Politikon September-October

"I don't know with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones. "

Albert Einstein Politikon September-October

Dear Friends of IAPSS, at this moment everyone of you should be aware of what happened ye- sterday in the USA. It has been something unbelievable, astoni- shing, horrible. The gravity, ab- ————————————HIGHLIGHTS surdity and madness of the tero- è What is political science for?/2. A response to Graetsch and Theocharis ristic attack let everybody stop to By Andreas Warntjen and Arndt Wonka - University of Konstanz……..page 3 listen to news and reflect on è How to become a right-wing extremist what was happening. “Political By Bettina Engels and Florian Storm - Free University of Berlin...…...page 5 Science of all subjects, has to stand firm, since it is the first to —————————ABOUT GLOBALIZATION è The Case for Globalisation/2 be suppressed when freedom is By Marcus Graetsch - University of Bremen…..……...…………………..page 7 reduced” (by Halvard Leira). è The politics of humanitarianism: humanitarian intervention as “the Being political science students mirror of global politics” we have to assume a firm By Silja Sukselainen - Helsinki…………………..……...…………………..page 9 position, strongly condamning è Bridging the Global Digital Divide all kind of terror and especially By Giuliano Gennaio - ASP Roma Luiss……...…………...……………...page 13 this kind, making thousands and thousands of innocent victims. ————–—––———FROM GROUND ZERO We, as the leadership of IAPSS è The inquiry for the needle in the haystack and on behalf of the entire asso- By Benjamin Zyla - Goettingen………….…...………………………..…...page 16 ciation, express solidariety and è Media and War lots of sympathy to the American By Salvatore Nigro - ASP Roma Luiss………...…...…………...………...page 19 people. On this tragic day seems to us that the terrible terror e- —————————————OTHER è Transnational parties: what future?/2. A Reposne to Benjamin Zyla vents that just happened are di- By Giuliano Gennaio - ASP Roma Luiss……...……………...…………...page 26 rectly connected to the subject of è Civic partecipation in the development of the political institution in the dangers to liberty in the Central and Eastern Europe world. We are opening a forum Mihai Varga - APSS……...………………………………………...………..page 28 on the web site of IAPSS to freely discuss on this terrible event. Feel free to join the discussion. Politikon - the IAPSS Journal What has happened is a threat to Second Issue, September-October free peoples. Democracy may be at risk. Our task is to stand still Giuliano Gennaio (Rome) Alina Dragolea (Bucharest) to re-affirm the principle of li- Jan Zutavern (Bern) Andrea Theocharis (Marburg) berty. Allan Guldberg (Aarhus) Per Martin Martinsen (Oslo) Urs Wahl (Bremen) Taina Ahtela (Helsinki) Marcus Graetsch (Bremen) Silja Sukselainen (Helsinki) Alessio Sanguinetti, Benjamin Zyla (Goettingen) Mojca Nemgar (Ljubljana) IAPSS Chairman Claudiu Cracium (Bucharest) Juris Dubrovskis (Latvia) Benedicte Bruun-Lie Erla Tryggvadòttir (Rekjavik) Anna Rappe (Uppsala) IAPSS Supervisor Giuliano Gennaio IAPSS Vice chairman Graphic by —––Ottavio Di Bella, Francesco Cetraro Politikon September-October

Luckmann’s idea of “The social construction of reality”. Berger and Luckmann focus their work on the “paramount reality” of everyday life. Their occupation is not with scientific knowledge, but with knowledge pro- A response to Graetsch and Theocharis duced in the “Lebenswelt” of everyday experience (Berger and Luckmann 1966: pp. 14, 26, 39). —Andreas Warntjen and Arndt Wonka According to Berger and Luckmann man is anthropologi- —University of Konstanz cally bound not to question the validity of his or her perception of reality. The decisions of everyday life are gov- Abstract: Central to Theocharis’ and Graetsch’s article in erned by pragmatism and routine action. This means that Politikon’s last issue is the question of whether today’s there is a direct link between knowledge acquired in the political science community is not only asking the wrong “Lebenswelt” and individual action. The perceived reality questions but also arriving at normatively doubtful an- is taken for granted as long as there is no misfit between swers. Needless to say, the authors of the article arrive at actual experiences and the expectations based on prior a positive answer to that question, based on their idea that knowledge (Luckmann and Schütz 1979: 254; Berger and a specific methodology necessarily leads to a certain set Luckmann 1966: 38). of answers. The methodology that Theocharis’ and In contrast to knowledge acquired and applied in every- Graetsch’s critique aims at, is the positivist approach to day life, scientific knowledge is not backed up by primary science, which, as they claim, dominates current political socialization and its everyday verification (Berger and science discourse. From the authors perspective, the posi- Luckmann 1966: 162). Thus, scientific knowledge is tivist approach leads to short-sighted and normatively prone to be questioned! In accordance with Berger and doubtful results. The inherent logic of Theocharis’ and Luckmann, Popper claims that the production of – in his Graetsch’s argument is that there is a genuine link be- case scientific - knowledge starts with the appearance of tween theoretical or scientific knowledge and the subse- problems (Popper 1969: 104). In scientific discourses quent behaviour of decision-makers in the actual realm of different solutions should be proposed to one problem, politics. The baseline of the argument is that economi- due to a plurality of methodological approaches as well as cally biased methods inevitably lead, viaeconomi- a plurality of possible answers from within the same cally biased theories, to economically biased poli- met hodology. tics. In a nutshell we will argue, that while it is true The plurality of that there are people abusing (pseudo-scientific) answers thereby theories to justify their personal dogmas – e.g. a produced should supply -side neo-liberal worldview -, this does not generate enough mean that certain results are inherent to a specific critical potential methodology. for dissenting Starting from the term political science we ask our- opinions to com- selves what the difference between science and pete for the most politics is? We will argue that wrong answers and plausible solu- misleading questions do not derive from a specific tion. The central methodology, but rather from the uncritical applica- idea of positiv- tion of any scientific methodology. We want to em- ism is the non- phasize that, in our view, there is a difference be- acceptance of tween scientifically gained knowledge and the para- any one answer mount reality of everyday life, acquired through as “the truth”. everyday experience. An idea which is We share Theocharis’ and Graetsch’s view that critical manifested in reflection is central to science and that a critical disposi- the principle of falsification. Thus, positivism in itself is a tion should be adopted towards any scientific theory. Af- critical enterprise! Exactly because scientific knowledge ter all, science should built a common ground on which must be constantly questioned, we assume that solutions various theories compete for plausible answers - ideally generated by a scientific discourse cannot be directly in a non-dogmatic way. transformed into political programs, without raising nor- Having said this, political science should aim at explain- mative questions. Therefore the realm of political science ing specific aspects of human behavior. This is to say that and the realm of politics should be seperated. Of course, its task is not to promote certain ideologies. It should this is an ideal-type illustration of how science should rather enable us to seperate the identification of mecha- work. But leaving this firm ground endangers us to be nisms operating in a given society from the normative lured away by the truth-claimers of political ideologies. evaluation of these mechanisms. Political Science, there- This brings us back to Theocharis’ and Graetsch’s cri- fore, should not introduce politics to science, but science tique of the empirico-analytical approach to political sci- to politics. ence. They claim that human beings cannot be reduced to Theocharis and Graetsch heavily draw on Berger and figures and rational actors. Politikon September-October

This is definitely true. But does this tell us anything about somewhat reduced representation of reality longing for the explanatory power of rational choice theory and sta- interpretation. So, the GDP can be interpretated as the tistical analysis, when applied to certain problems? overall welfare of a society, or the performance of the To be sure, neither of them can tell us the whole story economy of a given country. This leaves us enough room about human behavior in all its aspects and in every situa- to, on the one hand, criticize the meaning of the construct tion. But what these methods can do is to provide a struc- “GDP” in terms of its adequacy for the question we are turing framework, which, as an analytical tool, is an in- dealing with and on the other hand discuss the way the dispensable precondition for any empirically informed variable “GDP” is measured statistically. Therefore, sta- discussion. Thus, a certain reductionism is helpful to tistical analysis provides us with the facts that are the sub- grasp reality and to identify basic mechanisms and pat- ject of our discussion. The abstract character of statistics terns at work. Besides, rational choice theory does allow neither attributes a certain quality to the individuals mak- for the incorporation of (sociological) norms and values ing up the sample - we are not anonymous numbers stag- into the preference function of a rational actor. Rational gering around in a sterile world! – nor does it tell us any- choice theory is not limited to the homo oeconomicus, thing about the normative status of the status quo. So perfectly rational and fully informed in all instances. what? What it is saying, though, that given a specific ordering of Statistical analysis is a useful tool to first get facts on the preferences, which has to be defined, the individual will world at all and then discuss it. Rational choice theory choose the option that best fits his preferences. In some might be dominant in some areas of political science. cases this might well be an altruistic goal and not only This should not lead to any exclusionary claim about the profit-maximizing. Remember: We are not dealing with scientific status of other approaches. Advocates of differ- micro-economics, but with rational actors in a political ent approaches should be able to enter scientific debates context. and make use of insights discovered by methods other The knowledge creating value of a formal model lies in than their own. So let´s get out of our ideological trenches its ability to point out discrepancies between the predic- and compete with arguments. May the most plausible tions based on its underlying assumptions and the empiri- explanation prevail! cally observed behavior. Once discovered, the discrepan- Political science, being an interdisciplinary enterprise cies between the universal account and the empirically from the very beginning, can combine insights of various observed have to be covered by more detailed research research traditions, and thus arrive at a broader frame- that takes into account the specifities of the case at hand. work. This framework should allow us to avoid analytical The need to explicate the underlying assumptions and the inadequacies we might identify in overly economic as working hypothesis, inherent to formal models, are en- well as purely sociological approaches. To paraphrase hancing the potential for intersubjective criticism. Each Berger and Luckmann: Our conception of science implies part of these explanations is open to criticism, whereas a a specific conception of political science in general. It complex, holistic model can hardly be critizised without does not imply that political science is not a science, that abandoning it altogether. So, are we living in the “risk-/ its methods should be other than empirical or that it can- adventure-/fun-/atomized/cosmopolitan society” as Ulrich not be “value-free”. It does imply however that political Beck is trying to tell us? And if so, what does it mean and science takes its place in the company of the sciences that what are the consequenzes? deal with man as man (Berger and Luckmann 1966:211). Also, reductionism is often necessary to deal with com- As a consequence political science is able to leave the plex, interrelated phenomena in an intersubjective man- ivory tower and propose a number of solutions to a given ner, that allows us to track and counter the other persons problem. The final choice about what solution to imple- argument. ment will always be based on normative grounds. This So, what is political science for? Our previous discussion goes back to our previous statement that in our view po- should have made clear that in our perspective an empiri- litical science and politics should be treated as seperate cal and positivist approach does not necessarily privilege spheres. We are aware of the danger of conflating both certain politico-economical interests. Thus the question spheres and agree with Berger and Luckmann who state cannot be whom political science is for. We claim that that “To exaggerate the importance of theoretical thought methodological approaches do not necessarily in them- in society and history is a natural failing of the theoriz- selves transport ideological and normative propositions. ers” (Berger and Luckmann: p. 27). Rather, through uncritical application they can be abused In our view the responsibility of us as political science to that end. Thus, although being just a figure, a quantile students is, therefore, to assess ideas critically, to always might tell us something about social inequality, which consider a number of approaches and to utilize the critical other approaches might disguise. Aggregated figures can potential inherent to any methodology – thereby avoiding provide the broad picture, which, of course, are only a harmful intellectual hegemony. LITERATURE Berger, Peter/Luckmann, Thomas The social construction of reality. New York: Penguin Books, 1966 Popper, Karl Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, in: Adorno et al.: Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1969 Schütz, Alfred/Luckmann, Thomas Strukturen der Lebenswelt Bd. 1 Frankfurt/a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1979 Politikon September-October

