Dixie Mission 1944: the First US Intelligence Encounter with the Chinese Communists

Intelligence Lost in Politics The Dixie Mission 1944: The First US Intelligence Encounter with the Chinese Communists

Bob Bergin The Dustbin of History The communists welcomed the contact; they were frank and open The Dixie Mission was one that and willing to tell the Americans failed in conventional terms, what they wanted to know. Not for it didn’t lead anywhere. For everything the Americans heard Not everything the the moment at least it lies in the or saw was understood, but they dustbin of history.1 Americans heard or gathered a wealth of information, saw was understood, The first deep encounter of Amer- raw intelligence to be analyzed and but they gathered a ican officials with the Chinese Com- pondered by the China experts. A munists came in 1944, during World good deal of it concerned the strength wealth of information, War II, when a US Army observer and disposition of Japanese Forces in raw intelligence to be group was sent to meet with the com- North China and the communist Red analyzed and pondered munist leadership at its headquarters Army’s effectiveness in dealing with stronghold at Yenan in North China. them. But what may have been the by the China ex- It was essentially an intelligence most significant, intelligence on the perts. . . . But what may mission: Chinese Communists themselves, ap- have been the most pears to have been disregarded, then, The DIXIE Mission, which and in the years that followed. significant, intelligence consisted of nine members on the Chinese Com- representing the Air Corps, Dixie acquired facts and insights Medical Corps, Signal Corps into the political and military leader- munists themselves, and Infantry and was followed ship of the Chinese Communists at appears to have been a month later by a second a time when little was known about disregarded, then, and contingent, was sent to observe them. The Americans got a good with a purpose: to evaluate look at how the Chinese conducted in the years that fol- the Communist potential for “people’s war,” the model for the lowed. military collaboration against wars of national liberation that would the Japanese. They were also soon confront America in Asia and instructed to assess ‘the most Africa. But the war going on was the effective means of assisting the war with the Japanese, and concerns Communists to increase the about the role of communists in the value of their war effort.’ This future of China would have to wait. meant American aid and an The war ended, and a political American relationship, which debate began in Washington over a was exactly what Chiang Kai- supposed American betrayal of the shek feared and the reason he implacable enemies of the commu- had done his best to obstruct the nists, the Chinese Nationalists. It was mission.”2 renewed in the early 1950s over the

The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government. © Bob Bergin, 2019.

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West Point Historical Atlases, World War II, Asia Pacific Theater at https://westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/academics/aca- demic_departments/history/WWII%20Asia/ww2%2520asia%2520map%252036.jpg question, “Who lost China?” The A Blind Spot for US Intelligence tration which was then a blind Dixie Mission’s role was questioned. spot for American intelligence.3 In the spring of 1944, [General The intelligence it produced was said Joseph W.] Stilwell’s head- to be tainted and shunted aside—even As US participation in the China quarters, under the pressure within the US intelligence organi- war—and its alliance with Chiang of a new Japanese offensive zations of the time. The information Kai-shek’s Nationalists—grew, the against central China, began was ignored when it might have been communists faded into the back- to take an interest in the Com- most useful, as US intelligence and ground, behind a Nationalist blockade munist military . . . Donovan’s military strategists were trying to of “twenty divisions of [Chiang’s] officers at Chungking could no 4 come to grips with world communism best troops.” OSS intelligence chief, longer ignore reports that the and Soviet and Chinese attempts to William Donovan had become aware Communists controlled a force shape the world through revolution— of the communists’ military potential of one million partisans and and in Korea, through outright war. “even before Pearl Harbor,” but OSS intelligence agents in an area of manpower was limited and focused major Japanese troop concen- on the Japanese.5 In October 1943, Roosevelt ordered Donovan “to

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The idea for an observer mission into the communist area gather political intelligence in com- was first suggested by John Paton Davies, a US State munist-controlled areas” of China. Department officer serving as General Stilwell’s political Given Chiang’s refusal to permit any advisor. American access to the communists, it was evident, as Donovan told the president, that OSS could not do its argument was persuasive, or some tions for the guidance of the mission job unless it operated “independent other consideration moved him, the rather than the sort of orders usually of the Chinese and our other allies.”6 Generalissimo suddenly consented to issued to a unit of the United States 9 Collection on the Chinese Commu- the dispatch of observers.” Army.” It listed 19 subjects on which nists would be exceptionally difficult. “information is particularly desired.” Stilwell had already started These included Japanese and pup- The idea for an observer mission working on the mission in February. pet order of battle,a target and bomb into the communist area was first “To ensure observers who would damage assessments, and weather suggested by John Paton Davies, a not be at the mercy of their hosts, and economic intelligence. On the US State Department officer serving Stilwell looked for candidates who communist forces: their strength, as General Stilwell’s political advi- had knowledge of the language and composition, dispositions, equip- sor. In a June 1943 report to Stilwell, acquaintance with China,” Tuchman ment, training, and combat efficiency. Davies noted the importance of the wrote. To lead the mission he chose “No other instructions of any kind, North China area and that the “last “Colonel Barrett, said to be the oral or written, secret or non-secret official American observer to have only American who could tell jokes were ever given me.12 visited the communist region was convincingly in Chinese to Chinese.” Captain Carlson in 1938.”7 Davies He also had a close friendship with 10 sent a second memo to Stilwell in Stilwell. What was Known of the January 1944, which made its way to Col. David D. Barrett was an Chinese Communists? influential presidential advisor Harry assistant military attaché in Peking, Even before Pearl Harbor, Hopkins. In February, Roosevelt between 1924 and 1928, and from General Donovan had received formally requested Chang Kai-shek 1931 to 1936, when he was named information that the Chinese “to permit military observers to go assistant military attaché to Stilwell. Communist soldiers were “the ‘immediately’ to Shansi and Shen- In 1942 he succeeded Stilwell as best guerrilla troops in the si, tactfully omitting to specify the chief military attaché. In early 1944, world, trained under veteran region as Communist. . . . Chiang he was assigned to the Army G-2 leaders of long experience in gracefully agreed to ‘facilitate’ the section at Kweilin. Stilwell selected such tactics, and fired by a bit- mission which, he added, could visit him to head the observer mission on ter hatred of the Japanese.13 only those areas under the Central 25 March 1944.11 Government’s control.”8 Roosevelt Little was known of the political tried again with Chiang in April and On 21 July, the day before the or military situation in China when again met with no success. The pres- mission’s departure for Yenan, Bar- the United States came into the war ident then sent Vice President Henry rett realized he had no orders on what in Asia. The Chinese Communists Wallace to talk with Chiang. the mission was expected to accom- were a particular puzzle, closed off plish. He contacted Colonel Dickey, to outsiders by their own secrecy and In a series of meetings with Wal- G-2 at CBI (China-Burma-India) politics and by the remoteness of lace during 21–24 June 1944, Chiang Headquarters and received a single their Yenan stronghold, where they initially refused. The following day, typed sheet. It was unclassified, un- survived behind the Nationalist Army Wallace stressed “the American need signed, and “without authentication cordon. In the 1930s, two persistent for intelligence from North China, of any kind.” “Actually they were journalists found their way to the particularly in connection with B-29 more in the nature of general instruc- communists and wrote accounts operations. Whether this line of a. Chinese troops belonging to Japanese-established governments in areas of China occupied by the Imperial Japanese Army.

