The Berlin Republic: an Independent Germany Faces the 21St Century Jonathan Laurence
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
US – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES NUMBER 55 June 6, 2014 The Berlin Republic: An Independent Germany faces the 21st Century Jonathan Laurence With the era of Germany’s role as Cold War For decades after the end of the second World protectorate receding into history, the Federal War, the Federal Republic of Germany, with Republic has steadily gained in confidence Bonn as its capital, was known as a “semi- and assertiveness. It is growing into its large sovereign” state. Its defining traits – shoes, acting less beholden to traditional corporatism, federalism, strong institutional veto expectations and engaging in more points – habituated German governments to independent reasoning. Germany’s recovery cooperation at both subnational and of self-confidence is leading to the gradual international levels – from the federal discernment of its unique role in world affairs. To constitution through the European Union (EU) paraphrase Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Sikorski, Germany’s friends and allies need not treaties. Germany’s “reflexively multilateral” fear its “inaction” and should begin the foreign policy gained the trust of fellow learning process of how to engage Germany Europeans and the rest of the world in record on its own terms. This winter’s venting of time. Moreover, it accomplished this all while transatlantic dissatisfaction is healthier than the under Allied occupation. The contribution to alternative of festering silence. What was true international security came from its economic about European integration also goes for and monetary stability – and by hosting troops transatlantic relations. The era of “integration- and weapons. West German ballast kept a by-stealth” is past, so the case for cooperation divided Europe on an even keel. needs to be made directly to Congress, the Bundestag and to the German and US publics. This role was sometimes deferential, but it was never apolitical: postwar foreign policy has existed in a state of perpetual tension between Jonathan Laurence is an Associate the two World Wars’ seemingly contradictory Professor of political science at Boston College and Nonresident Senior Fellow in lessons: “Nie wieder Krieg” (“never again war”) Foreign Policy at Brookings. He is the on the one hand, and “Nie wieder Auschwitz,” author of numerous articles, essays, and on the other. Indeed, in Chancellor Angela books including, most recently, The Merkel’s speeches on the EU campaign trail Emancipation of Europe's Muslims. and before the US Chamber of Commerce in May, she emphasized this year’s 100th and 75th US – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES NUMBER 55 1 anniversaries of the starts of those two wars, September 7, 2014: The 20th Anniversary of both as a way of prefacing her Ukraine policy German Sovereignty and to explain Germany’s cautious stance towards military options – what former Foreign One date that the Chancellor left out from her Minister Guido Westerwelle called a “culture of recitation of round anniversaries this year is the military restraint.” moment when the Berlin Republic arguably began: Merkel was a junior minister in Helmut This belies a critical new development: German Kohl’s fourth cabinet on the rainy September governments in the 21st century will be much day in 1994 when American and Allied troops more likely to question the judgment calls of marched through the Brandenburg Gate for their friends’ military deployment, fiscal policy, the last time and the US army shut down its sanctions regimes, and, of course, intelligence Berlin headquarters. That was also the first time community practices – issues that they German troops paraded through the same previously considered outside their remit. gate since the Nazi era. Despite Moscow’s role German politicians now recognize that their in liberating Berlin, the Allies did not coordinate power has increased relative to European with the Russians and Russia had its own military partners, and their evaluation of American parade one week earlier. In 1990, a quarter of power is ever more nuanced. This reassessment a million US troops occupied West Germany. concerns basic questions like: why should we Their formal withdrawal – and Germany’s leave Africa to the French? Part of Germany’s recovery of full territorial integrity and charm, it has come to realize, is that there are sovereignty – dates back only 20 years. This ample roles to be played just by the default took place at the same time that official good fortune of not being either France or the blueprints of redesigned Berlin as capital city US! were unveiled: the prideful expression of independence regained. The world should expect to hear a more vocal expression of Germany’s national interests The government’s move to Berlin opened a around the globe – trade, regional stability and new parenthesis of German foreign policy. It human rights – and of its strong commitment to has been a period of coming-of-age for unified the international legal order. This past winter and unoccupied Germany. Both before and witnessed the busiest