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Deepwater, Deep Ties, Deep Trouble: a State-Corporate Environmental Crime Analysis of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill

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Deepwater, Deep Ties, Deep Trouble: a State-Corporate Environmental Crime Analysis of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Dissertations Graduate College 8-2012 Deepwater, Deep Ties, Deep Trouble: A State-Corporate Environmental Crime Analysis of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Elizabeth A. Bradshaw Western Michigan University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, Environmental Policy Commons, and the Politics and Social Change Commons Recommended Citation Bradshaw, Elizabeth A., "Deepwater, Deep Ties, Deep Trouble: A State-Corporate Environmental Crime Analysis of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill" (2012). Dissertations. 53. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/dissertations/53 This Dissertation-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DEEPWATER, DEEP TIES, DEEP TROUBLE: A STATE-CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME ANALYSIS OF THE 2010 GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL by Elizabeth A. Bradshaw A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of The Graduate College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Sociology Advisor: Ronald C. Kramer, Ph.D. Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan August 2012 THE GRADUATE COLLEGE WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY KALAMAZOO, MICHIGAN Date June 29, 2012 WE HEREBY APPROVE THE DISSERTATION SUBMITTED BY Elizabeth A. Bradshaw ENTITLED Deepwater, Deep Ties, Deep Trouble: A State-Corporate Environmental Crime Analysis of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill AS PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Doctor of Philosophy Sociology /^^y<^^<^ (Department) Ronald C^ramer, Ph.D Dissertatijzfh Beview Committer Sociology (Program) Gregory J. HowaroyPh.D Dissertation Review Committee Member Susan M. Carlson, Ph.D Dissertation Review Committee Member lymond Dissertation Review Committee Member APPROVED <^£ Date >Li)SV?^ Dean of The Graduate f ollege DEEPWATER, DEEP TIES, DEEP TROUBLE: A STATE-CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME ANALYSIS OF THE 2010 GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL Elizabeth A. Bradshaw, Ph.D. Western Michigan University, 2012 The 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill was one of the worst environmental disasters of all time. Using the concept of state-corporate environmental crime, this project applies a case study analysis of secondary data sources including publicly available government reports, corporate documents, academic sources and journalistic accounts to examine the causes of the blowout and the response to the spill. Building on Michalowski and Kramer’s Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime, this study introduces an additional level of analysis- that of the industry- between the organizational and institutional levels. The causes of the Deepwater Horizon explosion are rooted both in the history of federal development of the offshore oil industry, and the organizational actions of the corporations most directly involved: BP, Transocean and Halliburton. Undertaken in close coordination between the federal government and BP, alongside privately contracted oil spill response organizations, the response to the spill can be classified as a state-facilitated corporate cover up of the environmental crimes in the Gulf. This was accomplished through scientific propaganda and censorship of images and information. Working together, BP and the Obama administration sought to downplay the size of the spill and its effects. An unprecedented amount of toxic chemical dispersants were applied at the surface and directly at the wellhead in an effort to conceal the amount of oil. Federal restrictions blocked access to cleanup operations, beaches and airspace, thereby limiting public visibility of the spill. Policing the media blackout was an intricate matrix of federal and local law enforcement, and private security companies hired by BP. Suppression of images and information helped to contain public outrage while allowing BP and the federal government to carry out dangerous response measures with little oversight. As this study demonstrates, the most recent spill is not an isolated instance of state-corporate environmental crime, but rather is the result of the criminogenic structure of the deepwater oil industry. Copyright by Elizabeth A. Bradshaw 2012 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I must extend my sincerest gratitude to my dissertation adviser Dr. Ron Kramer and the other members of my committee, Dr. Greg Howard and Dr. Susan Carlson. Without their mentorship, support, and encouragement not only on this dissertation but for the duration of my graduate education, I would not be the critical scholar that I am today. Additional thanks to the outside member of my committee Dr. Ray Michalowski for his enthusiasm and contributions to this project. Furthermore, the generous support provided by the Dissertation Completion Fellowship from the Graduate College at Western Michigan University has been essential in allowing me to craft such a solid dissertation. Lastly, I am incredibly grateful for my family and friends who have helped keep me grounded throughout this disorienting educational journey. Elizabeth A. Bradshaw ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................... ii LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................. ix CHAPTER I. SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND Chapter One: Introduction and Background .................................. 1 Introduction........................................................................... 1 Oil in Santa Barbara and Power in America..................... 1 Literature Review .................................................................. 6 Definitional Debate ......................................................... 7 State-Corporate Crime.................................................. 11 Environmental Crime .................................................... 19 State-Corporate Environmental Crime........................... 23 Theoretical Approach........................................................... 27 Industry as a Level of Analysis...................................... 31 Research Design and Methods ............................................. 39 Sources of Data ............................................................ 42 Chapter Two: Federal Regulation of the Offshore Oil Industry .... 46 Peak Oil and Deepwater Drilling .......................................... 46 Establishing Federal Control: Early Offshore Oil Claims (1937-1954)......................................................................... 49 iii Table of Contents—continued The Submerged Lands Act and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 ........................................................ 51 Federal Royalties from Outer Continental Shelf Leasing (1954-1969)......................................................................... 53 Industry Influence on Government ................................ 55 Environmental Protection vs. Energy Development (1969- 1981)................................................................................... 55 Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Act Amendments ........ 57 Neoliberal Offshore Development: The Rise and Fall of the Minerals Management Service (1982-Present)...................... 59 Area-Wide Leasing ....................................................... 61 The Legislative Push into Deeper Waters ...................... 64 Problems at the Minerals Management Service.............. 65 Normalization of Deviance: The MMS Royalty-in-Kind Program Scandal 2008 .................................................. 69 Conclusions ......................................................................... 73 II. SECTION TWO: CAUSES OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON EXPLOSION Chapter Three: Corporate Actors ................................................ 75 Overarching Failure of Management at BP, Transocean, Halliburton........................................................................... 75 British Petroleum (BP)......................................................... 77 Lord John Browne, BP CEO 1995-2007....................... 78 Organizational Changes................................................. 79 Prior Offenses............................................................... 82 iv Table of Contents—continued Transocean .......................................................................... 90 Prior Problems with the Deepwater Horizon Rig........... 91 Past Accidents .............................................................. 91 Halliburton........................................................................... 93 Conclusions ......................................................................... 94 Chapter Four: The Blowout of Macondo..................................... 96 BP and the Macondo Well ................................................... 97 Causes of the Blowout ......................................................... 99 Drilling Mud ............................................................... 100 Changes to the Well Design ........................................ 101 Cementing the Well...................................................... 104 The Explosions ........................................................... 110 Failure of the Blowout Preventer.......................................
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