions: In gsung ʼbum (rgyal tshab rje, bla brang par ma) TBRC W4CZ2710.5:229- 410 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, 1999). Tibetan editions: In gsung ʼbum (rgyal tshab rje) TBRC W22110.5:207-392. (PDF of New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1980-1981). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi rnam bshad. TBRC W665:11-548 (PDF of zhang kang: zhang kang then ma dpe skrun kung zi, 2000). Collected Works of Rgyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, vol. 6 (entire). Delhi: Guru Deva, 1982. Also: Collected Works of Rgyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, vol. 6 (entire). Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1981. Also: Varanasi, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1974. Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tson-drü ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje ngag dbang brtson grus, 1648-1721/1722) Golden Wheel of Annotations / Precious Golden Wheel of Annotations to (Tsong-kha-pa’s) Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment mchan ’grel gser kyi ’khor lo / byang chub lam gyi rim pa chen mo mchan ’grel gser kyi ’khor lo rin po che Digital edition supplied by Drepung Gomang Library, Mundgod, Karnataka, India, 2017. Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive / Decisive Analysis of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive”: Storehouse of White Beryl of Scripture

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and Reasoning Free from Mistake, Fulfilling the Hopes of the Fortunate drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par ’byed pa'i mtha' dpyod ’khrul bral lung rigs bai dūr dkar pa'i ngan mdzod skal bzang re ba kun skong Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W22186.10:1-288 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, bla brang brka shis ’khyil dgon, publishing date unknown). Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W1KG21952.1 (PDF of sbag sa: nang bstan shes rig 'dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, [1968]). Tibetan edition: Published at Lhasa, Tibet: Go-mang College, date unknown. Acquired by Jef- frey Hopkins in Lhasa, Tibet, at Go-mang College in 1987. Taipei reprint (published by the Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, Taipei, Taiwan, 2008) of the 1999 codex (Mundgod, India: Go-mang Library, 1999) based on the 1995 Mundgod revision (Mundgod, India: Go-mang College, 1995) of the 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang edition (New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973). English translation of section one: William Magee. Principles for Practice: Jam-yang-shay-pa on the Four Reliances with Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Annotations. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org. English translation of section two: William Magee. Questioning the Buddha About Contradic- tions in His Teachings. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org. English translation of section three: William Magee. Buddha’s Answer Dispelling Contradiction in the Sūtras. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, uma-tibet.org. Great Exposition of the Middle / Decisive Analysis of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgār- juna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminat- ing the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate dbu ma chen mo / dbu ma ’jug pa’i mtha’ dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang ’jug ngogs Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje). TBRC W21503.9:11-894 (PDF of South India?: Gomang College?, 1997?). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje). bla brang bkra shis 'khyil: bla brang brka shis 'khyil dgon, publishing date unknown. Also available at: TBRC W22186.14. Collected Works of ’Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa’i-rdo-rje, vol. 9 (entire). New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973. Also available at: TBRC W1KG9409.9. Buxaduor, India: Gomang, 1967. Collected Works of ’Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa’i-rdo-rje, vol. 9. (entire). Mundgod, India: Gomang College, 1997. Also available at: TBRC W21503.9. Beijing, China: Pe cin yug hran shin 'gyig par khang, 2004. Mundgod, Karnataka, India: Drepung Gomang Library, 2007. Translation of the section on the two truths: Guy M. Newland’s Ph.D. thesis, The Two truths: A study of Mādhyamika philosophy as presented in the Monastic textbooks of the Ge-lug-ba order of Tibetan Buddhism. Translation of the beginning: Jules Levinson, What Does Chandrakīrti Add to Nāgārjuna’s Trea- tise? UMA Translation Project Publication, 2015. http://uma-tibet.org. Translation of the beginning of chapter six: Craig Preston, Meaning of “The Manifest,” Vessels for the Teaching of Emptiness, Nāgārjuna’s Lives, and Ten Samenesses: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six, Introduction. Translation of part of chapter six: Jongbok Yi. The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Autonomy School: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six. Translation of part of chapter six: Jongbok Yi. The Opposite of Emptiness in the Middle Way Consequence School: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Great Exposition of the Middle: Chapter Six. Great Exposition of Tenets / Explanation of Tenets: Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others’ Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings

