Developing a Model for Vietnamese Private Higher Education

DEVELOPING A MODEL FOR VIETNAMESE PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION

Lessons from China and Korea

Ha T. Ngo

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Education Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

April 2019

Surname/Family Name : Ngo Given Name/s : Thanh Ha Abbreviation for degree as give in the University calendar : PhD Faculty : Faculty of Arts & Social Sciencs School : School of Education Developing a Model for Vietnamese Private Thesis Title : Higher Education: Lessons from China and Korea

Abstract This study aims to establish a model that enables the development of private higher education (PHE) in Vietnam. Such a model must reflect the most relevant factors that impact the establishment and growth of the sector. To determine these, the study utilises two different and distinct approaches to those used by earlier researchers. Firstly, a different conceptual and theoretical approach was developed, consisting of three dimensions, which (1) employs three analytical levels, namely, macro, meso and micro levels; (2) combines Neo-Institutional Theory and Resource Dependence Theory, resulting in three institutional factors, namely institutional isomorphisms, logics and actors; and (3) focuses on three crucial aspects regarding the development of PHE, namely governance, finance and quality assurance. Secondly, a comparative approach was adopted to compare factors and the effect of these factors in enabling and supporting the development of PHE in Korea, China and Vietnam. Guided by this framework, data was collected from the selected cases of a private HE institution of the three countries, using documents and interviews as the major sources. The data reveals the impact of the three institutional factors on enabling and constraining the development of PHE in the three countries, despite the significant differences in PHE practices at both macro and meso levels in governance, finance and quality assurance. In addition, this study highlights the role of actors in shaping the development of PHE and offers critical insights to explain the differences in actors’ agentic behaviours. Consequently, the research concludes a series of implications for developing a more effective model that encourages PHE to grow, focusing on facilitating actors at the macro and meso levels to achieve agreement of the aims, goals, functions and roles of PHE based on a thorough understanding of the internal and external environments. This study offers an in-depth and comparative analysis of the PHE sector in the three countries, thereby significantly contributing to the scholarly understanding of the field of HE. In addition, this study also provides both theoretical and empirical implications for the better application of Neo-Institutional Theory in the field of HE. Finally, research findings and the relevant implications generated in this study are important for the future establishment of strategies and policies to guide the development of PHE in Vientam.

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CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS RELATING TO SECTION OF THE THESIS

Ngo, H. T. (2016). Developing a model for Vietnamese Private Higher Education: Lessons from China and Korea. Paper presented at the 2016 Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Canberra, Australia

Ngo, H. T. (2017). Factors that Impact the Quality Assurance Implementation Process: A Case Study of a Private University in Vietnam. Paper presented at the 17th Annual Conference of the Southeast Asian Association for Institutional Research, Singapore

Ngo, H. T. (2018). Development of Private Higher Education in Vietnam and Korea: Insights from Neo-Institutional Theory. Paper presented at the International Conference on Korea and Vietnam in the Modern and Contemporary Ages. Seoul, South Korea.

Ngo, H. T. (2019). Neoliberalism in Contemporary Higher Education of East Asia: What Can We Learn from the Past? Paper presented at the Fulbright University Vietnam Academic Conference, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.

Ngo, H. T. (2019). Neoliberalism versus Confucianism in Vietnamese Higher Education: Bridging the Missing Link? Paper presented at the 11th Engaging With Vietnam Conference, Leiden University, the Netherlands.

ABSTRACT

This study aims to establish a model that enables the development of private higher education (PHE) in Vietnam. Such a model must reflect the most relevant factors that impact the establishment and growth of the sector. To determine these, the study utilises two different and distinct approaches to those used by earlier researchers. Firstly, a different conceptual and theoretical approach was developed, consisting of three dimensions, which (1) employs three analytical levels, namely, macro, meso and micro levels; (2) combines Neo-Institutional Theory and Resource Dependence Theory, resulting in three institutional factors, namely institutional isomorphisms, logics and actors; and (3) focuses on three crucial aspects regarding the development of PHE, namely governance, finance and quality assurance. Secondly, a comparative approach was adopted to compare factors and the effect of these factors in enabling and supporting the development of PHE in Korea, China and Vietnam.

Guided by this framework, data was collected from the selected cases of a private HE institution of the three countries, using documents and interviews as the major sources. The data reveals the impact of the three institutional factors on enabling and constraining the development of PHE in the three countries, despite the significant differences in PHE practices at both macro and meso levels in governance, finance and quality assurance. In addition, this study highlights the role of actors in shaping the development of PHE and offers critical insights to explain the differences in actors’ agentic behaviours. Consequently, the research concludes a series of implications for developing a more effective model that encourages PHE to grow, focusing on facilitating actors at the macro and meso levels to achieve agreement of the aims, goals, functions and roles of PHE based on a thorough understanding of the internal and external environments.

This study offers an in-depth and comparative analysis of the PHE sector in the three countries, thereby significantly contributing to the scholarly understanding of the field of HE. In addition, this study also provides both theoretical and empirical implications for the better application of Neo-Institutional Theory in the field of HE. Finally, research findings and the relevant implications generated in this study are important for the future establishment of strategies and policies to guide the development of PHE in Vientam.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... vii ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS ...... xiv LIST OF TABLES ...... xv LIST OF FIGURES ...... xvi ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... xvii CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1.1. Research Background and Problem Statement ...... 1 1.2. Aims and Significance of the Study ...... 4 1.3. Scope of the Study ...... 6 1.4. Primary Research Questions ...... 7 1.5. Structure of the Study ...... 7 1.6. Chapter Summary ...... 8 CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 9 2.1. Overview of Private Higher Education Sector: Purposes and Functions ...... 9 2.1.1. Purposes and Contributions of the Private Higher Education Sector ...... 9 2.1.1.1. Accessibility ...... 11 2.1.1.2. Differentiation ...... 11 2.1.1.3. Quality ...... 12 2.1.1.4. The Vietnamese Situation ...... 12 2.1.2. Functioning Models and Typology of Private Higher Education Sector ...... 15 2.1.3. A Brief History of the Vietnamese Private Higher Education Sector ...... 20 2.2. Challenging Issues of PHE ...... 24 2.2.1. Regulatory Framework ...... 24 2.2.2. Issues of Resources and Funding ...... 27 2.2.3. Governance ...... 29 2.2.4. Quality Assurance ...... 32 2.3. Limitations of the Literature ...... 34 2.3.1. Lacking an Up-to-date Body of Research about the Current Situation of Vietnamese PHE ...... 34 2.3.2. Lacking a Strong Theoretical Basis ...... 35 2.3.3. Lacking Comparative Perspectives ...... 38

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2.4. Chapter Summary ...... 40 CHAPTER III: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ...... 41 3.1. The First Dimension: The Integration of Neo-Institutional Theory and Resource Dependence Theory ...... 41 3.1.1. Neo-Institutional Theory ...... 42 3.1.1.1. Isomorphisms...... 43 3.1.1.2. Logics ...... 45 3.1.1.3. Actors...... 46 3.1.2. Resource Dependence Theory ...... 48 3.1.3. Integration of the two theories ...... 50 3.2. The Second Dimension: The Three Levels of Analysis ...... 52 3.3. The Third Dimension of the Framework and Operationalisation of The Three Key Concepts ...... 53 3.3.1. Governance ...... 53 3.3.1.1. Governance Structure ...... 54 3.3.1.2. Autonomy ...... 56 3.3.2. Finance ...... 58 3.3.2.1. Financial Sources ...... 58 3.3.2.2. Funding Approaches ...... 59 3.3.2.3. Funding Levels ...... 59 3.3.3. Quality Assurance ...... 60 3.4. The Integrated Three-dimensional Conceptual Framework and Research Question Reformulation ...... 61 3.5. Chapter Summary ...... 63 CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS ...... 64 4.1. Comparative Study Methods ...... 64 4.2. Study Cases Selection ...... 66 4.2.1. Research Cases Sampling ...... 67 4.2.2. Participants Sampling ...... 68 4.3. Data Collection Methods ...... 69 4.3.1. Document Analysis ...... 69 4.3.2. Interviews ...... 70 4.4. Ethical Issues ...... 71

4.5. Data Analysis ...... 72 4.5.1. Coding ...... 72 4.5.2. Data Analysis Techniques ...... 73 4.5.3. Computer-based Data Analysis Program ...... 74 4.6. Trustworthiness of the Study ...... 75 4.7. Chapter Summary ...... 78 CHAPTER V: THE KOREAN CASE ...... 79 5.1. The First Dimension ...... 83 5.1.1. The Macro Level ...... 84 5.1.1.1. Governance ...... 85 5.1.1.2. Finance...... 99 5.1.1.3. Quality Assurance ...... 104 5.1.2. The Meso and Mirco Levels ...... 115 5.1.2.1. Governance ...... 119 5.1.2.2. Finance...... 137 5.2. The Second Dimension ...... 144 5.2.1. The Macro Level ...... 145 5.2.1.1. Isomorphisms...... 145 5.2.1.2. Logic: Egalitarian Utilitarianism ...... 152 5.2.1.3. Actors...... 160 5.2.2. The Meso Level ...... 165 5.2.2.1. Logics: University Identity Transformation and the Formation of a New Institutional Logic...... 167 5.2.2.2. Actors...... 184 5.3. Chapter Summary ...... 198 CHAPTER VI: THE CHINESE CASE ...... 201 6.1. The First Dimension ...... 206 6.1.1. The Macro Level ...... 207 6.1.1.1. Governance ...... 209 6.1.1.2. Quality Assurance ...... 219 6.1.2. The Meso and Micro Levels ...... 228 6.1.2.1. Governance ...... 231 6.1.2.2. Finance...... 246

6.2. The Second Dimension ...... 257 6.2.1. Isomorphisms ...... 257 6.2.1.1. Cultural-Cognitive ...... 257 6.2.1.2. Resource Dependence: External Market Demand and Internal Organisational Needs ...... 262 6.2.1.3. Normative: The Development of the Private Business Sector ...... 264 6.2.1.4. Coercive: The Regulatory Framework ...... 266 6.2.2. Logics: Pragmatic Authoritarianism ...... 268 6.2.3. Actors ...... 277 6.2.3.1. Position ...... 277 6.2.3.2. Agency: Instrumental Experimentalist ...... 278 6.2.3.3. Legitimacy ...... 282 6.3. Chapter Summary ...... 284 CHAPTER VII: THE VIETNAMESE CASE ...... 289 7.1. The First Dimension ...... 289 7.1.1. The Macro Level ...... 289 7.1.1.1. Governance ...... 291 7.1.1.2. Quality Assurance ...... 298 7.1.2. The Meso and Micro Levels ...... 312 7.1.2.1. Governance ...... 315 7.1.2.2. Finance...... 325 7.2. The Second Dimension ...... 335 7.2.1. The Macro Level ...... 336 7.2.1.1. Isomorphisms...... 336 7.2.1.2. Logics: Socialist Authoritarianism ...... 345 7.2.1.3. Actors...... 348 7.2.2. Meso Level ...... 353 7.2.2.1. Logics: Neoliberalism...... 354 7.2.2.2. Actors...... 358 7.3. Chapter Summary ...... 364 CHAPTER VIII: COMPARISION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR VIETNAM ...... 369 8.1. Isomorphisms ...... 369 8.1.1. Institutional Isomorphisms that Enable the Development of PHE: ...... 371

8.1.1.1. Cultural-cognitive ...... 371 8.1.1.2. Resource Dependence ...... 374 8.1.1.3. Normative: Private Business Templates ...... 376 8.1.1.4. Coercive: Deregulation ...... 377 8.1.2. Institutional Isomorphisms that Constrain the Development of PHE ...... 379 8.1.2.1. Cultural-cognitive: Socialism ...... 379 8.1.2.2. Resource Dependence: Limited Financial Capacity of the Private Sector ...... 380 8.1.2.3. Normative: Rankings ...... 381 8.1.2.4. Coercive: Strengthening Regulation ...... 382 8.1.3. Implications for Vietnam ...... 384 8.1.3.1. The Macro Level ...... 384 8.1.3.2. The Meso Level ...... 387 8.2. Institutional Logics ...... 389 8.2.1. The Two Major Ingredients ...... 391 8.2.1.1. Neoliberalism...... 391 8.2.1.2. Confucianism ...... 394 8.2.1.3. Confucianism meets Neoliberalism ...... 403 8.2.1.4. Confucianism versus Neoliberalism ...... 404 8.2.1.5. Confucianism under Neoliberalism ...... 406 8.2.2. Implications for Vietnam ...... 410 8.2.2.1. The Macro Level ...... 411 8.2.2.2. The Meso Level ...... 417 8.3. Institutional Actors ...... 421 8.3.1. The Macro Level ...... 422 8.3.1.1. Similarities ...... 422 8.3.1.2. Differences ...... 423 8.3.2. The Meso Level ...... 429 8.3.2.1. Differences ...... 429 8.3.3. Implications for Vietnam ...... 433 8.3.3.1. The Macro Level ...... 433 8.3.3.2. The Meso Level ...... 438 8.4. Chapter Summary ...... 439

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CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION ...... 442 9.1. Summary of Major Findings ...... 442 9.1.1. The First Dimension ...... 442 9.1.1.1. The Macro Level ...... 443 9.1.1.2. The Meso Level ...... 446 9.1.2. The Second Dimension ...... 447 9.1.2.1. The Macro Level ...... 447 9.1.2.2. The Meso Level ...... 451 9.2. Summary of Implications for Vietnam ...... 454 9.2.1. Isomorphisms ...... 455 9.2.2. Logics ...... 456 9.2.3. Actors ...... 458 9.3. Significance of the Study ...... 459 9.3.1. Literature Contributions ...... 459 9.3.2. Theoretical Contributions ...... 460 9.3.3. Practical Contributions ...... 461 9.4. Limitations of the Study ...... 461 9.5. Implications for Future Research ...... 463 9.6. Concluding Remarks ...... 464 REFERENCE ...... 466 APPENDIX ...... 499 Appendix 1. Interview Protocol ...... 499 Appendix 2. Letter of Invitation ...... 502 Appendix 3. UNSW’s Participant Information Statement and Consent Form ...... 503

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ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

ADB Asian Development Bank CCP Chinese Communist Party CPV Communist Party of Vietnam GDETA General Department of Education Testing and Accreditation HE Higher Education HEEC Higher Education Evaluation Center HEIs Higher Education Institutions IMF International Monetary Fund KCUE Korean Council for University Education KUAI Korean University Accreditation Institute MoE Ministry of Education MoET Ministry of Education and Training OECD The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PHE Private Higher Education QA Quality Assurance UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation WB The World Bank WTO The World Trade Organisation

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LIST OF TABLES

Table II-1. Purposes and Types of Private HEIs ...... 17

Table II-2. Types of Vietnamese HEIs (until 2006) ...... 21

Table III-1. The Three Pillars of Neo-Institutional Theory ...... 44

Table III-2. Operationalisation of The Concept of Governance ...... 57

Table III-3. Operationalisation of The Concept of Finance ...... 60

Table III-4. Operationalisation of the Concept of Quality Assurance ...... 61

Table V-1. List of Documents for Data Analysis at the Macro Level...... 84

Table V-2. The University Accreditation Standards developed by KUAI ...... 109

Table V-3. List of Documents Used for Data Analysis at the Meso Level ...... 118

Table VI-1.List of Documents for Data Analysis at the Macro Level ...... 207

Table VI-2. Evaluation Standards of the Chinese QA System ...... 223

Table VI-3. . List of Documents for Data Analysis at the Meso Level ...... 230

Table VII-1. List of Documents for Data Analysis at the Macro Level ...... 290

Table VII-2. University Accreditation Standards issued by the Vietnamese MoET in 2017 ...... 305

Table VII-3. List of Documents for Data Analysis at the Meso Level ...... 314

Table VII-4. Similarities and Differences between the Governance Structure of ‘Private’ and ‘Not-for-profit Private’ Universities ...... 318

Table VIII-1: Comparison of Institutional Isomorphism in Relation to PHE in each Country ...... 370

Table VIII-2: A Comparison of Dominant Logics by Level in Korea, China and Vietnam ...... 389

Table VIII-3: Typical Features of Public and Private HEI (M. Lee & Neubauer, 2009) ...... 400

Table VIII-4: The Array of Higher Education Benefits (Institute for Higher Education Policy, 1998, p. 20) ...... 412

Table VIII-5: A Comparison of Actors by Level in Korea, China and Vietnam ...... 422

Table IX-1. Governance, Finance and Quality Assurance Practices at the Macro Level in Korea, China and Vietnam ...... 443

Table IX-2. Governance Model and Financial Arrangements at the Meso Level in Korea, China and Vietnam ...... 446

Table IX-3. Institutional Factors that Impact the Macro Level in Korea, China and Vietnam ...... 447

Table IX-4. Institutional Factors that Impact the Meso Level in Korea and Vietnam . 452

Table IX-5. List of Implications for Vietnam based on the Analysis of Institutional Factors at the Macro and Meso Levels ...... 454

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Number of Private Universities Established by Year (1994-2014) ...... 23

Figure 2. The Three-dimensional Conceptual Framework ...... 62

Figure 3. Components of the University Accreditation Standards developed by KUAI ...... 110

Figure 4. Accreditation Procedures Developed by KUAI ...... 111

Figure 5. The OI Matrix ...... 188

Figure 6. The OI Matrix – Rational Actor Version ...... 194

Figure 7. Accreditation Procedures of the Vietnamese QA Framework ...... 307

Figure 8. The Governance Structure of the University ...... 316

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis is the record of my four-year-journey in UNSW, full of enjoyable experiences, which would have been impossible without the support, guidance, inspirations and love from many people who accompanied me in this journey. First of all, I wish to express my deep appreciations to my supervisors, Professor Stephen Marshall and Professor Colin Evers. Words cannot describe how helpful and supportive both of you were to me. I was always inspired by your advice, comments, feedback and guidance. This thesis is evidence of your valuable inputs and supervision.

Secondly, I would have never been able to complete this study without the patience and support of many people who helped me to gain access to universities and colleges, who participated in interviews and who provided me relevant documents. I am indebted to a large number of university leaders, scholars, professors, academic and administrative staff whose inputs have resulted in rewarding outcomes. Your support has made the difficult, stressful and time-consuming task of collecting data for a cross-country study more enjoyable, meaningful and stimulating.

Thirdly, I am grateful for the generous support I received from the University of New South Wales. The university scholarship allowed me to conduct my doctoral study, while support from the staff enabled me to have a meaningful time during my candidature.

Finally, I specially thank my fellow Christians, my parents and my friends for always being by my side, for their patience, support, love and forbearance. Because of them I never felt lonely while I was here in Australia, and because of them I was able to accomplish this work.

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To God, for this is Your provision to me.

To Vietnam, a country that I love but struggle to understand.

To R.W., for being my soulmate.

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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the research background is provided, revealing the problems in the current model of private higher education in Vietnam and the need for an alternative model that supports the sector’s development. A brief review of previous research highlights the aims and significance of this study in developing a conceptual framework to provide a theoretical basis for the study. In addition, the scope of the study is defined, and primary research questions are proposed.

1.1. Research Background and Problem Statement

Contemporary higher education (HE) in Vietnam has witnessed an impressive expansion of the private sector in a short period (Hayden & Dao, 2010; Huong & Fry, 2002). This sector emerged to meet the growing demand for access to HE and to share the burden of financing HE with the public sector (Le & Ashwill, 2004; Thiep, 2009). The Vietnamese government, having been pragmatic in mobilising private sources to finance HE (K.-H. Mok, 2008), has established the goal of increasing the private sector’s capacity to enrol 40 percent of students in 2020 (Hayden & Lam, 2006; T. N. Pham & London, 2010).

Despite such an ambitious goal, the private higher education (PHE) sector in Vietnam has been confronted by significant challenges, such as poor quality, inadequate investment, a deficient regulatory framework and an ineffective governance model (Hayden & Dao, 2010; Le & Ashwill, 2004; D. T. H. Nguyen, 2016). As a result, until 2015, the PHE sector accounted for only 19.6 percent of the total number of higher education institutions (HEIs) and 13.2 percent of the total number of students enrolled (Vietnamese General Statistic Office, 2015), making the goal of increasing the enrolment ratio of the sector to 40 percent in 2020 unrealistic.

Serious scholarly attention is required to investigate the problems that confront the PHE sector, to help the sector address its challenges. Unfortunately, the literature regarding the Vietnamese PHE is seriously insufficient. Up to date, there was a limited number of studies investigating the typology of PHE

institutions (Huong & Fry, 2002; L. Pham & Dam, 2014) and/or examining the problems confronting the sectors and their causes (Asian Development Bank, 2012; Hayden & Dao, 2010; K.-H. Mok, 2008; D. T. H. Nguyen, 2016; Welch, 2007b). These studies have certainly provided basic understandings of the diversity and development pathways of the PHE sector in Vietnam. However, the lack of attention to the sector has resulted in the literature regarding this sector in Vietnam being seriously under-developed. This can be seen not only in the small quantity of research but also in the quality of studies undertaken. The majority of studies were conducted using a descriptive approach and lack in-depth analysis. Moreover, PHE quite often was not treated as an independent topic, but instead as an additional interest or a marginal component of a study about HE in general.

In addition, there have been dramatic changes in the current situation of the PHE sector in Vietnam. The issue of the Education Law in 2005 and other relevant decrees terminated the semi-public type of institutions in 2006 (Vietnamese Government, 2006b). The economic boom in the period of 2005-2009 led to the strong involvement of private investors in the establishment of new private HEIs (Ngo, 2014; L. Pham & Dam, 2014). Along with these investors, their highly entrepreneurial management model also became popular, which resulted in private HEIs being treated as entrepreneurs (H. T. Tran & Nguyen, 2012). All these dynamic movements by various stakeholders have created a high degree of complexity to an extremely sophisticated picture of PHE. This requires more thorough investigation of the field. Nevertheless, only a very small number of studies focus on the development of PHE (Goyette, 2012; Hayden & Dao, 2010; Huong & Fry, 2002; Le & Ashwill, 2004; K.-H. Mok, 2008; D. T. H. Nguyen, 2016; L. Pham & Dam, 2014; Phuong, 2006; Welch, 2007b), and yet these studies do not reflect the dynamics of these circumstances.

In a global context, the literature in the field of PHE has mainly focused on (1) classifying the types of PHE (Geiger, 1985, 1996; Levy, 2009, 2011); (2) identifying the factors challenging the further development of the sector such as legislative framework, governance, finance and quality assurance and proposing

ideas to tackle the relevant issues (Svava Bjarnason et al., 2009; Levy, 2011; Wei, 2009). While research that classifies different types of private universities helps improve our understanding of the diversity of the sector, there are great differences in the literature in terms of which factors, and how and to what extent they impact the development of the PHE sector.

For instance, Wei (2009) described three crucial factors, which are government policy that promotes the expansion of PHE, the increasing demand for a highly skilled workforce and the increasing interest for HE. Levy (2011) agrees with Wei (2009) when he concluded that policy framework and legal authorization are the major factors determining the growth of this sector. Jamshidi, Arasteh, NavehEbrahim, Zeinabadi and Rasmussen (2012) on the other hand, proposed a set of eight factors, including: (1) applying oriented participatory strategic planning; (2) utilizing new learning methodologies; (3) using adequate marketing and advertising; (4) providing high quality education; (5) employing high qualified academic staff; (6) increasing students’ satisfaction; (7) providing market friendly courses and programs; and (8) improving performance mechanisms. These differences are the result of the variation in the institutional levels upon which the research has focused. While Wei (2009) and Levy (2011) studied at the macro system level whereas Jamshidi et al. (2012) focused on the meso university level.

Moreover, not only do these studies generate different findings due to differences in the levels of investigation, but also their research results have not been developed based on a solid theoretical basis in which important factors that enable or constrain the development of PHE are justified. This is a critical problem that undermines the validity of the literature regarding PHE, resulting negative outcomes of developing specious policies and implementing inappropriate practices. A detailed review of the literature and its limitations is provided in Chapter II. Literature Review.

Finally, the challenges in governance, finance and quality assurance have led to a need of an alternative model to help the PHE sector overcome these difficulties 3

and enable further growth. To do so, Vietnam must learn from other countries’ models to draw lessons and establish its own model (Dao & Hayden, 2010). This requires a comprehensive body of knowledge from a comparative perspective, because this approach allows researchers to reveal contrasts and similarities to establish particular arguments (Adamson, Nixon, & Su, 2012). However, there has not been any study investigating the experiences of other countries regarding PHE in comparison with Vietnam. In addition, the lack of a theoretical basis has caused difficulties in conducting comparative studies due to the absence of comparable criteria.

Therefore, in order to support the proper development of PHE in Vietnam, an alternative model to navigate and optimize the contribution of the sector is required. To achieve this goal, a thorough investigation of the development of PHE in Vietnam must be conducted in comparison with the experiences of other countries, using an effective theoretical lens to generate valid research outcomes. Accordingly, in this study, I attempted to develop a robust conceptual framework based on a comprehensive review and analysis of various theoretical perspectives to provide a sound analytical basis for the purpose of this study. A detailed discussion regarding the conceptual framework is provided in Chapter III. Conceptual Framework.

1.2. Aims and Significance of the Study

This study aims to establish a model that will enable the development of PHE in Vietnam. Such a model must reflect the most relevant factors that impact the establishment and growth of the sector. To determine these, the study utilises two different and distinct approaches to those utilised by earlier researchers. The first is to develop a different conceptual and theoretical approach, consisting of three dimensions, which (1) employs three analytical levels, namely macro, meso and micro levels; (2) combines Neo-Institutional Theory (NIT) and Resource Dependence Theory (RDT), resulting in three institutional factors, namely institutional isomorphisms, logics and actors; and (3) focuses on three crucial

aspects regarding the development of PHE, namely governance, finance and quality assurance.

The second is to adopt a comparative approach that compares factors and the effect of these factors in enabling and supporting the development of PHE in Korea, China and Vietnam. China and Korea are selected because of their geographical proximity to Vietnam, the similarity and differences between their political and economic systems and their advanced experience in the development of PHE. Such a framework helps to advance explanations of the dynamic interactions between factors that enable the growth and development of PHE found within PHE institutions themselves and those found in their local and national environments. Consequently, lessons drawn from this comparative analysis are then used to develop a new, hopefully more effective, enabling model for PHE in Vietnam.

By adopting an approach to the current study that is built on NIT and RDT, this study, as well as addressing the limitations of the literature as described above, potentially provides a richer, more nuanced explanation of the factors that enable a PHE institution to evolve and develop, and of the dynamic interactions of these factors across all levels - national, university and unit levels. Additionally, this study may provide a better understanding of the Vietnamese PHE sector, by exploring and comparing the challenging issues of governance, finance and quality assurance in PHE in three different national contexts – Korea, China and Vietnam. Collectively, the knowledge generated by this research may not only contribute to our scholarly understanding of the field of PHE, but also provide a scholarly foundation for the future development of strategy and policy to guide the development of PHE in Vietnam and thus enable the government to utilise PHE as a means of addressing the current problem of limited access to HE in Vietnam.

1.3. Scope of the Study

Generally, HE refers to the educational activities, including training and research conducted in institutions at post-secondary level authorised by national or state authorities (ERIC Thesaurus). However, this study specifically focuses on the three and four-year HEIs because of the specific context of Vietnam. In 2016, the Vietnamese government decided to divide the tertiary system into HE (primarily under the supervision of the Ministry of Education and Training, or the MoET), and vocational tertiary (under the supervision of the Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social Welfare, or the MoLISA). The majority of private HEIs in Vietnam are under the MoET’s supervision. Therefore, in this study, HE exclusively refers to universities that provide undergraduate and postgraduate courses, while other tertiary institutions that offer vocational training and other short courses are excluded. This definition is consistent throughout the three cases of this study.

Secondly, as indicated in the research topic, this study focuses on the PHE sector. In other words, private universities are the major subject of the investigation. Although the definition of public and private is often vague and complex (M. Lee & Neubauer, 2009), generally, the terms public and private are used to denote the sources of control, funding and operation of a HEI. Public is often equated to government, state-owned, or non-market while private refers to business or civil society, privately owned or market (Marginson, 2007). This definition is widely accepted in policies and practices. For the sake of defining the scope of this study, this definition is used to refer to the HEIs selected to investigate in this study. Nevertheless, as the research argument develops and the complexity of the public-private dichotomy is revealed later in the body of the study, a more in- depth analysis regarding this definition will be provided.

1.4. Primary Research Questions

This study aims to establish a model that will enable the development of PHE in Vietnam. Thus the primary research questions are:

1) What are the factors that positively impact the establishment and growth of the PHE sectors in China, Korea and Vietnam? 2) What are the features of the enabling models for PHE in China and Korea that are believed to have had a positive influence on the establishment and development of the PHE sectors in these countries? 3) What might be an appropriate enabling model for PHE in Vietnam given the answers to 1 and 2 above? It is important to note that these questions are broad and need to be refined to narrow the research directions. The further refining of research questions is carried out based on a thorough review of the literature and theoretical considerations.

1.5. Structure of the Study

This thesis consists of nine chapters, organised in the following sequence. Chapter I, Introduction, provides a research background and rationale of the study. Chapter II, Literature Review, discusses the relevant literature to provide initial understanding of the research topic and the limitations that this research has to address. Chapter III, Conceptual Framework, develops a conceptual and theoretical framework to investigate the relevant factors that influence the development of PHE. Chapter IV, Research Design and Methods, describes the research instruments for collecting, analysing and comparing data.

The research findings of the three cases of Korea, China and Vietnam are reported in chapters V, VI and VII respectively. In these three chapters, similar layouts are applied to describe the major themes of the research findings, in order to facilitate further comparisons in the following chapter. Chapter VIII, Comparisons and Implications for Vietnam, provides a comprehensive

comparative analysis of the research findings in the three cases as reported in the previous three chapters, then drawing 12 significant implications for the development of PHE in Vietnam. Chapter IX, Conclusion, summarises the major findings and implications for Vietnam, emphasises the significance of the study, acknowledges its limitations and provides suggestions for future research.

1.6. Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I discuss the research background to highlight the significance of conducting research to develop an alternative model that encourages the development of PHE. The scope of the study is established, and the primary research questions are identified. This chapter also provides a general overview of the structure of the thesis.

CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides a review of the literature, examining the general understanding of PHE and its purposes and functions. In addition, a brief introduction of the emergence and development of PHE in Vietnam is presented to emphasise the critical challenges in regulatory frameworks, finance, governance and quality that have confronted the sector. Most importantly, the limitations of the literature are discussed to identify the research directions of this study and establish the basis for theoretical discussion.

2.1. Overview of Private Higher Education Sector: Purposes and Functions

2.1.1. Purposes and Contributions of the Private Higher Education Sector

In this section I provide a brief introduction about the emergence of PHE and an explanation of how the background shapes the purposes and contributions of the sector to the HE system in general. Despite a large body of knowledge given by the literature to draw insights of the emergence of PHE, the majority of research agrees that PHE was established to fill in the gaps which their public counterparts have left public demand unsatisfied. What the gaps are may vary from country to country, but general patterns were drawn and categorised. This following section provides a summary of the literature regarding this matter.

According to Teixeira and Amaral (2001), the emergence of PHE is a result of “economy stringency, neo-liberal ideology and pressures from international agencies including the World Bank”. Agreeing with Teixeira and Amaral in terms of public budget cuts, Varghese (2004) explains the emergence and development of PHE under the light of government incapability to satisfy the unprecedented demand of HE. Mugabi (2012) on the other hand, argues that an enabling policy framework is an important factor. However, Levy (2006) points

out that the existence of such policies does not imply that governments initiated the growth or determined the type of institutions that emerged.

Jamshidi et al. (2012) analyse the case of Malaysia’s PHE to describe the impact of global economy on HE and explain the role of globalisation and its representative international agencies in supporting the development of the private sector in HE. The global trend in economic reform toward knowledge-based economies requires countries to develop a highly skilled workforce. Hence it has brought the inevitable expansion of HE. However, the public sector in many countries responded ineffectively to this phenomenon due to the scarcity of state funding resources for this sector, and inability to offer employment-oriented and market-friendly courses and programs (Varghese, 2004). Therefore, an alternative which can respond rapidly and efficiently to the market demands was seriously needed.

To understand why public universities are criticised for their ineffective responses to market demands, the public goods theory (Weisbrod, 1977) can provide excellent insights. This theory argues that the public (or quasi-public) goods provided by the government agencies tend to satisfy only “at the level of median voter. Consequently, there will be some residual unsatisfied demand for public goods among those individuals whose taste for such goods is greater than the median” (Hansmann, 1987, pp. 28–29). Base on this argument, the emergence of PHE can be explained as an effort to meet the extensive and heterogeneous demand of HE, which public universities alone cannot satisfy.

In agreement with this theory, Geiger (1985, p. 387, original emphasis) highlights three situations for PHE to emerge: “cases in which more higher education was demanded than was provided by the state, cases in which groups desired different kinds of schools from those provided, and cases in which qualitatively better education was sought”. This explanation of Geiger (1985) indicates the roles and purposes of PHE, which are providing accessibility, differentiation and quality education to meet the increasing demand of HE.

2.1.1.1. Accessibility

Because PHE was established to meet the increasing demand of the population that the public sector could not satisfy, the primary aim of this sector is to provide accessibility to HE. By mobilising and increasing the funding available for HE, private HEIs help to widen access without significant increases in public spending (Mugabi, 2012). Thus, private HEIs that concentrate strongly on the mission of accessibility are often characterized as highly ‘demand-absorbing’ universities (Levy, 2011) with tuition-dependence, market-orientation, unorthodox programmes, low academic standards, and reliance on casual teaching staff (Mugabi, 2012). This growth of demand-absorbing universities is caused by the excess of demand over supply, as Levy (2008, p. 9) noted: “This demand-supply gap increases especially where the middle class grows and the state is no longer able or willing to foot the bill for the great bulk of higher education”.

2.1.1.2. Differentiation

Though demand-absorbing is the most striking characteristic of PHE, it is not the only one that can be found in the mission of private HEIs. In fact, private HEIs vary in their missions, ownership, financial ability, and even in the ways of fulfilling their demand-absorbing role. According to Zumeta (1996), “private colleges and universities are a very diverse lot, and their autonomy permits them to offer a range of choices to students and other clients, such as governments and corporate research sponsors that would be hard to imagine being duplicated in the public sector” (p. 371). In other words, besides being demand-oriented, private HEIs also pursue the mission of diversification and differentiation. This role of PHE emerged from the dissatisfaction with the existing type of education in the system. In some countries, this contribution of private HEIs is the response to the increasing needs for cultural, religious or linguistic diversity (Mugabi, 2012). As such, this type of private HEIs often aim to serve a specific group of ethnic, religion, or culture with their own value, norms, and belief system that a

single public system cannot satisfy (Hölttä, Husen, & Neville, 1990; Levy, 2011).

2.1.1.3. Quality

Though it is not the common of PHE globally, in many countries such as America, Japan and Korea, private HEIs are the leaders in improving quality, not the public ones. Accordingly, those institutions have high reputations of academic excellence, up-to-date facilities, high-ranking academic staff, and are often ranked as elite institutions with “elite roles in social class, academics, or high positions, especially in the private job market” (Levy, 2002, p. 4).

2.1.1.4. The Vietnamese Situation

Vietnamese PHE, like many cases that have been reported in the literature (Jamshidi et al., 2012; Levy, 2006, 2013; K.-H. Mok, 2009, 2013; Mugabi, 2012), follows the similar patterns of rapid economic growth (Le & Ashwill, 2004), increasing demand for HE (Huong & Fry, 2002), and ineffective response of the public sector (Phuong, 2006). However, in terms of the purposes of PHE, it demonstrates slightly different characteristics which are worth more thorough investigation. The following section will briefly describe this situation.

For a decade after the country’s reunification in 1975, Vietnam experienced extreme hardship as the country attempted to recover from devastating wars that had lasted for a half century and economic crisis caused by a trade embargo led by the U.S. and unsuccessful policies (Le & Ashwill, 2004). These conditions led the 6th National Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party to launch socio- economic reforms, the so-called Doi Moi (literally meaning reformation), encouraging the private sector to emerge (London, 2010a; Phuong, 2006). Nourished by this reform, the economy quickly entered a boom time, fuelled by the increase of foreign investments. Consequently, a demand for skilled labour force to fulfil the requirement of an emerging market appeared (Welch, 2007b).

Vietnamese education has a long history (Huong & Fry, 2002; Welch, 2007b). However, due to the historical conditions, the contemporary HE system was

officially restructured after the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, under the concept of Socialist education (George, 2010). At that time, the Vietnamese higher education system was mainly elite-based and strongly controlled by the government (Hayden & Thiep, 2007). Only a very small number of the best students were allocated to public universities (Huong & Fry, 2002). Private school at any level were prohibited (George, 2010). The situation started to change after Doi Moi. The demand for a larger labour force to foster the growing ‘socialist-oriented market economy’ (referring to the transition from a planned to a market economy with a socialist orientation (Brabant, 1990; Fforde, 2019; Luong & Unger, 1998)) had increased while the capacity of the government to invest in education was limited (Hayden & Le, 2017). This created a great opportunity for private sector in HE to emerge. The first non-public university (Thang Long University) was officially established in 1993, but in fact the first form of it was set up much earlier in 1988 (Kelly, 2000).

The majority of private HEIs in Vietnam were established to provide more access for students who could not find a place in public institutions which were already overcrowded (Overland, 2006). For this reason, this sector is recognized for its strong demand-absorbing characteristics. Private universities in Vietnam often provide courses and programs that are in great demands but require low investment such as foreign language, business, commerce or accounting (L. Pham & Dam, 2014). In addition, the sector also highly depends on tuition fees which accounts for 82 percent of its revenue (Hayden & Dao, 2010). This strong tuition-dependence figure makes the competition for student enrolment between private HEIs more severe. However, because private HEIs are unable to compete with their highly ranked public counterparts, they gained the reputation of ‘degree mills’ that accept every student who could not find a place in public universities.

In terms of the function of differentiation, the linkage between Vietnamese private HEIs and the specific cultural, ethnic or religious groups that they aim to serve cannot be found due to the limitation of the legislative framework. In fact,

Vietnamese private HEIs differentiate themselves with pubic competitors by emphasizing the goals of providing market-friendly, job-oriented courses and creating international educational atmospheres for their students (L. Pham & Dam, 2014). It is possible for this sector to do so because their public counterparts are under strong control of government and slow to respond to the market requirements (Levy, 2006). Therefore, the feature of differentiation in Vietnamese PHE is not found in the sense of culture, religion or linguist, but in the sense of programs diversification.

Though Vietnamese private HEIs are not recognised in terms of academic excellence (Hayden & Dao, 2010; Le & Ashwill, 2004), their efforts to achieve higher levels of quality standards cannot be denied. In fact, some of them have demonstrated strong niches in fields such as business, language or information technology and developed creditable reputations nationally such as FPT University (for information technology), RMIT (for business), Thang Long University (for language, applied mathematics and information technology) (L. Pham & Dam, 2014). Nonetheless, these universities are not common in the sector, and they still possess features that characterise them as demand- absorbing.

It is crucial to note that most of the private HEIs in Vietnam possess at least two or more of the characters above. The diverse social demand for HE has brought about the complexity in the private HEIs’ purposes and missions. Institutions who cannot afford to satisfy this complexity would face extreme difficulties in competing with their competitors (L. Pham & Dam, 2014).

2.1.2. Functioning Models and Typology of Private Higher Education Sector

In this subsection, I introduce the functioning models and types of institutions in the private sector in general, mainly based on the studies of Geiger (1988) and Levy (2006, 2011, 2013). Subsequently, I briefly describe the linkage between the purposes of private HEIs and the types of institutions. At the end of this section, I use the case of Vietnam as an example to illustrate this argument. In addition, I summarise of Vietnamese literature regarding the types of private HEIs and highlight the limitations of this literature.

Most of the studies in the field of private higher education (PHE) agree that in the era of ‘mass higher education’ (Trow, 1973), it is very difficult to find a HE system in which the public sector exists alone (D. G. Jang, Wang, & Kim, 2010). Geiger (1988) studies HE systems in various states in the USA and explores three basic structural patterns of HE systems with two main components: public and private. The first structure is the public peripheral/private dominant (mass private and restricted public sectors). In this structure, the majority of students are enrolled in private institutions. The second pattern is the public-private parallel system in which both public and private are treated relatively equally and the private receives full funding from the state as do the public ones. The third pattern is the public dominant/private peripheral system. In this pattern, the private sector plays a supplementary role for the public, which is basically designed to fulfil all the demand for HE of the society.

Geiger’s study is helpful in identifying the current position and function of the PHE sector in a country and its relationship with its public counterpart. However, this study does not provide insights within the private sector, because it did not look into the sector itself to explore the diverse types of private providers participating in the market. Levy, in his studies (2006, 2011, 2013) provided a typology of PHE institutions based on roles and motives of private HEIs with “concomitant facts about ownership and management” (Levy, 2009, p. 14), which could help to address this issue. Basically, Levy’s typology could be

categorized into three groups: identity (religious) group, elite/semi-elite group and demand absorbing group.

In general, the religious/identity group of private HEIs is established based on religious or cultural/ethnic foundations. According to Levy (2011, p. 386), the emergence of this sub-sector reflects “the private purposes and niches rarely planned by government but rather representing self-interested pluralism”. On the other hand, elite PHE is not common (Levy, 2009). Possibly because the establishment of an elite PHEI requires a range of conditions, from financial to political, that is not easy to meet, especially in developing countries with a short history of contemporary higher education like Vietnam. However, as Levy has observed in his research (2006, 2011), more common is the emergence of the semi-elite institutions, which lie between the elite and non-elite sub-sectors. Those semi-elite institutions are commonly characterized by their strong emphasis on market orientation and entrepreneurship. They often aspire to develop their own niches and achieve leading positions in some specific fields. Though they cannot compete with highly ranked public counterparts in research or academic excellence, they gain their reputation by creating a student-centred atmosphere, offering market-friendly courses, and adopting professional management models.

The dominant group among private HEIs is the demand-absorbing group. This group emerges to absorb the rising demand for higher education. They often focus on low-cost and high demand fields. In addition, they tend to be profit- driven. Levy (2009) differentiates private HEIs in this demand-absorbing group into ‘serious’ and ‘garage’. Serious demand-absorbing private HEIs are responsive to changing demands in the labour market, endeavouring to attract non-traditional students. These universities pay substantial attention to entrepreneurial activities, implementation of effective management practices and pursuit of legitimacy. In contrast, garage demand-absorbing private HEIs typically try to maximise profit, often by rapidly increasing enrolment rates and offering short courses in low-cost areas which require minimum investment. As a

result, these universities are often criticised for their lack of transparency, poor quality and inferior resources (Levy, 2009).

Considering the typology proposed by Levy (2009) in regards to the work of Geiger (1985) about the purpose of PHE, the connection between the roles of PHE and the types of institutions can be recognized. Private HEIs that aim for providing accessibility to the increasing demand population are obviously characterized as demand absorbing ones, whereas institutions provide courses and programs for special targeted groups of students with specific religious or cultural/ethnic needs belong to the religious/identity group. Lastly, a small number of private universities that aspire to provide high quality become elite/semi-elite institutions. The link between purpose of PHE and its institutional type can be described as in Table II-1 below.

Table II-1. Purposes and Types of Private HEIs

Purposes of PHE Typology of private HEIs Contributions of PHE (Geiger, 1985) (Levy, 2009) MORE Accessibility/Equity Demand absorbing

DIFFERENT Differentiation/Diversity Religious/Identity

BETTER Quality Elite/Semi-elite

In Vietnam, PHE institutions accounted for 19.6% of total HE institutions, whereas the figure for the number of students enrolled in this sector is 13.2% (Vietnamese General Office of Statistics, 2015). Applying Geiger’s classification of patterns, it can be concluded that Vietnam has the public dominant/private peripheral system. In other words, the Vietnamese PHE plays only a peripheral role in the sense that they enrol only a small proportion of students.

In terms of typology, Vietnamese PHE shares some similarities and differences with other countries reported in Levy’s studies (2006, 2011). Firstly, demand absorbing private HEIs are the major sub-sector among private universities in Vietnam, manifesting some typical characteristics of this group. For instance, they were established to meet the growing demand for higher education and 17

mainly focus on low-cost (low investment) but in high demand programs such as foreign languages, business, accounting and law (Huong & Fry, 2002; L. Pham & Dam, 2014). In addition, private universities in Vietnam in general are low quality and status (Hayden & Thiep, 2007) and most of them are for-profit institutions (L. Pham & Dam, 2014).

Secondly, there is also a range of institution from serious to garage within the demand absorbing sub-sector in Vietnamese PHE. According L. Pham and Dam (2014), the most successful group which attracts the majority of students among private HEIs in Vietnam are those that (1) differentiate themselves from their public counterparts in terms of quickly responding to market demand; (2) provide dynamic and positive learning environment for students with higher job security after graduation; (3) have an effective management model; and (4) have a long- term vision of development and quality. These descriptions reflect the characteristics of the serious demand-absorbing group. The other institutions, the ‘garage’ ones, with low tuition fee, poor quality and focus on profit are ‘in danger’ and ‘facing to shut down’ (L. Pham & Dam, 2014).

Thirdly, there also are a few institutions that following the path of the semi-elite sub-sector in Vietnam. In general, these institutions aim at students who are socially advantaged with comparatively high tuition fees. They also pay serious attention to quality of teaching and students’ satisfaction. They develop their own niches and are among the leading institutions nationwide (L. Pham & Dam, 2014). RMIT and FPT University can be considered as examples.

Finally, religious/identity group of private universities does not exist in Vietnam because their establishment (particularly religious based ones) is proscribed by law (Article 19, Vietnamese Education Law issued in 2005). There are HEIs that are specially designed for different minority ethnic groups, but all of them are public and heavily subsidized by the government.

In terms of classifying institutional types of PHE in Vietnam, most studies are based on the ownership or managerial models of institutions. For example, Huong and Fry (2002) categorized private HEI in Vietnam into 5 groups as 18

follows: (1) private university owned by domestic or international investors; (2) semi-public owned/sponsored by state organisations or union organizations (because many civil society organisations in Vietnam are state-owned); (3) universities managed according to a cooperative model that all capital investors share the power of managing the university; (4) universities managed according to an enterprise model with a small number of members in the management board; and (5) universities managed according to an enterprise model with all the staff are the shareholders.

Using ownership/managerial models to classify institutions, Huong and Fry (2002) recognized that the diversity of private HEIs and their governance models has caused serious problems for the Ministry of Education and Training (MoET) as well as local government in guiding and administrating the development of private HEIs. However, the rapid changes in both policy and practice regarding PHE in Vietnam have made the categories of Huong and Fry out-dated.

The research of Huong and Fry (2002) is among only a handful studies about Vietnamese PHE. Most research focuses on higher education in general with the public system as the main component (Berlie, 1993; Dao & Hayden, 2010; George, 2010; Hayden & Lam, 2006). PHE receives very little attention from researchers despite a great demand for study (L. Pham & Dam, 2014). The small numbers of research that focused on PHE, unfortunately, are out-dated due to constant changes of Vietnam higher education, both in policy and practice.

To describe the complexity of this situation, there are some stark examples. Firstly, since the Education Law was issued in 2005 with its relevant decrees the semi-public type of institutions were terminated in 2006 (Vietnamese Government, 2006b). Secondly, the economic boom in the period of 2005-2009 led to the strong involvement of private investors in the establishment of new private HEIs (L. Pham & Dam, 2014). Along with these investors, their highly entrepreneurial management model also became popular, which resulted in private HEIs being treated as entrepreneurs (L. Pham & Dam, 2014). This, in turn, has brought about a call against ‘for-profit’, ‘commercialized universities’,

raised by researchers and scholars who worry that the ‘invasion’ of private investors with their ‘business’ mind-set will degrade traditional educational values (Ngo, 2014). All these dynamic movements by various stakeholders have created a high degree of complexity to an extremely sophisticated picture of PHE. This requires more thorough investigation of the field. Unfortunately, Vietnamese literature in this field has failed to carry out this task.

2.1.3. A Brief History of the Vietnamese Private Higher Education Sector

This section aims to provide a summary of the Vietnamese PHE since the establishment of the first private university after Doi Moi implemented in 1986 until the current situation where new universities mushroomed due to the economy booming. This will help understanding the background and current situation of Vietnamese PHE.

From the establishment of the first private university (Thang Long University) in 1993, until now the private sector has evolved through two major waves of development (Huong & Fry, 2002; L. Pham & Dam, 2014; Phuong, 2006). The first wave was from the late 1980s to early 2000s. This was a critical time when the newly emerged sector made efforts to establish its legitimacy in a society where socialist values are dominant (Le & Ashwill, 2004). Pioneer private HEIs at this time varied in types and forms with different names, referred to the transition from a system solely dominated by the public sector to a mixed system of public and private sectors.

As table II-2 describes, there were 3 types of institutions in the non-public sector, which were privately-owned (domestic or foreign-owned), people-founded and semi-public. The privately-owned institutions were those owned and operated by private investors, which can be domestic or foreigner investors. The first foreign- owned university established by the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT Vietnam) opened in 2003 in Ho Chi Minh City. People-founded institutions were owned and managed by nongovernmental organizations or associations such as trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations, and women’s associations (Huong & Fry, 2002; Phuong, 2006). Interestingly, due to 20

the unique context of Vietnam, these organisations are mostly state-subsidised, although they can be categorised as civil society organisations (Huong & Fry, 2002; P. A. Nguyen & Doan, 2016). Semi-public institutions were owned and operated by the state and a public authority at the central, provincial, district, or communal level.

Table II-2. Types of Vietnamese HEIs (until 2006)

Category Type Characteristics Founded, funded and controlled by Public government Private-owned by Domestic-owned individual or collective organizations Foreign-owned Non- Founded/funded by collective organizations public People-founded such as NGOs or Trade Union Founded and controlled by government but Semi-public funded by tuition fees

Institutions established in this stage in general were similar in insufficient resources, poor infrastructure and over-expansion (L. Pham & Dam, 2014). However, the government’s inability to supply HE for a growing young population to meet the demand of the ‘socialist-oriented market economy’ has created a great opportunity for these institutions to develop. The development of these institutions, therefore, proved the potential of the private sector to share the burden with their public counterparts.

After a short period of dramatic growth, Vietnamese PHE had to face up to several severe problems caused by inadequate resources, dramatic expansion and an incomplete legal framework. For example, in 1999, Decree No. 73 issued by the government emphasized the so-called ‘socialization in education’ in which the government encouraged investment in education in any form with an incentive system such as land usage fee exemption and individual income tax reduction (Vietnamese Government, 1999). However, the Decree No. 86 issued

in 2000 stated that properties of the university belonged to the collectivist body included investors, professors and staff (Vietnamese Government, 2000). This statement was unclear in identifying the property right of each stakeholder and therefore in practice could not attract private investors to invest, especially when their investment was not secured by the legal system (Le & Ashwill, 2004). This imperfect legal framework significantly restricted private investment in HE, hindering the development of the sector.

This stage also witnessed the failure of the models of semi-public and people- founded that the Vietnamese government tried to implement in the early 1990s. After a period of struggling to operate semi-public institutions, in 2005, the Education Law recognized three types of ownership in education: public, people- founded and private (Article No. 48). One year later, the government issued Decree No. 75, terminating the people founded type. In the same year, the Prime Minister approved 19 people-founded HEIs converting into private ones (Vietnamese Government, 2006a). Since then there are only two forms of institution in Vietnam HE: public and private.

A minor backward step could not stop the private sector to expand, especially when it was accompanied by the vibrant economic growth of the country. The increase of investment capital in education from the private sector was encouraged by the policy framework, especially the Investment Law that allows investors to keep a ‘reasonable profit’ (Thiep, 2009). Though the legal framework is still insufficient, and uncertainty remains (L. Pham & Dam, 2014), private investors found Vietnamese HE as an attractive (and profitable) market, with a young population and a long tradition and strong educational zeal in the world’s second fastest growing economy. Consequently, a new wave of development started. The private sector in Vietnam has increased from only 8 institutions in 1995 to 84 institutions in 2013. The number of students enrolled in this sector also increased dramatically, from 103,900 in 2000, to 272,000 in 2013 (Vietnam General Statistics Office, 2015). Until 2015, the number of students enrolled in private HEIs accounted for 13.2% of total students. This number is

expected to increase in the future since the Vietnamese government has set a goal to increase this number to 40 percent by 2020 (Hayden & Dao, 2010; Hayden & Lam, 2006).

Figure 1. Number of Private Universities Established by Year (1994-2014)

Source: Vietnam General Statistics Office (http://www.gso.gov.vn/Default_en.aspx?tabid=491)

In this stage, PHE experienced the participation of industrial investors and entrepreneurs (L. Pham & Dam, 2014). Their participation has strengthened the linkage between PHE and industry and enhanced the focus on market-orientation and job creation in the university’s educational goals. This strength has enhanced private HEIs’ competitiveness over public HEIs, helping them attract more students. Those institutions with ‘serious’ demand-absorbing characteristics (Levy, 2009) quickly became the fastest growing subsector in Vietnamese PHE.

The global financial crisis in 2008 obviously impacted the expansion of PHE in Vietnam. Investment capital in education decreased, many institutions had to delay their investment/expansion plans. ‘Short-term runners’ (L. Pham & Dam, 2014) with limited resources and unclear visions started to lag behind. The crisis also provided MOET a chance to revise the legal framework, adopting a new accreditation system in response to the global trend for quality assurance (Hayden & Dao, 2010). The 2008 global financial crisis, rather an opportunity than a crisis, allowed private HEIs to reset their educational vision, reconsider

their investment plans, and restructure their institutions, in many aspects such as managerial, financial, and educational.

Above is a short overview of the development path of Vietnamese PHE. However, for the sake of providing an overview, it only describes briefly historical events and issues without analysing systemically the problems which the sector is facing, which is addressed in the next sub-section.

2.2. Challenging Issues of PHE

The development of PHE is challenged by a wide range of issues, including (1) regulatory framework (Levy, 2011; Pachuashvili, 2011); (2) resource and funding (Asian Development Bank, 2012; Levy, 2009); (3) governance (Asian Development Bank, 2012; Hayden & Dao, 2010; K.-H. Mok, 2013); and (4) quality assurance (Asian Development Bank, 2012; Lemaitre, 2009). In this section, I discuss the challenges confronting the PHE sector in Vietnam.

2.2.1. Regulatory Framework

Despite the different terms used, many studies in the field have agreed that the regulatory framework (Fielden & Varghese, 2009; Jamshidi et al., 2012; Pachuashvili, 2011; Wei, 2009) is an important factor that directly impacts the daily operations of private HEIs from establishment to daily management. According to Fielden and Varghese (2009), the purposes of a regulatory framework are to (1) protect consumers, which are students, from poorly- operated and low quality private institutions; (2) collect information for public decision making; (3) ensuring the effectiveness and appropriateness of public policies regarding the private sector and (4) increasing the financial efficiency and accountability of the private sector.

Thus they emphasized the key issue for a government to establish a regulatory framework which favours private providers is to provide “a right balance between protecting the public and encouraging private providers to invest” (Fielden & Varghese, 2009, p. 72). However, it is very common that the PHE sector is confronted by major regulatory issues, including (1) non-transparent

processes; (2) complicated decision-making structure; (3) out-of-date, inappropriate and inflexible criteria for accreditation; (4) cumbersome approval processes and (5) lack of government support.

Nonetheless, Fielden and Varghese did not provide any comments about what causes these regulatory issues. Potential explanations can be found in the studies Zumeta (1996, 1997) and Levy (2011). In Zumeta’s works, an analytical framework that identified different governmental approaches towards PHE was proposed, including laissez-faire, central-planning and market-competition. The laissez-faire policy model refers to the state ignoring the sector altogether, providing no financial support either directly or via students. In the central- planning approach, the state purposefully uses PHE to serve public purposes under a careful plan. In this case, the state provides financial incentives, including direct incentives for universities and indirect student aids. The market- competition approach is a model in which the state reduces its direct intervention via detailed regulation and guides PHE using market mechanisms (Pachuashvili, 2011).

Levy (2011), in his study of the developmental patterns of PHE in different countries, discovers that in many countries, the PHE sector emerges without the intention and design of the government. Thus the initial regulatory approach towards PHE was laissez-faire. This brought about the lack of legal and policy framework dealing with PHE in many countries. Even when governments established the legal framework eventually (either directly managing the PHE or within the HE system), the explicit laws “[have] been no guarantee of clarity in practice” (Levy, 2011, p. 384). In this case, the role of governments and their policies regarding the development of PHE are often unplanned and indirect, even ‘paradoxical’ (Levy, 2011).

Collectively, the findings of Zumeta (1996, 1997) and Levy (2011) suggest that as governmental policies regarding PHE in many countries evolve from laissez- faire to market-competition. In addition, their failure to respond appropriately to

the rapid growth of this sector has brought about the absence of a clear and complete framework for the sector.

In the case of Vietnam, a similar situation to that described in the above- mentioned studies has been witnessed. Initially, the government in Vietnam did not expect the dramatic expansion of the private sector. Its inability to supply the surging demand for HE both politically and financially caused them to enable the PHE sector to grow (Hayden & Dao, 2010). Nevertheless, for a long period, the government could not establish a comprehensive framework to facilitate the full maturation of the sector. In a country where public education is dominant like Vietnam, this lack of a comprehensive framework has caused private HEIs to be vulnerably exposed in a dynamic, unpredictable environment (Le & Ashwill, 2004).

As the government eventually recognized the risk of leaving the private sector without governmental interventions, the Vietnamese government has implemented a set of ‘delayed regulations’ (Levy, 2006). Delayed regulation is a policy approach that aims to tighten the supervision of PHE, enhancing transparency, improving quality and increasing the legitimacy of the sector. The negative reputation and poor quality of private HEIs has caused governments to implement delayed regulations (Levy, 2006).

