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Home , Federal republic, Guido Westerwelle, Joachim Gauck

US – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES NUMBER 55 June 6, 2014

The Berlin : An Independent faces the 21st Century Jonathan Laurence

With the era of Germany’s role as For decades after the end of the second World receding into history, the Federal War, the Federal Republic of Germany, with Republic has steadily gained in confidence as its capital, was known as a “semi- and assertiveness. It is growing into its large sovereign” . Its defining traits – shoes, acting less beholden to traditional corporatism, , strong institutional veto expectations and engaging in more points – habituated German to independent reasoning. Germany’s recovery cooperation at both subnational and of self-confidence is leading to the gradual international levels – from the federal discernment of its unique role in world affairs. To through the European Union (EU) paraphrase Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Sikorski, Germany’s friends and allies need not treaties. Germany’s “reflexively multilateral” fear its “inaction” and should begin the foreign policy gained the trust of fellow learning process of how to engage Germany Europeans and the rest of the world in record on its own terms. This winter’s venting of time. Moreover, it accomplished this all while transatlantic dissatisfaction is healthier than the under Allied occupation. The contribution to alternative of festering silence. What was true international security came from its economic about European integration also goes for and monetary stability – and by hosting troops transatlantic relations. The era of “integration- and weapons. West German ballast kept a by-stealth” is past, so the case for cooperation divided Europe on an even keel. needs to be made directly to Congress, the and to the German and US publics. This role was sometimes deferential, but it was never apolitical: postwar foreign policy has existed in a state of perpetual tension between Jonathan Laurence is an Associate the two World Wars’ seemingly contradictory Professor of political science at Boston College and Nonresident Senior Fellow in lessons: “Nie wieder Krieg” (“never again war”) Foreign Policy at Brookings. He is the on the one hand, and “Nie wieder Auschwitz,” author of numerous articles, essays, and on the other. Indeed, in Chancellor Angela books including, most recently, The Merkel’s speeches on the EU campaign trail Emancipation of Europe's Muslims. and before the US Chamber of Commerce in May, she emphasized this year’s 100th and 75th

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anniversaries of the starts of those two wars, September 7, 2014: The 20th Anniversary of both as a way of prefacing her Ukraine policy German and to explain Germany’s cautious stance towards military options – what former Foreign One date that the Chancellor left out from her Minister Guido Westerwelle called a “culture of recitation of round anniversaries this year is the military restraint.” moment when the Berlin Republic arguably began: Merkel was a junior minister in Helmut This belies a critical new development: German Kohl’s fourth cabinet on the rainy September governments in the 21st century will be much day in 1994 when American and Allied troops more likely to question the judgment calls of marched through the Gate for their friends’ military deployment, fiscal policy, the last time and the US army shut down its sanctions regimes, and, of course, intelligence Berlin headquarters. That was also the first time community practices – issues that they German troops paraded through the same previously considered outside their remit. gate since the Nazi era. Despite ’s role German politicians now recognize that their in liberating Berlin, the Allies did not coordinate power has increased relative to European with the Russians and had its own military partners, and their evaluation of American parade one week earlier. In 1990, a quarter of power is ever more nuanced. This reassessment a million US troops occupied . concerns basic questions like: why should we Their formal withdrawal – and Germany’s leave Africa to the French? Part of Germany’s recovery of full territorial integrity and charm, it has come to realize, is that there are sovereignty – dates back only 20 years. This ample roles to be played just by the default took place at the same time that official good fortune of not being either France or the blueprints of redesigned Berlin as capital city US! were unveiled: the prideful expression of independence regained. The world should expect to hear a more vocal expression of Germany’s national interests The ’s move to Berlin opened a around the globe – trade, regional stability and new parenthesis of German foreign policy. It – and of its strong commitment to has been a period of coming-of-age for unified the international legal order. This past winter and unoccupied Germany. Both before and witnessed the busiest frenzy of internal German after the return to Berlin, the governments of debate over which leading politician could , Gerhard Schröder and Angela articulate the most robust vision of how to use Merkel have each given Germany’s partners a German power to help shape the world order different idea of what “normal” German in its own image. But it is easy to get carried foreign policy looks like. Each of them rooted away with the headlines and personality Germany further in European and transatlantic clashes: Is Merkel 3.0 truly a different foreign communities, and each has shown policy animal than her earlier incarnations? Or, commitment to remembering and learning do the restraints that Germany places on itself lessons from German history that can apply to conspire to keep it artificially “small,” as today’s world. President Joachim Gauck put it in his Reunification Day speech last year? Although Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, chairman of this is the third governing coalition led by the Munich Security Conference, has said that Chancellor Merkel, she is only the 2nd Federal Secretary Henry Kissinger’s old question about Chancellor to rule from Berlin and not Bonn. Europe’s phone number has been answered: it