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grub mtha’ chen mo / grub mtha’i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu’i re ba kun skong In the Collected Works of ’Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa’i-rdo-rje: Reproduced from prints from La- brang-tra-shi-khyil blocks, 15 vols, Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyunphel Series. New Delhi, India: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973. Mundgod revision of the 1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang (Mundgod, India: Go-mang College, 1996). Abbreviated reference: “1996 Mundgod revision.” Taipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod (Taiwan: The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foun- dation, 2000). Abbreviated reference: “2000 Taipei reprint of 1999 Mundgod.” Musoorie, India: Dalama, 1962 [based on the old Go-mang edition]. Abbreviated reference: “1962 Dalama.” Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje) TBRC W1KG9409.14:48-625 (PDF of New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973). Abbreviated reference: “1973 Ngawang Gelek bla brang.” Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W22186.13:35-614 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis ’khyil: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil dgon, [n.d.]). Abbreviated reference: “2001 TBRC bla brang.” Tibetan scanned edition: scanning of old Go-mang edition by Jongbok Yi at Mundgod in 2017. Abbreviated reference: “2017 old Go-mang.” English translation (entire root text and edited portions of the autocommentary and Ngag-wang- pal-dan’s Annotations): Jeffrey Hopkins. Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist Views on the Nature of Reality. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2003. English translation (beginning of the chapter on the Consequence School): Jeffrey Hopkins. Meditation on Emptiness, 581-697. London: Wisdom Publications, 1983; rev. ed., Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1996. English translation of root text with Lo-sang-kön-chog’s commentary: Daniel Cozort and Craig Preston. Buddhist Philosophy: Losang Gonchok's Short Commentary to Jamyang Shayba's Root Text on Tenets. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2003. Translation of the section of the distinctive tenets of the Consequence School: Daniel Cozort, Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1998). Translation into complex-character Chinese: Su-an Lin. Jeffrey Hopkins’ Easy Access to Jam- yang-shay-pa’s Maps of the Profound: Autonomy School. Translation into complex-character Chinese: Su-an Lin. Jeffrey Hopkins’ Easy Access to Jam- yang-shay-pa’s Maps of the Profound: Consequence School.. Root Text of Tenets: Lion’s Roar / Presentation of Tenets: Roar of the Five-Faced [Lion] Eradicat- ing Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Good Path to Omniscience grub mtha’ rtsa ba gdong lnga’i sgra dbyangs / grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzhag pa ’khrul spong gdong lnga’i sgra dbyangs kun mkhyen lam bzang gsal ba’i sgron me Collected Works of ’Jam-dbyaṅs-bzhad-pa’i-rdo-rdo-rje, vol. 14 (entire). New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1973 [this is the Tra-shi-khyil blockprint with some “corrections”]. Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje / bla brang par ma). TBRC W22186.1:223-276 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis ’khyil: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil dgon, [n.d.]). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In kun mkhyen ’jam dpal zhal lung sogs nyer mkho’i skor phyogs bsgrigs. TBRC W30060:152-177. [s.l.]: [s.n.], [2002] Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje). TBRC W21503.1:223-276 (PDF of Go-mang college[?], 1997[?]. Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W8LS17287.1. [s.l.]: [s.n.], [n.d.]. Jang-kya Röl-pay-dor-je (lcang skya rol pa’i rdo rje, 1717-1786) Clear Exposition of the Presentations of Tenets: Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer’s Teaching / Presentations of Tenets grub mtha’i rnam bzhag / grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun

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po’i mdzes rgyan Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (rol pa’i rdo rje). TBRC W28833.7:7-220 (PDF of Pe Cin: krung go bod brgyud mtho rim nang bstan slob gling nang bstan zhib ’jug khang, 1995). Edition cited: Varanasi, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1970. Also: Lokesh Chandra, ed. Buddhist Philosophical Systems of Lcaṅ-skya Rol-pahi Rdo-rje. Śata-piṭaka Se- ries (Indo-Asian Literatures), vol. 233. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1977. Also: An edition published by gam car phan bde legs bshad gling grva tshang dang rgyud rnying slar gso tshogs pa, 1982. English translation of Sūtra School chapter: Anne C. Klein. Knowing, Naming, and Negation, 115-196. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1988. Commentary on this: Anne C. Klein. Knowledge and Liberation: A Buddhist Epistemological Analysis in Support of Transforma- tive Religious Experience. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1986. English translation of Autonomy School chapter: Donald S. Lopez Jr. A Study of Svātantrika, 243-386. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1986. English translation of part of Consequence School chapter: Jeffrey Hopkins. Emptiness Yoga: The Tibetan Middle Way, 355-428. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1983. Jñānagarbha (ye shes snying po, eighth century) Autocommentary of Differentiation of the Two Truths bden gnyis rnam ’byed pa’i ’grel pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge). TBRC W23703.107: 8-32 (PDF of: Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). English translation with critical edition: Eckel, Malcolm D. Jñānagarbha’s Commentary on the Distinction between the Two Truths: An Eighth Century Handbook of Madhyamaka Philoso- phy. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987. Differentiation of the Two Truths satyadvayavibhaṅgakārika bden pa gnyis rnam par ’byed pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge). TBRC W23703.107: 4-8 (PDF of: Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Kamalashīla (pad ma’i ngang tshul; ca. 740-795) Illumination of the Middle madhyamakāloka dbu ma snang ba Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3887). TBRC W23703.107:268-489 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982- 1985). Peking 5287 Khay-drub-ge-leg-pal-sang (mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, 1385-1438) Compilation on Emptiness / Great Compilation: Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate: Treatise Bril- liantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness stong thun chen mo / zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa’i bstan bcos skal bzang mig ’byed Tibetan digital reprint edition: In dbu ma stong thun chen mo. TBRC W00EGS1016265:9-481 (PDF of Madhyamika Text Series, Vol. 1, New Delhi: ed. lha mkhar yongs ’dzin bstan pa rgyal mtshan, 1972). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (mkhas grub rje). TBRC W1KG10279.1:185-708 (PDF of bla brang par ma: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, 199?). Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W1KG15939. 1 vol (PDF of Lha sa: ser gtsug nang bstan dpe rnying ’tshol bsdu phyogs sgrig khang , 2009). Collected Works of the Lord Mkhas-grub rje dge-legs-dpal-bzaṅ-po, vol. 1, 179-702. New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1980. Also: Collected Works of Mkhas-grub dge-legs dpal, vol. 1, 125-482. New