An example of delayed regulations in Vietnam is the implementation of complicated, lengthy and costly procedures to approve a new private university. The government uses this approach to prevent short-term profit-driven private HEIs from being established. However, the high cost and complicated procedure might hinder private investment, especially when the government wants to promote private investment in education to expand system capacity and improve quality. Obviously, these delayed behaviours of the government have negatively impacted the development of PHE in general. Therefore, to mobilize private investment, it is necessary for the Vietnamese government to establish a transparent and comprehensive regulation system to fulfil the purposes as Fielden and Varghese (2009) had concluded.

Nevertheless, the goal of establishing such a framework will not be easily accomplished, as indicated in a report of the World Bank: “in most developing countries, no clearly identified set of individuals or institutions is working to ensure that all the goals of the country’s higher education sector will be fulfilled” (World Bank, 2000, p. 58). This conclusion demonstrates an important argument: the need for a regulatory framework is important, but other matters such as how to apply the framework, who takes responsibility and what the consequences would be if that framework was implemented also require careful consideration. Unfortunately, there is serious inadequacy of research covering these issues.

2.2.2. Issues of Resources and Funding

In general, it is not common for private universities to receive major public funding (Levy, 2006). However, the sector may receive funding through indirect means such as competition for evaluation-based research funding programs, student loans, tax incentives (Asian Development Bank, 2012). Besides public funding, a certain amount of financial resources for private HEIs comes from philanthropy (Levy, 2009). Some famous private institutions receive money regularly from this source. However, philanthropy is available for institutions in religious/identity or semi-elite subsectors but is very rare for the demand- absorbing subsector, which is the biggest player among the subsectors (Levy, 2011). The most common source of funding for private HEIs is from tuition, and the vast majority of them are heavily depend on tuition for funding (Hayden & Dao, 2010; Welch, 2007b).

Vietnamese PHE has been struggling for funding. Private universities in Vietnam do not receive direct subsidies from the government. The two major incentives for private investors are property usage tax reduction and income tax reduction (L. Pham & Dam, 2014). In addition, Vietnam does not have a tradition of donation or philanthropy in education. The government does not provide any incentives or at least tax exemption for those who donate to education (L. Pham & Dam, 2014). Consequently, Vietnamese PHE institutions depend heavily on

tuition fees. According to Hayden and Dao (2010) student tuition and fees account for 82 percent of the revenue of all private HEIs.

Furthermore, the legal framework is unsuccessful in providing a secure environment for private providers to invest in HE. The lack of regulations that protect investors’ rights hinders investment from private investors (Hayden & Thiep, 2007). As a result, there has been a tendency for private providers to concentrate on delivering programs or courses that require minimum investment with the maximum profit such as foreign language, business, economics and other low-cost professional programs (Le & Ashwill, 2004). Investment in facilities, R&D, curriculum and academic staff are not priorities. This, in turn, contributes to the reputation of low quality and poor performance of this sector.

Heavily depending on tuition fees, private HEIs have no choice but to increase tuition fees to generate income to afford the operational costs of the institutions, whereas the public competitors receive government subsidies to cover such costs (Dao, 2009). Consequently, tuition fees in private HEIs are often higher than their public counterparts. Some institutions, particularly those which develop their own niches in fields/majors that require large scale investment such as engineering, IT, or medicine have their tuition fees five to seven times higher than public ones (L. Pham & Dam, 2014). In this case, only a small number of students from advantaged groups can afford such institutions. If this becomes the common practice among private HEIs, the goal of providing accessibility, one of the primary functions of this sector, may be neglected.

In conclusion, Vietnam needs a system to ensure the private universities’ financial survival and at the same time to maintain the sector’s major function of increasing accessibility. As Asia Development Bank (2012) suggests, in such a system, governments can implement financial support to PHE via various mechanisms. These include direct and indirect approaches, such as student loans programs, tax incentives, minimal regulations on profits and returns, research and other grants. These alternative sources would help private HEIs cover their operational cost without over relying on tuition fees and/or compromising their

quality. However, Asia Development Bank (2012) only provides recommendations from general perspectives. In order to establish and implement such financial support mechanisms, it requires thorough consideration concerning the applicability of these mechanisms in specific contexts like Vietnam. Unfortunately, the literature regarding PHE in Vietnam has not considered this topic.

2.2.3. Governance

In this subsection, the topic of governance is explained, focusing on the global trend in university governance and the current model of governance in Vietnam. The purpose of this subsection is to demonstrate the significance of university governance and how an ineffective model of governance can hinder the development of the PHE sector.

According to Gayle, Tewarie and White (2011), universities governance refers to “the structure and process of authoritative decision making across issues that are significant for external as well as internal stakeholders within a university” (p. 1). This definition indicates the significance of governance to the development of a university. Effective governance provides clear purposes for organisations, clarifies directions, identifies priorities, ensure sufficient supervision (Gayle et al., 2011). Welch (2007a) also reports that governance is a crucial element in higher education reforms in recent years, in which the common goal is a shift towards decentralisation. The process of decentralization, particularly at the macro level is expected to ensure flexibility and diversity of the HE system, helping universities enhance their capacity in implementing effective governance models.

However, governments at the same time retain a strong interest in higher education, particularly its capacity to contribute to national economic development (Welch, 2007a). This tendency is strengthened further in the context of accountability when governments have tightened regulatory framework, restricting universities’ ability to implement decentralization and

reform (Armstrong & Chapman, 2011). In this process, governance reform is viewed as a form of centralized decentralization (K. H. Mok, 2004).

In the light of the relationship between governments and universities, the governance model in Vietnam is referred to as the civil-service model, in which universities are viewed as effective arms of governments (Dao & Hayden, 2010).

They are under the direct control and management of the ministries and universities staff are viewed as civil officers. For this reason, they receive specific provisions from governments to maintain academic autonomy (Dao & Hayden, 2010).

This model of governance is in effect in Vietnam due to the influence of the Soviet model (Hayden & Thiep, 2007), making Vietnamese HE highly centralized system in which the government is the source of authority. The Ministry of Education and Training (MoET), with the support from other ministries, represents and consults the government to govern the HE system, including the private sector. Its authority is involved in every aspect of system governance, from enrolment allocation, courses and program approval, general curriculum development to the appointment process for chair positions in universities and accreditation and qualification granting (Hayden & Thiep, 2007).

This civil-service model has been criticised for hindering effective governance and not providing universities the autonomy necessary to ensure their responsiveness to the rapidly changing demand of the external environment (Dao & Hayden, 2010). As a result, Vietnamese universities, constrained by this highly centralised governance model, are confronted by a wide range of issues such as inflexible management and teaching, inflexible funding mechanisms, aging facilities, out-dated learning resources and curriculum, low capacity of research and critical analysis.

Compared with public universities, private HEIs in Vietnam enjoy more financial autonomy because they receive no direct support from the state budget and totally rely on tuition fees (Hayden & Thiep, 2007). However, they are still

subject to strong regulation from the government in educational program management, curriculum and learning contents (Hayden & Thiep, 2007).

For instance, the centralised authority of MoET over curriculum is secured by Education Law 2005, Article 41. Every university, include private HEIs, must receive permission from MoET before introducing a new course, and must wait until MoET establishes an expert panel and develop the curriculum framework. This practice of central control of curriculum has limited the ability of the universities to develop new curriculum. This has resulted in inflexibility of universities in response to the rapid changes of the environment, which in turn causes criticism of its irrelevance to social and industrial demand.

The Vietnamese government is aware of the drawbacks of this governance model and the importance of educational reform. This can be seen in Resolution No. 14/2005/NQ-CP on Substantial and Comprehensive Renewal of Vietnams’ Tertiary Education in the 2006-2020 period, which is referred to as the Higher Education Reform Agenda (HERA). HERA pointed out the main objectives of HE development strategies including (1) increasing participation rate in HEIs; (2) improving quality and efficiency; (3) enhancing research capacity; and (4) improving HE governance at both national and university levels (Hayden & Lam, 2006). Similarly, resolution No. 05-NQ/BCSD on Innovation in Higher Education issued in 2010 by the MoET also emphasises the aim of reforms in Vietnamese HE is to promote “the autonomy, accountability and internal self- control of the institutions in accordance with the regulations of the state and of the institutions” (T. H. Do & Ho, 2011, p. 13)

The Vietnamese government has expressed a strong commitment to catching up with the global trend of governance, as shown in important policy documents mentioned above. Regrettably, in practice there has been little improvement in governance at the macro level (Asian Development Bank, 2012). The government is criticised for its inability to implement a new and more efficient model. Thus, the issues of governance continue to be one of the biggest barriers to the development of universities, both public and private. From an academic

perspective, it requires more research not only on what model should be adopted, but also how to implement efficiently such model in practice.

2.2.4. Quality Assurance

The issue of quality assurance (QA) in the field of PHE is examined in the following way. Firstly, the general definition of QA is provided before the general issues of QA in global PHE is explained. Then the specific QA problems of the Vietnamese PHE sector is described.

QA in HE generally refers to the process that evaluates universities or educational programs to ensure that the universities or programs meet the required standards established by the universities themselves, or professional and/or government agencies (Brennan & Shah, 2000). Common elements of quality assurance processes may include evaluation standards, internal evaluation of a university, external assessment by authorised agencies and a final decision (Belawati & Zuhairi, 2007).

For PHE, quality is one of the most challenging issues, particularly for demand absorbing and non-elite private HEIs. The poor performance of private HEIs in quality is often explained by their limitations in funding. In many cases, private providers chose to sacrifice quality for securing return on investment. The common alternative strategies are (1) increasing student enrolment; (2) providing programs that do not require high investment costs ; (3) operating in poorly facilitated infrastructure; (4) relying on part-time staff; and (5) focusing on teaching and vocational training (Asian Development Bank, 2012; Chen, Sok, & Sok, 2007; Hayden & Dao, 2010)

According to Lemaitre (2009), QA processes might have both positive and negative impacts on the development of private HEIs. Positively, QA helps (1) improve quality by establishing a set of minimum standards that requires HEIs to meet, (2) provide accurate information for parents and students to make their decisions of choosing HEIs to be enrolled, and (3) improve HEIs’ legitimacy.

Negatively, QA may hamper the HE system’s diversity because QA tends to adopt the same standards for all types of HEIs.

Thus, it is crucial to establish an appropriate and effective QA system for the PHE sector to improve the quality and enhance accountability of the expanding private HEIs. To do so, governments must establish effective policies and regulations for assessing and ensuring the quality of education in private HEIs. Depending on the context of the nation, different countries implement different QA policies and procedures. Asia Development Bank (2012) strongly advocates governments to consider carefully the economic, social, political and historical contexts of their countries when implement QA strategies for private HEIs.

Like other developing countries, Vietnamese HE is also facing major issues of quality. Generally, the system is criticised for its irrelevance and unresponsiveness to the social and industrial demands (World Bank, 2013). This situation calls for an improvement in every aspect of HE, from teacher training, curriculum development, teaching method innovations, to research capacity enhancement, institutional capacity building and infrastructure renovation.

In recent years, quality management has been given great attention. Four independent agencies in charge of quality assurance and accreditation have been established (H. C. Nguyen, Evers, & Marshall, 2017). Internal and external auditing has been implemented at the university level (T. H. Do & Ho, 2011). The government has endeavoured to develop QA systems for higher education, with both processes of institutional self-assessment and national external evaluation. MoET introduced a set of 10 standards and 63 criteria for institutional self-assessment (H. C. Nguyen et al., 2017).

However, the current QA system has been implemented in Vietnam in recent years and has not fully developed. In the past, the lack of a regulatory framework and effective QA caused low public confidence in private HEIs in the country (Le & Ashwill, 2004). This newly adopted QA system is expected to help the private sector in improve its institutional quality and improve their capacity in competition with their public counterparts. However, since this QA system has 33

been adopted recently, it is difficult to assess the impact of the QA mechanisms to the private sector. In addition, it may take a quite long time for the sector to implement this new system. Thus, in the near future, quality is still the biggest challenge of the PHE.

2.3. Limitations of the Literature

2.3.1. Lacking an Up-to-date Body of Research about the Current Situation of Vietnamese PHE

As discussed previously, the literature regarding the Vietnamese PHE is seriously insufficient. Only a handful of studies have attempted to investigate the typology of the institutions (Huong & Fry, 2002; L. Pham & Dam, 2014). Although the problems that the sector is facing and their causes were briefly mentioned elsewhere (Asian Development Bank, 2012; Dao, 2009; Hayden & Thiep, 2007; Le & Ashwill, 2004), they were not treated as an independent topic, but instead as a side interest or a marginal component of a study about the general HE system.

Researchers not only pay little attention to the field of PHE in Vietnam but also are unable to provide an up-to-date body of knowledge regarding this field. There are dramatic changes in the current situation of Vietnamese PHE, such as changes in the ownership types of PHE institutions, the new regulations regarding the PHE sector, and the emergence of newly established PHE institutions with strong entrepreneurial characteristics (L. Pham & Dam, 2014; H. T. Tran & Nguyen, 2012). Despite this rapid growth, little research has been focused on Vietnamese PHE under these circumstances. This situation requires more thorough investigation of the field. Unfortunately, only a very small number of studies focus on the development of PHE (Hayden & Dao, 2010; Huong & Fry, 2002; L. Pham & Dam, 2014; H. T. Tran & Nguyen, 2012), yet these studies do not reflect the dynamics of these circumstances.

Therefore, this study improves the understanding of the Vietnamese PHE sector firstly by providing an updated description of the current situation in Vietnam.

Secondly, this study explores and compares the challenging issues of governance, finance and quality assurance in PHE in three different national contexts - Vietnam, China and Korea. Collectively, the knowledge generated by this research not only contributes to our scholarly understanding of the field of PHE but also provides a scholarly foundation for the future development of strategies and policies to guide the development of PHE in Vietnam and thus enables the government to utilise PHE as a means of addressing the current limits of access to HE in Vietnam.

2.3.2. Lacking a Strong Theoretical Basis

In this subsection, the limitations of the literature in providing a theoretical basis to direct research arguments for this study is described. In the beginning, I emphasize the importance of theories for research before explaining why the literature in the field of PHE is unsuccessful in providing a theoretical foundation for this study. Based on this argument, I introduce briefly the theories used to build a theoretical framework.

A solid base of theories is crucial, particularly in empirical studies, because a theoretical framework greatly impacts the whole research process, from research design to data analysis (MacFarlane & O’Reilly-de Brún, 2012). Theories help explain and predict “causal processes accounting for observed associations” (Abraham, 2004, p. 70). Neglecting theories may lead to some serious research issues, such as irrelevant research questions, inappropriate research methods, unsuitable variables and/or inconsistent analytical approaches.

According to Fawcett and Downs (1986), theories are generally classified as descriptive, relational and explanatory. Because this research is descriptive, I will pay more attention to descriptive theories and explain why the previous literature in the field of PHE has failed to provide a solid foundation to establish a theoretical framework for this study.

Descriptive theories are generated and tested by descriptive research to answer questions such as “What is this?” (Diers, 1979, p. 103), and/or “What are the

existing characteristics of the real world relative to the specific questions?” (Payton, 1979, p. 44, cited in Fawcett & Downs, 1986, p. 7). Descriptive theories are generally categorised into naming and classifying theories (Stevens, 1984, cited in Fawcett & Downs, 1986, p. 5). A naming theory provides descriptions of the characteristics of individual, events or phenomenon whereas a classifying theory aims to produce typologies or taxonomies in which characteristics of the research object are structurally organised (Fawcett & Downs, 1986).

These two main streams of descriptive research theories can also be observed in the field of PHE. Geiger’s functional models of PHE (1985, 1988, 1996) or Levy’s studies (2006, 2009, 2011) with his impactful typology of private HEIs are clear examples of classifying theories. The other groups of research which focuses on identifying contributing factors of the development of PHE sector are those that aim to generate and/or test naming theories. However, there are great differences among this type of research about which factors determine the development of the sector.

For instance, Wei (2009) described three main crucial factors which are (1) government policy promoting the expansion of privatization of HE; (2) increasing demand for a highly skilled workforce; and (3) increasing in interest in higher education. Levy (2011) argues that (1) legal and policy framework and (2) legal authorization are the major factors. Meanwhile, Jamshidi et al. (2012) propose a set of factors which are crucial to the success of private universities, including (1) applying customer-oriented strategic planning, (2) utilising new learning methodologies; (3) using adequate marketing and advertising; (4) providing high quality education; (5) employing highly qualified academic staff; (6) increasing students’ satisfaction; (7) providing market-friendly courses and programs; and (8) improving performance mechanisms.

The huge differences in findings between different research as described above are the result of variation in the levels of analysis upon which the research has focused. For pragmatic reasons, each of these studies has focused on issues and practices at different levels. Some have focused on issues and practices at the

national, international or sectoral level. Others have focused on issues at the institutional level, while yet others have focused on these issues at the faculty/organisational unit level. For instance, Wei (2009) or Levy (2011) investigated at macro level, whereas Jamshidi et al. (2012) studied at institutional level. Because of these different levels of study, huge differences have been found regarding the topics of which factors impact the success of PHE sector, and how and to what extent they impact the development of this sector. These differences have resulted in a lack of a consistent theoretical basis to develop a framework that helps to define the research objectives and specify research sub- questions to structure the study.

This study aims to establish a model that promotes the development of Vietnamese PHE. That model must reflect the most relevant factors that impact the sector. Therefore, a substantive theoretical framework must be developed to provide a basis for advancing explanations to the dynamic interactions between a PHEI and its institutional environment. As described above, the literature could not provide a specific ground of theories to guide the research’s argument and fulfil the study’s aim. It requires the researcher to look beyond the field of PHE to search for other theories.

Among potential theories, Neo-Institutional Theory and Resource Dependence Theory fit well in this research because these theories explain many aspects of organizations, address topics such as why organizations are formed in particular ways, how decisions are made, and/or how political systems shape the management strategies of an organization (Heikkila & Isett, 2004). Especially, the Neo-Institutional Theory (NIT) focuses predominantly on external and internal influences on organizations, how institutions affect the ways in which an organization structures and adjusts practices in order to retain viability (J. W. Meyer & Scott, 1983). On the other hand, Resource Dependence Theory focuses on an organisation’s capability to make strategic choices to ensure sufficient resources (Reale & Seeber, 2011). Thus, these two theories will benefit this study by providing a guide to identify potentially relevant factors that determine the

establishment and evolvement of PHE sector. By adopting an approach that is built on Neo-Institutional Theory and Resource Dependence Theory, this study potentially provides a richer, more nuanced explanation of the factors which enable a PHE institution to evolve and develop, and of the dynamic interactions of these factors across all levels - national, institutional and unit levels.

As this section emphasises limitations of the literature and the need for establishing a theoretical foundation for this research, it is inappropriate to provide here an in-depth analysis of the theories that will be used in this study. A clear explanation of the theories and how I use them to build a theoretical framework will be provided in the next chapter (see chapter III).

2.3.3. Lacking Comparative Perspectives

As the Vietnamese government recognises the significant role of the PHE sector to help increase access to HE, it also acknowledges the need to learn from other countries which have extensive experience regarding PHE management to promote the growth of this sector. In addition, the challenges in governance, finance and quality assurance have led to the need for an alternative model to help the PHE sector to grow. In order to do so, Vietnam must learn from other countries’ models to draw lessons and establish its own model (Dao & Hayden, 2010). This requires a comprehensive body of knowledge from a comparative perspective, because this approach allows researchers to reveal contrasts and similarities to establish specific arguments (Adamson et al., 2012). However, little research has been done to provide understanding of PHE in other countries in comparison with the Vietnamese experience. This is a great gap that this study must address to achieve the research goal of developing a supportive model for the development of the PHE sector in Vietnam.

Moving beyond Vietnam, comparative perspectives are also commonly adopted in the literature regarding PHE in other countries. There are three dominant modes of analysis in comparative studies in PHE: (1) comparing public and private in one particular system/country (Dattey, Westerheijden, & Hofman, 2014; Eser & Birkan, 2005; Ferreira & Hill, 2008; Iqbal, Arif, & Abbas, 2011; 38

Wilkinson & Yussof, 2005); (2) single-country studies that focus on the private sector of one country but in the context of making comparisons with other countries in questions or in analysis (Alemu, 2010; Bernasconi, 2006; Ellis & Steyn, 2014; Gupta, 2008; Praphamontripong, 2011); (3) multi-sites studies that involve comparisons between different regions or nations, or between different states in one nation (Altbach, 1999; Jamshidi et al., 2012; Levy, 2006, 2011; Zumeta, 1992, 2011).

However, the vast majority of studies, regardless of the mode of analysis, use comparative methods to answer research questions in a specific topic such as policy, legislative framework, financial issues, human resource management, quality or equity. Although the topics related to the field are diverse, there is an obvious scarcity of research in terms of (1) conducting research that relies on or tests more general theories; (2) providing more general understanding of PHE in developed countries in Asia; and (3) providing broad and comprehensive knowledge about specific private sectors. Therefore, to contribute to the effort of finding a better model of development for Vietnamese PHE, it is necessary to conduct a comparative study that relies on general theories, involves cases from developed countries that share a similar context with Vietnam, and covers broader perspectives of research.

This study adopts a comparative approach to provide insights into how PHE in Vietnam can be enabled and developed by comparing how this is currently done in Vietnam, China and Korea. From this comparative perspective, the models of PHE in the three countries are explored. The findings generated from this comparison may significantly help to provide an academic foundation to develop a model for the advancement of the PHE sector in Vietnam.

2.4. Chapter Summary

In this chapter, by reviewing the literature, I discuss the general purposes and functions of PHE in the global and Vietnamese contexts. The literature has also distinguished different types of private HEIs, of which the demand-absorbing group is the major component of PHE. A brief overview of the development of PHE in Vietnam is also provided. In addition, critical problems in the regulatory framework, finance, governance and quality that have challenged the sector’s development as revealed in the literature are presented. This review helps identified major gaps where the literature lacks, primarily (1) updated research about current PHE in Vietnam, (2) a solid theoretical basis to guide this research, and (3) research using comparative perspectives. These are critical gaps that this study must address in order to accomplish its research aims.

CHAPTER III: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This part of the study aims to develop a substantive conceptual framework within which to navigate the research objectives and identify the specific research questions that help organise the study. In addition, such a conceptual framework provides a basis for advancing integrated explanations for the dynamism of the institutional environment of HE and its relationship with the universities in its domain. Consequently, it helps explain the complex behaviours, structures and processes that characterize the internal environments of the private universities.

The conceptual framework for the purposes described above includes three dimensions. The first dimension is the four perspectives of analysis: institutional logics, institutional isomorphisms, institutional structure and institutional actors. The second dimension is the three levels of analysis: micro, meso and macro level. The third dimension is the three aspects of analysis: governance, finance and quality assurance, which the literature suggests are the crucial aspects for PHE.

3.1. The First Dimension: The Integration of Neo-Institutional Theory and Resource Dependence Theory

In chapter II, I have explained why using Neo-institutional theory (NIT) and Resource Dependence theory (RDT) helps to build an appropriate framework for my study. In this subsection, I review the literature about NIT and RDT to explain how I combine these two theories to have the first dimension of the framework. Firstly, I examine the background of the two theories, the major concepts and insights of these theories, their relevant to this research, critiques of these theories, and the results of combining these two theories to be the one dimension of the conceptual framework of this study.

3.1.1. Neo-Institutional Theory

Neo-Institutional theory (NIT) draws on the ideas of Open System theory (OST), which views organizations as open systems actively interacting with their external environment (Katz & Kahn, 1978). In OST, the environment is seen as the major source that requires organisations to adapt to its changes (Hanson, 2001). However, OST was criticized for its narrow focus on “the technical facets and resources flow necessary to support the production process necessary to turn inputs into outputs” (Hanson, 2001, pp. 646–647).

Thus, institutional theorists led by J. Meyer and Rowan (1977) have proposed the NIT, focusing on explaining the interactions between organisations and the institutional field in which they exist. They argue that organisations’ interactions with external and internal environments are infused by values that are beyond technical requirements. Instead of viewing the environment “as if it was a life- support system” (Hanson, 2001, p. 646) that helps organisations change and adapt like OST, NIT suggests that the environment limits organisations’ adaptive ability. As Scott (Scott, 1991, p. 165) stated: “perhaps the single most important contribution of institutional theorists to the study of organizations is their reconceptualization of the environments of organizations”, NIT argues that organisations’ interactions with the environment are directed and shaped by social constraints or institutions.

In NIT, institutions are defined as “historical accretions of past practices and understandings that set conditions on action” through the way in which they “gradually acquire the moral and ontological status of taken-for-granted facts which, in turn, shape future interactions and negotiations” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 99). Institutions shape behaviours because being separate from them is “counteracted in a regulated fashion, by repetitively activated, socially constructed, controls” (Jepperson, 1991, p. 145).

NIT offers critical insights to understand the relationship between organisations’ internal contexts and their external institutional environments, among which the most relevant concepts to this study are isomorphisms, logics and actors. 42

3.1.1.1. Isomorphisms

By proposing the concept of institutions, NIT suggests that organisations are affected by and responsive to the symbolic and social pressures from their institutional environment created by other organisations (Lipson, 2011; Suddaby, Seidl, & Lê, 2013). Organisations’ responses to and interactions with institutional pressures and other organisations result in institutional isomorphism (Roszkowska-Menkes & Aluchna, 2017).

Isomorphism has a biological origin, meaning “Similarity in form, as in organisms of different ancestry” (Wiseman, Astiz, & Baker, 2014, p. 698). However, the concept of isomorphism in NIT initially introduced by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) refers to the phenomenon of organisations in an institutional environment resembling one another (Bager, 1994). Explaining this, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that as organisations in an institutional environment influence and are influence by one another, they become convergent in both structure and practices. Thus, isomorphism is a process of organisations adopting similar practices (Wiseman et al., 2014).

It is important to note that the key insight of NIT is its emphasis on the constraining power of instittutions in limiting organisational change (Kirby- Harris, 2003; Mouritsen, 1994; Ostrom, 1991). Hence, isomorphism should be understood as “a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (Hawley, 1968, p. 160) in which homogenisation itself is not the goal.

Accordingly, institutions stabilise organisational practices and therefore limit their ability to change through regulative, normative and culture-cognitive elements, which are “the building blocks of institutional structures, provide the elastic fibre that resist change” (Scott, 2001, p. 49). These elements were introduced by Scott (Scott, 1995) as an analytical framework for institutional

forces which helps explain the different but concurrent institutional pressures or influences that organizations can experience.

Specifically, the regulative element of institutions refers to basic rules and regulations, including formal (constitution, common law, and regulations) and informal rules (conventions, norms of behaviour, or codes of conduct). The normative element refers to what are legitimate, appropriate and correct according to social expectations and moral values (March & Olsen, 1989, 1998, 2011). The cognitive component addresses the taken-for-grantedness in social knowledge, such as common frames of reference, attitudes and stereotypes based on their organizational, peer and societal cultures (Scott, 1995, 2013). The differences between these three foundations can be found in Table III-1 below.

Table III-1. The Three Pillars of Neo-Institutional Theory

Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive Basic of Taken-for-grantedness Expedience Social obligation compliance Shared understandings Basic of Binding Relative Rules Constitutional schema order expectations Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy Rules Common beliefs Certification Indicators Laws Shared logics of action Accreditation Sanctions Isomorphisms Fear Affect Shame/Honour Certainty/Confusion Guilt/Innocence Comprehensible Basic of Legally Morally governed Recognisable legitimacy sanctioned Culturally supported Source: Scott (2013, p. 60)

Mirroring these three pillars are three mechanisms of institutional isomorphisms, which are coercive (by altering regulative pillars); normative (by altering the expectations of what is right and reasonable); or mimetic (for example, by taking 44

a new practice for a granted as a part of a new culture) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008).

3.1.1.2. Logics

In addition, NIT also brought with it a new focus on the organizational field. Organizational field constitutes “a recognised area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organisations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). An organisational field is constituted by institutions that are produced and reproduced through repeated interactions of organisations (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). At the same time, these institutions shape the ongoing patterns of organisations’ interactions. In other words, members of an institutional field share similar experience of the field which distinguish them from members of other fields.

Furthermore, institutional fields are characterised by institutional logics (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby, & Sahlin, 2008; Thornton, 2004; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 2008; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). Institutional logics are the taken-for-granted assumptions, values, beliefs and rules (both formal and informal) that shape interests and action at the field level. Institutional logics provide rationales, justifications, references and criteria for reasoning, actions and legitimacy, explaining contradictory practices and beliefs in institutions (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Specifically, they provide actors formal and informal rules, norms, principles and beliefs to interpret and justify what is legitimate and how to conduct actions.

More recently, researchers have recognized that there are more than one logic that constitutes an institutional field, referring to conditions of ‘institutional complexity’ (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Binder, 2007; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013). As a result, organisations are confronted by “incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics” (Greenwood et al., 2011). In order to survive in this situation, organisations must 45

manage the tensions and pressure caused by the incompatible logics, using different strategies (C. Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2013). Perhaps the most important insight of the concept of institutional complexity is that logics, rather than external rules and principles impact intentions and actions, and may provide helpful ‘tool kits’ (Swidler, 1986) for actors to influence external and internal environments of organisations.

3.1.1.3. Actors

Despite its useful insights and concepts, NIT is criticised for its over-emphasis on socialised constraints on organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Specifically, the traditional focus of NIT built on the premise of rational actors conforming to institutional forces are criticised for neglecting the strategic intents of actors in making decisions and taking actions (Besharov & Brickson, 2016) and paying more attention to structure over agency (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Suddaby, 2010). As a result, from the late 1990s onwards, a new phase of research has begun, focusing on the role of actors and their agentic behaviours. Recognising the significance of agency and the limitations of NIT due to its narrow focus on social constraints (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Selznick, 1996), researchers propose the concept of institutional entrepreneurship as part of the attempt to explore the role of actors.

Researchers have observed that institutional actors are not merely conformed by institutional forces, but also function as both carriers and creators of institutional logics (Giddens, 1986). By making meaning of their perceptions and experiences, they participate in the institutional environment (Scott, 2000). Therefore, the concept of institutional entrepreneurship was introduced, referring as “the activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or transform existing ones” (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004, p. 657). In other words, institutional entrepreneurs are actors who seek to initiate and enact institutional changes (Lockett, Currie, Waring, Finn, & Martin, 2012).

However, institutional entrepreneurship has been criticised for assuming that actors are ‘disembedded’ from their context and can therefore act freely. As a result, F. Macfarlane, Barton-Sweeney, Woodard and Greenhalgh (2013) introduced three sub-concepts in relation to human actors; agency, position and legitimacy. Specifically, agency refers to the ability to take actions within institutional structures (Marginson & Rhoades, 2002). The notion of position refers to an institutional position of an actor in an institutional field. Legitimacy, as explained by the literature (Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995), consists of structural legitimacy (obtained by actors through their formal position in the field) and normative legitimacy (obtained through actors’ ability to construct a moral, convincing argument of what is appropriate).

These three sub-concepts of actors proposed by Macfarlane et al. (2013) are helpful in explaining the relationship between institutional actors and institutional structures. In general, actors located in the centre of an institutional field with its given power and access to resources have advantages to enact changes. However, due to the privileges given to them by the existing institutional arrangements, they are unlikely to initiate change (Lockett et al., 2012). On the contrary, actors who are likely to enact change are those in peripheral positions of a field (Maguire et al., 2004) because they benefit less from the current institutional configurations (Haveman & Rao, 1997), and/or are likely to be exposed to new ways of working (Seo & Creed, 2002).

In summary, the core ideas of NIT are the following. Firstly, organisations interact with external environments forming similar practices and patterns, producing institutions. Secondly, institutions, in turn, influence the interactions of organisations, forcing organisations to conform to institutional pressures (isomorphisms), restricting organisations’ ability to change. Thirdly, organisational practices, therefore, reflect logics, values and structures of the broader society (logics). Fourthly, these institutional logics provide rationales for actors to take action, therefore, being reproduced by institutional actors. Finally,

institutional actors, however, may strategically select institutional elements available in the institutional environment to rationalise their actions.

3.1.2. Resource Dependence Theory

Another limitation of NIT is its neglect of the importance of material resources. As Scott (2013) indicates, despite being central constituents of institutions, rules, norms and cultural-cognitive beliefs must be supported by power and resources to be effective. In practice, organizations are aware of how important resources are to their survival and strongly compete for them. Russell, Knutson, and Crowley (2013) suggests that educational organisations are no exception, but must compete to each other for limited resources, including human, social and material resources.

In the case of private HEIs, within the national context, these universities must compete with each other and with the public sector for students, funding, academic staff and private investment and philanthropy. This highlights the central argument of RDT that in a competitive environment, organizations must interchange with other organizations to improve their competence and ensure survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Resource acquisition is the major driving force of organisations.

RDT proposed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) was widely used to analyse inter- organisational relations (Davis & Adam Cobb, 2010). As Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p. 25) stated, “resource dependence was originally developed to provide an alternative perspective to economic theories of mergers and board interlocks, and to understand precisely the type of inter-organizational relations that have played such a large role in recent ‘market failures’”.

Essentially, the Resource Dependence (RD) approach views organizations’ responding to external economic forces in a rational way (Kirby-Harris, 2003). RDT points out that organizations never are self-sufficient and must acquire resources to operate their activities (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This need for resources results in the interdependence between organisations and external

actors (Sanz-Menéndez & Cruz-Castro, 2003). Researchers using RDT pay careful attention to how organisations are economically constrained by the external environment and how they manage such dependences, which are among the most crucial actions of organisation management. The key strategy here, according to RDT, is to improve organisations’ ability to make strategic decisions and adapt which ensures sufficient resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Reale & Seeber, 2011)

Applying RDT to the case of private HEIs helps to explain how resources from external environmental affect and constrain private HEIs and how they respond to these external constraints. Researchers in this field has pointed out the severe difficulties of financial scarcity experienced by private HEIs in many countries (Kevin Kinser et al., 2010; Mugabi, 2012; Phuong, 2006; Praphamontripong, 2011). This lack of financial resources might stem from different causes such as economic decline, cutting government’s budgets, decrease in investment, increasingly intensive competition and/or reduction of the number of student enrolments (Asian Development Bank, 2012). Thus, RDT provides a substantial theoretical basis to explain how external environments shape the development of private universities by providing and/or restricting resources flow to these universities and why these universities respond in specific ways in such circumstances.

RDT obviously captures important aspects concerning the dependence relationships between organisations and their environment. However, since it was first proposed, “a number of theoretical challenges and critiques have appeared” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, p. xx). Firstly, RDT is criticised for its over-emphasis on the rational manners towards material resources without paying enough attention to other important environmental effects on organizations (Leisyte, 2007; Scott, 2001; Tolbert & Zucker, 1999). Scott (2008) emphasises: “Organisations require more than material resources and technical information if they are to survive and thrive in their social environment. [And] They also need social acceptability and credibility” (p. 59). This implies that RDT alone,

although is important, does not provide a full explanation regarding organizational behaviours in their institutional and social environment.

Secondly, RDT is criticized for its lack of attention to hierarchical power differences (Leisyte, 2007). According to Hall (1009), hierarchical power differences must be considered when studying organisations’ actions because “once the hierarchy is set, the power of positions at the top of the organisation would appear to be most central to the strategic decisions that are made” (p. 280). In other words, the higher the position in the hierarchy, the more powerful it is. Thus, the focus of RDT on interdependence between organisations and their struggle for resources might result in bias since the hierarchical power differences can over-ride such struggles. It requires a framework that takes into account the significance of the structure of power to compensate the weakness of RDT.

In conclusion, the above-mentioned critiques of RDT mainly focus on its neglect of factors other than resource-related ones that may have equally significant impacts on shaping organisations’ behaviours. Therefore, it is necessary to consider integrating RDT with other theories to provide a well-established theoretical lens for conducting empirical research to develop a supportive model for the growth of PHE.

3.1.3. Integration of the two theories

In the previous section, I have described the strengths and drawbacks of both theories: NIT and RDT. NIT emphasises the significance of conformity with the institutional environment such as rules, norms and cultures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; J. Meyer & Rowan, 1977). On the other hand, RDT highlights the importance of organizational ability to manage and control effectively and efficiently resource flows (Gornitzka, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Oliver (1991), when comparing these two approaches, points out that NIT and RDT “have attributed different degrees of resistance, activeness, and self-interested awareness to the behaviour of organizations responding to external constraints and demands” (p. 149). 50

However, in contradiction, the core essences of NIT and RDT, which respectively are institutional institutions and resources, are equally significant and mutually reinforcing, as Sewell (1992) indicates: “Schemas [institutions] not empowered or regenerated by resources would eventually be abandoned and forgotten, just as resources without cultural schemas [institutions] to direct their use would eventually dissipate and decay” (p. 13). Scott (2008) also agrees with Sewell when concluding: “An institutional perspective gives heightened attention to the symbolic aspects of social life, yet we must also attend to the activities that produce them and reproduce them and to the resources that sustain them” (p. 49).

These statements indicate the insufficiency of each theory by itself in explaining the complexity of the dynamics of organizational behaviours. Hence, integrating these two theories would help provide a more rigorous theoretical framework which maximises each theory’s strengths, compensates its shortcomings and offers better insights into the relationships between organisations and the environments. In fact, much research has taken this approach (Giddens, 1984; Goedegebuure & van Vught, 1994; Gornitzka, 1999; Kezar & Eckel, 2004; Leisyte, 2007; C. Oliver, 1991; Sewell Jr, 1992). Unfortunately, there has been no research in the field of PHE using this perspective.

Consequently, this study claims to be the first investigation in the field of PHE conducted in the East Asia region to follow this approach of combining the two theories to provide more complete explanations of how the environmental factor support and/or constrain the development of private HEIs. Being guided by the main concepts and insights advanced by NIT and RDT discussed above, the first dimension of the conceptual framework of this study is proposed based on the integration of these two theories. This dimension includes three perspectives of analysis, which are institutional isomorphisms (including coercive, normative, cultural-cognitive and resource dependence), institutional logics and institutional actors (consisting of position, agency and legitimacy).

3.2. The Second Dimension: The Three Levels of Analysis

As mentioned before (See section 2.3), the difference in level of analysis has brought about the difference in research findings regarding the topic of factors that shape the development of PHE. Therefore, the conceptual framework to be used in this study must indicate which levels this study focuses on. In addition, it must cover certain levels in which the impactful factors are most significant. As the result, this section explains the second dimension of the conceptual framework of this study, which is the three-level analysis. The three levels are the national (macro), the university (meso) and the departmental (micro) levels. These three levels of analysis are drawn from the ideas of NIT. A more specific explanation concerning these three levels of analysis will be provided below.

Scholars in NIT do recognize the significance of level of analysis because institutions are primarily located at institutional (macro) levels (Friedland & Alford, 1991) but operate at multiple levels (Scott, 2008). The range of analytical levels may “differ greatly in terms of whether the investigator is focusing on micro – or macro - phenomena” (Scott, 2008, p. 85). However, Scott (2008) identifies six levels of analysis, which are the levels of world system, society, organisational field, organisational population, organisation and organisational subsystems.

Integrating these six levels of analysis and the three key pillars of NIT (regulative, normative and culture-cognitive), Scott (2008) proposes a matrix of analysis, providing a “tool kit of concepts and methods from which scholars may choose as they approach selected problems of interest” (p. 219). Following the guidance provided by this matrix, this research identifies the primary levels of analysis are the macro (national system of PHE), meso (university level) and the micro (department level).

Although the importance of all six levels of analysis is acknowledged, it is impossible to “comprehend all meanings and levels in a single design” (Scott, 2008, p. 219). Therefore, this study will pay attention to the three particular levels of analysis mentioned above. In addition, this choice of levels is also 52

supported by the literature, as most of research has been conducted at these three levels (see chapter II).

3.3. The Third Dimension of the Framework and Operationalisation of The Three Key Concepts

In this section, the third dimension of the conceptual framework of this study is constructed based on the three crucial aspects suggested by the literature (see Section 2.3), which are governance, finance and quality assurance. In addition, each of these concepts are operationalised to help select appropriate research methods and research instruments to be used for data collection, which will be explained extensively in chapter IV.

In this section, a number of ideas and concepts regarding the concepts of governance, finance and quality assurance from the world and geographical regions in the field of HE and PHE are analysed. Hence, this analysis draws on the open notion of governance, finance and quality assurance as umbrella concepts to encompass the most common meanings that appear in public and informal discourse to describe the phenomena. This allows the researcher to see the kinds of ideas that predominate both in global and Vietnam contexts. As a broad category, it includes various types of interpretive, constructivist and discursive analyses dealing with differently conceived symbolic representations.

3.3.1. Governance

Governance perhaps is one of the most popular topics in the field of HE because it significantly impacts every single aspect of universities. According to Gayle et al. (2011), university governance “refers to the structure and process of authoritative decision making across issues that are significant for external as well as internal stakeholders within a university” (p. 1). Effective governance provides clear purposes for organisations, clarifies directions, identifies priorities, ensure sufficient supervision (Gayle et al., 2011). Gayle et al (2011) also distinguish the concept of governance from other strongly related concepts which are management, administration, and leadership. Accordingly, management and

administration focus on the implementation of decisions, while leadership refers to the roles and processes through which individuals seek to influence decision.

3.3.1.1. Governance Structure

Because of its significance, scholars have been endeavouring to explore the phenomenon of HE governance and its changes in recent years. Their efforts provide a fruitful body of knowledge that helps improve our understanding of how universities govern in the way they do. Clark’s classic studies (B. R. Clark, 1986, 1998) and other research drawn on his work later (McDaniel, 1996; Neave, 2003; Niklasson, 1996; Van Vught, 1995) distinguished three models of governance, which are (1) state-control model, (2) academic self-rule, and (3) market-oriented model. In Clark’s model of governance, a range from maximum campus autonomy to maximum external (state) control is presented (Braun & Merrien, 1999; McLendon & Ness, 2003; McNay, 1999). However, autonomy- based typology is criticised for its narrow focus because autonomy is only one of many other important requirements related to structural features of university governance. The others, such as goals, resources, leadership might be neglected.

Based on Clark’s (B. R. Clark, 1986) model, van Vught’s study (1989) on university governance differentiates between a state control model and a state- supervising model. These two models were developed based on general principle of government intervention: while more intervention is found in the state-control model, more facilitating and less intervention is found in the state-supervising model.

The state-control model, according to van Vught (1989), is characterised by a strong formal authority of state bureaucracy in nearly all aspects of the higher education system. This model appears to be predominant in developing countries and is criticised for its weak internal university management and the administration responsible for managing the internal affairs of the university (Braun, 1999)

In contrast, the state-supervising model is characterised by weaker authority of the state bureaucracy but a stronger academic community and stronger internal administration. In this model, the government’s intervention is reduced, while universities’ capacity of decentralised decision-making is strengthened. The role of the government is limited to establishing broad policy frameworks and facilitating universities (Van Vught, 1995). Therefore, in playing this supervisory role, the government respects HEIs’ autonomy and enhance the self-regulating capabilities of universities.

Nevertheless, criticising van Vught’s models, Braun and Merrien (1999) highlight that “both models are insufficient to grasp the recent changes in governmental governance strategies”, and “they are not differentiating sufficiently by excluding the market dimension from the analysis” (p. 4-5). As an attempt to compromise the drawbacks of van Vught’s study, McNay (1999) suggests four quadrant models of internal university governance: collegium, bureaucracy, corporation, and enterprise.

Each of these four models is characterised by a dominant aspect or feature. While in a collegium model, the role of academics is powerful and academic autonomy is central, in the bureaucracy model, a hierarchy of decision-making bodies and common regulations and procedures is dominant. In the corporate model, the role of university leadership is dominant, and the vice-chancellors or presidents of universities become chief executives responsible for setting priorities and allocating resources. In the enterprise model, the movement toward a market- oriented approach and the language of commerce and business such as customers, clients, market, and product becomes dominant in universities. However, this model has a major drawback of giving a low priority to the educational and learning objectives of universities, as well as for the exclusion of internal stakeholders (Young, 2004).

Treating these four quadrants as separate models and arguing that the governance of universities could be the dominant quadrant at any point in time, McNay (1999) predicts that the future trend is a movement of universities away from the

bureaucratic and collegium quadrant models, and toward the corporate and enterprise quadrant models. McNay’s prediction is confirmed by many studies, observing the strong shift from ‘collegial governance’ to ‘managerialism’ (Cutting & Kouzmin, 2001; Marginson & Considine, 2000; Young, 2004)

In McNay’s typology of governance, the model of bureaucracy is vanished quickly for it hinders effective governance and management through slowing or avoiding crucial strategic decision-making. In addition, this typology does not reflect one emerging model of governance, which is the trusteeship model. The trusteeship model, an invention of American HE (Herbst, 1982; Kezar, 2006), is considered as a model for not-for-profit organizations. It recognises that non- financial goals are among the core objectives of universities, yet it attempts to provide an effective governance and management structure.

Without intending to create a new classification of models to the existing ones, this study takes the view that van Vught’s (1989) classification of two clearly contrasting models of the state-control model and the state-supervising model are two fundamental models which can be used to interpret any macro models. Meanwhile, for a better description of governance models at meso (university) level, this study takes the typology suggested by McNay (1999) with the addition of the trusteeship model to classify the governance models adopted by universities in practice. Hence, the structure of governance in this study is classified as followings: at macro level, it ranges from state control to state supervising; whereas at meso level, it ranges across collegium, bureaucracy, corporation, enterprise and trusteeship models.

3.3.1.2. Autonomy

In an effort to deal with a specific and crucial aspect of governance, Estermann and Nokkala (2009) contribute by outlining the components of the autonomy concept. They report a trend towards greater autonomy in the organizational structures of universities, which covers aspects such as governing bodies, executive leadership and internal administration, as well as staffing matters, which involves the recruitment and appointment of staff, setting salary levels, 56

and the civil servant status of academics. This greater autonomy also applies to academic matters, which involves universities’ ability to define their own institutional strategies and academic profiles and freely regulate student admissions. The authors also map out various facets of financial autonomy and determine a trend towards competition-oriented funding policies such as student fees, block-grant funding, and third-party funding.

Berdahl (1990, p. 172, original emphasis) categories autonomy into substantive and procedural issues, in which “substantive autonomy is the power of the university or college in its corporate form to determine its own goals and programs” and “procedural autonomy is the power of the university or college in its corporate form to determine the means by which its goals and programs will be pursued”. In practical terms, substantive autonomy refers to the universities’ authority to determine academic and research policy such as standards, curriculum, program offerings, research areas, staff policy, and awarding degrees. Procedural autonomy refers to the universities’ authority in essentially non-academic areas such as budgeting, financial management, or non-academic staff.

Based on the suggestions of the literature, the sub-themes of governance are as in Table III-2 below.

Table III-2. Operationalisation of The Concept of Governance

State-control Macro State-supervising Collegium Structural Model of Bureaucracy Governance Meso Corporation Enterprise Trusteeship Appointive Substances of Academic governance Financial

Administrative Top-down Vertical governance Bottom-up Substantive Autonomy Procedural

3.3.2. Finance

In this part I focus on the process of operationalisation of the key concept of finance. The purpose of this section is to identify the major concepts of finance which have been mentioned in formal and informal discourse of both the public and private sectors, at both national and institutional levels. The results of this section are applied in the preceding sections, in which major focuses for interviews are generated and main categories for coding are identified. The findings of this section are mainly drawn from the literature.

3.3.2.1. Financial Sources

Universities, according to Pruvot and Estermann (2012) generate their revenue from the following sources: (1) public funding; (2) tuition fees, (3) other funding sources. Public funding generally refers to direct and indirect funding from the governments. Direct fund usually takes the form of block grants or earmarked funds. In addition, universities can receive public funding through open competition for project-based funding or targeted funding (Stachowiak-Kudła & Kudła, 2017).

Meanwhile, indirect funding usually refers to incentives universities receive indirectly from governments such as tax exemption or special loan rates. Tuition fees continue to be the most important income source for private universities in many countries (Pruvot & Estermann, 2012), whereas other funding sources can include revenue generated from contracts with industry, philanthropy like alumni fundraising, and income obtained through financial or business activities (Stachowiak-Kudła & Kudła, 2017).

3.3.2.2. Funding Approaches

Recently, a tendency has been observed in funding approaches for higher education, from governments’ direct funding to more indirect funding, along with more market-type mechanisms (Bakker, 2007; Dill, 1997; Jongbloed, 2003; G. Williams, 1998). Jongbloed (2003) argues that the introduction of market-type mechanisms from governments is associated with the move towards deregulation and often aims to enhance students’ choice and improve the quality and diversity of educational services offered by various HE providers.

3.3.2.3. Funding Levels

An important criterion for financial analysis is the level of funding. Dearden, Goodman and Wyness (2012) argue that direct funding to HE institutions without considering their composition of students, in other words, what their students are studying, causes serious inequity between institutions and students. Because certain subjects are more expensive to teach than others, the funding for universities should take the faculties/subjects into account. For instance, a university with a high proportion of engineering students will receive more funding than one with a high proportion of mathematics students, as engineering requires specialised equipment and technology, which is more expensive to teach than maths.

However, it would greatly damage education equity if funding was provided only for institutions, and not for students. Students, regardless of their background, should be encouraged to pursue their educational interests, particularly those with low SES. Therefore, many countries develop their student aid or student loan programs to provide opportunities to access HE to students with a disadvantaged background. These student aid/loan programs are generally nation-wide and made available to all students, regardless of their institutions.

A summary of important indicators that help to operationalise the notion of finance are introduced as Table III-3 below.

Table III-3. Operationalisation of The Concept of Finance

Government Industry/ Business Funding sources Private (Philanthropy or university-run-profit projects) Tuition fees Funding State intervention (Direct vs. Indirect) Approaches Market based mechanisms Institutional block grant Funding levels Faculty/Subject/Project level Individual (students)

3.3.3. Quality Assurance

Quality assurance (QA) generally refers to the process that evaluates universities or educational programs to ensure that the universities or programs meet the required standards established by the universities themselves, or professional and/or government agencies (Brennan & Shah, 2000). In this sense, QA in HE is a process of evaluating education products delivered by either universities themselves or by external authorised agencies. Key elements of QA processes, generally include a set of standards and a university’s self-evaluation, external assessment and a final decision

There are three primary modes of quality assurance globally: assessment, audit and accreditation (Ogunleye, 2013). Assessment is an evaluation which results in a grade, which tends to focus on quantitative indicators rather than qualitative measurement (Ogunleye, 2013). Audit is a process to monitor the ‘systems and processes’, not the outcomes, to ensure the systems and processes are in compliance with official requirements (Charlton & Andras, 2002). Accreditation, one of the most common practices in QA, is an evaluation to determine the status of a HEI and ensure that the HEI meets the minimum standards (Anderson, Johnson, & Milligan, 2000; Schwarz & Westerheijden, 2007). Besides these

methods, there are additional quality assurance activities such as rankings, performance indicators, and testing/examinations.

Kis (2005) provide a helpful framework to compare the QA systems in different countries. Because this study employs comparison methods to study the similarities and differences in QA systems between three countries; Vietnam, China and Korea, I apply Kis’ framework to operationalise the concepts of QA, as listed in Table III-4 below.

Table III-4. Operationalisation of the Concept of Quality Assurance

Accountability Purpose of QA Quality improvement Accreditation Assessment QA Methods Audit Ranking Institution Program Evaluation Levels Course Individual Government Professional agency QA Agency Institution itself Media/Others

3.4. The Integrated Three-dimensional Conceptual Framework and Research Question Reformulation

In the previous sections, I have explained specifically the framework which will be used to help this research specify the research questions by identifying the research focuses. This framework includes three dimensions, which are: (1) the three perspectives of analysis (institutional logics, institutional isomorphisms and institutional actors); (2) the three aspects of analysis (governance, finance, and

quality assurance); and (3) the three levels of analysis (sectorial, institutional, and departmental levels).

Figure 2. The Three-dimensional Conceptual Framework

Since this study aims to establish a model that will enable the development of PHE in Vietnam, the primary research questions are:

1. What are the factors that positively impact the establishment and growth of the PHE sectors in China, Korea and Vietnam? 2. What are the features of the enabling models for PHE in China and Korea that are believed to have had a positive influence on the establishment and development of the PHE sectors in these countries? 3. What might be an appropriate enabling model for PHE in Vietnam given the answers to 1 and 2 above?

In the light of the main integrated conceptual framework developed above, these three initial broad research questions of the study were reformulated to guide the research as follows:

1. At the macro level, what are the similarities and differences among the enabling models adopted in China, Korea, and Vietnam in respect to

governance, financing and quality assurance from perspectives of isomorphisms, institutional logics and actors? 2. At the meso level, what are the similarities and differences among the enabling models adopted in China, Korea, and Vietnam in respect to governance, financing and quality assurance from perspectives of isomorphisms, institutional logics and actors? 3. At the micro level, what are the similarities and differences among the enabling models adopted in China, Korea, and Vietnam in respect to governance, financing and quality assurance from perspectives of isomorphisms, institutional logics and actors? 4. What factors (or combination of factors) at the macro, meso and micro levels appear to have a positive impact in enabling and developing PHE institutions? 5. How relevant are/would these factors be to the development of the PHE sector in Vietnam? 6. What would an appropriate enabling model be for Vietnamese PHE?

3.5. Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I develop a conceptual framework that consists of three dimensions. Integrating NIT and RDT theories produces the first dimension, comprising of three institutional factors, namely isomorphisms, institutional logics and actors. The second dimension refers to the analytical levels, namely macro, meso and micro levels. The third dimension includes the three major analytical aspects of private HEIs, namely governance, finance and quality assurance. In addition, I also operationalise the key concepts of governance, finance and quality assurance to facilitate the development of research instruments in the subsequent chapter. Finally, based on this conceptual framework, specific research questions are re-defined.

CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

In the previous chapter, a theoretical framework to help situate the research focus, redefine the main research questions and navigate the research methods was developed. In the light of the developed framework, this section provide an overview of some methodological considerations. This chapter explains the research methods, research design, research strategies, research instruments, and techniques of data analyses.

4.1. Comparative Study Methods

As stated previously, this study aims to establish a model that supports the development of Vietnamese PHE. Vietnamese PHE is confronted by severe challenges for many reasons, especially the incomplete and ineffective regulatory framework and governance system. To overcome these challenges, Vietnam needs to adopt a new model that enables and promotes the growth of PHE. In order to do that, Vietnam must learn from other countries’ models to draw lessons and establish its own model (Dao & Hayden, 2010). This requires a comprehensive body of information and knowledge in a comparative perspective, because comparative study allows researchers and policymakers to “heighten contrasts and reveal similarities, which can be useful in establishing a particular argument” (Adamson et al., 2012, p. 18). Hence, this study adopts the comparative perspectives to help Vietnam learn from the models of other countries.

Moreover, according to Bleiklie (2014) comparative study by its nature, has several major strengths as follows: (1) possibly increasing generalizability; (2) improving understanding of social arrangements by providing a diverse range of possible variations of cultural, political and institutional aspects; and (3) challenging existing conceptual understanding of the topic.

The comparative approach involves different methods of study, which were categorized in several ways into sets of typology in the works of scholars such as Kogan (1996) or Stocpol (1984). Kogan’s typology includes single country

studies, juxtapositions, thematic comparisons and causal explanations; whereas Skocpol identified meaningful interpretation of single cases, identifying causal regularities and grand theories as a set of research strategies in historical sociology. Based on the work of these two scholars, Bleiklie (2014) introduced a set of comparative methods including: meaningful interpretation of single cases, juxtapositions, thematic comparisons, identifying causal regularities and grand theories.

Applying Bleiklie (2014)’s classification, this study applies two comparative approaches, which are a multiple country study and the thematic comparisons to have a multi-site case study approach. A multi-case study is chosen because it is able to provide a comprehensive understanding of complex phenomenon (Goode & Hatt, 1952; Merriam, 1998). In addition, this approach potentially provides more robust findings than from a single case (De Vaus, 2001).

As indicated earlier, this study aims to develop a supportive model for the development of PHE, by learning from other countries’ experiences. For this reason, this study emphasis the values of learning from other countries where more successful developmental patterns of PHE are being implemented. By doing so, this study identifies the common patterns between other countries before comparison with Vietnam. This allows to discover the shortcomings of the Vietnamese model, as well as highlighting a more successful model to be applied in the future.

In order to draw lessons and recommendations for the further advancement of the PHE sector in Vietnam, the following steps will be taken after data in three countries namely Vietnam, China and Korea are collected. Firstly, data of each case are described separately to provide understandings of the current model in each context. Secondly, the description of each case is organized into levels (national and university levels), themes (governance, finance and quality assurance), and perspectives (institutional logics, isomorphisms and actors) to prepare for cross-case comparisons. When comparing across cases, level by

level, theme by theme and perspective by perspective, commonalities and differences are expected to be discovered to generate the findings of this study.

4.2. Study Cases Selection

As mentioned above, the comparative approach that this study attempts to adopt requires selecting case studies. According to de Vaus (2001), the strategy to select study cases is as follows: (1) the chosen cases must share similarities with the host case (which is Vietnam) in terms of cultural, social or political context; (2) the chosen cases must be advanced or at least more mature than Vietnam in terms of private sector development; (3) the chosen cases must provide a wide range of circumstances to allow significant comparative findings to be drawn; (4) the chosen cases must be accessible.

Following those criteria, the two cases of China and Korea were selected because firstly, the two cases are in East Asia, within geographical proximity to Vietnam to make findings more applicable. Secondly, China has recently witnessed the remarkable increase of PHE, which accounts for 28.45% of the country’s total number of HEIs (Su, 2012). Meanwhile, Korea has a long history of PHE, which is dominant in the HE system (Chae & Hong, 2009). Thirdly, China shares many similarities in terms of culture (Confucianism) and politics (Communist political regime), but the geographical features of a large country present various models of PHE. Concurrently, Korea with the noteworthy characteristic of a private- dominant system in a rapidly growing economy would provide valuable lessons for Vietnam in terms of governing PHE to optimize the contribution of the sector to national development.