By Bettina Engels and Florian Storm —Free University of Berlin

Usually, right-wing extremist activities follow right-wing extremist attitudes. But right-wing extremist attitudes do not grow out of a vacuum. People are not born with political dispositions. How do then grow up right-wing extremist attitudes in the course of one’s personal development? Political socialization research tries to answer this question from an individual perspective. It starts from the assumption that the family as the first and possibly most important stage of socialization also presents a relevant stage of political socialization. Following the transmission thesis (Hopf/Hopf 1997: 134f), direct or manifest political socialization can take place in families: parents transmit their political convictions to their children, the elder brother introduces the younger into the right-wing extremist scene (Wagner 1998). But most of the right-wing extremist young people do not necessarily have right-wing extremist parents or brothers. But: above all, political socialization in families is indirect or latent. Internal processes in families which do not seem to have anything to do with political attitudes can be responsible for the development of political dispositions of young people, too. Right-wing extremist attitudes include tendencies to authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and prosperity-chauvinism. Already at the beginning of the 1950s when oblivion and inhibition of Na- tional Socialism boomed in Germany, Adorno et al (1969; 1973) in their studies on the Authoritarian Personal- ity stated that obviously (and theoreti- cally logical) in authoritarian structured families, authoritarian structured children grow up. Critical theory lead the stated ethnocentrism of the test persons back on the idealization of the own parents, especially the father. Negative childhood experience cannot be accepted and worked up because the Authoritarian Personality consciously does not see any reason for critique on the own parents. The idealization of the own parents can bee seen as an expres- sion for the process of inhibition. At the same time, it is the equivalent to an idealization of the own group which always includes the contempt of the foreign group. But lots of people with right-wing extremist attitudes do not have dispositions to idealize their own parents. On the contrary, Hopf and Hopf (1997) describe the case of an young man, called “Xaver”, who can hardly control his aggressions towards his father during the interview. Following Hopf and Hopf, the central concept of the parent’s idealization must be relativized and classified in an more complex typology. Possibly not only the experiences one make during childhood in the relationship with the reference-person are crucial but the way one handle it in the course of one’s personal development. Hopf und Hopf refer to the thesis of attachment- research which says that family-internal relationship experiences and its working-up and representation in the age of adolescence are relevant for the development of political orientations and behaviour. Attachment-research analyses how the child’s attachment to its reference-person is represented in the age of adolescence. Uncertain attachment experiences can cause different psychic “internal working models”. Conflicts exist in every parent-child-relationship. But children with uncertain attachment experiences manage worse to overcome and work-up conflicts. “Xaver”, the preoccupied-entangled and furious young man, has one in common with the right-wing extremist who idealizes his father (in the studies of the Authoritarian Personality): the aggression, aggression which has its origin in non-overcome Politikon September-October childhood conflicts and which should be directed towards the own parents. But the father as the representative of the more powerful is hard to attack. Another valve for the repressed aggression must be found. As a consequence, the aggression of the authoritarian structured who usually has little self-confidence is directed towards the weaker (because he is intent on never be the overcome himself). Existing right-wing extremist structures, scenes and cliques offer ways to transform the repressed aggression in aggressive activity against foreigners. The preoccupied hydrophobia of “Xaver” is an non-overcome part of the father-son-relationship which reproduces itself. In the case of “Xaver”, it is the reason for his violent behaviour towards foreigners by the right-wing extremist clique which “Xaver” belongs to. Scapegoat-offers by public discourses (Funke 1995) give acknowledgement of legitimacy to the violence against foreigners (in contrary, aggression towards the own father socially is not seen as legitimate at all). Aggression can be projected. Feminist theories (Rommelspacher 1995) explain in similar ways the gender-specific reasons for right-wing extremist attitudes of women: aggression towards men (the more powerful) of the own groups can be transformed into aggression towards the foreign group/ a minority (which is weaker). Repressed wishes and longings can be projected in the same way as repressed aggression: One envy the foreigner what one wishes unaware for oneself and reproaches him with it. Envy and reproach lay close to another. The level of individual psyche is only one possible level of analysis of right-wing extremist attitudes and behaviour. It must be combined with the analysis of other internal and external, short- and long-dated, historical, socio-economical and political factors (Stöss 1999). But ideas from political socialization research can explain why maybe people who have the same historical and socio-economical background have different political attitudes. More- over, it must be considered, that right-wing extremism of 12 or 13 year old children can hardly be explained exclusively with socio-economic factors. Also today, empirical studies show that right-wing extremist orientations of young people grow up in an authoritarian life environment (Hopf/Hopf 1997). Children and young people do not only live in their families. Wetzel et al (2000) proof the influence of the support by people at the same age with similar attitudes (peer group) for right-wing extremist violence. Also life environment in the quarter or village, in schools and youth clubs, in the church or in sports clubs can be formed in an authoritarian and hierarchical or in an democratic and discursive way. Aggression nourishes itself by a feeling of powerlessness, a “I am not asked”-, “I cannot influence things”-, “they do what they want anyhow”- and “discussion do not lead to anything”- feeling. What we need is the democratization of all-day-structures and the active inclusion and participation of children and young people in their personal life environment.

REFERENCES:

Adorno, Theodor W. 1973: Studien zum autoritären Charakter. Frankfurt am Main

Adorno, Theodor W. et. al. 1969: The authoritarian personality. New York

Funke, Hajo 1995: Rechtsextremismus- Zeitgeist, Politik und Gewalt. Eine Zwischenbilanz. In: Richard Faber u.a. (Hrsg.), Rechtsex- tremismus. Berlin

Hopf, Christel/Hopf, Wulf 1997: Familie, Persönlichkeit, Politik. Eine Einführung in die Politische Sozialisation Weinheim und Mün- chen

Rommelspacher, Birgit 1995: Warum auch Frauen rassistisch sind. In: Petra Wlechlik, Frauen und Rechtsextremismus, 19-31, Göttin- gen

Wetzel, Peter/Mecklenburg, Eberhard/Wilmers, Nicola/Enzmann, Dirk/Pfeiffer, Christian 2000: Gewalterfahrung, Schulschwänzen und delinquentes Verhalten Jugendlicher in Rostock. Kriminologisches Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen, Hannover

Stöss, Richard 1999: Rechtsextremismus im Vereinten Deutschland. Bonn

Wagner, Bernd 1998: Rechtsextremismus und kulturelle Subversion in den neuen Ländern. Berlina.M.: Suhrkamp, 1979 Politikon September-October

Spontaneous market actors ? Guldberg starts his article with some ideas on social justice. In doing so, he takes the book by Friedrich A. Hayek ‘Law, Legislation, Liberty’ and from that piece especially chapter nine on social justice. But before Response by Marcus Graetsch - University of Bremen Guldberg comes to the social justice question, he gives September 2001 the reader some assumptions, which, as Guldberg says “the whole school of Austrian economics” is using: Introduction They assume that the market order is a spontaneous proc- The last issue of the Politikon had three articles who ess. My first critique on Guldbergs article, or maybe on were about the globalization question in specific,also the “the whole school of Austrian economists” (although I do article on transnational parties can be related to that phe- not believe that Austria had only one school of econo- nomenon. But Guldbergs article raised in me especially mists and even the so called Austrian school had very attention. I personally think also for myself that the prob- different assumptions (look for example the works of lems which come with the so-called globalization, or bet- Ludwig van Mises in comparison with Hayeks)) is that a ter those problems which raised more attention in the market is not a “spontaneous” process. Spontaneity, as I public sphere especially in the last 6-8 years, namely eco- see it, is more irrational, less grounded in reason. If some- nomic, social, political inequality, racism, climate change one acts spontaneous, than he/she acts in a way which is to name just a few. And I personally believe that those more randomly rather than based on reasonable thought. problems are that much important, that humans should try In contrary the market actors act in many ways (not al- hard and harder to solve them. But these attitude which ways) on reason. If someone goes to a marketplace he/she are that one should be carefule and rigour towards ones has a purpose, a rational desire which should be fulfilled. own and others work, which is done to understand and A consumer, for example, looks for food to feed his/her maybe to help solving the problems is an ethical neces- hunger, an reasoned process. A merchant offers goods for sity which has to be taken into account. And the ethical the reason grounded purpose to sell it and maybe to sell it necessity is especially needed for the few rich (in relation for more than what he/she actually paid for the good in to global population) in the north. The ethical necessity is the production process. In seeing it so, I do not believe, needed because the problems we are facing are caused by that the market is spontaneous. humans and, as I believe, caused by the few rich in the Guldberg than states that a central authority who wants north. And the problems are death of hunger, diseases, to emulate this, as he says, “spontaneous” process is to- racism, and even climate change. talitarian. Guldberg, as I see it, is also trying to help solving at I will, or can not, elaborate the question if this is totalitar- least one problem just mentioned. His main point is that ian or not, mainly because Guldberg gives no explanation free trade is the solution for global inequality. In conclud- what he (or Hayek) means by totalitarian. However, I will ing so he is on the line with International Institutions like just rise attention toward the United States economy dur- the WTO, IMF and the Worldbank and also with various ing the second world war. There most of the economic governments, like the USA as main actor or with govern- sectors where to a very much extend state regulated. Was mental organization like the EU as another important ac- then the USA total in Guldbergs sense ? As I said, a diffi- tor in the policy making within the so-called globaliza- cult answer, because of the lack of Guldbergs definition. tion. I am aware that one could use ones own definition or just I personally see, honestly, not really a solution (if there look into the book of Hayek to use his, but the main point is only one) for those problems, simple because my own here shall be, that in these article there is a lack of it and studies and knowledge in general is below that point to thus makes a clear understanding more difficult. give an or more answers to those very important problems. If I would do give an answer, it would be nothing Social justice ? else than just opinion rather than a very well reasoned After that comes to “the issue of social justice”. He sees answer based on hard research and analysis. Off course, it, at that point in his article, as a difference in wealth and/ there is the desperate need to solve that problem, but as or income between different individuals. What springs to an individual and now with my limited resources I shall my mind is, that here the concept of social justice is very not try to give an answer, because the problems need, as narrow. What about justice in jurisprudence, justice in said, an ethical necessity to do a careful and strength political participation possibilities ? Are those “justices” analysis. Opinion making in the armchair is not helping not social ? Is social justice really only about economic anyone. justice in terms of wealth distribution ? Guldberg seems So, the reason why I am responding is more to give to think so, as one should conclude, because of his state- some critiques about statements in Guldbergs article. ment that social justice “is the question of ...”. These critique is not there to discredit anybody personally, it is more made to give some hints how these ethical Alternative ? necessity maybe can become fulfilled. It is thought as an The next statement which is noteworthy to me is that encouragement for others and myself in trying harder to “the market is not perfect, but indefinitely better analyse the problems which threaten millions of lives. than the alternative”. Politikon September-October

First one might think back that Guldberg means the alter- Passed by ? native of ‘emulating’ the ‘spontaneous’ market process. I In Guldbergs paragraphs which are titled with “the three want to stress out that especially in the contemporary cri- basic questions”, he starts to state that the “obvious” poor tiques of the so-called globalization process (and Guld- Africa countries are lagging behind, because the “this berg seems to aim his article towards those criticizers) the globalization has passed them by”. alternative is not just one. There are a lots of different Here again, I think the use of language is quite important. alternatives to the whole issue of contemporary global In saying that “this globalization ...” one could assume economics. Deliberalization in some market, Deliberali- that Guldberg has in mind many or at least more than one zation in all markets, Tobin Tax, reorganizing food pro- globalizations. I think that’s simply false. Globalization is duction and distribution, different access possibilities, a historic process and by the way one which started hun- democratization, benefits, debt cancellation, subsidies and dreds years ago (or maybe already with the early settlers a lot more. It is not about the alternative. which left the African territory to enter into new lands). However, it may be possible that the phenomenon had Logic ? different paces and maybe some different characters (for If one carefully reads Guldbergs essay than especially example the globalization of the exchange of goods and/ in the then following paragraph one should raise doubts. or the globalization of capital/investment). In seeing it as Guldberg tries to elaborate the question if poverty in- Guldberg one may believe that the poorness of Africa has creased or is increasing. In doing so, he uses the United always been so, and thus the people there just staying Nations Development Report of 1999 and puts as a poor because “this globalization” passes them by. Guld- counterargument against it a report by the Norwegian berg makes here I think the fault which is done by most Institute of Foreign Policy. Basically the UNDP report of the mainstream neoclassical economists, he forgets states that inequality in income terms rose between the about history, colonization thus had simple not happened. year 1960 and 1990 and between 1990 and 1997. The NIFP report states that this is a false picture. I can not Mutual benefits ? confirm this or even try to look for myself because I do The next statement which is concerning me is that not speak the Norwegian language, but what strikes me is “trade and an act of trade is generally not a process in the conclusion drawn from this. which one person is left poorer and the other richer, but Guldberg writes that in the UNDP report a 95 ratio of the an exchange for the mutual benefit of both traders.” This top and bottom quintile is being used. It was then 82:1. statement seems to be a social law for Guldberg. Here I He concludes that this “must mean that in the last six would like to put the spotlight on Karl Marx. Trade can years inequality has been decreasing”. Here I can not say also be understood as the exchange of labor which is al- wether that this is true or not. In the original text of Guld- ways needed for the whole production process. And here berg there is no hint towards the ratio of 2001. Or what is everybody who had or has to sell its own labor for earn- also dodgy did he mean 2001 or 2002 (because the article ing money can on itself experience that this law is not was published 2002) ? However, the crux in that counter- necessarily valid. Or furthermore where one is left poor argument is, that then Guldberg refers to the findings of and the other one richer. the NIFP which says that the UNDP failed “to adjust In a capitalist market system that law is definitely not there findings for purchasing power”. valid. If a poor worker is working for the rich capitalist Two things are to be said on this: Does the last statement (or at the end in part for the small shareholder) he/she is mean that the council who wrote the report want to pur- not benefitting in a mutual sense. Earning 1$ or less a day chase power by not adjusting there findings or does that in a sweatshop which produces T-shirts for GAP or shoes mean that they did not adjust the findings towards the for Nike in Indonesia is giving you maybe the possibility inclusion of the possibility to purchase power (ie by to eat one meal a day. In the same time the company sells broaden the access to participation in the decision making the stuff in big numbers and makes thousands a day, so process) ? It is not clear. that shareholders or managers can get high salaries, which But even one things of the second option , which sounds allow them every day a visit in the Ritz at Piccadilly in more convincing to me, than the second thing is to be London. Is that mutual benefit ? mentioned: We had already the social justice concept which was given by Guldberg himself. Having that in Conclusion mind, here suddenly, the inequality or injustice one might I will not bore the reader any longer. Rather I want to add, is more than that concept which was given before. conclude with that what has been said at the beginning of But furthermore I want to ask the author how is it possi- these article. If we maybe take the issues more seriously ble to operationalize “purchasing of power” in that way, with an ethical responsibility in mind we could make that a scholar can use it to analyse it with the Gini coeffi- clearer an argumentation. We could more look if it is cient, as stated in the last sentence of that paragraph ? clear what we want to say. Furthermore we should really Another thing which is quite difficult to understand in the set up and use a peer review system to make assure that context of Guldberg is that “Africa is still obviously be- the articles which are presented on our website have at hind”. Why obviously ? What is so obvious on that surely least a standard which will not make other people believe true fact, but at that stage in the article not related to any- that we just write about those really serious issues thing which makes it obvious to the reader. because of having nothing else to do. Politikon September-October

by the United Nations and other heads of state.