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vibhaṅgavṛtti, Tibetan Texts, Edited and Collated, Based upon the Peking and Derge Edi- tions.” In Studies in Indology and Buddhology: Presented in Honour of Professor Susumu Yamaguchi on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday, edited by Gadjin M. Nagao and Jōshō Nozawa. Kyoto: Hozokan, 1955. English translation: John Younghan Cha. A Study of the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga: An Analysis of the Religious Philosophy of the Yogācāra, Together with an Annotated Translation of Vasubandhu’s Commentary. PhD diss., Northwestern University, 1996. English translation: Jim Scott. Maitreya’s Distinguishing Phenomena and Pure Being with Com- mentary by Mipham. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2004. 3. Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes madhyāntavibhaṅga dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4021). TBRC W23703.123:81-92 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5522, vol. 108; Dharma vol. 77. Sanskrit: Gadjin M. Nagao. Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964. Also: Ramchandra Pandeya. Madhyānta-vibhāga-śāstra. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971. English translation: Stefan Anacker. Seven Works of Vasubandhu. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984. Also, of chapter 1: Thomas A. Kochumuttom. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982. Also, of chapter 1: F. Th. Stcherbatsky. Madhyāntavibhāga, Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes ascribed to Bodhisattva Maitreya and Com- mented by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati. Bibliotheca Buddhica 30 (1936). Osnabrück, Ger- many: Biblio Verlag, 1970; reprint, Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1971. Also, of chapter 1: David Lasar Friedmann. Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā: Analysis of the Mid- dle Path and the Extremes. Utrecht, Netherlands: Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, 1937. Also, of chapter 3: Paul Wilfred O’Brien, S.J. “A Chapter on Reality from the Madhyāntavibhāgaçās- tra.” Monumenta Nipponica 9, nos. 1-2 (1953): 277-303 and Monumenta Nipponica 10, nos. 1-2 (1954): 227-269. 4. Ornament for the Clear Realizations abhisamayālaṃkāra/ abhisamayālaṁkāra-nāma-prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstrakārikā mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan/ shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan shes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa Sanskrit editions: Amano, Kōei. A study on the Abhisamaya-alaṃkāra-kārikā-śāstra-vṛtti. Rev. ed. Yanai City, Japan: Rokoku Bunko, 2008. Stcherbatsky, Theodore and Eugène Obermiller, eds. Abhisamayālaṅkāra-Prajñāpāramitā- Upadeśa-śāstra: The Work of Bodhisattva Maitreya. Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series. Re- print ed. Delhi, India: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992. Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3786). TBRC W23703.80:3-28 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). English translations: Brunnhölzl, Karl. Gone Beyond: The Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, The Ornament of Clear Reali- zation, and its Commentaries in the Tibetan Kagyü tradition. The Tsadra Foundation series. 2 vols. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2011-2012. ―――. Groundless Paths: The Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, The Ornament of Clear Realization, and Its Commentaries in the Tibetan Nyingma Tradition. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publica- tions, 2012. Conze, Edward. Abhisamayālaṅkāra: Introduction and Translation from Original Text with Sanskrit-Tibetan Index. Roma, Italy: Is. M.E.O., 1954. Hopkins, Jeffrey and Jongbok Yi. Maitreya’s Ornament for the Clear Realizations. Dyke,

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VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2015: downloadable at uma-tibet.org. ―――. Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Explanation of the Treatise “Ornament for the Clear Realiza- tions” From the Approach of the Meaning of the Words: The Sacred Word of Mait- reyanātha. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2014: downloadable at uma- tibet.org. ―――. (containing 203 of the 274 stanzas) The Hidden Teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Seventy Topics and Kön-chog-jig-may-wang-po’s 173 Topics. Dyke, VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2014: downloadable at uma-tibet.org. Sparham, Gareth. Āryavimuktisena, Maitreyanātha, and Haribhadra. Abhisamayālaṃkāra with Vṛtti and Ālokā. 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company., 2006-2011. ―――. Golden Garland of Eloquence: legs bshad gser phreng, 4 vols. Fremont, CA: Jain Publishing Company, 2008-2010. 5. Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra theg pa chen po’i mdo sde rgyan gyi tshig le’ur byas pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4020). TBRC W23703.123:3-80 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5521, vol. 108; Dharma vol. 77. Sanskrit: Sitansusekhar Bagchi. Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāraḥ of Asaṅga [with Vasubandhu’s commentary]. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 13. Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, 1970. Sanskrit text and translation into French: Sylvain Lévi. Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le système Yogācāra. 2 vols. Paris: Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études, 1907, 1911. Nāgārjuna (klu sgrub, first to second century, C.E.) Treatise on the Middle / Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom” madhyamakaśāstra / prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakakārikā dbu ma’i bstan bcos / dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3824). TBRC W23703.96:3-39, vol. tsa (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5224, vol. 95. Edited Sanskrit: J. W. de Jong. Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ. Madras, India: Adyar Li- brary and Research Centre, 1977; reprint, Wheaton, Ill.: Agents, Theosophical Publishing House, c1977. Also: Christian Lindtner. Nāgārjuna’s Filosofiske Vaerker, 177-215. Indiske Studier 2. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982. English translation: Frederick Streng. Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning. Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1967. Also: Kenneth Inada. Nāgārjuna: A Translation of His Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1970. Also: David J. Kalupahana. Nāgār- juna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way. Albany, N.Y.: State University Press of New York, 1986. Also: Jay L. Garfield. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Also: Stephen Batchelor. Verses from the Center: A Buddhist Vision of the Sublime. New York: Riverhead Books, 2000. Italian translation: R. Gnoli. Nāgārjuna: Madhyamaka Kārikā, Le stanze del cammino di mezzo. Enciclopedia di autori classici 61. Turin, Italy: P. Boringhieri, 1961. Danish translation: Christian Lindtner. Nāgārjuna’s Filosofiske Vaerker, 67-135. Indiske Studier 2. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982. Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness śūnyatāsaptatikārikā stong pa nyid bdun cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3827). TBRC W23703.96:49-55 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5227, vol. 95. Edited Tibetan and English translation: Christian Lindtner. Master of Wisdom. Oakland: Dharma