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The first chronicler of the Red Army in action was Ameri- can journalist Agnes Smedley. . . . In 1936, she made her Star Over China—and with Edgar way to Yenan, befriended Red Army commander Chu Teh, Snow’s help—he spent eight months and later accompanied the Red Army in Japanese-con- with the Eighth Route Army, in his trolled areas. view “the only Chinese military organization that is consistently winning engagements with the Japanese.” He of the Chinese Communist move- The first chronicler of the Red wrote: “These troops are the most ment and its leadership. Later, a US Army in action was American jour- mobile I have ever seen. . . . This Marine Corps officer provided his nalist Agnes Smedley. She came to force will continue to resist the Japa- professional assessment of the Red Shanghai in 1928 as a journalist for nese if every other unit in China lays Army and its effectiveness. Frankfurter Zeitung.a In 1936, she down its arms. . . . And the resistance made her way to Yenan, befriended will be effective.”17 Edgar Snow’s Red Star Over Red Army commander Chu Teh,b China appeared in England at the end and later accompanied the Red Army All three writers were criticized as of 1937 and in the United States soon in Japanese-controlled areas. Her too sympathetic to the communists. afterwards. It received lavish praise China Fights Back: An American As a professional soldier, Carlson in as “a stunning and significant jour- Woman with the Eighth Route Army, particular attracted criticism from his 14 nalistic coup.” “Among the almost published in 1938, was the earliest peers and others. President Roosevelt two hundred influential Americans. . . account of the Red Army at war. It told Edgar Snow, “but the Marine

Snow’s volume was cited second was also well received, but not nearly Corps still insists he’s a Red!”18 And only to Pearl Buck’s blockbuster . . . as popular as Snow’s book. that was in 1944, when Carlson was The Good earth as a key source of already a legend. After the Unit- their picture of the Chinese.”15 De- A professional view of the Red spite criticism for believing too much Army came from of what the communists told him, a US Marine Snow turned his four-month sojourn Captain, Evans with the communist leadership into a Carlson—the ap- literary classic. But how useful could parent source of it be to a serious student of China? OSS Chief Dono- Harvard China scholar (and former van’s information OSS and Office of War Information cited above. Carl- [OWI] officer) John King Fairbank son had already addressed that years later: “[Red Star completed two Over China] not only gave the first tours in China connected history of Mao and his when he returned colleagues and where they had come there in 1937 as a from, but also gave a prospect of the language student future. . . . The book has stood the and observer Agnes Smedley (left) with Western literary figures, George Barnard test of time on both these counts—as with the Chinese Shaw and Harold Isaacs. The Chinese members of the group are a historical record and as an indica- Nationalist Army. from left to right: Soong Ching Ling, Cai Yuan-p’ei, Lin Yu-t’ang, tion of a trend.”16 Inspired by Red and Lu Hsun in undated photo from the 1930s. Source Wikimedia Commons. a. In Shanghai, Smedley was a close associate of legendary Soviet spy Richard Sorge: “The only person in China upon whom I knew I could depend on was Agnes Smedley,” said Sorge. “I solicited her aid in establishing my group in Shanghai . . . used [her]. . . as a direct member of my group.” Her involvement with the Chinese Red Army does not appear related to Sorge’s efforts as a Soviet agent. Source: Gordon W. Prange with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, Target Tokyo: The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring (Early Bird Books, 1984 [ebook]), Chapter 3. Recent information from Soviet Archives and other sources seem to confirm allegations that Smedley was an agent of the Comintern and later of the Soviet Union. Source: Ruth Price, The Lives of Agnes Smedley (Oxford Press, 2005), 6. b. Names of Chinese Communist officials will be rendered in the Wade-Giles romanization system most widely used during the period of this story. So too with locations, unless popular usage differs, as it does with Peiking, Nanking and Chungking.

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ed States entered WWII, Carlson became the creator and leader of the US Marine Corps Raiders, which operated according to philosophy and tactics he had learned from the Red Army.a

In 1944 there was no current “intelligence” on the Chinese Com- munists, but the journalistic accounts and Captain Carlson’s reports were reasonably accurate, although of questionable credibility to some readers. The pictures they painted were rosy, but they did provide good insight into the communist leaders and the strength and direction of their movement. The Red Army and the On 5 October a delegation of US military officers and friends of Colonel Barrett arrived bearing a Legion of Merit for him. They were welcomed by Chairman Mao and Communist guerrilla tactics that became people’s army commander Chu Teh. Photo in Wikimedia Commons, official military photo from war are well described. Together, the Barrett’s memoir, Dixie Mission, (photo 21). three accounts may be as good as what intelligence officers of the time The United States Army The First contingent of nine ob- could have produced, even better, Observer Group servers of the Dixie Mission arrived perhaps; All three writers had exten- at Yenan, in Shensi Province, North [T]he most exciting event ever sive China experience and progres- China on 22 July 1944; the second since the war against Japan sive political views that should have contingent, also of nine, arrived on started.19 helped them comprehend the ways of 7 August. Two of the 18 represented the Chinese Communists.b Their com- Because the Generalissimo had the Department of State; four officers bined work—once their biases are objected to the designation of and one sergeant were from the OSS. recognized—was a good overview the unit as a “mission,” it was One officer was from AGAS, one and could have served as the basis for named the Observer Group. . . . from the US Navy, five from the US specific intelligence requirements the Also, because for some months Army Air Corps (two of whom were Dixie Mission might have addressed c my colleagues and I had sport- from AGFRTS), and an assortment to fill gaps in the picture of the Chi- ingly called the Communist area of US Army officers, mostly infantry, nese communists in 1944. There is no Dixie—a rebel territory—the but including a doctor, Major Melvin indication that was considered. observers were also referred to, A. Casberg, from the Army Medical among Americans, as the Dixie Corps (who would be both Dixie

Mission.20 physician and intelligence collector.)

a. And Carlson brought the Chinese words “Gung Ho” (together) into the vocabulary of Marines. Source: Thomas, Season of High Adven- ture, 172. b. Some have argued that they did not fully comprehend the movement: “Despite Snow’s (and Mao’s) careful emphasis on the Reds’ Marxist-Leninist credentials and goals, the book left a lasting impression that these revolutionaries were only so-called Communists.” Even among US China experts, the Chinese Communists were long looked on as agrarian reformers. Captain Carlson thought “he had witnessed among the Reds a unique example of Christian ethics and brotherhood in practice.”Source: Thomas, 178. Socialist Agnes Smedley strongly supported the communists and wrote enthusiastically, but her work adds to the sense of what people’s war could be. c. AGAS was the “Air Ground Aid Service,” to assist the escape of American POWs; AGFRTS was the “Air and Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff,” an OSS/14th Air Force unit hidden from Dai Li inside the Fourteenth Air Force structure.