This article seeks to take a look at the interaction of humanitarian and national considerations in a humanitarian crisis. The purpose of the article is not take position on humanitarian interventions and their legitimacy as such, but to use it as an manifestation of the state of world politics. This could take us some way towards assessing the By Silja Sukselainen (Helsinki) framework in which the development of global values cur- rently takes place. One of the many debates that globalisation has raised is on the question of whether some kind of global values are Humanitarian intervention emerging along with the other processes that make up globalisation. What is meant by “global values” is “a com- By definition humanitarian involves a concern for human mitment to humanity as a whole rather than to individual welfare and it implies impartiality as it is concerned with states and/or nations”. (Held & McGrew, 2000, p.429). humanity as a whole. Ideally humanitarian action should This debate is also of central importance to discussions of also be free of particularistic and political considerations of global governance, which deal with the mechanisms to the parties involved and of the aid donors. According to uphold global norms and values. the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “The fundamental objectives of humanitarian action is to allevi- The dilemma of global governance is the discordance be- ate suffering and save lives. Humanitarian action focuses tween the idea of global or transnational values and the on people and is based on rights. Political action focuses structure of world politics, which is based by nation-states. on states and is guided by national interests and respect for There is of course nothing new in stating this fundament of sovereignty” (MacFarlane, 2000, p. 2). Apart from the international politics. political interests of But to get into the “Humanitarian intervention deserves to be put in quotes because it is a deeply ideological notion. Marking a frontier of the parties to the con- question of global val- flict, the participation international relations in the age of globalisation, humanitar- ues and where they of external powers stand in the current ian intervention raises the question of political responsibility in and donor states is world, it is necessary to the era of globalisation. Since we are aware of and connected contingent on politi- look at what their sig- to events taking place in distant parts of the world, informed of cal interest. If donors nificance is when it the sufferings of people in distant lands, what are the conse- don’t see their vital comes to real action. quences for our way of being in the world, for our sense of po- interests as being One clear way of as- litical engagement? The emotion involved may be termed long- threatened, they can sessing the setting of distance compassion; the realities are murkier. On the one be unwilling to accept global values is through hand, humanitarian intervention inaugurates a new kind on risks and expenses for humanitarian action citizenship, the citizenship of humanity, while on the other it getting involved. and especially humani- Humanitarian aid to tarian intervention, treads in the footsteps of conventional inter-state politics which, however, itself is in transition. Humanitarian interven- victims of catastro- which combine caring phes and conflicts is for humanity and the tion is a two-faced operation, idealism caught in the wheels of realism, realism outflanked by realities.” not a new concept. In risk involved for the Europe action was (Pieterse (1997) Sociology of Humanitarian Intervention: Bos- national interests of the being co-ordinated state. nia, Rwanda and Somalia Compared. p.72) during the wars of the 19th century and espe- It is also interesting to cially during the study this discordance in a situation where the discordance world wars. At the international level there was clear pro- is generally acknowledged by those in a position of power. gress after the world wars, for example by way of codifica- The failed humanitarian action of outside powers during tion of international humanitarian law. As mentioned the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 that cost according to dif- above, humanitarian action has, however, been in conflict ferent estimates 500-800 000 lives and forced about 2 mil- with the concept of national sovereignty that was firmly lion people to become refugees, is an example of this situa- established as one of the fundaments of the United Na- tion. During his visit to Kigali in 1998 the American Presi- tions. The debate on the inconsistency between a common dent Bill Clinton offered his apologies to the Rwandan humanity and exclusive communities has a longer history nation on behalf of the international community for their and has been considered by many such as Hugo Grotius failure to get involved in the humanitarian operation and and Thomas Hobbes. Humanitarian implies something the cause of the failure has been admitted as a lack of po- based on a common humanity that transgresses national litical will to get involved. This apology has been repeated boundaries. The concept of intervention, however, itself in * Pieterse, 1997, p.90 Politikon September-October based on the nation-state paradigm as the “intervention” state actors, mostly NGO’s grew in importance, the role of implies interference in the internal affairs of another that is nation-states remained crucial, as they are often the only considered sovereign. The state is only responsible to its ones able to provide the resources and material necessary own citizens and to get involved in an act of intervention to get humanitarian aid through to the conflict scene. that transgresses its mandate, it must get its citizens’ ap- proval for it (Parekh, 1997). What the decade after the end of the Cold War has mostly shown is the contradiction within the international system: In the 1990’s international humanitarian action has been values are universal but their application is selective. In much exposed with large numbers of conflicts breaking out certain conflicts the international community gets in- around the world. A significant change in this action has volved, but it is reluctant to do so in many others. Since the been, however, that military action has become part of it in international community is perceived to be more free to act a new way. Humanitarian intervention as such is an in humanitarian crises and the universal humanitarian “intervention in the internal affairs of another country with rights are so emphasised in international politics, one is left a view to ending the physical suffering caused by the disin- to wonder why this is so? What is crucial in a decision on tegration or gross misuse of the authority of the state, and humanitarian assistance? Clearly, it is impossible and per- helping to create conditions in which a viable structure of haps not even desirable that the international community civil authority can emerge”. (Parekh, 1997, p.53). It is dis- get involved in all conflicts. But there are conspicuous tinct from humanitarian aid which only aims to relieve cases, such as the Rwandan genocide where the sheer num- suffering and not bring about peace and order. It is also ber of victims and all the information available at the time slightly different from traditional peace-keeping, which raise serious questions. only aims at securing a peace-making process without at- tempting to become itself part of this solution. In these The selectivity of the action can be seen as proof that po- new humanitarian interventions political and humanitarian litical interests still affect the decisions of humanitarian aspects have become even more intertwined. action even in the post-Cold War world. The reason for the lack of involvement in Rwanda has generally been ac- After the Cold War knowledged to have been lack of “political” will. Is it simply a matter of realist-style national interests? On a very During the Cold War humanitarian action was closely re- superficial level it seems easy to pinpoint the strategic in- lated to the strategic aims of terests behind the operations (e.g. the the two power blocs, which Gulf War) but how can cases where it is prevented its impartiality from generally accepted that none existed (e.g. being materialized. The deci- US operation Restore Hope to Somalia) sions of humanitarian aid were be explained? We must go further. to quite an extent, explained by the logic on the bipolar world. In his article Sociology of Humanitarian After the Cold War the oppor- Intervention: Bosnia, Rwanda and Soma- tunities for humanitarian action lia compared, Jan Nederveen Pieterse have changed quite signifi- sees that, humanitarian interventions re- cantly. In this “new world or- flect a state of transition in world politics. der”, the realization of truly The traditional model based on nation- universal human rights without states has changed and the concept of the influence of political agen- sovereignty crumbled. Values, however das was seen to have become move on transnational level. Humanitar- possible. The United Nations, ian interventions thus, reflect the ambigu- paralysed by power politics ous nature of the situation. The lack of a during the Cold War, was ac- general doctrine on humanitarian inter- corded a great role in this new vention, of their authorisations and deci- development. This new vision sion-making is the principal problem of has also been called “new hu- humanitarian interventions. These issues manitarianism”. have been left to the Security Council, where national interests affect decision- For many, the development of the 1990’s has given reason making. The decisions are based on a calculation involving to optimism about the possibilities to realize universal hu- both considerations of common humanity on one hand and manitarianism as humanitarian action has been much ex- national interests on the other. This is, according to Piet- posed. The critics of this development, on the other hand, erse how humanitarian interventions serve as a “mirror of see the ideology of new humanitarianism as being only a global politics as they really exist”.(Pieterese, 1997, p.90) cover for world powers to pursue their national interests. Especially the military aspect of the humanitarian interven- What then affects a decision on humanitarian interventions raise many doubts on the motivation behind such tion? action. Although, during the 1990’s also the role of non- Politikon September-October

The decision of intervention: was and the area was seen as quite a hopeless region. the case of Rwanda and the United States The role of the media and domestic support for an opera- Although the United States in not a prime example to be tion are closely connected, but not exactly as is usually studied in the case of Rwanda as such due to its histori- claimed. The media, is of course, crucial in bringing an cally non-existent ties (and therefore interests) to the re- issue to general awareness of the public and public opin- gion, it offers the easiest way to study this process at a ion, in its turn influences the political leadership. The me- general level. The United States also has an undeniable dia, however does not usually affect political decision role on the international scene and a capacity to intervene, making itself, but rather the media looks to the political which makes it easier to observe its action. The United leadership for issues to bring on the agenda. Media rarely States was quite reluctant to invest in the UNAMIR peace- affects public opinion significantly, unless the issue has keeping force (set up to enforce the Arusha peace-accord been taken up by the political leadership. This was, for that ended the civil war in Rwanda in 1993) and desired example discovered by Jonathan Mermin in his study on the operation to be carried through with minimal expense, the role of the media in the public support for the operation even as clear warnings of massacres were pouring in. (For to Somalia (Mermin, 1997). This same also applied to the a short historical background on the events of the geno- Rwandan case, where media exposure didn’t seem to have cide, see annex 1). had much effect, before political leadership got more ac- The decisions to participate in an intervention involve tive in the summer following the genocide. both international and domestic considerations. The processes are not uniform and vary between different states In the Rwandan case it is significant to note that a certain according to historical ties, political systems and cultures, policy orientation had recently been reached in Washing- internal decision making systems, international roles etc. ton on the question of interventions . The failure of Soma- Assessing the process in a particular case, would require lia (reminiscent of the old legacy of Vietnam) had trauma- going through these different elements carefully. tised the political leadership which wanted to minimise the risk of getting involved in an operation that would end up Peter Viggo Jakobsen has studied decisions of involvement in bringing more body bags home in front of the TV cam- in peace-keeping operations (meaning here also humanitar- eras. The revision of the intervention policy resulted in ian interventions) in a number of conflicts including Presidential Decision Directive 25 in May 1994, three Rwanda (Jakobsen, 1996). According to him five main weeks after the genocide began. The directive tightened questions affect the decision: how “clear” the situation is the criteria that had to be fulfilled for the US to get in- in terms of international law and whether it has interna- volved in an operation, including demanding the presence tional support, whether there are national interests related of clear national interests. The government simply wasn’t to the conflict area, whether the donor ate has national ap- interested in getting involved. There were of course differ- proval from its citizens, the role of the media and what are ent opinions within it, but in the end the decision was the chance of success of the operation. based on the estimate that the operation couldn’t be carried through well enough for its political and financial costs. In the Rwandan case there was no ambiguity of the viola- Based on interviews of several government officials (PBS tion of universal humanitarian values but the international Frontline, 1999) it was a matter of avoiding facing reality community was reluctant to get involved. After Somalia, a and of getting stuck on the question of whether it was ac- successful operation was needed and Rwanda was soon tual genocide or not. judged to be hopeless. The international atmosphere was one of avoidance. The lack of timely and sufficient in- To create a completely accurate picture of the decision- volvement has been blamed on lack of adequate informa- making process, other actors should be studied as well tion on what was happening. It has, however been estab- (NGOs, congressmen, lobbyists etc.). The purpose here is lished in a number of reports made after the events, that not to make a full enquiry into the process, but rather get a there was abundant information and external powers were notion of the elements involved. well aware of what was happening, if not about the exact magnitude. It was a matter of lack of will, which was cov- Conclusions ered with the concept of genocide. The Geneva Conven- tion demands that its signatories act when signs of geno- Behind the apology offered to the Rwandans was a contra- cide are discovered in one of the states, so the term was diction between universal humanitarian values and politi- avoided even thought the conditions were known to be cal calculation grounded in the nation-state paradigm. The fulfilled. apology crystallises the gap between the reality and the ideal. The gap is generally acknowledged and humanitar- When understood in a strict, realist way, national interests ian interventions seem to reflect it quite clearly. How this don’t go very far in explaining most cases of intervention. discrepancy can be resolved and whether global values are In the Rwandan case, however, it can simply be stated that emerging are other, very important question for the global- the US didn’t have any national interests involved. The US isation debate to consider. Meanwhile, humanitarian ac- didn’t have a historical tie to the region as for example tion, due to its nature, shows us where truly global values Belgium and France, many hardly knew where the country fit in the world’s political system. For a more Politikon September-October

up-to-date view on the matter, involvement in The De- sacres were delivered to the UN. In April the country’s mocratic Republic of Congo or Sierra Leone could be ana- Hutu President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down and lyzed. At first glance, however, the setting doesn’t seem to extreme Hutus were suspected. The Hutu militia and the have changed significantly since the Rwandan genocide. Rwandan army began massacres that were answered by an attack of the Tutsi RPF. Due to its limited mandate the UNAMIR was basically mo- Annex 1 tionless during these massacres. The UN decided to cut it In 1990 a civil war broke out in down further at the end of Rwanda between the Hutu gov- April. There were signs of a ernment and the Tutsi Rwandese genocide but the word was Patriotic Front (RPF). In 1993 the carefully avoided. When the Arusha peace accord was reached information couldn’t be but the political process didn’t avoided anymore the UN de- develop well and violence kept cided to send more troops. In increasing during 1993. The UN May there were hundreds of was keen on operating a success- thousand of refugees crossing ful peace-keeping operation after the borders to the neighbouring Somalia. The success was desired countries and about 500 000 to be carried through with mini- million were estimated to have mal expenses and the UANMIR been killed. In June, under force was only a fragment of the French command the Opération initial plan. Especially the United Turquoise was launched and in States opposed increasing the re- July the RPF set up an interim sources that for example Belgium government. was pushing for. In January 1994 clear warnings of up-coming mas-

REFERENCE

Held, David & McGrew, Anthony (eds.) (2000) The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to The Globalisation Debate. Polity Press, UK.