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Publishing, 1986. English translation: David Ross Komito. Nāgārjuna’s “Seventy Stanzas”: A Buddhist Psychol- ogy of Emptiness. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1987. Precious Garland of Advice for the King rājaparikathāratnāvalī rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che’i phreng ba Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4158). TBRC W23703.172:215-253 (PDF of Delhi, India: Del-hi Karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982- 1985). Peking 5658, vol. 129; Dharma vol. 93. Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese: Michael Hahn. Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī. vol. 1. The Basic Texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese). Bonn: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 1982. English translation: Jeffrey Hopkins. Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland: Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation, 94-164. Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1998. Supersedes that in: Nāgārjuna and the Seventh Dalai Lama. The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses, translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, 17-93. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975; New York: Harper and Row, 1975; reprint, in H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso. The Buddhism of Tibet. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983; reprint, Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1987. English translation: John Dunne and Sara McClintock. The Precious Garland: An Epistle to a King. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1997. English translation of 223 stanzas (chap. 1, 1-77; chap. 2, 1-46; chap. 4, 1-100): Giuseppe Tucci. “The Ratnāvalī of Nāgārjuna.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1934): 307-325; (1936): 237-52, 423-35. Japanese translation: Uryūzu Ryushin. Butten II, Sekai Koten Bungaku Zenshu, 7 (July, 1965): 349-72. Edited by Nakamura Hajime. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō. Also: Uryūzu Ryushin. Daijō Butten, 14 (1974): 231-316. Ryūju Ronshū. Edited by Kajiyama Yuichi and Uryūzu Ryushin. Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha. Danish translation: Christian Lindtner. Nagarjuna, Juvelkaeden og andre skrifter. Copenhagen: 1980. Navidharma Stanzas Demonstrating a Condensation of Exclusions piṇḍanivartananirdeśakārikā ldog pa bsdus pa bstan pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4293, sgra mdo, she 250b.7-254a.3. TBRC W23703.196:502-509 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5782, sgra rig pa, le 245b.6-249a.6 (vol.140, p.100-101). [N] le 230b.1-234a.4. [Kinsha] 3782, le 316b.1 (p.159-3-1). Commentary on “Stanzas Demonstrating a Condensation of Exclusions” piṇḍanivartananirdeśavārttika ldog pa bsdus pa bstan pa’i rnam ’grel Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4294, sgra mdo, she 254a.4-277a7. [N] le 234a.4-260b.2). TBRC W23703.196:509-555 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5783, sgra rig pa, le 249a.6-273b.7 (vol.140, p.101-111). [N] le 234a.4-260b.2. [Kinsha] 3783, le 322b.1 (p.163-1-1). Ngag-wang-pal-dan (ngag dbang dpal ldan, b. 1797), also known as Pal-dan-chö-jay (dpal ldan chos rje) Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) “Great Exposition of Tenets”: Freeing the Knots of the Dif- ficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought grub mtha’ chen mo’i mchan ’grel dka’ gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor

