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Dixie Mission 1944: the First US Intelligence Encounter with the Chinese Communists

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Dixie Mission 1944: the First US Intelligence Encounter with the Chinese Communists Intelligence Lost in Politics The Dixie Mission 1944: The First US Intelligence Encounter with the Chinese Communists Bob Bergin The Dustbin of History The communists welcomed the contact; they were frank and open The Dixie Mission was one that and willing to tell the Americans failed in conventional terms, what they wanted to know. Not for it didn’t lead anywhere. For everything the Americans heard Not everything the the moment at least it lies in the or saw was understood, but they dustbin of history.1 Americans heard or gathered a wealth of information, saw was understood, The first deep encounter of Amer- raw intelligence to be analyzed and but they gathered a ican officials with the Chinese Com- pondered by the China experts. A munists came in 1944, during World good deal of it concerned the strength wealth of information, War II, when a US Army observer and disposition of Japanese Forces in raw intelligence to be group was sent to meet with the com- North China and the communist Red analyzed and pondered munist leadership at its headquarters Army’s effectiveness in dealing with stronghold at Yenan in North China. them. But what may have been the by the China ex- It was essentially an intelligence most significant, intelligence on the perts. But what may mission: Chinese Communists themselves, ap- have been the most pears to have been disregarded, then, The DIXIE Mission, which and in the years that followed. significant, intelligence consisted of nine members on the Chinese Com- representing the Air Corps, Dixie acquired facts and insights Medical Corps, Signal Corps into the political and military leader- munists themselves, and Infantry and was followed ship of the Chinese Communists at appears to have been a month later by a second a time when little was known about disregarded, then, and contingent, was sent to observe them. The Americans got a good with a purpose: to evaluate look at how the Chinese conducted in the years that fol- the Communist potential for “people’s war,” the model for the lowed. military collaboration against wars of national liberation that would the Japanese. They were also soon confront America in Asia and instructed to assess ‘the most Africa. But the war going on was the effective means of assisting the war with the Japanese, and concerns Communists to increase the about the role of communists in the value of their war effort.’ This future of China would have to wait. meant American aid and an The war ended, and a political American relationship, which debate began in Washington over a was exactly what Chiang Kai- supposed American betrayal of the shek feared and the reason he implacable enemies of the commu- had done his best to obstruct the nists, the Chinese Nationalists. It was mission.”2 renewed in the early 1950s over the The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government. © Bob Bergin, 2019. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 63, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2019) 11 Intelligence Lost in Politics West Point Historical Atlases, World War II, Asia Pacific Theater at https://westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/academics/aca- demic_departments/history/WWII%20Asia/ww2%2520asia%2520map%252036.jpg question, “Who lost China?” The A Blind Spot for US Intelligence tration which was then a blind Dixie Mission’s role was questioned. spot for American intelligence.3 In the spring of 1944, [General The intelligence it produced was said Joseph W.] Stilwell’s head- to be tainted and shunted aside—even As US participation in the China quarters, under the pressure within the US intelligence organi- war—and its alliance with Chiang of a new Japanese offensive zations of the time. The information Kai-shek’s Nationalists—grew, the against central China, began was ignored when it might have been communists faded into the back- to take an interest in the Com- most useful, as US intelligence and ground, behind a Nationalist blockade munist military . Donovan’s military strategists were trying to of “twenty divisions of [Chiang’s] officers at Chungking could no 4 come to grips with world communism best troops.” OSS intelligence chief, longer ignore reports that the and Soviet and Chinese attempts to William Donovan had become aware Communists controlled a force shape the world through revolution— of the communists’ military potential of one million partisans and and in Korea, through outright war. “even before Pearl Harbor,” but OSS intelligence agents in an area of manpower was limited and focused major Japanese troop concen- on the Japanese.5 In October 1943, Roosevelt ordered Donovan “to 12 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 63, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2019) Intelligence