Human Rights Watch Report Leave None To Tell The Story (3.1999) http://www.hrw.org

International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and The Surrounding Events, Special Report. (2000) http://www.oau-oua.org

Jakobsen, Peter Viggo (1996) National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement After The Cold War? Journal of Peace Research, no.2 1996, vol. 33, p.205-215

MacFarlane, Neil (2000) Politics and Humanitarian Action. Thomas J.Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies and UN University Occasional Paper no.41.

Mermin, Jonathan (1997) Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of A Media-Driven Foreign Policy. P o- litical Science Quarterly, Fall 1997, vol. 112, issue 3.

Parekh, Bhikhu (1997) Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention. International Political Science Review, Jan. 1997, vol.18.

PBS Online and WGBH Frontline (1999) Interviews: Philip Gourevitch, James Woods ja Tony Marley (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews)

Pieterse, Jan Nederveen (1997) Sociology of Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia Compared. International Polit i- cal Science Review, Jan. 1997, vol.18.

Vanderbilt University Television News Archive: Search of Evening News 1994. (http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu)

Wheeler, Nicholas J. (1997) Agency , Humanitarianism and Intervention. International Political Science Review, Jan. 1997, vol.18. Politikon September-October

By Giuliano Gennaio IAPSS Vice chairman [email protected]

The phantom menace 1,5 billions do not have water, A new threat frighten the world population; the new Mil- 1 billion is unemployed or without human wages condi- lennium Berlin Wall, the new iron curtain : the digital di- tions. vide menace. 125 millions kids do not go to school, 10% of the Popula- The success of Digital technologies makes some nation tion consumes 70% of resources. grew but does not help Gaps between South and less developing countries Abstract: North are today so huge that still can not even New technologies enhance the difference between "haves" that only the solidarity of afford the electricity for and "haves not" world wide. all the planet could nar- the normal phone call. Something born to be widely useful (Internet) is used today row the dividends. So, the difference be- without a solidarity and clever politics. The 3 richer persons tween haves - the on line The United Nations followed the American way for diffe r- have income and funds population- and haves ent reasons but for sure gains. more consistence than not - the off line popula- The new map of the world draft by the digital divide starts the 48 poorest countries tion- increases always to fear governments. annual production. more and more. 1,2 billion people live in Some countries have the developed countries, privileges and multiple choices on different field like 4,8 billions in the developing countries. health care and Tele-medicine, direct democracy and pri- In 25 years the developing countries will have 6,8 billions vacy regulations, e-learning and home-teaching; some oth- people and 4 billions of them will have to live with 2 dol- ers can not even afford teachers for normal education, do lars while 1,8 billions with less than 1 dollar. not have infrastructure and money for hospitals and do not The digital divide moreover will enhance all the already have democratic governments. existing gaps. On this case much has been done by volunteers and NGOs more than by computers or similar. Who is leading the technological world? In the western World, we await the new mobile phone This question can be easily answered: the United States generation, which will allow us to link internet and mobile, of America. leading us to the perfect interaction ever between com- The U.S. have got 41% of Internet customers with 192 puter and phone. billion people connected to the net! In third world countries, the debts to be paid to Western English (U.S.A., Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Aus- World, the lack of infrastructure and of primary sources do tralia, New Zealand, South Africa and India) is the most not allow people to think about tomorrow, to have hope to spoken language on the net with 47,6% of websites while handle a mobile, to have the chance to check e mails from the other European Languages reaches 29,2% and the Asi- Switzerland. atic languages reaches 23,1% (total non English is 52,4%) The world opener than ever, the chance for American citi- (Source: Global Reach,2000 www.glreach.com) zens to talk to Russian are today more than ever. In America (U.S.A. and Canada) there are 56.005.129 On the other hand the world is going two speeds, has got hosts (78% of the total host servers) with 684,56 hosts per new border lines, new "limes" that cut it on two different 10.000 inhabitants, while in Africa there are only 184.726 categories: the info- rich and the info- poor. hosts (0.3%) corresponding to 2,41 hosts each 10.000 citi- Some numbers from the United Nation Developing Pro- zens. gramme Report 2000: 70% circa of mankind never heard In the U.S.A. and in Canada there are 21,34 Personal Com- about Internet; only 5% can be on-line. puters each 100 citizens, in Africa instead, PC are 0.88 95% of servers, 97% of websites and 88% of Internet Cus- each 100 citizens. tomers are in the Western World (U.S.A and Canada have (Source: ITU 1999 www.itu.int) 57% of server while Africa and Middle East together less Why the U.S.? than 1%). Surely they have some technological advantage that step International sources like the world bank, the UN and gov- by step, year after year they reached; moreover the U.S. ernments give us the vision of riches always richer and used a lot of military technologies (their leading sector) poor always poorer. like the Internet, converted for the civil society; but also Today the world has more than 6 billion inhabitants. the governments form 60s to nowadays made special pol- 60% are in rural areas. Half of Human being (circa 2,8 icy to advantage dot.com, to liberalise the market and to billions) lives with less than 1 dollar in complete poverty. free companies from taxes. Politikon September-October

Technology is not only internet, indeed, but a lot of com- 2000): we have to forget the Digital Divide. First we have panies working on related fields and on different subjects to give them water, food, clothes, a house and education. like telephone, media, TV, radio, advertising companies, So, how can the bridging of the gap helps the developing school, university, foundations, institute technologies and countries? important NGOs, that exploited also the great grown of the Technology based on digital, the Internet, telephones, in- economy to make business following the overlapping Ja- formation technologies can help those society educating pan and the awake Europe. them, letting their government be more democratic, giving First, the U.S. spied Japan, leader in this field, then Japan third world population special glasses to watch out of their fell on the second floor followed by Europe. conditions and raise the head to the world. Now the Geo-economy of Information Technologies is But this create a problem: in globalise time, when the changing but it is very difficult to make better than the U. American culture is so dominant, do not we risk that the S. world will have only one face? If American business companies let technology reach third What kind of divide are we talking about? world countries, do not we risk a new colonialism? Coloni- The Digital Divide, or Digital Dividends or still Digital alism of way of life (the American way of life), high per- Apartheid (as called by Colin Power, American Secretary spective of living and equality of thoughts? of the state), is a gap, a theoretical division where the "haves" can afford commodities that the "haves not" can The role of governments, Seattle People and civil afford to have. society Education for example, today is based also on peculiar To answer to this questions we can not avoid the debate technologies like the e-learning or the use of the web, to fall on the democratisation of the political structure of which allows students to be part of the information society, third world countries. to handle debates with When we surf on the net, fellows and to do the we are attracted by a homework. new tool, a new world Technology, today, mak- and we are completely ing all these things that not aware of what the some days ago were to result of our uncon- be made by men, gives sciousness can be. people opportunity to Indeed we are so amazed have spare time, to cre- and captured by virtual ate other things, to have realities that we start ideas and projects, to believing those values enhance their social con- like ours, not being criti- dition. cal towards that virtual In the third world, in- society. stead, technology do not This is what happen to exist and even more, people not having the digital technology is use- chance to look at their less cause still there is a real world and to com- lack of primary sources, pare it with the new real- services: lack of water, ity. food, health!!! This is what can happen, When shall I think about indeed, to third world my vacation or spare countries. time if I can not even These population can be think what to have for easily captured by the lunch, given that my new way of easy rich- illness keeps all power ness, of easy money and out. easy living because the world they live in is poor and the It is like a spiral, a circle. In New York my primary world the net offers them is attracting. needs are satisfied, my secondary needs can be satisfied, If they were enough educated to be critical, this would not day by day, and still have time to cure my person and to happen. organise my free time in order to be happy. Good education comes in democratic countries and not in In Rwanda, first I have to find strengths to open my eyes totalitarian countries. Values of freedom, equality and jus- every morning and to search for hope, then the water to be tice. Totalitarism gives a strict education, to be follow drunk and maybe, after, the food not to starve. cause it gives all values and principles....given by only a This is the gap!!!!! man. In some countries as Ted Turner said in the conference" That is why the first thing to do is to boost governments to Sharing the Wealth" (Silicon Valley foundation May lead countries towards democratic principles. Politikon September-October

companies like the International Chamber of Commerce ( 1998), the Rotary clubs, the fashion industry and the Seattle people movement is going towards these queries, flight and assurance companies. this direction. Boosting western countries and western civil Working together is the key world used by Kofi Annan. society to teach the developing countries society how to In July 2000 Annan proposed a Global Compact: a global become democratic and how to compare their world with pact with private companies on specific fields like working the Western one, being critical. rights, human rights and environment. Also the western societies must wear glasses to see how Working together, with UN as director of the orchestra. the third world is done. Specifically related to the Digital Divide there has been the creation of a task force (Dot force) which shall be a divi- The role of the United Nations sional UN agency like UNDP or UNESCO. In the Millennium Report (We, the People. The role of UN can only be the moderator of a new debate on the the UN in the 21st Century) there are a lot of proposals on future of the world and much more on the future of the how to bridge the digital divide and moreover there is a red digital divide bridging. line to be followed to narrow the gap: following the U.S.A. example and developing technologies but with a Human Conclusions Face. The narrowing of the digital divide is a huge opportunity 3 Proposals, moreover, fit clearly with the Information to create a human globalise world. Problems in third world countries: Different models in different countries, must be the slogan; 1) building cyber troops (volunteers) to teach develop- but all countries with the same opportunity. ing countries to use new technologies. Giving education, food, health and experience to third 2) building a Health Inter network to link 10.000 hosp i- world countries is not easy but it is still the goal to be tals websites achieved in the New Millennium 3) a satellite and digital net (first on the ground) to face It is no more possible to be proud and selfish of our world, natural disaster or similar emergencies. not caring about our brothers in the South of a single, Where shall the UN get the funds to finance all these pro- unique world. jects? In the Millennium Report there is a new financial architec- If I shall answer the question: who can solve the Digital ture draft where, besides governmental funds, of rich coun- Divide problem, I would say: tries( like Japan), UN search for links with the Business We, the People.

SOURCES AND USEFUL LINKS ON DIGITAL DIVIDE: -Limes, Rivista di Geopolitica Italiana, articolo di Paolo Morawsky, I signori della rete,2000 Limes, www.limesonline.org -World Population Prospect: The 1998 Revision, United Nation Population Division, Department of Economic and social affairs, www.undp.org/popin/wdtrend -Prb- Population Reference Bureau, www.prb.org -How many on line, NUA Interent Surveys, www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.html -Internet Indicators, ITU-International Telecommunication Union, www.itu.int -Information Society Index 2000, Measuring the Global Impact of Infor- FOUNDATION AND INSTITUTE, mation Technology and Internet adoption, World Times/Idc, TREATING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: www.worldpaper.com/ISI/intro.html -Benton Foundation: www.benton.org -Venture Capitals, Wired magazine, www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.07/ -Digital Divide Network: www.digitaldividenetwork.org silicon.html -AOL Foundation: www.aolfoundation.org -Falling through the Net, NTIA- National Telecommunication and Infor- -AOL Time Warner Foundation: www.aoltwfoundation. mation Administration, www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/digitaldivide org -The digital divide and American Society, Gartner Group, -Digital Partners: www.digitaldivede.org www.gartner3.gartnerweb.com/public/static/aboutgg/pressrel/ -Bridges.org: www.bridges.org pr20001002a.html -Digital Dividend: www.digitaldividend.org -Who is not online, Pew Internet and American Life, http://63.210.24.35/ -Iicd, International Institute for Communication and De- reports/pdfs/Pew_Those:Not_Online_Report.pdf velopment: www.iicd.org -State of the Internet 2000 Usic-United States Internet Council, -Information society observatory: www.unesco.org/ www.usic.org/papers/stateoftheinternet2000/intro.html webworld/observatory/index.shtml -Africa Internet Connectivity, www3.sn.apc.org -The face of the Web: Youth, Angus Reid Group, www.angusreid.com -Surveying the Digital Future , UCLA Center for Community Policy, www.ccp.ucla.edu -We, the People: The role of the United Nations in the 21 st Century, United Nations, www.un.org/millennium/sg/report -Undesrtanding the Digital Divide Oecd- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Deveopment, www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/prod/ Digital_divide.pdf -World Development Report, World Bank, www.worldbank.org/poverty/wdpoverty/report/index.htm -Digital Divide, www.iste.org

Politikon September-October

Benjamin Zyla*

It was a sunny Tuesday morning that I started into very early. I had plans to go to Ottawa, the capital of Canada. The air was very humid, as every day is. The sun tried her best, but she didn’t succeed at this time of the day. It was 7 a.m., the streets were empty and peaceful, no traffic jam, which is very popular here in North America, no red lights at all. Finally I got on the bus and this heavy, huge silver Greyhound bus rolled onto highway 416 to Ottawa. This report, there’s no doubt, is a personal view on the The Canadian landscape with its huge wild rivers and incidents on September the 11th in New York. This short lakes was passing by until we reached the capital. For report tries to describe what happened to me personally political science students it almost seems to be manda- while I was visiting a good friend in King-ston, On- tory visiting the parliament, especially here in this tario, Canada. I am trying to avoid too much detailed mixed Anglophone - Francophone country. How does information, because by the time you read this article it work together having a small Big Ben right in front this information will be obsolete. This does of course of the parliament building and the flair of smaller not mean that this report doesn’t con-tain any informa- Paris down-town Ottawa and the Americans as tion at all. My article is more a personal feature than neighbours? an investigative report. All my thoughts and all my sorrow goes to the families, fathers, mothers, children and Coming out of the parliament the answer was quite loved ones who got involved in this tragedy. clear: it works to-gether, nobody explained in detail, but it works. So there I was, right in front of the parliament building and trying to open one of these huge tourist maps with one hand and holding the tour guide in the other hand. I was paving my way to the upper town, crossing the street right in front me when suddenly a police car was honking at me. The blue and red lights on top of the car were running and making loud noises. Sec-onds later another car passed me and the map was fluttering away. “What the fuck is this?”, I asked myself. Within minutes the houses of representatives and the senate were evacu-ated. All the streets around the parliament, all the embassies, actually all public and government buildings were shut down for the public within minutes. The financial district of Ot- tawa: locked up with yellow police bandage. The head of the police gave the order to abandon all pedestrians from the streets. Ottawa, originally a quiet city this par-ticular morning became a loud and noisy one. The sound of police cars and firefighters were in the air, friendly police officers explained to the nervous public what was going on. Their faces were covered mostly with black sunglasses, but you could see their nervous and serious faces. But what happened? The parliament and the senate were under bomb threat. A white van loaded with packages was suspicious. Everything around it had been evacuated. Minutes before two airplanes crashed into the World Trade Cen- tre in New York. I went around the building and talked to some journalists awaiting a speech of the Canadian prime min-ister the Honourable Jean Chrétien. I asked a reporter from The Toronto Star, one of the major newspapers here in Canada, what is going on here. He got the newest information about what happened in New York and ex-plained it to me. I couldn’t believe it that two airplanes crashed into the World Trade Centre. He said “ go to this café over there, they have nice coffee and a TV-screen.” So I went there, getting a coffee watch-ing the news on CNN, of course live. Since that morning until now CNN is live on the screen the entire time, 24 hours round the clock. I just arrived and one of the twin towers collapsed. I noticed a small murmur in the atmosphere and CNN didn’t fail to replay this situation.