4.2.1. Research Cases Sampling

In qualitative research, as opposed to quantitative approaches, it is very unlikely for a large sample to be selected for study (Saunders, 2012) as the nature of qualitative research is for gaining understandings and insights about specific accounts and phenomenon (Patton, 2002). The small sample used in qualitative research limits its generalizability in terms of statistical population, but a sample chosen appropriately for the research purposes is still possibly valid for theoretical generalizing (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009).

Saunders (2012) argued that various non-random sampling techniques could be divided into three groups commonly used in the field of qualitative research, which are (1) purposive sampling; (2) volunteer sampling and (3) haphazard sampling. Purposive sampling is the sampling techniques used by researchers to choose participants based on particular judgements, whereas in volunteer sampling, participants volunteer to participate and in haphazard sampling participants are included in the study mainly for the sake of the researcher’s convenience.

As the aim of this study is to investigate the current model of PHE in Vietnam, China and Korea to draw lessons for developing a better model for Vietnamese PHE, the sample cases in the three countries were selected based on a particular set of criteria to serve the purpose of study. Thus the sampling technique used in this study is purposive sampling, in which participating institutions are chosen on the basis of the researcher’s judgment to enable the researcher to answer the research questions.

4.2.2. Participants Sampling

Because this study focuses on issues such as governance, finance and quality assurance, the potential participants are identified as leaders of private HEIs and relevant departments such as director/deputy director, rector, members of the governing board, head of academic department, head of finance department.

The process of participants recruiting was as followings. Firstly, emails was sent to the head of the three private universities (presidents or directors, depending on the particular situations of the universities) to seek permission for conducting interviews. After permission for conducting interviews was obtained, the head of private universities was asked to nominate participants in relevant positions. When names and contact details of the potential participants were identified, the researcher sent letters of invitation to potential participants to provide general information about the study and invited them to participate. Any question from potential participants was answered either via written (emails) or verbal communication (phones) to ensure their understanding. Once potential participants agreed (in written or verbal forms) to participate, a written consent form was sent to them via email in their native language.

Since this study uses the case-study method, the screening step was used in the design stage to select the case institutions to study. In the stage of participant selection and recruitment, this study focused on leaders of the institutions and relevant departments. Potential participants were nominated by the heads of the private universities. Once the nominees agreed to participate, screening was not necessary. To ensure participants' eligibility to take part in this study, when requesting presidents of PHE institutions to nominate potential participants, the researcher explained carefully the purposes of this study, research questions and interview questions to the presidents. After receiving nominations from presidents, in the process of contacting participants, similar steps were taken via verbal (phones or meetings) and written (email) means to explain the study to potential participants.

4.3. Data Collection Methods

In order to collect data for the study, the following qualitative method will be adopted: (1) formal document (government and university documents); and (2) semi-structured interview (universities leaders and other stakeholders). Documents provide objective information that reflects the policies both from government and universities to implement the model for PHE development in practice, whereas interviews provide data about stakeholders’ perception and interpretation of the model’s structure, arrangements, strength and drawbacks.

Documents and interviews are two powerful sources for collecting data, for they help to provide multiple sources of evidence. Documents are important sources of data collection for they are available and ready for analysis (Creswell, 2019) whereas interviews are one of the major data collection tool in qualitative research (Punch & Oancea, 2014).

4.3.1. Document Analysis

Document analysis is a frequently used method in qualitative research because it is less costly than other approaches such as fieldwork (Rapley, 2008). Moreover, with the advancement of the Internet, documents are widely available for access, making the data collecting much easier. In the field of organizational studies, documents play an important role in research, because it provides rich information of policies, procedures and events concerning an organization’s life (Bowen, 2009).

In the field of social sciences, documents are regarded as a key source of data (Prior, 2008). Documents are categories into four groups based on the research focus, according to Prior (2008). These four groups are (1) research that focuses entirely on the content of the document and treats documents as a resource; (2) research that focuses on how the content of documents are developed; (3) research that studies how documents are used by people for particular purposes; and (4) research that studies how documents impact on social interaction and social organization.

Based on Prior’s categories, the approach adopted in this study is document analysis in which documents are treated as a resource. In this study, the research attempts to explore the content of documents (legal and policy documents at national and university levels) and how human actors, who are school leaders, interpret these documents to implement them in the daily functioning of a private HEI.

This study aims to explore/investigate the key issues of governance, finance and quality issues at different levels (macro, meso and micro) from the four perspectives of regulative, cognitive, normative and resource dependence. Especially in regulative and normative perspectives, viewpoints of organizations/institutions (at three levels) are generally expressed via documents such as national law, regulations, policies, acts, national plan (macro level), goal statement, policies, code of conduct, action plan, budgeting plan and report (meso and micro level). Studying these documents helps to understand the nature of the model which is currently adapted in the case country and generate insights about how PHE institutions operate in the setting of a multi-layered environment.

4.3.2. Interviews

An interview is an interaction between two or more people for specific purposes, usually one person trying to get information from the other (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009). Interviews are helpful in this study because they help provide rich and in-depth data about the stakeholders’ perception, concept, awareness and interpretation at both government and universities level to draw insights for better understanding of the system of the study cases. In addition, this method is feasible because this research requires interviews of a small number of participants that hold leadership position in the selected universities.

Fontana and Frey (1994) classified interviews into three types, namely, structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. Structured interviews, as its name indicates, require a high level of formality, whereas unstructured interviews are informal. Semi-structured interviews are in the middle and balance the two other methods. In this study, semi-structured interviews were used 70

because this method on one hand required the researcher to prepare some interview questions to guide the interviews while on the other hand allowed interview participants to participate, engage and influence the interview topics according to their own preferences and interests.

4.4. Ethical Issues

Ethical issues in this study primarily focus on ensuring research participants’ privacy, confidentiality and anonymity. Because the research participants of this study are mainly leaders and stakeholders in private universities in three cases, data collected from them must be comply with ethical requirements regarding participants’ consent, their anonymity, data privacy and confidentiality. To address these ethical issues, a thorough evaluation was conducted based on the consultation with supervisors and the guidance of the Ethics Approval Committee of the University of New South Wales where the study was based

To ensure participants’ privacy, confidentiality and anonymity, participants will be coded using a special coding system and pseudo names. The researcher developed the coding system and ensure the confidentiality of participants by setting up passwords for the coding files and the computer where these files are stored. These files were not made available to anyone except the researcher. In addition, the participants were consulted and asked for consent to use any of their own identifiable information.

In addition, this study involved an interpreter to conduct interviews in China since the researcher could not communicate with these participants in their native language. Thus, to ensure participants' confidentiality, a written agreement between the researcher and the interpreter about protecting participants' confidentiality was provided. The interpreter was required to maintain confidentiality, and not to disclose information acquired during the course or as a result of her work.

4.5. Data Analysis

4.5.1. Coding

Coding is the transitional process between data collection and more extensive data analysis (p. 4). According to Creswell (2005), “coding is the process of segmenting and labelling the text from broad themes in the data” (p. 237). However, coding is more than just labelling, “it leads you from the data to the idea, and from the idea to all the data pertaining to that idea” (Richard & Morse, 2007, p. 137, cited in Saldana, 2009). Coding provides researchers a discovery tool to uncover information, activate meaning reflection, and enable patterns to emerge, leading to an effective development of theories (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). Using coding to sort and categorise data, researchers give meaning to the data (Lofland, Snow, Anderson, & Lofland, 1995)

As indicated, this study employs constant comparison analysis and content analysis as the primary analytical tools. Therefore, the coding techniques must also be consistent with these methods of analysis. On one hand, three main coding techniques applied in constant comparison analysis, according to Strauss and Corbin (1998), are (1) open coding: the analyst chunks the data into smaller segments, and then attaches a descriptor, or code for each segment; (2) axial coding: the analyst group codes into similar categories; (3) selective coding: the process of integrating and refining the theory. Through these stages, the researcher can ‘create theory out of data’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998)

On the other hand, content analysis mainly employs provisional coding. Provisional coding is “a set of codes generated prior to fieldwork” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 58). The operationalised concepts and notions regarding the four key concepts of governance, finance, leadership and quality assurance explained in the previous section (see chapter III) have provided a set of pre- determined codes for the coding process. Therefore, the provisional coding helps place the coding process in alignment with the operationalisation and data collection worked previously done.

The above coding techniques are categorised based on coding purpose, which is to align with the research design and conceptual framework of this study. In terms of coding types, the coding techniques can be categorised as descriptive coding and in vivo coding. Descriptive coding summarises in a word or short phrase the basic topic of a passage of qualitative data. It is the foundation for qualitative inquiry, and its primary goal is to assist the researcher “to see what you saw and to hear what you heard” (Wolcott, 1994, p. 55). Therefore, it provides an essential basis for the second cycle coding and further analysis and interpretation. On the other hand, in vivo coding refers to a word or short phrase from the actual language found in the qualitative data record, “the terms used by participants themselves” (Strauss, 1987, p. 33). This coding technique is recognized for its priority and respect of the participants’ voices.

4.5.2. Data Analysis Techniques

In this section I would like to describe the analytical tools that I intentionally used to analyse data with the justifications for using those tools. In summary, there are two major analytical techniques applied for this study, including constant comparison analysis and content analysis. Each of these techniques was selected to answer different research questions and/or analyse different pieces of data. However, all of them are ultimately for generating a richer, nuanced interpretation of data. A more specific description of these techniques is as below.

Analysis of data is one of the most important steps in the research process. In qualitative research, there are a vast number of techniques available. Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2008) present 18 qualitative analysis techniques, organized around the four major sources of qualitative data, namely talk, observations, drawing/photographs/ videos, and documents. In doing so, these authors believe that the utility of triangulation can be achieved by using multiple data analytical tools, not by using multiple data sources as other research suggests (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Triangulation is typically achieved by using multiple sources of data, researchers, theoretical lenses or research methods (Denzin, 2017; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). However, Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2007, 2008) suggest that multiple analytical tools also help increase triangulation and improve research validity by providing diverse perspectives and insights regarding the data. Using multiple analytical techniques to utilise the strengths of each analytical tool, therefore improves understanding of the given data. As a result, more meaningful research findings can be generated, thereby enhancing the research quality. In addition, it helps reduce potential research bias and addresses difficulties confronting researchers during analysis. Consequently, these authors (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007, 2008) recommend using multiple types of analysing techniques to improve research reliability and quality.

Based on the list of techniques presented by Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2008), I purposefully selected two analysis techniques to analyse data in this research, namely, constant comparison analysis and content analysis. Constant comparison analysis is based on direct observation of the data. It will allow the important analysis dimensions to emerge from patterns found in the cases without presupposing what the important dimensions will be. Meanwhile, content analysis with main concepts identified based on the conceptual framework will help to generate patterns from data (Gale, Heath, Cameron, Rashid & Redwood, 2013). A theoretical framework-based content analysis will help to confirm and/or generalize findings.

4.5.3. Computer-based Data Analysis Program

In modern times, computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) programs (such as QDA Miner, NVivo, Ethnograph, etc) are very helpful in assisting researchers in their data analysis process (Bazeley, 2006; Fielding & Lee, 1998). These programs are helpful in storing, organising and sorting qualitative data. In addition, they are very efficient in categorising and comparing codes quickly collecting and displaying codes in a relatively short time. These are valuable functions that allow researchers to identify patterns and

connections, draw relationships, interpret meanings and build theories (Lewins & Silver, 2007).

This study used NVIVO 12 as the data analysis software because it is one of the most widely used CAQDAS programs (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011). Although CAQDAS programs are helpful and efficient, it is crucial to note that the researchers are the most important analytical tool (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). No software program can replace the researchers’ creativity and intuition (Dey, 1994).

4.6. Trustworthiness of the Study

This subsection of the thesis focuses on addressing the issue of trustworthiness and/or validity of research. Trustworthiness is a critical aspect of a qualitative study (Cope, 2014), referring to the degree of quality in research methods, data and analysis (Polit & Beck, 2014) which ultimately determine the integrity and value of a study (Connelly, 2016). Quite often, however, qualitative research is criticised for lacking rigorous methods, transparent analytical procedures and justifiable findings (Noble & Smith, 2015). Among various possible causes, lacking agreement on what constitutes trustworthiness is frequently cited as the major problem (Leung, 2015; Rolfe, 2006).

Nevertheless, criteria of trustworthiness proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985) are widely accepted and applied by qualitative researchers to develop and justify trustworthiness and rigor of studies. The initial criteria include credibility, dependability, confirmability and transferability. Later, Guba and Lincoln (1994) added authenticity as the fifth criterion.

Credibility, as the most important criterion (Polit & Beck, 2014), refers to the appropriateness of research, particularly in its methods, investigation procedures and data (Connelly, 2016; Leung, 2015). Dependability is the consistency and stability of data over time and conditions of the study (Polit & Beck, 2014; Tobin & Begley, 2004). Confirmability refers to the “balance between participant meaning and researcher interpretation” according to E. N. Williams and Morrow

(2009, p. 579). Transferability is generally considered as similar to generalisation in quantitative study, referring to the extent to which research procedures and/or findings are applicable to other settings or people (Polit & Beck, 2014; E. N. Williams & Morrow, 2009). Authenticity is the extent to which researchers realistically convey and faithfully present participants’ experiences in the study (Polit & Beck, 2014).

Applying the above criteria of trustworthiness, I have applied various strategies as mentioned below. However, it is important to note that many of these strategies have been discussed in different sections of the thesis. Thus the review of strategies here is primarily for the purpose of taking trustworthiness into consideration. In addition, in many cases one procedure can serve for multiple purposes. For example reflective journaling and detailed memoing are valuable tools that help ensure not only credibility but also dependability and confirmability of research.

Firstly, the conceptual framework developed in this study helps articulate research design, data analysis and interpretations of findings. This high degree of articulation is helpful in establishing integrity of the research. In addition, it also helps demonstrate clarity of thought processes and transparent decisions regarding data analysis and subsequent interpretations.

Secondly, the conceptual framework, developed based on two theories, namely Neo-Institutional Theory and Resource Dependence Theory, is an important component that helps achieve triangulation. Triangulation generally achieved by utilising multiple sources of theoretical lens, data, research methods and analytical tools (Denzin, 2017; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). In this study, I have used not only multiple sources of theoretical lenses (see Chapter III) but also of data (by conducting cross-country multi-site case studies), and of analytical tools (see subsection 4.5.2.) to produce more comprehensive findings.

Thirdly, different types of private institutions were selected as sample cases to conduct a cross-country study. The diverse types of PHE universities selected for

this study help address the requirement for rich data. In addition, in each case, I developed a broad range of topics that cover the activities of private universities, namely governance, finance and quality assurance. These broad topics help represent diverse perspectives in the study, resulting in producing more comprehensive findings. Moreover, comparisons between cases also significantly contribute to the goal of generating rich descriptions and thorough investigation.

Fourthly, I have specifically used reflective journaling, record keeping and memoing as the strategies to ensure credibility and integrity of the study because keeping detailed notes and records helps maintain transparent procedures while conducting research and demonstrate consistent interpretations of data. Audit trails were created of all activities during investigation processes, decisions about all aspects of the study (such as selecting sample cases and research participants and developing interview questions) and analytical and methodological memos. These journals and memos are critical for tracking research progress, ensuring the richness of description and interpretation, acknowledging the researcher’s bias and keeping the interpretations consistent (C. E. Hill et al., 2005; Morrow, 2005).

Fifthly, I also worked closely with my supervisors and discussed with other experienced researchers about my analysis and interpretation of data to help reduce one person’s bias and improve integrity of interpretation. This strategy is referred to as member-checking and debriefing by the literature (Connelly, 2016; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; E. N. Williams & Morrow, 2009). However, unlike other qualitative studies, member-checking was not used predominantly in this study for the purpose of reduce the researcher’s bias because of the restriction of time and cost. More importantly, because this study employs specific research perspectives that require in-depth theoretical knowledge, it was very difficult to have discussions with a broad group of colleagues. Thus, member-checking in this research was conducted primarily between the researcher with her supervisors and a small number of other experienced researchers.

The sixth strategy I used in this study was to provide a rich, detailed description of the context, location and the research participants to ensure authenticity of the study. As a person who has linguistic proficiency, background knowledge and experience of the context in Vietnam and Korea, I was able to understand, absorb and capture “the context of the situation or behaviour” (Ponterotto & Grieger, 2007, pp. 415–416) in these cases, which Lincoln and Guba (1985) refer to as ‘thick description’. In addition, direct quotes of the participants were used support findings and exemplify my interpretations.

Finally, other important elements that also help ensure the value and rigour of the research such as ethical implications, sampling methods and data analytical procedures. These elements are crucial to a research’s integrity and usefulness (Connelly, 2016). All these asepcts have been discussed in previous subsections.

4.7. Chapter Summary

In this chapter, a methodological discussion is provided, focusing on research design and methods used in sampling data collection, data analysis, ethical considerations and strategies to ensure trustworthiness of the research. Criteria and procedures to select cases and recruit research participants are presented. Documents and interviews are the two major data collection methods. The coding techniques, data analysis techniques and the software programs used for data analysis are also discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER V: THE KOREAN CASE

The Korean case is described first among three cases, namely Korea, China and Vietnam, for several reasons. Firstly, among the three countries, Korean contemporary PHE has the longest history. The first private university was established in the Korean peninsula in 1897 (Soongsil University) while the first private university established after the liberation of the Republic of Korea from Japan was in 1946 (Kookmin University). Compared with Korea, Chinese and Vietnamese PHE only emerged after significant reforms in the 1990s. The first private university was established in China in 1992 (Sanda University), and in Vietnam in 1993 (Thang Long University).

Secondly, along with its relatively long history of development, Korean PHE is the most advanced among the three countries. While PHE is the leading sector in Korean HE, with private HEIs accounting for 81.54 percent of institutions (Korean Education Development Institute, 2014), the figures for China and Vietnam are only 28.8 (L. Wang, 2016) and 19.6 (Vietnam General Statistics Office, 2015) percent, respectively.

Finally, with such advantages, Korean PHE have experienced significant changes in both quantitative expansion and qualitative development (D. H. Kim & Choi, 2015; Shin, 2015). As a result, investigating the development pathway of Korean PHE generally and of the private university in this case study in particular may provide significant insights for understanding the development of Chinese and Vietnamese PHE which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

General Information

The Republic of Korea was established in 1948, following independence from Japanese colonial rule from 1945 to 1948. At that time, nearly 80 percent of the South Korea population was illiterate because of limited public access to formal schooling (Kang, 1981). After the Korean War, the government invested more than 10 percent of its total budget on the education sector as a part of its national reconstruction (Lee, 2002). Education was considered an important element of

Korea’s reconstruction and a means to boost economic growth (Kim & Hong, 2010)

Korean HE has attained tremendous achievements since its expansion started in the late 1980s (D. H. Kim & Choi, 2015). Within a very short period, it has gone through a passage of massification to be transformed from an elite system to mass and then universal, according to the definition of Trow (1973, 2005). The enrolment rate in HE has increased from 12 percent in 1980 to 93.26 percent in 2015 (UNESCO, 2018).

The most significant feature of Korean education generally and HE specifically is its high reliance on the private sector in terms of providing and financing education (M. H. Lee, 2008; Shin, Postiglione, & Huang, 2015; Yeom, 2016b). Of 189 four-year universities, 154 were private (Korean Education Development Institute, 2014), accounting for 81.54 percent of the system. 2.63 million students are enrolled in private universities, accounting for 74.1 percent of the total enrolment in 2004 (M. H. Lee, 2008). Tuition fees are the major sources of finance in HE. Although public funding has been increasing gradually in recent years, household expenditure still accounts for 45 percent of total expenditure for tertiary education (OECD, 2018).

In terms of funding, HE in Korea is strongly supported by the private sector. Only 12.4 percent of private university expenditures come from government funding (B. Kim & Park, 2018). Despite the strict and direct control by the government, the private sector is the driving force of the HE system. Private universities are ranked relatively highly compared with public institutions. According to the University League Table published by Joongang Daily every year, an average of eight out of the top ten universities in Korea have been private universities (Kim, 2008).

A Brief History of Modern Korean HE

Most researchers agree that the seeds of modern universities in Korean were sown with the arrival of Western missionaries in the peninsula in the late 1800s,

despite having been a long tradition of HE in Korea (K. S. Kim & Woo, 2009; S. Lee, 1989; Shin et al., 2015). After suffering a long period of oppression under Japanese colonisation (1910-1945) and the destruction caused by the Korean War (1950-1953), with the support of the U.S., Korean HE has developed spectacularly thanks to industrialisation and economic growth in the post-war period (D. H. Kim & Choi, 2015; K. S. Kim & Woo, 2009; C. J. Lee, Kim, & Byun, 2012; Shin et al., 2015). Correspondingly, with the establishment of the present educational system, enrolment at each level of schooling increased rapidly, reaching 90% for primary school in the early 1960s, and similar levels for junior high school in the 1970s and senior high school in the 1980s (C. J. Lee et al., 2012). Enrolment in higher education has also increased continuously since 1945, but the pattern of growth reflects several phases of expansion and contraction based on the government’s enrolment-quota policies; the most explosive growth in HE has occurred since the late 1980s (C. J. Lee et al., 2012).

Since the success of democratization in 1987, the Korea government began to reduce its control over education by introducing marketization and deregulation (Kim & Choi, 2015). In addition, the Korean economy at that time was characterised by a shift toward technology and skill-intensive industries (Kim & Hong, 2010). In this socio-political context, privatization policies were introduced for various sectors. The HE policy was no exception since education is regarded by the general public as the mechanism of social mobility (Chae & Hong, 2009; K. S. Kim & Woo, 2009). The government attempted to de-regulate the HE system through a series of reforms, of which the July Education Reform Policy in 1980 and the Presidential Commission on Education Reform in 1995 are among the most significant policies that directly led to the explosive growth of HE in three decades (M. H. Lee, 2008; Shin et al., 2015). While the former allowed universities to increase their enrolment 30% higher than the graduation quota (C. J. Lee et al., 2012; Shin et al., 2015), the latter recommended deregulation and market-oriented approaches to HE. Consequently, HE institutions transited from centralised government control to a more market-

oriented model. During this period, the door to higher education was opened wide which brought about the rapid expansion of private sector institutions and private financing for education (Kim & Kim, 2015). The number of universities in Korea increased from 118 in 1990 to 186 in 2007 (S. Kim & Lee, 2006). HE enrolment rates increased from 39 % in 1980 to 73 % in 1995 (Kim & Hong, 2010) and 93.26 percent in 2015 (UNESCO, 2018).

From the 2000s onward, the Korean government has focused on addressing the critical issues of HE caused by the uncontrolled expansion in previous decades by shifting from quantitative growth to qualitative development (Shin et al., 2015) to respond to globalisation and the requirements of a knowledge-based economy (C. J. Lee et al., 2012). The critical initiatives implemented by the government aim to strengthen academic excellence and competitiveness of the country’s HE system. For instance, Brain Korea 21 (BK21) started in 1999 aims to establish ten research-oriented universities that would be globally competitive by 2012; World-Class University (WCU) Project introduced in 2008, aspires to develop world-class academic departments and universities by attracting/recruiting prestigious international faculty (C. J. Lee et al., 2012; Shin et al., 2015); and New University Regional Innovation (NURI) intended to strengthen university-industry cooperation (C. J. Lee et al., 2012). These initiatives are among other major public funding schemes for HE. In addition, other deregulatory measures have also been implemented to improve academic excellence and institutional diversity (C. J. Lee et al., 2012). As a result, universities in Korea have enjoyed more autonomy.

5.1. The First Dimension

The conceptual framework developed to guide this study consists of three dimensions (See Chapter III). The first dimension encompasses three analytical aspects, namely governance, finance and quality assurance. The second dimension presents three institutional factors: isomorphisms, logics and actors. The third dimension comprises three analytical levels: macro, meso and micro levels. As a blue-print for the research, the conceptual framework provided a basis to generate robust explanations to address the research questions. Therefore, this framework presents comprehensive (though not complete) elements that may have significant impact in characterising the institutional environment of the PHE field in each country.

The most extensive analysis corresponding to such a three-dimensional framework that covers every component may include 27 intersections (3x3x3). However, not all the elements proposed in this framework are relevant to the research topic. Therefore, in this chapter, I only present the most significant elements related to the research topic and research questions.

The primary focus of this chapter, in terms of analytical levels, is on the macro level because this research focuses on investigating institutional factors (i.e. logics, isomorphisms and actors). The description of the meso and micro levels are provided in relation to that of the macro level. Results from the analysis of the meso and micro levels are reported only when there are significant differences between these leves and with the macro level. Hence, if the data from the micro level is similar to that of the meso level, it is reported together with the meso level instead of being placed in a separate section to avoid repetition.

In addition, it is not necessary to describe institutional factors explicitly according to each analytical aspect of governance, finance and quality assurance because these institutional elements, in general, universally impact all aspects of an organisation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Scott, 1995). Consequently, this chapter is organised into two main sections, the first

dimension (analytical aspects) and the second dimension (institutional factors). The third dimension (analytical levels, mainly the macro and meso levels) is included in each of these two sections. This arrangement is also consistent throughout the empirical chapters (V, VI, VII), unless noted.

5.1.1. The Macro Level

In this subsection, the current model of Korean PHE at the macro system level was discussed, focusing on three major aspects of governance, finance and quality assurance (QA). In the governance sub-section, the governance structure and the issue of autonomy were analysed to describe the governance model implemented by the Korean government. The finance aspect was investigated based on the operationalised sub-concepts of financial sources, funding approaches and funding levels to describe how Korean financial policies have caused tremendous difficulties for private universities. Finally, the QA framework was investigated according to the operationalised sub-concepts of QA agencies, methods, standards, procedures and purposes to illustrate how the government has used QA as a mechanism to strengthen universities’ accountability.

The documents used for data analysis in this subsection are listed in Table V-1 below.

Table V-1. List of Documents for Data Analysis at the Macro Level

Document No. Description Name

1 Kr.Doc.1 Korean Private School Act, revised in 2016

2 Kr.Doc.2 Korean Higher Education Act, revised in 2017 3 Kr.Doc.3 Regulations on Accreditation Agencies, revised in 2014 Regulations on Self-Evaluation of Higher Education 4 Kr.Doc.4 Institutions, revised in 2013 Regulations on Accreditation of Higher Education Institutions, 5 Kr.Doc.5 revised in 2018

A brief introduction of the Korean Council for University Education (KCUE), its mission, history, functions and 6 Kr.Doc.6 activities, published in its website (Retrieved from http://english.kcue.or.kr/) An overview of accreditation by KCUE, published in its 7 Kr.Doc.7 website (Retrieved from http://english.kcue.or.kr/) An overview of accreditation by the Korean University Accreditation Institute (KUAI), its meanings and aims, 8 Kr.Doc.8 published in its website (Retrieved from https://aims.kcue.or.kr/eng_index.do) A brief introduction to KUAI, its history and organisation, 9 Kr.Doc.9 published in its website (Retrieved from https://aims.kcue.or.kr/eng_index.do) An introduction to the Korean quality assurance (QA) system provided by the National Archives of Korea, published in its 10 Kr.Doc.10 website (Retrieved from http://www.archives.go.kr/next/viewMain.do)

5.1.1.1. Governance

In this subsection, the governance model at the macro level of Korean HE was studied based on documents regarding the legal framework and the interview transcriptions. Research findings have shown that the Korean government represented by the Ministry of Education as the central government agency, has promoted deregulation under the influence of neo-liberalism. Consequently, the regulations regarding PHE have been liberalised, HE has expanded remarkably, and universities have been granted more autonomy.

Specifically, the Board of Trustees is the highest governing body in private universities and determines the university’s important matters such as appointment of President, program development, personnel issues, budget planning and other financial management issues. However, on the other hand, the regulations regarding PHE in recent years have also been strengthened in other

aspects in the name of accountability. Rapid expansion of HE was achieved by sacrificing quality, leading to the lessening of public trust in HE providers (which are mainly private).

As a result, the government has introduced several supervisory mechanisms such as the external trustee system, enrolment quotas in Seoul Metropolitan area, tuition cap policy and auditing system in private universities. These have limited the autonomy of PHE in Korea in certain aspects and caused a lot of discontent among private universities. In conclusion, the governance model at the macro level of the Korean case is ‘regulated deregulation’. a. Governance Structure

The Korean educational system is governed according to the democratic principles of equal opportunities (J.-K. Lee, 2000b). The ultimate power of managing education is placed in the hands of the President, according to the Constitution and the Education Law. However, in practice, it is the Ministry of Education that plays the central role to govern the system (J.-K. Lee, 2000b). In terms of structure, the macro governance includes the Ministry of Education (MoE) and, local offices of education at metropolitan, provincial and county level (J.-K. Lee, 2000b). Among these agencies, the MoE is the central authority that has the responsibilities to supervise and provide guidelines for the HE system.

Article 4: Any of the following entities shall be subject to control and supervision by the Minister of Education: Private colleges and universities, private industrial colleges, private junior colleges, private cyber universities, private technology colleges, and other private schools of various kinds equivalent to the aforesaid colleges and universities (hereinafter referred to as ‘college educational institutions’)

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

Specifically, it is in charge of developing the strategic plan for HE development and proposing the relevant budget to the National Assembly. It is the MoE and

relevant governmental agencies at central and local levels that determine the financial plan supporting universities. In addition, the government (central and local levels) may enact initiatives to support universities financially if necessary.

Article 7: The Minister of Education shall establish the 10-year general plan for expansion of support ratio to higher education of the entire national budget, which is used to establish the support plan for HE every two years and report it to the relevant standing committee of the National Assembly. […] The State and a local government may provide funding, in whole or in part, necessary for schools to accomplish their goals.

(Korean Higher Education Act, 2017)

Article 43: When the State or a local government recognizes the necessity of supporting private schools for the purpose of promotion of private school education, it may grant subsidies or render other forms of support to school legal entities or private school support organizations which have applied for support in accordance with the Presidential Decree or the Municipal Ordinance of the local government concerned.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016) b. Autonomy

In recent years, particularly with the process of democratisation of Korea from the late 1980s, there has been an undeniable tendency of deregulation in HE by the Korean government (Byun, 2008; Jeong, 2014; S. Kim & Lee, 2006; Shin, 2011; Yeom, 2011). Traditionally, the Korean government tended to intervene directly in the operations of universities (Shin, 2011). The extent of government interventions covered almost all aspects of university operations, including university establishment, academic program development, admission quotas, procedures and methods, graduation requirements and professors’ qualification (Byun, 2008). However, since the late 1980s, particularly from the critical reform in May 1995 onwards, the Korean government has consistently liberalised the system (Byun, 2008; Jeong, 2014; Shin, 2011; Yeom, 2016b).

According to Jeong (2014), these reforms aim to address major issues of HE quality in order to strengthen the national competitiveness to respond to the challenges of a knowledge-based economy in the context of globalisation. Strategic measures have been implemented to apply market principles in governing HE. Accordingly, the emphasis is on self-regulatory capacity and improving the autonomy of universities. Universities have been gradually granted autonomy because the government deliberately shifted the power of decision-making to the university level. As reported by Shin (2011), government direct interventions have significantly reduced and the majority of decisions are made by university leaders.

In fact, institutional autonomy is protected by the Korean legal framework. Clause 31, article 4 of the constitution of the Korean Supreme Court ensures the legal rights of universities: “educational autonomy, expertise, political impartiality and university autonomy are protected by the law”. In the case of private universities, it is the Board of Trustees that makes critical decisions regarding the development of a university, and this has been clearly specified in the Korean Private School Act. Generally, the Board of Trustees, as the central governing body of private universities, decides critical issues of the universities, including mission and goal establishment, financial and budget allocation, appointment of the president, and other important matters according to the legal framework and the university’s charter.

Article 16: The Board of Trustees shall deliberate and make decisions on the following:

1. Matters concerning budgets, settlement of accounts, loans, and acquisitions, disposal and management of assets of the legal entity; 2. Matters concerning amendment to the articles of association; 3. Matters concerning merger and dissolution of the legal entity; 4. Matters concerning appointment and dismissal of trustees; 5. Matters concerning appointment of the principal and teachers of a private school established by the legal entity;

6. Important matters concerning management of the private school established by the legal entity; 7. Matters concerning profit-making business; 8. Other matters under the jurisdiction of the Board of Trustees pursuant to the Act and subordinate statutes, or the university’s articles of association.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

Other critical aspects in which universities are allowed to exercise their autonomy include academic development, tuition fees, enrolment numbers and appointments. Specifically, universities can determine their curriculum according to the university regulations and policies.

Article 21: Schools shall operate curriculums, as determined by school regulations: Provided, that any curriculum operated jointly with domestic or foreign universities shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

(Korean Higher Education Act, 2017)

Tuition fees are also determined by a Tuition Fee Review Committee that consists of university personnel, student representatives and educational experts.

Article 11: Each school shall establish and operate a Tuition Fee Review Committee comprised of school personnel (including a person from a foundation recommended by an educational foundation in case of private university or college), students, relevant experts, etc. to set Tuition fees. […] Any founder or operator of a school shall respect the result of deliberations by the Tuition Fee Review Committee to the greatest extent possible.

(Korean Higher Education Act, 2017)

Universities are also granted autonomy to determine the enrolment number of their institutions according to the university regulations.

Article 32: Matters regarding the maximum student number for each university and college (including industrial colleges, teachers' colleges, junior colleges, cyber colleges, technical colleges, and various other kinds

of schools) shall be determined by school regulations within the scope prescribed by Presidential Decree.

(Korean Higher Education Act, 2017)

In terms of appointment, the president of a private university is appointed by the Board of Trustees, and the appointment of the head of departments and other academic staff is in the scope of the president’s authority.

Article 53: The head of various levels of schools shall be appointed by the school legal entity or private school managers who establish and operate the relevant schools.

Article 53-2: The power to appoint teachers of a college educational institution may be delegated to the head of school, as prescribed by the articles of association of the school legal entity concerned.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

As described above, the direct involvement of the government in daily operational activities of universities has been significantly reduced. Though in principle, all universities are subject to the supervision of the MoE, and the MoE does intervene directly to some extent regarding the establishment and financial management of private universities’ legal entity, it is limited only when the legal entity has difficulties or fails to properly perform its tasks. Direct involvement of the authorities will take place only upon the request of the university’ stakeholders in specific situations such as the founder of a private university dies during the process of transferring assets to the university’s legal entity.

Article 11: If a person who intends to establish a school legal entity has died after having determined the matters concerning the objectives and assets among those referred to in the subparagraphs of Article 10 (1), the Minister of Education may determine other matters upon the application of any interested person.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

Another case that requires direct involvement from the government is conflict resolution or dispute mediation between internal stakeholders of the universities. In the case that there are disputes among stakeholders or members of the university’s Board of Trustees, and there is a request from the university, the government can appoint temporary trustees to participate in the university’s Board of Trustees. Nevertheless, this involvement is only temporary (as indicated in the title of ‘temporary trustee’); as soon as the university’ legal entity proves that it can perform its tasks properly, the authority must cease its involvement by dismissing the temporary trustees from the relevant university’s Board of Trustees.

Article 25: In cases falling under each of the following subparagraphs, the competent agency shall select and appoint temporary directors upon receiving a claim filed by interested persons or ex officio through the deliberation of the mediation committee: (1) When the normal operation of the school legal entity is judged to be difficult on the grounds that the school legal entity fails to fill the vacancies of directors […]

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

Other aspects that require direct involvement of the authority include approval of the university charter;

Article 10: Anyone who intends to establish a school legal entity shall contribute a certain amount of investment for establishment, draft the articles of association […], and obtain permission from the Minister of Education, as prescribed by Presidential Decree.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016) disapproval of members of the Board of Trustees due to misconduct;

Article 20-2: If a trustee has committed any of the following acts, the competent agency may revoke its approval of his taking office:

(Korean Private School Act, 2016) and investigation in case of misconduct. 91

Article 70: The competent agency may make investigations into the education by private schools, ask a private school to submit a report on statistics and other necessary matters, and cause a subordinate public official to inspect account books and other documents or make an investigation into the status of education execution.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

In addition, autonomous activities of other universities’ stakeholders, namely staff and students, are also encouraged.

Article 12: Students' autonomous activities shall be encouraged and protected, and the basic matters about the organization and operation thereof shall be determined by school regulations.

(Korean Higher Education Act, 2017) c. Model of Governance: Regulated Deregulation

A shift toward deregulation since the late 1980s in the Korean HE system is undeniable. However, the Korean government has maintained its vital role of central agency in governing the sector despite a strong transition to liberalise the HE system through deregulation. Researchers generally agree that the HE sector is still extensively regulated by the government (N. Clark & Park, 2013). In the HE Act, article 5 emphasises that “all school shall be directed and supervised by the Ministry of Education”. This article allows the government not only to direct and supervise but also intervene and even control universities (Byun, 2008; Yeom, 2011). According to Shin and Park (2007), though the education policies have focused officially on deregulation, the government has been involved deeply in both substantial and procedural aspects and therefore substantially limited the autonomy of universities. Funding and legislation are the two primary methods utilised by the government to maintain its control. The major aspects in which the government retains its significant control include appointment procedures for members of Board of Trustees, admission procedures, enrolment quotas in the Seoul Metropolitan area and tuition fee and financial management.

According to B. Kim and Park (2018) the overexpansion of HE in the 1990s and early 2000s had led to the over-supply since private universities mushroomed during that period. Consequently, the quantitative growth was achieved by the sacrifice of quality. Under the pressure of globalisation and the continuous application of neo-liberal reforms, together with public dissatisfaction with low quality resulting from over-expansion in previous decades, there has been a strong call in the 2000s for a shift from quantitative growth to qualitative development and an emphasis on improving accountability and transparency in PHE.

In the past there were negative incidents when the founders of private universities placed their interests above the interests of the universities and other stakeholders (S. Kim, 2008, 2017). In an attempt to improve accountability of the PHE sector, the government has enhanced the regulations regarding appointive aspects, in order to neutralise the influence of the founders and their close relatives in the operation of private universities. Consequently, the regulations regarding appointment of members of the Board of Trustees have been significantly strengthened in recent years. Specifically, in 2005 the government introduced the system of ‘external trustees’ and ‘temporary trustees’ to improve transparency in the PHE sector.

Consequently, one fourth of the members of the Board of Trustees of a private university must be external trustees who are recommended by the External Trustee Recommendation Committee, a unit established within the University Council solely for the purpose of recommending external trustees. The procedures for recommendation and appointment of external trustees are heavily regulated in the Private School Law and other relevant presidential decree.

Article 14: […] Every school legal entity shall select and appoint trustees who correspond to one fourth of the fixed number of trustees referred to in the provisions of paragraph (1) from among the persons recommended by the External Trustee Recommendation Committee […]. The External

Trustee Recommendation Committee shall be established at the University Council […]

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

In terms of admission, seemingly universities are granted autonomy to determine the maximum number of students enrolled. However, the admission methods, procedures and criteria have been strictly regulated by relevant decrees.

Article 34: Methods of regular or special selections, a timetable for student selection and matters necessary for the operation thereof shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree.

(Korean Higher Education Act, 2017)

Most of Presidents of Korean private universities think that the university autonomy has been seriously violated in different aspects such as entrance exam, student selection or student education.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

In addition, universities in the Seoul Metropolitan area are given specific enrolment quotas since the government tries to avoid over-concentration in this area.

The government controls the enrolment numbers of universities in the Seoul Metropolitan area. The enrolment number is fixed. Students who can’t enter universities in Seoul have to choose other universities [outside Seoul] which led to the establishment of private universities outside [Seoul].

If universities in the Seoul area keep increasing in terms of enrolment numbers, other universities outside Seoul will be negatively affected. Because there are also some good universities in other provinces [which cannot attract students because of the over-concentration in Seoul]. […] Also if students all congregate in Seoul, the government has to invest more in this area. Therefore, considering education policies, [population policies, and urban development policies] together, the government has implemented [such restriction of enrolment numbers to universities in Seoul].

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

Although universities are autonomous to determine tuition fees via a Tuition Fee Deliberation Committee with the participation of various stakeholders, universities have recently not been allowed to increase tuition fee due to the ‘tuition fee cap’ established by the government. This has been causing incredible frustration among private universities since tuition fees are the major source of revenue for these universities.

Universities in Korea are forced to not increase their tuition fees [tuition fee cap policy], all universities. […] This is the biggest problem of Korean HE. There is no way out for us [in terms of financial resources]

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

Finance is probably one of the aspects that is regulated the most. The government has made a huge effort to force private universities to open their account books and disclose publicly their financial resources and expenditures. Regular auditing is also required.

Article 31: Every school legal entity shall report its budget to the competent agency and publish its budget before the commencement of each fiscal year and report the settlement of accounts to the competent agency and publish the same after the end of each fiscal year, as prescribed by Presidential Decree. […] When a school legal entity submits a report of settlement of accounts, such a report shall be accompanied by an audit report to which all auditors of the relevant school legal entity affix their signatures and seals.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

The university legal entity must be supervised and managed by the authority, in terms of financial management, accounting, and regular auditing. The authority always supervises these aspects […].

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

Universities are also required to report accurately their financial activities to the authority, from transition of assets when established to managing accumulated funds.

Article 32-2: The Minister of Education may take necessary measures in relation to whether college educational institutions and school legal entities establishing and managing a college educational institution shall accumulate funds, how much and how long they shall accumulate funds, in consideration of the financial standing of such college educational institutions and school legal entities and other factors.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

In addition, the authority may ask for correction of the budget in case it discovers any violation and may enforce sanctions if there is any misconduct.

Article 31: When the competent agency deems that the budget reported under paragraph (1) is compiled in violation of the Acts and subordinate statutes, etc. related to accounting, it may guide the correction of such budget.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

After registering the Board of Trustees to the authority, […] the Board will be under the supervision of the government. The Board will be supervised and audited to ensure [that all financial activities are in compliance with the regulations]

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

In summary, there has been an obvious trend of deregulation since the first civil government took over from the military regime in Korean in 1987. The government has implemented significant reforms and initiatives to liberate regulations and requirements which had restricted HE, particularly private ones, alleviating the pressing demands of HE. As a result, direct intervention from the government has been significantly reduced, and universities have been granted considerable autonomy in important aspects such as academic programs and

curriculum development, enrolment numbers, admission standards, tuition fees, and appointments. This process of deregulation has led to the impressive expansion of HE from the late 1980s until the 2000s, transforming Korean HE from an elite to a universal system, with tertiary gross enrolment rate increasing from 12.44 percent in 1980 to 93.26 percent in 2015 (UNESCO, 2018).

However, the overexpansion resulting from the deregulation movement in the 1980s and 1990s has caused serious problems since expansion was achieved by sacrificing quality. This led to a public outcry for a shift from quantitative growth to qualitative development. In addition, as the Korean government has continued adopting neo-liberalism, new public management mechanisms with their stress on accountability have been also implemented in various domains, including HE.

Consequently, regulations have been strengthened under the name of accountability in significant areas, namely enrolment procedures, tuition fees, enrolment quotas in the Seoul Metropolitan area, appointment procedures and financial management. In addition, the government has also used funding as an indirect mechanism to maintain its control over universities. Private universities, as the major component of the HE system, has been significantly impacted by this tendency of regulation.

In conclusion, the governance model at the macro level in Korea is characterised by deregulation on one hand and strict regulation on the other. This approach is referred to as regulated deregulation which was proposed by Mok (2010) in his observation of a similar phenomenon in Singapore and Malaysia. However, Mok and his collegue also use this term interchangeably with centralised decentralisation (K.-H. Mok, 1997, 2013; K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008) to describe the macro governance model in China. This may cause confusion because it does not help distinguish the differences in governance models of these countries. Therefore, in this research, while borrowing the two terms of regulated deregulation and centralised decentralisation proposed by Mok (1997, 2010, 2013), I suggest that the macro governance models in Korea and China should be

referred to as regulated deregulation and centralised decentralisation, respectively.

The rationales for using different terms to distinguish the two models are the following. Firstly, the two countries have different political regimes. The Chinese central government is the administrative instrument of the Chinese Communist Party and is granted a legal basis to control/intervene in every aspect of the nation, including HE. Meanwhile the Korean government, since its civilian takeover in 1987, is a democratic state which has committed to implement decentralisation and deregulation as part of the neoliberal ideology promoted by the regime (Jeong, 2014; Jo, 2005). Thus, it is necessary to use different terms to denote the differences in nature of the two political systems.

Secondly, though decentralisation is the most prominent feature in Chinese HE these recent years, the purpose and speed of decentralisation and the extents to which this process occurs are controlled by the central government (K.-H. Mok, 1997, 2013; K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008). The central government in China has maintained its ultimate authority to intervene. In the case of Korea, the civil governments in Korea have carried out decentralisation as an indicator of democratisation in various domains, including HE (K.-S. Kim, 2005), in which the whole sector was completely decentralised (the Board of Trustees is the central governing body of a private university and has the highest authority to determine important matters of the university). The Korean government must use legislation or funding methods to influence the HE system, in which indirect mechanisms (i.e. funding) have been the preferred tool used in recent years (Jeon & Kim, 2018; Shin, 2012).

In conclusion, the governance models in China and Korea may appear to have similar characteristics but present different nature and realities. To avoid confusion between the two models, I suggest using the term centralised decentralisation to refer to the Chinese model and regulated deregulation to describe the Korean model.

5.1.1.2. Finance

In this subsection, the financial arrangements at macro level were described. The data has indicated that private sources (i.e. tuition fees) contribute a significant part of Korean HE finance. Nevertheless, the Korean PHE sector is suffering severe financial problems since tuition fees, its major source of revenue, have been restricted by the ‘tuition cap policy’ implemented by the government, and the decrease in student population caused by the low birth-rate. Meanwhile, the government has been gradually increasing funding for HE since the late 1990s, in response to the requirements of a knowledge-based economy. However, public expenditure is insufficient to finance a universal HE system like the case of Korea. Specifically, the government has employed performance-based funding as the dominant approach to strengthen the system’s capacity, efficiency and competitiveness. Most of the funding projects in this category target the faculty- level, not the universities. Therefore, this type of government funding does not significantly help sustain the financial situation of universities. a. Financial sources: High Dependence on Tuition Fees

The responsibility of the Korean government to finance education was legislated in the Education Act (article 25), Higher Education Act (article 7 and 8) and Private School Act (article 43). However, they are not mandatory and emphasise mainly symbolism without specific statements about funding sources, scales and methods (B. Kim & Park, 2018).

Government expenditure for tertiary education in Korea has increased steadily, from 0.6 percent of GDP in 2010 to 0.9 percent in 2015 but is still lower than the average one percent of OECD members. Meanwhile, private funding for tertiary education has decreased from 1.9 percent of GDP in 2010 to 0.9 percent in 2015, but household expenditure still accounts for 45 percent of total expenditure for tertiary education, much higher than the average 22 percent among OECD countries (OECD, 2018).

Since the majority of public expenditure on education was spent on non-tertiary (3.5 percent as a percentage of GDP in 2015), Korean HE depends heavily on private sources, mainly tuition fees (H. K. Hong & Chae, 2011). The situation is more extreme in the private sector. In the public sector, tuition fees and government funding accounted for 19.7 percent and 50.9 percent respectively in 2011. The figures in private universities are the opposite, with tuition fees contributing 70 percent of the university income, while public funding contributing only 12.4 percent (B. Kim & Park, 2018).

There are public and private universities in Korea. Public universities receive funding from the government for facility development or payment for faculties. That’s why they can offer lower tuition fees. […] In private universities, this financial burden is shared by students via tuition fees […].

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

As noted, private universities are allowed to set their tuition fees under the supervision of a Tuition Fee Review Committee established in each university. Nevertheless, the enormous pressure of citizens opposing any increase in tuition fees has prevented almost all Korean universities from increasing their tuition fees since 2008 (B. Kim & Park, 2018). In addition, the university-age population has gradually decreased due to the low birth-rate (Chae & Hong, 2009), consequently causing the Korean government to restructure the Korean HE system by decreasing the enrolment quotas. These together have led private universities in Korea to suffer severe financial difficulties, since these universities are very dependent on tuition fees.

In Korea, all universities are not allowed to increase tuition fees, all universities. From universities’ perspectives, expenses are increasing. […] Where do we get the money from? The government does not provide financial support for us. This is the biggest problem for us now.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

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Under this financial pressure, private universities in Korea have proactively sought out additional sources of finance in the era of decreasing number of domestic students and tightening public budget. As a result, Korean private universities started gazing upon the new market of international students under the label of ‘internationalisation’ (S. W. Lee, 2017).

Since the early 2000s, a series of initiatives (for instance, Study Korea Project and CAMPUS Asia) were introduced by the Korean government, encouraging universities to attract more foreign students (Byun & Kim, 2011a; Jon, Lee, & Byun, 2014), primarily from neighbouring Asian countries such as China and Japan (Jon et al., 2014; S. W. Lee, 2017). Consequently, the number of international students enrolled in Korean HEIs has dramatically increased, from 3,963 in 2000 to 86,878 in 2012 (S. W. Lee, 2017). Among these students, 71 percent are from China (OECD, 2015).

Private universities in rural areas and outside of Seoul aggressively enrol this group of students because they are the most vulnerable group of universities affected by financial difficulties (Byun & Kim, 2011b). This flow of international students, particularly those from China, has helped these universities survive financially in the difficult situation described above (S. W. Lee, 2017). b. Funding Approaches: Performance-based

Since the May 31 Education Reform Plan was introduced in 1995, the Korean government has adopted neo-liberal mechanisms to strengthen the role of HE in contributing to economic development and improving national competitiveness (Byun, 2008; Jeon & Kim, 2018). Among these mechanisms, performance-based funding has been the primary principle of public funding for universities (Chae & Hong, 2009; Yi, Kwak, & Kim, 2015). A wide range of performance indicators were developed using data collected through the Korean Higher Education Data System launched in 2008 (Yi et al., 2015). Based on these indicators the Korean government has implemented several initiatives to distribute financial resources

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to universities, either at university level as block grants, or at faculty level as program-based funding programs (B. Kim & Park, 2018).

The pre-determined performance indicators utilised by the government to allocate funding include graduates’ employment rate, student retention rate, financial aid per student, expenditure per student, and faculty to student ratio (Byun, 2008; Yi et al., 2015). The funding initiatives include the University Education Capacity Enhancement Program (UECEP), Brain Korea 21 (BK21), new University for Regional Innovation (NURI), World-Class University Project (WCU), Leaders in Industry-University Cooperation (LINC), and Creative Korea (CK) (B. Kim & Park, 2018). By the late 2000s, performance-based funding had become the dominant funding mechanisms (Jeon & Kim, 2018; Shin, 2012).

[…] Faculties apply and receive research grants according to the financial requirements of their research from governmental and non-governmental agencies […]

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

The performance-based funding approach was designed to motivate universities to improve organisational performance by increasing autonomy within and competition among universities (Yi et al., 2015). However, research has found that these performance-based funding mechanisms have not only increased the competition between universities significantly (Byun, 2008; C. J. Lee et al., 2012; Shin et al., 2015), but also altered dramatically the priorities of universities (Byun, 2008; Yeom, 2011). These funding schemes have strengthened the roles of the government despite the absence of direct intervention (Chae & Hong, 2009; Jeong, 2014). By forcing universities to extend significant efforts to improve their performance corresponding to the desired indicators (B. Kim & Park, 2018; Yi et al., 2015), the government has directed universities toward specific goals such as promoting ten universities into the top 200 and three universities into the top 20 of the world’s university rankings (Jeon & Kim, 2018).

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In addition, this funding approach has widened the gap between universities while reducing diversity among them since most universities have had to adjust themselves to match the indicators established by the government (Chae & Hong, 2009). Except for a handful elite research universities, most universities have been stressed-out due to financial pressure and fierce competition (Jeon & Kim, 2018). c. Funding Levels: Program-based

In terms of funding levels, government funding for HE can be categorised as university-level block grants, or program-based grants for faculty level (B. Kim & Park, 2018). University-level block grants can be categorised by purpose: capacity enhancement (i.e. UECEP), or support for lower tuition fees (i.e. FICNS). UECEP was adopted to improve educational quality at undergraduate level in universities for 6 years from 2008 to 2013. The Family Income Connected National Scholarship (FICNS) is a program that supports Korean students from low-income groups. However, this program also financially supports universities for their efforts to reduce tuition fees and/or increase financial support for students (B. Kim & Park, 2018).

Program-based funding programs aim to strengthen universities’ specialisation in particular fields (for instance, CK or LINC) (B. Kim & Park, 2018). In recent years, program-based grants have become dominant (Jeon & Kim, 2018). After UECEP finished in 2013, there has been no significant university-level grant for private universities, whereas FICNS is more funding tool to support students rather than universities.

In short, the picture of financing a universal HE system in Korea is quite depressing. Notwithstanding a steady increase in public expenditure for HE in recent years, the system still depends heavily on private funding (i.e. tuition fees). Given the fact that private universities constitute a large proportion of Korean HE (87 percent in terms of number of universities and 75 percent in terms of number of students) (B. Kim & Park, 2018), in the context of a

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decreasing student population and restriction in tuition fees, it can be concluded that funding for HE in Korea is seriously insufficient. Moreover, the performance-based approach employed by the government since the late 1990s has improved the performance and efficiency of universities, yet simultaneously strengthened the dependence of universities on the government, worsened the competition among universities, and widened the gap between them.

5.1.1.3. Quality Assurance

In this subsection, the Korean Quality Assurance (QA) system was described based on its core domains, namely QA agencies, methods, standards and procedures and purposes. The data indicates that the current QA system in Korea is characterised by the participation of various agencies, including government, non-government and media. Their participation has brought about the diversification of methods and specialisation of standards. Importantly, the introduction of the current QA system in 2008 demonstrated a strong emphasis on using QA to strengthen accountability of universities.

Shin (2017) summarises the development of the QA system in the contemporary Korean HE and divides it into four major stages. QA was first introduced to Korea in 1973 as a government initiative. The government was directly involved in quality control at university, faculty, and program levels (S. Lee, 1989). In 1982, the Korean Council for University Education (KCUE) was established as a non-government organisation representing Korean university presidents. KCUE took the lead in implementing independent evaluation methods to ensure quality and autonomy (Korean Document No.6) and transformed the QA system into an accreditation system following the U.S. model in 1994 (Yeom, 2015). In 2008, the government combined the original accreditation model implemented by KCUE with accountability-strengthening measures in response to the global trend of QA as a neo-liberal mechanism at that time (Shin, 2017).

As well as accreditation, Korean media, namely Joongang Daily and DongA Daily, have also conducted university rankings to provide consumers (i.e.

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students and parents) alternative perspectives of university evaluation (Korean Document No. 10) a. QA Agencies

According to the newly revised legal framework, an accreditation agency must be approved by the MoE to officially conduct accreditation and is subject to the supervision and monitoring of the MoE.

The Minister of Education may designate a relevant specialized evaluation institution, a school consultative body […], and an organization or a group, etc. designed for the promotion of academic research as an accredited institution.

(Korean Higher Education Act, 2017)

Article 9: The [MoE] may check if authorised accreditation agencies fulfil the requirements as prescribed in [the Regulations on Accreditation of Higher Education institutions and this document]

(Regulations on Accreditation Agencies, 2014)

Article 4: The [MoE] may supervise or provide guidance for authorised accreditation agencies […]

(Regulations on Accreditation of Higher Education Institutions, 2018)

Generally, accreditation agencies must ensure their independence and not be influenced by either their sponsors or members.

Article 4: [Authorised accreditation agencies] are not-for-profit organisations [or associations] that aim to accredit universities or programs and are independent from their sponsors or members.

(Regulations on Accreditation Agencies, 2014)

Accreditation agencies maintain their independence particularly financially and in development of accreditation standards.

Article 4: [Accreditation agencies] must ensure its financial independence and sustainability to implement accreditation service effectively and 105

impartially. […] [Accreditation agencies must submit] general principles of accreditation, accreditation procedures and standards […]

(Regulations on Accreditation Agencies, 2014)

The Korean Council for University Education (KCUE) was established in 1982 as a non-government organisation to strengthen member universities’ competitiveness based on principles of autonomy, excellence, knowledge-sharing and internationalisation (Korean Document No. 6). The Council has gradually expanded since its establishment. Nevertheless, QA of member universities has been always a key function of KUCE since its foundation (Korean Document No. 6).

After the QA system was transformed in 2008 with the revision of the relevant regulative framework, KCUE established an affiliated organisation, Korean University Accreditation Institute (KUAI) in 2009. It was recognised by the MoE as an accreditation agency in 2010, and started implementing university accreditation in 2011 (Korean Document No. 9)

The Korean Council for University Education (KCUE) was founded in 1982 as a mechanism to facilitate government-university dialogue and inter- university cooperation. […]

(Korean Document No. 6)

[…] Korean University Accreditation Institute (KUAI) [is] designated as an […] institute of evaluation and accreditation for higher education institutions in September 11, 2010 […] by the MoE […].

(Korean Document No. 9)

Besides KCUE-KUAI, there are also other agencies participating in accreditation (at the university and program levels) and other QA methods. For instance, the Korean Accreditation Board for Vocational Higher Education provides accreditation services for its member junior colleges. Other program accreditation agencies include the Accrediting Board for Engineering Education of Korea (ABEEK), Korean Accreditation Board of Nursing Education

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(KABONE), Korea Architectural Accrediting Board (KAAB) and etc. (J. W. Ko, 2017) b. QA Methods

b.1. The Accreditation System by KCUE-KUAI

This accreditation system was first introduced by KCUE in 1994 (Shin, 2012, 2015). During the period from 1994 to 2006, KCUE conducted two phases of accreditation for its member universities (Yeom, 2015) until the system was modified by the revision of the legal framework in 2008. The current accreditation system includes the universities’ self-evaluated indicators specified by the government into the accreditation standards developed by the agency (Korean Document No. 8).