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Lectures began the morning after our arrival . . . we were scheduled for talks with senior cadres, most of whom had selected for Dixie after completing been teachers at Whampoa Military Academy in the 1920s 15 months operating against the . . . [who] shared with us what they considered their most Japanese in Burma. He had helped effective military tactics organize the Kachin Scouts and led them in intelligence and guerrilla operations. Raised in Tianjin, China, a In line with Stilwell’s wish for expe- Working Days at Yenan where his US Army captain father rienced people, most of the observers Lectures began the morning had retired, he was a proficient Chi- were old China hands, or had other after our arrival . . . we were nese speaker. He saw his job in Yenan b extensive experience in Asia. scheduled for talks with senior as investigating “the potential of using Chinese Communist Armies.”23 The C-47 carrying the first contin- cadres, most of whom had been teachers at Whampoa Military His memoir, The Spirit of Yenan, gent arrived at Yenan at about noon which was published in 1991, would on 22 July 1944. The airstrip was Academy in the 1920s . . . [who] shared with us what they consid- provide some of the most detailed, small and had not been used for sev- and colorful, accounts of Chinese eral years. As the aircraft rolled down ered their most effective military tactics . . . Of all our teachers Communist forces and their behavior the runway, the left landing gear sud- in and around Yenan during the life of denly collapsed into an ancient grave . . . Mao was the most interest- 22 the mission. no one knew was there. The spinning ing. propeller separated from the engine In turn, the Americans taught the Colling was eager to get out of and sheared through the fuselage communists new guerrilla warfare Yenan and join the Red Army in the right behind the pilot. No one was techniques. Capt. John Colling, the field. It would be a month before that injured. Standing by the door when most senior OSS member of the mis- happened, however. In the interim, he the team exited was Chou En-lai, sion, was a demolitions expert, and was introduced to intelligence possi- ready to introduce the other import- he had brought along 400 pounds of bilities at Yenan: Red Army Chief of ant communist officials waiting with state-of-the-art demolition supplies, Staff, General Yeh Chian-ying, want- the crowd. There was also an honor including Composition C, a new ed an “Air Intelligence” organization guard, and many curious peasants. putty-like explosive, and Primacord, for the Red Army. With AGAS assis- The Americans were taken to their a highly effective detonating cord. tance, a plan was drawn up in the first quarters, the famous Yenan caves, Colling did four demonstrations, each week. Colling himself had a special “really not caves at all, but short tun- drew over 1,000 interested observers.c top secret project he hoped to move nels. . . cut into the steep hillside and The communists were impressed, and forward at Yenan. Named the “Apple lined with beautifully fitted blocks of eager to obtain such equipment. To Project,” its objective was to acquire 21 hewn stone.” Then came an “excel- Colling’s regret that was not possible; actual Japanese perspectives on the lent” lunch and an introduction to life arming the communists was beyond effectiveness of US B-29 bombing 24 in Yenan. the Dixie charter. of Japanese cities.” An improbable task, but at Yenan it would become Colling brought extraordinary possible. experience to the team, having been a. Casberg spent four months behind Japanese lines, “hiking with the Chinese Communists by night and hiding during the day.” Source: Caroline J. Carter, Mission to Yenan (The University Press of Kentucky, 1997), 33. b. After the original Dixie Mission ended in about January 1945, the United States maintained a small presence at Yenan until 1947. From 22 July 1944 to 11 April 1946, the mission was called the US Army Observer Group; From 13 April until the last man departed Yenan in 1947, it was called the Yenan Liaison Group. These residual elements were also called the “Dixie mission.” This article covers only the approximate first six months, when the majority of the original 18-member observer group was still engaged inYenan. By early 1945, communist leaders had begun to leave the region for other areas in a race to take control of territory as the Japanese left the country. c. “The biggest bang,” in Colling’s demonstrations “came from a .22 caliber assassination pistol.” It had a hair trigger, and Colling’s assistant managed to accidentally fire off a round that “whistled past Chou En-lai’s ear. There was a stunned silence - broken only when the imperturbable Chou, smiled and casually quipped, ‘Close.’” Source: Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 72.

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Soon after he arrived in Yenan, Colonel Barrett was pre- Two other US priorities were sented an insight into Red Army acquisition and use of also implemented with communist intelligence information at the most fundamental level. assistance. The first was obtaining weather reports, essential to the 14th at Abbott and Costello.”28 When the knew precisely the order of bat- Air Force’s bombing missions and to weather was good, everyone went tle of Japanese divisions; enemy the US Navy’s warships closing on to the dances in the pear garden, and lines of communications; the the Asian mainland. “Large num- “capered . . . to the noise of a battered spectrum of occupation zones.35 bers of small radios . . . were sent to phonograph playing scratchy records distant parts of the communist-con- of ancient vintage.” Mao always at- White’s evaluation of Chinese trolled areas, and an astonishingly tended and accepted invitations from intelligence capabilities was reason- large number of useful reports, sent pigtailed girls who asked, “Chairman, ably accurate. It became apparent by means of these small radios, were 29, a that the Red Army had good account- 25 please dance with me.” received in Yenan.” ings of the Japanese Army’s strength and disposition in areas where the The other priority was the rescue 30 communists operated. Understanding of downed American aircrews. “One An “Intelligence Cornucopia” how the Chinese Communist system of the most strategically beneficial O brave new world, that has functioned, however, required a bit contributions the Dixie Mission such people in ‘t!31 of learning that would provide some [made] . . . was the development surprises. of a rescue system . . . for Ameri- Time magazine’s man in China, journalist Theodore H. White, arrived can airmen downed in Communist Soon after he arrived in Yenan, with the second Dixie contingent.32 territories behind Japanese lines.” Colonel Barrett was presented an He was well-received by the commu- B-29s returning from missions over insight into Red Army acquisition nists.33 Later, he wrote an enthusiastic Tokyo, low on fuel and sometimes and use of intelligence information overview of communist intelligence with battle damage, had to cross at the most fundamental level. On capabilities based on interviews with Japanese-occupied areas of North 26 August, at Barrett’s request, the 11 of the 13 Politburo members at China. Red Army intelligence and its 718th regiment put on a tactical direct help with the rescues made it Yenan: “Their frankness, in wartime, possible for AGAS to save “approxi- on their dispositions, plans, move- mately 300 American lives.”27 AGAS ments, was to me astounding.”34 Lieutenant Whittlesey, who helped White was looking for a story; he implement the system, was Dixie’s was not bound by a list of questions only casualty, shot by the Japanese seeking specific answers. The lack of when he and his Chinese counterpart stricture let him see what he might entered a village they believed had not have been expecting: been abandoned by the Japanese.27 The generals in the politburo When the day’s work was done, admitted they knew nothing of there were friendly dinners and the use of modern artillery; that they knew nothing of aviation, occasional banquets. The communists Colonel Barrett, wearing his newly awarded presented theatrical performances, that their own staff work was Legion of Merit, was given a bouquet of and the Americans hosted showings primitive; that their commu- flowers by Chu Teh’s wife. Shown here is of American films. Smedley wrote nications net was rudimenta- Mao admiring the bougquet Source: Wi- of Gen. Chu Teh that he “was seen ry. . . . But their intelligence kimedia Commons, official military photo service was spectacular: they from Barrett’s memoir, Dixie Mission, at almost every showing, howling (photo 25). a. The dances were Smedley’s legacy, a tradition she started at Yenan in 1937. After the work day, “During such idle, friendly moments I would often line everyone up and teach them the Virginia Reel . . . General Chu . . . would swing his partner do-si-do and kick up the dust with a gust as great as that of the youngest guard in the line.” Source: Smedley, The Great Road, 3.

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“Classroom work consisted mostly of sitting around in small rooms and reading the [Liberation Daily].” Back at would remain at the center of the Yenan, Barrett expressed his disappointment to the Chi- Chinese Communist movement for nese chief of staff. Once again, Barrett had missed the decades, while the “wars of national significance of what he had seen. liberation” it inspired would be the preoccupation of US intelligence and military strategists over the many exercise, a sham battle. The Chinese In his foreword to Barrett’s book, long years of the Cold War. scenario included the appearance of a Fairbank explained what Barrett had Japanese regiment. Barrett asked how missed—the birth of people’s war, a the Red Army would have learned of new era that Barrett, like most others Observing People’s War then, could not see or grasp. “One the Japanese presence; where had the The mobilization of the common fascination of this memoir,” Fairbank information come from? “The people people throughout the country wrote, “is to see how one can be a told us.” Had there been patrolling will create a vast sea in which true China hand and yet remain in or reconnaissance “to determine the to drown the enemy.”39 possible intentions of the enemy?” some ways quite culture bound:” That was not necessary; “everything A number of Dixie Mission Barrett is reporting on the needed was learned from the peo- observers would visit “Japanese 36, a Chinese Communist forces . . . ple.” Barrett was not impressed, Resistance Bases,” the areas inside but he sees them in the Ameri- but he failed to see something very Japanese-occupied territory that were can military categories which significant. under Red Army control, and report exclude politics. He finds their back their impressions that “the military training school really Shortly afterwards, Barrett Communists were being supported doing next to nothing militarily; visited the “Japanese Resistance by the entire civil population.” To the trainees seem to spend their Military-political University” at which Chairman Mao remarked, “if time merely reading the [Libera- Suiteh, northeast of Yenan, where they did not have the support of the tion Daily]. Out of this reading, a small village had been turned people, they would never survive of course, came the revolution- into dormitories and classrooms. in areas virtually surrounded by the ary army so ideologically in- At this military university, Barrett Japanese.”40 discovered, there was “no military doctrinated that it could retain instruction. . . . It was actually sort popular support and operate On a first encounter with peo- of a rest and recreation center where decentralized but under disci- ple’s war, professional US military party workers, officers, and enlisted pline. On manoeuvers Barrett officers—their careers devoted to the men were sent for recuperation and finds the Communists rely on study and practice of conventional indoctrination. . . . Classroom work the populace to get accurate in- warfare—the concept must have been consisted mostly of sitting around in telligence on the enemy and so perplexing. It required the full in- small rooms and reading the [Liber- fail to do that energetic scouting volvement of the civilian population ation Daily].” Back at Yenan, Barrett and patrolling that has been as an effective adjunct to the main expressed his disappointment to the part and parcel of the American fighting force. The Dixie observers Chinese chief of staff.37 Once again, army tradition since the French who went into the field with the Red