“This guys who decided to make war against the US have chosen their own destruction” (George W. Bush, Camp David 15.9.)

From this time on Ottawa was turned around. I went into the National Gallery to get a break from the nervous happen- ings in downtown Ottawa. I couldn’t believe it. One week before I went to New York, visited the Empire state Building and went up to one of the twin towers. I had a very bad German sausage in the park right in front of the World Trade Centre. I sat down on a couch and my thoughts were weird. I looked back to my time in New York. Questions were coming up: How did it happen? And who the hell did this thing? How many people died? My view was mov-ing around and finally stopped at a mass of police cars. Later I no-ticed that the national gallery was on the opposite side of the American embassy. Police officers with sniffing dogs were ensuring the prop-erty of the American embassy, which stood under bomb threats the whole day. Other police officers armed with submachine guns and protected Politikon September-October

with bulletproof vests and helmets were securing situation and guiding the traffic: state of emergency in Ottawa. Em- ployees were running off, the house had been evacuated. The streets around the embassy were painted in white and red, the colours of the police cars and the emer-gency lights. My day in Ottawa was more or less over, all the major shops and shop-ping malls closed, because everyone feared bomb attacks. The gallery had to close as well so my silent time was over. Dismaying for me is the fact that the investigation pulled out. It is likely that the basis for this attacks was (and probably still is) in Germany. Terrorists went to German schools, got socialized in my country. Obviously not enough!

“We’ll run a crusade to liberate the world from this wrongdoer.” (George W. Bush in Camp David 16.9.)

This fear is still going on. At the time the attack happened Bush was in Florida to visit a school. Ten minutes after the attack the North American airspace was closed for all commercial airplanes. The govern-ment and the FBI feared more threats and the president had to come back to the White ouse Office. It was a national security issue and the life and safety

The inquiry for the needle in the haystack

This report, there’s no doubt, is a personal view on the incidents on September the 11th in New York. This short report tries to describe what happened to me personally while I was visiting a good friend in King-ston, Ontario, Canada. I am trying to avoid too much detailed informa-tion, because by the time you read this article this information will be obsolete. This does of course not mean that this report doesn’t con-tain any information at all. My article is more a personal feature than an investigative report. All my thoughts and all my sorrow goes to the families, fathers, mothers, children and loved ones who got involved in this tragedy.

Coming out of the parliament the answer was quite clear: it works to-gether, nobody explained in detail, but it works. So there I was, right in front of the parliament building and trying to open one of these huge tourist maps with one hand and holding the tour guide in the other hand. I was paving my way to the upper town, crossing the street right in front me when suddenly a police car was honking at me. The blue and red lights on top of the car were running and making loud noises. Sec-onds later another car passed me and the map was fluttering away. “What the fuck is this?”, I asked myself. Within minutes the houses of representatives and the senate were evacu-ated. All the streets around the parliament, all the embassies, actu-ally all public and government buildings were shut down for the public within minutes. The financial district of Ottawa: locked up with yellow police bandage. The head of the police gave the order to abandon all pedestrians from the streets. Ottawa, originally a quiet city this par-ticular morning became a loud and noisy one. The sound of police cars and firefighters were in the air, friendly police officers explained to the nervous public what was going on. Their faces were covered mostly with black sunglasses, but you could see their nervous and serious faces. But what happened? The parliament and the senate were under bomb threat. A white van loaded with packages was suspicious. Everything around it had been evacuated. Minutes before two airplanes crashed into the World Trade Cen- tre in New York. I went around the building and talked to some journalists awaiting a speech of the Canadian prime min-ister the Honourable Jean Chrétien. I asked a reporter from The Toronto Star, one of the major newspapers here in Canada, what is going on here. He got the newest information about what happened in New York and ex-plained it to me. I couldn’t believe it that two airplanes crashed into the World Trade Centre. He said “ go to this café over there, they have nice coffee and a TV-screen.” So I went there, getting a coffee watch-ing the news on CNN, of course live. Since that morning until now CNN is live on the screen the entire time, 24 hours round the clock. I just arrived and one of the twin towers collapsed. I noticed a small murmur in the atmosphere and CNN didn’t fail to replay this Politikon September-October

situation.

“This guys who decided to make war against the US have chosen their own destruction” (George W. Bush, Camp David 15.9.)

From this time on Ottawa was turned around. I went into the National Gallery to get a break from the nervous happen- ings in downtown Ottawa. I couldn’t believe it. One week before I went to New York, visited the Empire state Building and went up to one of the twin towers. I had a very bad German sausage in the park right in front of the World Trade Centre. I sat down on a couch and my thoughts were weird. I looked back to my time in New York. Questions were coming up: of the president had priority in this situation. I couldn’t believe it, as I saw the story on CNN, but it was true. Air Force One, the plane of the president, was immediately protected and monitored by armed jet fighters. His vicepresident, Richard B. Cheney, was carried to Camp David, so that not both the president and the vice president are under attack. Later investigators found out that Air Force One as well as the White House were targets of the terrorists. Americans running crazy?

Bush: “We are at war!”

Rather not! The other day George W. Bush announced that some terrorists still might be inside the country. He said the attack is not over yet, more attacks on cities, buildings or landmarks are at least somewhat likely-soon. Canada was one of the most affected countries beside the U.S. All the planes with destinations to New York or Washington were diverted to Canadian airports. The airspace was shut down for almost three entire days with a loss of more than 300 billion dollars already. As a result almost 30,000 people were stranded in Canadian airports. Canadians of-fered free accommodation, organized trav- elling to and from the airport and tried to make the life of the pas- sengers as comfort- able as possible (Canadians are so nice!). As soon as the airports were reopened more than 300 flights just in Canada were can- celled. Back to normal was a foreign word. The Canadians were the first who provided medical help, firefighters and investigative support. As a response to the attacks on Septem- ber 11th the American Airlines and United Airlines already laid off about 40,000 jobs, their suppliers like Boeing and Airbus are following. All in all 100,000 people are without jobs at the end of this month. The airlines are expecting a re-duction of flights and bookings of 30-40 percent. This of course, affects the Canadian economy as well. People who are in their final year of University are now looking for a job; the recruit-ing of the companies has begun. But the job-expectations are lower than ever before. How many people and how much intelligence were killed through this attack shows the example of Morgan Stanley. This company is a pre-eminent global financial services firm that maintains leading market positions in each of its businesses. Mor- gan Stanley had its headquarter in the World Trade Centre and rented almost 50 floors. Hundreds of lifes are gone, the company pretty much lost its entire headquarter. The Chairman Philip Purcel just survived this day because he went to the school en-rolment of his sun. He arrived after nine o’clock at the World Trade Centre when the towers were already on fire. In an advertisement this week (Newsweek September 24,2001) he thanked “the hundreds of fire-fighters, police officers and individuals for their courageous ef-forts.” The Chief Executive Officer of Morgan Stanley was fa- mous for his harsh management style in the past. This week he said “We mourn their (the victims) loss and extend our hand to all those in need of our help.” The human face of a top-manager.

*Born in 1977 and studies Political Science, journalism and business at Uppsala University and Goettingen

Politikon September-October

access to and reporting from theatres of war, curiously little has been said about from a normative point of view of how we would like the role of the media to be in war and that can be achieved. Academic research on news production has shown time and again that the media in general are highly dependent on information from socie- By Salvatore Nigro* ties institutions. It is a dependency born out of a desire and need to keep down the costs of newsgathering and it Introduction applies at times of international conflict too. This essay is an attempt to show which has been the role When war reporting emerged as a specialisation in the of the Media in the lasts conflicts as Gulf War, Chechnya period from 1865 to 1914 the expectations of journal- and Kosovo, how they influenced the public opinions and ists were quite simple. As Philip Knightley (1975:42- the Western States and which differences can we see 44) has pointed out in his seminal book on the history among the cases studied. of war reporting, the huge popularity of Summary: Historic Transition war reporters at the time was dependent · Introduction Up to and during the on their ability to · Historic Transition Cold War, media ap- write war reports as peared primarily na- narratives of adve n- · Media as Sites and Actors in Global Politics: Conclu- tional in form, and in- ture without too much sions from the Iraqi Wars ternational communica- political comment or · Chechnya tion across borders re- moralising. · Media at War: The role played in the Kosovo crisis mained secondary. Kosovo Crisis and Media in Europe From the point of view A century on, the issue · Conclusion of International Rela- of the relationship be- · Reference List tions, media could be tween journalists, me- seen therefore as com- dia and war has come p o nents of the to the fore again, but ‘domestic’ order, relat- this time the expectations of journalists are far less clear ing to national politics and public opinion. Media were cut. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has seen a not seen as signficant components of the international number of horrific intra-state conflicts where episodes of order, except to the extent (generally considered limited) severe human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing and geno- that the domestic affected the international. Increasingly, cide have prompted demands that the international com- of course, international theory stressed ‘interdependence’ munity should intervene on humanitarian grounds and between national economies (Keohane and Nye, 1977), stop the violence. International journalists have found and the emergence of ‘non-state’ actors - such as multi- themselves to be key players in the public communication national corporations - in international relations. By the processes about this modern variation on the theme of end of the Cold War period, such processes were seen as war even if the exact dynamics of the process are cur- breaking down the divisions of ‘domestic’ and rently very poorly understood. For many international ‘international’ and leading to ‘post-international’ world journalists covering the intense violence in places like politics (Rosenau, 1990). Rwanda, Iraq, Bosnia, Chechnya and Kosovo has led to personal soul searching and questioning of the appropri- Economic and cultural integration, moreover, was ate roles of journalists in such conflicts – particularly as it seen as taking the form of ‘globalisation’ in which bor- has become clear how much the protagonists have used ders were undermined. In radical versions of this ar- local media to build and sustain the very same conflicts. gument, the proliferation of non-state actors included social movements - including, for example, women’s, Unfortunately, such journalists will find little help in the peace and environmental movements - and was lead- current academic scholarship on war and the media. As ing towards the formation of a ‘global civil soci- Susan L. Carruthers (2000: 11) has pointed out in her ety’ (Falk, 1995). This was itself seen as part of a comprehensive book “The Media at war” research has wider movement towards a ‘global society’. tended to fall into a fairly limited number of categories: studies of the media performance in single, specific con- Curiously, media figured very little in these transforma- flicts; participant accounts and memories by war corre- tions of the International Relations debate. International spondents; analyses of the military media activity in war media groups were of course recognised as one variety of time, such as propaganda, war photography or wartime the increasingly important multi-national corporation, and cinema. Critique of journalistic performance in war is media were criticised in radical accounts as part of the commonplace in such studies but bear a general condem- dominant American hegemony (Chomsky and Her- nation of military and governments regulation of media man, 1988). But the significance of media was Politikon September-October