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Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1964. Tibetan digital reprint edition: In TBRC W5842.1 (PDF of Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1964.). Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅag-dbaṅ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vols. 4 (entire)-5, 1-401. Delhi: Guru Deva, 1983. Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (nga dbang dpal ldan). TBRC W5926.177. 3-356 (PDF of Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983). Taipei edition: Drepung Gomang Library (Taipei, Taiwan: Corporate Body of the Buddha Edu- cational Foundation, 2007). Explanation of Veil Truths and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets grub mtha’ bzhi’i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa’i don rnam par bshad pa legs bshad dpyid kyi dpal mo’i glu dbyangs Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (ngag dbang dpal ldan). TBRC W5926.1:9-280 (PDF of Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983). New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1972. Also: Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅag-dbaṅ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vol. 1, 3-273. Delhi: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983. Translation of the chapter on the Great Exposition School: John B. Buescher. Echoes from an Empty Sky: The Origins of the Buddhist Doctrine of the Two Truths. Ithaca, Snow Lion Pub- lications: 2012. Stating the Modes of Explanation in the Textbooks on the Middle Way and the Perfection of Wisdom in the Lo-sel-ling and Go-mang Colleges: Festival for Those of Clear Intelligence blo gsal gling dang bkra shis sgo mang grwa tshang gi dbu phar gyi yig cha’i bshad tshul bkod pa blo gsal dga’ ston Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (ngag dbang dpal ldan). TBRC W5926.3:417-598. (PDF of Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983). Word Commentary on the Root Verses of (Jam-yang-shay-pa’s) ‘Great Exposition of Tenets’ tshig ’grel / grub mtha' chen mo’i mchan 'grel gyi skabs skabs su mdzad pa’i rtsa ba’i tshig ’grel zur du bkod pa In Collected Works of Chos-rje ṅag-dbaṅ Dpal-ldan of Urga, vols. 4 (entire)-5, 1-401. Delhi: Guru Deva, 1983. Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (nga dbang dpal ldan). TBRC W5926.177. 3-356 (PDF of Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Gurudeva, 1983). grub mtha’ chen mo’i mchan ’grel dka’ gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor, Taipei Edition (see above), includes Ngag-wang-pal-dan’s Word Commentary on the Root Verses. Prajñāmokṣha (shes rab thar pa) Commentary on (Atisha’s) “Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way” dbu ma’i man ngag ces bya ba’i ’grel ba Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma). TBRC W1PD95844.64:381-399 (PDF of Pe cin: krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang, 1994-2008). Ren-da-wa Shön-nu-lo-drö (red mdaʼ ba gzhon nu blo gros, 1349-1412) Commentary on (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Fundamental Treatise on the Middle’”: Illuminating the Tenable dbu ma rtsa baʼi ʼgrel pa ʼthad paʼi snang ba Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ʼbum (gzhon nu blo gros) TBRC W23629.2:155-478 (PDF of Kathmandu: Sa skya rgyal yongs gsung rab slob gnyer khang, 1999). Shāntideva (zhi ba lha, eighth century C.E.) Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds bodhi[sattva]caryāvatāra byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 3871). TBRC W23703.105: 84-578, dbu ma, vol. la (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Sanskrit: P. L. Vaidya. Bodhicaryāvatāra. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 12. Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, 1988.

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Sanskrit and Tibetan: Vidhushekara Bhattacharya. Bodhicaryāvatāra. Bibliotheca Indica, 280. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1960. Sanskrit and Tibetan with Hindi translation: Rāmaśaṃkara Tripāthī, ed. Bodhicaryāvatāra. Bauddha-Himālaya-Granthamālā, 8. Leh, Ladākh: Central Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1989. English translations: Stephen Batchelor. A Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life. Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979. Marion Matics. Entering the Path of Enlightenment. New York: Macmillan, 1970. Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton. The Bodhicaryāvatāra. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Padmakara Translation Group. The Way of the Bodhisattva. Boston: Shambhala, 1997. Vesna A. Wallace and B. Alan Wallace. A Guide to the Bodhisattva Way of Life. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1997. Contemporary commentary: H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso. Transcendent Wisdom. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publi- cations, 1988. H.H. the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso. A Flash of Lightning in the Dark of the Night. Boston: Shambhala, 1994. Ta-drin-rab-tan (rta mgrin rab brtan, tre hor dge bshes, 1920-1986) Annotations / Annotations for the Difficult Points of (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “The Essence of Elo- quence”: Festival for the Unbiased Endowed with Clear Intelligence drang nges rnam ’byed legs bshad snying po dka’ gnad rnams mchan bur bkod pa gzur gnas blo gsal dga’ ston Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W1KG10421, 1 vol. (No publication data). Delhi: Lhun-grub-chos-grags, 1978. Tag-tshang Shay-rab-rin-chen (stag tshang lo tsā ba shes rab rin chen, b.1405) Explanation of “Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets”: Ocean of Eloquence grub mtha’ kun shes nas mtha’ bral grub pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho Tibetan digital edition: In grub mtha’ kun shes nas mtha’ bral sgrub pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos: TBRC W29895: 55-271 (PDF of Pe Cin: Mi Rigs dpe skrun khang, 2004). Edition cited: Bir, Kangra, India: Dzongsar Institute, 2001; also, Thimphu, Bhutan: Kun-bzang- stobs rgyal, 1976; and photographic reprint in the possession of Khetsun Sangpo, no other data. Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets grub mtha’ kun shes nas mtha’ bral grub pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos Tibetan digital edition: In grub mtha’ kun shes nas mtha’ bral sgrub pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos: TBRC W29895: 29-54 (PDF of Pe Cin: Mi Rigs dpe skrun khang, 2004). Edition cited: Bir, Kangra, India: Dzongsar Institute, 2001; also, Thimphu, Bhutan: Kun-bzang- stobs rgyal, 1976; and photographic reprint in the possession of Khetsun Sangpo, no other data. Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419) Explanation of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Ocean of Reasoning / Great Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba’i rnam bshad rigs pa’i rgya mtsho / rtsa shes ṭik chen Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma). TBRC W22273.15:5-622 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, [199?]). Peking 6153, vol. 156. Also: Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, n.d. Also: rJe tsong kha pa’i gsung dbu ma’i lta ba’i skor, vols. 1-2. Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press,

