Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption
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17-26-50 THE LAW COMMISSION LEGISLATING THE CRIMINAL CODE: CORRUPTION CONTENTS Paragraph Page PART I: INTRODUCTION 1 The meaning of corruption 1.11 3 Corruption and breach of duty 1.12 4 Corruption, theft, fraud and dishonesty 1.17 5 Corruption and theft 1.18 5 Corruption and fraud 1.23 6 Corruption and dishonesty 1.26 7 Conclusion 1.28 8 Method of working 1.31 8 Provisional conclusions and proposals 1.34 9 PART II: THE PRESENT LAW 12 The common law Bribery 2.2 12 The meaning of “public officer” 2.4 12 The bribe 2.6 13 The mental element 2.7 14 Misconduct in a public office 2.8 14 Extortion 2.12 15 The common law of Scotland 2.14 15 The statutory offences 2.15 15 The 1889 Act 2.16 16 Public bodies 2.17 16 The bribe 2.18 17 The 1906 Act 2.20 17 Agents 2.22 18 The bribe 2.23 18 The meaning of “corruptly” 2.24 18 The 1916 Act 2.29 20 The presumption of corruption 2.30 20 iii Paragraph Page The Sale of Offices Acts 1551 and 1809 2.32 20 The Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925 2.34 21 PART III: PREVIOUS REFORM PROPOSALS 23 The Redcliffe-Maud Report 3.2 23 Recommendations on reform of the law Disclosure of pecuniary interests by councillors and officers 3.4 23 Misuse of official information 3.6 24 Prevention of corruption 3.7 24 The Government response 3.9 25 The Salmon Report 3.10 25 Recommendations on reform of the law of corruption 3.12 26 Conflicts of interest and registers of interests 3.13 27 Other recommendations 3.14 27 The Government response 3.15 27 The Nolan Report 3.16 28 General recommendations 3.20 29 Members of Parliament 3.21 29 Ministers and civil servants 3.22 30 Executive quangos 3.23 30 The Government response 3.24 31 Conclusions 3.26 31 PART IV: THE NEED FOR CHANGE 32 The problem with “public bodies” 4.3 32 The presumption 4.4 33 Agents 4.7 33 Inapplicability of the presumption 4.8 34 Persons connected with agents 4.9 34 Persons who have been, or are to become, agents 4.10 34 Purported agents 4.11 34 Police officers 4.12 35 Judges 4.13 35 Local councillors 4.14 35 The meaning of “corruptly” 4.15 35 Conclusion 4.18 36 PART V: CORRUPTION AND BREACH OF DUTY 37 Two basic law reform questions 5.1 37 The first question Acting contrary to duty: the radical approach 5.2 37 Conclusion 5.4 38 iv Paragraph Page The second question Corruption by means other than bribery and extortion Causing another to act in breach of duty 5.5 38 Breaches of duty and “extortion” 5.8 38 The present law and corruption by means other than bribery 5.10 39 Corruption by way of threats Blackmail 5.11 39 Other offences 5.14 40 Corruption by way of deception 5.15 40 Conclusion and provisional view 5.17 41 Procuring a breach of duty by deception or threats and liability of the parties 5.18 41 Threatening to breach duty 5.22 42 PART VI: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PUBLIC BODIES AND OTHERS 43 The significance in the present law of the distinction between public bodies and others 6.2 43 The scope of the 1889 Act 6.3 43 The scope of the offences Third parties 6.4 43 Persons who have been, or are to become, agents 6.5 44 Penalties 6.6 44 The presumption 6.7 44 The distinction between a person serving under a public body and a person serving under a non-public body 6.9 45 The definition of a public body 6.10 45 The Holly test 6.12 46 The Local Government and Housing Act 1989 amendment 6.14 46 Public bodies outside the United Kingdom 6.16 47 Should the distinction be retained? 6.18 47 Is public sector corruption more serious than private sector corruption? 6.19 47 Is the public sector more in need of protection than the private sector? 6.22 48 The need for higher standards of conduct in the public sector 6.24 49 Private bodies with public functions 6.26 49 If the distinction were retained, should the definition of a public body be extended? 6.35 52 v Paragraph Page PART VII: THE AGENCY RELATIONSHIP 54 Preliminary points Terminology 7.4 55 Scope of the agency relationship Public and private duties 7.7 55 Duties not within the agency relationship 7.8 56 Defining the agency relationship 7.9 56 The fiduciary model approach 7.10 56 The status-based fiduciary 7.11 57 The fact-based fiduciary 7.12 57 A preliminary definition of the agency relationship 7.17 59 Quasi-fiduciaries 7.18 59 Incorporating quasi-fiduciaries into the definition of the agency relationship 7.22 60 Specific exclusions 7.25 62 The list approach 7.26 62 Various classes of persons we propose should be included in the list 7.30 63 Classic examples 7.31 63 Judges 7.32 63 Local councillors 7.36 64 Police officers 7.37 65 Proposed specific exclusions Witnesses, jurors and electors 7.39 65 Members of Parliament, members of the House of Lords and Government Ministers 7.42 66 Conflict between the jurisdiction of the courts and Parliament 7.43 66 Previous reform proposals 7.45 68 Provisional proposals Fiduciaries 7.50 70 Quasi-fiduciaries 7.51 70 Transnational agency relationships 7.53 71 Individual extra-jurisdictional principals 7.55 71 The public interest of other countries 7.57 72 vi Paragraph Page PART VIII: FORMULATING A MODERN BRIBERY OFFENCE 73 The distinction between corrupt and non-corrupt conduct Is it necessary to draw the distinction? 