often restricted to the interface of ‘foreign policy’ decades have had deep significance for the roles of me- with ‘domestic’ public opinion in conflicts, which dia. Media and journalists are often in the forefront, and themselves were often conservatively theorised since at the cutting edge, of transformative processes the diffu- war remained mostly a topic in the ‘realist’ end of In- sion of information through increasingly global media ternational Relations. Because domestic politics too cannot be contained within bounds which even the most was seen as only an inconsistent, intermittent influ- powerful state leaders would prefer. ence on international relations, it also figured fairly marginally in the field. I turn to an emblematic case of contemporary, post Cold Specific media phenomena (e.g. CNN, the Internet) have War international relations: the Gulf War and its Kurdish achieved totemic status - the former in discussions of for- aftermath. eign policy, the latter in globalisation debates. However it is fair to say that no systematic, general rethinking of media has appeared in any of the critical debates in Interna- Media as Sites and Actors in Global Politics: Conclusions tional Relations. Media studies retain a cinderella status from the Iraqi Wars in all main theoretical schools. The Iraqi wars of 1990-91 present a considerable paradox The transformation of the state order has been very much in contemporary international relations. On the one hand, a condition for the development of globalised communi- the (Persian) Gulf War appears as something of a limiting cations and global civil society (and indeed case, the first clearly interstate conflict after the Cold War ‘globalisation’ in general). The internationalised political to have involved the Western powers as direct protago- order has been increasingly liberal in content, facilitating nists rather than war-managers. It is therefore a standard transnational, and increasingly globalised, communica- against which other ‘new wars’ (as Kaldor, 1999, has tions and culture. It is in these circumstances that press called them) are measured, and only the Kosova war of and television have become more and more frameworks 1999 has matched it. On the other hand, the Kurdish refu- for transnationalised and globalised information and gee crisis has been taken as a paradigm of a new form of ideas. Although many have located the emergence of a ‘humanitarian intervention’ in which states use military global civil society in globalist social movements - envi- power for ends distinct from the classic pursuit of strate- ronmental, feminist, human rights etc. - the common gic interest. Despite the obvious links of these two em- framework of this emerging form has been the trans- blematic episodes, they have been studied for the most formed public sphere of mass media. part separately. Moreover, despite the contrasting media roles which were central to the two cases, no attempt has The development of transnational and global public been made to theorise the linkages between these experi- spheres has coincided with the development of new me- ences. In 1990-91, it involved four distinct phases of war: dia technologies, institutions and mar- the Iraqi army’s invasion of Kuwait; the kets. Mass media have become less ho- UnitedStates-led coalition’s campaign mogenous - technologies have multi- against the Iraqi state; the Shi’ite insur- plied, markets have fractured even as rection in the South of Iraq and its crush- overall they have expanded, and interac- ing by the Iraqi state; and the Kurdish tivity has increased. However the trans- insurrection in the North and its defeat. formation of the public sphere does not It was clear to all, of course, that the war depend solely, or even mainly, on these was heavily mediated. The most impor- developments, as the totemic importance tant studies confirmed the success of the of CNN and the Internet might suggest. principal coalition states’ governments It is important to emphasise the extent to and armed forces in managing media which historic national media and institutions, such as coverage, to reinforce the military campaign. (Taylor, radio, television and the BBC, have become primary ve- 1992). There was little detailed attention to even this is- hicles for transnational and global trends. Just as state sue as it affected the Arab world. And almost all aca- internationalisation has depended on the integration and demic media studies ceased at the point at which George harmonisation of nation-states’ practices, so the transfor- Bush attempted but failed to end the wars, with the coali- mation of media and civil society has involved interlinked tion ceasefire of 28 February 1991. national media. The hugely expanded and speeded-up There was therefore very little close attention to the role flow of information and images between media institu- of the media in the insurrectionary wars and their after- tions means that core content is increasingly harmonised, math, the huge and desparate exodus of refugees from the even while its framing in public broadcasting retains repression of the Saddam Hussein regime. This is ex- many distinctively national characteristics. The location tremely curious given that the totemic role of CNN, of media in civil society is reinforced by the fundamental which arose first from its coverage of the coalition assault political transformations of our time. The movements on Iraq, became identified in subsequent debates with the towards democratisation in Latin America, east-central role of media in the Kurdish refugee crisis and the genesis Europe and the former Soviet Union, and many parts of of the Anglo-American-French intervention to create Asia, Africa and even the Middle East, in the last two ‘safe havens’ in Kurdistan. Politikon September-October

The term ‘CNN effect’ - as emblematic of the media’s on the initial success. it is important to grasp the dynam- role in international politics today as ‘Vietnam syndrome’ ics of television, newspaper and other media coverage, was in earlier days - means the ability of dramatic televi- especially the relations between film, commentary and sion pictures of suffering to force Western governments’ text, in generating political impact. Television news pro- hands in the way they are presumed to have done in the grammes, no more than newspapers, are simple purveyors Kurdish case. of information and images. What is crucial is the narrative within which these two commodities are presented. Although predominantly visual media construct narratives The Kurdish case became the paradigm for the debate in different ways from those of textual media, the narra- about ‘humanitarian intervention’ which preoccupied tive is still king. The ability of news presenters to frame many international scholars in the early and middle years visual images and representations of actors is crucial to of the decade and returned at its end with the Kosova war. their power. Only when governments can more or less International relations has mostly been happy to take the define the narratives within which journalists operate can media’s role for granted, in order to concentrate on the they hope to manage coverage. forms of intervention it was presumed to have induced. The unexamined consensus about the ‘power’ of the me- First, we need to understand the role of increasing inter- dia in the Kurdish crisis of 1991 is that television was linkages of domestic and inter-state politics in global able to show shocking visual images of refugees’ suffer- politics. These are only partially and (compared to previ- ing, the transmission of which aroused public opinion and ous periods) less distinct fields within an increasingly forced the US and UK governments to change their poli- common world political framework (Rosenau, 1997). The cies. first mistake of Bush, John Major and other leaders, re- Anyway these images did not work by themselves. Their produced in many academic studies, was to believe that impact depended on two additional factors. First, the inter-state and domestic politics could be separated in the presence on the ground of authoritative reporters, able to Iraqi situation. In effect, they mistook the convenient fic- provide a first-hand gloss on the images which the cam- tion of national sovereignty for a description of political eras produced, was central. Secondly, the integration of reality. They intervened in the conflict of Iraq and Ku- both pictures and first-hand commentary into a general wait, apparently a straightforward inter-state conflict, narrative - elaborated more or less consistently over a only to find once they had succeeded in ‘resolving’ this period of weeks by anchorpeople and through voiceovers issue that behind it lurked the complex social and political as well as by the reporters on the ground - completed the conflicts ‘inside’ Iraq. These ‘internal’ conflicts con- process. In the final weeks before first the Major and then cerned, however, ethnic and religious groups which con- the Bush administrations made dramatic ‘U-turns’ to- nected across the borders into wards intervention in northern neighbouring states (Iran, Turkey Iraq. The power of this campaign and Syria) and so involved inter- made television the pivot of national as well as domestic poli- Western civil-society interven- tics. tions in general, mobilising both general public opinion and the Second, we need to start from the actions of other actors such as assumption that global politics as humanitarian organis ations. a whole is constantly mediated in However it also left the Kurds a a more or less common frame- walk-on role in their own salva- work. States like other actors re- tion, as they were reduced to quire sophisticated understandings pidgin-English soundbites call- of media if they are to comple- ing for help, their voices ment their political and military dwarved by the journalists’ own with media strategies - and with- much more articulate and elabo- out successful integration of me- rated arguments. dia with other strategies, the latter Indeed, the Kurdish crisis was an may also fail. So Iraqi military-political strategy failed almost unique conjuncture because of the investment of because it was based on an out -dated version of the Viet- Western media as well as military resources in Iraq, the nam syndrome - the belief that media would amplify US reaction of journalists against their subordinate role in the casualties to the point of withdrawal - which the US pre- managed military campaign, and the very direct nexus of empted. Coalition strategy was more successful in the responsibility which television was able to exp loit. These short term, but the second mistake of Bush and Major was factors have not operated in the same ways even in Pales- to believe that it was enough to successfully manage the tine, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti or Chechnya, in all media coverage of their planned military campaign. They of which large-scale global media coverage has occurred failed to foresee how the constant mediation of political and played a political role - let alone in the dozens events would move beyond the situation beyond the results of their planned campaign, and would thus rebound Politikon September-October

of wars around the world which have received minimal, episodic and generally unifluential coverage. Indeed, the Kosovo war of 1999 was closer than any other conflict to the conditions of the Iraqi wars of 1991. It ap- Chechnya peared, in its early stages at least, like a speeded-up, more concentrated version of the Gulf/Kurdistan crises. Here Not much can be said about media or public opinion the interstate conflict, of NATO and Serbia, was inextri- and the ongoing crisis in the Russian province of cably linked from the start with the genocide of the Kos- Chechnya. The Russian government has been left to ova Albanians (whereas in Iraq, the genocidal campaign its own devices in dealing with the independence seek- against the Kurds had followed the interstate war which ing rebels of Chechnya. They have succeded in many began over Kuwait). Here the nexus of responsibility im- senses at framing the Chechens as terrorist and blam- plicating the West in the fate of Albanian civilians was ing them for several bombings that have taken places present in the causes of intervention (rather than having to within Russian cities. Global Media has played a very be established by media against the Western state as in limited role in even bringing the Chechen wars to the Iraq). This connection of responsibility was deepened forefront discussion. Most striking are two front-page when Serbia responded to Western military action by in- “Corriere della Sera” pictures which showed the Chechen capital Grozny before and after the massive Russian bombing campaign. The “after“ picture showed the world a hol- lowed out version of the city, deso- lated and de- serted. The led to some mild public opinion that Putin should be com- pelled to end his campaign in Chechnya. How- ever, the West has seen some sys- temic interest in not crippling the viability of the Russian government and already- weakened economy by becoming directly involved. Were one to compare to the situation in the former tensifying its war against Kosovan civilians (similarly to Yugoslavia without taking into account the historical how ferocious repression of Shi’ites and Kurds followed power positions of the various nations, one would Western action against Iraq). quickly assume that the Western powers would have intevened on behalf of the Chechens. The clear difference between the conflict in Chechnya and Recent U. Media at War: The role played in the Kosovo crises S. and NATO intervention is the lingering respect for Russia, or more precisely a remembrance of a power- The Persian Gulf war had a specific narrative line, a pre- ful Soviet empire based in Moscow, following the real- cise schedule and an emphatic closure, leading some to ist paradigm; or it can be seen also as an effect of the suggest that the most appropriate metaphor for that war -- lack of interest played by the Western Media thus as experienced in the NATO Countries -- was "total tele- switching the discussion on the neo-realist theory. In vision." Perhaps a comparable metaphor for the war in my opinion both of them can be seen as consequences Yugoslavia is the World Wide Web. Not only was this the of the scarce interest from Westerns State s. first war covered online, but this war and the web Politikon September-October completely the channels of information, no readily dis- nopolized by the major television networks. Through re- cernible borders, no real sense of history and no sense of ports from other media sources, the U.S. learned that such closure, simply a chaotic, immanent, present. bombs went astray into neighboring countries, hit civilian I argue that complex issues of national identity affect the neighborhoods, took out commuter trains and destroyed government and media narratives of war, which in turn the Chinese embassy. Significantly, much of the informa- affect its public reception I examine the role of global tion about possible targets and mishaps of the U.S. weap- communication technologies as crucial vehicles for con- ons systems were first posted on the Web, and then veying the story of the war. The World Wide Web, in picked up by news organizations. This critical informa- particular, is both symptom and agent of changes in notion was available because, according to Web publishers tions of sovereignty, which underlie the apathetic recep- and media analysts, the war in Yugoslavia was the first tion of the war in Yugoslavia. The differences, however, armed conflict in which all sides had an active presence between the two wars in terms of narrative structure and on the internet. reception by the public reflect the changes in the Western Countries both economically and technologically in the The presence on the Web of accessible information from past decade. Global communication technologies – the all sides of the conflict contrasts sharply with the con- internet and particularly its graphical interface the World trolled coverage of Persian Gulf war. U.S. media cover- Wide Web -- made a crucial difference in the coverage age during the Gulf war was nearly monopolized by the and reception of the war in Yugoslavia. A spokesman for major television networks. Despite the access to multifac- the Air Force Print Service, which hosted a web site for eted and multiple narratives of the war, and despite exten- Air Force families put it this way, "Just as Desert Storm sive amounts of alternative press, the U.S. public re- was the catalyst for CNN, the Kosovo crisis will be the mained largely apathetic to the war in Yugoslavia. There stimulus for online news"(Verton:1999). In fact, because was no call for public support by the media or politicians, of the prominence of the Web during this time, this war as there was during the Persian Gulf war, and since no has been called by some media sources the first Internet ground troops had been committed, and most of the U.S. war and Web War I (Lynch: 1999). The sheer amount of citizens at risk were pilots high above the ground, the war information on the Web about the war in Yugoslavia was, remained a distant abstraction. Even before the ground in fact, overwhelming. A simple Boolean search with the troops had been sent in, the Persian Gulf war drew huge key words "Kosovo And war" on the search engine Alta crowds of supporters and protesters alike to almost every Vista found 3,831,464 Web pages. Monopolized by CNN major city in the U.S.; during the war in Yugoslavia such and other major television news stations, the Gulf war demonstrations were almost non-existent. Whereas thou- was spun as a televised spectacle of U.S. technological sands of protesters marched in Europe, protests in the U. might. The major networks constructed a tightly con- S. generally had only a handful of participants. trolled media narrative, reflective of the limited freedom Why this difference?American position, as e.g. with re- and information granted them by the U.S. government gard to the question of sending ground forces to Kosovo. and military. Rather than being publicly critical of such Here a certain concept of ‘Europe’ emerged during the limitations, however, the news media by and large chose war, one defined by a partial opposition to the United instead to celebrate the war as a triumph of U.S. technolo- States. The more general and essay-like articles on future gies – in particular, the "smart" weaponry. Because jour- visions of ‘Europe’ referred to a much wider concept, nalists were not allowed to enter the war zones and as which is rather an idea than a concrete political or geo- little alternative information was available, the exagger- graphical space. ated claims about the efficiency of the weapon systems went unchallenged. General Schwarzkopf could claim that Patriot Missiles were "100 percent effective" without Although only examining a limited time period, the cov- fear of repudiation. Later figures released would show the erage of Kosovo highlighted the differences that exist correct figure at less than six percent. Through reports between countries regarding the debate on the issue of from other media sources, the U.S. learned that such common security policy in Europe, ranging from quite bombs went astray into neighboring countries, hit civilian developed in France to barely existent in the UK. The neighborhoods, took out commuter trains and destroyed differences between countries regarding this aspect of the Chinese embassy. Significantly, much of the informa- integration do of course reflect historical differences and tion about possible targets and mishaps of the U.S. weap- traditions. It is also apparent that, in general, ‘national ons systems were first posted on the Web, and then security identity’ and policy has not yet given way to any picked ‘European’ equivalent. It is not really surprising that this up by news organizations. This critical information was would be the case. Even where there was debate on Euro- available because, according to Web publishers and me- pean security policy, it tended to be from a ‘national’ per- dia analysts, the war in Yugoslavia was the first armed spective, an example being the case of Italy, with the fo- conflict in which all sides had an active presence on the cus on Italian solutions to European problems. There is a internet(Lynch:1999). The presence on the Web of acces- sense that media coverage, whether reflecting elite opin- sible information from all sides of the conflict contrasts ion or political statements, allows for differing definitions sharply with the controlled coverage of Persian Gulf war. of what is ‘European’ and at what point it is appropriate U.S. media coverage during the Gulf war was nearly mo- to include the nation-state in this grouping. Politikon September-October

age was given to coverage of the troops. Hence the CFSP and a European dimension constituted an important ele- Conclusion ment in Italian coverage while the UK debates remained national or NATO-focussed. The reporting did not at- The 1990s have therefore ended as they began, with tempt to link explicitly the wider political and economic highly mediated wars of the Western state against geno- debates about European integration with events in the cidal nation-states. If anything, the intensity of mediation Balkans. The same failure to connect these events was increased, with the West in Kosovo c true of both The Times and The Guardian. The Balkans In order to answer to that question we should analyse the conflict was neither discussed nor reported in the wider role played by the Media in the European Countries. context of developments in the European Union, not least the implications of that conflict for common foreign and Kosovo Crisis and Media in Europe defence frameworks.

