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Innovation and China's Global Emergence Innovation and China’s Global Emergence downloaded under license from NUS Press (epress.nus.edu.sg) downloaded under license from NUS Press (epress.nus.edu.sg) Innovation and China’s Global Emergence Edited by Erik Baark, Bert Hofman and Jiwei Qian downloaded under license from NUS Press (epress.nus.edu.sg) © 2021 Erik Baark, Bert Hofman and Jiwei Qian is work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Published by: NUS Press National University of Singapore AS3-01-02, 3 Arts Link Singapore 117569 Fax: (65) 6774-0652 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://nuspress.nus.edu.sg Print ISBN: 978-981-325-148-9 ebook ISBN: 978-981-325-164-9 All rights reserved. is book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher. National Library Board, Singapore Cataloguing in Publication Data Name(s): Baark, Erik, editor. | Hofman, Bert, editor. | Qian, Jiwei, 1976- editor. Title: Innovation and China’s global emergence / edited by Erik Baark, Bert Hofman and Jiwei Qian. Description: Singapore : NUS Press, [2021] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identi er(s): OCN 1240294794 | ISBN 978-981-325-148-9 (paperback) Subject(s): LCSH: China--Economic policy--2000- | Technological innovations-- Economic aspects--China. | China--Foreign economic relations. Classi cation: DDC 338.951--dc23 Typeset by: Ogma Solutions Pvt Ltd downloaded under license from NUS Press (epress.nus.edu.sg) Contents List of Tables vii List of Figures ix 1. Introduction: Innovation and China’s Global Emergence Bert Hofman, Erik Baark and Jiwei Qian 1 Part One: Implications of China’s Innovation Emergence 2. China and the US: Technology Conflict or Cooperation? Gary H. Jefferson 19 3. The US-ChinaTrade War and Myths about Intellectual Property and Innovation in China Dan Prud’homme 41 4. Global Implications of China’s Policies on Indigenous Innovation Erik Baark 65 5. China’s Talent Challenges Revisited Cong Cao and Denis Fred Simon 90 6. China’s International S&T Relations: From Self-Reliance to Active Global Engagement Denis Fred Simon 113 7. How Does International Collaboration Lead to Radical Innovation in Latecomer Firms? Xiaolan Fu, Cintia Külzer-Sacilotto, Haibo Lin and Hongru Xiong 144 Part Two: Industrial Policy Challenges 8. PRC Industrial Policies Postdate Rather than Lead Economic Activity Carsten A. Holz 167 9. Made in China 2025 and the Proliferation of Intangible Assets Anton Malkin 203 v downloaded under license from NUS Press (epress.nus.edu.sg) vi Contents 10. Industrial Policy and Competitive Advantage: A Comparative Study of the Cloud Computing Industry in Hangzhou and Shenzhen Bai Gao and Yi Ru 232 11. Global Value Chains and the Innovation of the Chinese Mobile Phone Industry Yuqing Xing 263 List of Contributors 287 Index 289 downloaded under license from NUS Press (epress.nus.edu.sg) List of Tables Table 3.1: Typology of Aggressive Technology Transfer Policies in China 44 Table 3.2: Aspects of China’s IPR Regime Currently Making it Friendlier than the IPR Regimes in Prominent Rich Nations to IPR-intensive Businesses 54 Table 5.1: China’s Talent-Attracting Programmes and the Number of Returnees Benefited, 1994–2018 97 Table 5.2: Chinese Returnees Who Sought Certification for Their Foreign PhD Degrees, 2008–14 99 Table 5.3: Disciplines in which Chinese Returnees Received Their Foreign PhD Degrees, 2008–14 99 Table 7.1: Randomly Selected Collaboration Projects with their Attributes (from C-Tech Global Collaboration Database) 153 Table 7.2: Difference between Foreign and Domestic Collaboration: Logit Regression Results 153 Table 8.1: Industrial Policy Summary 174 Table 8.2: Explaining Investment Growth, 2012–15 180 Table 8.3: Explaining Investment Growth, 2015–17 182 Table 9.1: Timeline for Achieving MIC 2025 Goals 205 Table 9.2: Tsinghua Holdings’ Sino-Foreign Partnerships 220 Table 9.3: Selected Intangible Asset-Focused Acquisitions of Overseas Assets by Chinese Firms 223 Table 10.1: Digital Infrastructure in China 238 Table 10.2: The nvestmentI and Financing Services Provided by the Hangzhou Government 241 Table 10.3: The nvestmentI and Financing Services Provided by the Shenzhen Government 241 Table 10.4: TheTop Five Companies in the Chinese Public Cloud Computing Market 248 Table 11.1: Tasks Performed by Chinese Firms for the iPhone 3G and iPhone X 275 Table 11.2: Foreign Technology and Suppliers of the OPPO R11s 278 Table 11.3: Foreign Technology and Suppliers of the Xiaomi MIX 2 279 Table 11.4: Technology and Suppliers of the Huawei P30 Pro 281 vii downloaded under license from NUS Press (epress.nus.edu.sg) downloaded under license from NUS Press (epress.nus.edu.sg) List of Figures Figure 2.1: Kuznets “Inverted U” Curve: Technology Policy Conflict vs. Technology Distance 