8.2 73 Some possible criteria 8.4 73 Inducements and rewards 8.5 73 Whether the act procured or rewarded is itself a breach of duty 8.12 76 Refraining from acting in breach of duty 8.14 76 A moral standard 8.24 77 Is a moral element necessary? 8.25 79 A moral element for the private sector only? 8.28 80 Dishonesty 8.30 81 Does the word “corruptly” imply an element of dishonesty? 8.32 82 Should the word “corruptly” be replaced by a requirement of dishonesty? 8.34 82 Should there be an additional requirement of dishonesty? 8.37 83 Specific defences 8.40 84 Openness 8.41 84 The principal’s consent 8.42 85 No obligation to account 8.48 86 Normal practice 8.51 87 Small value 8.53 88 Conclusions 8.58 89 The nature of the benefit 8.59 90 The prohibited acts 8.65 91 The bribee 8.66 91 The briber 8.68 91 Tripartite relationships 8.69 92 Third parties Liability of third parties 8.70 92 Liability of the agent 8.74 93 Liability of the briber 8.76 93 Intermediaries 8.78 94 Persons who have been, or are to become, agents 8.80 95 vii Paragraph Page The mental element 8.82 95 Advantage offered or solicited but not conferred 8.84 96 Advantage conferred, but giver and recipient not equally corrupt 8.85 96 The recipient acts corruptly, but the giver does not 8.87 97 The recipient mistakenly believes that the giver is acting corruptly 8.88 97 The recipient knows that the giver has no corrupt intent 8.90 97 The giver acts corruptly, but the recipient does not 8.92 98 Purported agency 8.95 98 Entrapment 8.100 99 Summary of main proposals and consultation issues 8.102 100 PART IX: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 102 The present law General 9.2 102 The corruption offences 9.7 103 Extension of jurisdiction by the Criminal Justice Act 1948 9.10 103 The Criminal Justice Act 1993 9.13 104 The effect of extending the Criminal Justice Act 1993 to bribery 9.15 105 PART X: ANCILLARY MATTERS 106 The requirement of the Attorney-General’s consent 10.2 106 Justification for the requirement of the Attorney-General’s consent 10.4 106 Recent discussions of the need for the Law Officers’ consent The Consent to Prosecutions Bill 10.6 107 The Home Office submission to the Franks Committee 10.8 108 Issues for consultees 10.11 109 Private prosecutions for corruption 10.12 109 Whose consent should be required 10.15 110 Mode of trial 10.16 110 Sentence 10.17 111 Retrospectivity 10.19 111 False documents 10.20 111 PART XI: PROVING CORRUPTION 113 The presumption 11.2 113 Historical reasons for the creation of the presumption 11.7 114 Justifications of the presumption 11.13 116 Does the presumption infringe the Convention? 11.17 117 The presumption of innocence 11.18 117 Possible implications of the CJPOA 1994 11.25 119 viii Paragraph Page The effects of the presumption and the CJPOA 1994 compared 11.34 122 Establishing a case to answer The existing law 11.35 122 If section 2 were repealed 11.36 122 Where the defendant adduces no evidence The existing law 11.37 123 If section 2 were repealed 11.38 123 Where the defendant does not testify but adduces other evidence The existing law 11.39 123 If section 2 were repealed 11.40 124 Where the defendant testifies The existing law 11.41 124 If section 2 were repealed 11.42 124 Conclusions 11.43 124 Options for reform Option 1: extend the presumption 11.48 125 Option 2: the Hong Kong option 11.51 127 Option 3: reduce the weight of the burden placed by the presumption 11.57 129 Option 4: abolish the presumption 11.61 130 PART XII: THE INVESTIGATION OF CORRUPTION 132 The Serious Fraud Office 12.2 132 Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 Powers 12.3 132 Safeguards 12.6 133 Justification for section 2 powers 12.7 133 Comparison with the CPS and the police 12.8 134 Comparison with the DTI 12.10 135 Section 2 and the Convention 12.16 136 Extending the powers to investigate corruption 12.20 138 Option 1: no change 12.23 138 Option 2: give the police similar powers to those of the SFO in all corruption cases 12.24 139 Option 3: give the police similar powers to those of the SFO in corruption cases falling within the SFO’s terms of reference but, for whatever reason, investigated not by the SFO but by the police 12.25 139 Option 4: create further investigative powers for corruption offences, not identical to those of the SFO 12.26 139 ix Paragraph Page PART XIII: SUMMARY OF PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS, PROPOSALS AND CONSULTATION ISSUES 140 APPENDIX A: EXTRACTS FROM RELEVANT