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starts with +49-30 (the country and city codes rather than specific outcomes. Regardless of for Berlin). For example, in 1990-91, Chancellor policy preferences, the US cannot ask more of Kohl’s government financed over 12% of the the Bundestag than German governments do: costs of the Desert Storm military intervention in safeguards are safeguards. As the differences Kuwait – and it signed away the beloved in opinion become both subtler and potentially Deutsche Mark at Maastricht later that year in more obstructive, the transatlantic relationship the name of European unity. Chancellor should be gauged not by the alignment of Schröder’s coalition sent forces to fight in opinions but rather by the mutual ability to and Afghanistan – and its finance understand and restate the other’s position ministry was flexible about the entry criteria for without caricature. Going from “Partnership” to the original Eurozone countries (the ministry “Zweckgemeinschaft” (or a goal-oriented required a bit of flexibility itself). Chancellor alliance) need not be a demotion. Indeed it Merkel, for her part, has maintained her can even lead to more ambitious objectives. decade-long commitment to Afghanistan – and she has overseen the transfer of hundreds It is possible to discern an active, moral, of billions of Euros to keep the common frequently generous and risk-taking German currency afloat. And yet, Berlin does not foreign policy in the past two decades. The participate fully in all of the transatlantic country is still finding its voice and footing, discussions because it takes certain options off learning to align those instincts with its the table. For its critics, Germany still skirts the significant human and capital resources. But controversial line between “military restraint” Germany already makes a unique contribution and occasional “failure to render assistance.” to international security; it is not a free-rider nation. Of course, there are very few German Germans and Americans have very high voices that would like to shape public opinion expectations of each other because of the towards military intervention per se. It was intimate relationship engendered by military President Obama, not Chancellor Merkel, who occupation and common interests. Despite the noted during their press conference that shared history, it is unrealistic to gaze across the German aircraft were patrolling the Baltics Atlantic at each other and expect to see a while Russian troops massed on the Ukrainian mirror image. To rise and fall with each different border. But that is the reality in the position, to sigh in disappointment at each background: nearly 5,000 Bundeswehr soldiers point of asymmetry or to focus on tabloid are deployed worldwide. This does not change stories of the moment does not do justice to Germany’s aversion to military solutions. The the relationship’s depth and breadth. And it government platform states that the kinetics of prevents more efficient institutionalization and its foreign policy remain “diplomacy, peaceful routinization of cooperation and exchange. conflict resolution and development cooperation.”1 Germans understand war to be It is obvious but worth stating that “what the US literally the last resort. Even to rattle one’s saber wants” from Germany must be concordant is to acknowledge that all other options have with what Germans want – and with the already failed. outcomes produced by German institutions that have significant safeguards against executive power – and against haste in general. The two countries’ relationship should 1 2013 CDU, CSU, SPD Coalition Agreement, p.168, naturally emphasize process and engagement http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/koalitionsvertrag1 36.pdf