31 Figure 5.1: Share of High-impact Publications by Returnees above Chinese Average 101 Figure 5.2: Numbers of Mobile Chinese Scientists in China, the EU and US 101 Figure 7.1: Knowledge Flows Network Embedded in a Regular IRP Project 157 Figure 8.1: First-digit Sector Investment Shares 2015 and Growth Rates (2012–15, 2015–17) 186 Figure 8.2: Second-digit Industrial Sector Investment Shares 2015 and Growth Rates (2012–15, 2015–17) 187 Figure 8.3: Central vs. Local Shares in “Urban” Investment, 2015 (%) 190 Figure 8.4: Sources of Investment Funding (shares in total in %) 191 Figure 8.5: Investment Shares by Ownership, “Urban” Investment, 2003–17 (%) 193 Figure 8.6: Investment (except by Rural Households) by Sector and Ownership, 2015 (%) 194 Figure 9.1: Charges for the Use of Intellectual Property, Payments (BoP, current US$) 214 Figure 9.2: Charges for the Use of Intellectual Property, Receipts (BoP, current US$) 215 Figure 9.3: Patent Grants under MIC 2025 Technology Categories 216 Figure 9.4: OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index: Selected Economies 218 Figure 10.1: The istributionD of Ownership of Industrial Enterprises in Shenzhen between 2000 and 2017 249 Figure 10.2: The istributionD of Ownership of Industrial Enterprises in Hangzhou between 2000 and 2017 250 Figure 11.1: Chinese Output and Export of Mobile Phones (million units) 271 Figure 11.2: Chinese Smartphone Market Share (%) 272 Figure 11.3: Global Smartphone Market Share (%) 273 ix downloaded under license from NUS Press (epress.nus.edu.sg) x Lists of Figures Figure 11.4: Chinese Value Added Embedded in the iPhone 3G and iPhone X 276 Figure 11.5: Distribution of the OPPO R11s Value Added by Country (%) 279 Figure 11.6: Distribution of the Xiaomi MIX 2’s Value Added (%) 280 downloaded under license from NUS Press (epress.nus.edu.sg) 1 Introduction: Innovation and China’s Global Emergence Bert Hofman, Erik Baark and Jiwei Qian The International Implications of Innovation in China The US-China trade war has called attention to China’s transition to a “new normal” economy driven by innovation and productivity growth. The global implications of this transition will be large, as China’s economy has become the second largest in the world and is deeply integrated into world trade and global value chains. China’s rapid economic growth during the last four decades has lifted large segments of the Chinese population into middle-income international levels, with the average Chinese citizen’s purchasing power now about a quarter of that of the average American. This achievement was grounded in the mobilisation of labour, capital and foreign direct investment that provided technological upgrading and generated export-led growth. The recent slowdown of economic growth is related to the decline in productivity growth experienced as the previous strategy of cheap labour and high rates of savings and investment ran its course, and this has prompted observers to predict that China may risk entering the middle-income trap (Zeng and Fang 2014). The concept of a middle-income trap was launched in 2007 and the factors leading countries to fall into—or to avoid—such a trap have been debated ever since (for example, Cai 2012; OECD 2013; Doner and Schneider 2016). Regardless of such predictions, China’s leadership has recognised the need for a transition to high value-added production, institutional reform, and innovation as drivers for the next phase of economic development. 1 downloaded under license from NUS Press (epress.nus.edu.sg) 2 Bert Hofman, Erik Baark and Jiwei Qian Consequently, China in 2019 invested 2.2 per cent of its GDP in research and development (R&D) and China’s total R&D expenditure is the second highest in the world after the United States (Guojia tongji ju 2020). The number of patents filed by Chinese companies and individuals has risen sharply since 2010, domestically as well as internationally. The number of patents filed overseas expanded five-fold from 2010 to 2017, and China’s “total citation count” (number of patents times forward citations) increased from 4 per cent to 7 per cent of that of the US. Over the same period, the number of foreign patents filed by US companies in China increased by 50 per cent. The number of Chinese patents filed overseas is expected to triple by 2025, which would make China the fourth-largest filer after the United States, Japan and Germany. The sharp rise in China’s patent count was in part due to multinationals that offshored R&D to China: the R&D expenditure of US multinationals’ foreign affiliates in China grew fourfold between 2004 and 2014 (Branstetter et al. 2019). Co-invented and Chinese-invented patents assigned to multinational firms made up well over half the patent count until the end of the last decade.
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