Art. VI.— the Campaign of Ælius Gallus in Arabia
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Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland http://journals.cambridge.org/JRA Additional services for Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here Art. VI.— The Campaign of Ælius Gallus in Arabia A. Sprenger Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland / Volume 6 / Issue 01 / January 1873, pp 121 - 141 DOI: 10.1017/S0035869X00016166, Published online: 15 March 2011 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/ abstract_S0035869X00016166 How to cite this article: A. Sprenger (1873). Art. VI.— The Campaign of Ælius Gallus in Arabia. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland, 6, pp 121-141 doi:10.1017/S0035869X00016166 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/JRA, IP address: 134.225.1.226 on 01 Jan 2015 121 ART. VI.— The Campaign of JElius Oallm in Arabia, By A. SPRENGER. In the year 18 B.C. JElius Gallus, a Roman knight, then Governor of Egypt, undertook, by order of Augustus, a campaign into Arabia. Strabo, p. 780, says, "Observing that the Red Sea is extremely narrow, and forms an incon- siderable barrier between the ^Ethiopians and the Arabs, the Emperor ordered Gallus to ' explore' both countries, being determined either to make these nations his friends and allies, or to subdue them. As they had from time immemorial been selling the spices and precious stones of their countries for cash, and never imported goods from foreign parts, they were proverbial for their wealth; and this was the principal inducement for making an attempt to win them as friends, or to subdue them in case of resistance. The Emperor was, moreover, encouraged by the Nabateans, who were allies of the Romans, and promised to further his views." Pliny 6, 27, § 140, relates that previous to Tiberius's campaign into Armenia and Parthia, Augustus sent the geographer Dionysius Periegetes to explore these countries, and to report thereon ; and it seems a similar measure was taken previous to the invasion of Arabia by iElius Gallus. Juba II., King of Numidia, and son-in-law of the Triumvir Antonius, wrote for Augustus a work, De Expeditione Arabica, which, to judge from the extracts preserved by Pliny, contained the fullest description of the peninsula ever com- piled by a foreigner. We have no direct proof to show that this report was written and submitted to the Em- peror previous to Gallus's expedition:! but there is some circumstantial evidence ; for instance, Pliny, 6, 28, § 160, says, that most of the towns which Gallus conquered had not been mentioned by authors who had written before him. As, besides Juba, there was, as far as we know, no detailed 1 The words of Pliny are : in hae tamen parte arma Eomana sequi placet nobis Jubamque regem. ad eundem Caium Caesarem soriptis voluminibus de eadem expeditione Arabica. 122 THE CAMPAIGN OF iELIXJS GALLUS IN" ARABIA. geography of Arabia extant, this remark seems to refer more particularly to the defects of Juba's report. But, putting the work, De Expeditions Arabica, out of the question, there were Roman officers and residents all over Syria, and nothing could have been more easy for the Emperor than to obtain information on the chances an invasion of Arabia was likely to have. The most superficial inquiry must have shown that the difficulties were insurmountable; and we can only ascribe it to the blind confidence in the invincibility of the Roman arms that Roman statesmen decided on so adventurous an enterprise. Pliny says, "Augustus tantum prospexit Arabian!," and the fancy of the Emperor seems to have over- ruled all objections, if any were raised, against so wild a scheme. It is, however, not the rashness of those who ordered the expedition on which I wish to pass any remarks, but rather on Strabo, the only author who has left something like a detailed account of it, because we shall find it im- possible to follow him unless we know his bias. Gallus failed, and there was no mincing matters. The ^Ethiopians on the other side of the Red Sea, encouraged by Gallus's defeat, rose in rebellion against the Romans, and the impression which these events made upon the populace of Rome cannot have been very cheerful. Everybody very naturally asked: What is the cause of this check of our in- vincible arms? It would have been both impolitic and unjust to impute any fault to Gallus. The honour of the Roman General was the honour of the nation, and it must be allowed he penetrated deeper into the interior of that sterile country than a military chief would in our days be able to advance, and he seems to have managed his retreat with consummate skill. The real cause of discomfiture—that the whole scheme was unsound and impracticable—neither Gallus nor the public dared to admit; for it had emanated from the Emperor himself, and the belief in the irresistibility of the Roman arms was so strong, that such an insinuation would have been considered high treason. Under these circumstances, a scapegoat was required to satisfy public opinion. Syllseus, the Wezeer of the King of the Naba- THE CAMPAIGN OF ^ELIUS GALLUS IN ARABIA. 