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On the one hand, Germany has said “No, spectator” of world affairs. These words were thanks” to some of its closest allies’ cherished spoken in the context of coalition negotiations proposals of military intervention in , , and it is safe to say the government took up Mali and Syria. And it has proceeded with its President Gauck’s challenge. The legislative own sovereign pace and methodology in program and cabinet of activist rivals have managing the Eurocrisis, the banking crisis, as been articulating what that international role well as the current situation between Russia could look like, with a cabinet composed of and the Ukraine. Yet on the other hand, the Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Ursula Von der same German coalitions have provided Leyen in diplomacy and defense matters as reassurance about the country’s orientation: well as Wolfgang Schäuble on the economic Germans have suffered casualties in Kosovo front. and Afghanistan in the name of the alliance and shared values, and have repeatedly The coalition agreement’s segment on foreign come to the Euro’s rescue at great individual policy was titled “Germany’s Responsibility in expense. the World” – a very different tone from 2005’s grand coalition goals of “being in the service of Merkel 3.0 peace.”2 According to the document, Germany will now “actively help shape the So what will be Germany’s global role: on global order” with a strong independent role which side of this ledger will it spend most of its and through the use of EU instruments. On the time? Specific strengths will guide the broad topic of military instruments and capacity, the outlines of its foreign policy. Germany is a agreement speaks not only of “crisis leading exporter to war-torn countries of prevention,” but also of “participation in instruments of the rule of , individual rights, conflicts. In late January and early February, a and the administration of interior, justice and concerted effort followed to preemptively lay defense ministries – and of substantial the groundwork, to build public support for a shipments of weapons. It has an active network larger German role in the world. of NGOs and para-public associations across the developing world that serve as brokers and Once in office, everything happened very bridge-builders. The country’s statesmen and quickly. Within the space of a week and a half, stateswomen play the role of moral every transatlanticist with a Twitter account conscience on the world stage – even outside was trumpeting that “Germany is back.” The their turf: See, for example Martin Schulz’s old reunification slogan – “Wir sind wieder wer” musings in the Knesset in February, or Joachim (“We’re someone again”) – seemed more Gauck’s comments on Turkish politics in Ankara relevant than ever. This winter, the Policy in April. This is not limited to speeches: Germany Planning unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is seeking leadership of the UN Human Rights and the speechwriting office at President Council to give its views a higher profile. Gauck’s Schloss Bellevue went into overdrive. The two most clamorous arrivals to the new Merkel 3.0 has given these familiar positions cabinet, the foreign and defense ministers, more teeth. The German stance goes beyond “shook up” their ministries – to the extent a “respecting” international law and comes German minister can – by bringing along closer to “enforcing” it. This began with President Gauck’s comments in fall 2013 about 2 2005 CDU, CSU, SPD Coalition Agreement, p. 125, how Germany could not afford to be “a mere http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/CDU/Koalitionsver traege/Koalitionsvertrag2005.pdf

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controversial advisors and reorganizing Washington in May, siding with her foreign priorities. Steinmeier and Von der Leyen traded minister and saying she would reconsider all criticism over Africa and Ukraine policies, sanctions after Ukrainian elections. Merkel’s aiming for the right balance of activism and cool expression of sovereignty under heated caution. pressure from Washington, and her faith in the places into perspective the crude President Gauck’s second major speech on question of “what it would take” for the German foreign policy at the Munich Security German government to add sharper sanctions Conference on January 31 coincided with a against Russian financial and energy nodes. window of opportunity to put this new activist From the German perspective, raising threats approach to work. The government sent and “all options” are not always deterrents – trainers to Mali and began to destroy Syrian their very mention can escalate crises. In that chemical weapons in Münster (something the way, the German reaction to more sanctions previous foreign minister said would be echoes the transatlantic and intra-European impossible). The new government has also debate about arming the Syrian opposition. showcased its talent for brokerage: Facilitating Escalation pushes parties further away from Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s exit from Russia, Berlin negotiating table – which is precisely where also hosted the president of the Central African Germany feels most at ease – and towards the Republic and Ukrainian opposition politicians at zone of war, where it is the least comfortable. key moments. Unilateralism, German The “Munich Moment” was a short honeymoon: just four weeks after President Germany’s other “global roles” are at the heart Gauck’s speech3 on “Germany’s role in the of EU and European Economic and Monetary world… based on values and human rights…,” Union (EMU) institutions. The same confidence the Ukrainian government rejected more EU in rule-based institutions has driven Germany’s integration, and protesters gathered at Maidan response to the Eurozone and banking crises. Square – setting in motion a crisis that has Here, however, the German logic from the severely tested this new activist stance. The realm of international security is turned on its timing is significant because it shattered the head, and we see a very different side of the consensus that had begun to build around out- country’s so-called “reluctant .” of-area deployment, notably in Africa, which suddenly was the less controversial topic – and In the Eurozone, as with the banking union, replaced it with the older debate about ironically, the Germans try to avoid the NATO’s and EU borders and the relationship “negotiating tables” they espouse in with Russia. diplomatic contexts. This is sound reasoning – keep others guessing while holding the Euro This left only the defense minister still beating a together and trying not to foster moral hazard drum of activism – which almost ended badly among spendthrift governments. German with the hostage taking of German military participation in Brussels rulemaking is still taking observers in Donetsk. But Chancellor Merkel place within a “pro-European” framework. But settled the cabinet debate during her visit to the adjective “European” means something different in French than it does in German, and 3 http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/ there is a risk of growing opinion gaps in that Reden/DE/Joachim-Gauck/Reden/2014/01/140131- crucial relationship as well. Germans are now Muenchner-Sicherheitskonferenz.html