The Kosovo raised questions about peace and stability, A particular aspect of the Spanish media during this time, expansion of the EU towards the East and the future role which was more pronounced than in other countries was of NATO in Europe. All of these issues were important coverage of the Russian angle on the crisis due to Mos- background debates in the media during the crisis but the cow visits of the Spanish President Aznar. On French nature and depth of discussion varied between countries television a series of thirty to ninety-second news reports influenced by past traditions and alliances and also by on the TV primetime newscasts showed co-operation be-

current concerns and interests. tween, and possible divergences among, European leaders In Italy the conflict inspired debate about ‘the concepts of regarding Kosovo and examples of co-operation between ‘Europe’, ‘European integration’ and ‘European identity’ European soldiers. There was concern that Europe emerged in war news dealing with Europe’s role in the was playing second fiddle to the US within NATO, and crisis, with reference to the discussion of a ‘European that Kosovo illustrated the urgency of a common Euro- security identity’ and foreign policies.’ In both the Irish pean defence and security policy. and Swedish media the Kosovo war revolved around questions of neutrality. In general debates on CFSP were The German media reflected internal debates including apparent in all the quality press but severely lacking in heavy critique within the Green Party of the government Britain, the Scottish title, the Herald, being an exception. whose Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer is a member of There was some focus on the national role being played the Green Party. Many opponents of the war left the in the conflict, which in Italy referred to the Italian gov- Green Party, causing severe problems for the ernment’s peace proposals, while in Britain much cover- coalition. Politikon September-October

The government had to steer between this critical position and the ommitted from the start to ‘humanitarianism’, and Serbia more astute than Iraq in utilising world and Western media to influence the struggle. These experiences underline the need, ar- gued for in the first part of this essay, for an account of media in conflicts which is located in a larger understanding of the role of media more generally in global politics. This requires these issues to be taken out of the context of me dia studies and developed within international relations - but in an international theory which has been reconstructed so as to be able to encompass them.

*ASP Roma Luiss

REFERENCE LIST:

Carruthers, Susan L.: The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) Chomsky, Noam and Edward S. Herman.: Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (1988) Falk, Robert.: On Humane Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). Kaldor, Mary.: New and Old Wars: Organized Warfare in the Global Era (Cambridge: Polity, 1999). Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S.: Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Bo ston: Little Brown, 1977) Lynch, April: Kosovo being called first internet War (San Francisco Chronicle: April 15, 1999) Knightley, Philip: The First Casuality (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 1975) Rosenau, James N.: Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) Taylor, Philip M.: War and the Media (Manchester: Manchester Univeristy Press, 1992) Verton, Daniel: Kosovo Brings Barrage of Web Activity (Federal computer Week April 12, 1999)

On the net: www.corriere.it www.repubblica.it www.cnn.com www.lemondediplomatique.fr www.bbc.com www.berlinermorgenpost.de www.delt.de www.guardian.co.uk www.heraldtribune.com www.times.com www.elpais.es Politikon September-October

Popular party)are only aggregate of national parties. This is not how the system works, and European members of Parliament know it. EU parties must be reformed starting becoming real parties, proposing political programmes and then trying to start an Europeanisation of their queries, of their pro- By Giuliano Gennaio*—ASP Roma Luiss gramme, of their interests. Now, it seems that EU parties are only good final re- A Response to Benjamin Zyla sources for national interests. - Author of the article "European Party jungle.. Trans- Before leaving peculiar topic anyway i would like to national parties: a European Meander?" published in write the last small comment on Mr Zyla's article. Politikon-1st Issue-. Mr Zyla, according to me, mistaken the basic assumption of the debate. He said: EU parties can not be Trans- In the first issue of this journal, Benjamin Zyla, which I national parties cause the are not even parties. consider a good debate-friend of mine, launched a ques- I would suggest to change the basic assumption ( and tion that I can not leave it unanswered. from now I will use this new assumption: Are European Parties 1) European parties In this article: Trans -national parties? are not parties but they He promptly answered · A Response to Benjamin Zyla will when the EU gains to this question with · Are "EU parties" parties? a political identity. "NO", giving his rea- · The Globalisation process: New Demands and the 2) Trans- national sons and explaining change in the political system. parties are globalise that European Parties · The International Institutions parties. can not be parties in the · The need for Trans-national parties "conventional" sense · Trans-national party and the Global Governance Since the first point has cause : already been discussed, we will go on the sec- 1) they do not fulfil ond point presenting a one of the Weberian criteria (methodological, ab- general background first. stract criteria) to recognise a party 2) they do not have a milieu where supporters and vot- The Globalisation process: ers have grown up New Demands and the change in the political system 3) they do not recruit their political personal from the This second assumption is today very important. EU but from national levels, following national par- Globalisation of cultures, markets and so on is taking ties and national political interests. place world wide, nowadays. Someone fights this process, someone else debates on it, Moreover Mr.Zyla stressed that the point that EU parties some try to understand it. do not for a government but they have only a consultative We live in a globalise Western world which is going to status. diversificate people queries in one hand but which is go- In this way EU parties become only "Interest associations ing to concentrate all the protest movements on the other of people, but also of companies, other interest groups, hand. scientific staff and so on. But they are not parties in the We therefore have different levels to be discussed by original sense" politicians in according with the Civil Society, the busi- And again, "EU parties are parties of clients, but not par- ness world and the international institutions ties of a huge amount of members". Political parties did not fit in this new reality yet. They did not react to Seattle protesters, to the decisions of I dear say: wow! International organisation or to the reform of the United Mr.Zyla started trying to understand whether EU parties Nations. are Trans-national parties and ended up concluding that They do not have a well structured political response yet. EU parties are not even parties "in the original sense". Events run very fast and political bureaucratic parties Wow! could not find space for understanding what was happening. Are "EU parties" parties? Right now, they are behaving like historians: They let the I am fine with the explanation given by Mr Zyla and I events happen, they write on them and then, finally, they think that there is something true in what he said. study them. EU parties are not parties YET, but they will be when the Most parties today are not able to follow the different EU reform (asked by several members) will be imple- queries coming from all over the world: digital divide, mented. environmental problems, direct democracy, Eco- Still, consensus is missing, recruitment at an European capitalism, New Economy, Internet society, Global level also and moreover EU parties (like the European governance, future of economy, debts of the third Politikon September-October world; Globalisation, in short. (the Market of political ideas on supra-national level). Why they did not react? Because they have never hap- Parties run on the Trans-national level for elections, re- pened to find theirselves in this problem and they have cruiting elites and try to aggregate the will of people". never gained the necessary experience to handle these demanding. I like this definition very much, but I guess something is National levels were enough....Why loosing time with missing or, maybe, something is added that shall not be Inter and Supra- national queries? taken into consideration right now: the focus on domestic But nowadays, today's world requires new politics and politics. new politics can b implemented neither by European par- This is something that today's parties already do and to ties not by National based parties. limit the idea of Trans-national parties on the capacity to We need new political subjects. focus on national and supra-national level is absurd. Instead, the idea to let Trans-national parties recruit elites, The International Institutions participate at supranational level to elections and articu- At the basic of the need for Trans-national parties there is late the will of people, is definitely right. the today situation of the Kaos surrounding international This is one of the goals foe all parties categories and I organisations. think a Trans-national party shall do that. NATO, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, WTO, So the point I do not agree with is the focus on domestic and a lot more- including the UN reform- are today ac- politics. cused not to be democratic and not to respect other than What kind of party, indeed, could be coherent with its business companies interests and multicorporates needs. politics intra and extra nation? The Seattle Movement, that i would call a "Say No" How to reconcile the interest on national economy and Movement cause is more abrogative that propositive, put the new one on European level? new queries in the table and nobody risks to deny the im- How to solve the infrastructure problem of a country portance to have a constructive dialog with this new plat- starting from the International arena? form cause they are strong. They are strong, and in some way, Trans-national. These and much more are the problems that we can en- They can be the pre-movement in fieri that can bring us counter speaking about one organisation( a party) for both to Trans-national parties.; but first they need to get rid of national and international lelvel. Marxism, Catholicism and left wings radicalism. So far, this kind of System already works with the Radi- International institutions are today a huge effort of gov- cal party or the International Socialist organisations. ernments to create a global governance, where Trans- But this is not what I mean; I foresee a system where na- national interests can be decided at International levels. tional parties serve only to national (and above all local) What is wrong today is that, whether in one hand there is interests not entering the international queries that have to the willingness for Trans-national politics, on the other be faced, instead, by elites elected by all citizens. Of the hand instead they do not risk to loose sovereignty. world, using the Internet system and with the interaction International institutions are the proto governments of the of civil society, business companies, trans-national par- future, but they are still uncompleted. ties, customers organisations and international govern- Indeed they are bureaucratic, concerning the organisa- ments- the United Nations. tional structure and national-interest-based, concerning A renewed form of corporativism , get rid of fascist ideas the best practices. and free from totalitarian aspects of life. Moreover, Multinational companies rule thiese organisa- Consociativism mixed to corporativism helped by the tions making this world cynical and a-solidaristic. Internet in order to be efficient and quick. Trans-national parties must be actors of the decisional The need for Trans-national parties system and they would the consultants, the experienced Therefore, we arrive at the basic part of this essay: the bodies. need for Trans-national parties. So, giving a defintion: This long introduction was necessary to explain my ideas A Trans-national party is a party that articulate and aggre- to the extend of a new system based on multiple choices gate interests, wills and political views at an international and different political systems. level, participating of the interaction with other forms of We have to go back to the general assumption made active politics; parties which elects the Global govern- above: Trans-national parties are globalise parties; and we ment during International elections. have to demonstrate it. Moreover we need a definition of Trans-national party, Trans-national party and the Global Governance the background in which Trans-national party can be The only organisation that can be reformed towards a fixed and their future role in the civil society. Trans-national party system is the United Nation which A definition: government will be elected by citizens of the world in Mr Zyla, in his article, defined Trans-national parties as International campaigns and where the first actor to follow: choose elites and candidates are Trans-national parties. "Parties that do not focus only on the domestic politics, but further on, focus on the International political Market *[email protected] Politikon September-October

By Mihai Varga, APSS The most common form of direct involvement The comparison with the situation before the is, of course, the electoral process. A mature strata of citi- changes that occurred 11 and 12 years ago is one the first zens capable of analyzing and choosing between political thing that comes in mind once the term “civic participa- offers, measured by how flexible the party system became tion” is used in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) after the changes at the beginning of the 90’s, is probably context. And understanding the political institution as the what most people associate with “civic participation” *. field of activity where State and parties meet greatly adds Direct involvement is linked to the extent at to this perspective. Of course, as everyone which the state allows it’s citizens to knows, during the socialist regimes in the enter or to use it’s very structures and CEE countries, the State and the party thus to have an important role in influen- meant the same: both in what concerns the cing key-decisions: as a criteria for indi- recruitment procedures and sources and cating civic participation, direct involve- the decision-making process. Yet, starting ment has to be measured also according with the early ‘90s, the region underwent to the objectiveness by which the State impressive political changes – due to both recruits it’s personnel or by the number the nations’ desire to escape their past and of legislative initiatives (such as changes their efforts to join the European Union in the Constitution) directly supported and the Atlantic Alliance. The question by the citizens**. regarding the civic participation’s role in the changes that occurred during the last Other examples of civic participation are decade has its importance: if civic partici- related to the independence of some key pation played a negative part, or if it became less present components of the democratic societal system, such as the during the last years, it would mean that all reforms were press and the non-governmental sector. Of course, in or- carried out only due to the will of a politically influential der for these to be real indicators of the level of civic par- minority, supported by the West’s financial aid and ticipation, they have to be independent, influent in the know-how. The current essay aims to show what were the decision-making process and, above all, representative. most common forms of civic participation in the region, and, most of all, how efficient they were. Being representative is, unfortunately, only rarely the case of the press in many of the CEE countries. Forms of civic participation The press might even reflect on short term periods trends and opinions contrary to the majority’s or to it’s main Civic participation is defined by the existence body of readers point of view, with one reason for this of two dimensions: involvement on the one hand, and being the role that private ownership of big media trusts integration on the other. As for the current discussion, plays in the content of many newspapers: It also often involvement refers to the citizen’s will to participate, whi- happens that such giant trusts are controlled by foreign le integration acts on the more objective level of the investors, only certain points of view being allowed to be society’s extent to which it allows participation. It also published in the newspapers. This is the case of Yogosla- has to be mentioned that including the State and the party via and, at a lower extent, of Romania. But other regions system in the category of political institutions doesn’t fill also face this issue: In Poland, 56% of national publica- in for the definition: The political institution is defined by tions and 50% of the regional ones are owned by German the existence of a statute, the targeting of a social need, enterprises. the public area as the place for all activities and the decision-making process as the key for answering the aforementioned social need. Keeping these traits in mind, we can move on to taking a closer look at some examples of civic participation, starting with direct involvement.