123 taeans, had served Gallus as guide during the whole cam- paign, in which also Nabatsean and Jewish auxiliaries were employed. Gallus thought it prudent to make poor Syllsous answerable for the failure; and in order that the public might become fully impressed with his guilt, he was dragged to Rome, and beheaded there. Strabo was a personal friend of Gallus, and what he aims at, in his narrative of the campaign, is to show that the General was from beginning to end misled by treacherous Syllseus, and in order to exonerate Gallus from any blame of having allowed himself to be duped, he represents Arabia as a com- plete terra incognita, where the General was in every measure he had to take dependent upon his guide. Strabo takes good care that the vast tract of land through which the Roman army marched should remain a terra incognita; his account, looked at from a geographical point of view, being contemptible, and wholly unworthy of the great geographer. In his desire to write an apology for his friend, he went so far as intentionally to render the geography of the country darker than it had been, and he succeeded so well that the attempts to follow the Roman army in its progress and retreat have hitherto been unsuccessful. Our researches will be considerably facilitated if we first follow up the report of Gallus's retreat. The furthermost town, says Strabo, p. 782, which the Romans reached was that of the Rhamanites, whose king was then Ilisaros. The Romans besieged it for six days, but want of water obliged them to raise the siege. It is clear that they were defeated, and thought it prudent to make the best of their way towards their homes. This, however, Strabo does not like to con- fess, but speaks emphatically of the treachery of Syllasus, and says that now, all on a sudden, Gallus discovered the latter's snares, and began to act for himself. He re- turned by a road different from the one by which he had advanced, and this shorter road it seems he found by himself. On the ninth day after he had commenced his retreat, he reached Negrana, where he had fought a battle; and eleven days after he had passed this town, he came to a place which, 124 THE CAMPAIGN OF MLIVS GALLUS IN ARABIA. as there are seven wells there, is called Seven Wells, Be- ginning from this village, the country was peaceful, and he passed the small town Chaala, and subsequently Malotha, which is situated on a river. The country through which the road leads after this place suffers from scarcity of spring water. Finally, however, he reached the town of Egra, which is situated on the sea-shore, in the territory of King Obodas. The whole march he completed in sixty days, whereas he had been six months on the road in advancing. I shall show lower down that the town of the Rhamanites is the capital of Radman, which, in Baron Von Maltzan's recent map, is in long. 45° 44', lat. 14° 33'. The data furnished by Hamdany induce me to place it a little further N.W., in long. 45° 30', lat. 14° 40'. Negrana, i.e. Nejran, may be situated in long. 44° 35', lat. 17° 25'. The dis- tance between these two towns is 180 geographical miles, and this is exactly the distance which a caravan usually marches in nine days—about 20 miles a day. The road to Nejran leads through the Jof, and the Eomans passed the fourth and fifth days of their retreat the second time through this fertile and in ancient times highly cultivated valley. Before following iElius Gallus on his further progress to the place of embarcation, from which, as Strabo says, he shipped his men in eleven days over to Myos-Hormos on the African coast, it appears advisable to ascertain the position of this port and its distance from Nejran. Strabo calls it Egra, and says that it belongs to the dominions of Obodas, King of the Nabateans, who resided at Petra. Pliny and Ptolemy apply this name to a town in the interior s of the country, which is called by the Arabs al-Hijr (^ -\)t and formed in those days part of the kingdom of Aretas, a relation of Obodas.