Copyright© 2018 by University of Massachusetts Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America ISBN 978-1-62534-355-o (paper); 354-3 (hardcover) Designed by Jack Harrison Set in Scala Printed and bound by Maple Press, Inc. Cover design by Sally Nichols Cover art: Plate 412, Lower the curtain, thefarce is ended ( Baissez le rideau, la farce estjouee), by Honore Daumier, from the journal La Caricature, volume no. 201. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Sarat, Austin, editor. I Douglas, Lawrence, editor. I Umphrey, Martha Merrill, editor. Title: Law and performance / edited by Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, Martha Merrill Umphrey. Description: Amherst : University of Massachusetts Press, 2018. I Series: The Amherst series in law, jurisprudence, and social thought I Includes bibliographical references and index. I Identifiers: LCCN 2017050261 (print) I LCCN 2017052142 (ebook) I ISBN 9781613765968 (e-book) I ISBN 9781613765975 (e-book) I ISBN 9781625343543 (hardcover) I ISBN 9781625343550 (pbk.) Subjects: LCSH: Sociological jurisprudence. I Performance art. I Law and art. Classification: LCC K376 (ebook) I LCC K376 .L3554 2018 (print) I DDC 340/.n5-dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017050261 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. CHAPTER 4 Statements before and after Arrests Performingat Law's Edge in Apartheid South Africa CATHERINE M. COLE The field of"law and literature"is by now well established, having formed a professional society, launched a journal, gestated an ample bibliogra­ phy, convened regular conferences, and even become, in the words of one critic,"quaint.''r "Law and performance," by way of contrast, has been a far more nascent, embryonic, and fractured conversation, moving in fits and starts over time, migrating from legal studies to literary studies to medieval and Renaissance studies to theater studies, rhetoric, history, and performance studies. It has not, as of yet, congealed into a coherent conversation much less a well-defined "field," despite the fact that some of its key interventions extend back at least fifty years-and much longer if we care to consider the ancients.2 "Despite the persistence of the trope likening law to theater, despite the vast body of critical writing on'law and literature,' the rise of'Performance Studies' and the more general proliferation of the term 'performance' in critical studies," wrote Julie Stone Peters in 2005,"there has been no sus­ tained theoretical articulation of the nature of legal performance or the meaning of legal theatricality in the critical literature."3 Two years later Dennis Kezar echoed these sentiments when he said that theater remains a "perennial blind spot" in the larger law and literature movement, even though theater and law in the early modern period were not just relevant to each other but were actually defined by an institutional co-presence.4 Henning Grunwald expressed a similar opinion in 2012: "Despite-or perhaps partly because of-manifest structural similarities between 122 Statements before and after Arrests 123 theater and courtroom, between stage and tribunal, scholars of politics, law and culture have been slow to take seriously the performativity of law."5 Perhaps only now, with the publication ofthis edited collection Law and Peiformance, is the question of the relationship of law and perfor­ mance coming clearly into view. Two superb literature reviews on "law and literature" and "law and per­ formance" written by Julie Stone Peters and published in 2005 and 2008 respectively provide excellent introductions to each field, rich in citations and pithy in their identification of key problematics, with insights that remain relevant today.6 Interestingly, mirrors emerge as a key metaphor in both essays. Oflaw and literature, Peters writes: In effect, through this double desire for the other and for the other's projec­ tion of the self, each discipline [law and literature] came to desire in itself what the other discipline had put there. In the disciplinary hall of mirrors, they met in the shared space of mutual projection, in work that acted out both sets of anxieties while repressing some of the most important insights of each discipline.7 Mirrors also figure in Peters's characterization ofthe relationship between law and performance,but here the cross-disciplinary conversation is not figured as a co-equal gazing down a hallway of reflections. Rather, Peters sees theater as "law's twisted mirror, its funhouse double: ever-present, substantiating, mocking, reinforcing, undermining."8 Theater is the object that seems to simultaneously fascinate and disorient, reflect and distort, entice and repel those who think about the law. The twisted mirror may incite vertigo, or perhaps simply exhaust with novelty. For this and other reasons, the pace of the conversation has been slow. Perhaps the most inhibiting obstacle has been a set of pernicious