The accreditation system implemented by [KCUE] aims to evaluate systemically the quality standards of universities and grant universities public recognition by disclosing the evaluation results to the public

(Korean Document No. 9)

A more detailed description of this accreditation system will be provided in part c of this subsection.

b.2. The Government’s QA Initiative – Linking QA with Funding

From the 1980s until the late 1990s, QA was mainly carried out by KCUE (Shin, 2017; Yeom, 2015). Nevertheless, before the 1990s, Korean HE, at both the macro and meso levels, had not paid adequate attention to the aims and outcomes of quality evaluation (Yeom, 2015). Since 1994 the government has implemented a performance-based funding approach that is linked with evaluation of university quality (Shin, 2012). Its emphasises on performance, quality and accountability as the main agendas of HE reform and their association with public funding have made QA the keyword in HE dialogue (Yeom, 2015). Consequently, this has weakened the influence of the KUCE-led accreditation system which is not associated with funding.

[The MoE] has been assessing universities to provide specialised financial 107

support programs for universities

[The MoE], since 1994 has implemented general and specialised support programs for universities based on the university assessment’s outcomes. […] Later these support programs were integrated into three categories, the graduate education support program (BK21), regional university support program (NURI), and support program for specialisation of universities in the Seoul area.

(Korean Document No. 10)

b.3. Rankings

University rankings carried out by Korean media (Joongang Daily and Donga Daily) have been strengthened in recent years (Yeom, 2016b). Ranking criteria include university classification (first, second or third tier), location (Seoul or non-Seoul) and the average university admission test score of enrolled students, which is the most significant criterion (Yeom, 2016b).

Media, on behalf of consumers, implemented university rankings. The Joongang Daily in 1994 with the US News & World Report started ranking universities and disciplines based primarily on quantitative indicators.

(Korean Document No. 10)

Yeom (2016b) criticises these ranking systems implemented by Korean media for causing damage to Korean HE at all levels. At the individual level, these rankings systems have created a sense of inferiority for students who can’t attend those ‘highly ranked’ universities and for their parents. In response, parents invest heavily in private tutoring to help their children enter more prestigious universities, thus household expenditure on education is unnecessarily increased. At university level, ranking systems emphasising standardised admission test scores have prevented universities from developing their niches according to their missions and goals because they have to provide courses and programs that attract the top-scoring students to ensure their rankings. Secondary schools also have to focus on helping students increase their test scores, therefore causing a decline in the school’s overall quality. Collectively, they have resulted in 108

lowering teaching competence at both secondary and university levels. At the society level, students who have graduated from less prestigious or non-Seoul universities often experience employment discrimination or other disadvantages in the workplace. Finally, highly ranked universities in the Seoul area by attracting better student input have caused a decline in local industries, reduced local employment opportunities, and over-crowding in the capital. c. Accreditation Standards and Procedures

The current accreditation system developed by KCUE – KUAI includes accreditation for universities and for programs (Korean Document No. 3). Each cycle of accreditation lasts for five years (Korean Document No. 8). Standards for university accreditation consists of six categories, specified in 17 areas and 54 criteria (Korean Document No. 8) as following.

Table V-2. The University Accreditation Standards developed by KUAI

No. Category (6) Area (17) Mission and Educational Objectives Mission and 1 Development Plans and Specialisation Development Plan Self-Evaluation Academic Programs Teaching and Learning 2 Education Academic Administration Student Outcomes Faculty Institutional 3 Staff Community Students Basic Facilities Educational 4 Supporting Facilities Facilities Library Financial Resources Finance and 5 Budgets and Management Management Audits

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6 Community Service Community Service

The 54 criteria include six key items of the university’s self-evaluation report as required by the legal framework.

Article 5: The accreditation standards [developed by accreditation agencies] include the compulsory criteria of the university self-evaluation report as prescribed in the Regulations on Self-Evaluation of Higher Education Institutions […] and the criteria to evaluate the over-all operation of universities.

(Regulations on Accreditation Agencies, 2014)

These six key items are (1) Number of Full-time Faculty; (2) Number of Facilities; (3) New Student Enrolment Rate; (4) Retention Rate; (5) Ratio of Educational Expenditure to Tuition; (6) Ratio of Scholarship to Tuition (Korean Document No. 8). In short, the components of the university accreditation standards developed by KUAI can be summarised as following.

Figure 3. Components of the University Accreditation Standards developed by KUAI

(Korean Document No. 8)

The university accreditation procedures, as shown in Figure 7.2, consist of a documentary report review, a site-based evaluation, and decision making (J. W. 110

Ko, 2017). Firstly, universities submit an accreditation application, self- evaluation report and other relevant documents. According the legal framework, university self-evaluation is mandatory and must be conducted every two years (Yeom, 2015). These documents will later be reviewed by the accreditation agency before visiting the university. During this visitation, the evaluation committee will conduct a qualitative analysis based on observation, additional information and consultation (J. W. Ko, 2017). Results from this process will be verified based on mutual communication between the university and the agency before the final accreditation decision is made.

Figure 4. Accreditation Procedures Developed by KUAI

(Korean Document No. 8) d. Purposes of QA

Kis (2005) suggests that the two main focuses of QA generally are quality improvement and accountability. While quality improvement often refers to the

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efforts to improve academic institutions, accountability frequently refers to the global trend of initiatives implemented by governments to “place new obligations on institutions of higher education” (El-Khawas, 2007, p. 24). Similarly, Perellon (2005) argues that there are two approaches in QA: formative and summative. While a formative approach focuses on improving quality in universities, a summative approach often links QA results with specific goals (e.g. funding) (Shin, 2017). In other words, the two major aims of QA encompass quality improvement (of universities or programs) on one hand and accountability enhancement on the other (determining budget allocations based on QA outcomes).

Sachs (1994) is concerned that there has been a growing tension between these two aims of QA. Hodson and Thomas (2003) criticise the QA system in UK HE for its strong shift towards accountability. Consequently, Brown (1999) suggests that careful consideration should be given to finding an appropriate balance between accountability and improvement.

Evidence of accountability and quality improvement aims were both found in the data. For example, according to KUAI, institutional accreditation is a system that aims to evaluate if universities satisfy ‘basic requirements’ and ensure ‘public confidence’. To be granted accreditation certificate, universities must prove that they meet ‘minimum requirements’, ‘in accordance with’ relevant laws and regulations in HE (Korean Document No. 8). In other words, from KUAI’s perspective, accreditation is a method to ensure that universities are accountable to their stakeholders (i.e. the state, students and parents) by providing evidence of their compliance with legal requirements and social expectations.

Verify conformity with accreditation criteria based on performance records over a specified time period. […] Check compliance with quantitative indicator[s] […] on an annual basis

(Korean Document No. 8)

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In addition, the quality improvement aim can be found in its statements that emphasise universities’ ‘continuous efforts to enhance quality’ (Korean Document No. 8), and consider accreditation as a method to help ensure universities’ fitness-for-purpose (i.e. how universities effectively achieve their mission and objectives) (K Kinser & Lane, 2017).

Check if university performance is aligned with stated objectives and educational philosophy

(Korean Document No. 8)

Though both aims of QA, namely accountability and quality improvement, were mentioned, QA for accountability is growing in importance in the current Korean HE system. When analysing the focuses and aims of QA in KCUE-KUAI’s statements, it is obvious that the accreditation system has evolved into a form of measurement against indicators and standards which strongly stresses accountability and compliance rather than genuine enhancement of what universities actually do (Strathern, 2000). This observation is in accordance with the suggestion of Ko (2017), arguing that the establishment of the current system has shifted the focus of QA from quality improvement to accountability.

Indeed, Shin (2017) suggests that the transformation of the Korean QA system into its current form adopted in 2008 is strongly related to the global trend of accountability. During the period from 1994 to 2008, KCUE was the leading agency in conducting accreditation. The government, embracing neo-liberalism under the influence of globalisation, wanted to strengthen university accountability via HE reforms. Hence the government intended to use university data collected from accreditation processes conducted by KCUE to enable reforms and link funding to QA outcomes. Nevertheless, the government and KCUE could not reach agreement for data provision. Consequently, a new system combining the original accreditation system implemented by KCUE and the funding-linked assessment system led by the government was developed in 2008.

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In accordance with Article 11(2) Paragraph 4 of Higher Education Act, the results of university evaluation and accreditation shall be used for the government’s administrative and financial policies starting from 2014.

(Korean Document No. 8)

Consequently, Shin (2017) concludes that there are differences in focuses between the current QA system introduced in 2008 and its previous version. While the accreditation system by KCUE during the period from 1994 to 2008 emphasised quality improvement, the current systems that combines the accreditation system with the government-led assessment criteria emphasises the importance of accountability. Yeom (2011) is in agreement with Shin (2017), suggesting that the government has used QA as a tool to strengthen universities’ social responsibility and increase public awareness about their accountability.

A strong move towards accountability in the aims of QA may do more damage to HE system than good. As the literature suggests, without an appropriate balance between accountability and quality improvement, QA methods may cause dysfunction in the QA system itself (Hodson & Thomas, 2003; Power, 1997; Sieber, 1981). Especially, in the context of the Korean government expending enormous effort and resources restructuring the HE system through specialisation policies to strengthen the system’s diversity (H. Park, Choi, Yun, & Chae, 2015), an over-emphasis on accountability and compliance may have hindered the success of such policies. Indeed, research indicates that the government’s effort to use QA outcomes as a benchmark for budget allocation might have hampered diversity of the HE system since both funding and evaluation are measured based on standardised criteria (Yeom, 2015)

In a nutshell, this subsection provides an introduction to the QA system in Korean HE with specific focuses on major QA agencies, methods, standards, procedures and the purposes of QA. The Korean QA system has evolved over time. Since the late 1990s, the QA system in Korea has been characterised by the diversification of QA agencies, specialisation of QA standards, and intensification of pressure associated with QA outcomes (Yeom, 2015). The 114

participation of various government and non-government agencies (i.e. MoE, KCUE, KEDI, other program-evaluating organisations and the media) have resulted in diverse QA methods. As a result, QA standards have become specialised.

This period also witnessed an aggressive change in the aims of QA, from quality improvement to accountability. This transformation began with the introduction of the current system in 2008, combining the original, independent accreditation system implemented by KCUE with funding-attached assessment criteria established by the government. The strong association between QA and funding promoted by the government, and the popularity of university rankings advocated by major media have deepened the impact of QA on universities’ finances and reputations. There is growing academic concern of potentially negative impacts of this compliance-based QA system; namely that it may neither help universities to genuinely enhance their quality, nor improve the diversity of Korean HE, a key policy agenda the government has actively promoted in recent years (Yeom, 2015).

5.1.2. The Meso and Mirco Levels

The Korean private university in this case study was selected for investigation because it fits my sampling criteria of a mature private university that reflected the history of contemporary PHE in Korea. This university was founded in the 1950s in response to the need to rebuild the country destroyed by the devastating Korean war (1950-1953). Established in Seoul by a businessman with significant support from the Korean government at that time (Korean University Document No.6), it aimed to produce excellent human resources in business, language and diplomacy, critical areas that were badly needed for a developing country aspiring to rise from the ashes of war. These areas have become the core disciplines of the university. After more than 60 years of development accompanying the Korean economic growth, the university has accomplished remarkable achievements. It has become a comprehensive university ranked in the top 20 of best universities in Korea (Korean University Document No.1). The

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two campuses accommodate more than 17,000 undergraduate and more than 4,000 graduate students (Korean University Document No.1).

In addition, good personal connections with some faculty of the university which were formed during the time I did my master in Korea are also an important factor determining my selection of this university for conducting case study. Surprisingly, however, gaining access to this case university was not as easy as I expected. The potential participants hesitated to participate in this study due to their busy schedules. Professor K., one of the participants and the contact person that help me gain access to the university explained to me how academic staff and managers of universities are always under huge pressure of workload. Partaking in research as participants was not a priority for these people whose timetables were always full. It took a lot of time with lot of communication for me to receive approval to approach the potential participants. Thanks to the Korean culture where seniority is deeply respected, my invitations were accepted because they were delivered through professor K., a senior professor in the university. As the Dean of the College of Engineering, he had helped me to gain access to not only the academic staff and middle-level managers but also the President of the university.

Due to my tight schedule, I had to apply for a Korean visa in Vietnam while collecting data there. The Korean consular in Vietnam inexplicably granted me only a ten-day, not the normal two-week or one-month visa. Thus, I was forced to compress my meeting plans and interview agendas to fit in such a short trip. Fortunately, all the meeting went smoothly according to my plan without any change or delay. All the participants were very professional and supportive. Those at managerial leadership positions were very punctual, straight forward and professional, which made our interviews quite formal. Meanwhile, the professor was much more relaxed, friendly and gregarious thanks to our communications beforehand that helped reduce the normal tension of interviews.

Interviews were conducted in the participants’ offices. Because this university has two campuses, one in Seoul and another in a nearby city, I had to travel back 116

and forth between the two cities. The Seoul campus has changed dramatically since the first time I visited it almost ten years ago. With more new buildings, it was lively as students filled every corner of the campus. Its overcrowding is understandable because one-fifth of the country’s population lives in Seoul, the capital city of Korea. Yet the campus still maintains its elegance decorated by autumnal tints and golden leaves of maidenhair trees. Meanwhile, the other campus is located in a small town two hours away from Seoul (but it is still in the Seoul Metropolitan area, the second largest metropolitan area in the world). Walking along the campus’s main walkway, its quietness reminded me of the ideologically sacred atmosphere of a university as a ‘knowledge powerhouse’. Sadly, the contrast between the two campuses reflects the extent of population density in Seoul (which is belived to be almost twice that of New York).

Apart from interviews, I also collected rich data thanks to the online availability online of the university documents. This was very different from the Chinese case where many documents are available to ‘authorised personnel’ only, or the Vietnamese case where the requirements for public disclosure has not been strengthened, universities in Korea are required to disclose important documents to the public, mainly via online means, to ensure shared governance and strengthen university accountability. As a result, I was able to collect highly significant documents which I could not obtain in the other cases, such as the meeting minutes of the Board of Trustees, the University Council and the Tuition Fee Review Committee, the university’s internal evaluation report and statistical yearbook. The university documents used for data analysis in this subsection are listed in Table V-3 below. The documents without dates were retrieved from the university’s website. However, due to the requirements of ensuring participants’ privacy and confidentiality, the website address cannot be provided.

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Table V-3. List of Documents Used for Data Analysis at the Meso Level

Document No. Description Name A brief introduction of the university, its founding spirit, educational philosophy, vision, mission, goals, motto, a 1 Kr.UDoc.1 chronological description of its development, and a summary of its achievements until now. This document was available on the university’s website A meeting minute of the Board of Trustees (1), recorded in 2 Kr.UDoc.2 February 2018 A meeting minute of the Board of Trustees (2), recorded in June 3 Kr.UDoc.3 2018 A meeting minute of the University Council, recorded in 4 Kr.UDoc.4 February 2018 The list of members of the Board of Trustees, published in the 5 Kr.UDoc.5 university’s website. A description of the history of the university at its early stage, 6 Kr.UDoc.6 published in the university’s website 7 Kr.UDoc.7 The university’s 2017 statistical yearbook 8 Kr.UDoc.8 The university’s 2015 internal evaluation report A meeting minute of the Tuition Fee Deliberation Committee (1), 9 Kr.UDoc.9 recorded in January 2018 A meeting minute of the Tuition Fee Deliberation Committee (2), 10 Kr.UDoc.10 recorded in February 2018 A meeting minute of the Tuition Fee Deliberation Committee (3), 11 Kr.UDoc.11 recorded in April 2018 12 Kr.UDoc.12 The university’s 2017 internal evaluation report 13 Kr.UDoc.13 The university’s 2017 internal evaluation report (appendix)

Overall, this university provides an interesting and somewhat typical story of higher education in Korea. The university has been striving to survive in a turbulent environment characterised by fierce competition, increasing demands from the government and general public, and growing pressure of globalisation 118

while endeavouring to maintain its traditions, values and identity. Specifically, its model of trusteeship governance presents interesting lessons regarding the not- for-profit PHE sector which dominates the Korean HE system.

This subsection consists of two parts, describing the university’s operational practices primarily in governance and finance aspects. For the governance aspect, a detailed analysis of the major constituents of the governance structure, their roles and functions and the characteristics of the university trusteeship governance model was provided. The financial situation of the case study was outlined based on the operationalised categories of financial sources, funding approaches and funding levels to describe the financial crisis confronting the PHE sector in Korea. The strategies developed by the university to address their financial challenges were also covered. Unlike the previous subsection of the macro level in which QA was included as one of the three major aspects, namely governance, finance and QA, the QA practice of the case university was omitted in this subsection because the Korean QA system has been clearly defined and legislated and the university has mainly implemented the QA required to comply with the legal framework.

5.1.2.1. Governance a. A Trusteeship Governance Model

The case university has adopted the trusteeship model of governance in which a Board of Trustees is established. The members of the Board are non-residents who come from outside of the university (except the President). All the trustees discharge their duties voluntarily. The Board of Trustees is the highest governing body in the university, determining critical matters of university affairs such as establishing mission and goals, appointment of trustees, the President, and other key leadership positions (both academic and administrative posts), amendment of the university regulations and policies, development of academic programs and allocation of budgets and other resources.

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Besides the Board, there are also other internal decision-making units, namely the President and his management team, the University Council, the Faculty Deans Committee, the Professors Association and the Alumni Association. The participation of these diverse internal bodies in the decision-making process is evidence of the shared governance model in the university. In addition, the increasing significance of the President and his management team and their active roles in mediating different internal structures confirms that the rise of managerialism is visible in this university.

Basically, the components of governance structure in Korean private universities include a Board of Trustees, President, University Council, Faculty Deans Committee, Professors Association and Alumni Association. There are also other committees to ensure shared governance in universities such as External Trustee Recommendation Committee, Tuition Fee Review Committee, and Student Committee. Among these governing bodies, the Board of trustees, President and University Council are the major and most powerful components within the governance structure of a private university.

The governance structure of the case university, generally speaking, is in accordance with the legal requirements as explained in the previous subsection. Specifically, the major components of the governance structure in the case university include the Board of Trustees, the President and his management team, the University Council, the Faculty Dean Committee and the Professor Association.

a.1. Board of Trustees

Korean private universities adopt the American trusteeship model of governance. The trusteeship model is a distinctive innovation of the U.S. from around the 17th century, though the concept originated in Europe much earlier (Herbst, 1982). It is unique because the lay board plays crucial roles in policy formulation and accountability, replacing the central ministry which is absent in the American political structure (Kezar, 2006). Regardless of differences in structures of the governing board in different universities corresponding to different states’ 120

legislative frameworks and/or the university’s characteristics, Boards of Trustees in American universities take a similar role – to govern the university according to its mission and for the public good (Kezar, 2006).

Adopting such a model, the regulatory framework in Korea requires private universities to establish a Board of Trustees as the governing board of the university.

Article 15: A board of trustees shall be established under every school legal entity. The board of trustees shall consist of directors.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

Since we are a private university, we have a Board of Trustees […].

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

As the central governing body of a private university, the Board of Trustees determines important affairs of the university, including mission and goals establishment, appointment of trustees and the President, amendment of the university charter (or articles of association), personnel issues, budget allocation and other financial matters.

Article 16: The Board of Trustees shall deliberate and make decisions on the following: 1. Matters concerning budgets, settlement of accounts, loans, and acquisitions, disposal and management of assets of the school legal entity; 2. Matters concerning amendment to the articles of association; 3. Matters concerning merger and dissolution of the school legal entity; 4. Matters concerning appointment and dismissal of officers; 5. Matters concerning appointment of the President and teachers of a private school established by the school legal entity; 6. Important matters concerning management of the private school established by the school legal entity; 7. Matters concerning profit-making business; 8. Other matters under the jurisdiction of the Board of Trustees pursuant to Acts and subordinate statutes, or the articles of association.

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(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

Trustees are non-residents who come from outside of the university they serve and carry out their fiduciary duties as volunteers without receiving remuneration.

Article 26: No remuneration shall be paid to executives of a school juristic person other than the full-time executives as referred to in articles of association: Provided, that reimbursement of actual expenses shall be made to them.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

By law, a Board of Trustees must have at least nine trustees, of which there are at least two auditors who are responsible to supervise the activities of the Board of Trustees and may provide advices when needed.

Article 14: Every school legal entity shall have, as its executives, seven directors or more and two auditors or more:

Article 15: […] The auditors may attend the meetings of the Board of Trustees and present their opinions.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

The presence of auditors in the Board of Trustees is to strengthen the university accountability, particularly of the Board. Their functions according to the legal framework as follows:

Article 19: […] The auditors shall perform the following duties:

1. To audit the state of property and the accounts of the school legal entity concerned; 2. To audit matters concerning the operation and duties of the Board of Trustees; 3. To report to the Board of Trustees and the competent agency on illegal or defective points which have been found as a result of audit of matters concerning the state of property of the school legal entity or operation and duties of the Board of Trustees; 4. To request the convocation of a meeting of the board of Trustees, when it is required to make a report as referred to in subparagraph 3; 122

5. To state their opinions to the Chairman or Trustees concerning the state of property of the school legal entity concerned or the operation and duties of the Board of Trustees.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

Another important point in the legal framework regarding the governance structure in private universities is the presence of external trustees in the Board of Trustees. According to the Private School Act, at least one fourth of the Board of Trustees must be external trustees. These external trustees must be appointed based on the recommendation of the External Trustee Recommendation Committee, which is an affiliated committee under the University Council. The purpose of these external trustees is to neutralise the influence of the founding members and their relatives in private universities’ boards of trustees, and therefore protect other stakeholders’ legal rights and interests, mainly staff and students (S. Kim, 2008, 2017)

Article 14: Every school legal entity shall select and appoint trustees who correspond to one fourth of the fixed number of trustees […] (hereinafter referred to as the "external trustees") from among the persons who are recommended by the External Trustee Recommendation Committee […]. The External Trustee Recommendation Committee […] shall be established by the University Council […].

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

At the case university, there are eleven members in the Board of Trustees, of whom two are auditors. In addition, there are four external trustees, including one auditor (Korean University Document No. 5). These external trustees were appointed based on the recommendations of the External Trustee Recommendation Committee (Korean University Document No. 3). The members of the Board of Trustees have diverse backgrounds. There are four trustees whose expertise are in academia (including the President), whereas each of the rest of members has expertise in the following areas of legal, business,

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public sector, media, non-government organisation, and alumni (Korean University Document No. 5).

Examples of important affairs that were discussed and determined by the Board of Trustees as observed in the data includes (1) amendment of the university’ regulations; (2) appointment of trustees; (3) budget allocation and other important financial management issues; (4) employment plan of academic staff and key management leadership position; (5) sanctions for academic staff; and (6) others.

Meeting agenda:

a. Discussion items: (1) Appointment of new trustees; (2) Amendment of the university organisation regulations; (3) Amendment of the charter of the Board of Trustees; (4) Budget plans (draft) of the Board of Trustees and of its affiliated institutions; (5) Revised supplementary budget (draft) of the high school affiliated to the [outskirt] campus. b. Report items: (1) Increase of the Board of Trustees’ office moving budget (Korean University Document No. 2)

Generally, the decision-making process is the following. The President and the management team under his leadership develop plans and/or proposals regarding the university affairs.

Generally, a President must propose a development plan which describes the future direction of a university.

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

While developing plans and/or proposals, other internal bodies such as the University Council, the Faculty Deans Committee, the Professors Association, etc. may review the plans and provide comments and feedback.

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Do you know the Faculty Deans Committee? It’s the gathering of all the Deans in our university. We only can enact changes through this group of people. If there is no agreement among them, there is no change. We can’t carry out anything.

Firstly we [the President and his team] propose, if anyone disagrees, we have to discuss with them. If we can’t negotiate an agreement, we will eventually vote to decide.

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

[The Council Chairperson] informed that the university budget plan of 2018 has been made available beforehand for members of the University Council to review.

(Korean University Document No. 4)

After comments and feedbacks are reflected, the revised plan is proposed to the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees reviews the plans proposed by the management team led by the President before making decisions (approving, rejecting, or requiring further development). Decisions are made by voting.

Finally, the proposal will be submitted to the Board to be approved before being implemented in the university.

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

After all the trustees discussed, [the Chairperson of the Board] asked trustees to vote for approval of the amendment plan of [the university] academic staff policy.

(Korean University Document No. 3)

With the approval from the board of trustees, the plan will be implemented in the university under the leadership of the president.

It requires the endorsement of the Board members before implementing anything.

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

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a.2. The President and His Management Team

Legally speaking, a president of a university is responsible for the overall-control of university affairs, including managing academic matters, supervising staff and guiding students.

Article 15: The president or dean shall exercise overall control of school affairs, supervise subordinate school personnel and guide students.

(Korean Higher Education Act, 2017)

In Korea, the President is in charge of academic affairs and university management.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

As the President is appointed by the Board of Trustees to be the ‘chief executive officer’ (Duryea, 1973), he is responsible to execute and implement the decisions made by the Board of Trustees.

Article 53: The head of various levels of schools shall be appointed by the school legal entity or private school managers who establish and operate the relevant schools.

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

In the case university, the functions of the President can be categorised as academic and administrative functions. The President plays a critical role and is seen as central to both academic and administrative aspects. His role has been recognised as crucial to the governance of the university.

The most important factor is the President. […] Generally, a President must propose a development plan which describes the future direction of a university.

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

In Korea, the President is in charge of academic affairs and university management. [The President and his management team] establish the direction of the university, determine budgets for different programs […].

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The faculty is in charge of academic and student affairs. These are the two backbones of a university […].

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

However, in practice, his emphasis is on the administrative aspects, particularly the university mission development, goal establishment and budget planning. Particularly, as a member of the Board of Trustees (Korean University Document No.5), he is critical in bridging between the Board and the rest of the university.

[The President and his management team] establish the direction of the university, determine budget for different programs […]. In terms of the administrative aspect, the President’s leadership is essential.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

The management team under the President’s leadership mainly consists of the head of administrative departments. These people are the key driving force for university operation and implementation the decisions made by other governing units described above.

The heads of administrative departments led by the President. We call them the management team. […] They are the people who implement decisions. They normally meet every week to develop implementation plans.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

The management team plays a vital role in communicating between important internal governing bodies of the university such as the Board of Trustees, the University Council, the Faculty Deans Committee, the Professors Association, etc. In the university documents, particularly the meeting minutes of the Board of Trustees, the majority of issues were reported or proposed to the Board by the management team such as the Department of Strategic Planning and/or the Administrative Office, etc. The faculty have much less direct communication with the Board compared with those of the management team. In the two meeting minutes of the Board of Trustees, of 16 times the Board reviewed reports and

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proposals to make decision, they listen directly to a faculty member (i.e. the Head of a school) only one time.

The focus of the President’s on administrative areas and the pro-active role of the management team as the mediator between internal components of the university’s governance structure are evidence of the rising significance of managerialism in the university. Meanwhile, the limited direct communication between the faculty and the Board does not necessarily mean that the faculty’s voice has been neglected. Instead, it may signify that the faculty has still maintained its autonomy in academic affairs.

Since the Board of Trustees is the central governing body to determine crucial matters of a private university, the roles of other supervising and advocating mechanisms such as the University Council, Faculty Deans Committee, and Professors Committee in private universities are much less significant compared with of those in public universities. In the following subsection, the roles of each of the above-mentioned internal decision-making bodies will be discussed.

a.3. University Council

The University Council, as an official governing body representing university faculties and academic staff, is responsible to monitor the activities of the President and the Board.

Article 26-2: The University Council mandated to deliberate on the matters falling under any of the following subparagraphs shall be set up in each of university educational institutions: Provided, That the matters in subparagraphs 3 and 4 shall be subject to consultation:

1. Matters concerning the development plan of the university; 2. Matters concerning establishment or amendment of school regulations; 3. Matters concerning establishment or amendment of a charter of the university; 4. Matters concerning operation of university educational course;

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5. Matters concerning recommendation by the members of recommendation committee;

(Korean Private School Act, 2016)

In the case university, the University Council exercises its roles as a monitoring and advocacy body, reflecting viewpoints and perspectives of faculty, students and staff to the President and the Board of Trustees.

[…] After [the Budget Planning Team Leader] reported the major items of [the university] budget plan in 2008, [the University Council] provided its advices.

(Korean University Document No. 4)

In addition, it aims to ensure the Board’s accountability and transparency and to improve the educational quality of the university and the well-being of faculty, staff and students (Korean University Document No.4). The University Council has the authority to question the Board and the management team (including the President) in a wide range of topics, such as (1) activities of the Board of Trustees; (2) development strategy and implementation activities; (3) financial management; (4) for-profit projects; (5) staff affairs; (6) student affairs; (7) activities of affiliated organisations; and (8) legal compatibility requirements (Korean University Document No.4).

In general, the role of University Councils in Korean universities is not significant despite their legal status. Most of University Councils emphasise the function of advocacy rather than supervision. However, the data collected in this study is insufficient to conclude that the University Council of the case university is just a nominal organisation to formally endorse the Board’s decision.

a.4. Faculty Deans Committee

The Faculty Deans Committee is the decision-making body that gathers all the faculty deans in a university. Specifically, it is given the authority to supervise and deliberate the academic affairs of a university.

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We have the Faculty Deans Committee in our university. This Committee gathers all the Faculty Deans. They develop regulations and policies for the university or determine other important decisions.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

However, in most of universities, this decision-making body only works as an advisory board or a formal organisation without practical contributions. In fact, this Faculty Deans Committee consists of deans, and other heads of departments who are appointed by the university President. Hence, instead of working as a governing board to monitor and deliberate the president’s activities in academic aspects, the Faculty Deans Committee is likely to becomes an advisory board or implementation agency under the President. In addition, most of the members of the Faculty Deans Committee are on the University Council, hence the roles of the Faculty Deans Committee and the University Council are overlapping in many cases. Consequently, the Faculty Deans Committee has become less significant compared with the University Council.

a.5. Professors Association

The Professors Association is the decision-making body that represents every professor in a university. In the case university, the Professors Association is in charge of major academic issues, such as curriculum, program development, student affairs, and faculty management.

The faculty and professors are critical to developing the academic quality and specialised features of a university. […] Based on that [the faculty and professors] the university develops its academic direction

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

Although the Professors Association cannot directly participate in the governing board, their roles in the shared governance structure of the case university is undeniable. In a culture where education is highly esteemed, and seniority is deeply respected, the influence of professors is enormous. By providing advice

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and feedback to the plan proposed by the President, the Professors Association can significantly affect the decisions made by the Board.

Based on the President’s leadership and the agreement of the professors, the university’s mission and direction were developed and determined.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

We all have to discuss and negotiate. Ultimately, it is up to the management team, the Deans Committee and the Professors Association to make the final decision [of drafting proposal].

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

a.6. Alumni Association

Another important actor that may influence the decision-making process in the case university is the Alumni Association. This is a very interesting feature of the case university. Since the Alumni Association has its representative in the Board of Trustees, it significantly influences the decision of the Board (Korean University Document No. 5), particularly regarding the development strategy of the university.

In our university, among members of the Board, there are trustees recommended by the Association Alumni, trustees recommended by the Chairman of the Board and trustees recommended by the university professors. That’s how trustees are selected and appointed.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

In this process [of establishing mission and goal] […] the Alumni Association plays an auxiliary role.

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

Moreover, the Alumni Association is a distinctive feature of the culture of Korean HE. The majority of prestigious universities have established alumni associations. Alumni networking is critical in Korean HE, because Korean culture highly esteems the sense of collective belongingness (집단주의 ) and

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group harmony (Hsu, 1971; K.-S. Kim, 2005; Kuo-shu Yang, 1981). In addition, alumni support one another in career development. The case university, as its niches are language, humanities and social sciences, has developed a strong network of alumni in several areas including business, diplomacy and international relations. Its alumni are very active and famous among graduates. Therefore, to a certain extent the alumni association has significantly influenced the mission and development of the case university since it is related to the career development of students. b. Trusteeship Model, Shared Governance Model and the Rise of Managerialism

The participation of other internal units such as the University Council, Faculty Deans Committee, the Professors Association and Alumni Association in the decision-making process of the case university are significant evidence of the shared governance model in the case university. The shared governance model, according to Trakman (2008), is the model in which the university’s “most immediate stakeholders”, namely faculty, staff and students are the key members of the governing board. This model is referred to as the collegial model, as suggested by Harman and Treadgold (2007).

The direct and indirect involvement of the above-mentioned internal decision- making bodies in the governance structure of the case university confirms what the literature regarding the trusteeship model has observed recently. Brubacher and Rudy (1997), while studying the trusteeship model in American universities, report that there has been a balance of power between the lay board, which emphasises the connection of the institution and society, and the institutional control, which stresses the intellectual authority of experts (i.e. faculty).

In their comparison of the three models of governance, the traditional collegial model, the business corporate model and the trusteeship model, Harman and Treadgold (2007) suggest that in the ‘modern’ trusteeship model the participation of faculty, students and alumni in decision making are made available through board representation which is somewhat similar to the traditional collegial model.

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The difference between the two models, perhaps, is that trusteeship refers to the manner of governance, implying a ‘trust’ relationship between the board and other stakeholders of the university, whereas the collegial model refers to the partnership in governance, primarily of the university’s main stakeholders (Trakman, 2008).

According to the interview participants, the model of shared governance obviously helps balance power between stakeholders and therefore ensure the stable development of the university. Nevertheless, this model in the case university also has some drawbacks. As the President admitted the governance structure of the university requires a lot of effort to negotiate with the different stakeholders to reach agreement to enact changes. As these diverse internal groups get involved in the decision-making process of a university, the roles of each group are unclear on one hand and overlapped with others on the other.

Moreover, these complicated governance structures in Korean universities raises questions about their efficiency. In particular, this hinders the university’s ability to respond promptly to dynamic changes in the external environment, a critical requirement for an organisation to survive.

There are both strengths and weaknesses in [this shared governance] model. The strength is that it stabilises the university. The weakness is that it makes it extremely difficult for a university to enact changes.

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

Apart from the trusteeship model and the shared governance model as discussed above, the case university has also witnessed the rise of managerialism in recent years, as seen in the President’s emphasis on administrative areas and the proactive role of the management team.

Managerialism originated from the neo-liberal ideology widely adopted in developed countries which emphasises the significance of free-market forces and imposes market principles from the private sector upon public services (Deem, Hillyard, & Reed, 2007). The goal of this approach is to enhance strategic

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effectiveness and operational efficiency. Borrowing the terminology from the corporate world, this approach introduces managerialist principles to universities. Managerialism highlights the roles of professional administrators and line managers, asserts the competition among organisations for resources (Kolsaker, 2008), stresses the significance of performance indicators, rankings, and quality assurance (Kalfa & Taksa, 2017), and introduces a new culture of audit and accountability (Watts, 2017).

Korea is not exempt from the effect of neo-liberalism and new public management which promote reforms to enhance the effectiveness of the system. Additionally, fierce competition among universities in an environment with insufficient resources has forced universities to pay serious attention to operational efficiency besides their traditional emphasis on academia.

With the rise of new public management and the popularity of managerialism, there has been a separation between the decision-making function carried out by the Board, and the decision execution function carried out by the university’s internal structure (Brubacher & Rudy, 1997). Thus, in this contemporary version of trusteeship governance, the role of the President has been strengthened as the chief executive officer who implements decisions made by the Board (Duryea, 1973).

As Professor K., the Dean of College of Engineering admitted, the roles of the President have been changing dramatically. Instead of hiring a President whose academic and ethical excellence are recognised as in the past, Boards of Trustees in Korean modern universities now highly value those with significant leadership attributes and critical management skills.

Initially, Presidents in Korean universities were those who were famous for their academic and moral influence. University Presidents were figures with academic excellence and outstanding personalities. […] However, it is changing now. There are more requirements regarding the leadership and management skills of a President. Like in America, Presidents must be innovative, attract funding, and able to implement changes in the university. 134

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

Moreover, the significance of the management team and administrative staff have been also strengthened. Academic excellence and quality must be accompanied by high quality management to meet the increasing demands of stakeholders, particularly students who regard themselves as customer of the universities.

You have to respond to the students’ requirements. For instance, you have to design the building to match the requirements of students. If the students feel comfortable learning in this building, it directly impacts [their learning experience]. In these aspects the administrators are very important. What’s the point if we teach well while the building is dirty, or the facilities are in poor condition? […] In these aspects both [the management team and the faculty] must work together.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

However, the rise of managerialism in the case university, through the lens of Dean K., a faculty member, does not reflect the tension between faculty and administration as reported in the literature (Barry, Chandler, & Clark, 2001; Knights & Clarke, 2014; Kogan & Hanney, 2000; Lewis & Altbach, 1996; B. Macfarlane, 2005). Dean K. affirmed that it is critical for the operation of the university to have the academic and administrative components coordinate and cooperate smoothly. In his viewpoint, the management team is a facilitator to enhance performance and professionalism and ensure accountability.

The management team is involved in both administrative and academic areas. If needed they will propose to the deans of the Faculty Deans Committee to receive feedback and approval. By this way both the management team and the faculty can coordinate together. How these two groups work together is very important.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

To sum up, the research findings show that the case university has adopted the trusteeship model of governance. This adoption is in accordance with the legal

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framework that requires private universities in Korea to establish a Board of Trustees as the highest governing body. In the case university, members of the Board of Trustees normally come from outside the university they serve (except the President) (Korean University Document No.5). Trustees discharge their fiduciary duties voluntarily without receiving remuneration (Article 26, Korean Private School Act, 2016). The Board of Trustees is the ultimate decision-making body, determining critical matters of a university, such as establishing its mission and goals, appointing the president, developing academic programs, and ensuring the university to fulfil its mission (Article 16, Korean Private School Act, 2016; President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016).

However, the trusteeship model alone does not adequately describe the governance practice of the case university. Apart from the Board of Trustees as the central governing body, there are other internal units that participate in the decision-making process of the university, namely the University Council, the Faculty Deans Committee, the Professors Association and the Alumni Association. The participation of these units has helped enhance the shared governance practice and balanced the governance structure between the external (i.e. the lay board) and internal stakeholders (i.e. the faculty).

Amid this trusteeship – shared governance structure, the President and his management team appear to be in the centre and play a mediating role in communication between different groups of stakeholders. The emphasis of the President’s responsibilities on administrative aspects and the proactive involvement of the management team led by the President in almost all areas of the university’s affairs demonstrate the increasing significance of managerialism in the case university. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that the influence of the faculty in the case university has been weakened. Indeed, faculty members recognised the importance of administrators and managers, considering their roles to be critical for the effective and efficient operation of the university.

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5.1.2.2. Finance

In this subsection, the financial condition of the university was described, revealing the strong correlation between the university’s financial circumstances and the macro financial arrangements. The university in this case is heavily dependent on tuition fees to secure its finance. However, due to the political atmosphere of falling tuition fees in Korea, it has not been able to increase tuition fees in recent years. Apart from tuition fees, the university has also received governing funding, primarily in the form of performance-based grants. Nevertheless, this type of funding mainly aims to strengthen research capacity and performance at faculty-level, therefore it cannot help to improve the university’s financial sustainability. In addition, its traditional strengths and niches in non-STEM disciplines also hinders the university receiving more funding from the government or industry, since a significant proportion of funding from these two sources are for STEM disciplines. To diversify its financial sources, the university has utilised its traditional strengths in language and international studies to develop for-profit projects (i.e. language-based projects) and attract international students. Nevertheless, the development of this university, like many other private universities in Korea, is constantly challenged by inadequate finance and it has not been able to develop long-term strategies to address this problem. a. Financial Sources: High Dependence on Tuition Fees

The financial sources for private universities primarily include tuition fees, government funding, for-profit projects, philanthropy, funding from university- industry cooperation and transferred capital or investment from the university’s legal entity. However, tuition fees are the most important financial source of PHE.

In terms of financial sources, essentially there are transferred capital from the legal entity, tuition fees and government funding. […] In practice, a university’s revenue is mainly from tuition fees, government funding, and philanthropy 137

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

The case university, similar to other private universities, is highly dependent on tuition fees. Tuition fees accounted for 70.5 percent of its revenue in 2016 (Korean University Document No.7). However, this traditional source of finance is under threat. Low birth rates in recent years have led to a significant decrease in the number of students enrolled in higher education. Meanwhile the massive HE expansion in the last three decades has led to the establishment of many universities in Korea. Collectively, these have caused the over-supply of access to HE. Consequently, tuition fees, the main financial source for private universities, have been gradually falling.

In the situation that the university-age population has been decreasing due to the low birth rates […]

(Korean University Document No. 9)

Moreover, the government has forced universities to maintain the same level of tuition fees under the pressure of the public demanding for reduced tuition fees

(반값등록금). This policy has caused tremendous difficulties for private universities which are very dependent on this source of finance. It is not surprising that the topics of ‘tuition fee cap’ and ‘admission fee reduction’ are frequently mentioned in the data regarding finance.

Since our university’s financial situation is worsening due to the tuition fee cap policy and tightened regulations regarding private universities, we desperately need to develop strategies diversifying financial sources for financial sustainability

(Korean University Document No. 8)

According to the government’s tuition fee policy and the general public discourse, it is very difficult to increase tuition fees.

(Korean University Document No. 12)

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Generally, there is a suggestion in the government to reduce admission fees by 16 percent […]

(Korean University Document No. 9)

Meanwhile, the university has relative low tuition fees in comparison with other private universities in the Seoul area. Particularly, in science disciplines (both natural and applied sciences), it is significantly below the average.

Comparing by disciplines with other private universities in Seoul, particularly with our competitors, our university has lower tuition fees. Especially in STEM fields, we are lower than the average tuition fees of private universities in Seoul.

(Korean University Document No. 12)

This university traditionally focuses on and is famous for non-STEM disciplines, namely languages, humanities and social sciences, despite being a comprehensive university. In addition, the inadequate financial sources also hinder the university in developing its capacity in STEM areas. As described in the internal evaluation report, the university has much lower investment rates in education compared with other private universities in the Seoul area.

[The university’s educational investment rate] in 2017 is still relatively low compared with other major private universities but we have been trying to improve despite the internal and external difficulties confronting us.

(Korean University Document No. 12)

Since its strengths are in language education and international studies, the university has developed different for-profit projects, mainly language-based. This source of finance contributes nine percent of the university’s total revenue (Korean University Document No. 7).

[…] We are doing for-profit projects, mainly language training programs […], or providing language camps for K-12 students […]

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

Most for-profit projects managed by the Project Development Team are

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language-based projects

(Korean University Document No. 10)

However, also because of its traditional reputation in non-STEM areas, it is very difficult for the university to develop strong university-industry linkages. This is the reason why cooperation with industry does not significantly improve its financial situation. The university primarily cooperates with industries to enhance students’ learning experience and create strong networks to improve student employability.

Cooperation with industry does not generate significant income for us. Because in most cases universities generate income through research patents or technology transfer. For a university whose strengths are in language and humanities like us, it is not applicable.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

Unlike American universities which receive great financial support from philanthropy and endowment, Korean universities still receive very little funding from these sources. In the case university, philanthropy accounts for only four percent of its financial income.

The amount of philanthropy we receive depends on the economic conditions of the country. If the economy develops well, we receive a lot of donations. If not, business firms don’t donate. Unfortunately, the Korean economy hasn’t developed well in recent years. So Korean universities are facing tremendous financial problems.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

Lastly, private universities can receive funding from the legal entity who owns the university. In Korea, some wealthy private universities receive strong financial support from their legal entities (sometimes they are owned by large enterprises). However, the case university receive very little from its legal entity

[…] Though [the university’s] Board of Trustees is very devout, its capacity is limited. […] That’s why I say the financial problem is really challenging. 140

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

In terms of government funding, as described in the previous subsection, government funding for PHE is quite limited. It accounts only for 12.4 percent of private universities’ income in 2011 (B. Kim & Park, 2018). In the case university, only 13.9 percent of the university’s revenue is from this source (Korean University Document No. 7). b. Funding Approach: Performance-based

Government funding for the university can be categorised into two types: financial support for student in the form of subsidies for universities and performance-based funding. Firstly, the government subsidies universities if they reduce tuition fees and admission fees or increase financial support for students. As a result, the university in this case strives to reduce its tuition fees to receive this type of funding. However, this type of funding is more an indirect support for students than for universities.

We have to meet the requirements to receive type 2 funding from the government [for universities that reduce the tuition fees or increase financial support for students]

(Korean University Document No. 10)

Secondly, the majority of government funding for universities is in the form of performance-based projects to improve teaching quality and enhance research capacity. The university receives this type of funding mainly from the central government, primarily from the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Science and Technology (Korean University Document No. 7).

Funding for teaching consists of government grants such as the Education Capacity Enhancement Program […]. The MoE provides funding for universities to improve their teaching capacity.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

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c. Funding Level: Faculty and Research Team Levels

Performance-based funding mentioned in the previous subsection as the major type of government funding for universities is primarily provided for faculty and research teams. Funding from this source does not significantly contribute to the financial security of the university.

[…] Faculties apply and receive research grants according to the financial requirements of their research from governmental and non-governmental agencies […]

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016) d. Financial Source Diversifying Strategies

The financial difficulties confronting the university are a universal problem among private universities in Korea. To diversify its financial sources, the university has employed several strategies such as (1) developing new for-profit projects; (2) attracting more international students; (3) applying for government funding; (4) enhancing university-industry linkages; (5) attracting more philanthropy; and particularly (6) ensuring financial efficiency.

The legal entity should develop for-profit projects to increase the amount of capital transferred to the university; the university should develop strategies to improve financial sustainability via channels such as government funding and other financial support programs.

(Korean University Document No. 8)

We have been trying to improve the university’s financial efficiency to strengthen the university’s financial sustainability and to effectively address the financial problems caused by the tuition fee policy.

(Korean University Document No. 12)

However, the financial condition of the private sector in Korean HE generally and of the case university particularly is extremely challenging since they have not developed more sustainable sources of funding.

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What can we do now? Apart from continuing to apply for funding […], even for small amounts. Is there any other way apart from that? I think it’s not only our university, other universities in Korea are facing similar problems.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

This subsection has provided a description of the financial situation in the case university. Like other private universities in Korea, the university is facing critical challenges caused by the decrease in the student population and the ‘tuition cap’ policy adopted by the government. These circumstances together have caused the university to face tremendous difficulties since its traditional financial source (i.e. tuition fees) could no longer cover its operational costs. The limited support from the government and the high dependence on tuition fees are the direct causes of the university’s financial vulnerability. To improve its financial condition, the university has sought strategies to diversify its financial sources, such as developing for-profit projects, applying for government funding, attracting more philanthropy and particularly enhancing efficiency. Nevertheless, these strategies do not address the major causes of limited government funding and strong dependence on tuition fees, thus do not help to sustain the university’s financial situation.

The fundamental problems underlining Korean PHE’s financial crisis are its strong dependence on private sources, and its high exposure to market forces. Firstly, the Korean government after the Korean War was unable to invest heavily in HE due to the lack of resources. Instead, they focused on non-tertiary education to produce semi-skilled labour forces that met the need to re-build the country (S. Kim, 2017). Consequently, the Korean government has been dependent on private sources to finance HE. The massive expansion since the late 1990s has only worsened the situation. In a relatively short period of three decades, Korean HE was transformed from an elite to a universal system (C. J. Lee et al., 2012). The scale of a universal system goes beyond the government’s funding capacity, which has been strained even to finance an elite system in the

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past. Although the government has been steadily increasing the scale of funding (B. Kim & Park, 2018), it is still significantly deficient.

Secondly, since Korean HE depends strongly on private sources of finance, Korean PHE is highly exposed to market forces. Particularly, since the late 1990s, the government has promoted HE reforms embracing neo-liberalism which emphasise performance, efficiency and competition (Jeon & Kim, 2018). These reforms have not only increased funding for PHE but also increased the degree and broadened the extent to which private universities are driven by market principles. Korean HE has expanded dramatically in the last three decades and the market has reached saturation point. Since 2018 the number of high school graduates is smaller than the university quota (B. Kim & Park, 2018). Korean PHE now needs to develop new strategies to survive in such threatening circumstances. Unfortunately, its short history and the explosive growth in the past did not help the sector accumulate adequate resources to implement major changes.

5.2. The Second Dimension

The second dimension of the conceptual framework developed in this research highlights the interactions of institutional factors (See Chapter III), namely institutional isomorphisms, logics and actors and how such interactions influence the development and shape the practices of the Korean PHE sector. As their names indicate, these factors are primarily located at the macro (institutional) level. Hence this subsection primarily focuses on these institutional factors at the macro level.

Nevertheless, at the meso level, the university in this case presents interesting insights when it transformed its identity in response to external pressures. This behaviour of the university has significant implications for understanding institutional environments because it suggests that construction of identity at the meso level may influence the institutional environment at the macro level. In addition, as a response to environmental changes, the Korean university’s strategic choice of transforming its identity potentially provides valuable insights 144

for understanding the development of the independent college in the case of China and the private university in the case of Vietnam which are also experiencing challenges caused by their environments. Consequently, in this subsection, I present institutional factors at both macro and meso levels.

5.2.1. The Macro Level

5.2.1.1. Isomorphisms

Isomorphisms are institutional forces located in an institutional field that influence organisations existing in that field and mould them toward homogenous patterns (Greenwood et al., 2008). One of the most striking characteristics of Korean PHE is its extremely high convergence or homogeneity, between the macro requirements and the meso compliance, and among universities co-existing in the same HE field. This convergence is explained in the following subsection, from the perspective of institutional isomorphisms, focusing on how such institutional pressures interact with one another to strengthen the degree of convergence in the Korean HE system.

Codling and Meek (2006) propose a range of propositions for divergence in HE, separated into five categories: (1) environment; (2) policy invention; (3) financial incentives; (4) competition and cooperation; and (5) ranking. Using the Conceptual Framework developed in this study, I re-interpret the suggestions of Codling and Meek (2006) to generate interesting insights to help understand the high degree of homogeneity in Korean HE system. Accordingly, the institutional pressures that are influencing the Korean HE system towards homogeneity are described below, categorised into cultural-cognitive, resource dependence, normative and coercive isomorphisms. a. Cultural-cognitive

a.1. Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is an ideology that emphasises economic rationality (Kezar, 2004) and the private benefits obtained from HE (Tilak, 2008). It has become the prevailing ideology that governs and guides the political and economic practices 145

in many countries around the globe (Clarke, 2007). Korea is no exception. The Korean government has officially adopted Neoliberalism in various domains, including HE (Jeong, 2014; Jo, 2005). As a result, common practices promoted by Neoliberalism such as deregulation, liberalisation, corporatisation and marketisation are dominant in Korean HE (T. Kim, 2008; C. J. Lee et al., 2012; Shin, 2012).

The adoption of such practices in Korean HE has led to the massive expansion of the sector, particularly after the critical reform in May 1995 that liberalised the HE system (Byun, 2008; Jeong, 2014; Yeom, 2016a). Enrolment rates in HE increased from 12 percent in 1980 to 93.26 percent in 2015 (UNESCO, 2018). PHE is the leading sector in Korean HE, with private HEIs accounting for 81.54 percent of total HEIs (Korean Education Development Institute, 2014). In addition, neoliberal strategies have been consistently implemented by successive governments to strengthen the link between HE and economic growth and improve the system’s competitiveness and excellence (Jeong, 2014). As a result, HEIs in Korea pay close attention to global and national rankings since they are used as indicators to measure HEIs’ competitiveness and quality.

a.2. Confucianism

Like other countries in East Asia, Korea is deeply embedded in Confucian culture (T. Kim, 2009; J.-K. Lee, 2001; Marginson, 2011; C. H. Williams, 2017). Confucianism emphasises the pragmatic functions of education, in contributing to nation building as well as individual advancement through social mobility (T. Kim, 2009). As the philosophy that impacts every aspect of society, from human relationship (C. H. Williams, 2017) to national management (J.-K. Lee, 2000b), the influence of Confucianism in Korean HE is undeniable.

The belief that education is the only vehicle for social mobility fundamentally motivates Korean parents to invest in HE for the future success of their children. Parents in Korea are famous for their ‘educational zeal’ or ‘education fever’ which encourages them to sacrifice everything for their children’s education (J. Kim, Lee, & Lee, 2005; J.-K. Lee, 2006; Sorensen, 1994). This link between 146

education and private gains is the driving force of HE expansion through private sources in Korea (S. Kim, 2008).

It is the desire for status transformation that makes […] parents willing to sacrifice everything they have for their children to live a better life. That’s why educational fever/zeal in Korea is so strong.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

However, as Korean HE is heavily dependent on private sources to finance HE (70 percent of private HEIs’ total revenues are from tuition fees (B. Kim & Park, 2018)), this has caused serious problems of inequality in education opportunity (Yeom, 2011), which strongly violates the principle of egalitarianism (S.-Y. Park, 2010), a fundamental value of Confucianism deeply institutionalised in Korean society for thousands of years (Hayhoe & Li, 2008; T. Kim, 2009). As a result, the Korean government has been forced to implement several mechanisms to constrain the development of PHE and protect the principle of egalitarianism, such as restricting enrolment quotas in the Seoul Metropolitan area and the ‘tuition fee cap’ policy that prevents HEIs to increase their tuition fees (B. Kim & Park, 2018). b. Resource Dependence: Market Demand

As Korean universities are highly dependent on tuition fees and government funding for their finances, market demand and government funding are the two major resource dependence mechanisms that have significantly influenced Korean HEIs and moulded them towards homogeneity.

Since the critical May 1995 Reform was implemented, Korean HE has been significantly liberalised and deregulated due to the increasing demand for HE. The deregulated legal framework, the increasing demand and the rapid growth of HE have allowed universities, particularly those that are young, or less prestigious to access resources and opportunities to compete with other institutions by duplicating the ‘best model’ of more successful and highly esteemed universities (Geiger, 1996) to attract more students. Thus, all Korean

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universities tried to adopt the practices of those top-ranked universities (i.e. Seoul National University, Korea University and Yonsei University) for ‘best practice’ (Shin, 2015). Consequently, Korean universities have shared many similarities in their operational practices.

However, due to the decline in student population and the tuition cap policy implemented by the government, tuition fees alone are not enough to cover the operational costs of universities. This has led to universities’ greater dependence on government funding. Unfortunately, the government’s performance-based funding approach based on pre-determined indicators measuring universities’ performance and fixed formulas to develops funding incentives have not promoted diversity. As universities have to expend enormous efforts to achieve the indicators set by the government, this funding approach has forced universities towards convergence. c. Normative Isomorphisms: Ranking

Ranking also exerts significant normative pressure, which in turn may hinder the diversity of a HE system, according to Codling and Meek (2006). In Korean HE, the participation of major media in university rankings has helped institutionalise the practice of ranking and strengthen the popularity of ranking in Korean society.

Korean parents pay great attention to universities’ brands and university ranking. […] It shows how university ranking is popular in an information society like ours. All students know about university rankings and apply to universities according to their ranking. That’s why we do our best to raise our ranking.

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

The strongly hierarchical structure in the Korean HE system (S. Kim, 2008), which has been re-enforced by the formal and informal rankings, has supported the dominance of the top-ranked universities. Universities ranked at the bottom, therefore, seek to raise their ranking by mimicking the successful practices of

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those ranked higher. Thus, ranking, whether formal or informal, creates normative isomorphic pressure promoting institutional convergence (Marginson & Considine, 2000). In addition, the dominance of alumni from the so-called SKY group (i.e. the top three most prestigious universities in Korea, namely Seoul National University, Korea University and Yonsei University) in almost all social segments has also helped maintain the hierarchical structure in Korean HE (S. Kim, 2008) and therefore strengthened the isomorphic effect created by the university ranking system. d. Coercive Isomorphism: Deregulation versus Regulation

The regulatory framework established by the Korean government has played a critical role in shaping the degree of convergence in the Korean HE system. Traditionally, the government used a one-size-fits-all approach regarding HE policies.

The Korean government’s policy did not distinguish clearly between public and private universities generally.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

Under the uniform supervision of the government, Korean universities critically lacked individuality and uniqueness (J.-K. Lee, 2000a). Korean universities, after several decades pursuing quantitative expansion, have been criticised for their similarities in missions, goals, targeted students, academic programs and teaching methods (H. Park et al., 2015). Recognising its weakness in lacking divergence, the Korean government has implemented a ‘specialisation policy’ in recent years to promote the system’s diversity and strengthen universities’ competitiveness (K.-H. Mok, 2006). According to the Plan on Specialisation of Universities, universities are classified into three groups: research, teaching, and technical education and are required to develop their own plan to specialise based on each university’s strengths and capacity (H. Park et al., 2015).

Though the government has promoted the specialisation policy to diversify the HE system, the QA framework that emphasises accountability has forced

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universities to comply with the legal requirements instead of developing their own strengths.

Accreditation is a system to evaluate whether universities satisfy basic requirements as educational institutions; […] to ensure the quality of education in accordance with applicable laws and regulations in higher education such as the Standards of the Establishment and Operation of Universities and the educational goals of universities; [to][v]erify conformity with accreditation criteria based on performance records over a specified time period; [to] [c]heck compliance with quantitative indicator benchmarks on an annual basis;

(Korean Document No. 8)

The national QA system which strongly emphasises accountability and measures universities’ quality according to fixed and standardised criteria (Yeom, 2015) has caused universities to conform to an isomorphic tendency. As a result, the anticipated success of the specialisation policy might have been threatened due to the lack of necessary mechanisms to prevent such an isomorphism. e. The Environment

The above-mentioned isomorphic pressures can be found completely or partially in different HE systems. Therefore, using isomorphisms alone is not enough to explain the exceptionally high degree of conformity of Korean HE. The unique Korean context also creates an environment that significantly encourages convergence of the system.

