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TREX-07536 (Redacted).Pdf GreggS.Perkin,P.E. EngineeringPartnersInternational August26,2011 BLOWOUTPREVENTERMACONDO TableofContents AppendixA: AbbreviationsandAcronyms..............................................................................................3 AppendixB: DeepwaterDrilling..............................................................................................................6 AppendixC: WellControl........................................................................................................................8 AppendixD: BlowoutPreventers&Systems.........................................................................................13 AppendixE: BOPRegulatoryCompliance.............................................................................................20 AppendixF: ResponsibilityforBOPConfiguration...............................................................................27 AppendixG: DEEPWATERHORIZON'SSubseaBOP...............................................................................32 G.1 Modifications....................................................................................................................47 G.2 Testing...............................................................................................................................48 G.3 Training.............................................................................................................................52 G.4 BOPMaintenance.............................................................................................................57 G.5 BestAvailableandSafestTechnology("BAST")................................................................59 AppendixH: BP'sMacondoWell...........................................................................................................67 H.1 ApplicationforPermittoDrill...........................................................................................67 H.2 MaximumAllowableSurfacePressure(“MASP”):............................................................71 H.3 WellControlResponsibilities............................................................................................81 AppendixI: EventsLeadingUptoBP’sMacondoBlowout..................................................................86 AppendixJ: PostBlowout....................................................................................................................95 AppendixK: MacondoDesignandImplementationFailures................................................................97 AppendixL: Mr.GreggS.Perkin,C.V.andrelatedinformation.......................................................104 AppendixM:SourcesandInformation..................................................................................................114 EndNotes........................................................................................................................................223 2 AppendixA: AbbreviationsandAcronyms| GreggS.Perkin,P.E. EngineeringPartnersInternational August26,2011 BLOWOUTPREVENTERMACONDO AppendixA: AbbreviationsandAcronyms ACS ....................... Acoustic Control Deadman ............... An alternative term System for the AMF System. AMF ....................... Automatic Mode DP ......................... Drill Pipe Function DS ......................... Drill String APD ....................... Authorization for Permission to Drill DVS ....................... Double V Shear (Ram) API ........................ American Petroleum DWOP .................... BP’s Drilling and Well Institute Operations Practices Autoshear ............... An Emergency BOP Dynamic Event ........ Flow system on the EB ......................... Engineering Bulletins HORIZON, activated when EDS ....................... Emergency Disconnect System BAST ...................... Best Available and Safest Technology EP ......................... Initial Exploration Plan Beach ..................... On shore EPI ........................ Engineering Partners International, L.L.C. BHA ....................... Bottom Hole Assembly ER ......................... Emergency Response BHPM ..................... Bottom Hole Assembly Pressure Method FAT ....................... Factory Acceptance Test BOEMRE ................. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Fishing ................... Pulling disconnected Regulation and material out of the Enforcement, formerly wellbore MMS FMECA ................... Failure Mode, Effect BSR ....................... Blind Shear Ram and Criticality Analysis BOP ....................... Blowout Preventer ft ........................... Foot or feet Casing .................... Pipe used to line the gpm ....................... gallons per minute hole GoM....................... Gulf of Mexico CCU ....................... Central Control Unit Hot Stab ................. ROV Connection CFR ....................... Code of Federal Regulations 3 AppendixA: AbbreviationsandAcronyms| GreggS.Perkin,P.E. EngineeringPartnersInternational August26,2011 BLOWOUTPREVENTERMACONDO HORIZON ................ DEEPWATER MMS ...................... Minerals Management HORIZON Service, now BOEMRE HP ......................... High Pressure MODU .................... Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit HPU ....................... Hydraulic Power Unit Mud ....................... Drilling mud Hydrocarbons .......... Deposits beneath the earth’s surface such MUX ...................... Multiplex as oil and gas MW ........................ Mud Weight IADC ...................... International Association of Drilling NDT ....................... Non-Destructive Contractors Testing In .......................... Inch or inches NPT ....................... Non-Productive Time ID .......................... Inside diameter OCS ....................... Outer Continental Shelf Joints ..................... Individual sections of drill pipe OD ........................ Outside diameter Kick ....................... Unexpected flow of OEM ...................... Original Equipment hydrocarbons into the Manufacturer wellbore OIM ....................... Offshore Installation LDS ....................... Lock Down Sleeve Manager LIT ........................ Lead Impression Tool PLC........................ Programmable Logic Controller LMRP ..................... Lower Marine Riser Package ppf ........................ Pounds per foot Long String ............. Long String of ppg ....................... pounds per gallon Production Casing psi ......................... Pounds per square MASP ..................... Maximum Anticipated inch Surface Pressure Riser ...................... Marine Riser System MAWP .................... Maximum Allowable RMS ....................... Rig Maintenance Working Pressure System MC252 ................... Mississippi Canyon ROV ....................... Remotely operated Block #252 – location vehicle of the Macondo well RP ......................... Recommended MD ........................ Measured depth Practice MGS ....................... Mud-gas separator 4 AppendixA: AbbreviationsandAcronyms| GreggS.Perkin,P.E. EngineeringPartnersInternational August26,2011 BLOWOUTPREVENTERMACONDO SEM ....................... Subsea Electronic UMRP ..................... Upper Marine Riser Module Package SPOF ...................... Single Point of Failure UWILD ................... Underwater Inspection in Lieu of Dry-Dock ST Lock .................. Hydro-mechanical ram locking mechanism V ........................... Volt TA ......................... Temporary Abandon VBR ....................... Variable Bore Ram TD ......................... Total Depth TVD ....................... Total Vertical depth 5 | GreggS.Perkin,P.E. EngineeringPartners International August26,2011 BLOWOUTPREVENTERMACONDO AppendixB: DeepwaterDrilling 1 Deepwater drilling has been commonly known historically as the process of conducting oil & gas exploration and production operations in seawater depths of more than 500 feet (“ft”). Using this definition, there have been approximately 600 Deepwater wells drilled in the GoM.2 Oil production in water depths exceeding 6,000 ft is currently taking place in different parts of the world.3 New explorations in ultra-Deepwater drilling operations are being performed in water depths exceeding 9,000 ft.4 Deepwater drilling presents unique technical and safety challenges, especially for the BOP. At these depths, the BOP equipment, hoses, and connections cannot be reached, except by Remote Operated Vehicle (“ROV”). ROV operations are difficult due to water pressure, lack of visibility, depth perception and color (everything is monochromatic), lack of appropriate tools and the limitations of remote control. In addition, the BOP cannot easily be brought to the surface even when the well is shut in, especially when the well is flowing. When the BOP malfunctions, repair or replacement becomes difficult, if not impossible. Accordingly, planning for Deepwater drilling BOP strategies must be undertaken with the utmost care and prudence. SINTEF published a reliability study on behalf of the MMS, to review subsea BOP performance, entitled Deepwater Kicks and BOP Performance dated July 24, 2001.5 The study reported a total of 117 BOP failures and 48 well kicks were recorded in the 83 wells observed between 1997 and 1998.6 Of the 83 wells, 58 wells were deemed “exploratory drilling”, defined as drilling in less well known formations. Macondo was an exploratory well.7 The report indicated that many of the GoM Deepwater wells were high pressure/high temperature
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