Barrett had missed the significance of and Indian War.”38 Army saw that the Chinese people what he had seen. were indeed engaged against the Jap- People’s war was central to anese invader. Under the Red Army’s almost all things at Yenan, as it a. John Stuart Service, the diplomatic observer for Stilwell and the US embassy in Chungking, echoed the observation, commenting in his collection of despatches on Major Casberg’s report: “The Eighth Route Army depends to a great extent on the People’s Militia for intelligence . . . While I was behind the Japanese lines in the Eighth sub district the military men in our party could give me daily information on the exact movements of the enemy around us. . . . When we attacked a blockhouse we knew not only the exact number and size of the firearms, the exact number of the soldiers, both Japanese and puppet, but also in many cases even the names of the soldiers.” Source: John S. Service, Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service, 238.

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tutelage, peasants and other citizenry had become porters and guides and soldiers and spies—and appeared to be very effective at it. The Dixie team in the field experienced how good it could be:

Intelligence cover is absolute. We were at all times within ten or fifteen miles of Japanese strong points. We at times slept within one mile of Japanese blockhouses. The [Communist] officers at all times had complete knowledge of the where- abouts and exact strength of Japanese forces in the area.41

Central to people’s war was the People’s Militia. The Red Army was dependent on the People’s Militia for more than intelligence. Early on, Colling had noted the militia presence at Yenan: “The People’s Militia, a critical extension of the . . . Red Army, was a homemade Army comprised of Chinese peasants. Their arsenal included picks, shovels, and flintlocks. . . . At times it was hard to tell where the People’s Militia stopped and the Red Army began.”42 Colling’s appreciation of the militia would deepen when he joined their operations in the field.

Other Dixie members witnessed the militia at work, chief among A portion of a John Stuart Service report to Washington. John Service, Report No. 1, 7/28/1944., to Commanding General Fwd. Ech., USAF; CBI, APO 879. First Formal Im- them the Dixie doctor, Major M.A. pressions of Northern Shensi Communist Base. State Department, NARA, RG 59. Casberg, “who in seven weeks had trekked a thousand miles through the Eighth Route Army to fight near the front are organized by the guerrilla areas.” His report was the Japanese. In some ways it the People’s Militia for rapid on medical conditions in communist resembles the Minutemen of evacuation. These minutemen areas, but he included descriptions on our Revolutionary War days, keep constant watch over Jap- the overall situation in the “fighting for they are really civilians, re- anese strongpoints and spread zone.” On the People’s Militia he ceiving no pay and wearing no the alarm the moment the enemy writes: uniforms. Their support comes starts on the march.”43 In brief, this unit is an orga- from their farms. Each member has a rifle . . . and three or four Casberg described the “elaborate nization of peasants banded caves which extend a distance of two together and cooperating with hand grenades. . . . Villages

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miles underground . . . as a means that the prisoners had been ‘thor- Other Contemporaneous Per- of escape from the raiding parties of oughly brainwashed,” noting that the spectives on POW Treatment the enemy,” and militia mine warfare term itself was not in ‘common use’ in Communist Hands so effective “that in many areas the at the time.49 (The only American at Japanese are afraid to venture far Yenan who appears to have come into The American Embassy’s Japanese from their blockhouses.”44 A final contact with the idea of brainwashing Specialist, John Emmerson, had section of his report contains his ob- was Theodore White.b) Meanwhile, arrived in Yenan in October. He servations of the Eighth Route Army back at the OWI headquarters in reported that he had spent several frustrating months in Burma with regulars. He begins: “There have Washington, John Fairbanks was fol- General Merrill in an unproduc- been numerous accusations by the lowing these developments closely: tive effort to interrogate Japanese Kuomintang that the Eighth Route prisoners. Emmerson contrasted his Army is not fighting the Japanese. I can vividly recall the fascina- experiences with those in Yenan: The From my observation I am convinced tion with which we greeted . . . Chinese Communists, employing that nothing could be further from the the reports on Chinese commu- very effective psychological warfare, had achieved remarkable success truth.”45 nist success in psychological warfare against the Japanese in dealing with Japanese soldiers. Communist interrogation methods, . . . by our own observer there, based more on persuasion than force Intelligence Exploita- Francis McCracken Fisher . . . or brutality, led to much valuable tion of Japanese POWs Japanese troops had almost intelligence information about the never surrendered to American enemy.52 Particularly valuable as sources forces. . . . Despite the leaflets According to the information obtained of intelligence were the Japa- so assiduously dropped on them nese prisoners of war.”46 in Yenan, about 2500 Japanese by the O.W.I . . . the Japanese soldiers were captured by Red Army captured alive had usually been When Colonel Barrett was given troops between July 1937 and De- unconscious at the time. . . . cember 1944.53 a tour of the Japanese POW quarters Fischer sent back food for at Yenan, he found about 150 cap- After three days, all prisoners were thought.”50 tured Japanese soldiers, “a number given the option of returning freely to their unit, and according to League which seemed impressive to me in Captain Colling was quick to comparison with the 25 or so held members, sometimes a prisoner recognize the “strategic importance” would choose to leave However, a by the Nationalist Government just of the JEL. The league was directed three-day absence from any Jap- 47, a outside Chungking.” All were by Susumu Okano,c who had orga- anese troop unit meant summary wearing Chinese Communist uni- nized it and the associated Japanese execution, and so most decided to 54 forms. The Chinese referred to them Peasant and Workers School. The remain.” not as prisoners, but as “members school helped the Japanese POWs of the Japanese People’s Liberation assimilate into their new life with the other media flowed. It was through 48 [or Emancipation] League,” Barrett Red Army, and turned them willing these newspaper and radio reports considered the possibility that some collaborators.51 “The league also that Okano received messages in were Chinese “ringers” posing as operated an intelligence network code from his sources in the Japanese

Japanese, but “prisoners later inter- that ran from behind Japanese lines media. viewed . . . were genuine Japanese.” in China to Tokyo, through which a Barrett also suggested the probability stream of Japanese newspapers and a. Barbara Tuchman added: “No one had ever seen the prisoners claimed by the Kuomintang except for a token group which was always the same, like the captured helmets.” Source: Tuchman, Stillwell, 476. b. The head of K’ang-Ta (Fight Japan) University at Yenan, Politburo member P’eng Chen, told White that “whether semiliterate battalion commanders or college-trained intellectuals, [his students] had to have their minds washed out, had to be remolded in ideology.” Source: White, In Search of History, 256. c. Okano was Sanzo Nosaka, a founding member of the Japanese Communist Party. He spent the war years in Yenan. After the war he returned to Japan to lead the Japanese Communist Party.