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1975. Also: Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975. Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979. English translation: Geshe Ngawang Samten and Jay L. Garfield. Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. English translation (chap. 2): Jeffrey Hopkins. Ocean of Reasoning. Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1974. Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Mid- dle’”: Illumination of the Thought dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma). TBRC W22273.16:5-582 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, [199?]). Peking 6143, vol. 154. Also: Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, n.d.; Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973; Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975; Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979. English translation (chaps. 1-5): Jeffrey Hopkins. Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, 93-230. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1980; the portion of the book that is Tsong-kha-pa’s Illumination of the Thought (chapters 1-5) is downloadable at: http://uma-tibet.org/edu/gomang/dbu_ma/middle.php. English translation (chap. 6, stanzas 1-7): Jeffrey Hopkins and Anne C. Klein. Path to the Mid- dle: Madhyamaka Philosophy in Tibet: The Oral Scholarship of Kensur Yeshay Tupden, by Anne C. Klein, 147-183, 252-271. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1994. Four Interwoven Annotations on (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path” / The Lam rim chen mo of the incomparable Tsong-kha-pa, with the interlineal notes of Ba-so Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, Sde-drug Mkhan-chen Ngag-dbang-rab-rtan, ’Jam-dbyangs-bshad- pa’i-rdo-rje, and Bra-sti Dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma/ mnyam med rje btsun tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa’i byang chub lam rim chen mo’i dka’ ba’i gnad rnams mchan bu bzhi’i sgo nas legs par bshad pa theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron Tibetan digital reprint edition: In lam rim mchan bzhi sbrags ma (bla brang bkra shis ’khyil par ma). TBRC W29037.1:3- 978 (PDF of bla brang bkra shis ’khyil edition printed from the 1807 bla brang bkra shis 'khyil blocks in 1999?). Also: New Delhi: Chos-’phel-legs-ldan, 1972. Also: Gomang Library, 2016 Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Stages of the Path to Enlightenment Thoroughly Teach- ing All the Stages of Practice of the Three Types of Beings lam rim chen mo / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i rim pa thams cad tshang bar ston pa’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma). TBRC W22273.13:51026 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, [199?]). Peking 6001, vol. 152. Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, 1964. Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975. Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979. Edited Tibetan: Tsultrim Kelsang Khangkar. The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Lam Rim Chen Mo). Japanese and Tibetan Buddhist Culture Series, 6. Kyoto: Tibetan Buddhist Culture Association, 2001. English translation: Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee. The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment. 3 vols. Joshua W.C. Cutler, editor-in-chief, Guy Newland, editor. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2000-2004. English translation of the part on the excessively broad object of negation: Elizabeth Napper. Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, 153-215. London: Wisdom Publications, 1989. English translation of the part on the excessively narrow object of negation: William Magee. The Nature of Things: Emptiness and Essence in the Geluk World, 179-192. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow

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Lion Publications, 1999. English translation of the parts on calm abiding and special insight: Alex Wayman. Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, 81-431. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978; reprint, New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1979. Introduction to the Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition: Clearing Away the Mental Darkness of Seekers sde bdun la ’jug pa’i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel Tibetan digital reprint edition: TBRC W1KG4466. 1 vol (PDF of Sarnath, India: dge ldan spyi las khang, 1972). sde dge, 5416. New Zhol Par-khang edition of the collected works of Tsong-kha-pa, Vol. tsha. Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities / Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment to be Practiced by Beings of the Three Capacities together with an Outline / Short Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment skyes bu gsum gyis nyams su blang ba’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa bring po sa bcad kha skong dang bcas pa / lam rim ’bring / lam rim chung ngu Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma). TBRC W22273.14:5-474 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, 199?); Peking 6002, vol. 152-153. Also: Mundgod, India: dga’ ldan shar rtse, n.d. (includes outline of topics by Trijang Rin- bochay); Bylakuppe, India: Sera Je Library, 1999 (includes outline of topics by Trijang Rinbochay); Dharmsala, India: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, 1968; Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1975. Also: Delhi: Guru Deva, 1979. English translation of the section on special insight: Jeffrey Hopkins. In Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2008. Robert Thurman. “The Middle Transcendent Insight.” Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa, 108-185. Dharmsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1982. Edited Tibetan text and Japanese translation of the section on special insight: Tsultrim Kelsang Khangkar and Takada Yorihito. A Study of Tsong khapa’s Mādhyamika Philosophy 1: Anno- tated Japanese translation of the Vipaśyanā Section of Medium Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Lam rim). Tsong kha pa chuugan tetsugaku no kenkyuu 1, Bodaidousidairon chuuhen, kan no shou: wayaku, Tsultrim Kelsang Khangkar and Takada Yorihito, Kyoto: Buneido, 1996. Japanese translation: Tsultrim Kelsang Khangkar and Takashi Rujinaka. The Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment by rJe Tsong kha pa: An Annotated Japanese Translation of Byang chub Lam rim chung ba. Kyoto: Unio Corporation, 2005. Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par phye ba’i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (tsong kha pa). TBRC W22109.21:486-722 (PDF of New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1975). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (tsong kha pa, bla brang par ma). TBRC W22273.14:515-762 (PDF of bla brang: bla brang bkra shis ’khyil, 199?). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (tsong kha pa). TBRC W22274.19 (PDF of sde dge lhun grub steng: sde dge par khang, n.p.). Tibetan digital reprint edition: In gsung ’bum (tsong kha pa). TBRC W29193.14:483-720 (PDF of Dharamsala: Sherig Parkhang, 1997). Peking 6142, vol. 153. English translation of the Prologue and Mind-Only section: Jeffrey Hopkins. Emptiness in the