*: The second half of the 90’s brought some political changes in Poland which prove to some extent that the electorate is capable and interested in changing it’s political choices: the end of president’s Walesa mandate and the confirmation of A. Kwasniewski, the overall complexity of the party system (compared to that in other CEE countries) are some of the clues of a strong system. **: The Romanian Liberal Party claims it collected some 600.000 signatures (1999-2000) in support to its plan to change the Constit ution. Politikon September-October

fluence by being represented trough organizations, even if As for the NGO sector, in most of the CEE not in the form of unions: it’s the case of the Slovenian countries it is probably more representative than indepen- Agricultural Association and the Farmers’ Party in Po- dent. During the recent years, local branches were sup- land, or the Yugoslav Otpor movement. Many of these ported with huge amounts of money by their mostly We- organizations first started as NGOs, later transforming stern mother-organizations*, these branches distributing their structures in order to become political parties. The afterwards the money among other NGOs. Still, this fact influence of such organizations has always been linked to doesn’t necessarily prove the lack of independence of the their level of representation, disappearing as soon as they CEE civil society, nor the extent at which Western orga- lost the support of their public, as seen in Romania in the nizations control the CEE non-profit sector: it is more the case of the Students’ League. But once they ensured that sign of the low self-sustainability of Central and Eastern they would be truly representative, such organizations got European organizations. enough power as to leave the non-governmental sector Developing civic participation. From trade u- and try to take part in the decision-making process. Still, nions to parties this isn’t the mainstream trend among parties from CEE countries. Parties are usually established on their adhe- All examples reflect the rate of the citizens’ sion to different ideologies more than on the representa- interest in politics and their support and confidence for tion of a specific part of the public. Once the ideology has the present political systems, while the aforementioned been selected, parties try to gain the support of the electorate is one of the best ways to understand civic participa- rate that would benefit the most from supporting these tion nowadays. The forms of civic participation changed a ideologies, the setback consisting of the fact that the pu- lot during the recent years: at the end of 1989, the fall of blic and even party members hardly know what the offi- communism due to the support received by dissidents cial doctrine is about. Instead, parties, founding their ac- from the population was a great example of civic partici- tions on representing only certain groups (such as parties pation. But since a certain level of stability was achieved supported by trade unions or founded by professional/ in most CEE countries, civic participation changed, and ethnic/religious groups), definitely have a more stable the above-mentioned examples are signs of a different electorate – even if never as big as in the case of standard reality that the one that produced the events at the begin- parties. Yet the electorate’s size disadvantage was often ning of the ‘90s**. The involvement of citizens is still surmounted by establishing coalitions or pressure groups present, although not as direct as it was a few years ago. influent enough as to determine politics in countries such Nowadays the concept evolved also in the CEE region as Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. from direct involvement to including a strong element of representation. In order to illustrate this, we have to take a The unions: a question of perception closer look at organizations influent enough as to deter- As to the importance of building strong trade unions mine the decision-making process while still maintaining inside the CEE countries, few people actually still believe ties to certain parts of the population, ca- in it (among them, the author of the pable of supporting and backing their ac- article). It is hard to tell whether or not tions. The first type of such organizations trade unions are still regarded, by the that comes in mind is trade unions. majority of the vast CEE public, as one They’re present in many CEE countries, of the last signs of a long-gone and in some cases they have kept their “communist” tradition. Still, it is known influence (as most of them continue struc- that in some cases, as in the Czech tures established during the socialist regi- Republic, Hungary, Romania and even mes), while improving their level of repre- Poland (despite of the Solidarnosc’s sentation***. Yet other evolutions also great example), an important part of the occurred: in Yugoslavia, trade unions are intellectual elite still portrays the trade powerless, while inside the Baltic States they lost most of unions in a negative way. Trade unions have been made their influence. responsible But other professional groups also gained in- *: Between 1995 and 1996, a violent debate started regarding a governmental legislative initiative targeting the sources of NGO- funding in Slovakia. NGOs responded by regrouping around The Third Sector association and initiating protests. **: Civic participation in the form of public meetings and demonstrations is not yet extinct: recent demonstrations in Yugoslavia during the last year, which led to the fall of Milosevic and his regime, and the “miners’ raids” in the spring of 1999 in Romania are two examples of the same category. An interesting fact regarding these two examples is the position of the media and the NGO sector: during the events on the 5 th of October in Yugoslavia the NGO sector was one of the initiators, while some of the national publications and all of the foreign ones supported the demonstrations; in Romania, the “miners’ raids” were condemned by both Romanian and foreign press and the NGO sector. ***: This is the case of Romania, where unions evolved to one of the greatest forces the government has to deal with when implement- ing its policies. But trade unions are present and influent also in Poland, event though the workers’ level of readiness to strike dropped, in Hungary (although more active in the health care and educational systems rather than among workers) and in the Czech Re- public (21% of the employees are members in trade unions). Politikon September-October for scarring off the investors (in Romania), for slowing scene is often depicted in terms resembling to the situa- down reforms and for harboring some of the last tion of Mafia controlled unions during the 30’s in the U- remaining “commie nests”. Their alleged link to the nited States. socialist past and their image as “workers’ movements” is shaping their future in a negative manner. But trade Yet corruption represents a problem common to unions don’t necessarily represent workers, some of the the entire Eastern European society, whit the lack of tran- biggest Eastern unions being movements of teachers and sparency regarding the fund-raising procedures inside the health care employees*. And, strengthening this sector party system being a far greater problem then the one has its advantages: trade unions are on the one hand, more faced by trade unions. As any other organizations, trade closer to their voters, as they are smaller and with a unions are increasingly harder to control: once they beco- mission better understood (by their public) then parties, me larger, the leading elite of the structure tends to beco- and, on the other hand, they’re interested more in me more independent, meaning that it starts looking out efficiently representing their backers** than in gaining rather after it’s own interests, than after the ones of the political power. So that the following question becomes entire organization***. Still, problems such as these, are, inevitable: How many of the Central and Eastern as proved by Robert Michels, common to all democra- European countries focused on rebuilding this sector and cies, and they should be addressed by legislative measu- how many of them actually want to? res tackling corruption and improving the level The answer is that even if they of transp arency regarding procedures inside or- wouldn’t be lacking the will to do so, ganizations and especially funding from outside. such tasks would nowadays seem Civic participation and political culture impossible to achieve – remaining successful trade unions in the CEE Having tried to determine what are the ways by countries are, almost all of them, which civic participation nowadays influences present in state-owned companies and the development of the public institution, two state-controlled structures such as the new questions arise: health care and the educational The first one refers to what influences civic systems. Supporting the development participation, while the second one deals with of trade unions inside private-owned how the political institution developed (due to companies is regarded by all the civic participation) in the Central and Eastern countries of the region as suicidal: it European countries. would mean the destruction of the fragile Eastern European economies, When addressing the first question, a key role due to a massive retreat of the foreign should be given to the existing mind-set in each investors to more cooperative Third World countries. country and, of course, to the civic education and culture****. The society in some countries might be shaped as But it isn’t just the CEE countries’ fear about to forbid the civic participation of larger groups*****, the trade unions potential of scarring off investors and while tradition and mentality might also be contrary to the sabotaging reforms that’s keeping them from supporting citizens’ rate of involvement******. Still, the present such movements: detractors of the idea of Eastern Euro- situation in most of the CEE countries proves that civic pean trade unions point out at the high level of corruption participation did it’s job in backing the democratic politi- that’s plaguing the trade unionist scene. Trade unions cal system, starting with the events which took place in leaders often tend to use their power and influence in or- 1989 and finishing with the more recent situation in Yu- der to obtain personal benefits, while they’re especially goslavia. vulnerable to bribery and extortion – as they are left to establish their own hierarchy inside their organizations. While these facts can not be denied, the trade unionist *: Compared to other countries, especially strong in Hungary and Romania. **: Sometimes, leaders of trade unions even choose the way of personal sacrifice: in Romania, the leader of the Tepro Iasi Union (representing thousands of workers from Iasi) was murdered after he refused to cope with the corrupt governmental representatives and foreign Czech investors controlling the Tepro Industrial platform. ***: It a process similar to the one described by Mr. Robert Michels in his book “Political Parties” (Les Partis politiques. Bibliothèque de philosophie scientifique, Paris, Flammarion, 1914), an essay on the oligarchic tendencies of democratic organizations such as parties. ****: Focus and Eurobarometer surveys claim having identified a low amount of civic culture among Slovaks, which should explain the polarization of political forces during the mid ’90s. But such “facts” are questionable: why should Slovaks have less civic culture than Poles or any other neighboring nation? *****: For instance, studies showed that the tribal structure of Albanian society played it’s part in the country’s development, including in the citizens support rate for any other initiatives other than the ones using traditional channels. ******: In Poland, surprisingly, NGOs are seen as “social-funds-consumers” or as groups lobbying only for stronger financial support, in spite of the large size of the NGO sector. Surveys such as Focus or Eurobarometer explain the existing negative attitude towards NGOs in relationship to the country’s socialist past. Politikon September-October

Many claimed that these structures were the most dange- As to the second question, once the former so- rous for the civic participation, and that it was mainly the cialist regimes were abolished in the CEE countries, the Western pressure to protect the democratization process political institution evolved in a less obvious manner. The that kept the CEE countries on the track leading to EU participation of the citizens although not anymore as di- integration. And to a certain extent they’re right: although rect as in 1989, played its part more or less in supporting the population supported both NATO and EU integration control activities of the political institution initiated by and the democratization process, it lacked the experience the press or the NGO sector. But, most probably, the fact needed to support democracy. The citizens had the will to that governments didn’t need any more uprisings to re- participate in uprisings (as seen in 1989) and to support fresh their memory on how the socialist regimes ended*, political changes (as shown in recent polls such as Euro- had the most significant role. barometer and Focus), but not the knowledge of the new Integrating the civic participation political and economic institutions – which is understan- dable due to the speed of the changes. The reader probably already understood from Summing things up, the idea is that on the one the article’s general tone that it supports the idea that ci- hand, civic participation can not exist without the state’s vic participation alone wouldn’t have had succeeded in permission. On the other hand, there’s no civic participa- protecting and developing the a- tion if there isn’t any civic culture, chievements of the last decade, and it is the role of the democratic without the support of strong e- state to support the development of xternal factors. The political elite civic culture, which in the end will that carried out the reforms in ensure that it’s political institutions most of the CEE countries, al- work correctly. The West did a lot in though both backed, selected and taking the pressure of having to deve- controlled trough civic participa- lop civic culture off the shoulders of tion, would have accomplished far CEE governments, yet its help focu- less without Western help. And sed only on the situation in some of even the existing rate of civic par- the former socialist countries: just as ticipation is an effect of the We- on the economic level, in this case stern efforts to prevent the CEE also different levels of civic participa- states from blocking civic initiati- tion might draw new lines of reclu- ves. Now, it is obvious that after the fall of communism, sion in the East***. there were no structures in any of the ex-socialist countries strong enough to stop the government from returning to non-democratic procedures of exerting power. Of course, immediately after the fall of communism, most of the newly established democracies were run by revolutiona- Bibliography: ries, mainly dissidents strongly attached to the values of democracy. But only few of these leaders knew how to “Central and Eastern Europe on the Way into the Euro- deal with the crucial economic and financial issues their pean Union”, by Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), 1997 countries faced, and they were soon replaced by more “Focus” Eastern European surveys, 1990-1999. experienced people**. Also on the lower levels of the “Eurobarometer”, 1990-1999. state’s structures and administration, few of the former Michels, Robert: “Les Partis politiques”, Bibliothèque de communist bureaucrats were changed, simply because philosophie scientifique, Paris, Flammarion, 1914 there was no one experienced enough to be replaced with.

*: Except for Romania, where one government was overthrown by a miner uprising in 1991, with the last out of the 6 miner revolts taking place as late as 1999. **: These people were regarded as “former communists”: it seemed to be the fate of any left -wing party to be regarded, especially by the media, as “former communist”. Yet, since all parties, including right-wing ones, had among their ranks former members of the Communist Party from their countries, the choice of words seems unfortunate. Anyway, the point is that the political class wasn’t pre- pared to face civic participation (especially in the form of media) in a democratic way (due to the fact that it had been brought up during socialism), and it took years until it learned to do so. ***: How can we compare the Czech Republic or “sunny” Slovenia with the grim realities of the year’s 2000 Ukraine? A journalist was beheaded after accusing the president of corruption, but after strong protests supported by al large part of Kiev’s population, president Leonid Kuchma is still on duty.

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AMSTERDAM ÅRHUS BELGRADE BERN BREMEN BUCHAREST BUDAPEST CAPE TOWN CLUJ- NAPOCA DAR-ES -SALAAM DEBRECEN HELSINKI ISTANBUL LEIDEN LIJUBLJANA MISKOLC OSLO RE- YKJAVIK ROME TURKU UPPSALA