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The Politics of Combat the Political and Strategic Impact of Tactical-Level Subcultures, 1939-1995 Ingesson, Tony

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The Politics of Combat the Political and Strategic Impact of Tactical-Level Subcultures, 1939-1995 Ingesson, Tony The Politics of Combat The Political and Strategic Impact of Tactical-Level Subcultures, 1939-1995 Ingesson, Tony 2016 Document Version: Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Ingesson, T. (2016). The Politics of Combat: The Political and Strategic Impact of Tactical-Level Subcultures, 1939-1995. Lund University. 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LUND UNIVERSITY PO Box 117 221 00 Lund +46 46-222 00 00 The Politics of Combat The Political and Strategic Impact of Tactical-Level Subcultures, 3;5;–3;;7 Tony Ingesson Cover art by the author © Tony Ingesson Faculty of Social Sciences and Department of Political Science ISBN ;9:-;3-9845-929-8 (print) ISBN ;9:-;3-9845-92:-5 (PDF) ISSN 2682-2259 Typeset in LATEX Printed in Sweden by Media-Tryck, Lund University Lund 4238 Acknowledgements Over the course of the years I’ve spent writing this dissertation, I’ve accumulated a substantial debt of gratitude toward many. First of all, I must mention my supervisor, Magnus Jerneck. Not only was he instrumental in convincing me to accept the position as Ph.D. Candidate at a point when I had already declined, he has also been a constant source of support. His creativity and ability to ask just the right questions to push one’s effort forward are second to none. Secondly, I must thank my assistant supervisor, Johannes Lindvall. His exceptional eye for structure, prose, detail and method has vastly improved this dissertation. At the department of Political Science, I have received invaluable comments and suggestions from many colleagues. In particular, I want to mention Håkan Magnusson, Anders Sannerstedt, Douglas Brommes- son, Karin Aggestam, Jakob Gustavsson and Mikael Sundström. The diligent work of the administrative and technical staff has also been invaluable over the years, both to support my work on this book and to facilitate my teaching. For this I am very grateful to Kristina Gröndahl Nilsson, Helen Fogelin, Amir Parhamifar, Margareth Andersson and Marie Persson. The Ph.D. student community at the department has also been a great source of support and inspiration. While I cannot possibly do you all justice in this brief text, I would in particular like to mention Niklas Altermark, Cecilia von Schéele and Sarah Anne Rennick. Without you, these years would not have been anywhere near as enjoyable. I also want to thank Klas Nilsson, Fabio Cristiano, Kurtis Boyer and Linda Nyberg for being such good colleagues and friends, as well as some of the most hilarious table companions I have ever met. Thanks also to Carlo Knotz, for helping me with translations and formulas, and to Ivan Gusic for comments on the sections regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina. For their invaluable help in providing me with research data, I thank Peter at the Deutsches U-Boot-Museum in Cuxhaven-Altenbruch for assistance with the German U-boat patrol reports and Christian Ankerstjerne for providing carefully compiled statistical data on the independent Tiger battalions. For his thorough efforts as proofreader, and his flexibility when faced by my unorthodox manuscript format, I am grateful to Sir David Ratford. I also want to thank those from my past who inspired me to write this dissertation. In particular, my former company commander, Gary Campbell, and platoon commander, Ola Lindahl, as well as my com- manding officers in the years that followed, Anders Lindell and Jörgen Jarälv. I am also deeply thankful to Peter Hagelin, who supported my decision to leave the navy to pursue my Ph.D. For the financial support that enabled me to attend several interna- tional conferences, I thank Helge Ax:son Johnsons stiftelse. I am also indebted to the open-source community, which has unselfishly created and developed the software (Linux, LaTeX, Inkscape, GIMP, JabRef, etc.) I’ve used in my work on this dissertation. I would never have gotten this far without my grandparents and parents, who always supported me in my pursuit of knowledge as a child. In particular, I want to mention my dear departed grandparents Inge and Alva-Liisa. Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to my wife Hanna and my son Alexis, who have given my life a new sense of purpose, and made me happier than I have ever been before. Contents 3 Introduction 3 Theoretical Contribution 6 Hypotheses 8 Research Design : Definitions: Military Levels, ; The Evolution of Tactical Command 32 4 Politics and War 37 The Political Role of the Military 39 The Clausewitzian Perspective, 39 – Structure and Agency, 3; – Uncertainty and Friction, 43 – An Implementation Perspective, 44 Subcultures 46 Tactical-Level Subcultures 48 Boyd’s OODA-loop, 49 – March & Olsen’s Logic of Appropriateness, 49 – Military Psychology, 4: – Previous Research on Military Subcultures, 53 – Focal Points, 55 – Functional Imperatives, 57 Tactical-Level Subculture Categories 59 Formal Autonomy versus Actual Autonomy 62 Huntington’s Professionals 65 Theoretical Summary 69 5 A Comparative Case Study 6; The Case Selection Bias Issue 73 Within-Case Analysis 75 Source Material Considerations 76 6 Pair I: Dilemmas of the Deep 79 Sources 7: A Brief Note on Submarine Warfare in wwii 82 The Ubootwaffe, 3;5;–3;62 85 Formative Factors, 85 – Strategic Objectives, 87 – Challenges, 8: – Personnel, Commanders and Equipment, 92 – Tactical-Level Subculture, 94 – Impact of Tactical-Level Subculture, 96 – Summary, 9; The Silent Service, 3;63–3;64 :3 Formative Factors, :3 – Strategic Objectives, :6 – Challenges, :7 – Personnel, Commanders and Equipment, :8 – Tactical-Level Subculture, :: – Impact of Tactical-Level Subculture, ;2 – Summary, ;8 Summary of Case Pair ;: Rival Explanation 3: Submarine Technology, ;: – Rival Explanation 4: Torpedo Woes, 322 – Tactical-level subcultures as Explanation, 324 7 Pair II: Behind Armor 32; Sources 332 A Brief Note on Tank Warfare 333 The Israeli 9th and 3::th Brigades, 3;95 336 Formative Factors, 337 – Strategic Objectives, 33: – Challenges, 33; – Personnel, Commanders and Equipment, 342 – Tactical-Level Subculture, 346 – Impact of Tactical-Level Subculture, 34: – Summary, 358 The German Tiger Battalions, 3;64–3;67 35; Formative Factors, 362 – Strategic Objectives, 364 – Challenges, 365 – Personnel, Commanders and Equipment, 366 – Tactical-Level Subculture, 36: – Impact of Tactical-Level Subculture, 374 – Summary, 387 Summary of Case Pair 38: Rival Explanation: the Unique Design of the Tiger, 392 – Tactical-Level Subcultures as Explanation, 393 8 Pair III: Unspeakable Deeds 397 Sources 398 A Brief Note on Atrocities 399 Charlie Company, 3;8: 39; Formative Factors, 3:3 – Strategic Objectives, 3:6 – Challenges, 3:7 – Personnel, Commanders and Equipment, 3:8 – Tactical-Level Subculture, 3:; – Impact of Tactical-Level Subculture, 3;3 – Summary, 3;: The Totenkopfverbände, 3;55–3;64 424 Formative Factors, 425 – Strategic Objectives, 426 – Challenges, 427 – Personnel, Commanders and Equipment, 429 – Tactical-Level Subculture, 435 – Impact of Tactical-Level Subculture, 43: – Summary, 448 Summary of Case Pair 44: Rival Explanation: National Traits, 44: – Tactical-Level Subcultures as Explanation, 44; 9 Pair IV: In the Name of Peace 453 Sources 454 A Brief Note on UNPROFOR 3;;4–3;;7 455 Nordbat 4, 3;;5–3;;7 457 Formative Factors, 458 – Strategic Objectives, 45: – Challenges, 45; – Personnel, Commanders and Equipment, 464 – Tactical-Level Subculture, 466 – Impact of Tactical-Level Subculture, 46: – Summary, 475 Dutchbat 3;;6–3;;7 478 Formative Factors, 479 – Strategic Objectives, 47: – Challenges, 482 – Personnel, Commanders and Equipment, 483 – Tactical-Level Subculture, 486 – Impact of Tactical-Level Subculture, 489 – Summary, 496 Summary of Case Pair 497 Rival Explanation: the Faulty Mandate, 497 – Tactical-Level Subcultures as Explanation, 49: : Conclusions 4:5 Theoretical Contribution Revisited 4:6 Contributions to the Operational Styles Literature, 4:7 – Subcultures in Public Administration, 4:: – The Civil-Military Dilemma, 4:; Civil-Military Policy Lessons 4;2 Broader Applicability 4;4 List of Figures 4;9 Bibliography 4;; Introduction Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen war. — Carl von Clausewitz ([3:54] 3;;9, p. 88) ithin political science, the lower levels of military organiza- W tions and their potential political impact have frequently been overlooked. Traditionally, the tactical level has been associated with the conduct of the practical aspect of operations, and it has rarely been considered to be relevant from a political science point of view. This despite the fact that military leaders at the lower levels, who command between a dozen and a few hundred troops, can have a major political impact (see for example McEvoy, 4233, p. 32:). In addition, this phenomenon is becoming increasingly common (Ruffa et al., 4235, p. 545). Thus, robust theoretical tools for analyzing these military leaders as political actors are needed to further our understanding of both their impact and the mechanism behind their decisions.
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