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Mind-Only School of Buddhism. Dynamic Responses to Dzong-ka-ba’s The Essence of Elo- quence, Volume 1. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. English translation of the introductory section on the Middle Way School; Jeffrey Hopkins. Emp- tiness in the Middle Way School of Buddhism: Mutual Reinforcement of Understanding De- pendent-Arising and Emptiness. Dynamic Responses to Tsong-kha-pa’s The Essence of Elo- quence, Volume 4. UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies. http://uma-tibet.org. English translation of the entire text: Robert A. F. Thurman. Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence, 185-385. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. Editions: see the preface to Hopkins’ critical edition of the Introduction and section on the Mind- Only School, Emptiness in Mind-Only, 355. Also: Palden Drakpa and Damdul Namgyal. drang nges legs bshad snying po: The Essence of Elo- quent Speech on the Definitive and Interpretable, 84.16-103.5. Mundgod, India: SOKU, 1991. Ye shes thabs mkhas. shar tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pas mdzad pa’i drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par ’byed pa’i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po (The Eastern Tsong-kha-pa Lo-sang-drag-pa’s “Treatise Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence”). Tā la’i bla ma’i ’phags bod, vol. 22. Part Two, 125.1-145.13. Varanasi: Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies, 1997. Vasubandhu (dbyig gnyen, fl. 360) Eight Prakaraṇa Treatises 1. Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes” madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa’i ’grel pa / dbus mtha’i ’grel pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4027). TBRC W23703.124:4-55 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5528, vol. 108 Sanskrit: Gadjin M. Nagao. Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964. Also: Ramchandra Pandeya. Madhyānta-vibhāga-śāstra. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971. English translation: Stefan Anacker. Seven Works of Vasubandhu. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984. Also: Thomas A. Kochumuttom. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982. Also, of chapter 1: F. Th. Stcherbatsky. Madhyāntavibhāga: Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes Ascribed to Bodhisattva Maitreya and Com- mented by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati. Bibliotheca Buddhica, 30 (1936). Osnabrück, Ger- many: Biblio Verlag, 1970; reprint, Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1971. Also, of chapter 1: David Lasar Friedmann, Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā: Analysis of the Mid- dle Path and the Extremes. Utrecht, Netherlands: Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, 1937. 2. Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras” sūtrālaṃkārābhāṣya mdo sde’i rgyan gyi bshad pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4026). TBRC W23703.123:260-521 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, Gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982- 1985). Peking 5527, vol. 108. Sanskrit: S. Bagchi. Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra of Asaṅga [with Vasubandhu’s commentary]. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 13. Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, 1970. Sanskrit and translation into French: Sylvain Lévi. Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le système Yogācāra. 2 vols. Paris: Libraire Honoré Champion, 1907, 1911. 3. Principles of Explanation vyākyhayukti

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rnam par bshad pa’i rigs pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4061). TBRC W23703.136:59-270 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5562, vol. 113. 4. The Thirty / Treatise on Cognition-Only in Thirty Stanzas triṃśikākārikā / sarvavijñānamātradeśakatriṃśakakārikā sum cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa / thams cad rnam rig tsam du ston pa sum cu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4055). TBRC W23703.213 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5556, vol. 113 Sanskrit: Sylvain Lévi. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi / Deux traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā (La Vingtaine) et Triṃsikā (La Trentaine). Bibliotheque de l’École des Hautes Études. Paris: Libraire Honoré Champion, 1925. Also: K. N. Chatterjee. Vijñapti-Mātratā-Siddhi (with Sthiramati's Commentary). Varanasi, India: Kishor Vidya Niketan, 1980. English translation: Stefan Anacker. Seven Works of Vasubandhu. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984. Also: Thomas A. Kochumuttom. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982. 5. Treasury of Manifest Knowledge abhidharmakośa chos mngon pa’i mdzod Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4089). TBRC W23703.140:3-51 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5590, vol. 115 Sanskrit: Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārtha Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra. Bauddha Bharati Series, 5. Banaras: Bauddha Bharati, 1970. Also: P. Pradhan. Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu. Patna, India: Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975. French translation: Louis de La Vallée Poussin. L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. 6 vols. Brussels: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1971. English translation of the French: Leo M. Pruden. Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam. 4 vols. Berkeley, Calif.: Asian Humanities Press, 1988. 6. The Twenty viṃśatikā / viṃśikākārikā nyi shu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa Tibetan digital reprint edition: In bstan ’gyur (sde dge, 4056). TBRC W23703.136:7-9 (PDF of Delhi, India: Delhi Karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985). Peking 5557, vol. 113 Sanskrit: Sylvain Lévi. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi / Deux traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā (La Vig- taine) et Triṃsikā (La Trentaine). Bibliotheque de l’École des Hautes Études. Paris: Libraire Honoré Champion, 1925. English translation: Stefan Anacker. Seven Works of Vasubandhu. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984. Also: Thomas A. Kochumuttom. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982. English translation (stanzas 1-10): Gregory A. Hillis. An Introduction and Translation of Vin- itadeva’s Explanation of the First Ten Stanzas of [Vasubandhu’s] Commentary on His “Twenty Stanzas,” with Appended Glossary of Technical Terms. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univer- sity Microfilms, 1993. 7. Work on Achieving Actions karmasiddhiprakaraṇa las grub pa’i rab tu byed pa