frenzy of internal German after the return to Berlin, the governments of debate over which leading politician could Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder and Angela articulate the most robust vision of how to use Merkel have each given Germany’s partners a German power to help shape the world order different idea of what “normal” German in its own image. But it is easy to get carried foreign policy looks like. Each of them rooted away with the headlines and personality Germany further in European and transatlantic clashes: Is Merkel 3.0 truly a different foreign communities, and each has shown policy animal than her earlier incarnations? Or, commitment to remembering and learning do the restraints that Germany places on itself lessons from German history that can apply to conspire to keep it artificially “small,” as today’s world. President Joachim Gauck put it in his Reunification Day speech last year? Although Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, chairman of this is the third governing coalition led by the Munich Security Conference, has said that Chancellor Merkel, she is only the 2nd Federal Secretary Henry Kissinger’s old question about Chancellor to rule from Berlin and not Bonn. Europe’s phone number has been answered: it US – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES NUMBER 55 2 starts with +49-30 (the country and city codes rather than specific outcomes. Regardless of for Berlin). For example, in 1990-91, Chancellor policy preferences, the US cannot ask more of Kohl’s government financed over 12% of the the Bundestag than German governments do: costs of the Desert Storm military intervention in safeguards are safeguards. As the differences Kuwait – and it signed away the beloved in opinion become both subtler and potentially Deutsche Mark at Maastricht later that year in more obstructive, the transatlantic relationship the name of European unity. Chancellor should be gauged not by the alignment of Schröder’s coalition sent forces to fight in opinions but rather by the mutual ability to Kosovo and Afghanistan – and its finance understand and restate the other’s position ministry was flexible about the entry criteria for without caricature. Going from “Partnership” to the original Eurozone countries (the ministry “Zweckgemeinschaft” (or a goal-oriented required a bit of flexibility itself). Chancellor alliance) need not be a demotion. Indeed it Merkel, for her part, has maintained her can even lead to more ambitious objectives. decade-long commitment to Afghanistan – and she has overseen the transfer of hundreds It is possible to discern an active, moral, of billions of Euros to keep the common frequently generous and risk-taking German currency afloat. And yet, Berlin does not foreign policy in the past two decades. The participate fully in all of the transatlantic country is still finding its voice and footing, discussions because it takes certain options off learning to align those instincts with its the table. For its critics, Germany still skirts the significant human and capital resources. But controversial line between “military restraint” Germany already makes a unique contribution and occasional “failure to render assistance.” to international security; it is not a free-rider nation. Of course, there are very few German Germans and Americans have very high voices that would like to shape public opinion expectations of each other because of the towards military intervention per se. It was intimate relationship engendered by military President Obama, not Chancellor Merkel, who occupation and common interests. Despite the noted during their press conference that shared history, it is unrealistic to gaze across the German aircraft were patrolling the Baltics Atlantic at each other and expect to see a while Russian troops massed on the Ukrainian mirror image. To rise and fall with each different border. But that is the reality in the position, to sigh in disappointment at each background: nearly 5,000 Bundeswehr soldiers point of asymmetry or to focus on tabloid are deployed worldwide. This does not change stories of the moment does not do justice to Germany’s aversion to military solutions. The the relationship’s depth and breadth. And it government platform states that the kinetics of prevents more efficient institutionalization and its foreign policy remain “diplomacy, peaceful routinization of cooperation and exchange. conflict resolution and development cooperation.”1 Germans understand war to be It is obvious but worth stating that “what the US literally the last resort. Even to rattle one’s saber wants” from Germany must be concordant is to acknowledge that all other options have with what Germans want – and with the already failed. outcomes produced by German institutions that have significant safeguards against executive power – and against haste in general. The two countries’ relationship should 1 2013 CDU, CSU, SPD Coalition Agreement, p.168, naturally emphasize process and engagement http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/koalitionsvertrag1 36.pdf US – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES NUMBER 55 3 On the one hand, Germany has said “No, spectator” of world affairs.