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Using Okano’s sources and the classes, and to help China win Colling on POW and Militia coded message system from Tokyo, the war.”57 Cooperation Colling’s “Apple Project” was made a reality.55 The accepted US view General Chu later issued an order At San Chiao we took an import- was that the Japanese would fight to to all Eighth Route Army troops for- ant blockhouse that overlooked the last man to defend the Japanese bidding “injury or insult . . . confis- the railway line . . . and were able homeland. Apple Project information cation or damage to [POW] personal to take about a dozen prisoners with the help of JEL members who revealed that B-29 bombings were possessions . . . and required “special care and medical treatment . . . to all accompanied us on the raid. . . . On demoralizing the Japanese people and nights before a blockhouse was to eroding their will to fight, knowledge sick or wounded Japanese captives,” be stormed. . . JEL members would that was an important factor in US as well as “proper work” for those speak through megaphones, calling 58 planning at that stage of the war. who wish to remain in China. to the soldiers in the blockhous, telling them . . .their cause was Good treatment of POWs, unlike At Yenan, General Chu’s orders hopeless . . . to remain meant certain the traditional practice of torturing were still being carried out. Colling death, and that if they surrendered voluntarily, they would . . . live to and killing captives, was first estab- and others who accompanied Chi- nese combat units noted that the see their families. . . .Coming from a lished in 1938, by Red Army com- Japanese whose accent cannot be mander Chu Teh.56 Agnes Smedley, communists, working with the JEL, mistaken, this was convincing. accompanying the Eighth Route “devised ingenious methods to lure Army then, wrote how this came disgruntled Japanese troops to fight As we approached our target area, San Chiao, the sound of marching about after a battle with the Japanese alongside them . . . tapping into tele- phone lines, dispatching letters, and feet of the peasants echoed off the 20th Division in early November hills. . . . hundreds and hundreds of 1937. The first two “uninjured” Japa- infiltrating comfort kits” across the them. . . . Of the 120 Eighth Route nese had been captured, “one a radio lines. Once in Chinese hands, new Army Members . . . only 40 of us took operator, one an infantry captain.” POWs “were given food and ciga- the blockhouse. . . . eight of us dug They were shown to the local people rettes . . . as though they were among underneath its foundation to build a tunnel into the middle . . . where the as part of a program to organize the friends. After a few days interroga- tions would begin. . . . Sometimes the explosives were set . . .we blew the anti-Japanese resistance. “Pandemo- blockhouse, setting it afire. . . . The nium broke loose and hoarse voices prisoner told everything. . . . when a JEL men showed Japanese charac- shouted: “Kill the devils!” To restore prisoner was stubborn and refused to ter cards and told the soldiers inside, order, General Chu addressed the talk, they were educated slowly and ‘We won’t hurt you if you come out town’s people: methodically. During this period of and surrender [or] we’d have to seal continued education, a prisoner was them alive inside. . . . that brought He asked the people to realize given a fair amount of freedom and them out immediately. . . . about 100 members of the Peoples’s Militia . . . that the Japanese soldiers were detained in a place called a “guest knocked it down brick by brick.61 workers and peasants who had house.” 59 been conscripted and sent to anxious to travel to forward areas got China by the Japanese war- their chance to escape the “diplomat- lords and financial magnates. With the Red Army, the People’s ic games” at Yenan and see the Red The Japanese people had not Militia and the JEL in the Field Army in the field, to gain the “experi- made this war, he said, and “On 4 September 1944, we left ence to file a realistic report docu- large numbers of Japanese 62 Yenan for the Chin-Cha-Chi menting the Communists potential.” anti-fascists had already been border region where we would On the 4th, Colling, Navy Lt. Herbert imprisoned or killed for oppos- work with the Eighth Route Hitch—the only Navy man attached ing it. The Eighth Route Army 63 Army and the People’s Mili- to the mission —and Army Air intended to capture, educate, tia.”60 Forces Lt. Louis Jones left Yenan for and train Japanese soldiers to the Chin-Cha-Chi border region on fight their own rapacious ruling In early September, Captain horseback. Their equipment went by Colling and other mission members mule. “Piles of rubble where towns

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once stood were constant reminders Enter the Special Em- Barrett quickly told Chou En-lai of the consequences of Japanese issary of the President who the visitor was. Chou “dis- 64 domination.” “War for the villagers of the United States appeared in a cloud of dust,” but meant saving their land. Seventy-five reappeared quickly with Mao and percent of the villagers we met did Hurley’s arrival in Yenan during a “hastily mustered” honor guard. not know much about either Chiang that first week in November General Hurley reviewed the troops, Kai-shek or Mao. They were eager to 1944, to begin negotiations with “drew himself to his full impressive accept us, and the villagers showed Chinese communists, is a clas- height . . . and let out a Choctaw war their respect for the Red Army with sic instance of the derailment of whoop. . . . I shall never forget the 68 the unconditional sharing of food, history by accident.” expression on the faces of Mao and shelter and resources.”65 Chou,” Barrett recalled.70 Hurley had On a dull November afternoon, come to Yenan to solve the problem the usual crowd of Chinese and Colling took note of the losses the of the communists. Japanese were suffering and wrote Americans gathered at the Yenan that they had “adopted what could be airstrip to await an incoming flight. Hurley was a corporate lawyer called a ‘fort’ policy” in which they The C-47 arrived, and a second air- and self-made millionaire from “constructed defensive outposts using craft appeared. Some recognized it as Oklahoma. Born in a log cabin in forced labor by the local populace.” Stilwell’s former command airplane. Indian territory, he was for a time “From these forts they could emerge From it stepped “a tall gray haired, the national attorney for the Choc- at strategic periods . . . to engulf and soldierly, extremely handsome man taw Nation. A soldier in World War lay waste the surrounding territory. wearing one of the most beautifully I, he became secretary of war in the 69 The Chinese answer was to destroy tailored uniforms I have ever seen.” Herbert Hoover administration. A Re- the blockhouses.”66 As a demolition Colonel Barrett recognized Maj. Gen. publican, he supported the Roosevelt expert, Colling was a natural partic- Patrick J. Hurley, special emissary of administration, and became useful ipant: the president. Neither the Americans to the president as his representative nor the Chinese at Yenan had been on overseas assignments. When the Colling spent six weeks in the advised of his visit. long-standing feud between Chiang field with the Red Army and the People’s Militia. On his return to Yenan, in front of a huge gathering of peasants come for the dances in the pear orchard, Chou En-lai bestowed on Colling the award of Demolitions Hero: “The award was a large flower with paper bunting and four Chinese characters on it, in blue and pink.”67

The Dixie Mission was making progress. The Americans were collecting a wealth of information, and the communists were happy to oblige. New initiatives were being considered. Everything was going well.

Ambassador Patrick Hurley, met by Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and Zhu Teh. Source Wikimedia Commons.