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the greatest enthusiasts of the Euro (72% National? This scenario is not science fiction. It approve compared to 44% of Italians) and are first happened in the first round of the 2002 also the only Eurozone country where a presidential elections, when Jean-Marie Le Pen majority (85%) agreed that “the economy is beat out Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. It took somewhat/very good.”4 French opinion has place again this March with the FN’s outright reversed itself on bailouts, now viewing them as victory in fourteen French municipalities larger a way to spread German budgetary austerity. than 9,000 inhabitants. In the EU Parliamentary elections on May 25 – the body that will review Berlin can do more to help broker the delicate the banking union that Germany negotiates relationship of other national capitals with with its partners — the Front National (25%) Brussels. In particular, it must convince François outperformed the government’s candidates by Hollande and the French public that Paris and double digits. Berlin are on the same side. As German parties have come to understand An ironic and undesirable outcome of within the “Berlin Republic,” there is only so Germany’s rule-based approach to the much “going along to get along” – that is to Eurozone issues and the banking union would say, international cooperation against one’s be to drive its most reliable partners (and own public opinion – that can be asked of any customers) out of business. A French recession country in the name of loyalty to treaties and does not serve German interests either. That alliances. There is a point when requisite influence can be used to “positive” effect, dutifulness domestically weakens the very such as in 2011, when the European Central friends that were being counted on. But this is a Bank “reduced its buying of Italian bonds,” delicate and complicated situation, since which helped sink Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition.5 Chancellor Merkel cannot afford to be too There are increasing indications of the toll this is conciliatory either. While Southern European taking on the French left, which has been voters feel they have been outfitted with a forced to shed budget items since the summer German belt around the waist – an economic and faces internal resistance. French Prime chastity device – only 16% of German Minister Manuel Valls’s recent budget included respondents consider their own government $50bn in savings, and passed by a narrow capable of protecting German national margin (265 to 232) –with 41 Socialist Party interests in the Eurozone. abstentions. The EU had a similarly negative assessment of the budget, predicting that If Merkel were to try and make life easier for the France could not abide by its promises. French government, then things become more difficult for her in the Bundestag and the Perhaps the German government would have Bundesrat. For every Socialist vote that preferred that the French finance ministry had Germany saves in the Assemblée Nationale, or remained under the center-right’s (UMP) snags from the hands of Marine Le Pen in the control. But what good is it if conditions voting booth, Merkel’s strategists argue that become so punishing for French Socialists as to the CDU hands one of its own voters over to make them less popular than the Front the Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) – an anti- Euro party that demands an even firmer hand to be played against French indulgences. The 4 http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/05/2014-05- 12_Pew-Global-Attitudes-European-Union.pdf AFD won 800,000 votes (more than 7%) in May’s 5 http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2014/ EU Parliamentary elections, the first time its monnets-brandy-and-europes-fate