Lost in Politics The idea for an observer mission into the communist area gather political intelligence in com- was first suggested by John Paton Davies, a US State munist-controlled areas” of China. Department officer serving as General Stilwell’s political Given Chiang’s refusal to permit any advisor. American access to the communists, it was evident, as Donovan told the president, that OSS could not do its argument was persuasive, or some tions for the guidance of the mission job unless it operated “independent other consideration moved him, the rather than the sort of orders usually of the Chinese and our other allies.”6 Generalissimo suddenly consented to issued to a unit of the United States 9 Collection on the Chinese Commu- the dispatch of observers.” Army.” It listed 19 subjects on which nists would be exceptionally difficult. “information is particularly desired.” Stilwell had already started These included Japanese and pup- The idea for an observer mission working on the mission in February. pet order of battle,a target and bomb into the communist area was first “To ensure observers who would damage assessments, and weather suggested by John Paton Davies, a not be at the mercy of their hosts, and economic intelligence. On the US State Department officer serving Stilwell looked for candidates who communist forces: their strength, as General Stilwell’s political advi- had knowledge of the language and composition, dispositions, equip- sor. In a June 1943 report to Stilwell, acquaintance with China,” Tuchman ment, training, and combat efficiency. Davies noted the importance of the wrote. To lead the mission he chose “No other instructions of any kind, North China area and that the “last “Colonel Barrett, said to be the oral or written, secret or non-secret official American observer to have only American who could tell jokes were ever given me.12 visited the communist region was convincingly in Chinese to Chinese.” Captain Carlson in 1938.”7 Davies He also had a close friendship with 10 sent a second memo to Stilwell in Stilwell. What was Known of the January 1944, which made its way to Col. David D. Barrett was an Chinese Communists? influential presidential advisor Harry assistant military attaché in Peking, Even before Pearl Harbor, Hopkins. In February, Roosevelt between 1924 and 1928, and from General Donovan had received formally requested Chang Kai-shek 1931 to 1936, when he was named information that the Chinese “to permit military observers to go assistant military attaché to Stilwell. Communist soldiers were “the ‘immediately’ to Shansi and Shen- In 1942 he succeeded Stilwell as best guerrilla troops in the si, tactfully omitting to specify the chief military attaché. In early 1944, world, trained under veteran region as Communist. Chiang he was assigned to the Army G-2 leaders of long experience in gracefully agreed to ‘facilitate’ the section at Kweilin. Stilwell selected such tactics, and fired by a bit- mission which, he added, could visit him to head the observer mission on ter hatred of the Japanese.13 only those areas under the Central 25 March 1944.11 Government’s control.”8 Roosevelt Little was known of the political tried again with Chiang in April and On 21 July, the day before the or military situation in China when again met with no success. The pres- mission’s departure for Yenan, Bar- the United States came into the war ident then sent Vice President Henry rett realized he had no orders on what in Asia. The Chinese Communists Wallace to talk with Chiang. the mission was expected to accom- were a particular puzzle, closed off plish. He contacted Colonel Dickey, to outsiders by their own secrecy and In a series of meetings with Wal- G-2 at CBI (China-Burma-India) politics and by the remoteness of lace during 21–24 June 1944, Chiang Headquarters and received a single their Yenan stronghold, where they initially refused. The following day, typed sheet. It was unclassified, un- survived behind the Nationalist Army Wallace stressed “the American need signed, and “without authentication cordon. In the 1930s, two persistent for intelligence from North China, of any kind.” “Actually they were journalists found their way to the particularly in connection with B-29 more in the nature of general instruc- communists and wrote accounts operations. Whether this line of a. Chinese troops belonging to Japanese-established governments in areas of China occupied by the Imperial Japanese Army. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 63, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2019) 13 Intelligence Lost in Politics The first chronicler of the Red Army in action was Ameri- can journalist Agnes Smedley. In 1936, she made her Star Over China—and with Edgar way to Yenan, befriended Red Army commander Chu Teh, Snow’s help—he spent eight months and later accompanied the Red Army in Japanese-con- with the Eighth Route Army, in his trolled areas.
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