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At the end of November 1944, OSS China headquarters Kai-shek and Stilwell reached crisis was advised of an upcoming visit by OSS Chief General proportions, Roosevelt dispatched Donovan. General Wedemeyer planned to use the visit to Hurley to resolve it. Hurley’s in- present Donovan “some comprehensive ideas for assis- structions: “to promote harmoni- tance to the Communist guerrilla forces. ous relations between Chiang and General Stilwell and to facilitate the latter’s exercise of command over rejected.”74 Looking at the document, ist government. In this instance, the the Chinese Armies placed under Nationalist Foreign Affairs Minister proposals would first be raised with his direction.”71 The Chiang-Stilwell T.V. Soong, and Chiang’s brother-in- the communists. relationship was likely beyond help law, immediately told Hurley, “The at that point;a Stilwell was relieved Communists have sold you a bill of In a message later sent to the chief on 18 October and replaced by Gen. goods.”75 Hurley nevertheless tried to of staff of US Forces, China Theater, Albert Wedemeyer. Disgusted by the continue his negotiations. Bird cites eight points in the “tenta- decision, US Ambassador Clarence tive agreement” reached in discus- Gauss resigned soon afterward. On sions with Red Army commander 17 November 1944 General Hurley The Bird Mission Chu Teh, and his Chief of Staff, 72 General Yeh [Chian-ying]. Among replaced him. At the end of November 1944, the points: OSS China headquarters was ad- At Yenan, Hurley had no idea vised of an upcoming visit by OSS what he was stepping into. He was OSS to place Special Oper- Chief General Donovan. General not a reader of embassy reports and ations [SO] men with their Wedemeyer planned to use the visit was “atrociously uninformed about [Communist] units for pur- to present Donovan “some compre- Chinese affairs” and a firm believer poses of destroying [Japanese hensive ideas for assistance to the in “personal diplomacy.”73, b He and targets] . . . and to generally Communist guerrilla forces. Two Chiang seemed to get along famous- raise hell and run; to provide separate proposals emerged.” The ly. At Yenan, Hurley apparently set complete equipment for up to Army recommended that 5,000 off to work in the belief that his not twenty-five thousand guerrillas American paratroops be sent to North inconsiderable charm would similarly except food and clothing;[to] China to work with the communist win over the communist leadership— Set up school to instruct in use partisans.”76, d The OSS proposal was most importantly, “Moose Dung” as of American arms, demolitions, more complex. On 15 December he called the communist leader.c “Af- communications, etc;[to] Set up 1944 Heppner’s deputy, Lt. Col. Wil- ter three days of negotiations, Hurley intelligence radio network. . . ; lis Bird and Dixie Mission command- was able to obtain Mao’s signature on To supply at least one hundred er Barrett flew to Yenan to present a document outlining the conditions thousand Woolworth one shot the proposals to the communists. for a coalition with the Nationalists, pistols for Peoples’ Militia; To The usual procedure was to discuss conditions the Nationalists in turn receive complete cooperation such matters first with the National- of their [Communist] army of a. Hurley apparently thought so: “The Generalissimo’s case for recall [of Stilwell] was forwarded by Hurley [to Roosevelt] on October 11 and endorsed [by Hurley] on the essential basis that Chiang and Stilwell were “fundamentally incompatible.” Source: Tuchman, Stilwell, 501. b. T.H. White experienced how personal it could be. On Hurley’s arrival White “briefed Hurley” on his own conversations with Mao. “I did not know, when I told Hurley that his unannounced and unbriefed mission was probably futile, how much it would enrage him. Hurley sent a dispatch to the State Department the next morning, “concerning my disruptive presence. . . . White’s whole conversation was definitely against the mission with which I am charged.” Source: White, In Search of History, 265–66. c. In fairness, Hurley addressed the Generalissimo as “Mr. Shek.” But Hurley’s charm did not win him many supporters among the Amer- icans at Yenan or elsewhere. “His favorite stunt of yelling Oklahoma Indian war whoops branded him a buffoon.” The OSS code name for Hurley was “The Albatross.” Source, Smith, OSS, 272, 172. d. Some accounts of the Army’s offer seem to conflate the 5,000 paratroops in this proposal with the 28,000-strong paratroop division that was the subject of the MG McClure issue and of Barrett’s 27 December visit to Yenan discussed below. Neither Barrett nor Bird mention this initial 5,000 paratroop proposal as a subject of discussion with communists on 15 December. It does not appear again in the narrative.

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On 27 December, Barrett went back to Yenan; it would be his final visit. Wedemeyer was out of town, and Maj. Gen. ship with OSS and most US military Robert B. McClure, Wedemeyer’s chief of staff, gave Bar- units in China, is beyond the scope of rett “a most important mission” this paper, but much of that was due to Tai Li’s secret police methods and SACO efforts being more focused on six hundred fifty thousand and They seemed “reasonably pleased” Chiang’s political enemies than the Peoples’ Militia of two and a at prospects of a large US presence invading Japanese. Early in January half million when strategic use on their territory and assured Barrett 1945, Commodore Miles invited Am- 77 required by Wedemeyer.” that they could provide such support bassador Hurley to “Happy Valley,” as might be needed.79 Soon after his After Bird and Barrett returned to SACO headquarters, “where the am- return from Yenan, Barrett received bassador was greeted with pomp and Chungking, they learned “Ambassa- good news: General Wedemeyer 82 dor Hurley had not been fully briefed circumstance.” As Miles described had nominated him for promotion to it in his memoir: about the purpose of the visit which brigadier general. Colonel Bird and [Colonel Barrett] We greeted him with flags, had made to Yenan, or if he had been But then, “Early in January the ruffles and flourishes, and The cut into the picture, he had failed to roof fell in on me. Nationalist Gov- Star-Spangled Banner. . . . And take much cognizance of it. . . . he ernment intelligence agents in Yenan we even slipped in a full review. was incensed, and took the stand we had reported back to Chungking that The troops passed—ten min- had tried to work behind his back I had offered . . . the Communists an utes of infantry ending with the against the interest of the National American paratroop division. . . .” drill team. . . . The dogs made 78 Government.” The Nationalist were “naturally their attack. The pigeons flew much upset” and asked Hurley for an On 27 December, Barrett went when released. Our few motor explanation. “It developed my visit vehicles passed smartly. Then back to Yenan; it would be his final to Yenan had not been cleared with visit. Wedemeyer was out of town, ten minutes of cavalry. (We the ambassador . . . or . . . he had had only sixty horses for our and Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure, forgotten the whole thing.” Barrett training school but we bor- Wedemeyer’s chief of staff, gave Bar- would write that Hurley “blew higher rett “a most important mission”: He rowed a neighboring troop of than a kite” and had his promotion five hundred of General Tai Li’s 80 was to inform the communist leaders rescinded. 83 that “after the defeat of Germany mounted men. . . . a US paratroop division [28,000 Historian Frederick Wakeman strong] . . . might be sent to China Spies at Work tells the rest of the story: to take part in the final attack on the Tai Li got wind of the plan, Japanese islands.” He was to ask: “if . . . while being entertained at and Miles was ready to brief [the communists] could take care of dinner. . . . Miles persuaded the Hurley about this clandestine the supply of the division . . . [until] Oklahoma oilman that a mas- contact.81, a regular U.S. Army supply procedures sive conspiracy was being un- could begin to function.” Barrett was Lt. Gen. Tai Li was Chiang dertaken by U.S. State Depart- “to impress upon the Communists Kai-shek’s spymaster, the head of ment officers to send American that my talk with them was purely of the KMT intelligence and security. troops and weapons to the Com- an exploratory nature.” Barrett was Tai Li was also head of SACO, the munists. Miles also offered the assured that his mission was cleared Sino-American Cooperative Organi- ambassador the use of SACO’s with Ambassador Hurley. Barrett zation, a joint project with US Navy Navy radio communications met with the communist leadership, Commodore Milton “Mary” Miles as link with Washington in order to including Mao, on 27 December. his deputy. SACO’s strained relation- bypass the American embassy a. The “clandestine contact” was Barrett’s proposal—and the OSS proposal Bird had delivered earlier—to Yenan. While Wakeman cites the 15 December Yenan visit for both, by Barrett’s own account, Hurley’s anger was triggered by his 27 December 1941 visit.