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candidates were on the ballot. This points back the Ukraine crisis, and the Transatlantic Trade clearly to the aforementioned constraints and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will be held under which German governments operate hostage by protectionists in various guises – and to frustrating unintended consequences consumer advocates, industrial lobbyists, et al. that can flow from allies who overly limit one another’s choices. But the bottom line is US-German interdependence, which makes the Princess Elsa, not Spiderman relationship indispensable and requires all efforts to foster deeper understanding of one There is a clear anti-German note in populist another’s motivations. On the NSA and movements across Europe – from the intelligence sharing point it is important to hear Movimento Cinque Stelle in Italy to the UK and respond to Germans’ specific concerns Independence Party to mainstream parties in while the US conveys its own constraints as the . This feeling could spread to other Snowden affair sends the 2004 intelligence parties if they start losing because of reform in the other direction, away from concessions to German rigor and austerity. That collaboration. The American intelligence is why Gary Schmitt’s “Spiderman doctrine”6 – community is still reeling from these leaks and that “with great powers come great has been set back a decade in terms of responsibilities” – is inadequate. Precisely which internal US government sharing across national great responsibilities come with these great agencies – let alone across international powers? German diplomats cannot shoot borders. The US could adapt trust-building webs around town willy-nilly. A more serious measures from the domestic experience in analogy would be to Princess Elsa in Walt facilitating federal, state and local Disney’s Frozen – inspired transatlantically by collaboration in intelligence affairs. A similar Hans Christian Andersen’s Snow Queen. Elsa is “fusion center” approach to transatlantic so intimidated by her own powers that she intelligence – information-sharing across cloisters herself away from a society that needs jurisdictions - would increase face time and her until she finds true love and the right pool redundant resources. apparel to harness her special abilities and use them to the benefit of the community that she When Chancellor Merkel says, as she did about happily rejoins. the Ukrainian situation that “I am convinced that the rule of law will prevail,” this can sound The logic of self-restraint and knowing the limits wishful to an American ear. It would be unfair of what can be asked of one’s allies without to call this “doctrinal” – or Ptolemaic. But it inflicting collateral damage also applies fully to does reflect a stubborn (and noble) vision that the transatlantic relationship. At present, slow the international order is fixed – or ought to be progress on the key transatlantic agenda items so. Despite the best-intended political desires, is predictably being blamed on stereotypes. however, the natural of the political The US government is portrayed as the universe still apply. The American position obstacle to intelligence sharing and limits on sounds an awful lot like “when they outlaw collection, the “corporate lobby” in Germany is guns, only outlaws (and ) will have guns” said to have prevented a muscular response to writ large. But as Slobodan Milosevic, Muammar Qaddafi, Bashar al-Assad and 6 http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense- Vladimir Putin have demonstrated in policy/regional/europe/germany-and-the-spider- man-doctrine/

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succession, Eppur si muove (as Galileo told his begin closing the gap between them. Given US inquisitors): facts can outweigh ideas. and Germany’s common security threats and development goals, it is counterproductive for Chancellor Merkel likely believes that her two these allies’ respective strengths to be a cause main challenges – economic and military of division. leadership – can and should be decoupled.

After all, German economic dominance will not be made more palatable just because the ABOUT CUSE: country plays a greater role in security policy.

Similarly, American military dominance will not The Center on the and Europe be more easily swallowed just by softening (CUSE) fosters high-level U.S.-European hardball tactics in the global “War on Terror” or dialogue on the changes in Europe and cyber spying. The Chancellor also knows that global challenges that affect transatlantic the rule of law and the postwar international relations. The Center offers independent order are not a suicide pact. At the end of the research and recommendations for U.S. and day, Germany sent personnel to help allies in European officials and policymakers, and Iraq and Mali and installed Patriot batteries convenes seminars and public forums. under NATO in southern Turkey. Since reunification, scores of German soldiers have The Center’s research focuses on the given their lives in Bosnia, Kosovo, Georgia and strategic priorities for Europe and the Afghanistan. United States, including: the

transformation of the European Union (EU) Two public opinion-related dangers lurk. One is and its institutions; engaging the regions based on US-German differences. The and countries beyond the frontiers of the television station ARD’s recent polling on Syria, EU—including the Balkans, Caucasus, Libya and Ukraine show that a solid two-thirds Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine; the ongoing to three-quarters of German survey economic and political dilemmas of the respondents shy away from military intervention euro zone crisis; prospects for transatlantic in almost all circumstances.7 (The German free trade and investment; European public is more evenly divided with regard to security issues such as the future of NATO, economic sanctions against Russia.) energy security, and non-proliferation; and

EU foreign policy and transatlantic The other opinion pitfall arises from the danger coordination. The Center also houses of indifference: Post-NSA apathy and specific programs focusing on key European continental drift. Already, last month’s Merkel- players—France, Germany, Italy, and Obama meeting was less “anticipated” than Turkey. usual, most coverage concentrated on the absence of a “no-spy” agreement, not on the The Brookings Institution many areas of convergence. The divergences Center on the United States and Europe in opinion are leading German and American 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW publics to tune out, which will only be improved Washington, DC 20036 when political leaders acknowledge the merits www.brookings.edu/cuse and historical roots of each other’s practices to

7 http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschland trend1834.html

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