polarities. On the one hand is the proclivity to extoll the "good" (which can be, forinstance, theater's "truth," a na1ve embrace ofits utopian potential for transforma­ tion, or similarly, an uncritical faith in a legal liberal humanist rights dis­ course). On the other hand, we also see haughty (and hasty) disavowals of the "bad" (such as theater's artifice and insincerity, or law's normativity). We would do well to curb kneejerk reactions and pejorative dismissals, as these have demonstrably inhibited a scholarly conversation that has long been identified as compelling, necessary, and important. Perhaps it is time to move beyond the "mirror stage" in the law and performance conversation, with its distortions, projections, misrecogni­ tions, narcissisms, and innate two-dimensionality. The common mode of analysis has been analogy: metaphoric and comparative work on law and 124 Catherine M. Cole theater. This remains a valid line of inquiry, with many important explora­ tions yet still to be done on topics such as law's space, acoustics, costume, gesture, comportment, presence, affect, voice, interactivity, spectatorship, ritual, and liveness in relation to theater. The vocabulary and theories of performativity and theatricality that arose in the r99os and 2000s have pushed the law and performance discourse inaugurated by Milner Ball and others in the r96os and r97os into a far more complex theoretical register.9 So where are we now? What avenues are most likely to advance the law and performanceconversation in substantive ways? I want to advocate for a deeper understanding of the performativityof the law, the way in which one becomes a subject before the law through performative acts, and how the law itself performs especially as it inter­ sects with theater's simultaneous ontic and mimetic dimensions. I agree with Martha Merrill Umphrey that the full implications of Judith Butler's scholarship on performativity and the law have yet to be seriously under­ stood, much less explored, especially in more empirically grounded ways. Among the questions that Butler's work prompts Umphrey to ask are: How do trials "do" law? How are trials "law-making (and not just law-applying or law interpreting) events because of their peiformativity?" 10 Joshua Takano Chambers-Letson's recent book A Race So Different:Peiformance and Law in Asian America provides a sophisticated navigation of the "slippery ground between performativity and performance,"a nuanced appreciation of how law is situational and realized through legal habitus and aesthetic perfor­ mances.n I appreciate his distinction between quotidian and aesthetic are­ nas, as well as the insistence that these are not binary oppositions. There is great value in examining the aesthetic representations of the law in rela­ tionship to "everyday" legal habitus.12 What I propose is a course correc­ tion that balances our disproportionate focus on trials (and related legal "events" such as truth commissions and hearings) as the primary venues for exploringthe relationship between law and performance.13 We need to think more expansively about legal habitus, the performativity of law in arenas and spaces outside of the trial. If we think about law as a set of con­ tingent enunciations performed in many locations, including, in Martha Merrill Umphrey's words, "the street corner, the interrogation room, the district attorney's office, a lynching scene and, of course, the trial," what new lines of scholarly research does this open up?14 My focus here is on the arrest as a situational space where the law asserts itself overtly, hailing subjects-seizing, capturing, charging, and detaining them. Louis Althusser long ago showed us that subjects are ],1 125 Statements before and after Arrests "always already" interpellated by the law. The scene of the arrest or a hailing by a police officer are merely instances that make explicit what is otherwise implicit: the law's pervasive reach as well as law's depen­ dence upon subjects to affirm its legitimacy. That said, arrests are highly performativeiterations of the law; three-dimensional, durational, visceral, and kinetic. Arrests fundamentally change the status of the person appre­ hended. Things are "done" with words in the course of the arrest, to use J. L. Austin's theorization of the performative.rs In the moment of arrest, one sees the paradigmatic trope of interpellation, as theorized by Althusser: I shall then suggest that ideology "acts" or "functions" in such a way that it "recruits" subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or "trans­ forms"the individuals into subjects (it transformsthem all) by that very pre­ cise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: "Hey, you there!" [Note: Hailing as an everyday practice sub­ ject to a precise ritual takes a quite "special" form in the policeman's practice of "hailing" which concerns the hailing of "suspects." Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn round.