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“Hurley’s direct access to the President was the trump in Chongqing [sic], which was card.” He used it “to press what amounted to a purge of presumably infiltrated by fellow the professional China experts in the field, the men who travelers determined to defeat had been in the country for years, who spoke the lan- 84 Chiang Kai-shek. guage, who knew the place and its dramatis personae.” On 15 January 1945, Hurley sent his report to President Roosevelt. as engaged in a conspiracy had achieved.”90 The US Central “He had learned from SACO and to overthrow Chiang and see Intelligence Agency was established Dai Li that there was a plan to use him replaced by a Communist in 1947. US paratroopers to lead commu- government. He summed up nist guerrillas. . . . this amounted to his position this way: ‘The recognition of the communists and record of General Stilwell in Messengers Were Not approval of their objectives to destroy China is irrevocably coupled Well Received the nationalist regime.” Hurley went in history with the conspiracy I have wondered just what be- on to denounce the American “China to over throw the Nationalist came of my reports.91 hands” who he blamed for this.” “His Government of China, and to cable to Roosevelt was the opening set up in its place a Communist Colonel Barrett wrote “many blow of his long campaign to dishon- regime—and all of this move- reports, all on military subjects. . . . or both the Foreign Service China ment was part of, and cannot be I devoted particular attention to es- experts who labored under him and separated from, the Communist timates of the strength of the Com- the military officers in Wedemeyer’s cell or apparatus that existed at munist forces . . . and their tactics, command, not only to dishonor them, that time in the Government in equipment, training, discipline, and 85 but to purge them from the service.” Washington.”87 morale.”92 There was apparently no feedback, from Chungking or Hurley’s rage and where it would In early 1945, “Hurley’s direct Washington, on intelligence reporting take him is encapsulated in the access to the President was the trump from Yenan. In December 1944, as comment below by historian Richard card.” He used it “to press what the Dixie Mission was winding down, Bernstein describing Hurley’s belated amounted to a purge of the profes- several Dixie members traveled to reaction to Stilwell’s firing—which sional China experts in the field, the Washington. They were taken aback Hurley endorsed—and to the negative men who had been in the country by their reception. American press coverage of Chiang it for years, who spoke the language, unleashed: New York Times journalist who knew the place and its dramatis Because of a letter he was asked Brooks Atkinson, for example, com- personae.”88 “The Generalissimo to hand deliver to Chief of Naval mented: “Relieving General Stilwell later congratulated Hurley on having Operations Admiral King, Lt. Hitch and appointing a successor has the “purged the United States headquar- found himself addressing the Joint effect of making us acquiesce in an ters of the conspirators.”89 Chiefs or Staff on the China situation. unenlightened cold-hearted autocratic He described “the Chinese Commu- 86 World War II ended with Japan’s political regime.” nist scene as he saw it.” From what surrender on 15 August 1945. The he had observed, he concluded that Hurley said nothing public following month, President Tru- no matter how much [US military right away. But within a year man terminated the OSS, America’s support] we give to the Nationalist or so, he was making comments premier foreign intelligence orga- Government], “the people calling that can only be described as nization. “There appeared to be no themselves Communists will some- deranged, accusing Stilwell, the need for foreign intelligence. . . . US day take over China.” Hitch’s com- State Department officers who military planners felt comfortable, ments “were not well received; he agreed with the General about almost complacent with the techno- was told he would not be going back Chiang, and the American press logical advantage the United States

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The environment the team worked in was unusual, but the mission succeeded. It gathered a wealth of fresh informa- represented, as was the OSS and tion and developed solutions to immediate problems like other specialized elements that could weather reporting and the rescue of downed US airmen. It evaluate Chinese Communist capa- even produced intelligence information from inside Japan. bilities. The environment the team worked in was unusual, but the mission succeeded. It gathered a wealth to China.”93, a He soon learned that he of [interviewing] after they realized of fresh information and developed was assigned to the Philippines desk my involvement with the Dixie Mis- solutions to immediate problems like in the Office of Naval Intelligence. sion.”95 As to value of his reporting: weather reporting and the rescue of downed US airmen. It even produced The war had already ended when In the spring of 1945 I had intelligence information from inside Major Casberg, Dixie’s doctor, returned [to OSS] my carefully Japan. returned to Washington on Christmas kept files on Chinese field tac- Eve 1945 and went directly to what tics. They were ignored through Much of Dixie’s success came was left of OSS headquarters—it both the Korean and Vietnam- from Stilwell’s direction to use had officially been disbanded three ese conflicts. These files were “China hands” or others with exten- months before—to discuss his long returned to me with my origi- sive Asian experience. The Chinese experience with the communists. nal seals intact in 1972, after Communist experience was new for He offered his assessment: A civil ‘Ping Pong Diplomacy’ thawed everyone, but having the language, war between the communists and US-China relations.96 or at least past experience with an nationalists was unavoidable, and Asian culture, eased the team’s entry the communists would win; after Colling believed that “Washington into its interactions with communist the communists took over, China learned little of what we did, partially counterparts. The principle of using would not maintain close ties with the because the purpose behind the mis- experienced area specialists in the Soviet Union; in the long term, Chou sion was extinguished by the ending most difficult situations has always En-lai and those who “wore his man- of the war.” The other part is the been valid. tel” would have the greatest influence paradox that Colling believed Dixie in China. The people listening to had become. Extensive intelligence informa- him laughed, “probably thinking him tion was collected on the Japanese The Dixie Mission was meant to military and on the communists. merely a medical man, not qualified be a military mission in pur- to predict military outcomes.”94 That much of this information was suit of strategically important later disregarded was due to external John Colling also traveled to information. What became clear factors. The war would end quickly Washington in December 1944. He soon after was that the politics and unexpectedly and totally devalue was instructed to report directly to that brought us to Yenan eventu- intelligence on the Japanese. General Donovan. According to ally silenced our reports of what 97 Colling, “it turned out, Donovan was we had learned.” Intelligence collected on the Chi- the only high official inashington W nese Communists should have had who wanted to know anything about a longer life, but it became tainted the Dixie Mission.” In his 1991 mem- The Dixie Experience and by political conflict that grew out oir Colling wrote that only years later Its Lessons for Intelligence of America’s involvements in Chi- did he learn the “political ramifica- The Dixie Mission is an early na and post-war concern about the tions” of his involvement with Dixie. example of the task force approach global spread of communism and was “When the CIA began recruiting me applied to an intelligence problem. shunted aside. The lack of anyone in in 1952 for the Korean War, I was Participation in the team was wide, Washington wise enough to glimpse quickly dismissed on the second day the Army, Navy, and Air Force were the true significance of the Chinese a. The letter Hitch delivered to the CNO was a “secret” appeal for US assistance from Mao—one of several attempts by the Communists to circumvent Ambassador Hurley and other reactionary elements among the Americans in China.”

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The major lesson from Dixie for the managers of intel- Communists and the intelligence ligence services and for the non-intelligence outsiders produced by the Dixie Mission was appointed to oversee them is that an intelligence service the killing blow. That insight might must be kept well clear of politics and actively protected have come from OSS Chief Donovan, from any such involvement. by war’s end the only “high official interested in the Dixie Mission,” but OSS was disbanded in September to countries contending with Maoist nist influence.”98 In looking for ways 1945 and Donovan was gone. insurgencies had little grounding in to defeat the CPT, the Thai turned to Chinese communism. The presump- captured party members as teachers Did the loss of this intelligence tion was that it was the Soviet hand on communism and Maoist thought. have an effect on US strategic efforts that guided world communism, and In time, former senior CPT members in the post-war period and the Cold Chinese communism was simply sub- became advisers to the police, and War? In retrospect, one can imagine ordinate to that. Soviet communism military effort focused on the insur- the effects in US decisions made received the emphasis. gency. The key to the CPT insur- during the Korean War to support gency’s collapse was amnesty, and imagined Nationalist remnants Another significant lesson lost in reintegration of the insurgents into fighting the new communist govern- time was how the Red Army treated Thai society. The insurgency ended in ment—Dixie Mission members are Japanese POWs and the dividends 1982; the peace established then has likely to have argued that communist that paid. John Fairbank saw the never been broken. The approach that control was so great no Nationalist meaning of that immediately. Wheth- led to the end of the Maoist insur- counterinsurgency could possibly er American adoption of the Red gency in Thailand came from senior cause enough damage to disrupt Peo- Army’s “lenient” treatment of POWs Maoist-rained CPT members. ple’s Republic of China war efforts in might have served American inter- Korea or gain control over territory in ests in later wars is difficult to say. The major lesson from Dixie for Northeast China. Regrettably, the Red Army way was the managers of intelligence services not considered, or even the subject of and for the non-intelligence outsiders On a more global scale, if we serious study. appointed to oversee them is that an imagine that the information had intelligence service must be kept well been put to use, for example, in the An example can be taken from clear of politics and actively protect- training of US intelligence officers, Thailand. During the Vietnam era, the ed from any such involvement. There particularly those assigned to coun- Thai government found itself sudden- is no place for partisanship in an tries experiencing Wars of National ly confronted by a Maoist Communist intelligence service. To do otherwise Liberation. During the Cold War, Party of Thailand (CPT) insurgency. risks undermining the objectivity of most US intelligence officers were Within 10 years it affected half the a service’s reporting and devalues the reasonably grounded in Soviet country. “Thirty-six of Thailand’s 73 service and all its work. communism, but even officers sent provinces were under strong commu-

v v v

The author: Bob Bergin is a former foreign service officer. He has contributed frequently to this and other journals on East Asian and other historical topics.