Firstly, Korea is a small country where people strongly believe in and are proud of being an ethnically homogenous nation, sharing a common language, history and culture (Han, 2007). This ethnically homogeneous nationalism which emphasises the country’s long tradition of unity and homogeneity characterises its uniquely and clearly defined identity (Seth, 2005). As a result, this has led to the homogeneity in the student population and convergence in the stakeholders of HE.

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Secondly, Korean culture, like other East Asian cultures, strongly emphasises the value of conforming to social norms and collectivistic traditions to ensure group harmony (Hsu, 1971; Kuo-shu Yang, 1981). In addition, the nationalistic ideology of unity has resulted in uniformity (Han, 2007). The collectivistic culture that highly esteems conformity and the nationalistic ideology that accentuates uniformity have been manifested in the uniformity of educational contents and standards (Seth, 2005).

Thirdly, the major critical events which occurred during the last century, particularly after the Korean War, have significantly influenced the HE system, moulding universities in a similar pattern. Due to the destructive Korean War (1950-1953), the majority of Korean universities were established or re- established in the post-War period (S. Lee, 1989). The military regime lasted for almost three decades (1961-1987) with the state’s central planning having a strong role (Minns, 2001) directly intervening in universities’ establishment of missions and goals to match the national economic development plan (H. Park et al., 2015). The May 1995 Education Reform liberated the regulatory framework, leading to the massive expansion of HE during the 1990s and 2000s. The steep decline in student population since 2010s has challenged universities’ financial situation, forcing the government to re-structure the system (Jeong, 2014). These crucial stages have shaped the uniform development of private universities.

Finally, Korea has successfully implemented socio-economic and regional development policies to bridge the regional gaps, particularly between urban and rural areas through transportation infrastructure development projects (World Bank, 2009). These projects have helped reduce the economic distance (J.-H. Jang, 2009) and regional variation and therefore have brought about convergence in economic conditions throughout the country.

We have discussed the homogeneity in environmental conditions in Korea which consist of similar stakeholder constituents, uniform educational contents and standards, identical development patterns among universities and small regional variations. This environmental homogeneity has significantly enhanced the 151

convergence of HE (Codling & Meek, 2006), and hence, weakened the effect of the government’s policy to increase the system’s diversity.

5.2.1.2. Logic: Egalitarian Utilitarianism

In this subsection, the logic that characterises the field of HE in Korea is discussed. Researchers show that Korean HE borrows practices from Western models of HE (T. Kim, 2008; S. Lee, 1989; Shin, 2012). However, further investigation of the data reveals that although Korean HE appears to be similar to Western HE models, it is essentially different from these models in the critical values that justify the functions of HE. Specifically, Korean HE is justified by the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism. a. Influence of Western HE Models

Contemporary Korean HE was influenced by the American model through American missionaries and the German model through the Japanese (Shin, 2012). HE was first introduced to Korea through missionaries who arrived at the peninsula in the late 1800s (Kang, 2012; K. S. Kim & Woo, 2009; S. Lee, 1989; Shin, 2012). Missionaries established schools, colleges and hospitals to open the way to preach the gospel to the Korean people (Kang, 2012). According to S. Lee (1989) there were a total of 796 schools at all levels established and operated by missionaries within a short period from 1895 to 1910, accounting for 35 percent of formal schools in Korea at that time. However, the education movement led by American missionaries was soon interrupted by the Japan invasion of the Korean peninsula and colonisation from 1919 until the end of WWII (1945) (S. Lee, 1989). During this time, Korean HE adopted the German model of universities imported by the Japanese colonial government (S. Lee, 1989; Shin, 2012).

The interaction between Korean and the US was strengthened after WWII, and particularly after the Korean War (1950-1953). With the support of the US, Korean HE was rebuilt. Many universities in Korea were established and operated according to the American model (S. Lee, 1989). In addition, America was the major destination for Korean graduate students. Through various U.S aid

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projects, a total of 2,883 Korean students received training overseas during 1954- 1967 (Dodge, 1971). Most Korean educational pioneers studied in the U.S. during the 1950s and 1960s (M. H. Lee, 2008; S. Lee, 1989). Shin (2012) estimates that approximately 40 percent of Korean academics have been trained overseas, primarily in the U.S. (S. Lee, 1989), a ratio that has remained stable since the 1960s. Korean graduates returning to their country from America have significantly contributed to the spreading of the American education model in Korean HE (M. H. Lee, 2008; S. Lee, 1989; Shin, 2012).

As a result, Korean HE has been strongly influenced by the American and German-Japanese models (K. S. Kim, 2007; Shin, 2012). Some features and practices of these models are present in current Korean HE. For example, Korean HEIs borrow from America the trusteeship model of governance and course- based credit hour (Shin, 2012), while adopting the Japanese-German practices which emphasised HEIs as subordinates of the state, regardless of ownership of HEIs (T. Kim, 2008).

However, although Korean private universities have adopted both the American and German models of HE, the fundamental values of these Western models of HE such as autonomous functions of HE or a balance between ‘public interest’ and ‘university interest’ (Altbach, 2013; K. Harman & Treadgold, 2007), has not been successfully institutionalised in Korean PHE. Korean PHE emphasises ‘public interest’ over ‘university’s interests’. Moreover, unlike the Western models in which ‘public interest’ is defined as long-term social responsibility (K. Harman & Treadgold, 2007; Olsen & Gornitzka, 2006), the ‘public interest’ in the case of Korea is particularly defined by the government and primarily justified by a utilitarian approach. b. Characteristics of the Korean HE Model

These characteristics of Korean HE (the state’s control and a utilitarian justification of HE’s functions) are clearly seen in the data. Firstly, the traditional role of control of the Korean government has been acknowledged in the

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literature. Jeong (2014) argues that despite the neo-liberal approach having been embraced by the civil governments, the role of the state in HE has not been substantially lessened. The state of Korea has always played a vital role in educational development. The characteristics of ‘statism’ (K.-S. Kim, 2005) are still evident in the way HE is considered to be crucial for national development, and therefore the government’s interference is necessary.

[In the past] The government controlled strictly because [it views that] education was not an individual matter but must be approached from the national perspective. Thus, it insisted that the government’s control was necessary to ensure quality.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

This statism’s characteristics are explained by “the long period of Confucian legacy, the bureaucratic vestige of Japanese colonization and a three-decade military rule” (Jeong, 2014, p. 116). Reviewing the HE reforms implemented from 1993 to 2003, Kim (2005) concludes that the legacy of statism still exists pervasively in the so-called ‘civil’ governments because the military elites had built up supportive groups and regions which had a major influence on election results. In addition, the new civilian leaders’ lack of experience in running the state had given rise to the huge body of bureaucrats left from the military regimes who were either reluctant to cooperate or manipulated policy processes to modify reform policies to match their own interests (K.-S. Kim, 2005). Therefore, although the Korean political system has been transformed to a democratic regime, HE is still under the continued influence of the previous statist regime that used to strictly control the system.

Of course the policy agendas have changed gradually with time but the major line of control […] to some extent still remains.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

Secondly, Korean HE is characterised by a utilitarian approach (M. H. Lee, 2008; Shin, 2012). Indeed, the main goal of HE, from the Korean government’s

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perspective, is to develop human capital for economic development and improve national competitiveness (Yeom, 2011). Most researchers agree that economic rationale the primary justification for educational policies (Jeong, 2014; Shin et al., 2015; Yeom, 2011). Both in the deregulation reforms since the late 1990s and in the accountability movement in the 2000s, economic rationale measured by national economic growth and individual well-being enrichment has been the driving force of reforms (Jeong, 2014).

This utilitarian approach is evident in the data provided by the university in this case study. The university was established based on the requirements and support of the government in response to the need for human resource in the fields of language, business, international studies and diplomacy, although the original intention of the founder was to establish a university focusing on natural and applied sciences (Korean University Document No. 6). The establishment of the university was to further the modernisation of Korean, aiming to help the country overcome the difficulties caused by the Korean War (Korean University Document No. 1).

The university’s focus on national building is consistent with the state’s viewpoint regarding the role of HE to contribute to national development, as stated in the legal framework.

Article 28: The purposes of universities and colleges are to develop students' personality, teach and research the profound theories of science and arts necessary for the development of the State and human society, and methods of application thereof, and to contribute to the State and human society.

(Korean Higher Education Act, 2017)

Since the Korean government affirms the roles of HE in the development of the country and depends heavily on private sources to finance HE, the development of the Korean HE has been closely connected with the national economy (Shin, 2012, 2015). Accordingly, the university in this case has evolved through various stages corresponding to national economic development. Changes in economic 155

demands have led to the changes in the university’s educational goals, objectives and programs.

[To meet the requirements of] the national economy [that strongly focused on export], the workforce that had excellent foreign language proficiency could be enough. However, since the late 1980s, [due to the changes in economic development], language proficiency alone was not acceptable as widely as before.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016) c. Origins of Utilitarianism in Korean HE

c.1. Confucianism

This utilitarian approach of Korean HE is a product of the Confucian values of education cultivated in a strictly hierarchical society. Under the influence of Confucianism, education has been highly valued. More importantly, when the highly esteemed educational values were placed in an extremely hierarchical society, it made education the only means for social mobility. Specifically, in the reign of the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1897) for more than five centuries, Korean society was categorised strictly into different classes. In order for a person from the lower class (천민) to be transformed to the upper/privileged class (양반), he must be educated.

In the past, we had nobleman and commoner. Noblemen are the privileged minority group of people. For the majority, the only way to be elevated was through education. You had to pass the national exam to change your status.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

Evidence of the Korean social hierarchy can still be found in the hierarchical structure of Korean HE until now. Through the competitive national university entrance examination, top ranked universities which have outstanding reputations are allowed to attract better students, faculty and funding incentives from the government (S. Kim & Lee, 2006), which accentuates the hierarchy in HE (S.

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Kim, 2008). In addition, a substantial base of alumni from highly ranked universities (the SKY group, i.e. Seoul National University, Korea University and Yonsei University) who dominate leadership positions in virtually all segments of society (S. Kim, 2008) also helps to maintain both the competitive admission procedure and the hierarchy in Korean HE.

In such a strict social hierarchy, worsened by the unfavourable environment (insufficient natural resources, rigorous climate and constant threats of external invaders), the Confucian value which highly esteemed education was subsequently enhanced to become the only means of social mobility.

Unlike Vietnam or Malaysia where there are rich in natural resources and people could live without much education, Korean people had no other way but education to survive.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

It is this belief that helps explain the phenomenal spread of the missionaries- established education model in Korean society in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Within the short period from 1885 to 1910 a total of 796 schools from elementary to college levels established and operated by missionaries, accounting for 35 percent of formal schools in Korea at that time (S. Lee, 1989). Most of Korean people could not enrol in the traditional meritocratic elite education system. Therefore, the new model of education introduced by the missionaries was welcomed in Korea because it created access to education for marginalised, under-privileged and vulnerable groups of people (Kang, 2012) who deeply believed that education was the only way to achieve a better future. This traditional belief has penetrated deeply in people’s way of thinking, motivating Korean parents to sacrifice everything for their children’s education (Seth, 2005).

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

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In addition, the severely disturbed history of contemporary Korea created the perfect environment for social mobility. Within the relatively short period of 90 years (1897-1987), Korea had experienced major critical social changes such as the collapse of the Chosun Dynaty (1392-1897) (Kang, 2012), Japanese colonisation (1910-1945) (K. S. Kim & Woo, 2009), the defeat of Japan in WWII, the independent nation and the divided peninsula (1948) (S. Lee, 1989), the destructive Korean War (1950-1953) (C. J. Lee et al., 2012), military dictatorship (1961-1993) (K.-S. Kim, 2005), the miraculous economic growth (D. H. Kim & Choi, 2015), and the peaceful transition from military regime to democratic civil government (1993) (K.-S. Kim, 2005). These critical events have caused the social stratification to be frequently disrupted, and consequently have created a perfect environment in which education has become the major vehicle for personal advancement (D. H. Kim & Choi, 2015).

c.2. Neoliberalism

The neoliberal education reforms implemented by the Korean government since the 1990s (Jeong, 2014; Jo, 2005; S.-Y. Park, 2010) have only deepened the institutionalisation of the utilitarian justification of HE in Korea. Firstly, Neoliberalism, as the underpinning ideology of these reforms, emphasises the economic rationality and individuals’ rights to maximise one’s human capital stock through education (Kezar, 2004). Such emphases were quickly endorsed by the Korean government and society where the link between education and social mobility and private gains have been deeply institutionalised. In addition, Neoliberalism’s promotion of private investment in education is widely accepted in Korea, where private education has existed for more than a thousand years (E. Park, Kang, Jeong, & Kang, 2008).

As a result, PHE in Korea has experienced exceptional growth, particularly from the late 1990s (S. Kim, 2008; Yeom, 2016b), thanks to the social demand for access to HE motivated by the Confucian belief that education is the only means for social mobility and the government’s neoliberal reforms that liberalise HE. This utilitarian approach to HE helps explain the high proportion of private

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education, and the rationale of private funding in Korean HE. Because education is regarded as a private good, as long as it is able to generate high enough returns, it can be successfully financed by private sources (S. Kim, 2008). d. Egalitarianism

However, another important feature of Korean HE is its emphasis on egalitarianism (S.-Y. Park, 2010; Seth, 2005). The most obvious example of this egalitarian approach can be found in the national university entrance examination. This examination is criticised for creating enormous pressure on students and parents and strengthening the hierarchical structure between HEIs (S. Kim, 2008). However, this intensely competitive admission procedure continues to be conducted because it is underpinned by the fundamental Confucian egalitarian belief that there is no class distinction in education and that everyone is educable (Hayhoe & Li, 2008; W. O. Lee, 1996).

This university entrance exam originates from the famous national civil service exam commonly organised by the imperial states in East Asian countries (Hayhoe & Li, 2008). An unchanged feature of these types of examination is that they are always organised by the state (whether imperial, military, or civil government) because by doing so the state ensure that equal opportunities are available to all people to demonstrate their knowledge and excellence (Hayhoe & Li, 2008).

For a long time, this egalitarian approach was central to Korean HE. The Korean military regimes over nearly three decades between the 1960s to the early 1980s implemented this approach in HE to gather support from the general public by strictly controlling the establishment of HEIs and the enrolment quotas (D. H. Kim & Choi, 2015; K.-S. Kim, 2005; S. Kim, 2017; S.-Y. Park, 2010; Seth, 2005). However, with the implementation of neoliberal reforms in HE from the 1990s, Korean HE has become heavily dependent on private sources to finance HE (B. Kim & Park, 2018). Consequently, inequality in education has been intensified, causing enormous political and social pressures for the Korean government (S.-Y. Park, 2010; Yeom, 2016a). In response, the Korean 159

government has been forced to restrict enrolment numbers in the Seoul Metropolitan area to reduce regional disparities and prevent universities from increasing tuition fees by the ‘tuition cap’ policy (B. Kim & Park, 2018), even though such practices seriously violate the principle of the free market, a core notion of Neoliberalism which the government officially declares to embrace (Jeong, 2014).

In conclusion, in this subsection, the logic that dominates Korean PHE has been discussed. Specifically, Korean PHE, at the national, university and individual levels, is characterised by a utilitarian approach that strengthens the link between HE and nation building and individual advancement through social mobility. This approach justifies public policies, universities’ positioning and individual choices regarding HE in Korea. On the other hand, an egalitarian approach is still present in Korean HE, manifested in its extremely competitive national university entrance examination, restriction in enrolment quotas in the Seoul Metropolitan area and the tuition cap policy.

These seemingly contradictory characteristics of utilitarianism and egalitarianism coexist in Korean HE as a result of the combination of the Confucian legacy and Neoliberalism. However, with the neoliberal reforms continuing to be implemented in Korean HE recent years (Jeong, 2014; S.-Y. Park, 2010), apparently the characteristic of utilitarian prevails. For this reason, I argue that the dominant logic that characterises Korean HE is egalitarian utilitarianism.

5.2.1.3. Actors

In this subsection, the roles of actors at the macro level in shaping the practice of PHE in Korea is discussed. At the macro level, the Korean government plays a central role in regulating, guiding and supervising the PHE sector. Hence, I focus on investigating the significance of this actor based on the operationalised sub- concepts of actor, namely position, agency and legitimacy.

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a. Position

The role of the Korean government has been legislated in the regulatory framework as the central actor to govern the HE system (J.-K. Lee, 2000b). As a result, it has secured a position at the centre of the HE field. With this position, the Korean government has been playing a vital role in shaping the development of Korean HE (Jeong, 2014). As an actor occupying the central position in HE, the Korean government is able to implement critical initiatives to direct the HE according to its goals. These initiatives include the May 1995 Reform which directly led to the HE expansion by liberalising the regulations, the performance- based funding approach starting in the 2000s to enhance competitiveness of universities and the Specialisation Policy to re-structure the HE system in response to the challenges of a falling student population and declining education quality. b. Agency: The State as a Capitalist Mediator

As the Korean government occupies the central position in the field of HE, it has played a critical role in shaping the development of HE. As T. Kim (2008, 2011) suggests, the Korean government has kept a strong role as regulator in HE reforms in recent years. Jeong (2014), based on his observation of the government’s roles in HE reforms in the last two decades, agrees with T. Kim (2008, 2011) when concluding that the government has been successful in initiating HE reforms. However, I argues that the Korean government, by playing the role of a ‘regulator’ (Jeong, 2014; T. Kim, 2008, 2011) has manifested the agency of a ‘capitalist mediator’ (Jeong, 2014, p. 118).

In fact, the government has implemented critical initiatives to enable HE reforms. For instance, to ensure the contribution of PHE to national development in response to the requirements of a knowledge-based economy, the government liberalised the regulatory framework through the May 1995 Reform, leading directly to the expansion of HE during the 1990s and the 2000s (Shin, 2015). In addition, to cope with the decline in student population and over-expansion of HE, the government used important mechanisms to restructure the HE system 161

(i.e. performance-based funding approach and specialisation policy), forcing universities to improve their quality, competitiveness, and efficiency (M. H. Lee, 2008; Yeom, 2011).

Nevertheless, the Korean experience has proven that the government’s role is mostly reactionary (S. Kim, 2008). The government did not initiate HE expansion by intentionally allocating funds to promote HE growth. Policy initiatives to expand HE implemented by the government in the late 1980s to the 2000s were in response to the public demand for increased access to HE (K. S. Kim & Woo, 2009) and to market demand for human resources to facilitate economic growth (Shin, 2012), not as a result of strategic planning conducted by the government (D. H. Kim & Choi, 2015).

Limitation of resources confronting the Korean government in the post-war period forced it to focus its inadequate budget in basic education (S. Kim, 2008; Shin, 2015). The government has only started investing heavily in HE since the 1990s because upgrading to a knowledge-based economy requires greater investment in R&D, which is mainly conducted at HE level (Chae & Hong, 2009). However, the establishment and strong solidarity of the Teachers’ Union has prevented the government shifting public expenditure on K-12 education to HE (S. Kim, 2008). In addition, the over-expansion of HE during 1990s – 2000s has caused more challenges for public funding since it is unable to fund such a large HE sector, despite public expenditure having increased gradually over time (OECD, 2018).

Comparing Korea and China, the significant difference in their experiences of HE massification is in the roles of the governments in the two countries. While the state of China deliberately utilised HE expansion to address socio-economic problems (i.e. boosting domestic economy and reducing unemployment rates (Shi, 2015)), HE growth in Korea was mainly a result of the public’s pressing demand to access for HE (D. H. Kim & Choi, 2015). The public demand for HE and the willingness of Korean families to finance HE privately are the major

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causes of HE expansion in Korea, the government initiatives may have affected only the timing and extent of HE expansion (S. Kim, 2008).

To better understand the role of the Korean government and its agentic behaviours in shaping the development of HE, the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism provides helpful insights. Driven by this logic, the government has recognised the significance of PHE in the nation’s development and utilised the sector by shifting the major burden of financing HE from the pubic budget to private funding (i.e. household expenditure).

This logic is still a pervasive character in Korean HE policies, regardless of political regimes. In recent years, the Korean government has implemented a series of reforms of HE under the influence of neo-liberalism. Jeong (2014) argues that the neo-liberal HE reforms carried out by the Korean government in the last two decades are universally underpinned by economic rationale. The government believes that employing market principles to strengthen universities’ competitiveness will ultimately “enrich the national economy and individual well-being in a globalised knowledge-based economy” (Jeong, 2014, p. 119).

Therefore, regardless of political regimes or environmental pressures, the Korean government has always modified HE according to the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism. Government policies have always prioritised economic rationale. This tendency has been further strengthened in the context of neo-liberalism as the dominant political ideology in recent years (Jeong, 2014). As Torres (2002) argues that the neo-liberal state has played “a central role as mediator in the context of crisis of capitalism” (p. 367), I propose that the Korean government exercises its agency of a ‘capitalist mediator’, using regulation and funding as means to mediate between the market and universities. In this respect, HE is considered as “an economic engine” (Jeong, 2014, p. 117) to achieve national economic development.

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c. Legitimacy

In this research, legitimacy is understood according to the definition of Suchman (1995) as “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (p. 574). An organisation obtains legitimacy from “internal and external audiences who observe organisations and make legitimacy assessment” (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 54). Accordingly, the two important sources of legitimacy, according to Suchman (1995), are (1) an organisation’s formal institutional structures which bestow structural legitimacy to the organisation; and (2) the organisation’s ability to conduct moral arguments to justify its courses of actions as being desirable and appropriate, which help it attain normative (moral) legitimacy.

Employing the concept of Suchman (1995) to evaluate the Korean government’s legitimacy based on the perspective of external observers (i.e. interview participants at the meso level), it has shown that this actor has demonstrated very strong structural legitimacy due to its critical position in the field of Korean HE. Meanwhile, external audiences at the meso level expressed their disappointment in the government’s reluctance to enact more progressive initiatives to liberalise the HE system.

[Although we all recognise that it is essential to change the current admission regulations], the government is not confident in its ability to manage potentially negative effects associated with such a change. […] That’s why the government is very cautious in this regard.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

Moreover, students these days require better facilities, better buildings, better equipment […]. Where do we get the money from? The government does not provide financial support for us. This is the biggest problem for us now.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

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However, the meso actors’ dissatisfaction caused by the macro actor’s behaviour is insufficient evidence to conclude that the macro actor has weak normative legitimacy. Indeed, the fact that Korean PHE has not developed an alternative to justify its function apart from what the macro government has defined proves that the macro actor still maintains high normative legitimacy.

In conclusion, in this subsection, the role of the macro government in shaping the development of PHE in Korea has been described based on the operationalised concepts of actor, namely position, agency and legitimacy. Specifically, the Korean government occupies the central position in the field of HE, exercising its agency as a capitalist mediator to mediate between the market and HEIs. Thanks to its position and agency, it also maintains strong structural and normative legitimacy.

5.2.2. The Meso Level

Institutional factors, according the conceptual framework developed in this study, include logics, isomorphisms, and actors. Isomorphisms are institutional pressures that shape organisations toward homogeneous tendencies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; J. Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Meanwhile institutional logics provide actors frames and rationales for their actions (Friedland & Alford, 1991), particularly in response to isomorphic pressures. Researches have pointed out that there could be different, sometimes contradict logics co-existing in an organisational field (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz, Phillips, & Tracey, 2016). Different actors at different levels, according to their agency, may strategically choose different logics to justify their courses of actions (Giddens, 1986; Glynn, 2008; Kraatz et al., 2016). In this case, it is necessary to investigate the interactions of institutional factors (i.e. logics, isomorphisms and actors) at different levels. Because institutional logics and isomorphisms are generally situated at the macro level, if actors at the meso level respond to institutional isomorphisms based on a logic that is different from that of the macro level as their justification, the institutional factors that should be addressed at the meso level are primarily logics and actors. 165

In the case of Korea, as described in the previous subsection, Korean HE is characterised by the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism. In addition, the universal influence of the government as a mediator between the market and the HE sector and the homogeneous pressures exerted by institutional isomorphisms account for the high degree of conformity in Korean HE. As a result, the Korean PHE sector, including the university in this case study, has not developed a counterargument to the utilitarian approach for its function and positioning. In this case, one may argue that it is not necessary to have a separate subsection to describe institutional factors (i.e. logics and actors) at the meso level.

However, the Korean government has recently implemented the specialisation policy which promotes the system’s diversity and competitiveness by encouraging universities to develop specialisation plans based on their strengths and capacity (H. Park et al., 2015). The empirical data in this study is insufficient to conclude that the actors at the meso level have adopted a different logic from egalitarian utilitarianism to develop alternative justifications. Nevertheless, as Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) argue, identity construction is crucial for the creation of new institutions, I suggest that this policy may provide initial conditions for the creation of a potential alternative logic.

In addition, investigating the Korean university’s behaviour of transforming its identity to respond to the environmental pressures may provide significant insights to understand how organisations respond when the external environment seemingly does not support its development. This in turn, may offer valuable implications for the development of PHE in Vietnam.

As a result, in the coming subsection I described in detail how the university has responded strategically to institutional pressures (of STEM education) by transforming its own identity using the government’s specialisation policy as a rationale. To unpack such a process, I used critical concepts of NIT, namely institutional environment, institutional logics, institutional complexity and (de)institutionalisation. These concepts may help address the limitations of the traditional literature of identity as described in the work of Albert and Whetten

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(1985), and provide more nuanced explanation for the fluidity of the identity construct (Gioia & Thomas, 1996).

5.2.2.1. Logics: University Identity Transformation and the Formation of a New Institutional Logic a. The Rise of the STEM Movement and the University’s Response

As described previously, the Korean HE system is characterised by the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism, which emphasises the significance and contribution of HE to economic growth. Specifically, the Korean government in recent years has implemented neo-liberal reforms restructuring HE to improve universities’ competitiveness and the system’s efficiency to meet the requirements of a knowledge-based economy (Jeong, 2014). As part of this attempt, the Korean government has invested heavily through funding projects (i.e. BK21, Humanities Korea, and Creative Korea) to improve universities’ research capacity and the system’s global competitiveness (C. J. Lee et al., 2012). The Korean government’s focus on research and innovation to boost the knowledge- based economy has caused the growth in STEM disciplines.

STEM is a term that refers to the academic disciplines of science, technology, engineering and mathematics. This term has been widely used in recent years in both public and academic domains to address education policy and curriculum issues, particularly regarding improving the competitiveness of a HE system in science and technology development (Gonzalez & Kuenzi, 2012). The fierce competition between countries for cutting-edge technology, the concerns of lacking an adequate work force in science and technology areas, and the poor performance of students in these subjects in global assessment systems such as PISA, are considered the driving forces for the countless attempts to invest in STEM education in many countries (Charette, 2013)

In the case of Korea, STEM has been receiving a lot of attention from the government. The Ministry of Education has highlighted the significance of STEM education in The Master Plan to Foster and Support Human Resources in

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Science and Technology (2011-2015) (Jon & Chung, 2013). In Korea, STEM education is used to strengthen students’ ability to understand science (Jho, Hong, & Song, 2016). In line with the government’s policy guidelines, Korean universities and enterprises actively join this competition for STEM by providing initiatives, developing courses and curriculums regarding STEM teaching and learning (Martin, Im, & Song, 2016). In these circumstances, universities which are traditionally strong at STEM obviously have an advantage in competing with others.

The market demand for HE is primarily focusing on science and technology

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

The Korean case university in this study was founded in the 1950s to respond to the increasing demand for skilled workers to boost the economy (Korean University Document No. 1 and No. 6). In the context of that period of time, when the government strived to build an export economy, it largely required a professionalised labour force with strengths in foreign languages to work in business and diplomacy (Korean University Document, No. 1 and No. 6). It was the basis of the university’s establishment. With the traditional strengths in research and teaching in languages, social sciences and humanities (LSSH), the university expanded and developed along with the Korean economic growth (Korean University Document No. 1). Inseparable from the general context of Korean HE, the university also strives to differentiate itself from other HE institutions while maintaining its distinctiveness, which is its core strength in LSSH.

We do provide courses in sciences and technology, but compared with other disciplines, these courses are less important.

Because the importance of disciplines such as social sciences, business, law, and humanities are emphasised, we have always maintained our university’s leading status in language and humanities.

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

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However, with the rise of technology and the increasing significance of STEM disciplines, the university’s traditional strengths are seemingly unable to help it compete with other universities, particularly those that are strong in engineering and natural sciences, as Dean J., the Head of the Department of Planning, explained in his interview:

Our university’s emphases, as you know, are languages and foreign studies. However, the current global trend greatly favours the disciplines of natural sciences and engineering. In general, universities famous for these disciplines are highly regarded in the ranking systems, receive more funding, and also have better performance in terms of graduates’ employment.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

Therefore, to respond to the external pressures from the STEM movement, the university has strategically developed new university mission, goals, and academic programs which emphasise the ‘interdisciplinary’ identity. As a result, it has been of transforming its identity from a leading university in non-STEM areas (i.e. languages, social sciences, and humanities) to a ‘world-class interdisciplinary university’ (Korean University Document No. 8).

To realise the vision of a ‘world-class interdisciplinary university’, the following central goals have been established: (1) fostering interdisciplinary experts; (2) strengthening interdisciplinary research capacity; (3) establishing support systems; (4) securing financial conditions.

(Korean University Document No. 8) To fulfil the new university mission and goals, three major strategies have been specifically implemented, including (1) developing interdisciplinary courses and curriculum; (2) developing diverse, flexible educational programs; and (3) cooperating with diverse partners (i.e. enterprise, NGOs, international organisations, etc.) to improve student learning experience and education quality.

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We also need to develop a kind of network that facilitates our students [to be global citizens]. For example, they may want to study in a program that allows them to spend two years in our university, and another two years in other universities, or study for five years to receive both bachelor and master’s degrees. We need to constantly develop such diverse academic programs.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

The university has justified its identity transformation strategy as appropriate because it is aligned with the specialisation policy. The Korean government, for the last 15 years, has implemented a specialisation policy to improve the system’s diversity (J.-K. Lee, 2000a), and strengthen universities’ competitiveness (K.-H. Mok, 2006). Korean HE has been criticised for a lack of significant differences in terms of university missions, programs and student selection (N. Park & Weidman, 2002). Many colleges and universities in Korea have been criticised for their similarities in institutional values or missions, targeted students, educational programs, teaching and learning strategies, etc. (H. Park et al., 2015).

In the 2000s, the Korean government decided to restructure the entire HE system through specialisation. In accordance with the Plan on Specialisation of Universities, universities were categorized into three groups; universities for teaching, research or technical education, depending on each institution’s strengths and circumstances (H. Park et al., 2015). Individual universities are required to establish and implement their own development plans based on their strengths of institutional specialisation and capacity for sustainable growth. The university, in this case, has developed its specialisation by combining its traditional strengths in non-STEM disciplines with the universal trend of STEM education, aspiring to be a ‘world-class interdisciplinary university’. b. The University’s Transformation of Identity and Theoretical Implications

The university’s identity transformation process supports the argument that organizational identity (OI) is less stable and enduring than was previously 170

depicted in the literature. Albert and Whetten (1985), in their foundation work on identity, emphasize how central, distinct, and enduring attributes constitute an organization’s essential character, thereby individuating and differentiating organisations. However, the identity transformation process which occurred in the case university suggests that identity does not necessarily endure but changes dynamically over time. Thus, Albert and Whetten’s definition of identity does not cover the dynamic potential of change within the notion of identity. For this reason, Gioia and Thomas (1996) suggest that a dimension of fluidity should be included in the understanding of the concept.

Responding to the call of Gioia and Thomas (1996), an emerging school of thought employs Neo-Institutional Theory (NIT) to investigate OI because these two bodies of knowledge share significant similarities and potentially contribute to one another (Kraatz et al., 2016). Specifically, there is growing interest among institutional theorists regarding how institutions are constructed (Kraatz et al., 2016). Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004, p. 635) suggest that “institutionalisation occurs as actors interact and come to accept shared definitions of reality”.

Interestingly, researchers in OI also share similar viewpoints while highlighting the interactions between organisation members in the process of meaning-making to produce “the understandings that constitute the essence of organisational identity” (Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, & Corley, 2013, p. 170). From this perspective, identity construction is seen as a process resulting from the continuing interactions of organisational members (Kraatz et al., 2016). This similarity in understanding the process of constructing institutions and identities may provide an interesting juncture for the two bodies of theory to inform and support each other (Kraatz et al., 2016).

Following this suggestion, researchers argue that studying the identity formation process may help to generate significant insights on how institutional logics are constructed and vice versa. Gioia, Price, Hamilton and Thomas (2010), in an attempt joining these two schools of thought, notice the significance of 171

interactions between organisations and field-levelled external actors in constructing organisational identity. Similarly, Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006) suggest that organisational identity is constructed based on shared cultural elements, but the construction process takes place through a series of negotiations at both organisational and institutional levels. These are evidence of the mutual influence between institutional environment and organisational identity.

As a result, in this study, I attempt to explain the identity transformation process of the university from a NIT perspective, confirming the potential contribution of NIT to the scholarly understanding of OI. More importantly, I argue that investigating the identity transformation process of the university helps understand how organisations through identity transformation potentially shape the formation of a new logic which may counter the influence of the dominant logic of egalitarian utilitarianism in Korean HE.

b.1. Organisational Identity Under Influence of Institutional Pressures

Firstly, NIT helps address the fluidity in the construct of OI. From this perspective, OI is not fixed, but subject to institutional pressures. The case university was recognized as a prestigious institution in non-STEM disciplines. However, under external forces that favour STEM disciplines (STEM disciplines receive more funding from both public and private sectors, attract more students, and rank higher in the ranking systems), it was placed under huge pressure to change, including its own traditional identity, to respond to such pressures:

The most important thing for a university is to adapt and respond flexibly to the everchanging environment over time.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

In this respect, the university’s identity can be viewed as being embedded in institutional contexts, as suggested by the literature (Baron, 2004; Glynn & Abzug, 2002). It is thus not separate from the environment but is constantly

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created and reshaped by the university’ interpretations of the environment and its actions on the environment (Daft & Weick, 1984; Milliken, 1990).

Because the environment always changes, it is impossible for a university to [remain unchanged]

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

b.2. Similarities between Organisational Identity and Institutional Logics

Secondly, to explain the university’s strategic behaviour of transforming its traditional identity from non-STEM to ‘interdisciplinary’ university in response to the external pressures of STEM education, it is necessary to employ the concept of institutional logics from NIT. Institutional logics, is defined by Thornton (2004, p. 69) as:

the socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organise time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality.

The role of institutional logics is to provide “the formal and informal rules of action, interaction, and interpretation that guide and constrain decision makers in accomplishing the organisation’s tasks and in obtaining social status, credits, penalties, and rewards in the process” (Thornton, 2004, p. 70). As “assumptions and values, usually implicit, about how to interpret organisational reality, what constitutes appropriate behaviour, and how to succeed” (Thornton, 2004, p. 70), logics characterise an institutional field.

There are significant similarities in the functions of institutional logics and OI. The literature highlights the role of OI in providing justification for organisational behaviours (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Kellogg, 2011; Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014). Gioia et al. (2013) argue that OI is a “subliminal guide” (p. 1) for organisational members of what they should do. In addition, an emerging school of thought has emphasised the potential significance of identity in

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functioning “as a filter for interpreting and responding to strategic issues and environmental changes” (Glynn, 2008, p. 418; Kraatz & Block, 2008)

Similarly, Gawer and Phillips (2013) suggest that OI shapes the understandings of organisation members in making sense of the practices implemented under the influence of institutional isomorphisms. There are two potentially important implications related to this suggestion. Firstly, institutional pressures are mediated by organisational identity; hence, organisational identity is critical in determining the degree to which organisations are influenced by institutional isomorphisms. Secondly, implementing organisational changes to respond to such pressures may require a process of identity transformation.

From these definitions, we see that institutional logics and OI have similar functions in providing templates and references for organisations’ behaviours and actions. The critical difference is while logics is considered to be at the institutional field level (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Glynn, 2008; Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; Kraatz et al., 2016; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), OI obviously is located at the organisational (meso) level. Hence, OI can be seen as a kind of logic at the meso level (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Glynn, 2008).

b.3. Organisational Identity as a Filter and a Logic at the Meso Level

In fact, the empirical evidence of this study indicates that the institutional processes that create pressures for isomorphism of STEM education in organizations are mediated by the university’s traditional identity, as Mr. Kim insisted:

However, it does not necessarily mean that universities will offer any courses or programs according to market or social demands

But in such a process [of identity transformation], we cannot and should not give up our original DNA. Like I said our DNA is ALSH.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

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The process of identity transformation in the case university provides a rich description of how institutional isomorphisms were interpreted within the university via the filter of its traditional OI. Since its establishment in the 1950s, the university has been developed based on root of LSSH. It has certainly adjusted itself according to the requirements of the dynamic environment, but LSSH as its ‘DNA’, governs its strategic choices of adjustments.

In our university’s development history of more than 60 years, we have always emphasised the significance of languages, [social sciences and humanities]. From the 1990s, we started developing courses in area studies. In conclusion, we treasure our inherent values based on disciplines such as languages, [humanities] and area studies.

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

In this case, the university’s traditional identity has become a filter to mediate the effect of institutional pressures and provides rationale and justification for their strategic planning. In the interviews, though our participants agreed that it is critical for universities to respond promptly to environmental changes, they also emphasised that it is inappropriate for universities to respond without critical reflection. From their perspective, the university’s traditional identity is an anchor and a guideline for the university to respond to external pressures

The Korean university presents a different viewpoint of how organisations should respond to external environment from what of the Vietnamese and Chinese universities. Both the universities in Vietnam and China are relatively young (less than 20 years), and still in the process of constructing their own identities. In other words, the identities of these two universities are relatively weak and unclear. The literature has indicated that organisations with weak OIs are likely to implement more creative and innovative practices (B. R. Clark, 2017) because weak identities provide more opportunities for organisations members to interpret, contest, challenge, and compromise the organisational settings (Stensaker, 2015). That’s why their response to external pressures are made with much less deliberation. 175

For instance, the case university in Vietnam offers any courses that are in high demand in order to attract more students. The independent college in China, after almost 20 years operating as an independent college with remarkable achievements thanks to the generous support from the central and local governments, determined to transform into a public institution to access greater support and resources. Meanwhile, the Korean private university in this case, insisted on what it called ‘inherent, distinctive values’ (고유가치)

Because [this DNA] is very important to us. This is the way we respond to market demand. Because the history and origin of academic areas are important. Other universities just simply give them up. They only care about how to improve global competitiveness [...]. But we make it very clear. [Our DNA in non-STEM areas] is important for us, we can’t just blindly follow market demand [without paying attention to our origin] [...].

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

b.4. Institutional Complexity Caused by Multiple Logics

As a kind of logic at the meso level, when institutional isomorphisms of STEM education mediate through the university’s traditional identity, a kind of conflict has risen between external pressures forcing the university to conform to the STEM movement and the university’s distinctive characteristics of non-STEM education.

[….] As I said before, our DNA is ALSH. With this kind of DNA, specialized programs in engineering, or IT, etc, actually are not strongly relevant to us.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

This conflict can be explained using the concept of institutional complexity. Recent research has recognised that an organisational field is quite often characterised by more than a single logic (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Kraatz et al., 2016). Consequently, organisations operating in such a field are frequently confronted with tensions caused by multiple logics (Greenwood et al., 2011). In order to survive, organisations must exercise a 176

certain degree of strategic decision making to manage such tensions (C. Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2013).

Since OI is a kind of logic, functioning as a filter to mediate external pressures at the meso level, the conflict between OI and external pressures creates a kind of complexity at this level. Being exposed to such a conflict requires the university to exercise some level of strategic choice because this conflict has brought about “high uncertainty and ambiguity” (Navis & Glynn, 2011, p. 480) which challenge the taken-for-granted characteristics of the university’s organisational settings and require the university to make decisions in order to secure support and ensure survival (Pache & Santos, 2013). As a result, the university had to go through a process of identity transformation, from providing pure non-STEM educational programs to developing interdisciplinary curriculums.

Our strategic plan of specializing ourselves is to integrate multiple disciplines, such as humanities, social sciences, linguistics, natural sciences and engineering.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

[…] Combining studies in the humanities, law, social sciences, business, and computer science. Students are educated in the liberal arts encompassing the humanities as well as the social and natural sciences to build a sound foundation of knowledge. Furthermore, students are trained in one or more foreign languages, a prominent feature and speciality at our university.

(Korean University Documents No. 4)

b.5. Logics as Tool Kits

The university’s strategic behaviour of identity transformation confirms the findings in the literature (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pratt & Kraatz, 2009; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011), suggesting that as organisations operate in a field characterised by multiple logics, they are not necessarily passive under the conformity effect of institutional pressures. Instead, they can select different

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elements from the multiple logics co-existing in a field and customise them according to their internal context to construct distinctive OIs. In this respect, logics are not only “rules of actions, interaction and interpretation” (Thornton, 2004, p. 70), but serve as ‘tool kits’ for actors to construct ‘strategy of action’ (Swidler, 1986).

Therefore, this is the third potential contribution of NIT to the understanding of OI construction. Glynn (2008) argues that organisations construct their identities based on ‘raw materials’ – meanings, symbols, values, sentiments, and rules – elements available at both institutional and organisational levels. Furthermore, these raw materials can be used by organisations not only to construct their identities, but also to implement such identities (Glynn, 2008).

Reflecting on our case, the interaction between the environmental pressure of STEM education and the university’s traditional identity as non-STEM forced the university to work out a compromise to produce a new form of hybrid identity.

Our DNA obviously is in language and foreign studies. […] That’s why instead of simply providing an IT course, like teaching software coding programs, we integrate linguistic or social sciences into the programs, I mean something like…what the social values of this coding program are, how this program can support our society, etc. That’s the content of our education program. That’s how we specialize ourselves.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016) The most significant point here is that the university did not generate its new identity in an ‘institutional vacuum’ (Weber & Glynn, 2006) but built on its traditional identity.

The most significant advantage we have is that [based on the traditional strengths in non-STEM disciplines] we can develop interdisciplinary programs by clustering different academic areas such as language, social sciences, business and technology.

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(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

We have developed our unique strengths that help us to maintain our leading status in language education that covers more than 27 language groups to provide academic programs regarding strategic countries or regions. We will continue to strengthen our niches.

(Korean University Document No. 8)

In addition, the university has utilised the specialisation policy as rationale to legitimise its strategy. Thus, specialisation is also an important element supplied by the institutional environment for the university to construct its new OI. Accordingly, we see the university has developed its new interdisciplinary identity based on (1) the external pressures that promote STEM; (2) the traditional identity of non-STEM; and (3) the specialisation policy as justification.

b.6. Organisational Identity Construction and (De)institutionalisation

The identity transformation process of the case university definitely implies a certain degree of strategic planning. Nevertheless, it should not be considered a decision based purely on rationality. Lok (2010) challenges the general concept of viewing identity construction as a purely strategic action of actors (mostly leaders) and adds a significant degree of flux to the notion of identity by pointing out that identity construction is constantly contested, though quite often subtly, and transformed by organisational members on an everyday basis, even when the identity is strategically and officially adopted.

Although focusing on different research participants, the empirical study of Gioia and Thomas (1996) is in agreement with Lok (2010), revealing that a strategic plan of identity transformation is likely to be an input for, not an outcome of, the organisational members’ sense-making process. In this respect, OI is viewed as an ongoing series of negotiations among relevant actors in their sense-making (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991) to interpret organisational reality (Weick, 1995). Therefore, OI construction occurs when organisations

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enact policies and practices because these enactments allow internal and external members to make sense of who they are (Besharov, 2014). These findings again suggest that identity work (identity construction, transformation, and implementation, etc), to a certain degree, is less strategic than it seems to be.

In agreement with the above-mentioned researchers, I suggest that the concept of (de)institutionalisation, another perspective of NIT, might help generate a more nuanced understanding of the degree of fluidity of the identity construct. Deinstitutionalisation is referred to as “the process by which institutions weaken and disappear” (Scott, 2008, p. 196), whereas Oliver (1992, p. 564) defines it as “the process by which the legitimacy of an established or institutionalised organisational practice erodes or discontinues”. This concept captures the process of ongoing negotiation among an organisation’s external and internal members in their making sense of organisational reality, resulting in the disruption of one organisational practice to be replaced by another.

In the case of the Korean private university, as conflict arose between the external pressure of STEM education and the university’s traditional identity, and requirements to change intensified, the traditional identity as a kind of logic at the meso level, started being deinstitutionalised. The deinstitutionalisation process of the traditional identity was evident in the conflicting attitudes of professors and students which the leaders of the university had to convince to give way for the new ‘interdisciplinary’ identity to be implemented in practice (i.e. developing interdisciplinary programs and courses).

The biggest challenge to developing such diverse, flexible programs is uhm… something already tenacious, like uhm… practices or customs that uhm… were strongly established and constructed in the past. I mean, actually, there are people who oppose the programs we proposed. That’s what we have to overcome. […] [Both professors and students] may oppose. It depends. For example, developing new academic programs may bring about unexpected anxiety for students, or may change the relationship between senior and junior students [a significant relationship in Korean

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culture that may impact students’ employability]. For these reasons, they may oppose our proposals of developing new academic courses. Same thing may also happen to professors.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

However, as the process of deinstitutionalisation progressed, the practices that embodied the traditional identity were not entirely replaced. Similarly, the newly adopted OI has not been completely institutionalised in the university. The constant interactions between the deinstitutionalisation of the traditional identity and the institutionalisation of the new identity allows the university’s identity to be continually and gradually shaped and transformed.

In short, I have presented at least four aspects of NIT that potentially help improve scholarly understanding of OI, using empirical evidence from the case of identity transformation of the Korean private university. From a NIT perspective, the research findings suggest that, firstly, OI is not as fixed and enduring as suggested in the previous literature (Albert & Whetten, 1985) but is embedded in the institutional environment and subject to institutional pressures. Secondly, borrowing the concept of institutional logics, I argue that OI is a kind of logic at the meso level (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Glynn, 2008), functioning as a filter that mediates pressures from external environment (Glynn, 2008; Kraatz & Block, 2008) and provides organisational members guidance for their actions (Gioia et al., 2013; Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014), particularly to respond to the external environment.

Thirdly, when there is a conflict between OI and external pressures, it creates a condition similar to ‘institutional complexity’ in which more than a single logic operating in a field, leading to conflicting tensions being exerted upon organisations (Greenwood et al., 2011). This conflict causes organisations to exercise a certain level of strategic planning to implement necessary changes in response to such tensions, which may require organisations to transform their identities. In this respect, logics (at the institutional and organisational levels)

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serve as ‘tool kits’ (Swidler, 1986), providing ‘raw materials’ (Glynn, 2008) for the process of identity construction and transformation.

However, organisations’ identity transformation should not be considered as a purely rational decision resulted from organisational actors’ (mainly leaders) strategic planning (Lok, 2010). Hence, I suggest that (de)institutionalisation, the fourth aspect of NIT, may help address the ‘dimension of fluidity’ (Gioia & Thomas, 1996) of the construct of identity. Accordingly, the university’s identity transformation process can be seen as an ongoing interaction between the institutionalisation of the new ‘interdisciplinary’ identity on one hand and the deinstitutionalisation of the traditional ‘non-STEM’ identity on the other. In this light, OI is constantly shaped, contested, transformed, constructed and reconstructed through the interactions of organisations’ external and internal members in their making sense of the organisational reality.

b.7. Transformation of Organisational Identity and Construction of Institutional Logics

Above are some of the potential contributions of NIT to the understanding of OI. However, I believe that there are mutual contributions between these two schools of thought. As the literature suggests that NIT and OI can support and inform each other (Kraatz et al., 2016), understanding OI and the process of identity construction is important because identity is crucial in linking institutions and organisations (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Glynn, 2008). Specifically, the link between identity construction and logic institutionalisation has been acknowledged (Westenholz, Pedersen, & Dobbin, 2006). Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) suggest that actors’ identity constructing behaviour is crucial for creating new institutions. Lok (2010) contributes to the literature of this topic by arguing that not only may new logics be created but also old logics may be maintained thanks to the actors’ identity work. This is because “institutionalisation occurs as actors interact and come to accept shared definition of reality” (Phillips et al., 2004, p. 635). As actors individually or collectively identify themselves with one

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or more particular logics, new logics can be institutionalised (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) as well as old logics can be maintained (Lok, 2010).

These studies not only improve our scholarly understanding of institution construction but also offer significant insights to the current situation of Korean HE. As described in the previous subsection of institutional factors at the macro level, Korean HE is dominated by the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism in which universities are justified by their contribution to national economic growth and individual advancement (T. Kim, 2009). In addition, the field of HE in Korea is also characterised by a high degree of conformity in which the impact of utilitarianism is unprecedentedly universal. An alternative logic to counter the influence of utilitarianism has not been well developed and institutionalised.

Nevertheless, the identity transformation process occurring at the university provides great insights for the potential institutionalisation of such an alternative logic. Under the pressures of STEM education supported by the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism, the university has developed an ‘interdisciplinary’ identity by combining its traditional identity of ‘non-STEM’ with the external demands of ‘STEM’. This new identity is rationalised by the specialisation policy enacted by the government. This means that the specialisation policy provides a justification for the university’s strategy of providing non-STEM programs, on the ground of differentiating itself from other competitors. Obviously, at the current stage, differentiation has not been fully institutionalised. However, since logics are socially constructed and institutionalised when actors interact and share similar definition of reality (Phillips et al., 2004), the more universities utilise specialisation and diversity as rationales for their differentiating identities and strategies, the more deeply the logic of diversity will be institutionalised. Consequently, this process may weaken the influence of utilitarianism.

In conclusion, in this subsection I have provided both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to confirm the suggestion of other studies that NIT and OI can contribute to each other. Specifically, I suggest that NIT can contribute to the 183

scholarly knowledge of OI from at least four aspects, using the notions of institutional pressures, institutional logics, institutional complexity and (de)institutionalisation. Empirically, these concepts of NIT provide a more nuanced explanation of the identity transformation process of the case university in this study. Theoretically, these concepts confirm that, on one hand, organisations are subject to and shaped by institutional environment, but on the other hand, they are not ‘mere vehicles’ of institutional logics (Giddens, 1984, 1986). Instead, organisations actively interpret, select and make sense of which logics and how logics would impact organisations’ development. The research findings highlight the role of OI as a filter and guidance for organisations in response to external pressures. In addition, these concepts also help explain the fluidity in the construct of identity. Finally, studying the identity transformation of the university provides significant insights regarding the formation of a potentially alternative logic as a counterargument that may weaken the dominance of egalitarian utilitarianism, the logic that currently characterises the Korean HE system.

5.2.2.2. Actors

As described in the subsection 7.1.2.1, there are various stakeholders participating in the decision-making process of the university, including the Board of Trustees, the President and his management team, the Deans Committee, the Professors Association and the Alumni Association, forming the shared governance model of the university. Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny the critical role of the President in every aspect of the university. Therefore, in this subsection of the meso actors, I focus on describing the role of the President according to the operationalised concepts of actors, namely position, legitimacy and agency.

At the institutional level, because the university occupies the middle position in the institutional field, the President also is at the middle position. This has resulted in this actor’s medium/average structural and normative legitimacy in the field of HE. However, at the university level, the President, as a central actor

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of the university’s organisational structure, obtained strong structural legitimacy to enact critical changes in the university such as identity transformation. In this process, he exercised two different types of agency, relevant to two different steps of transforming the university’s identity. Firstly, he used the agency of a sense-giver to develop a strategic plan of identity transformation. Secondly, he employed the agency of a negotiator to negotiate with other university members the contents of the new identity in the next step of implementing this new identity. Because of this type of agency, he also received strong normative legitimacy that allows him to carry out his strategic plan of identity transformation. a. Position

At the institutional field level, the government takes the central position, as described in the previous section. However, due to leading role of the private sector in Korea, private HEIs occupies relatively high positions close to the centre of the field. For this reason, I conclude that the institutional position of the President in this case is at the middle position of the field.

Nevertheless, at the university level, the President obviously occupies the central position of the university. On one hand, he is a member of the Board of Trustees, the highest governing body of the university. On the other hand, as the President, he is the legal representative of the university, representing the university’s internal stakeholders (i.e. faculty and students). Such a dual role allows him to link the university’s external and internal stakeholders and balance power within the university. For this reason, he is located in the centre of the university’s organisational structure and plays a critical role for the development of the university. b. Agency: The President as a Sense-giver and a Negotiator

Because the government has adopted the model of regulated deregulation which grants little autonomy to universities, the meso actor’ capacity is limited in implementing changes that challenge the institutional arrangements. Thus, in this

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subsection of the meso actor’s agency, instead of describing his agency in his vertical relationship with the macro actors, I focus specifically on this actor’s behaviours in his horizontal interaction with other meso actors to respond to external pressures. For this reason, the case of the university transforming its traditional identity provides a great illustration to uncover the actor’s agentic behaviours.

b.1. Weaknesses of the Notion of Institutional Entrepreneurship

Simply looking at the fact that the university has transformed its traditional identity, one may easily conclude that the President has exercised the agency of institutional entrepreneurship (IE) to enact such a significant change in the university. IE is defined by Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence (2004, p. 657) as “the activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or transform existing ones”. According to Lockett et al. (2012), institutional entrepreneurs (IEs) are actors who seek to initiate or enact institutional changes. Nevertheless, this concept of IE has been criticised for its assumption of actors being ‘disembedded’ from their context and its over-emphasis on actors’ rationality (Kraatz et al., 2016).

In agreement with the above-mentioned research, I argue that the concept of IE is insufficient to describe the complexity of the President’s agency in the process of identity transformation. Since OI is a complex construct that requires various concepts of NIT involved to obtain a nuanced explanation, we should not expect that the agentic behaviours of the President, one of the most critical actors in such a complicated process, to be simple. Therefore, to understand the meso actor’s agency, it is necessary to carefully investigate the organisational settings in which the actor is embedded.

b.2. Developing an Analytical Tool to Examine the Meso Actor’s Agency

In the previous subsection we discussed the case of the university transforming its traditional identity of non-STEM to an interdisciplinary university in response

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to the external pressures of STEM education and using the specialisation policy to justify its strategy of identity transformation. This transformation process, broadly speaking, can be divided into two major steps: strategic development of a new identity and the implementation of such a new identity in practice.

Using the concepts of NIT to analyse the first step, the conflict between the external pressures (of STEM education) and the university’s traditional identity (of non-STEM) is recognised as the cause that has led to the university’s strategic response of identity transformation. These findings confirm the literature’s suggestions (Besharov & Brickson, 2016; Glynn, 2008; Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014) that greater alignment between OI and institutional pressures increases the possibility of organisational members responding to such pressures. Hence, the degree of alignment between OI and institutional pressures significantly determines the extent to which organisations respond to institutional isomorphisms.

Additionally, the traditional identity has been deeply institutionalised in the university, and thus has strongly influenced the way the university interprets institutional pressures. Because the university has a strong identity (of non- STEM), when it was confronted by the external demands (of STEM education), it could not give up its traditional identity despite the strong isomorphic pressures. Instead, it has employed the specialisation policy implemented by the government to justify its strategy of providing non-STEM programs in the name of the newly developed ‘interdisciplinary identity’. Here we see the degree of institutionalisation of OI (and the symbols and practices that embody such an identity) within an organisation also affects the ways the organisation interprets and prioritises different institutional demands.

In short, the NIT perspective helps describe both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the construct of OI in relation to organisational members’ behaviours. Vertically, the greater OI is aligned with institutional pressures, the more organisational members pay attention and respond to such pressures. Horizontally, the more OI is institutionalised in an organisation, the more

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actively organisational members interpret institutional pressures. These two dimensions of OI can be visualised as in the figure 7.3. below.

Figure 5. The OI Matrix

The figure describes how different aspects of OI (vertical alignment and horizontal institutionalisation) influence the extent to which organisational members respond to institutional pressures. Specifically, it provides a simplified descriptive tool for organisational members to understand which situations may require strategic behaviours in response to environmental demands based on critical analysis of the OI and the institutional environment.

In the figure, organisations’ responses to environmental pressures are classified into four categories according to the OI’s alignment with institutional isomorphisms and the OI’s institutionalisation within an organisation. Among these four categories, category I and III require a high level of strategic behaviours from organisational actors because the incompatibility between the

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OI’s alignment and institutionalisation brings about ‘uncertainty and ambiguity’ in organisational settings (Navis and Glynn, 2011). Specifically, strategic responses are crucially required when (1) OI is highly aligned with institutional demands but is not strongly institutionalised within the organisation (category I); a typical description of a young, trendy university whose identity has not yet been established; and (2) OI is strongly institutionalised within the organisation but unfortunately is no longer in alignment with external demands (category III), a portrayal of an established, relatively prestigious university with a strong identity and consistent image.

Meanwhile, the OI’s aspects of alignment and institutionalisation in category II and IV are compatible and therefore require less strategic behaviours. If OI is highly institutionalised (strong identity) in an organisation and also aligned with institutional isomorphism (category II), such an OI will definitely be maintained and developed further in the organisation. The opposite case is when OI is neither fully institutionalised (weak identity) in an organisation nor aligned with environmental demands (category IV). In this case, it is very likely for this OI to be replaced by a new identity.

Correspondingly, the Korean private university in this study falls into category III. The empirical evidence of the university confirms the matrix’s suggestion and the university’s leaders have in fact strategically developed a new form of identity to respond to the external pressures (of STEM education). As a result, the university identity has been transformed from a non-STEM to an interdisciplinary university.