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2. OTHER WORKS Dreyfus, Georges B.J. and Sara L. McClintock, The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Dif- ference Does a Difference Make? (Wisdom Publications, 2003) Hopkins, Jeffrey. Absorption In No External World: 170 Issues in Mind-Only Buddhism. Dynamic Responses to Dzong-ka-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence, Volume 3. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2005. ―――. Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist Views on the Nature of Reality. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2003. ―――. Meditation on Emptiness. London: Wisdom Publications, 1983; rev. ed., Boston, Ma.: Wisdom Publications, 1996. ―――. Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland: Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2007. ―――. Reflections on Reality: The Three Natures and Non-Natures in the Mind-Only School. Dy- namic Responses to Dzong-ka-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence, Volume 2. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Rogers, Katherine Manchester. Tibetan Logic. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2009. Yotsuya, Kodo. The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Candrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa: A Study of Philosophical Proof According to Two Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka Traditions of India and Tibet. Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 8. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999.

Jeffrey Hopkins is Professor Emeritus of Tibetan Buddhist Studies at the University of Virginia where he taught Tibetan Buddhist Stud- ies and Tibetan language for thirty-two years from 1973. He received a B.A. magna cum laude from Harvard University in 1963, trained for five years at the Lamaist Buddhist Monastery of America in Freewood Acres, New Jersey, USA (now the Tibetan Buddhist Learning Center in Washington, New Jersey), and received a Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies from the University of Wisconsin in 1973. He served as His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s chief interpreter into Eng- lish on lecture tours for ten years, 1979-1989. At the University of Virginia he founded programs in Buddhist Studies and Tibetan Stud- ies and served as Director of the Center for South Asian Studies for twelve years. He has published fifty-five books, some of which have been translated into a total of twenty-two languages. He published the first translation of the foundational text of the Jo-nang school of Tibetan Buddhism in Mountain Doctrine: Tibet’s Fundamental Treatise on Other-Emptiness and the Buddha-Matrix. He has translated and edited sixteen books from oral teachings by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the last four being How to See Yourself as You Re- ally Are; Becoming Enlightened; How to Be Compassionate; and The Heart of Meditation: Discovering Innermost Awareness. He is the Founder and President of the UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies.

This is the sixth of seven volumes presenting Tibetan views on the controversy that arose in Buddhist India over how to refute production from self. The controversy revolves around the first stanza of the first chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Called “Wisdom.” His principal Indian commentators explain the refutation of production from self in varying detail, the differences engendering the split between what came to be called the Autonomy School and the Consequence School. The first three volumes provide explanations of the controversy by the Tibetan scholar Jam-yang-shay-pa Ngag-wang-tsön-drü (1648-1721/ 1722). Included also in first volume are translations of Buddhapālita’s and Bhāvaviveka’s commentaries as well as the first translation into English of Avalokitavrata’s (flourishing mid-seventh century) extensive commentary on Bhāvaviveka’s presentation, his minute examination allowing Bhāvaviveka’s terse text to be seen in high relief. The second volume provides Jam-yang-shay-pa’s explanation of how Chandrakīrti defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka’s criticisms of Buddhapālita’s refutation of production from self. The third volume details Jam-yang-shay-pa’s explanation of how Chandrakīrti tears apart Bhāvaviveka’s own refutation of production from self. It is concerned with compatibly appearing subjects, which Ge-lug-pa scholars see as the prime, but not only, source showing that Bhāvaviveka accepts that phenomena are conventionally established by way of their own character. This complex topic stems from an original presentation in Tsong-kha-pa’s Great Ex- position of Special Insight in his Stages of the Path to Enlightenment. Tsong-kha-pa’s focus in the Great Exposition of Special Insight begins with the material in the final phase of the controversy between Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Chandrakīrti on the topic of compatibly appearing subjects. His analysis of that phase constitutes volumes five and six, utilizing the first three volumes as introductions. Tsong-kha-pa’s presentation itself is embedded with two color-coded commentaries to enhance its accessibility: Jam- yang-shay-pa’s Golden Wheel of Annotations and Dra-ti Ge-she Rin-chen- dön-drub’s Annotations. The topics are used in Tibetan monastic colleges to draw students into fascinating reflections about how phenomena appear and thereby to explore the nature of the reality behind appearances. uma-tibet.org