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Endnotes 1. David D. Barrett, Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan, 1944 (University of California Press, 1970), from the Foreword by John K. Fairbank, Harvard University, 7. 2. Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45 (Macmillan, 1970), 477. 3. R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (University of California Press, 1972), 260. 4. Ibid, 259. 5. Ibid. 6. Frederick Wakeman, Jr., Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service (University of California Press, 2003), 315. 7. Tuchman, Stilwell, 463. 8. Ibid. 9. John Paton Davies, Jr., Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and One Another (W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), 308. 10. Tuchman, Stilwell, 463. 11. William P. Head, Yenan! Colonel Wilbur Peterkin and the American Military Mission to the Chinese Communists, 1944–1945 (Docu- mentary Publications, 1987), 37. 12. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 27–28. 13. Smith, OSS, 259–60. 14. S. Bernard Thomas, Season of High Adventure: Edgar Snow in China (University of California Press, 1996) 172. 15. Ibid, 171. 16. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (Grove Press, 1968), from “Introduction by Dr. John K. Fairbank,” 13. 17. Captain Evans F. Carlson, USMC, Letter to Captain Stapler, from “Hq. 8th Route Army, somewhere in Shansi, 20 December 1937,” prepared as an Intelligence Report by South China Patrol, Canton, China, 3 January 1938. Available at: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/ cdm/fullbrowser/collection/p15799coll12/id/1155/rv/compoundobject/cpd/1160 18. Thomas, Season of High Adventure, 268. “FDR had known Carlson since he commanded his presidential bodyguard at Quantico, where they became friends. White House backing had become essential to overcome the old-line Marine opposition to the whole Raider training system, which Carlson had set up . . . Jimmy Roosevelt had been Carlson’s executive officer, and he later become commander of the second Raider Battalion. “Jimmy,” his father once said to me, “is crazy about Carlson.” Source: Edgar Snow, “Random notes on Red China, 1936–1945,” Harvard East Asian Research Center, included as Appendix II In Colling, Spirit of Yenan, 163–70. 19. Richard Bernstein, China 1945: Mao’s Revolution and America’s Fateful Choice (Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 91. Bernstein noted that Mao himself helped to set the affable tone, writing in an editorial that the mission was “The most exciting event since the war against Japan started.” 20. Davies, Dragon by the Tail, 318. 21. Barrett, p. 29. 22. John Colling, The Spirit of Yenan: A Wartime Chapter of Sino-American Friendship (API Press Ltd, Hong Kong, 1991), 67–70. 23. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 14. 24. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 80. 25. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 35. 26. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 76. 27. Ibid, 77 28. Agnes Smedley, The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh (Monthly Review Press, 1956), 4. 29. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 50–51. 30. Smith, OSS, 263. 31. Shakespeare. The Tempest, Act 5 Scene 1. 32. Barrett, Dixie Mission, from the Foreword by John K. Fairbank: “[The Dixie Mission] also coincided with the admission to Yenan of a group of American journalists who got across the Kuomintang blockade to report on that other China....” Theodore White had made his own way, accompanying the second Dixie contingent with the help of friends at the US Embassy.” 33. Theodore H. White, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure (Warner Books, 1981), 249: “And all—except Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung—were convinced, apparently, that I was a semi-official and friendly reportorial arm of the American government.” 34. Ibid, 250. 35. Ibid, 249. 36. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 38–41. 37. Ibid, 41–42. 38. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 9, from the Foreword by John K. Fairbank. 39. Mao’s statement continued:” ... [,].create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the war.” Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted War, Selected Works, Vol. II, Foreign Language Press, 1965), 154.

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40. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 44. Mao made the comment to John Service. 41. John S. Service, Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service (Random House, 1974), 240–41. From Ser- vice memo based on talks with journalists Harrison Forman, M. Votaw, and I. Epstein on their journey with the Red Army in Northwest Shansi. 42. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 26. 43. Service, Lost Chance in China, 236–37. 44. Ibid., 236, 237. 45. Ibid., 238. 46. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 34 47. Ibid. 48. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 35. 49. Ibid., 34. 50. Ibid., 7–8. OWI rep Francis McCracken Fisher was not a member of the Dixie team as such. The date of his appearance at Yenan could not be determined. Said to have been “one of America’s foremost newspaper correspondents” in China, he most likely accompanied the group of journalists that had arrived almost concurrently with Dixie. In December 1941 he had been sworn in as an Auxiliary Foreign Service officer to represent Donovan’s OSS precursor office, Coordinator of Information, and later OWI. Source: Page on Fisher at “Social Networks And Archival Context” website. 51. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 80–81. Spies sent by the Japanese Army had been discovered in the school. Colling wrote that “After good treatment and indoctrination, some agents confessed and worked for the group [JEL]” 52. Head, Yenan, 82. 53. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 83. 54. Ibid., 86. In this author’s dealings with early members of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force—i.e., those who had trained in the early 1950’s—he learned that their flight instructors were primarily Japanese Army pilots, former POWs who had decided to remain in China after the war. Bob Bergin, “Growth of Air Defenses: Responding to Covert Overflights, 1949–1974,Studies in Intelligence 57, No. 2 (June 2013), 20. 55. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 88. 56. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 83. 57. Smedley, The Great Road, 363. 58. Smedley, The Great Road, 364. The date of the order is unknown, but was probably November 1937, the time of the above incident. 59. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 85–87. Captain Evans Carlson records an encounter with Japanese POWs in about mid-1938. Two officers and 11 enlisted men were being held in a small village. “The people smilingly informed us that the Japanese “guests” were doing their lessons. We found them in a sunny courtyard . . . a Chinese soldier stood before a blackboard talking to then in Japanese. The subject, I was informed, was the basic theory of co-operative societies. . . . All appeared to be in good health and well fed, and all were cheerful.” Source: Evans Fordyce Carlson, Twin Stars of China: A Behind-the-Scenes Story of China’s Valiant Struggle for Existence, by a U.S. Marine Who Lived & Moved With the People (Dodd, Mead & Company, 1940), 229. 60. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 95. 61. Ibid., 101–106. 62. Ibid., 93. 63. Ibid., 158. 64. Ibid., 95. 65. Ibid., 96. 66. Ibid., 100 67. Ibid., 106. 68. White, In Search of History, 261. 69. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 56. 70. Ibid., 71. Carolle J. Carter, Mission to Yenan: American Liaison with the Chinese Communists, 1944–1947 (The University Press of Kentucky, 1997), 107. 72. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 108. 73. Smith, OSS, 274. 74. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 114. 75. Bernstein, China 1945, 155. 76. Smith, OSS, 272. 77. Willis Bird Memo, “Yenan Trip,” 24 January 1945, NARA 226, Entry 148 Box 7, Folder 103. 78. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 76, 77. 79. Ibid., 79. 80. Ibid., 78.

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81. Wakeman, Spymaster, 348. 82. Ibid. 83. Milton E. Miles (Vice Admiral, USN) and Hawthorne Daniel, A Different Kind of War: The Little-Known Story of the Combined Guer- rilla Forces Created in China by the U.S. Navy and the Chinese during World War II (Doubleday, 1967), 468. 84. Wakeman, Spymaster, 348. 85. Bernstein, China 1945, 182. 86. Ibid., 48. 87. Ibid. 88. Bernstein, China 1945, 228. 89. Wakeman, Spymaster, 148–49. 90. Dino A Brugioni and Doris G. Taylor, Eyes in the Sky: Eisenhower, the CIA and Cold War Aerial Espionage (Naval Institute Press, 2010), 34–35. 91. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 36. 92. Ibid. 93. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 118. 94. Carter, Mission to Yenan, 207, 298. 95. Colling, The Spirit of Yenan, 124. 96. Ibid., xxi. 97. Ibid., 125 98. Bob Bergin, “Defeating an Insurgency: The Thai Effort against the Communist Party of Thailand, 1965-ca. 1982,”Studies in Intelli- gence 60, No.2 (June 2016), 31. v v v

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