Above I have provided an analysis of how the environmental settings have caused the meso actor to initiate strategic development of a new identity in the university. The matrix developed in Figure 7.3. provides a descriptive tool to critically review the organisational context and facilitate strategic planning. Applying this matrix to the Korean university, there was discord between the degree of institutionalisation and of alignment of the university’s traditional identity, which required the meso actor to employ strategic behaviours. In such a

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scenario, the President (and his top management team) has exercised a special type of agency – sense-giver – to instigate the strategic transformation of identity.

Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991), in their research of strategic changes in a public university, have developed a “sequential and reciprocal cycle of sense-making and sense-giving” (p. 443) to highlight the role of the university leaders in initiating strategic changes. Sense-giving generally refers to organisational leaders’ attempts to shape interpretations of organisational members regarding strategic changes (Besharov & Brickson, 2016). Sense-making refers to organisational members’ “developing set of ideas with explanatory possibilities” (Weick, 1995, p. xi). In the study of Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991), the university’s CEO, through his initial attempts of strategic planning, provided “a viable interpretation of a new reality and to influence stakeholders and constituents to adopt it as their own” (p. 443).

The empirical data of this study confirms the findings of Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991). The top leaders of the Korean university, based on a critical review of the external environment, have exercised sense-making and sense-giving modes, resulting in the strategic decision to transform the university’s identity. The President, together with his management team, developed a strategic plan of identity transformation via several steps. Firstly, he developed a proposal for strategic changes which was reviewed by other stakeholders. By doing so, he invited other university’s members to participate in a sensemaking process by giving initial suggestions for such a process.

In general, the President has to propose a plan of which direction the university should take. If there is disagreement about the plan, we will discuss. […] By doing so, more ideas are generated […].

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

When other stakeholders reviewed the President’s proposed plan, they worked to make sense of the plan and influenced the suggested plan by providing feedback.

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After their feedback was incorporated, the revised proposal was approved, and the strategic plan for identity transformation was officially adopted.

We discuss and negotiate [to reach an agreement]. However, the management team, the Faculty Deans Committee and the Professor Association are among the final decision-makers.

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

However, the official adoption of the new identity does not necessarily mean that the identity transformation process is complete. After taking the first step of strategically developing a new identity, the university must take the second step of identity enactment or implementation for the new identity to be fully institutionalised. In this second step, the new identity is constantly shaped, transformed, constructed and reconstructed through a series of ongoing negotiations among the university members (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991) for which the strategically developed and officially adopted identity is considered an input (Gioia & Thomas, 1996).

In this process of continuing negotiations, the President, as a member of the university, has also taken part by interacting with other relevant stakeholders to negotiate the contents of the university’s new identity. As a result, apart from exercising the agency of a sense-giver, the President has also employed another type of agency, a negotiator. The data reveals that this type of agency is critically important for the President in his strategic plan to transform the university’s identity and implement this new identity in reality. In the interview data, the President believed that the most important virtue of leadership is the leader’s ability to negotiate.

I think negotiation is most important. The agreement [achieved through negotiation] among relevant stakeholders is the most important condition to enact changes, regardless of the changes you may want to make.

(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

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The governance structure is also another important factor that determines the type of agency employed by the President. As discussed in the previous subsection, the university had adopted the shared governance model in which various stakeholders participate in the decision-making process (i.e. Board of Trustees, the President, the University Council, the Faculty Deans Committee, the Professors Association and the Alumni Association). In this structure, the President plays the central role of being a bridge between the external Board of Trustees and the internal stakeholders (i.e. faculties and students). In other words, the President is vital in balancing the power structure of the university. This specific task has critically shaped his agency as a negotiator to negotiate the power balance among these various stakeholders. For instance, critical decisions such as goal setting or budget allocation are determined based on the agreement between various stakeholders such as the President, the University Council, the Professors Association and the Board of Trustees in which negotiations are involved extensively in every step of decision-making.

Based on the President’s leadership and the agreement of the professors, the university’s mission and direction were developed and determined.

(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

The fact that the President strongly emphasised the significance of this type of agency is evidence of how much negotiation was involved in the second step of identity implementation in practice. In such a step, the President and his team definitely experienced a lot of difficulties caused by conflicts of interest among different university members. In addition, although the strategic plan of transformation was official adopted a few years ago (Korean University Document No. 8), the university is still in the process of implementing this new identity, demonstrating that this step of identity institutionalisation might require a long time to accomplish.

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(Dean J., personal communication, 1 November 2016)

In this subsection, I have discussed the types of agency employed by the President in the process of identity transformation. I argue that the concept of institutional entrepreneurship suggested by the literature to describe the meso actors’ effort to enact change is insufficient to describe the complexity of the President’s agency. Thus, to unpack this actor’s agency, it is important to thoroughly investigate the context in which the actor is embedded. To do so, I have provided an analysis of the identity transformation process according to a time frame in which was divided into two steps, the strategic development of a new identity and the implementation of the new identity. Based on these steps, the organisational settings that have determined the types of agencies exercised by the President were unveiled.

In the first step, a matrix was developed to describe the organisational context that led to the strategic decision to transform the university’s identity. This matrix consists of two dimensions that reflect the range of the two aspects of OI – the degree of alignment between OI and institutional isomorphisms and the degree of institutionalisation of OI within an organisation. This matrix provides a critical tool to review the context for strategic planning. Based on these two dimensions, the matrix was classified into four categories to help identify which situations may require strategic behaviours.

b.3. Modifying the Analytical Tool based on the Premise of Rational Actor

Since the matrix was originally developed to explain how the context leads to the meso actors’ strategic response of developing a new identity, it is unable to 193

reflect the actor’s agency. For this reason, in the original version of the matrix (figure 7.3), I have noted only ‘Strategic Response Required’ to leave space for the description of the actor’s agency. However, from the perspective of strategic planning, taking the premise of rational actor, specific strategic behaviours can be identified in the modified version of the matrix as following.

Figure 6. The OI Matrix – Rational Actor Version

(I) Growing tree – Establishing OI: OI is closely aligned with institutional demands but not strongly institutionalised within an organisation.

As I mentioned before, this is the description of a young, trendy university with a promising future. Though the university does not have a strong identity, a high degree of alignment with the environmental demands provides significant resources for the development of the university and great opportunities to establish its identity to be consistent and institutionalised.

(II) Watchtower – Maintaining OI: OI is highly aligned with institutional pressures and strongly institutionalised within an organisation 194

This is a picture of a relatively established university in its peak. It has built up its own identity with a strong image and branding that are supported by the institutional isomorphisms. It is critical then for such a university to be watchful of the dynamic environmental changes and not become complacent.

The Korean university in this study was once in this scenario when its identity of non-STEM (languages, social sciences and humanities) was strongly aligned with the environment demands of an export economy during the time from the 1970s to the early 1990s (Korean University Document No. 1 and 6). However, when the external demands changed with the requirements of innovative technology to boost a knowledge-based economy, the university’s traditional identity was no longer aligned with the environment, leading to the critical step of identity transformation, which is described in the next category.

(III) Iron fist in a velvet glove – Transforming OI: OI is not aligned with institutional isomorphisms but strongly institutionalised in the organisation

This was recently the portrait of the Korean university. The misalignment of the university’s traditional identity with the environmental requirements caused the university to go through a process of identity transformation in which several strategies have been implemented to transform its traditional identity of non- STEM to an interdisciplinary university. As discussed previously, this process required much work and time (for strategic planning and implementation) and was characterised by difficulties, anxiety and conflicts of interest. Leaders are critical for the success of such a process. On one hand the leaders must be determined and resolute to carry out the agreed strategic plan. On the other hand, they must also be wise in negotiating the ways to accomplish such a plan with other organisational members.

(IV) Gravestone – Eliminating OI: OI is neither aligned with environmental arrangements nor strongly institutionalised in the organisation.

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If this scenario occurs, though very unlikely, the university’s existence is threatened. In this case, a serious evaluation is required to determine if it worth trying to rescue its identity.

The matrix above helps describe how the organisational context has shaped the meso actor’s strategic response. Based on the description of the context, the type of agency employed by the President in this step of strategic planning was identified. Specifically, the President has exercised the agency of sense-giver. By developing a proposal for transforming the university’s traditional identity, he has provided suggestions for other members to re-interpret the university’s identity. Through a cycle of sense-giving and sense-making, major stakeholders of the university have formally established and adopted strategies to transform its identity.

In the second step of identity transformation, the new identity was implemented in practice. This step is described as an ongoing series of negotiations among relevant stakeholders regarding the contents of the new identity. Consequently, the President, as a member of the university who also participated in this step, employed the agency of a negotiator. His role of being a bridge between the external stakeholders (i.e. Board of Trustees) and internal stakeholders (i.e. faculty and students) also significantly influenced his choice of agency. Since he is crucial to balancing the power structure of the university, it is critical for him to exercise the agency of a negotiator. c. Legitimacy

As noted previously, the concept of legitimacy used in this research is based on Suchman’s study of legitimacy (1995), referring to the perception regarding an actor’s actions as appropriate. Legitimacy is categorised into structural legitimacy (obtained through formal institutional structures) and normative legitimacy (obtained by conducting moral arguments of what is desirable to do). Applying these two categories of legitimacy to investigate the university President’s legitimacy, it is concluded that based on analytic levels, there are two types of legitimacy, namely institutional legitimacy and organisational 196

legitimacy. Institutionally, since the President occupies middle position in the field of HE, he also obtains average/medium structural and normative legitimacy. Organisationally, the research findings indicate that the President obtained highly structural legitimacy and normative legitimacy.

Firstly, the President certainly received strong organisational structural legitimacy thanks to his position as the leader of the university. His formal position as the President allowed him to assume authority and legitimacy to carry out critical steps in changing the university (i.e. transforming the university’s identity, re-structuring faculty, and re-organising academic programs).

It’s not enough to have only good intentions, it also must be a person who has the authority to implement his intention/plan. […] No matter how good your idea is, if you don’t have the authority to implement it, it has no meaning. […] If a Dean or Head of Department has a good plan, it is still very difficult to carry out. It must be the President to be able to put the plan in practice.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

Besides structural legitimacy, the President also obtained strong organisational normative legitimacy thanks to his leadership that had led the university to undergo crucial stages of its development. As pointed out in the subsection of agency, the university is in the process of transforming itself from non-STEM to an interdisciplinary university to meet the environmental demands. This process is considered as a series of continuing negotiations among the university’s relevant stakeholders in which the President, particularly, has participated by exercising his agency as a negotiator. As a result, leadership and management skills such as the ability of negotiation and persuasion are critically necessary.

You must be capable of persuading others. It’s leadership. […] You must be able to convince others; if they disagree, you have to persuade them. You have to try all your best to persuade those who disagree.

(Dean K., personal communication, 31 October 2016)

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(President C., personal communication, 3 November 2016)

In summary, I have discussed the role of the President based on the three sub- concepts of actor, namely position, agency and legitimacy. In terms of position, the President occupies the central position and is critical for every aspect of the university. This position grants him the structural legitimacy to enact critical changes such as identity transformation. Using the university’s identity transformation process as an illustration, I investigated the different types of agency exercised by the President. The research findings revealed that the President employed two different types of agency in different steps of identity transformation. Specifically, in the first step of strategic development of a new identity, the President utilised the agency of a sense-giver, providing university members new interpretations of its identity. In the second step of implementing the new identity, the President as a member of the university, participated in a process of negotiating the contents of the new identity with other relevant stakeholders. Hence, in this step, he exercised his agency as a negotiator. This type of agency helped him to obtain normative legitimacy to carry out his plan of transforming the university to meet the environmental demands.

5.3. Chapter Summary

This chapter provides an extensive discussion of the research findings regarding the Korean PHE generally and the university particularly. Firstly, the current practice of Korean PHE is described, primarily in three major aspects of governance, finance and quality assurance. Research findings revealed that at the macro level, the Korean government has adopted the governance model of regulated deregulation, in which it allows Boards of Trustees as the highest governing bodies in private universities to determine important matters of the university but simultaneously the government strongly intervenes through mechanisms such as funding and regulations. 198

As a result, this strong intervention has caused private universities to experience serious financial crisis because of the tuition cap policy that prevents universities to increase tuition fees. In addition, the performance-based funding approach implemented by the government has strengthened the dependence of private universities on government funding and therefore, indirectly altered universities’ directions and priorities. The Korean quality assurance system has experienced a shift in focus, from quality improvement to accountability, as an attempt of the government to link quality assurance mechanisms and performance-based funding. This move has raised serious concerns about the negative impacts of this compliance-based system that may neither help to improve university quality nor the system’s diversity.

Secondly, at the meso level, the private university of this study has adopted the trusteeship model of governance according to the legal requirements. In this governance model, the Board of Trustees is the ultimate decision-making unit. However, in the university’s governance structure, the participation of other units such as the University Council, the Faculty Deans Committee, the Professors Association and the Alumni Association in the decision-making process is the evidence for the shared governance practice in the university. At the centre of this structure, the President and his management team plays the critical role in balancing power, indicating the rise of managerialism in the university’s governance practice.

As part of Korean PHE, the university in this study has also experienced tremendous financial difficulties caused by the decline in student population, the tuition cap policy, and the fierce competition among universities for government funding, resulting in its unstable financial situation. Though it has developed several strategies to diversify its financial sources, these strategies did not fundamentally solve the university’s financial problems.

Thirdly, the institutional factors that shape the current practice of the Korean PHE including logics, isomorphisms and actors are discussed. The data revealed that the system is characterised by the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism. 199

Although Korean PHE adopted many practices from Western models of HE, Korean PHE has not developed an alternative logic to counter the influence of utilitarianism. In addition, strong isomorphisms, including coercive (i.e. regulations and policies), resource dependence (i.e. funding programs), normative (i.e. rankings) and homogenous environmental conditions have enhanced the convergence of the HE system, and therefore, strengthened the universal impact of utilitarianism.

In such a context, the Korean government, occupying the central position of the HE field, has exercised its agency as a capitalist mediator because it is driven by the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism and the neo-liberal capitalist ideology. Consequently, it has utilised funding and regulations as means to mediate between the market and universities to direct universities towards its goals of national development and economic growth.

Finally, the university’s identity transformation process provides fascinating insights into how organisations respond to external environment and organisational behaviours may impact institutions. In response to external demands for STEM education which is supported by the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism, the university has strategically transformed its identity from non- STEM to an interdisciplinary university. It has employed the specialisation policy implemented by the government as a rationale for its new identity. By thoroughly investigating the process of identity transforming from a NIT perspective, I argue that this strategic behaviour of the university may help develop an alternative logic as a counterargument to egalitarian utilitarianism.

In this process of transforming identity, the President, as a central actor of the university’s organisational structure, has used two types of agency. As a sense- giver, he provided the university’s members new interpretations regarding the university’s identity by developing a proposal for the strategic plan to transform its identity. He then exercised the agency of a negotiator to participate in the second step of implementing the new identity, negotiating with other members the contents of this new identity. 200

CHAPTER VI: THE CHINESE CASE

Because I intended to investigate different models of PHE in the selected countries of Vietnam, China and Korea for a broader range of references and lessons, the subsector of independent colleges in China has captured my attention for at least two reasons. Firstly, since the first independent college was established in 1995 (K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008), independent colleges in China have achieved remarkable development despite their short history. Currently, this subsector accounts for nearly 70 percent of the undergraduate enrolment in the private sector (J Liu & Elliott, 2016). However, there has been little research regarding this subsector, particularly those focusing on explaining its phenomenal development. Secondly, this subsector is distinctive in its operational modes based on cooperation between the public and private sectors (J Liu & Elliott, 2016; K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008). Studying this subsector, therefore, potentially provides significant lessons for Vietnam in developing PHE.

Chinese HE has witnessed incredibly rapid expansion since the late 1990s (Wan, 2006). The total enrolment rate in tertiary education has increased impressively, from 6.46 percent in 1999 to 15.24 percent in 2003, and to 48.44 percent in 2016 (UNESCO Institute for Statistic, 2018). This means that China had rapidly transformed its HE system from elite to mass system within five years, and very soon will enter the stage of universal HE, according to the definition of Trow (1973). The Chinese HE system mainly consists of public institutions, primarily affiliated with provincial or local governments (1,623 institutions). There are a small number of targeted institutions affiliated with national ministries that enjoy more funding and prestige (113), another significant number of institutions (706) are privately funded and/or operated (National Bureau of Statistic of China, 2012).

PHE, generally referred to as ‘minban’ (literally, people-operated) in Chinese, is one the most striking phenomena in recent Chinese HE (R. Yang, 1997). Although it is a newly established sector, it has achieved tremendous 201

development in recent years and has been rapidly growing quantitatively (Jian Li & Du, 2016). Within the more than 20 years from 1980 to 2006, private institutions that are qualified to grant degrees have increased from zero before 1980 to 278 (F. Li & Morgan, 2011). In 2002, the Chinese government enacted the Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools, and two years later, it issued Guidelines to implement the newly enacted Private Education Promotion Law. These documents have provided the legal framework for PHE to operate.

The critical functions of PHE in China is to fill the gap left by the public HE (J. Zhang & Wang, 2017). As HE in China has witnessed a significant expansion after critical education reforms (Jian Li & Du, 2016), it has become impossible to afford mass HE by public funding. PHE in China was developed to address this lack of funding (F. Li & Morgan, 2011). Thus, the priority of PHE in China is not social equity or educational quality but education accessibility. Since its focus is on accessibility, Chinese PHE has been criticised for paying less attention on educational objectives and of being low quality (K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008; Shi, 2015).

To address the quality issues of the private sector while maintaining its strengths of mobilising social resources, independent colleges (duli xueyuan) were established. Independent colleges are an important component of the private sector with a special hybrid form (J Liu & Elliott, 2016). As a part of PHE, the main function of establishing independent colleges is to meet the increasing societal demand of HE, respond to the requirements of HE reform, address the lack of resources for education, and ultimately contribute to the process of massification of HE in China (K.-H. Mok, 2009; K. Yu, Stith, Liu, & Chen, 2012; L. Zhang & Adamson, 2011). Like conventional private colleges and universities, independent colleges are self-financing entities which operate based on market principles (Jian Liu, 2014; J. Zhang & Wang, 2017). However, these special type of HE institutions are different from the conventional PHE in their strong affiliation with public universities which highlights their strength of basic

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academic quality assured by public ‘parental universities’ (K.-H. Mok, 2009; K. Yu & Ertl, 2010; L. Zhang & Adamson, 2011).

Distinctive Characteristics of Independent Colleges

Generally, these colleges are established based on cooperation between public universities and private funding (K. Yu et al., 2012). They are created to utilise the prestige and quality of the faculty of public institutions (L. Hong, Chen, Wang, & Li, 2014) and to secure funding from private investors (K. Yu & Ertl, 2010). Public universities tend to support independent colleges academically, with teaching staff, facilities and even academic administration, varying from case to case (Jiming Li, 2011; Wen, Guo, & Zhang, 2016). These colleges can be considered as quasi-private institutions since their funding is from private sources (K. Yu & Ertl, 2010). They are allowed to establish their own tuition fees, which are not limited by the government unlike public institutions. In addition, ‘a reasonable’ percentage of income or operational surplus of these colleges may be returned to the ‘parental university’ and the private investors based on the cooperation contract (K. Yu & Ertl, 2010). These colleges, offering the advantages of their public ‘parental universities’ but with much lower enrolment standards, are in high demand despite their higher tuition fees compared with other public universities (J Liu & Elliott, 2016). The number of independent colleges has increased to 292 in 2013, accounting for more than 70 percent of the undergraduate enrolment in the private sector (J Liu & Elliott, 2016).

Brief History of the Independent College Subsector

The short development history of the independent college subsector can be summarised and divided into three major developmental stages (J Liu & Elliott, 2016; Jian Liu, 2014; Wen et al., 2016). Firstly, the emerging stage was from 1999 to 2002. Some colleges affiliated with private ownership to public universities were established in response to the increasing demand for HE which the public budget failed to address on one hand and the decreasing quality of the conventional PHE on the other. In this stage, without a specific regulative 203

framework for guidance, each college developed its own strategy and development pathway.

The second period from 2003 to 2008 was the regulating stage. After reviewing the development of these newly established private affiliated colleges, the Chinese central government, represented by Ministry of Education issued Decree No. 8 in 2003 on Standardizing and Strengthening the Management of Independent Colleges Run in New Mechanisms and Modes by Universities. This is the first time the private affiliated colleges were called independent colleges, referring to their specific characteristics of ‘excellent resources, independent administration and private ownership’, Specifically, independent colleges are special initiatives that mobilise excellent educational resources and employ institutional independence with private attributes (J Liu & Elliott, 2016; Wen et al., 2016; K. Yu & Ertl, 2010; L. Zhang & Adamson, 2011). This decree marked a new stage of standardised operation of these colleges.

From 2008 until now, independent colleges have gone through a period of moderate development and transformation. The rapid growth of independent colleges in the previous stages had caused public concerns to arise due to some unethical and quality-threatening practices for profit (J Liu & Elliott, 2016). In response, the Chinese Ministry of Education reviewed the relevant policies to guide the development of this subsector by redefining its purposes, functions and features and clarifying its rights, responsibilities, and relationship with other agencies and stakeholders. At this stage, the central government proposes four pathways for independent colleges: first, continuing to operate as independent colleges; second, converting to public colleges; third, converting to fully private colleges; and finally, closing down (Wen et al., 2016).

Types of Independent Colleges

Since independent colleges are an attempt to mobilise social resources for education, this feature is reflected in the establishment background and structure of these colleges (Jiming Li, 2011; K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008; Wen et al., 2016; J. Zhang & Wang, 2017). Consequently, Chinese independent colleges can be 204

categorised into six types according to funding sources and cooperative structures: (1) independent colleges established by public universities and local governments; (2) independent colleges established by public universities and private enterprises; (3) independent colleges established by public universities and private universities; (4) independent colleges established by public universities and foreign educational institutions; (5) independent colleges established solely by public universities, which is the largest group of this subsector (almost 50 percent); and (6) independent colleges established based on the cooperation of public universities, government and private enterprises. This type of colleges, although not accounting for a large proportion of independent colleges, enjoys stable funding sources secured by negotiation between the different parties, especially between government and private enterprises. Our case college belongs to this category.

The case college is located in Z province, one of the most economically advanced areas in China (J. Zhang & Wang, 2017). Thanks to the advanced economy of the local area, there has been burgeoning demand for a highly skilled workforce to boost the economic growth of the local region (Liu & Jia, 2003, cited in J Liu & Elliott, 2016). The establishment of the college was an outcome of the collaboration between the municipal government, a national flagship university located in the city and a large enterprise in the province. More importantly, its establishment is part of a large project aiming to transform the flagship university to ‘world-class’ status by merging four universities into a comprehensive institution. The independent college was established to relocate superfluous staff from these four universities. Additionally, it was expected to provide more access to undergraduate programs for local students with less government funding and relatively high quality.

At the same time, with the involvement of business, it was expected that the linkage with industry would be strengthened to foster highly skilled human resources to meet the demand of the economic growth of the local economy. This college is among a very small number of independent colleges that were

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established by three parties as described above. Its development has manifested a particularly fascinating example of a hybrid model of public – private partnership that is worthy of thorough investigation.

In this chapter, the practices of the independent college model in China are described according to the three dimensions of the conceptual framework developed in Chapter III. The first dimension consists of three analytical aspects, namely governance, finance and quality assurance. The second dimension covers three institutional factors, that are isomorphisms, institutional logics and actors. The third dimension comprises three analytical levels – macro, meso and micro levels. As explained in the previous chapter (chapter V), this chapter focuses primarily on providing descriptions of the current practices of the independent college model at macro and meso levels. Data from the micro level is also included in the meso level because of the similarities in findings between these two levels. Consequently, this chapter is organised into two main sections, the first dimension (analytical aspects) and the second dimension (institutional factors). The third dimension (analytical levels, mainly the macro and meso levels) is included in these two sections.

6.1. The First Dimension

In this section, the unique model of independent colleges in Chinese HE is examined, focusing on the three major aspects of governance, finance and quality assurance (QA) at the macro and meso levels. At the macro level, the changes in governance structure and autonomy as well as the development of the QA system of Chinese HE are reported. The finance aspect at the macro level is included in the subsection of the meso level for two reasons. Firstly, the college in this case study has a special governance structure in which a representative of the local government participates in the governing board, making the boundary between the macro and meso levels unclear. Secondly, as China implements decentralisation in HE finance, the majority of Chinese HEIs receive public funding from local governments. As a result, the financial arrangements in Chinese HE are described as a subsection of the meso level. 206

6.1.1. The Macro Level

The documents used for data analysis in this section are listed in Table VI-1 below.

Table VI-1. List of Documents for Data Analysis at the Macro Level

Document No. Description Name Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1998, 1 Cn.Doc.1 issued in 1998, revised in 2015 Chinese Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools of the 2 Cn.Doc.2 People’s Republic of China, issued in 2002, revised in 2016 Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent 3 Cn.Doc.3 Colleges, issued in 2008 An introduction of the Higher Education Evaluation Center 4 Cn.Doc.4 (HEEC) of the Ministry of Education (MoE), published on its website (Retrieved from http://www.pgzx.edu.cn/en/index.jsp) An official speech of the Director of HEEC regarding the 5 Cn.Doc.5 implementation of the Chinese Quality Assurance (QA) system (Retrieved from http://www.pgzx.edu.cn/en/index.jsp) Regulations on Implementation of the Chinese QA Framework, 6 Cn.Doc.6 including QA agencies, QA standards, procedures and methods (Retrieved from http://www.pgzx.edu.cn/en/index.jsp) Outline of China’s National Plan for Medium and Long-term 7 Cn.Doc.7 Education Reform and Development (2010-2020) (Retrieved from https://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org) A published article of the Director of the HEEC introducing the 8 Cn.Doc.8 QA system in China (Retrieved from https://hedclub.com/en/library/)

Among these, the following documents provide critical elements of the legal basis for establishing the regulative framework of Chinese HE. Firstly, the Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China (HE Law) issued in 1998, specifically addressed the nature, tasks, principles, basic institutions and 207

investment for HE. Importantly, it includes the organisational structure of HE institutions. According to this law, HE institutions enjoy the status of a legal entity on its establishment with the president as its legal representative. Specific regulations also clarified institutional autonomy, admissions, academic programs. Regarding PHE, the central government issued the Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools of the People’s Republic of China in 2002. Two years later, the regulations for implementation were promulgated, providing clear instructions and guidelines which eventually helped bridge the gaps between the legal documents and educational practices.

In 2003, the Ministry of Education issued a decree on Standardizing and Strengthening the Management of Independent Colleges Run in New Mechanisms and Modes by Universities, which helped clarify the nature, legal status, functions, rights and responsibilities of these colleges (J Liu & Elliott, 2016; Wen et al., 2016; J. Zhang & Wang, 2017; Zhao, 2014). This policy document helped to address controversies regarding the issues of education quality and equity. In addition, conflicts between independent colleges and other stakeholders such as their affiliating public universities, the investors and the governments were also rectified (J Liu & Elliott, 2016). In this legal document, the hybrid form of the independent colleges was clarified, and the operating principles for these colleges were also established. Specifically, independent colleges are autonomous in administration and can acquire the status of a legal entity on establishment (Wen et al., 2016). The colleges award diplomas and qualifications independently from the parental universities. Their campuses are also separated from of the affiliating institutions, and their financial management is also independent.

In 2008, the Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges was promulgated by the Ministry of Education. In this policy document, an explicit agenda was announced, aiming to transform the independent colleges into (1) public institutions; (2) private institutions; (3) remain as independent colleges; and finally (4) closing down (Wen et al., 2016). However, by the end of

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2012, only 25% of independent colleges had completed transformation into private colleges (Jian Liu, 2014). The rest still remained in their hybrid form.

6.1.1.1. Governance

In this section, the governance model at the macro level of China was investigated based on the data collected from legal documents and policy statements. Research findings have revealed that the distinctive model of governance employed by the Chinese government is ‘centralised decentralisation’. This refers to the approach of the government that promotes decentralisation in HE by redistributing power and responsibility to the local governments, diversifying financial resources for education by encouraging PHE to develop, and granting greater autonomy to HEIs. However, the extent and speed of this decentralisation process is under the strict control of the central government, namely that autonomy in critical aspects such as mission establishment, academic program development, student enrolment, and governance has not been fully granted to HEIs. a. Governance Structure: Central and Local Governments

Basically, the data reveals that there are two major government agencies involved in governing HE at the macro level, the central and provincial governments, with the latter taking the main responsibility. According to the HE Law in 1998, Chinese HE is under the unified leadership and the management of the State Council. Local governments (provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities) manage HE within their administrative domain to meet the demand of the local areas.

The State Council is the agency in charge of establishing policy and providing guidance and instruction to direct the HE system.

Article 13: The State Council shall provide unified guidance and administration for higher education throughout the country.

(Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1998)

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The Ministry of Education is the State Council’s executive body for education. It is responsible for conducting strategic planning and drafting regulations. In addition, the Ministry of Education also supervises and manages the implementation of HE policies, teaching and research practices, staffing and student affairs (K. Yu et al., 2012).

Article 6: The administrative department of education under the State Council shall be responsible for overall planning, comprehensive coordination and macro management of the independent colleges nationwide.

(Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges, 2008)

Meanwhile, the educational-specialised departments affiliated wiht the National Assembly are administrative agencies that manage different educational aspects and projects.

Artilce 41: Administrative departments for education and the relevant departments shall, in accordance with the law, exercise supervision over and provide guidance to privately-run schools, [...] in order to enhance the quality of privately-run schools; and they shall make arrangements or entrust public intermediary bodies to assess the quality of education of such schools and make the assessment results known to the general public.

(Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools of the People’s Republic of China, 2002) b. Changes in the Governance Model in China

In the past, Chinese HE was under the state-controlled model of governance in which the central government assumed full responsibilities for formulating HE policies, allocating resources, exercising administrative controls, employing teaching and research staff, developing curricula, choosing textbooks, recruiting students, and assigning jobs to university graduates. However, there has recently

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been a tendency to decentralisation, resulting in a shift of governance from a state-controlled to a state-supervised model (M. Li & Yang, 2014).

Regarding decentralisation, according to Mok (2004), one of the major characteristics of reform in China is “the state’s concerted effort to make use of the non-state sector and to mobilise market forces to finance education” (p. 208). This, however, does not necessarily mean the role of the state is weakened. Instead, the decentralisation process in China is characterised by the dominant role of the state in determining “where the work will be done, by whom and how” (K. H. Mok, 2004, p. 202). In this context of decentralisation, the central government of China has deliberately redistributed power and responsibility, particularly to local governments. Resources for education have been diversified by encouraging multiple channels of funding, including cost sharing measures such as tuition fees. In addition, HEIs have been granted greater autonomy in general.

To be specific, there has been an increase in joint governance between the central and provincial governments. In each province and municipal city, there is a local department of education, taking responsibility of managing the education system at the local/regional level. Educational finance to sustain the system is determined generally under the collective agreement between educational departments and relevant government agencies.

Article 8: The administrative departments for education under the local people's governments at or above the county level shall be responsible for managing privately-run schools in their own administrative regions. The administrative departments for human resources and social security and the relevant departments under the local people's governments at or above the county level shall respectively be responsible for managing privately-run schools within the scope of their duties.

(Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools of the People’s Republic of China, 2002)

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Generally, the local governments coordinate the overall development of HE within their respective administration areas, implement the regional HE development plan, manage the affiliated HE institutions at the provincial level, including public, private universities, independent colleges and vocational colleges, and implement the laws, regulations, rules, and relevant decisions and orders of the central government. Article 6: The administrative department of education of the people's government of provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the Central Government (hereinafter referred to as the provincial administrative department of education) shall be responsible for managing independent colleges within its administrative region, and shall perform the following duties according to law: (1) Managing licenses for operating independent colleges; (2) Keeping brochures and advertisements of independent colleges for the record review; (3) Publishing information related to independent colleges; (4) Examining independent colleges annually; (5) Rewarding excellent independent colleges; (6) Investigating independent colleges’ illegal actions and violations; (7) Other duties as stipulated by laws and regulations.

(Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges, 2008)

In addition, one of the most remarkable initiatives in reforming the Chinese HE system has been mobilising social resources to participate in HE management, particularly from the private sector. The government’s attempts to encourage the participation of other social forces in PHE can be clearly observed in the relevant legal documents. Firstly, the state promotes the development of PHE,

Article 6: The State encourages all sectors of society, including enterprises, institutions, public organizations or groups as well as individual citizens, to establish and operate higher education institutions in accordance with law

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and to participate in and support the reform and development of higher education.

(Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1998) and considers PHE and independent colleges as a component of public welfare,

Article 3: Privately-run schools belong to the public welfare system and constitute a component of socialist education. With regard to privately-run schools, the State applies the principles of enthusiastic encouragement, vigorous support, correct guidance, and administration according to law. People's governments at all levels shall consider the development of the privately-run schools in their economic and social development plan.

(Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools of the People’s Republic of China, 2002)

Article 3: The independent college sector is an important part of private higher education and belongs to the public welfare system […]

(Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges, 2008) by granting PHE the same status as its public counterparts,

Article 5: Privately-run schools and government-run schools shall have equal legal status, and the State safeguards the autonomy of privately-run schools. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the sponsors, principals, teachers and staff members and students of privately-run schools.

(Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools of the People’s Republic of China, 2002) and protecting its legal rights according to the regulative framework.

Article 5: The State guarantees the legitimate rights and interests of independent colleges and their founders.

(Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges, 2008)

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Secondly, the Chinese government allows for-profit PHE;

Article 43: After deducting the operational costs of a school, reserving development funds, and other necessary expenses in accordance with relevant regulations, an independent college may obtain a reasonable return from the school revenue. The criteria and procedures for the investors to obtain a reasonable return shall be implemented in accordance with the regulations of the Private Education Promotion Law and relevant regulations.

(Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges, 2008) and founders and/or owners of PHE institutions are permitted to participate in the management process of the institution.

Article 20: The sponsors of a privately-run school shall, according to the authority and procedures prescribed in the charter of the school, participate in the operation and management of the school.

(Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools of the People’s Republic of China, 2002)

Finally, incentives such as funding, tax exemption for private investors and donors, student loans and scholarships for students enrolled in private institutions, leasing property or assets are offered to private institutions.

Article 47: Privately-run schools shall enjoy preferential taxation policies formulated by the State, and non-profit privately-run schools may enjoy the same preferential tax policies as government-run schools.

(Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools of the People’s Republic of China, 2002)

Article 5: Independent colleges are entitled to various rewards and support policies stipulated in the Regulations on the Law on the Promotion of Non- public Schools and the Implementation of the Law on the Promotion of Non- public Schools.

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(Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges, 2008) c. Autonomy

Regarding autonomy, Chinese HE since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in 1949 until the late 1970s was controlled by the state and lacked independence from national politics (K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008; Zhao, 2014). Recent reforms since the late 1980s, particularly in the 1990s have led to much greater self-determination among Chinese universities (Wan, 2006). The Chinese government has committed to enhance institution autonomy as part of HE system reform. The Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China issued in 1998 legitimizes university autonomy in six perspectives:

(1) curriculum development and department restructuring;

Article 10: The State, in accordance with laws, ensures the freedom of scientific research, literary and artistic creation and other cultural activities conducted in higher education institutions.

Article 34: Higher education institutions shall, based on academic requirements, act on their own to develop their academic programs, educational materials and organise their academic activities.

(2) staffing and personnel management;

Article 37: They shall, in accordance with relevant regulations, assess the performance of teachers and other professional staff, [...] and re-adjust [...] salaries.

(3) income-generation and financial distribution:

Article 38: Higher education institutions shall, in accordance with the law, act on their own to manage properties provided by sponsors, fiscal funds allocated by the State and contributions and donations received.

(4) international exchange and cooperation:

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Article 36: Higher education institutions shall, in accordance with relevant regulations, act on their own to carry out academic exchange and cooperation with higher education institutions from overseas [...].

(5) teaching research and social services;

Article 35: Higher education institutions shall, based on their own circumstances, act on their own to conduct research, develop technology and provide services for society. and (6) restructuring of internal governance.

Article 37: Higher education institutions shall, based on actual needs and on the principle of efficient administration, act on their own to organise the internal structure for teaching, research and executive functions [...].

Theoretically, a strong push towards decentralising HE, the strengthened roles of provincial governments and the marketisation of the HE sector should have led to increased university autonomy across the domains of teaching, research and administration. However, as reported by Wang (2000) based on a survey of more than 200 universities, academic staff recruitment was the only item where more than half the respondents considered that there was improvement compared with the past. Other areas considered still lacking autonomy included student enrolment, academic program development, organisational structure, fund allocation, promotion and recruitment of senior administrators and departmental heads. In short, Chinese universities now have greater freedom in only appointive and academic aspects, and some additional financial independence from the government in the form of private funds (M. Li & Yang, 2014)

As a part of the HE system, PHE and independent colleges are still subject to the control of the Chinese government. The key aspects where the government emphasises its control are establishment, quality, finance and enrolment. Mostly, the government established the standards for the establishment of private institutions and is responsible to examine and approve their establishment once requirements are met (article 25 and 29, Higher Education Law; article 17,

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Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges). Similar to public institutions, private HEIs must follow the guidance and supervision of the government in terms of quality assurance (article 41, the Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools).

In terms of finance, although private HEIs can determine their tuition fees, the government exercises its control by supervising the process of setting tuition fee standards. In particular, the tuition fee collection methods are determined by the local government (article 38 and 39, the Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools). In the case of admissions, PHE is less restricted in the number of students enrolled. While public universities must enrol students according to the number established by the State (article 32, Higher Education Law), private institutions only have to submit the enrolment number to the relevant authority for the record (article 42, the Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools).

For independent colleges, macro government control is especially seen in the matter of governance. Specifically, it is the relevant authority to which the lists of members of the board of directors of these colleges are reported (article 25, Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges) and by which the appointment of the president of the college is approved (article 29, ibis). In addition, the enrolment scale of these colleges also needs the approval of the authority (article 33, ibis).

The remarkable development of conventional PHE and independent colleges in recent years is an undeniable evidence of the decentralisation process promoted by the Chinese government. Simultaneously, HEIs have been gradually granted autonomy in several aspects as shown above. Especially, in comparison with public HE institutions, the conventional private HEIs and independent colleges have received more autonomy as an incentive from the government to encourage private investment in HE. However, the reality of the autonomy granted to HE institutions, both public and private, is still unclear, since some critical aspects

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such as university mission establishment, academic development, student enrolment, and governance have not been fully granted to institutions.

This approach adopted by the Chinese government might have been the cause that characterises the ‘semi-independence’ feature of Chinese HE, as Li and Yang (2014) discover. According to these researchers, Chinese universities are “neither distinctively separated from the government, nor squarely under its complete control” (p. 48). They have moved from a fully controlled model of governance under the central planning systems to a semi-independent model of institutions partially independent and partially controlled by the central and provincial governments. In some areas, they enjoy full freedom of self- determination, such as in the appointment of staff and the structuring of academic and administrative departments. In other areas, including the appointment of university presidents, they are controlled by governments. In some areas, such as making changes to disciplinary programs, they may initiate and take action on their own, but must submit proposals and documents to the governments afterwards.

To recap, in this section we have discovered the distinctive model of governance at the macro level in China, which is the ‘centralised decentralisation’ approach. In this model, the government, on one hand promotes the process of decentralisation by redistributing power and responsibility to local governments. In addition, the development of conventional PHE and independent colleges are encouraged as a way to diversify financial resources for education. At the same time autonomy has been gradually granted to HEIs. On the other hand, the government still exercises its control in some critical respects such as mission establishment, academic program development, student enrolment and governance.

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6.1.1.2. Quality Assurance

The massive expansion in Chinese HE since the late 1990s (Shi, 2015) has caused the system to face dramatic challenges to quality because the development of teaching capacity and improvement in quality have not matched the rapid growth in HE demand (S. Liu & Rosa, 2008). As a result, the Chinese government has paid significant attention to improving the quality of the HE system. The Outline of China’s National Plan for Medium and Long-term Educational Reform and Development (2010-2020) has highlighted that quality improvement is critical for the development of the Chinese HE system and a basic requirement for nation building (Chinese Document No. 7). This indicates that HE reform in China has shifted from quantitative expansion to qualitative development, and quality improvement is at the centre of HE transformation.

The development of the Chinese QA system can be divided into several stages. The first stage started in 1985 with some pilot projects evaluating HE conducted in selected provinces (Chinese Document No. 4). The first official regulation on QA that clearly defined purposes, principles and methods of HE evaluation, was promulgated by the State Education Commission (renamed to Ministry of Education in 1998) in 1990 (F. Huang, 2017). The second stage began in 1994 with the State Education Commission initiating systemic evaluation based on the above legal framework, using three major methods, namely quality assessment, excellence assessment and random assessment (S. Liu, 2013).

These forms of evaluation were conducted until 2002 when the Ministry of Education (MoE) decided to combine the three methods into a unified evaluation method, forming the current system of QA in 2002 (Chinese Document No. 4). This move marks the third stage of QA development in China. In 2003, the MoE proposed an action plan of education reform for the 2003-2007 period in which the first five-year cycle of evaluation from 2003 to 2008 was introduced, evaluating 589 HEIs (Chinese Document No. 8). In 2004, the Higher Education Evaluation Center (HEEC) was formally established under the leadership of the MoE (S. Liu, 2015). Finally, from 2009 until now, the second cycle of evaluation 219

is being conducted, focusing on evaluating newly established HEIs that were not evaluated in the first cycle (S. Liu, 2016a).

In the following section, the QA system in Chinese HE is described according to the operationalised notion of QA, namely QA agency, QA methods, QA standards and procedures and QA purposes. It is important to note that the QA system in Chinese HE includes different evaluation instruments according to evaluation level (i.e. university or program levels) or type of university (i.e. research-oriented, teaching oriented or vocation-oriented) (Chou, 2016; X.-H. Huang, Adamson, & Lee, 2014). Because this study focuses on teaching-oriented private HEIs, only the QA instruments relevant to the teaching-oriented university level are described here.

Accordingly, the research findings show that firstly, similar to many other countries (Chou, 2016; Mohrman, Wang, & Li, 2011), the QA practices in China include three major methods, namely accreditation, audit and rankings. However, given the dominant role of the government and its affiliated agency (HEEC), the QA standards and procedures were designed and implemented according to a top-down manner with little opportunity to facilitate mutual communication between the macro and meso levels to genuinely improve quality (Chou, 2016; S. Liu & Rosa, 2008). As a result, the conflict between quality improvement and accountability has intensified (Y. Li, 2010; S. Liu & Rosa, 2008; Zou, Du, & Rasmussen, 2012), as well as the tension between centralised control and university autonomy (Chou, 2016; Mohrman et al., 2011). This conflict and tension might have been the result of the Chinese government attempts to balance the traditional approach of centralised control with market-based reforms (Mohrman et al., 2011; K.-H. Mok, 2005; K. H. Mok, 2004). a. QA Agency

Because quality is identified as crucial for HE reform in China (Chinese Document No. 7), massive efforts have been expended to implement QA from the central government to university levels. At the macro level, the MoE takes the responsibility to formulate QA policies and relevant implementation plans 220

(Chinese Document No. 6), establish evaluation agencies (Mohrman et al., 2011), approve evaluation committees, and coordinate between different levels and agencies to ensure the consistency and conformity of the QA system (Chinese Document No. 6).

The MoE formulates QA policies and relevant implementation plans and establishes expert committees to evaluate the undergraduate teaching aspect in the HEIs.

(Chinese Document No. 6)

Local governments are required to coordinate with the MoE in implementing the QA mechanisms in the regions and support universities in the relevant regions to implement QA.

The local Education Administrative Department shall coordinate with the Education Department of the Ministry to implement QA in the relevant region and the department.

(Chinese Document No. 6)

The MoE also established the Higher Education Evaluation Center (HEEC) in 2004 as the accreditation agency to implement the QA system at the national level.

The HEEC was formally established in August 2004 and is an administrative institution directly under the MoE.

(Chinese Document No. 4)

The HEEC is responsible to implement QA for undergraduate education. Specifically, it provides training for QA experts, conducts research on QA to help develop QA policies and regulations in China, provides consultancy services regarding QA (Chinese Document No. 4 and 6) and builds and maintains a national database of QA for policy making (F. Huang, 2005).

Apart from these state-owned agencies, there are also non-government agencies that are qualified to participate in accrediting HEIs, such as the Shanghai Agency for Education Evaluation or Jiangsu Agency for Education Evaluation (S. Liu, 221

2016a). In addition, the National Higher Education Quality Assurance and Evaluation Institutions Coordination Association was established in 2010 with more than 200 member institutions, endeavouring to improve QA in China from a non-government perspective (Mohrman et al., 2011). However, given the dominant role of the state-owned agencies in QA (X.-H. Huang et al., 2014; Mohrman et al., 2011), the contribution of these non-government agencies to the development of the Chinese QA system is viewed to be limited (S. Liu, 2016a). b. QA Methods

There are three major QA methods adopted in the Chinese QA system, namely accreditation, audit and ranking. Accreditation is the primary QA method to evaluate HEIs, particularly the newly established HEIs that were not evaluated in the first cycle of accreditation during the period from 2003 to 2008 (Chinese Document No. 8). It is mandatory for HEIs to be accredited by evaluation committees organised by HEEC (Chou, 2016).

Audit is another QA method that was introduced by the MoE in 2014, targeting the 650 HEIs that participated in the first cycle of accreditation and awarded accreditation certification (Chinese Document No. 8). The focus of this method is to strengthen HEIs’ ‘fitness for purpose’ and their response to public demands.

The auditing evaluation emphasizes that HEIs should develop measurements based on their own standards, focusing on their fitness for educational purpose, their responsiveness to public demands, […] and the satisfaction of students and employers with their functions of developing comprehensive talents for nation building and economic growth.

(Chinese Document No. 8)

University rankings have significantly influenced QA in China, becoming extremely popular, particularly to potential students and their parents (F. Huang, 2017; S. Liu, 2016a). However, the government or state-owned agencies have not paid much attention to developing rankings or league tables (F. Huang, 2017). The majority of rankings developed in China so far are attempts of for-profit educational companies such as Netbig, of non-government organisations, namely 222

the Chinese University Alumni Association, or of research institutes, including Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Wuhan University (Chou, 2016; S. Liu, 2016a), c. QA Standards and Procedures

In the first cycle of accreditation, the MoE developed a set of uniform standards, including eight major standards and 19 indicators (X.-H. Huang et al., 2014; S. Liu, 2016b). However, these standards were criticised for being vague, rigid and mainly focused on facilities and quantifiable indicators (Cao & Li, 2014; Mohrman et al., 2011). In addition, the one-size-fits-all standards did not encourage the HE system’s diversity (Y. Li, 2010).

As a consequence, the MoE has kept revising QA standards, aiming to encompass a wide range of HEIs (Mohrman et al., 2011). The current standards were revised in 2011, including 7 standards and 20 indicators for general HEIs, as listed below.

Table VI-2. Evaluation Standards of the Chinese QA System

No. Standards Indicators University Mission 1 University Operation Leadership Educational Model Faculty Size and Structure 2 Faculty Education and Teaching Level Training for Academic Staff Education Conditions Infrastructure 3 and Facilities Funding for Teaching Course Development Course and Curriculum 4 Curriculum and Education Development Applied Education Administration Staff 5 Quality Management Quality Supervision 6 Student Support On-campus Learning Support

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Support Services Moral Education Professional Knowledge and Skills 7 Education Quality Physical and Aesthetic Education On-campus and Off-campus Education Graduates’ Employability

(Chinese Document No. 6)

Unlike the first-cycle standards which were criticised for being one-size-fits-all and did not consider the diverse background and characteristics of HEIs (S. Liu, 2016b), the newly revised standards have shown substantial efforts by the authority to reflect the diversity of the system by developing additional standards for non-state-owned HEIs and institutions with special purposes. Specifically, slightly different ‘observation points’ for standards and indicators such as leadership and faculty size and structure are applied to non-state colleges and universities (Chinese Document No. 6).

In terms of procedures, , accreditation procedures in China, like other countries, include three major steps: self-evaluation, on-site visit, and follow-up reform (S. Liu, 2013, 2015; Mohrman, 2015). Specifically, the university prepare a self- evaluation report, an evaluation committee conducts an on-site visit and later reports the evaluation results to the university and the MoE. A corresponding self-improvement report is then developed by the university for its future development (Chou, 2016; Y. Li, 2010).

The main procedures for the evaluation include self-evaluation, experts’ evaluation, review and evaluation result release.

(Chinese Document No. 6)

The self-evaluation is conducted according to the main themes, including major achievements, shortcomings and solutions, and measurements to improve quality and QA at the university. The external evaluation is organised by the MoE (Chinese Document No. 6) or by the local department of education. The evaluation committee based on the results of the self-evaluation report review, 224

on-site visit and interviews and other sources of information will determine the evaluation outcomes with recommendations for improvement (Chinese Document No. 6). After receiving the evaluation results, the HEEC will publish the outcomes

Article 44: Administrative departments for education shall be in charge of organizing specialists or entrusting the third-party professional organizations to evaluate […] the quality of education in institutions.

(Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1998)

The HEEC will officially release the evaluation outcomes based on the conclusion of the evaluation committee.

(Chinese Document No. 6) d. QA Purposes

Since the Chinese government views quality improvement is at the centre of HE reforms, undoubtedly the focus of QA in Chinese HE is quality improvement. This task is explicitly spelled out in important policy documents such as the National Medium and Long-term Education Reform (2010-2020) (Chinese Document No. 7). The report of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China emphasised that quality improvement in HE is critical to successfully implement ‘comprehensive reforms’ in education because the Chinese government considers improving quality in HE is an essential requirement for nation building through developing a strong HE system (Chinese Document No. 5). Consequently, systemic steps to develop a QA system have been taken, including establishing QA standards, procedures and agencies, and building a national database of QA. The Chinese government expects to promote a QA culture in its HE system through a comprehensive QA approach that includes internal and external evaluation methods (Chinese Document No. 4 and 5).

Combine external evaluation and internal evaluation, and actively promote the establishment of internal education quality assurance mechanisms in higher education institutions. 225

(Chinese Document No. 4)

First, from the university level, the establishment of an annual report and national database will help improve QA awareness in HEIs, […] strengthen the internal quality monitoring mechanisms in HEIs and established a normalized assessment system.

(Chinese Document No. 5)

Meanwhile, the emphasis on accountability in the Chinese QA system can be observed in the requirements to disclose QA outcomes, including the self- evaluation reports, the external evaluation report, and the decision made by the evaluation committee (Chinese Document No. 6). The authority anticipates that publishing such information will encourage the participation of various stakeholders in the evaluation process. In addition, it is planned to strengthen the supervision by the society (Chinese Document No. 4) via various mechanisms such as inviting experts from industry and enterprises to participate in evaluating HEIs (Chinese Document No. 6) and building a national database of QA to provide transparent and useful information for stakeholders, namely alumni, employers, students, parents and media (Chinese Document No. 5).

A working mechanism in which all sectors of society participate in the assessment will be established and experts from industry and enterprises will be invited to participate in the assessment.

(Chinese Document No. 6)

From the societal level, the establishment of the database […] helps strengthen the system’s responsiveness to the social demand of quality in HE and engaging social organizations, alumni, employers, students, parents, media, etc. in HE.

(Chinese Document No. 5)

Even though the link between QA and funding is unclear in Chinese HE (S. Liu & Rosa, 2008), the MoE warns that necessary sanctions may be applied to HEIs that fail to promptly implement QA requirements and improve quality accordingly, such as reducing enrolment quotas, or restricting applications for 226

opening new courses. This is more evidence for the summative approach that emphasises accountability and compliance with QA in Chinese HE.

For the colleges who postpone the evaluation due to failing to meet the evaluation standards, the MoE will restrict their applications for opening new courses or reduce the number of enrolled students.

(Chinese Document No. 6)

In general, QA in China has been criticised for being a compliance-driven process rather than encouraging self-improvement (Chou, 2016; S. Liu, 2015). According to Chou (2016), the centralised governance at the macro level that allows the Chinese government’s control over HEIs has led to top-down approach of QA with mandatory standardised criteria and requirements applied to all HEIs. In addition, the dominant role of the government tends to put pressure on HEIs to comply with the QA requirements regardless of individual institutions’ plans and characteristics (Y. Li, 2010; G. Zhou, 2016).

This dominance by the government and the compliance focus of the first cycle of evaluation were the primary causes of its failures, according to S. Liu and Rosa (2008). These authors argue that although QA policies were successful in helping the Chinese government measure the achievements of the system, it did not evidently help either improve the quality of HEIs or strengthen accountability as expected (S. Liu, 2016b). In agreement with these authors, Zou, Du and Rasmussen (2012), based on evidence from their content analysis of the self- evaluation reports provided by HEIs in China, proving that the impact of this QA scheme is limited, even distorting educational quality of Chinese HEIs.

Acknowledging these shortcomings, the government is attempting to address them in the second cycle of accreditation (from 2009 until now). Substantial initiatives were introduced such as developing additional indicators and observation points for different types of HEIs to ensure the system’s diversity (Chinese Document No. 6) and diversifying QA methods by introducing audits for more developed HEIs while applying accreditation primarily for newly established, less prestigious HEIs (Chinese Document No. 8). In addition, 227

information disclosure has been enforced to strengthen public supervision by measures such as the ‘Sunshine Evaluation’ process (Chinese Document No. 6). By publishing annual reports and a database regarding the quality of the HE system, this process is expected to engage the broader public in supervising HE quality while strengthening transparency of the evaluation process (Mohrman et al., 2011).

In conclusion, the QA system of Chinese HE is progressing toward developing a more comprehensive approach to evaluate and promote quality improvement in HEIs. Obviously there is still the fundamental tension between policy and practices (X.-H. Huang et al., 2014). From different perspectives, this tension can be seen as the conflict between the logics of quality improvement and of accountability within the QA system (Y. Li, 2010; S. Liu & Rosa, 2008; Zou et al., 2012), or a power struggle between the state and HEIs, expressed in the form of tension between central control versus university autonomy (Chou, 2016; Mohrman et al., 2011). Such tension in the QA system of Chinese HE may be the result of the approach of centralised decentralisation adopted by the Chinese government, in which the government attempts to balance centralised control with the ascendant approach of market-based reform (Mohrman et al., 2011; K.- H. Mok, 2005; K. H. Mok, 2004).

6.1.2. The Meso and Micro Levels

I experienced great difficulties in gaining access to independent colleges in China. Though I tried to use personal connections to get in touch with key potential participants before my travel to China, Chinese academics seemed very cautious in their communication with an external researcher like me. I eventually gained access to this college thanks to my connection with a senior manager of a large German technology firm in China who had a strong relationship with universities via university-industry linkages. Since China’s economy is booming and technology is among the targets of the government to upgrade China from a manufacturing-based to a knowledge-based economy, relations between industry and universities have been strengthening. This technology firm has supported

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Chinese universities, especially those in the disciplines of engineering, computer sciences and other tech-based areas. Thanks to this strong industry-university relationship, I was allowed to approach some of the academic staff and managers of the case college.

However, the strong linkage between the college and the tech firm did not help me to have in-depth interviews with participants due to the tight schedule, rushed arrangements, and watchful attitudes. The participants were quite cautious, particularly those in leadership positions. When I asked if the documents regarding the arrangements of rights and responsibilities between the major founders in establishing and operating the college, I was told that it is available only for ‘authorised’ personnel. Apart from information available on the internet or other public documents such as college brochures, they could not provide me any information. Additionally, unlike the cases in Vietnam and Korea where I could approach leaders at a high level such as the chairman (of the governing board) or the president, in the Chinese case college, I could only access leaders at faculty level and academic staff.

Nevertheless, the individual participants were highly supportive, respectful and professional. The Dean of the College of Engineering agreed to meet me despite her busy schedule. When we met at her office, she arrived with her suitcase as she had just finished a trip from another province. Other participants were willing to extend the interviewing time as we talked though I had requested only one hour of their time. All participants were straight forward and professional. From them I could sense the youthful and dynamic atmosphere of the young college.

As I walked in the college campus, I was impressed by its modern facilities and pleasant environment. It had a large campus, despite being located in one of the most densely populated and economically advanced cities in China. The buildings were relatively new and modern. The physical layout of the campus featured with beautiful gardens and streams, obviously reflecting the traditional beauty of ‘jiangnan’ (literally refers to the southern areas of the Yangtze River),

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a poetic term that denotes the geographical and literal features of the local area, for which the city is famous. However, the facilities were highly functional with little emphasis on artistic design and symbolic meaning.

Meetings for interview were organised in the office of the College of Engineering. Despite rushed arrangements and tight schedules, I was able to collect rich information regarding operational activities of the college. Documents used for data analysis are listed in the table VI-2 below. Similar to the Korean case, documents without dates were retrieved online with dates unknown. However, due to the requirements of ensuring research participants’ privacy and confidentiality, wesite addresses cannot be provided.

Table VI-3. . List of Documents for Data Analysis at the Meso Level

Document No Description Name A brief introduction to the independent college, its history, achievements, faculty structure, and organisational 1 Cn.UDoc.1 structure. This document was published in the university’s website 2 Cn.UDoc.2 A brief introduction to the college available on its website An article published on the college’s website in 2018 about the recent meeting of representative faculty and staff 3 Cn.UDoc.3 member discussing the college’s strategies to transform the college to a public institution An article published on the college’s website in 2018 4 Cn.UDoc.4 identifying the key targets of the college for the second half of 2018 A list of key leaders of the college published in the 5 Cn.UDoc.5 university website. A document introducing major characteristics of the college, its vision, achievements, resources and most 6 Cn.UDoc.6 prominent features. This document was published in the university’s website.

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An official document published in the university’s 7 Cn.UDoc.7 website, introducing the college’s strategy, its mission, vision and strategic goals. The college’s self-evaluation regarding its quality and 8 Cn.UDoc.8 quality assurance system in the 2016-2017 academic year. 9 Cn.UDoc.9 The college’s budget plan for the 2017 academic year 10 Cn.UDoc.10 The college’s financial report for the 2017 academic year 11 Cn.UDoc.11 The college’s budget plan for the 2018 academic year

This section provides a description of the independent college in this case study, focusing on two aspects, namely governance and finance. In terms of governance, a detailed analysis reveals the college’s governance structure, including its major constituents, and the characteristics of its governance model. As explained previously, the financial situation of the college is described in this section to illustrate financial arrangements in Chinese HE, emphasising the changes in Chinese HE finance, the problems resulting from the current financial structure and the strategies the independent college in this case study has adopted to address its financial difficulties. The QA aspect is omitted in this section because Chinese QA policy is mandatory, and the college has mainly implemented QA mechanisms to comply with the legal framework.

6.1.2.1. Governance a. Governance Structure

The governance structure of the college includes the Board of Directors and the Executive Council. The Board of Directors, as the highest governing board, consists of representatives of the three founders of the college, namely the local government, the public university and the public enterprise. Meanwhile the Executive Council led by the President takes responsibility to implement the key decisions made by the Board. The existence of these two units within the college’s governance structure and the clear division of responsibility between them are strong evidence for the corporate governance model the college has adopted.

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Interestingly, despite this corporate governance borrowed from private business practice, the college is strongly public-oriented, thanks to the involvement in its leadership of the three members from the public sectors which are the local government, the public university and the public enterprise. The publicness of the college can be found in its mission, educational objectives and the generous support from the government which exceeds what has been granted to conventional private HEIs.

a.1. The Board of Directors

At the meso level, the case college has adopted a hybrid form of governance. Its hybridity is displayed firstly through the cooperation of both public and private sectors in establishing and operating the college. Secondly, the distinctive feature of this college is that it is governed according to a corporate business model under the leadership of the public sector (i.e. the local government and the public parental university).

In the governance structure of the case college, the most important governing bodies are the Board of Directors and the Executive Council. The Board of Directors is a unique feature that only exists in PHE. Legally speaking, the main members of the Board of Directors include the investors, the president and leaders of the college, and representatives of the staff (article 21, the Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools, 2002). For independent colleges, the Board of Directors as the governing board of the college consists of representatives of the ‘parental public university’, representatives of the investors (either individuals or organisations), presidents of the colleges, and representatives of the faculty (article 25, Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges, 2008).

However, in the case college, the special feature of its governance model is the involvement of the local government. In the Board of Directors of this college, there are representatives of three main members which are the local government, the public university and the enterprise. Among them, the representative of the

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public university is the chairman of the board, while the representatives of the local government and the enterprise are the deputy chairman.

We have a board of directors: the President of [the parental university] is the chairman and the deputy mayor of [the city] government and the general manager of [the enterprise] are deputy chairman.

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

By law, the Board of Directors, as the governing body of an independent college, generally is responsible to determine important matters of the college such as appointing the president, amending the charter (or articles of association) of the institution, establishing the development plan, determining budget and resource allocation and other important issues (article 22, the Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools, 2002). Similarly, the functions of the Board of Directors of the case college is to determine important issues of the college. However, since its members are from different parties, each party performs different roles and responsibilities.

a.1.1. Local government

The local government plays a critical role in the development of the college. The original purpose was to establish an applied college that provides high quality undergraduate programs for local students to meet the demand for economic growth of the region without putting pressure on the public budget. At the initial stage, the local government contributed by providing land for the new college.

For example, [the city] government provides the land, the place and the money. […] [The city] municipal government plays a key role in our independent college. So obviously as a shareholder, it should perform its relevant duties. Definitely we get more support with such a relationship.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

In addition, it continues to provide extensive support to the college both politically and financially. For example, the academic staff of the college are

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granted the status of public servants as with other public institutions, which is very hard for other independent colleges to achieve.

In fact [the college] is a public institution that is affiliated with [the city] government while many other independent colleges are not because they are established by enterprises. This means that teachers, who are very important for a good university, in [the college] have the same status as those in public universities, they are employees of public institutions. Most independent colleges cannot achieve this.

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Moreover, several courses provided by the college which are in high demand and critical for the development of the local area receive financial support from the local government.

For example, the tuition fee of [the public parental university] is 5,500 RMB, and that of [the college] is 16,000, then the 20% of students who come from [the province] only need to pay 5500. So there is a gap between 5,500 and 16,000 which [the city] government will make up because this is school operating cost.

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

The government also grants the college priority to participant in important research collaboration projects.

And maybe it [the local government] will give priority to us when considering the cooperation between us and [the city] government. For example, if we conduct collaboration projects - the college collaborates with the local government or local companies - it will support us first. [...] Frankly speaking, we are an affiliated institution. When you sign a contract, you should consider us first, right?

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Undoubtedly the endorsement and support of the local government have contributed significantly to the development of the college. Without this support,

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the college could not have obtained its remarkable achievement within its short history. Therefore, maintaining a good relationship with the local government is always the college’s priority.

In China, a closer relationship with the government will help a lot in developing programs and courses. You will learn about key issues such as the government's policy regarding the development direction of an industry and so on. The decisions based on such information will be more beneficial to the college.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

a.1.2. The Public University

The role of the ‘parental public university’ is central to any independent college. According the regulative framework, only public university with high status are allowed to establish independent colleges, and independent colleges must maintain their independent status from their parental institutions. Independence here mainly refers to independent campus, independent management, independent admission, independent awarding of graduate certificates, independent financial management, independent legal entity, and independent responsibilities (Fang & Wang, 2013; J Liu & Elliott, 2016; A. Q. Yu, 2015).

Due to the concerns of public resource abuse/misuse, the contributions of public universities to their affiliated independent colleges are general under the form of intangible assets such as university reputation, intellectual property rights, management resources, educational and teaching resources (article 11, Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges, 2008). The parental university in this case, is a prestigious university listed in project 985, a project implemented by the Chinese central government, aiming to strengthen the academic power of China by investing extensively in selected public universities to achieve ‘world-class’ status (Jian Li & Du, 2016; Wan, 2006). Accordingly, the contribution of the parental university to the college, first and foremost, is its name and its reputation.

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[…] and [the public parental university] provided intangible assets like reputation. [W]hat the parental university gives us, actually, is reputation […].

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

In addition, the parental public university also supports the college’s development by sharing teacher resources, providing joint-programs for undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Importantly, at the time of the college’s establishment, the ‘parental public university’ was in the process of reformation by merging with other universities in the local area. The newly established college therefore provided a great solution to the problem of excessive staff at these public universities after the merges by reallocating them to the new college. As a result, the college inherited an excellent resource of academic staff from the ‘parental university’, which has brought about its dramatic improvement in academic quality.

We had nine departments when established and the heads of these nine departments were all part of the academic backbone of [the public parental university].

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Moreover, the parental university also supports the enrolment management process of the college. This support of the parental university is crucial to guarantee the quality of the college, especially to achieve its goal to be in the top 100 universities in China, aiming at providing first-class applied education.

[…] and more than 120 master students are jointly trained by [the public parental university]

(Chinese University Document No. 1)

[The parental university] is quite supportive, and we can jointly train postgraduates. And [the parental university] carries out the enrolment management of the joint training programs while we only provide supervisors [...].

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(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

In fact, the influence of the parental institution to an independent college goes beyond the academic boundary. By law, the representatives of the parental institutions in the Board of Directors of an independent college are not less than two-fifths of the Board (article 25, Regulation on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges, 2008). It is the role of the public institution to recommend the president of the independent college to be appointed by the Board of Directors (article 29, ibis). In addition, to ensure the quality of independent colleges, their pubic parental institutions are supposed to provide guidance regarding matters of teaching, strengthening the teaching quality evaluation system of the independent colleges (article 44, ibis). Therefore, it is not surprising that the college is substantially influenced by the parental university, particularly in its orientation development and goal setting. Since the public university is a ‘first-class’ research university, the college also aims to achieve ‘first-class’ status in teaching and applied areas.

a.1.3. The enterprise

The local area where the college is located is one the most advanced economic areas in China. Since the goal of the college is to provide first-class applied education to meet the local demand, the involvement of public enterprise in the establishment of the college is to reduce the burden from the public budget on one hand and to strengthen the link between the college and industry on the other. Firstly, the public enterprise provided accommodation facilities for the initial establishment of the college.

In the beginning there were several buildings in front of the college which belonged to [the enterprise]. These buildings were supposed to be part of a [professional] school but no student had lived there. So in conclusion, [that enterprise] provided the facilities [...].

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

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In addition, the presence of this enterprise helps strengthen the link between the college and industry. By providing internship opportunities for students and giving priority to the college to participate in important research projects in industry, the enterprise also contributes significantly to the development of the college.

[The enterprise] is a shareholder [of the college]. […] Frankly speaking, when we cooperate with [the industry], it will prefer to support us. […] For instance, our students do internship there. And our teachers conduct some collaborative projects with the industry. Then it will, let’s say this project is conducted by our teachers or it is operated by our college. Compared with other colleges, it definitely should support us first.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

More importantly, its representatives are members of the board, having its own voice in determining important matters of the college. Since it is a public enterprise and does not requires returns on investment, this makes the college a not-for-profit institution, which is significantly different from other independent colleges that are mainly aiming for profit.

The third party is a state-owned enterprise and it doesn’t take profit from the college […]. [The enterprise] asks nothing in return. […] In my view, [the representative of the enterprise] is the deputy chairman of the board. So in big issues about the university’s development, it has its voice. […] Its responsibility should be the same as [the city government] and [the public university]. […] Generally speaking, it is responsible for the healthy development of [the college].

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

However, the role of the enterprise is much less clear in comparison with the other parties, namely the local government and the public university. In the public documents provided and advertised by the college, its name is hardly mentioned. Seemingly apart from having representatives on the board, the enterprise is not involved much in the daily operational activities of the college.

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From this perspective, the local government and the public university have played a much greater part in the leadership roles.

a.2. The Executive Council

Another key internal structure of the college is the Executive Council with the president as the legal representative of the college. The president is responsible to carry out the daily operational activities of the university. In the case college, the members of the Executive Council include the president, vice-president, representatives of the Communist Party and representatives of the faculty (Chinese University Document No. 5).

Legally, the president undertakes ‘over-all’ responsibility for the teaching, research and administrative affairs of a HE institution (article 41, Higher Education Law, 1998). Specifically, the president primarily executes the decisions made by the Board of Directors, establishes the development plan of the institution, appoints staff members, takes care of academic affairs, ensures educational quality, and other functions according to the regulations of the institution (article 25, Promotion of Privately-run School Law, 2002). Accordingly, the Executive Council in the case college is subject to the leadership of the Board of Directors. However, the Executive Council is granted significant autonomy in determining the daily operational activities of the college, while the Board of Directors is responsible for major issues such as goal establishment or budget planning.

Our President is the legal representative. […] We specify this system what the President assumes responsibility under the leadership of the Board of Directors

The daily work is performed by [the college] itself which has the President and other people.

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

According to the regulative framework, independent colleges are required to establish a Board of Directors as the governing body. However, there is no

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specific requirement to establish an Executive Council and/or separate the Board of Directors and the Executive Council.

Article 25: An independent college shall establish a board of directors as the decision-making body. The board of directors shall be composed of representatives of parental institutions, of social organizations or individual, the presidents of independent colleges, and representatives of faculty and staff who participate in the organization of independent colleges.

(Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges, 2008)

The case college, interestingly, has demonstrated a great degree of separation between the decision-making and executive functions. The Board of Directors, mainly consisting of the local government, the public university and the public enterprise functions as its governing body, while the Executive Council represented by the President is responsible to carry out the decisions made by the Board. The Executive Council of the college is relatively independent from the Board of Directors. This structure is very similar to the corporate governance model of an enterprise.

To make a not-very-appropriate metaphor, this model is like that of a company which has a board of directors. There are a chairman and general managers. But [the college] is a college which has a Chairman and a President. The form is different, but the nature is the same.

In our college [the Executive Council] has the President and secretaries and heads of departments [...]. It’s an independent organizational structure.

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

In addition, the college pays great attention to the efficiency of its governance structure. The Executive Council is granted great autonomy in determining daily operational matters when implementing the decisions made by the Board of Directors. In return, the President and other managers are evaluated based on their performance. 240

Old universities may have many administrative units and people may have different thoughts. […] We have a simple management system […]. I don’t know if other universities have more leaders. But in [the college], if the President emphasizes the importance of a matter, a decision will be made quickly.

The performance of our college will directly influence the evaluation of the President and his team. When the admission officers notice potential risks, they will report to the vice President in charge of teaching and the President. […] They will make decisions after discussion. I believe it is because of the vision of the President. And because the performance of the college directly affects the President, so he is under pressure.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017) b. The Private Corporate Governance Model under the Public Sector’s Leadership

As described, the independent college is operated in a completely private manner, despite it being established by public institutions (local government, public university and public enterprise). This is according to the policy guidelines from the central government. In the document Suggestions on Specification and Reinforcement of Independent Colleges Established by Universities in a New Mechanism and Pattern issued by the Ministry of Education in 2003, the ‘new mechanism and pattern’ by which independent colleges are characterised refers to the private practices adopted to operate these colleges. From the governance perspective, the private mode could be seen in the establishment of the Board of Directors accompanied by the separation between leadership, represented by the Board of Directors, and management, represented by the Executive Council; and its emphasis on efficiency in decision-making.

Although it is undeniable that the college has adopted a private corporate governance model as described above, it is unmistakably public-oriented. Firstly, it was established according to the intentions of the local government and the public university, aiming to produce skilled labour forces for the local economy.

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The three parties just set a clear aim when establishing the college. The aim is clear: it should serve the local economy. […] [I]t doesn’t serve the whole country. It focuses more on [the province]. It serves the local economy of [the province]

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Its orientation is clearly stated in its slogan inscribed at its main gate.

So when [the college] was founded, there was a sign at the [college] gate on which "Dedicate All-round Talents for the City" was written.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Secondly, the staff of this college is granted the status of public officials, similarly to other public HE institutions, an advantage that other private university and independent colleges cannot compete with.

Essentially, there is no difference. Just like I am a full-time professor here, like the full-time professors of [the public university], in fact we are all public officials [...].

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Thirdly, though private resources were mobilised in establishing and operating this college, the college is not a for-profit institution unlike other independent colleges which mainly aim for profit purposes.

So far, I don’t think we should expect to gain profit. It’s a kind of education, I think. Actually, the government hopes that after the initial investment, it doesn’t need you to generate any kind of returns. […] When needed, it will invest again properly. It does not expect to make money from this, right? This is very critical.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Finally, from the public university perspective, this college is an initiative to respond to the pressure from the local government to educate undergraduates. Thus, it is considered an affiliated college belonging to the parental university, which is a public institution. This explains the strong influence of the parental 242

university, a national flagship research institution with ‘first-class’ status (K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008), in forming the educational goals of the college, aiming to provide ‘first-class’ education in applied disciplines (Chinese University Document No.1, 3 and 6). In addition, the three major members of the Board of Directors, the local government, the public university and the public enterprise, are public organisations. Essentially, this college is a public-oriented institution.

In fact, our college is a public college, strictly speaking. You know what? These three shareholders are all state-owned, so it actually is… it feels strange from some point of view. […] However, just look at our three shareholders, which one is private then? None.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

In recent years, the public orientation of this college has become even stronger since the city municipal government has determined to transform this college from an independent (which is private) college to a public one.

The meeting has clarified specific arrangements to transfer the college into a provincial-run public college, and fully implement public enrolment.

(Chinese University Document No. 3)

Explaining the motivation of this decision, the interview participants believed that it will help the college access to better student inputs as well as public funding resources. Although the college has been performing extremely well in recent years, it is difficult for it to further improve its performance, since such attempts require more resources which are restricted due to the current policy arrangements.

I think it is advantageous for us to change. We have done the best in this field, until now, but there are some restrictions caused by national policies or other things. Just like playing a game, you are already the top one in the second division; you surely want to be, uhm…, you have to enter the first division if you want to improve.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

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Nevertheless, there were certainly serious concerns since this critical decision was going to transform the mission and goals of the college, resulting in enormous anxiety of staff and students caused by uncertainty. The implementation of such a dramatic change would be surely difficult, as well as the transition of the college’s status from private to public one would not be smooth.

[The college] finally made the decision and chose to focus on research. But the decision-making experienced struggles.[…] The new aim was not agreed immediately by everyone. [Applying this new target, there are several concerns]. […] The second concern is whether the students will be ignored. […] [As an independent college], we constantly put students first and we all agree with it. So when research is emphasised more, we have to redefine what ‘serving students’ is. If this problem cannot be properly solved, confusion will always exist.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

However, the college is still at the initial stage of transformation in that transformation plan has been developed but not yet implemented. Actors at the micro levels such as middle managers and/or faculties have not been clearly informed about the transformation plan, how such a transformation is going to impact the development of the college, particularly its original mission, objectives and characteristics, and what the college aspires to become through the transformation. As a result, the data of the implementation process is not sufficient for further discussion.

Definitely there is [an action] plan [for transformation]. I don’t know. You know this must be approved first. Because look at our board of directors, [the local government] is there, this is its decision.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

The leaders of the college will determine [how the role of the public enterprise will change after the college transforms to a public institution]. It

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is difficult to answer these questions. I do not know if it will be consistent with the original aim.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

In short, the case college provides a remarkable illustration of a hybrid form of public-private partnership, in which it employs private mechanisms to serve the public interest. Private mechanisms here refer to (1) the way private resources have been mobilised for the establishment and (2) the private practices adopted to operate of the college including the separation between leadership and management and its emphasis on efficiency. Nonetheless, the case college is strongly public-oriented. Its establishment is to meet the three-fold target: (1) to meet the demand of skilled workforce for the economic growth of the local economy; (2) to achieve the goal of undergraduate education established by the local government and the public parental university; and (3) to solve the surplus staff issue resulting from merging four public universities in the local area.

To sum up, at the meso level, the case college displays a unique form of hybridity in its governance model. On one hand, the college obviously employs corporate governance which is the prevailing model among PHE institutions. In this model, the Board of Directors act as its governing body to determine important matters of the college such as appointing president, amending the articles of association of the college, determining the college’s development plan, raising fund and other issues (article 22, the Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools, 2002).

At the same time, there is also an Executive Council, taking responsibility for managing the college’s daily operational activities. The President is the head of the Council, taking the responsibility to execute the Board’s decisions. There is a high degree of separation between the Board and the Council, granting a lot of freedom for the President in implementing what has been determined by the Board. On the other hand, the presence of both the public sector (the local government and the public university) and the private sector (the enterprise) in the college’s Board of Directors and the college’s clear orientation in serving the 245

public interest have presented an interesting hybrid form of public-private governance.

6.1.2.2. Finance

In this subsection, the financial arrangements of Chinese HE are described, focusing on explaining the changes in its financial structure, particularly since its remarkable reforms in the late 1990s (Jian Li & Du, 2016; K.-H. Mok, 2009; T. Zhang & Zou, 1998) and the problems of its current structure. These arguments are further illustrated by the description of the financial condition of the college in this case study. Finally, strategies used by the college to address its financial problems are discussed. a. Changes in Chinese HE Financial Structure

Chinese HE has experienced remarkable changes since the late 1990s (Jian Li & Du, 2016; T. Li, 2017; K.-H. Mok, 2009; K. H. Mok, 2004; Wan, 2006; L. Wang, 2016). The decentralisation reforms in HE have not only contributed to the rapid expansion in Chinese HE (K.-H. Mok, 2009; K. H. Mok, 2004), but also significantly influenced the financial structure of the system (Carnoy, Froumin, Loyalka, & Tilak, 2014; J. Y. Lin & Liu, 2000; C. Wang, 2000; L. Wang, 2016; Zha, 2009; T. Zhang & Zou, 1998).

Traditionally, the state budget was the main or only source of funding for HE (Carnoy et al., 2014; Zha, 2009). Direct funding from the government accounted for 83 percent in 1990 while the rest came from university-raised funding, not the tuition fees (Carnoy et al., 2014). However, the Chinese HE system has gradually moved toward charging fees. In 1985, the government allowed HEIs to enrol ‘self-supporting students’ to diversify HEIs’ financial sources (Zha, 2009), which followed later by a modest charge for tuition in 1989 at a small number of HEIs. The user-charging scheme was expanded to the whole system in 1997 (Zha, 2009). Eventually, the Higher Education Law issued in 1998 officially legitimised the cost-sharing scheme by allowing HEIs to raise funds from diverse

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sources include tuition fees, donations, investments and other sources (article 60, 61, 63 and 64).

Article 60: Higher Education applies a system in which sponsors share the major burden of funding, students share reasonable training costs and additional funds are supplied through various of avenues by higher education institutions.

(Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1998)

Along with implementing the cost-sharing scheme by charging tuition fees in HEIs, there was a major financial restructure of the HE system. Decentralisation of finance took place, in which the local governments at the provincial level took more responsibility to fund HEIs (C. Wang, 2000). As a result of the financial decentralisation in the late 1990s (J. Y. Lin & Liu, 2000; T. Zhang & Zou, 1998), over 95 percent of HEIs are under the supervision of local governments while only a small number of HEIs (mainly highly ranked, prestigious universities listed in projects 211 and 985) are directly supervised by the MoE. Therefore, local governments have become the major source of funding for HEIs, including the MoE-directly-supervised universities (X. Wang & Vallance, 2015).

Article 60: […] The State Council and the people's governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government shall, in accordance with the provisions in Article 56 of the Education Law, ensure that funds for State-run HEIs gradually increase.

(Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1998)

In addition, the public funding approach has also been changed. The current funding formula is primarily based on enrolment numbers and other additional funding provided via irregular, ad hoc projects for special purposes (C. Wang, 2000; Zha, 2009). The head-count block grant is the largest share of funding for HEIs, with the major parameter to allocate funding being the number of full-time students (Zha, 2009).

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Accordingly, the sources of funding for HEIs include funding from public sources, tuition fees and others (article 60, Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1998). Since the majority of HEIs are administered and governed by either the MoE (the central government) or the provinces and municipalities (the local governments), public funding for HEIs generally comes from three sources, namely the MoE, the other ministries, and the local governments at the provincial or municipal level (T. Li, 2017; C. Wang, 2000). Among these three sources, local governments are the primary financial source for the majority of HEIs (T. Li, 2017).

Moreover, HEIs have become increasingly dependent on tuition fees to finance HE as the government encourages and provides HEIs financial autonomy to diversify their sources of funding (Cao & Levy, 2015; Carnoy et al., 2014; Sun & Barrientos, 2009; L. Wang, 2016). Tuition fees, from zero in 1990 (Zha, 2009) have jumped to account for the second largest share of finance for HEIs (about 33 percent) in 2009 after public funding (Carnoy et al., 2014). However, the proportion of tuition fees of total costs varies according to the type and tier of HEIs, from the lowest share in the most elite HEIs to the highest in expensive private HEIs (Carnoy et al., 2014).

Other than public funding and tuition fees, HEIs also generate funding through conducting research, providing consultation and other services to industries and communities, and attracting donations (C. Wang, 2000; L. Wang, 2016; Zha, 2009).

Article 63: Earnings from industrial undertakings run by higher education institutions or from transfer of their intellectual property rights or other scientific and technological achievements shall be used for running of such institutions.

(Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1998)

For conventional private HEIs, because they receive almost no funding from the state budget, the major source of funding is from tuition fees, accounting for 87

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percent in the majority of private HEIs in 2006 (Su, 2012). For independent colleges, depending on the constituents of their founders, they may receive funding from the local government. For instance, as well as tuition fees as the major source and donations (Chinese University Document No. 10), the college in this case study has received substantial financial support from the local government to cover their operational cost.

The operation cost of our college depends on tuition fees, government support and a small donation from society.

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

The main source is tuition fees.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Funding from the local government for the college is mainly in the three following forms, namely:

(1) direct funding:

[Tuition fees in the college] are charged based on operational costs. […] However, as the quality of [the college] has been improved in recently years, there are 5 majors have entered the first batch of enrolments in [the province]. The students [enrolled in these majors] accounts for the 20% of students from [the province]. These students are charged similar tuition fees to those in public universities. For example, the tuition fee [the public university] is 5,500 RMB, and that of [the college] is 16,000. 20% of students who come from [the province] only need to pay 5,500. The difference between 5,500 and 16,000 is subsidised by [the city government] to cover the operation costs of the college.

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

(2) land provision:

[The city government] paid for the land. In this way, [the college] was established.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

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(3) and low interest loans

In the beginning, the college relied on bank loans to cover construction fees […]. Thanks to the excellent development of our college, the government helped us to pay the money back […] in 2009 or 2010.[ This means] we only need to pay back to the government [without] paying interest which is tens of millions [RMB] a year. This reduces the burden and is a kind of support [from the government].

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017) b. Problems with the Current Financial Structure of the Chinese HE

Despite the strong commitments and enormous efforts exercised by the government to increase public expenditure in HE (C. Wang, 2000), Chinese HE has been increasingly dependent on private sources. The expenditure for HE in China accounted for 1.4 percent of GDP in 2010, of which only 0.6 percent is from public sources, lower than that of 0.8 percent from private sources (L. Wang, 2016). Interestingly, as L. Wang (2016) points out, the public to private funding ratio in China is relatively similar to the figure for Japan, where PHE is dominant. Most researchers agree that public expenditure in Chinese education is relatively low compared with many developing or developed countries (Sun & Barrientos, 2009; C. Wang, 2000; L. Wang, 2016). Given the context of rapid growth in HE enrolment rates in recent years, the limited public funding in Chinese HE means that PHE in China still has opportunities to fill the gap (L. Wang, 2016).

However, the decline in public funding and the increasing reliance on private sources may result in severe problems. Firstly, diversification in financial sources of the Chinese HE is not sufficient. Chinese HEIs depend primarily on two sources of funding, namely the public budget and tuition fees. In 2009, public funding and tuition fees were 49 and 33 percent respectively of the total revenue of HEIs (Carnoy et al., 2014). Since the state budget for HE continues to fall, private sources have become critical for HEIs’ survival (L. Wang, 2016; Zha, 2009).

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In this study, the college largely depends on tuition fees to finance its operations. Although it has received generous support from the local government as described previously, it is not able to escape the financial difficulties facing Chinese private HEIs that have been identified above. Like many other private HEIs in China, tuition fees are the major sources of finance in this college.

In fact, one of the biggest obstacles to the development of our college is that we depend exclusively on tuition fees. […] Because public universities are supported by the state while we can only depend on tuition fees. […] The main source [of finance] is tuition fees.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

The simple method that many HEIs in China use to strengthen their financial situation is to increase enrolment numbers and/or tuition fees.

Actually, for independent colleges like [the college], the most direct ways to increase revenue are recruiting more students and charging higher tuition fees. […] Enrolment in higher education increased a lot around 2004 so many independent colleges tripled the number of students which also tripled the revenue.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

However, this strategy has proven to be ineffective, particularly for long-term development of HEIs. Quantitative expansion may result in a decline in educational quality (Lei, 2012), which in turn threatens the legitimacy of HEIs. Rapid increases in tuition fees may limit the opportunities for students (K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; Sun & Barrientos, 2009; C. Wang, 2000; Zha, 2009), while making the institutions less attractive, especially when quality assurance is not in place. If Chinese HEIs do not develop specific strategies to address this problem, their development will be severely jeopardized, particular when the student population is declining while competition between HEIs is intensified due to the increase in the number of HEIs and the expansion of existing HEIs (Lei, 2012).

Secondly, the growing importance of private sources may pose a threat to accessibility to HE. In the context in which tuition fees have increased along with 251

HE massification (Zha, 2009) whereas financial aid for students from low-SES background is insufficient (C. Wang, 2000), over-reliance on private sources to finance HE may result in inaccessibility to HE since many students from poor, rural areas are not able to afford HE. Indeed, growing concerns about HE inequality and inaccessibility have been reported (K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; UNDP, 2005; R. Yang, 2007; Yao, Zhang, & Hanmer, 2004). Among the student cohort, 84.43 percent are from urban areas, despite the number of urban employees accounting for only 19.33 percent of the labour force (Sun & Barrientos, 2009)

Thirdly, the financial arrangements in which the local government takes the major responsibility to finance HE has resulted in disparities between regions and inequality between HEIs. Those in the east and south coastal regions are far more economically advanced than those in the west and central areas (C. Wang, 2000). As a result, the local governments in these areas have greater capacity to fund HE, leading to the imbalanced development of HEIs between regions (Sun & Barrientos, 2009). HEIs that receive more funding from local governments are able to attract better students and faculty. Consequently, this has led to inequality between HEIs.

To make the situation worse, local governments in China have provided incentives for students in their local areas through HEIs. HEIs that enrol local students receive more funding from local governments (T. Li, 2017). The justifications for this policy are (1) the belief that investing in HE will help boost the local economy; and (2) the use of enrolment numbers in HEIs as an indicator to evaluate local government officials’ performance (T. Li, 2017). Since local governments contribute a significant proportion of funding to HEIs’ total revenue, they have significant bargaining power in allocating enrolment quotas.

The college in this case study obviously gives priority to local students in the province. Local students make up to 70 percent of its enrolment (Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017). In addition, as mentioned previously, the college receives direct funding from the local government as an

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incentive for local students who enrol in majors that are in great demand for the development of the local economy. Specifically, local students who enrol in the following majors in the college pay the same amount of tuition fees as in public HEIs, while the rest of the operational costs of these majors are covered by direct subsidies from the local government to the college

[The five majors are] civil engineering, asset evaluation, computer science, clinical medicine and finance. These majors require higher entry scores than other majors.

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Finally, the gap between HEIs has widened because of differences in government funding for different types of HEIs. According to Carnoy et al. (2014), educational expense per student in elite HEIs is about 40 percent higher than non-elite in 2007 because these elite HEIs receive considerable funding from both the central and local governments (T. Li, 2017). Although the figure for the private sector is not available, because of the high dependence on tuition fees (up to 87 percent) (Su, 2012), it is likely that the gap between public and private HEIs would be much wider.

The college in this study has also experienced similar discrimination in funding due to its independent status. As an independent college, the funding it receives from government sources is restricted due to the limitation imposed by the policy. In addition, its access to other sources of finance such as research projects is also limited.

I think we now have the ability to be in the top 100. The only obstacle is […] [that] we are private, not public. So we have many things that are not supported by the policy. […] For private colleges, when you apply for some projects, the national policy […] supports public universities more than private. In this respect, we have the capability, but we cannot get the resources.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

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c. Strategies of the College to Address its Financial Problems

To address the problem of insufficient finance, the college in this case study did not choose to increase the number of students enrolled but determined to transform it to a public institution.

However, we still remain true to our original philosophy. […] From the very beginning, [the college] […] accommodated about ten thousand students. Even now we only have about 13,000 students. Because of the college’s philosophy, we do not choose to increase the number of students just to increase the revenue.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Definitely, its decision to transform itself is not derived purely from a financial perspective. This strategic move is taken in the context where independent colleges in China are required by the MoE to transform into either public or private institutions (Wen et al., 2016) due to rising public concerns about quality problems and unethical practices (J Liu & Elliott, 2016). The college’s strategic choice to transform to a public college is also based on the background of its establishment in that its founders were three public institutions (i.e. the local government, the public university and a public enterprise) and its function is primarily to serve the development of the local province.

In fact, our college is a public college, strictly speaking. You know what? These three shareholders are all state-owned, so it actually is… it feels strange from some point of view.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Nevertheless, the interview participants from the college acknowledge the advantage of being a public college, even though they are unsure about how the college would operate as a public institution.

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second division; you surely want to be, uhm…, you have to enter the first division if you want to improve.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

If we are a public institution, then all the problems will be taken care of by the government.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Specifically, the college has planned to transform by gradually increasing the number of courses that charge similar tuition fees to public HEIs from 20 percent of students currently to 50 percent in the next three years and later to 100 percent.

In the future, we plan to increase the number of such majors which charge according to the public universities’ standards. At present, the percentage is 20%. In three years, we want to increase to 50% and later to 100% which means that the tuition fees of our college will be the same as of public universities.

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

In conclusion, in this subsection, the financial arrangements in Chinese HE have been discussed. In particular, HE reforms since the late 1990s have caused major changes in financial aspects of Chinese HE (J. Y. Lin & Liu, 2000; T. Zhang & Zou, 1998). These changes are most clearly seen in the adoption of the cost- sharing scheme which allows HEIs to charge tuition fees (Carnoy et al., 2014; Zha, 2009), the decentralisation in which the local governments at provincial and municipal levels have become the primary sponsor for the majority of HEIs (C. Wang, 2000; X. Wang & Vallance, 2015), and in the implementation of the funding formula based on the number of students enrolled (C. Wang, 2000; Zha, 2009).

As a result, tuition fees have become increasingly important for HEIs (Cao & Levy, 2015; Carnoy et al., 2014; Sun & Barrientos, 2009; L. Wang, 2016). Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go for Chinese HE to diversify its

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financial sources since HEIs still raise funds primarily from the public budget and tuition fees (L. Wang, 2016). Meanwhile the growing reliance on private sources to finance HE because public expenditure for HE continues to decline may cause significant threats to the healthy development of the HE system in China.

Firstly, over-dependence on tuition fees may severely hamper the improvement of quality, which has always been a critical problem for Chinese HE, particularly in the private sector (K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008; Shi, 2015). Secondly, there is a potential problem of lacking accessibility to HE, since students with disadvantaged backgrounds may not be able to afford HE due to high tuition fees and a lack of sufficient financial support (K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; Sun & Barrientos, 2009; UNDP, 2005; C. Wang, 2000; R. Yang, 2007; Yao et al., 2004). Finally, as the role of the local governments in funding HE is becoming increasingly important, it may lead to disparities between regions which in turn cause inequality between HEIs and eventually result in inequity in education (Carnoy et al., 2014; T. Li, 2017; Sun & Barrientos, 2009; C. Wang, 2000).

What is described above is evident in the college in this study. As an independent college established by the local government, the public university and a public enterprise, it has received significant support from the local government in the forms of land provision, direct subsidies and loans. Nevertheless, it still depends heavily on tuition fees as the major source of finance. In addition, because of its status as an independent college, the financial support it receives from the government is limited and quite often its access to other sources of funding are also restricted. Consequently, the college has decided to transform itself from an independent college to a public institution. Its decision is based on external pressure from the central government that requires independent colleges in China to transform themselves into either public or private institutions (J Liu & Elliott, 2016; Wen et al., 2016). In addition, as the college was established by public institutions and has functioned with strong motives of contributing to public benefits, its decision to transform into a public institution is understandable.

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6.2. The Second Dimension

The involvement of the local government in the college’s governance model is one of its unique features. This makes the boundary between macro and meso levels become unclear. On one hand, the local government, as a government agency, represents the central government to implement policies at the given region, and therefore is part of the macro level actors. On the other, its presence in the college’s governing board (the deputy mayor of the municipal city is a member of the college’s Board of Directors) secures its position at the meso level. Due to its dual positions, in this section I focus on explaining the roles of institutional factors namely, isomorphisms, logics and actors in shaping the practices of the college without making a clear distinction between macro and meso levels.

6.2.1. Isomorphisms

In this section, I focus on exploring the isomorphic pressures that shape the practices of the independent college as we have previously discovered. Essentially, isomorphic pressures are the common norms and values that influence organisations existing in an institutional field, which consequently lead them toward a certain degree of homogeneity (Greenwood et al., 2008). To obtain legitimacy, organisations strive to conform to these isomorphic pressures. The data has revealed that the four institutional pressures, namely, cultural- cognitive, resource dependence, normative and coercive isomorphisms, are present in the institutional environment of Chinese HE and exert powerful pressures to either enable or restrict the development of PHE in China.

6.2.1.1. Cultural-Cognitive

The cultural-cognitive isomorphisms refer to the shared social knowledge, beliefs and values based on cultures that people take for granted and manifest in their attitudes, frames of reference or even stereotypes (Scott, 1995). In the case of China, the key cultural-cognitive elements that critically impact the development of PHE include Neoliberalism, Confucianism and Socialism. However, while

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Neoliberalism and Confucianism encourage the development of PHE, Socialism hinders it. a. Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is a significant ideology that governs the contemporary globalisation movement (Kai, 2009), generally referring to political and economic practices promoted by major international organisations such as World Bank, IMF, WTO and OECD (D. E. Neubauer, 2008). The neoliberal approach emphasises economic rationality and an individual’s right to maximising personal benefit (Apple, 2013; Kezar, 2004). Hence, Neoliberalism advocates reducing the state’s involvement, and encourages the participation of the private sector in traditional public services to improve national competitiveness and governance efficiency (Kai, 2009). As a result, practices such as liberalisation, decentralisation, privatisation, commodification, corporatisation and reduction of state intervention have become increasingly common (Harvey, 2007; K.-H. Mok, 2007; K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; Moutsios, 2009).

Under the influence of Neoliberalism, Chinese HE has been sensationally restructured and reformed (K.-H. Mok, 2009). Although it is difficult to label China as a neoliberal state (Bamberger, Morris, & Yemini, 2019; Nonini, 2008; Wu, 2010), China has embraced key principles of Neoliberalism in its HE policies and practices (L. Wang, 2016). Specifically, decentralisation (K.-H. Mok, 2001) and cost-sharing policies in which part of the HE financing burden has been shifted to families (Carnoy et al., 2014; Zha, 2009) have been implemented. These are clear evidence of privatisation and commodification, key practices promoted by Neoliberalism (Chu & So, 2010; Harvey, 2007; K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; Moutsios, 2009).

As a result, these practices have dramatically transformed HE in China, resulting in the proliferation of HE providers and diversification of HEIs, increasing accessibility to HE and providing more learning opportunities (K.-H. Mok, 2000; K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; R. Yang, 1997). In addition, greater autonomy and more

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flexibility have been granted to HEIs through decentralisation (Chou, 2008; M. Li & Yang, 2014; L. Wang, 2016). Collectively, neoliberal strategies are among critical reforms that have led to the massive expansion in HE, manifesting as the privatisation in the public sector as well as the rapid growth of the private sector in Chinese HE (Cao & Levy, 2015; Chu & So, 2010; Guan, 2005; K.-H. Mok, 2009; K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; L. Wang, 2016; Xu, 2001) b. Confucianism

The development of Chinese HE is inseparable from the influence of Confucianism (Hayhoe, 2017; Jun Li & Hayhoe, 2012; Marginson, 2011; C. H. Williams, 2017). As the orthodox philosophy that governs both individual and social behaviours (Bell, 2010; T. Kim, 2009; C. H. Williams, 2017), Confucianism strongly emphasises the importance of education (Choi & Nieminen, 2013; Gong & Dobinson, 2019; W. O. Lee, 1996; C. H. Williams, 2017), and stresses the link between education and national development and social mobility for individual advancement (Choi & Nieminen, 2013; Hayhoe & Li, 2008; J. Li, 2016).

R. Yang (2018) offers an in-depth analysis of the historical roots and legacy of Confucianism on Chinese HE, exploring the interdependence between Confucianism, higher education and the state. He argues that the establishment of the Imperial Acacademy (太學-國子監 Taixue-Guazijian) in 3 CE marked the “beginning of China’s strong tradition for more than 2000 years” of a close relationship between Confucianism and the state, making higher education aim “at preparing would-be officials for the state” (R. Yang, 2018, p. 4). Although modern Chinese universities have transformed dramtically by adopting Western practices, R. Yang (2018) argues that the influence of this traditional orientation of education resulting from a close integration between Confucian ideology and the state on Chinese higher education have remained profound.

The traditional interdependence between Confucianism and the state has been institutionalised in the social arrangements, resulting in the belief that investing in HE will help enhance economic growth (Choi & Nieminen, 2013; T. Li, 259

2017). In addition, under the influence of the Confucian legacy, Chinese parents strongly support their children to pursue HE (Choi & Nieminen, 2013; Marginson, 2011; Shi, 2015). As a result, the demand for HE underpinned by the Confucian value in which education is highly esteemed has become the driving force for the development of HE in this country.

Collectively, Confucianism plays a significant role that, at the national level, encourages the Chinese government to allow the private sector to participate in HE provision in order to boost the economy, while at the individual level motivates Chinese parents to willingly invest in HE. As a result, the strategic decision of the Chinese government in the late 1990s that promoted PHE was warmly welcomed by Chinese parents, thanks to this Confucian legacy (Shi, 2015), resulting in the impressive expansion of PHE in China within a short period (K.-H. Mok, 1997, 2009). c. Socialism

Although China has openly adopted a neoliberal approach in HE and other areas, it is difficult to conclude that China is a neoliberal state (Bamberger et al., 2019; Nonini, 2008; Wu, 2010). China still strongly adheres to its socialist orthodoxy based on Marxist theory (J. Li, 2016), while considering the neoliberal practices it adopts as ‘left-wing deviations’ from the original capitalism as quoted by Deng Xiaoping (L. Wang, 2016). The extraordinary political power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the dominant role of the state still remain as major characteristics of the Chinese Socialist regime until the present day (Kornai, 2000).

Consequently, the adoption of Neoliberalism in China was labelled as ‘market socialism’ by the CCP (Bowles & White, 1992; Chu & So, 2010; Ikels, 1996; K.- H. Mok, 2005; Schweickart, 2006; Solinger, 1993; M. Zhou & Logan, 1996). This term demonstrates strong evidence of the adherence of China to Socialism, because the party-state is still in control while socialist values are widely

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supported by both party elites and the general public (Chu & So, 2010; Kornai, 2000; L. Wang, 2016).

The Chinese government’s commitment to socialist ideology has significantly hindered the development of PHE in China. For a long time, PHE was prohibited (Xu, 2001) despite it was an essential component of education in Chinese history for more than one thousand years (J. Li, 2016). Although the implementation of neoliberal strategies in HE under the label ‘market socialism’ has enabled the remarkable expansion of this sector, the development of PHE in China is still facing tremendous problems caused by Socialism.

Because China is a socialist country, Neoliberalism, the ideology that underlines the development of PHE, cannot be officially advocated and endorsed to avoid open criticisms from the general public (Chu & So, 2010). Some Chinese researchers argue that Neoliberalism and its child, PHE, will damage China as a socialist country (L. Wang, 2016). In China, the term privatisation is avoided, and private HEIs are referred as minban, which literally means people-operated, because of the belief that privatisation essentially promotes capitalism (L. Wang, 2016).

Under the socialist legacy, the implementation of neoliberal strategies in China is only ‘partial’ (Liew, 2005; Wu, 2010). Meanwhile, this legacy has also resulted in the public mistrust that questions the significance of PHE as well as its quality (Cao & Levy, 2015; Cao & Li, 2014; Lei, 2012; Xu, 2001). Chinese PHE receives little or no support from the government. The independent college in this case study has determined to transform itself into a public institution in order to increase its access to better resources which are normally not available to private HEIs.

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6.2.1.2. Resource Dependence: External Market Demand and Internal Organisational Needs

Resource dependence is one of the most evident isomorphisms observed in the data. Because the development of PHE in general and of independent colleges in particular is a result of the government’s decision to diversify HE providers to meet the burgeoning social and economic needs (Choi & Nieminen, 2013; J. Li, 2016; K.-H. Mok, 1997, 2009; Shi, 2015; L. Wang, 2016), the prevailing presence of resource dependence isomorphisms in shaping the college’s practices in this study is understandable.

Specifically, the case university was established based on the needs of the locality/region. Taking the society’s need into account is a critical principle of HE institutions in general, and particularly private and independent institutions. The legal framework regarding HE in China has paid great attention to this principle.

Article 11: Higher education institutions shall be oriented according to society’s needs

Article 24: Higher education institutions shall be in accordance with the State plans regarding the development of higher education [...].

(Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1998)

In accordance with this principle, the college was established to meet the need of undergraduate education for the economic growth of the region. Particularly, the area where the college is located is an economically advanced city which has high demand for a highly skilled workforce.

[The college aims to] serve[s] the local economy of [the province]. So from this point of view, what the current local economy need, we will provide that kind of majors. […] So what it needs, we develop it. […] For example, you know, it [the city] is famous mostly for e-commerce, so we aim to develop these majors in Computer Science

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

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In addition, the public HE sector in this area, for some reason, is less developed than other neighbouring areas. Thus, establishing the college was required to meet the demands of the local economy.

There were very few universities in [the province], especially compared with [the neighbouring province] at that time so [the local] municipal government hoped that [the parental university] could serve the local demand.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Its establishment was driven by the aim to reduce the financial burden on the public budget for education. Thus, the involvement of the enterprise was encouraged. The enterprise contributed by providing accommodation facilities.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

In addition, the involvement of the enterprise in the establishment and operation of the college have strengthened its link to industry, since the college aims at providing courses in applied disciplines.

[The enterprise] is a shareholder. [...] Frankly speaking, when we cooperate with [the industry], it will prefer to support us. For instance, our students do internship there. And our teachers conduct some collaborative projects with the industry. Then it will, let’s say this project is conducted by our teachers or it is operated by our college. Compared with other colleges, [the enterprise] definitely should support us first.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Moreover, as the public university had gone through a critical transformation by merging with other local universities at that time, a new affiliated college which targeted undergraduate teaching was a solution that killed two birds with one

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stone. On the one hand, it helped solve the excessive staff issue resulting from the merger. On the other hand, it also helped share the load of educating undergraduate students, so the public university could focus on its primary target of research. At the same time, for the local government, economic growth was a crucial criterion to justify its performance and legitimacy (Lai, 2016). Recognising the college’s significant contribution to the local economy, the city municipal government endorsed the public university to establish the college and has been supporting its operation since then.

Thus, the college has been receiving generous support from both the public university and the local government. The public university has provided support to the college, not only in the form of its reputation, but also in academic management, such as establishing a mission and goals, providing human resources (both academic and management staff), developing academic programs, and cooperating in post-graduate education. The local government has also been contributing to its development through various incentives such as providing land, granting loans and offering internship opportunities for students.

In conclusion, the development of the case college, particularly its unique hybrid form of public-private governance can be explained as the result of resource dependence mechanisms since its foundation and its operation has been sustained by the resources provided by the three parties involved in its establishment.

6.2.1.3. Normative: The Development of the Private Business Sector

One point worth mentioning is that independent colleges emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the Chinese economy started booming thanks to critical reforms in the previous decades (L. Li, 1998; J. Y. Lin & Liu, 2000). Also, it is no coincidence that the independent college in this case study was established in that specific locality. The province is one of the most economically advanced provinces in China. The city where it is located is not only the capital and most densely populated city of the province but also a technological and logistical hub of the Chinese southern coastal regions. The private sector almost dominates the economy of that region (K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008). In addition, 264

PHE plays a significant role in financing and providing education in the area since the public sector is less developed.

There were very few universities in [the province], especially compared with [the neighbouring province] at that time so [the city] municipal government hoped that [the public parental university] could serve the local demand.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

One more point is that [the province] is quite special. In terms of universities that ranked in the top 10 across the nation, we [the province] only have one. […] There are only a small number of good local universities that they [students] can choose. […] But [the province] is a wealthy area and the education level is high. […] because of several factors such as economic advance, [students] are not willing to leave [the province]. So it is easy to attract students to our college.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Similarly to the suggestion of Yang (2006) that PHE is an outcome of the recovery of the private economy, the corporate governance adopted by the college is among many practices borrowed from the private business sector (Cao & Levy, 2015). HE, including public and private sectors, have emulated private business not only in governance practices, but also in management, curriculum and programs (Cao & Levy, 2015). The college in this case adopted the corporate governance model not only to comply with the legal requirements, but also because this practice of the private business sector has been substantially institutionalised in various domains, including public services.

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6.2.1.4. Coercive: The Regulatory Framework

Evidences of coercive isomorphisms and their influence on the practices of the college in this study are undeniable. At the macro level, coercive isomorphisms manifested in the decentralised legal framework have directly led to the massive expansion of HE in China and encouraged the participation of the private sector in HE provision (K.-H. Mok, 2009; O. Ozturgut, 2011), including the hybrid form of private-partnership such as that of the college in this case study. At the meso level, specific requirements of the regulative frameworks have explicitly established the templates for the college to adopt, such as the corporate governance model, or to comply with, such as the QA mechanisms.

For instance, the legal framework requires independent colleges to establish governing boards which consist of investors, president and representatives of the public parental university. Additionally, it is the authority of parental universities to recommend the President for the governing board to appoint.

Article 25: An independent college shall establish a governing board or a board of directors as the decision-making body. The governing board or the board of directors shall compose of representatives of parental institutions, of social organizations or individuals, presidents of independent colleges, and of faculty and staff who participate in the organization of independent colleges. In the governing board or the board of directors, the representatives of parental higher education institutions shall not be less than two-fifths.

(Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges, 2008)

As a result, in the college, the major members of the Board of Directors include the local government, the public university and the enterprise since they are the co-founders of the college. Meanwhile, the President is a Dean of a college of the parental university.

Because [the college] is jointly established by [the university], [the local] government and a third-party […]. We have a board of directors: the

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President of [the parental university] is the chairman and the deputy mayor of [the local] government and the general manager of [the enterprise] are deputy chairman.

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

In conclusion, this subsection provides a description of the institutional pressures that shape the practices of Chinese PHE generally and of the independent college in this case study in particular. Institutional pressures are categorised into cultural-cognitive, resource dependence, normative and coercive. Firstly, in terms of cultural-cognitive pressures, the development of PHE and independent colleges in China have been impacted by the three ideologies present in the institutional field of HE, namely Neoliberalism, Confucianism and Socialism. However, while PHE is encouraged to develop by Neoliberalism and Confucianism, it has suffered from challenges caused by Socialism.

Secondly, the resource dependence that influences the development of PHE and the independent college in this study are the burgeoning market demand for access to HE to boost economic growth and enhance individuals’ social mobility. This demand fuelled by some specific conditions and organisational needs of the local government, the public university and the public enterprise in this case study led to the establishment of the college in this case study.

Thirdly, the development of the private business sector in China has significantly influenced the development of PHE and independent colleges. The private business sector provides templates for PHE to adopt, not only in governance and management, but also curriculum and program development. Finally, the regulatory framework has directly influenced the development of the PHE sector. At the macro level, it has led to the rapid growth of the sector in the short period of time since the late 1990s. At the meso level, its specific requirements have shaped the specific operational practices of the college.

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6.2.2. Logics: Pragmatic Authoritarianism

As mentioned, the Chinese independent college subsector emerged to meet the increasing demand for HE which went beyond the capacity of the public budget by mobilising private resources (K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008) . In addition, this type of HEIs was established to address the quality issues which are associated with the conventional private sector (K.-H. Mok, 2009, 2012). Therefore, the literature mostly agrees that the emergence of independent colleges in China is a resource-driven initiative (J Liu & Elliott, 2016). However, I argue that resource dependence alone is insufficient in explaining the development and popularity of independent colleges generally and the college in this case study specifically. The phenomenal development of independent colleges should not and must not be considered as a coincidental event, but in the broader context of Chinese HE at that time.

According to Shi (2015), Chinese HE has experienced dramatic growth since the late 1990s. The gross enrolment rate had increased from less than 7% before 1997 to 15% in 2002 and to 27% in 2012 (Shi, 2015), indicating that China HE has entered into an era of massification. Shi (2015) also divides the massification pathway of Chinese HE into three stages. The first stage is from the early 1990s to 1998, the second stage is from 1999 to 2006 and the third stage is from 2006 onward. Among these three stages, the second stage saw the most impressive expansion in Chinese HE.

Shi (2015) provides a comprehensive account that reflects various perspectives to explain the causes of this dramatic expansion. Firstly, the demand for domestic economic growth fuelled by the global trend of developing knowledge-based economy required the Chinese government to prepare highly skilled labour forces. Secondly, China was suffering from the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the unemployment rate was relatively high. Increasing HE enrolment rates would help stimulate consumption in education and investment in related industries and services because education is highly regarded in Chinese society. In addition, increasing HE enrolment would help delay the high school graduates entering the

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workforce. Finally, in a society where education is highly esteemed, HE becomes one of the most important ways to address social issues.

From Shi’s explanation, we can see that the Chinese policy makers’ approach to HE is highly focused on economics and practicality. Yang (2002) refers to this thought as “economic ideology of education” (p. 16-18). Generally agreeing with Yang but with a broader viewpoint, Lai (2016) suggests that the primary thought underlining Chinese contemporary policies is pragmatic authoritarianism. Pragmatic authoritarianism refers to the adaptive, flexible and practical ways the political regime utilises to strengthen its power, sustain its rule, and bolster its legitimacy (Lai, 2016). Driven by this logic, high economic growth and provision of public services have become crucial to sustain public support for the regime. Consequently, economic growth and public service improvement have become key criteria for personal promotion in the Chinese public sector (Lai, 2016).

This pragmatic approach that stresses the role of HE in contributing to economic growth is evident in the regulatory framework, in which the state repeatedly emphasises the significance of HE in responding to societal demand and the state development plan of higher education. Specifically, HEIs are required to take into account societal need when developing their own enrolment plans.

Article 11: Higher education institutions shall be oriented according to the society’s needs and shall operate on their own and in accordance with the law [...].

Article 24: Higher education institutions shall be established in accordance with the State plans regarding the development of higher education [...].

(Higher Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1998)

Driven by this pragmatic approach, HE expansion in this sense has become a crucial political agenda. Consequently, the Chinese government has initiated a series of attempts to stimulate HE growth. In an effort to reform and increase the capacity of the HE system, the central government launched a movement of institutional mergers in the 1990s (Jian Li & Du, 2016; Wan, 2006). The public

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parental university of the college in this case, as one of the oldest and most prestigious HE institutions in China, were among the universities going through a period of critical transformation in the late 1990s, by merging with other public universities in the local area to build up a comprehensive research university with significant national and international significance (J Liu & Elliott, 2016).

The college was established as part of this transformation plan. It was expected to be a solution to the staffing issues resulting from the merger. Moreover, the college would help share the burden of educating undergraduates to meet the growing demand of the local economy, since the local city is the most densely populated city and an industrial-technological hub of one of the richest and most developed provinces in China (J. Zhang & Wang, 2017). Consequently, the municipal government of the local city had decided to cooperate with the newly merged public university in establishing an affiliated college with the clear goal of providing undergraduate programs in applied disciplines for the local economy.

[The public university] and [the city government] considered the strategic plan of [the public university] during the first half of 1999. [The public university] is a member of Project 985 which is affiliated with the Ministry of Education. There were very few universities in [the province], especially when compared with [the neighbouring province] at that time so [the city government] hoped that [the public university] could serve the local demand.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

The concept of pragmatic authoritarianism has shed a new light to understand the establishment of the college specifically and of independent colleges generally. It was not only a resource-driven initiative, but also a political decision. Driven by this pragmatic approach, the state of China, once it realised that its own capacity could never satisfy the requirements to expand the HE system, deliberately determined to mobilise private mechanisms to govern and operate the HE system (K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008) by introducing market principles to HE such as cost-

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sharing financial systems and allowing PHE to emerge from the late 1980s (Jian Li & Du, 2016; Wan, 2006). It is under this logic that the local government and the public university had enacted the initiative of establishing the college by mobilising society’s resources, which, in this case, was the enterprise.

In the beginning, there were several buildings in front of college which belonged to [the enterprise]. These buildings were supposed to be part of a [professional] school but no student had lived there. So in conclusion, [the enterprise] provided the facilities and [the public parental university] provided intangible assets like reputation. [The city government] paid for the land. In this way, [the college] was established.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Moreover, the development of the college would help meet the demand of the local economy in accordance with the pragmatic principle of HE contributing to economic growth.

because you are a private college, an independent college, you charge more so [the local government] hopes that you can be self-funding. You can go smoothly on your own, keep developing. […] Mainly, [the local government] hopes that you can serve the local economy and educate excellent workforce. This is the most important thing.

The national policy allows you to establish an independent college that charges high tuitions to train students.

The [college] operates following the mechanism of independent colleges. It runs like a private college.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

However, introducing market principles does not necessarily mean that the Chinese regime has yielded to “the free market philosophy” (K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008, p. 188). The logic of pragmatic authoritarianisms explains that the state of China utilises the market as an instrument to steer the development of HE in a more effective and efficient manner while still maintain its authoritarian control.

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The emergence of the independent college in this case provides a perfect illustration. Concerned with the development of conventional PHE for its “manipulating official policy in the interests of profit making, in the process damaging or undermining the rights of students and parents”, the MoE argues that PHE “lacks self-discipline and pose difficulties for management”(K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008, p. 185). The establishment of the independent college in this case study as a cooperation between three parties of the local government, the public university and the enterprise grants what the authority believes “a better alternative for achieving the policy objectives of expansion of HE enrolments” (Lin, 2004, p. 17-18, cited in K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008, p. 185).

This explains why the college has received generous support from the government from the beginning. The MoE quickly approved the proposal of establishing an affiliated college based on the cooperation of the local government, the public university and the enterprise. The newly established college had been allowed to grant degree, an authority that was rarely given to a private institution at that time.

Actually, it was established hurriedly in 19[xx]. At that time, we were called the first relatively normative independent college because we could award the college’s own diplomas while many other colleges of our kind awarded diplomas of their mother universities. It shows that [the college] was independent from the very beginning.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

In addition, the local government has provided financial support in various forms such as land provision, tax deduction, cost recovery payment, mortgage and loan interest payment. Other opportunities are also provided for the college’s students such as fieldwork, internship and employment in the local government offices.

[The city government] paid for the land. […] Thanks to the good development of our college, the government helped us to pay back the loan [...] in 2009 or 2010 and then we only have to pay back the capital to the

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government, so we do not have to pay the interest which is about tens of millions a year. This reduced the burden and is a kind of support.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

[…] Five majors have enrolled the first enrolment batch in [the province] or we call them ‘public majors’. The number of students of these five majors accounts for 20% of the total number of students from [the province]. So there’s a gap in tuition fee and [the city government] will pay that. […] In addition, [the city government] also establishes many laboratories inside and outside the college. The laboratories outside the college are established by [the city government] and in many enterprises so that students can do internships there.

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

In short, the college is a successful experiment with the endorsement of the central government because it helps fulfil the political agenda of enhancing HE growth on one hand and retaining the regime’s control on the other. Therefore, as long as the college performs its tasks properly and fulfils its responsibilities, it will obtain recognition and support from the government, regardless of changes in political leadership at the local government level.

You mean the changes of the leaders of the government every 5 years? We call it the leadership transition, right? It is none of our business [it does not influence the development of the college]. The Communist Party is still in power. The political party does not change.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

However, the college, despite receiving generous support from both the government (central and local) and the public university, is still confronted by the limitations that hinders its development. As it has developed and reached a certain level of quality, which out-performs what other conventional private universities and independent colleges generally do, the college is facing the ‘glass ceiling’ which is the clear boundary between public and private. These barriers are mainly (1) the entrance examination classifying and allocating 273

students based on their performance which allows public institutions to obtain the best inputs; and (2) the government incentives that are provided only to the public sector.

The only obstacle is [...] [that] we are private, not public. So, we have many things that are not supported by the policy. For example, the excellent students of our college are not behind those of the universities that rank around 60th, 70th or 100th at all. But our students are not eligible for examinations exemption, so they cannot be recommended and be enrolled without passing entrance examination. This is a big problem, right? Then for private colleges, the national policies, when you apply for some projects, [...]. But it supports public universities more than private colleges. In this aspect, we have the capacity, but we cannot [compete with public universities] to obtain resources.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Since the national policies still favour and support the public sector, the college is stuck in the ‘middle trap’ of performing better than other private providers, but unable to push its ranking higher to compete with other public universities because the support for independent colleges from the government is limited. Therefore, in order to improve the quality, performance and further development, it decided to transform itself to a public institution to obtain better student inputs and receive further support from the government.

So we hope we will have better development as a real public college. Because currently the national policies support public universities more than independent colleges. […] We are already the top one of our kind, right? But, actually the country supports public universities more than private ones. This is one point.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

That’s the reason the theme of transforming to a public institution appears repeatedly in interviews and university documents. Especially, one of our participants, Prof. Y kept emphasising that transforming into a public institution

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allows the college to have ‘the identity’ which will activate the government supports that are currently limited to the public sector only and having such an ‘identity’ is critical for this college’s future development. This proves that the discrimination, or the clear boundary between the public and private sector in Chinese HE still remains intact. This is obviously contrary to the regulative framework that regards PHE as equal to the public sector (article 5, the Law on the Promotion of Non-public Schools, 2002).

From the perspective of the college’s development, I believe that if it wants to reach a higher level, you know that the [public] identity is important, so we want to have that identity.

Once you change to be a public college, maybe there will be a lot of incentives every year. For a public university, the country pays for it.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

The college has recognised the limitations of the ‘independent’ mechanisms in furthering its development under the current institutional configurations which have limited its choices of student inputs, of government supports and funding opportunities. Since it has reached the highest ranking of its kind, the college has now determined to change to the new ‘clothes’ of a public institution to match such institutional arrangements.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

The logic of pragmatic authoritarianism also helps to explain the motivation for the college’s transformation. The emergence of the independent college subsector has been to meet the need for HE expansion, a goal established by the central government, by mobilising private resources and mechanisms. When the

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resources and mechanisms are unable to continue to facilitate HE expansion, this subsector loses the rationale for its existence. This is because apart from the ‘economic ideology’ of higher education, as Yang (2002) indicates, the central government has not identified further orientation for this subsector.

[...] our country [...], at least in the current stage, it does not have a relatively specific planning on the future development of independent colleges, I think.

From this point of view, or maybe I misunderstand, that from our college’s orientation, we are already at the top of independent colleges. So we hope we will have better development as a real public college. Because currently the national policies support public universities more than independent colleges.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Indeed, even its motivation to transform to a public institution is driven by pragmatic reasons such as to obtain better incentives from the government, better student and teacher inputs to improve its ranking.

Yeah. The university also wants to receive support from the government. […] That’s why we want to be a public [institution]. If you are an independent college, you are responsible on your own whether you make profit or not, how much money do you have? [...] [I]n our country, the biggest source of money is the government.

(Professor Y., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

In summary, the development narration of the college has revealed the pragmatic approach of the Chinese government in which the independent college subsector is a useful means to achieve policy objectives (i.e. higher education expansion for economic growth). The development of this subsector does not denote a change in political viewpoints of Chinese policy makers. It does not mean that the significance of PHE and independent colleges are recognised and thus they are granted the same status as public universities. Indeed, the emergence and development of PHE and independent subsector are strong evidence of the 276

pragmatic strategies employed by Chinese policy makers to mobilised private resources and mechanisms to achieve specific socio-political goals. The institutional arrangements which fundamentally discriminate between the public and private sectors still exist and are the critical hindrances for the further development of the PHE sector, including the independent colleges.

6.2.3. Actors

The major members of the college’s governing board include representatives of the local government, the parental public university and the enterprise. Since the local government and the public university take the lead in the governing board as shown previously, this section will focus on exploring the roles of these actors in shaping the governance practices of the college, based on the key operationalised notions regarding this concept of actor, including position, agency and legitimacy.

6.2.3.1. Position

Position of an actor in an institutional field refers to both the “formal, bureaucratic positions and the socially constructed and legitimated identities available in the field” (Lockett et al., 2012, p. 357). Correspondingly, the actors in this case have occupied the central position in the HE field. The local government is the representative of the central government in the corresponding region and takes the responsibilities of managing and supervising HE in the region, including PHE and independent colleges. It is granted significant authority and autonomy from the central government.

Article 6: The administrative department of education of the people's government of provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the Central Government (hereinafter referred to as the provincial administrative department of education) shall be responsible for managing independent colleges within its administrative region.

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(Regulations on Establishment and Management of Independent Colleges, 2008)

The public university is one of the oldest and most prestigious universities in China. As a flagship research-oriented institution, this comprehensive university is under the direct administration of MoE. Therefore, its position is also in the centre of the HE field.

[The public university] is a member of Project 985 which is affiliated with the Ministry of Education.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Since the local government and the public university take the leadership role in the governance structure of the case college and both of them occupy a central position in the field of HE, it is sensible to conclude that the meso actors’ position in this case is also in centre of the HE field. This position allows the actors to enact critical actions such as establishing the case college and/or transforming it from an independent college to a public one with the endorsement and support of the central government.

6.2.3.2. Agency: Instrumental Experimentalist

Agency, according to Marginson and Rhoades (2002), refers to the ability to take action, either individually or collectively. An actor’s agency shapes its strategic choices. Scholars have recently recognised the ability and effort of organisations to influence the environment in which they are placed and by which they are influenced. Seo and Creed (2002) use the notion of ‘paradox of embedded agency’ to describe the tensions between the institutional pressures and actors’ agency responding to such pressures in specific actions. Using this concept of agency, this section will explain the role of the main actors, namely the local government and the public university, in shaping the governance practices of the case college.

As explored in the previous section, the principle strategy of policy makers in post-Mao China is pragmatic authoritarianism which attempts to utilise market

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principles to achieve development targets while retain its authoritarian control (Lai, 2016; K. H. Mok, 2004). Driven by this logic, the local government and the public university in this case study had taken the initiative to establish the independent college. Their position in the centre of the field of HE allowed them to enact such an initiative with strong support from both internal and external stakeholders.

[F]irst is the original intention that [the public university] and [the city government] jointly aimed to establish a first-class application-oriented college.

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

In fact, when [the college] was established, [the city government] placed great expectations on us. The mayor once took the ministries and commissions to [the college] and solved the problems of [the college] directly.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

Since it utilises strengths of both the public and private sectors, this college is a successful experiment (K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008) and has received significant support from the government right from the beginning. Consequently, it triggered the remarkable development of the independent subsector in the 2000s (Jian Li & Du, 2016; K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008). Here the college acts as an experimental model whose success was then exported to other localities with modifications.

Adopting the model of this college, public universities, local governments and enterprises in other areas of China have established 292 independent colleges within a short period from 1999 to 2013 (J Liu & Elliott, 2016), making this subsector an important component of PHE specifically and of HE generally. Subsequently, the model of independent colleges has been modified, varying from government-university-enterprise as in this case, to government-university, university-enterprise, domestic university – foreign educational institution, public

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university – private university and/or university alone (K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008).

In the development of the independent subsector, the process of establishing a college as an example of a model then exporting to other localities provides a striking example of a pervasive feature of the policy process in China, which Heilmann (2008) proposes as an approach of decentralised experimentation. This approach, referred to as youdian daomian in Chinese which literally means point- to-surface, has been widely adopted in various domains such as promoting private business, restructuring state-owned enterprises, regulating stock market, and diversifying higher education provision (Heilmann, 2008; K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008).

Essentially, decentralised experimentation is a policy process in which the Chinese central policy-makers encourage local officials to try out new ways of problem solving and then feed the local results back into national policy formulation. By allowing local leaders to initiate instruments to fulfil identified targets and goals, this approach helps reduce ‘blind’ implementation in diverse environments, encourages local participation, promotes multiple models and saves scarce resources (Heilmann, 2008).

Similarly, the local government and the public university in this case have conducted an experiment in establishing the college. As a locally produced innovation that provides an excellent alternative to address HE expansion apart from conventional PHE which has been criticised for its neglect of quality, the model presented by it was then picked up by policy makers in the central government. This could be observed in the MoE’s quick approval of its establishment. Additionally, its model was quickly copied in other localities, and eventually resulted in the issue of a regulative framework for independent college subsector later in 2003 and 2008.

Hence, the actors of this college have undertaken the agency of ‘experimentalists’. They enacted an initiative by jointly establishing the college, granting the college’s staff equivalent status to those in public universities, and 280

providing other incentives to support the college’s development. None of which had ever granted to conventional PHE before.

[…] [T]eachers, who are very important for a good university, in [the college], have the same identity as those in public universities, they are employees of public institutions. Most independent universities cannot achieve this.

In addition, [the city government] also establishes many laboratories inside and outside the college. The laboratories outside the college are established by [the city government] and many enterprises so that students can do internship there.

(Dean H., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

However, as Heilmann (2008) notes, the critical aspect of the experimentation mode of policy process practiced in China is its focus on finding innovative policy instruments rather than defining policy objectives, which remain the prerogative of the Party leadership. Most importantly, the Chinese experimental approach should not and must not be mistaken as an attempt at ‘scientific’, ‘evidence-based’ policy selection. Instead, it has always been “an intensely politicised process driven by competing interests, ideological frictions, personal rivalries, tactical opportunism or ad hoc policy compromises” (Heilmann, 2008, p. 28).

In summary, the local government and the public university, as the major actors of the case college, thanks to their central position in the field of HE, have obtained strong structural legitimacy. In addition, they have also been successfully constructing moral explanations for their courses of action (i.e. the college’s mission and aims) to gain normative legitimacy. The central position, strong structural and normative legitimacy have allowed them to exercise their agency of ‘instrumental experimentalist’.

With this agency, the actors initiated the innovative establishment of the case college with a unique hybrid model of governance, employing the private

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corporate model of governance under the leadership of the public sector to meet the goal of HE expansion set by the central government. As a result, the case college has become a successful experiment and the model presented by it has been exported to other localities, with different variations. However, the experimental model of the case college is successful not because it was carried out by a scientific approach, but because it aligned with the prevailing logic of pragmatic authoritarianism and has received significant endorsement and support from the central government. In other words, its success is highly politicised.

6.2.3.3. Legitimacy

Legitimacy here refers to “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Suchman (1995) categorises legitimacy into structural and normative legitimacy. Structural legitimacy is obtained by organisations through formal institutional structures, whereas normative legitimacy is secured through moral arguments of ‘what ought to be’ and ‘what is the right thing to do’ (Lockett et al., 2012). There is high correlation between structural legitimacy of an actor and its position in an institutional field. The closer an actor is to the centre of an institutional field, the stronger structure legitimacy is bestowed on it. Meanwhile, an actor’s ability to construct morally convincing arguments for its courses of actions determines the degree of normative legitimacy it obtains.

As explained, the actors including the local government and the public universities, which are the major members of the governing board of the college, occupy the central position of the HE field. Due to their central positions, these actors simultaneously receive strong structural legitimacy associated with their positions. In addition, since these actors are regarded as experts in the field of HE, they assume strong normative legitimacy.

[…] it depends on the vision of the leaders or if the leaders are decisive or not [to make appropriate decisions to respond to the changes in national enrolment policies]. […] I believe it is the vision of the President [that helps

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him to make appropriate decisions to respond to the changes in national enrolment policies]. [I wonder if] he foresaw [these changes].

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

The actors of the case college have obtained high normative legitimacy by constructing a persuasive argument for what they believe are appropriate actions for the college to take (i.e. establishing a clear mission and goals and how to achieve such goals). Moreover, they have communicated such arguments effectively with other actors (i.e. middle managers such as faculty deans and directors of different departments) to obtain their support.

By establishing a mission and goals that are suitable to the college’s context and being responsive to external environments, the leadership team of the college has received strong support from the external stakeholders (i.e. the central government) as well as internal stakeholders (i.e. the faculty, staff and parents). In addition, the college’s mission and goals have been communicated effectively to different levels of the college. For example, Ms. S, the Deputy Director of the Department of Student Affairs expressed her observations and appreciation of how clear and consistent aims and goals had helped her work efficiently in enrolment and relevant issues of student affairs.

To me, the most important reason is that the [college’s] aims were consistent with the demands of society and parents at that time. This has caused the aims to be [widely] understood. In addition, the leaders really pay attention [to realise these aims in practice through] ideas like “putting students first”. By doing so, the aims become clear to us.

(Deputy Director S., personal communication, November 12, 2017)

We have discovered that the actors in this college not only occupy positions at the centre of the field of HE but also have obtained strong legitimacy both structurally and normatively. These are considerable strengths for these actors in their actions, since structural and normative legitimacy are crucial for actors to take action in organisations (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).

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6.3. Chapter Summary

In this chapter, a detailed discussion of the research findings regarding the Chinese PHE is provided, illustrated by the college in the case study. Accordingly, the practices of Chinese PHE and independent colleges are described from three major aspects, namely governance, quality assurance and finance.

In terms of governance, the Chinese government at the macro level has employed an approach ‘centralised decentralisation’ as suggested in the literature (M. Li & Yang, 2014; K.-H. Mok & Han, 2017; K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008). In this model of governance, the government, on one hand, has promoted decentralisation by redistributing power, authority and responsibilities to localities, allowing the private sector to participate in providing educational to diversify financial channels, and granting more autonomy to HEIs (Wan, 2006).

However, this decentralisation process does not necessarily mean that the Chinese state does less, or its role is weakened (K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008; Wan, 2006). In fact, the Chinese government has maintained its vital role in managing and supervising the HE system (M. Li & Yang, 2014). Significant aspects are still under the strict control of the government such as mission establishment, academic program development, student enrolment and internal structure organisation. In addition, the emergence and development of conventional PHE and independent colleges should not be considered as an attempt to genuinely decentralise and diversify the system (K.-H. Mok & Ngok, 2008). Instead, it is the state’s interests and endorsement that have brought about the remarkable growth of this sector (K.-H. Mok, 2009).

As a result, the governance model at the macro level of Chinese HE should be seen as ‘centralised decentralisation’. In this model, the state of China has employed market principles in managing HE to expand the system and increase its efficiency without necessarily withdrawing its control.

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At the meso level, the college in this case study has developed a hybrid form of governance. The distinctive feature of this governance model is that it employs a corporate governance model from the private sector to fulfil the aim identified by the local government and the public university, which is to contribute to the development of the local area. As a result, though the college was established with the involvement of the private sector and has been operated completely according to private ways, it is undeniably public-oriented. The enterprise that participates in its establishment has contributed significantly to its development by providing assets and strengthening the academia – industry linkage. Moreover, the college’s governance structure has shown a high degree of separation between leadership, represented by the Board of Directors, and management, represented by the Executive Council.

Nevertheless, the college is regarded as a public institution since its founders are from the public sector (the enterprise is state-owned) and it is an affiliated college of a prestigious public university. Additionally, it has been receiving significant support from the local government, especially by its staff having the same status as of those in public universities. Finally, the Board of Directors of the college has recently determined to officially transform it from an independent college (which is private) to a public institution.

In terms of quality assurance (QA), the Chinese QA system appears to be very similar to other countries, in that it uses accreditation as the major QA method as well as audit and rankings. However, the critical differences are in the dominant role of the government and its affiliated agency (HEEC) and the way QA mechanisms have been implemented in a top-down manner. As a result, little mutual communication was developed between the macro and meso levels, resulting in the intensifying tension between genuinely improving quality and complying with the government’s requirements. From a different perspective, this can be interpreted as a tension between centralised control by the government and university autonomy which might have resulted from the

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Chinese government’s attempts to implement market-based reforms while maintaining its traditional centralised control.

In terms of finance, there have been major changes in the financial structure of Chinese HE. A cost-sharing scheme was adopted, leading to the increasing importance of tuition fees in HEIs’ sources of revenue. In addition, decentralisation in finance has led to more involvement of local government in financing HEIs. Consequently, HEIs have becoming increasingly dependent on government funding and tuition fees. In the private sector, the situation is worse. Since this sector receives little funding from the government, it has become over- dependent on tuition fees to finance itself.

This poses significant threats to the development of the sector, because there are clear signs of decline in student population in the near future. These threats can be identified as (1) neglect of quality improvement due to lack of sufficient funding; (2) a lack of accessibility to HE due to increasing tuition fees; and (3) regional disparities caused by differences in funding capacity between local governments, ultimately leading to educational inequality.

As an independent college, the college in this case study depends heavily on tuition fees to finance its operation. In addition, it also receives substantial financial support from the local government. However, this support is limited because of its ‘label’ as an independent college, despite its significant contribution to the public good. As a result, the college has determined to transform itself into a public institution in order to access better resources.

In explaining the institutional factors that shape the practice of governance at the case college, the research findings have revealed the significance of the institutional pressures, institutional logics and actors. Firstly, the data has uncovered the relevance of isomorphic pressures, namely cultural-cognitive, resource dependence, normative and coercive isomorphisms, in shaping the development of PHE generally and of the college in particular.

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The cultural-cognitive pressures includes the three major ideologies such as Neoliberalism and Confucianism, which encourage the development of PHE, and Socialism, which restricts it. The resource dependent isomorphisms refer to the external market demand of access to HE to enhance economic growth and individual social mobility while public funding is limited. The normative isomorphism in this case relates to the development of the private business sector that provides necessary templates in terms of governance models, management practices, curriculum and program development for the PHE sector to adopt. Finally, the coercive mechanisms are observed in the decentralised legal framework which at the macro level, encourage the rapid growth of the PHE sector, while at the meso level, clearly define the practices of independent colleges, such as the corporate governance model, the QA mechanisms and its financial management requirements.

Secondly, the logic of pragmatic authoritarianism provides significant justifications for actors in this case study to establish and operate the independent colleges. The two major actors in this case (the local government and the public university), driven by this logic, have mobilised private resources, including private investment and market principles in operating the case college for pragmatic purposes.

On one hand, private investment and operational practices according to market principles help to reduce the financial burden on the public budget while achieving the targeted HE expansion. On the other hand, the presence of the local government and the public university help strengthen its public-orientation, improve quality and prevent for-profit behaviours which are very common in conventional PHE. These together ultimately aim to fulfil the political agendas identified by the Chinese central government (i.e. HE expansion to strengthen economic growth and alleviate social dissatisfaction) and bolster its legitimacy.

Finally, in their cooperative establishment and operation of the case college, these two actors have displayed the agency of instrumental experimentalist. This type of agency is a pervasive characteristic in the unique context of policy

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process in China. It allows local actors to develop effective policy instruments to fulfil policy objectives identified by policy makers at the central government level. The local government and the public university are able to utilise this type of agency because they occupy the central position in the field of HE.

Moreover, the process of decentralisation employed by the central government that gives much authority and autonomy to local governments to create different experimental models that fit their local context. Additionally, these two actors have obtained significant structural legitimacy thanks to their position, and normative legitimacy thanks to their expertise in HE. However, as Heilmann (2008) emphasises, this agency of ‘instrumental experimentalists’ does not necessarily refer to the actors’ approach of employing evidence-based methods as in general understanding. Their decisions instead are highly political, since decentralised experimentation is successful only with support from policy makers at the central government level (Heilmann, 2008; K.-H. Mok, 2012; Ross & Lou, 2005).

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CHAPTER VII: THE VIETNAMESE CASE

In this chapter, the current model of PHE in Vietnam is described, according to the conceptual framework developed in this study (See Chapter III). Therefore, the chapter is organised into two main sections corresponding to the two dimensions of the conceptual framework. The first dimension encompasses three analytical aspects, namely governance, finance and quality assurance. The second dimension presents three institutional factors, which are isomorphisms, logics and actors. The third dimension of the conceptual framework, comprising three analytical levels of macro, meso and micro, is included in the above two dimensions. However, as this study focuses primarily on the macro level, the description of the meso level is provided as reference to the macro level whereas the micro level is omitted.

7.1. The First Dimension

In this section, the practices of the PHE sector in Vietnam are described in three major aspects, namely governance, finance and quality assurance, according to two analytical levels, namely macro and meso levels. At the macro level, the descriptions of the governance model and the national quality assurance system are provided. However, since accreditation as the major quality assurance method is mandatory in Vietnam, the description of the quality assurance practices at the meso level is omitted. In addition, because the Vietnamese government does not provide any direct subsidies to the PHE sector, the financial aspect is discussed only at the meso level.

7.1.1. The Macro Level

In this subsection, I provide a description of the current model of PHE in Vietnam, according to the two major aspects of governance and quality assurance. In terms of governance, an analysis based on policy documents and interviews reveals the highly centralised governance model at the macro level with its critical drawbacks. In terms of quality assurance (QA), the QA framework is described based on the operationalised sub-concepts of QA

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agencies, methods, standards, procedures and purposes, manifesting the government’s behaviours of ‘walking the line’ between Neoliberalism and its state-centric values. Since the government in Vietnam does not support the PHE sector financially, the finance aspect is omitted in this subsection.

The data presented in this chapter were collected from two main sources: documents and interviews. Documents include the laws and regulations, particularly those that identify the functions, roles and responsibilities of the key players in the field (the government, the Ministry of Education and Training (MoET), other line ministries, the universities and other agents). The majority of these documents were issued by the government and were available on the Internet. In addition, documents issued by the case university were collected, particularly during the fieldtrip to this university. These documents include the university’s mission statement, reports to relevant authorities, public announcements, and other documents for internal use.

Table VII-1. List of Documents for Data Analysis at the Macro Level

Document No. Description Name 1 Vn.Doc.1 Regulations on Accreditation Agencies, issued in 2012 2 Vn.Doc.2 Vietnamese Higher Education Law, issued in 2012 3 Vn.Doc.3 Vietnamese University Charter, issued in 2014 4 Vn.Doc.4 Regulations on Accreditation Procedures, issued in 2012 Regulations on Higher Education Quality Evaluation Standards, 5 Vn.Doc.5 issued in 2007 Regulations on Accreditation of Higher Education Institutions, 6 Vn.Doc.6 issued in 2017 Regulations on Encouraging Private Investment in Education, 7 Vn.Doc.7 Vocational Training, Public Health, Culture, Sports and Environment Improvement, issued in 2008 8 Vn.Doc.8 Vietnamese Law on Land, issued in 2013

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7.1.1.1. Governance

In this subsection, I provide a description of the governance model at the macro level of Vietnamese HE and how such a model impacts the general development of universities at the meso level. Accordingly, the data reveals that at the macro level, the Vietnamese government, represented by the Ministry of Education and Training (MoET) as the highest administrative body, assumes significant responsibilities and authority to manage and supervise the HE system. Although there are early signs of a deregulation movement at the macro level, in general the Vietnamese governance system is characterised by a strong state-controlled model in which there is deep involvement of the government in various aspects, even in the daily operation of universities. University management and accountability in the public sector have not received adequate attention and the flow of decision-making is strictly top-down. As a result, universities at the meso level, in general, enjoy very limited autonomy. a. Governance Model: Strong State Control

The governance structure in Vietnamese HE, under the influence of the Soviet legacy, has been highly centralised (Hayden & Thiep, 2007). The state-centric characteristics (Madden, 2014) are manifested in the view that HE is part of the state bureaucracy (Dao & Hayden, 2010) and the strict control of the government, represented by the MoET, over the HE system. According to the legal framework, the macro governance in Vietnamese HE includes the MoET, other line ministries and local governments at the provincial or municipal city level. However, The MoET assumes the most extensive responsibilities (Dao & Hayden, 2010) that encompass almost all aspects of HEIs in Vietnam (T. T. Tran, 2014).

Article 69: The government takes chief responsibility of state management for HE. The MoET is accountable to the government in carrying out the state management of HE. Other line ministries coordinate with the MoET to carry out state management of education according to their given authority. Provincial People’s Committee (local governments) within its scope of

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responsibility and authority, carries out the state management of education according to the government’s administrative arrangement; monitors universities located in relevant provinces in compliance with regulations; implements educational socialisation; ensures the quality and effectiveness of local HE.

(Vietnamese Higher Education Law, 2012)

In recent years, the Vietnamese government has attempted to decentralise the HE system in response to the global trend of decentralisation (K.-H. Mok, 2008; T. T. Tran, 2014). For example, in 1993, two flagship national universities were established by merging small, specialised universities, giving them more autonomy than other universities in the system (T. T. Tran, 2014). The Vietnamese government also explicitly indicates its commitment to decentralisation in an important policy document, the Higher Education Reform Agenda in the 2006-2020 period, usually known as HERA 2020 (T. N. Pham & London, 2010). In this document, institutional autonomy is guaranteed to be strengthened. Concrete steps have been implemented, including all universities establishing university councils as the governing board (Dao & Hayden, 2010)

However, the research findings reveal that Vietnamese HE at the macro level is still under the strong control of the government. In both documents and interviews, the authority of the government represented by the MoET are repeatedly mentioned, emphasizing that universities must seek permission and/or approval from the government (represented either by Prime Minister, the MoET, other line ministries or the provincial governments, depending on the activities) in various activities.

For example, in the Vietnamese Higher Education Law issued in 2012, phrases such as the government regulates, [MoET] permits, [Prime Minister or the MoET] approves, [the Prime Minister or the MoET] decides, [MoET] issues [regulations or decrees], [MoET] coordinates with other ministers and other relevant bodies to implement, [MoET] issues the letter of approval for, [MoET] guides, instructs, and implements, are frequently observed. The number of times

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the roles and authority of the government (i.e. Prime Minister, the MoET, other line ministries or provincial governments) were mentioned in one single document (the Vietnamese Higher Education Law issued in 2012, consisting of 72 articles) is double the number of times the aspects or areas of which universities can exercise their autonomy were mentioned.

Article 33: [MoET] issues specific requirements and procedures to open or close courses at diploma, bachelor, master and doctoral programs; approve to open or close courses at diploma, bachelor, master and doctoral programs. Article 36: [MoET] promulgates the minimum amount of knowledge and capability requirements for university graduates in each educational program; regulates the procedures to develop, examine and promulgate the curricula of diploma, bachelor, master and doctoral programs; (Vietnamese Higher Education Law, 2012)

As a result of such a strict state-controlled governance model, the Vietnamese government is deeply involved in various aspects of HE. The following review of its involvement in major aspects of HE, including academic, appointment and finance will provide firm evidence for its over-controlling behaviour. Specifically, academic is the aspect in which the government’s authority is mentioned the most (28 times in comparison with 12 times in appointment, 11 times in finance in a single document of the Vietnamese Higher Education Law).

For the academic aspect, it is obvious that the government exercises strong authority in almost every activity, from establishing HE development plans, setting university assessment standards, setting enrolment quotas for each university, approving textbooks and references used in universities, setting the format of degrees and certification universities award, even of printing, awarding, and/or withdrawing those degrees and certifications.

Article 34: [MoET] regulates the process of generating enrolment quotas and issues the enrolment regulations. Article 36: [MoET] promulgates the minimum amount of knowledge and capability requirements for university graduates in each educational 293

program; regulates the procedures to develop, examine and promulgate the curricula of diploma, bachelor, master and doctoral programs; identifies the compulsory subjects in different programs at institutions that involve foreign investment; regulates the development, selection, examination, approval and usage of textbooks and references in HE educational programs. (Vietnamese Higher Education Law, 2012)

This strong involvement, in many cases, is not in accordance with policy statements and/or other regulations. For example, according to article 28 of the Higher Education Law, universities are given the autonomy to develop their own academic profiles by determining their strategic development plan and the programs they want to offer that align with their mission and educational goals. However, in the same document, the structure of educational programs is controlled by the MoET (article 68). Moreover, universities cannot offer courses without the approval of the MoET (article 33). It is hard to conclude that universities are granted genuine academic autonomy since the ultimate decisions are put in the hands of the MoET.

Staffing is possibly the area in which the arrangement between state authorities and universities is the most complicated, unclear and overlapping. Despite the statement in the Higher Education Law issued in 2012 emphasizing the autonomy of universities in terms of key personnel appointment (article 28), the MoET still maintains its strong control. In both public and private universities, appointment of both rector and chairperson of the university council of trustees must be approved by the MoET (article 16 and 20). In addition, although the university council is the highest decision-making body at university level, it is the rector who has the authority to make decisions on personnel (article 20). This arrangement in the context of inadequate genuine appointive autonomy given to the university makes the governance model of university council impractical to be implemented in reality.

Article 16: Chairpersons of University Council are appointed by the head of the state authority. 294

Article 20: Rectors are appointed or approved by the state authority. Rector has the responsibility and authority to regulate, issues regulations in universities according to the decisions of the university council; plans and develops the academic profiles (academic personnel and managers) of universities. Article 28: Universities have the responsibilities and authority to organise management systems; recruit and employ, manage and develop academic staff, managers, administrative staff, and employees. (Vietnamese Higher Education Law, 2012)

In terms of finance, the involvement of the government can be seen in its strong commitment to support the public sector financially. According to our participant, the government involves itself deeply in financial aspects of the public sector because this sector is heavily subsidized by the public budget, whereas the private sector receives almost no financial support from the government

Article 12: [The government] increases the state budget to invest in education; invests with clear focus to form clusters of high-quality research universities, particularly those advanced in natural science, hi-tech, and other important disciplines that contribute to the socio-economic growth and society improvement, to compete with other regional or global education institutions. The government orders and provides budgets for universities that are advanced in science and technology to carry out research tasks. (Vietnamese Higher Education Law, 2012)

Interestingly, most of the articles in Higher Education Law concerning financial issues do not distinguish between the public and private sectors for investment priority. However, the legal framework has been designed to favour the public sector because only public universities with their advantage of resources (both human and material resources) and prestige can meet the requirements to receive funding from the state budget. For instance, universities with better rankings and strong academic/research profiles are given priority to receive funding or

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research contracts from the government (article 9, 12 and 42, Vietnamese Higher Education Law). Obviously, only public universities with their longer history, better facilities, and more advanced academic staff can meet these requirements. Accordingly, in the Higher Education Law, of the 18 times financial arrangements were mentioned, 16 of them were implicitly about subsidies for the public sector. b. Limitations of The State-Controlled Model of Governance

In such a state-centric governance model in which the government exercises its control over every aspect of HEIs, Vietnamese universities have been desperately begging for more autonomy. Nevertheless, autonomy in Vietnamese HE has not been adequately understood (Dao & Hayden, 2010). At the current stage, institutional autonomy applies only to financial aspects and is granted to a very small number of universities (T. T. Tran, 2014).

Moreover, this state-control governance approach has been criticised for its weak internal university management and weak administrative responsibility for managing internal university affairs (Braun, 1999). Our interview participant explicitly criticises administrators’ poor performance in governing and managing public HE, both at macro and meso levels. His main argument is that there is a neglect of accountability in the field of HE and it has damaged the performance of the sector and hindered any attempt to reform the system.

There is a lack of accountability for rector’s performance. [...]. Therefore, the accountability of university management and administration has not been carefully considered

How can universities’ performance be measured? If they are under- achieving, who is accountable for it? No one. Who checks if the rectors are under-performing? [In report] There is nothing public universities do not achieve.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

In the statements above, our participant criticised the lack of accountability in the HE system. For him, the absence of measurable and student-based indicators in 296

evaluating the performance of university leaders, particularly rectors, is the critical weakness of the system. It discourages competitive capacity enhancement and quality improvement.

Research findings from the legal documents, unfortunately, support his statement. Indeed, the key word ‘accountability’ could not be found in any of the legal documents. The closest expression to ‘accountability’ is the ‘responsibilities’ of relevant stakeholders, such as the state, the universities, the rectors, and other agents as in the excerpts below.

Article 20: Rectors of public universities and presidents of private universities are the account holders, bearing the legal responsibilities to manage the assets and financial affairs of universities; strengthening the autonomy and taking responsibility to implement transparent financial systems according to legal requirements; complying with regulations in auditing and accounting. Rectors at private universities are authorized representatives of account holders, having authority and responsibility as account holders in the authorized areas. Article 37: Universities are autonomous and take responsibility to organise and manage the academic activities according to academic programs, year, and semester; carry out the academic principles and curricula according to the educational programs and formats. (Vietnamese Higher Education Law, 2012)

Although there are different understandings of accountability in HE, in general, it is a concept related to efficiency, effectiveness and performance evaluation; it means proving that responsibility for the performance of certain tasks has been carried out most efficiently (Kai, 2009). In this sense, in the Vietnamese regulatory framework, stakeholders are assigned specific tasks to carry out, but their accountability, or their responsibilities to monitor their tasks have not been identified. This neglect of accountability mechanisms in the legal system is the main cause of our participant’s critiques regarding the roles of rectors at public universities.

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In short, I have described specifically in this subsection the governance model at the macro level with strong state-control characteristics. The state bureaucracy led by the Prime Minister and represented by the MoET has the authority to involve itself and exercise its control in almost all aspects of HEIs, including academic, appointment and finance. This model has hindered the genuine autonomy of universities, despite the commitment of the government to increase institutional autonomy in universities. In addition, this model has often neglected organisational accountability, particularly in managing universities’ internal affairs.

Noteworthy also is the differences in the application of governmental control between the public and private sectors. The majority of the government’s involvement in academic and administrative aspects are applied to both the public and private sectors, whereas the involvement in appointive and financial aspects are primarily applied to the public sector only. This might be significantly associated with the different degree of university autonomy between the public and private sector. It suggests that private universities may enjoy more autonomy than their public counterparts, in both substantive (appointive and strategic aspects) and procedural (financial aspects) autonomy.

7.1.1.2. Quality Assurance

Improving quality in Vietnamese HE has been among the most serious challenges for the whole system (G. Harman, Hayden, & Pham, 2010). Under this tremendous pressure for quality improvement in education, the Vietnamese government represented by the MoET has adopted a new QA system, primarily focusing on accreditation. Firstly, the General Department of Education Testing and Accreditation (GDETA) was established in 2003, marking the official beginning of a QA system in Vietnam (H. C. Nguyen et al., 2017). Following this, policy documents were produced, among which the QA standards developed in 2004 and revised in 2007 were crucial for the development of the QA system in Vietnam. In addition, accreditation agencies were also established. At present, there are five accreditation agencies in Vietnam.

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Along with these regulatory frameworks, pilot projects were carried out to help universities implement the new QA mechanisms (H. T. Pham, 2018). Initially, a small number of public universities took the lead in applying QA mechanisms in assessing their educational quality (Q. T. N. Do, Pham, & Nguyen, 2017). Lessons and recommendations were generated from this pilot project to expand the policy to all universities in the HE system (H. C. Nguyen, 2017). At the current stage, internal and external accreditation have been implemented in the majority of universities (H. C. Nguyen & Ta, 2018). Many universities (207 universities, according to the Vietnamese Ministry of Education and Training, 2016) have implemented this new QA system because of the pressure of the government’s new QA mechanisms and the general public’s demand for quality improvement.

In this section, the newly adopted QA system of Vietnamese HE is discussed in detail, based on the operationalised elements of QA, namely QA agencies, methods, standards, procedures and purposes. The data reveals interesting characteristics of the Vietnamese QA system, in which the MoET is granted extraordinary power of control over the system, including the accreditation agencies and HEIs (H. C. Nguyen et al., 2017). Consequently, the implementation process of QA mechanisms in HEIs is considered time- consuming and compliance-driven (Q. T. N. Do et al., 2017; H. T. Pham, 2018). Given the context that QA was first introduced to Vietnamese HE by the World Bank under the principle of Neoliberalism (Dang, 2009; Madden, 2014), the controlling behaviour of the Vietnamese MoET can be viewed as the government’s effort of ‘walking the line’ between Neoliberalism and its state- centric values (Madden, 2014). a. QA Agencies

According to the legal framework of QA, QA agencies include the MoET as the highest administrative body, and other accreditation agencies approved by the MoET to officially conduct accreditation under the supervision of and monitoring by the MoET.

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a.1 MoET

The MoET assumes the highest authority in the QA framework, taking the responsibility to develop regulations and standards of QA such as national standards for HEIs, HE quality evaluation standards, minimum requirements to operate HE programs and courses, and QA procedures. In addition, the MoET also issues operation protocols for accreditation agencies, and establishes or approves the establishment of accreditation agencies, etc.

Article 52: The Minster of Education and Training issues national standards for HEIs, regulations on HE quality evaluation standards, HE programs evaluation standards, […], regulations HE quality accreditation procedures, regulations on accreditation agencies, […] establish or approve the establishment of accreditation agencies […].

(Vietnamese Higher Education Law, 2012)

Within the structure of the MoET, the General Department of Education Testing and Accreditation (GDETA), established in 2003, is the internal unit specialised in QA at the macro level (H. C. Nguyen et al., 2017). This unit is in charge of developing policies in QA for the educational system of Vietnam, from elementary level to HE.

For the first time in 2002, a national body [of QA] was established under the Division of HE of the MoET, which was called the General Department of Education Testing and Accreditation [GDETA] in 2003 […]. The GDETA can be seen as the national body of QA in Vietnam. […] Its main function is to develop QA policies and strategies for the whole educational system of Vietnam, from primary to HE.

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017)

a.2. Accreditation Agencies

Accreditation agencies provide accreditation services for educational organisations and assist educational organisations to improve educational quality after conducting accreditation (article 13, Regulations on Accreditation Agencies, 2012). There are two types of accreditation agencies, namely state- 300

owned and non-state-owned (article 3, Regulations on Accreditation Agencies, 2012). Until now, five accreditation agencies have been established, of which four are state-owned (H. C. Nguyen & Ta, 2018).

From the end of 2012 onward, the MoET has approved the establishment of few accreditation agencies. At present there are five agencies in total, four of them have been approved to operate. […] Among the five, four are located within universities, namely the National University of Hanoi, Danang, Hochiminh and Vinh.

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017)

A very interesting characteristic of these state-owned accreditation agencies is their dependence on the MoET in terms of funding and appointment. Legally, these accreditation agencies are recognised as legal entities and are required to maintain their independence from HEIs (article 3, Regulations on Accreditation Agencies, 2012). However, their independent status is questionable because they receive funding from the public budget (article 15, Regulations on Accreditation Agencies, 2012) and the heads of these agencies are appointed by the Minister of Education and Training.

Article 12: […] Director of the state-owned accreditation agencies must be appointed by the Minster of Education and Training

(Regulations on Accreditation Agencies, 2012)

Although we call them independent accreditation agencies, but I think in the context of Vietnam, it is not accurate. Because these agencies must receive approval from the MoET for establishment and operation.

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017)

In addition, as accreditation agencies in Vietnamese HE started as a result of the initial efforts of some national flagship universities, these state-owned accreditation agencies are located within these universities, utilising the universities’ resources such as facilities and human resources. As a result, it is questionable whether these agencies are truly independent of these universities.

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Among five of them [accreditation agencies], there are four located within universities, such as the National University of Hanoi, Danang, Hochiminh and Vinh. […] Frankly speaking, these national universities are the founders of these accreditation agencies. […] At the initial stage, these agencies utilised facilities and human resources of the universities they are located in. When I talked with these agencies, they all admitted that without the support of these universities, it would have been extremely difficult for the agencies to start.

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017)

Serious concerns arise regarding potential conflict of interests caused by these arrangments in which the MoET assumes various responsibilities and accreditation agencies are dependent on the MoET and some flagship universities for their appointment and finance. Indeed, such arrangements have resulted in critical challenges for the QA system in Vietnam to be properly implemented. In an interview, a QA expert of GDETA, Mr. H complained that placing the QA system under the supervision of the MoET has caused severe delays in developing and implementing relevant regulations for QA.

When I first arrived at the MoET in 2007, we already planned to develop financial management strategies for accreditation in Vietnam. Until now, it has been 10 years already and that task has not been accomplished.

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017)

As a unit of the MoET, GDETA is limited by the rigid funding systems of the MoET, which does not provide it sufficient resources to fulfil its primary task of developing a comprehensive QA framework for Vietnamese HE (H. C. Nguyen et al., 2017).

For instance, in the GDETA where I work, there are five people in total. Can you imagine how we are going to supervise the whole QA system with just five people? […] Just answering inquiries from HEIs will take all of our time. How can we develop policies and strategies for the system? Because we belong to the MoET, we can’t hire more people even if we want to,

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because there is a limited quota for the number of staff in the MoET. We can’t even outsource because there is no funding […].

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017)

In addition, because QA is a very new topic and has been adopted in Vietnamese HE only very recently, Vietnam lacks substantial understanding and infrastructure to quickly implement it in HE system.

There is no previous legal documents help identify and determine cost for accreditation service. [….] When I discuss with relevant stakeholders, most of the time we have to estimate the cost based on other financial management policies.

[…] The most challenging issue is to improve awareness of managers, academics, staff, and students for them to acknowledge the significance of accreditation.

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017) b. QA Methods

Accreditation is the primary QA method in Vietnam (H. C. Nguyen & Ta, 2018; H. T. Pham, 2018). Apart from accreditation, benchmarking (article 2, Regulations on Accreditation of Higher Education Institutions, 2017) and ranking (article 9, Vietnamese Higher Education Law, 2012) have also been mentioned in the QA framework but there has not been a significant effort to implement them.

Therefore, accreditation in Vietnamese HE is defined as an activity of assessing and recognising an educational organisation’s achievements of educational objectives, curriculum and contents (article 2, Regulations on Accreditation Agencies, 2012). Accreditation is compulsory for HEIs in Vietnam (Q. T. N. Do et al., 2017; H. C. Nguyen et al., 2017; H. C. Nguyen & Ta, 2018; H. T. Pham, 2018). Accreditation was introduced to Vietnam through international organisations such as the World Bank (Dang, 2009; Madden, 2014) and international and regional accreditation agencies including the Asia Pacific Quality Network (APQN) and the ASEAN University Network – Quality 303

Assurance (AUN-QA) (Q. T. N. Do et al., 2017; H. C. Nguyen, 2017). The Vietnamese QA system has been developed based on the international experiences of other countries and recommendations of these international organisations.

Based on experiences of other countries, accreditation is one of the major instruments of QA. […] As far as I know, ideas of QA and accreditation were first introduced to Vietnam in the late 1990s, early 2000s. Vietnam was recommended to adopt QA mechanisms, and accreditation was among the recommendations.

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017) c. Accreditation Standards and Procedures

c.1. Accreditation Standards

The Vietnamese MoET promulgated the first QA standards in 2004 which were revised in 2007. This version of standards was used until a new set of standards was issued in 2017.

In 2004, the first set of accreditation standards of Vietnam was issued […], later on it was revised in 2007, consisting of 10 standards and 63 criteria, and was used until now.

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017)

The new QA standards show a significant increase in the number of standards and criteria (25 standards and 111 criteria compared with 10 standards and 63 criteria in the 2007 version). These new standards are grouped into four categories as following.

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Table VII-2. University Accreditation Standards issued by the Vietnamese MoET in 2017

No. Category (4) Standards (25) Vision, Mission and Culture Administration Leadership and Management Strategic Management Mission and 1 Strategies on Education, Research and Community Strategy Service Human Resource Management Financial Management Networking and External Relations Internal Quality Assurance System Organisational Self-evaluation and External Evaluation 2 Quality Assurance Information System for Internal Quality Assurance Quality Improvement Admission and Enrolment Educational Curriculum Development Teaching and Learning Evaluation of Learners Quality Assurance 3 Support Activities for Learners by Activities Research Activity Management Intellectual Property Right Management Research Collaboration Community Engagement and Community Service Teaching Performance Research Performance 4 Performance Community Service Outcomes Financial Performance

(Regulations on Accreditation of Higher Education Institutions, 2017)

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These new standards are expected to address critical problems of the previous standards such as primarily focusing on inputs rather than outcomes (K. D. Nguyen, Oliver, & Priddy, 2009; N. D. Tran, Nguyen, & Nguyen, 2011), and emphasising accountability rather than quality improvement (Dao, 2015). According to Mr. H, these new standards are adaptations of the accreditation standards developed by AUN-QA.

The new standards are an adaptation of the standards developed by AUN- QA. Our plan is to implement these new standards from 2018.

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017)

This can be seen as the Vietnamese authority’s effort to internationalise by integrating into the global QA system (Q. T. N. Do et al., 2017). In addition, as ASEAN countries push forward to form a regional community (Goh, 2000; Hew & Soesastro, 2003; Severino, 2006), this attempt is expected to help improve the recognition of Vietnamese HE and strengthen student mobility within the region (Q. T. N. Do et al., 2017).

c.2. Accreditation Procedures

The accreditation procedures developed by the Vietnamese MoET include the following three major steps: internal evaluation report review, on-site evaluation, and decision making. The specific steps are illustrated in the figure VII- below.

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Figure 7. Accreditation Procedures of the Vietnamese QA Framework

Establishing Verifying External Internal Evaluation On-site Visiting Evaluation Committee Outcomes

Conducting Internal Reviewing Internal Decision Making Evaluation Evaluation Report

Submitting External Establishing Evaluation Request Publicising External Evaluation to Accreditation Evaluation Results Committee Agency

Specifically, universities first prepare a self-evaluation report by establishing an internal evaluation committee to conduct internal evaluation (article 8 and 10, Regulations on Accreditation Procedures, 2012). After receiving the request for external evaluation from universities (article 38, Regulations on Accreditation of Higher Education Institutions, 2017), accreditation agencies establish external evaluation committees to review the internal evaluation report submitted by universities and organise site-based evaluation (article 20, Regulations on Accreditation Procedures, 2012). The evaluation outcomes will be reported to the accreditation council of accreditation agencies to determine whether universities satisfy the accreditation requirements or not (H. C. Nguyen & Ta, 2018). The final results must be published to the public by universities and accreditation agencies (article 4, Regulations on Accreditation Procedures, 2012). Universities are required to be accredited every five years (article 16, Regulations on Accreditation Procedures, 2012). d. Purposes of QA

The two major purposes of a QA system, namely quality improvement and accountability (Kis, 2005) are both present in the relevant policy documents and regulations developed by the Vietnamese authority. For example, in the 307

Regulations on Accreditation of Higher Education Institutions promulgated in 2017, both of these purposes are mentioned

Article 3: Educational institutions use the quality evaluation standards to evaluate their activities, aiming to continuously improve educational quality and ensure that they are accountable to relevant stakeholders, particularly in quality and effectiveness and efficiency of the institutions.

(Regulations on Accreditation of Higher Education Institutions, 2017)

Specifically, the quality improvement is emphasised based on the definition of quality as fitness for purpose (how well HEIs fulfil their objectives) as stated in the regulatory framework.

Article 2: Educational quality in HEIs is the fitness for purposes established by the HEIs, meeting requirements of the Higher Education Law, and meeting the demand of human resources for national and regional development

(Regulations on Higher Education Quality Evaluation Standards, 2007)

This definition has been warmly welcomed by private universities as they see that having an accreditation certificate is strong evidence of their improved quality and thereby gaining public trust and legitimacy.

First we have to complete this [self-evaluation] report to find out what our strengths and weaknesses are. […] The ultimate purpose of self-evaluation is to improve ourselves [universities]. You must endeavour to improve. […] If there is an improvement, you pass. […] In short, as long as you are accredited by accreditation agencies, it means that you reach a certain level, or league. […] I think as long as universities do it [accreditation] well, quality will be improved.

(Vice-president M. (quality assurance), personal communication, 16 October 2016)

Nevertheless, a review of policy documents and regulations developed by the macro government of Vietnam reveals that a summative approach to QA (Perellon, 2005) has been emphasised since QA outcomes of Vietnamese HEIs 308

can be used not only to evaluate universities’ educational quality, but also to determine their ranking and reputation, justify the extent to which they are granted autonomy (e.g. enrolment number) and allocate funding.

Article 51: Accreditation outcomes are used as inputs to evaluate HE quality, ranking and reputation of HEIs; determine the extent of autonomy granted to HEIs, allocate funding to HEIs, […]. Accredited HEIs will be given priority by the authority to receive funding, or greater extent of autonomy.

(Regulations on Accreditation of Higher Education Institutions, 2017)

In fact, the tension between the two purposes of QA as in the case of Vietnam is not new. Researchers have long warned of the increasing conflict between quality improvement and accountability (El-Khawas, 2007; Hodson & Thomas, 2003; Kis, 2005; Sachs, 1994) and strongly recommended for a proper balance between these two aims (R. Brown, 1999; Kis, 2005) to facilitate the healthy development of HEIs and the HE system. In Vietnam, researchers criticised the current QA system’s tendency to over-emphasise accountability while neglecting quality improvement and diversity of the HE system (Dao, 2015; Madden, 2014; K. D. Nguyen et al., 2009; N. D. Tran et al., 2011). These critiques have contributed to the development of a new set of standards as an attempt to address these issues. However, having a new set of standards alone is not sufficient to achieve a proper balance as it is suggested in the literature.

The fundamental problem of Vietnamese QA, as revealed in the data of this study as well as in the literature (Q. T. N. Do et al., 2017; Madden, 2014; H. C. Nguyen et al., 2017; H. T. Pham, 2018), is the excessive control of the MoET and HEIs’ lack of autonomy. Firstly, the MoET’s control over accreditation agencies may threaten objectivity and transparency of quality evaluation, an important principle of accreditation in HE clearly stated in the Higher Education Law.

Article 49: Principles of accreditation in HE: […] Independence, objectivity, […], transparency, […].

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(Vietnamese Higher Education Law, 2012)

According to Mr. H, an expert in QA, accreditation agencies must be independent, not only from HEIs but also from the MoET to ensure that evaluation outcomes produced by these agencies are objective, transparent and effectively used to improve the quality of the HE system.

I think when the [QA] system is independent, the QA information provided to the authority and to users can be transparent and effectively used. […] If the MoET establishes universities, and then organises evaluation committees to evaluate universities that are under its direct supervision, I’m afraid that the evaluation results won’t be independent and transparent.

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017)

In addition, Mr. H also argues that not only should accreditation agencies be independent, but the GDETA should also be separated from the MoET. As a MoET-affiliated unit specialised in formulating QA policies, the limited funding and rigid procedures of the MoET has significantly restricted the GDETA’s capacity, and therefore significantly delayed the proper implementation of the QA system in Vietnam.

As we [GDETA] belong to the MoET, anytime we want to issue any document regarding accreditation, we can’t do it by ourselves, but must be signed by the Minister. It takes a huge amount of work that has to go through many complicated steps for the Minister to sign a document. Anytime we want to change or update anything, we have to go through such procedures. It takes too much time to keep updated.

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017)

Secondly, the micro management of the government has led to a serious lack of autonomy in implementing QA mechanisms at the university level. The one-size- fits-all approach in QA adopted by the government and its strong interference has not only impacted the diversity of the system (K. D. Nguyen et al., 2009) but also forced universities to implement QA mechanisms to comply with the

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government’s requirements because QA outcomes are linked with allocation of enrolment quotas (H. T. Pham, 2018).

Why do we always complain that Vietnamese HE is too slow to change? Because we don’t have autonomy. I think it’s the same with QA. Universities must be given more autonomy, in all respects. The QA system in Vietnam should also be given higher autonomy.

I think we need more financial autonomy to properly estimate the cost of accreditation. The current legal framework has not allowed us and universities to be financially autonomous to determine the cost of accreditation.

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017)

As a result, implementing QA in Vietnamese HEIs generally is a compliance- driven process which is viewed with great reluctance by academics, staff and students (Q. T. N. Do et al., 2017) without genuine motivations of improving quality.

Also, it [QA] is a new system, many people like academics do not want to implement it, because they do not see any benefit of implementing it while it takes so much time. […] Not only academics, even many leaders of universities do not really support [the implementation of QA]. Mainly because they have not clearly seen the positive impacts of implementing QA.

(Expert H., personal communication, 23 November 2017)

Despite the critiques from experts (Q. T. N. Do et al., 2017; Madden, 2014; H. C. Nguyen et al., 2017; H. T. Pham, 2018) about its excessive control behaviours, the MoET has not shown any sign of reducing control. Considering the fact that QA was first introduced to Vietnam by international organisations such as the World Bank under the influence of a neoliberal approach (Dang, 2009; Madden, 2014), this behaviour of the Vietnamese government is fascinating. Indeed, Madden (2014) argues that the implementation of QA mechanisms in Vietnam is a graphic example of its attempt to ‘walk the line’ between neoliberal principles and state-centric values. This behaviour of the Vietnamese government has also 311

been found in other areas and is considered a typical characteristic of the Vietnamese state-led developmental model (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Dixon, 2003; Masina, 2012; Painter, 2005).

In short, in this section, the newly implemented QA system in Vietnam is described, according to major concepts of QA, including QA agencies, methods, standards, procedures and purposes. As an emerging field, the Vietnamese QA system is still at its early stage with few accreditation agencies established under the direct supervision of and monitoring by the MoET (H. C. Nguyen & Ta, 2018). The MoET, as the highest administrative body, takes responsibility to develop the macro system of QA by establishing regulations regarding QA standards, procedures and accreditation agencies’ operational protocols. The Vietnamese QA system is constantly revised to keep up-to-date with the regional and international networks of QA as an attempt to internationalise and integrate with ASEAN and Asia regions (Q. T. N. Do et al., 2017).

Nevertheless, the system is facing critical challenges of a one-size-fits-all approach that does not encourage the system’s diversity (K. D. Nguyen et al., 2009). In addition, the excessive control by the MoET over the national QA system and accreditation agencies may cause serious problems such as lack of objectivity and transparency during implementation, ineffective use of QA outcomes, reluctance of support from university stakeholders, and delay in the implementation process (Q. T. N. Do et al., 2017; H. C. Nguyen et al., 2017; H. T. Pham, 2018). In conclusion, the implementation of Vietnamese QA as a result of the cooperation between the MoET and international organisations such as the World Bank can be seen as a contested field of contradictory Neoliberalism and state-centric values (Madden, 2014).

7.1.2. The Meso and Micro Levels

The university in this case study is a very new university, established in the mid 2000s, as a response to the Vietnamese government’s reform agenda of increasing the enrolment rate in the PHE sector (T. N. Pham & London, 2010). The founder of this university is a successful businessman in the finance sector 312

and also an educator. Established to satisfy the growing demand for HE, this university aims to become a comprehensive university that provides competitive courses and programs in business, technology, humanities and medical disciplines (Vietnamese University Document No. 1). Since its founding, the university has been growing dramatically in terms of number of student enrolments and number of programs (from 400 students in 2007 to 6000 in 2015, mainly enrolled in finance, business, MBA, information technology, engineering, English, architect and pharmacy).

This university fits my sampling criteria as a typical university in the demand- absorbing group, according to the typology of PHE developed by Levy (2006, 2009). This is the largest and fastest growing group in the PHE sector of Vietnam. In addition, this university also belongs to the sub-group of ‘serious demand-absorbing’ (Levy, 2009) universities which pays careful attention to improving quality despite the focus of meeting the burgeoning demand of access to HE (for definition and detailed explanation of the diversity of the sector, see Subsection 2.1.2. Functioning Models and Typology). Moreover, as Vietnam has witnessed the increasing participation of the private business sector in higher education, the university in this case is ideal because its founder is a successful businessman and an educator. As a result, this university has a strong linkage with the private business sector and industries. Finally, the university also matches my requirements in terms of the length of operation. It is not too young (under five years old) that its operational experience is limited. It also does not belong to the the group of institutions established in the early stage (around 20 years old) because this group of universities do not meet the criteria of having strong connection with the private business sector and industries and many of them are struggling to operate due to limited capital.

As a new, dynamic university with a strong business culture, the university in this case study was very open to being examined. I was warmly welcomed by the leaders of the university including the Chairman of the Board of Directors (the founder and owner of the university) and the faculty. As a result, my interviews

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in this university proceeded smoothly. I was allowed freely access to my potential participants, and all of my invitations were accepted. The participants generously gave time for me to interview them. I was able access to high levels of leadership in this university, from the Chairman of the Board of Directors, to the President and the Head of the Finance Department.

In total, I conducted interviews with five members of the university. This university has two campuses with its main campus located on the outskirts of Hanoi, the capital city of Vietnam. However, because the main administrative teams are located in the city campus, all of the interviews were conducted there, in the participants’ office. Located in what is called the ‘university-district’ of Hanoi (where most of universities in Hanoi are), its city campus is relatively small and hidden in a small but busy street. Since this campus is used for administrative and admission purposes, there were not many students around during the time I visited this university.

Apart from interviews, I was also provided important internal documents by the participants. Many of these documents were not available on the internet. The documents used for data analysis in this section are listed below.

Table VII-3. List of Documents for Data Analysis at the Meso Level

Document No Description Name A report published by the university in 2016, briefly 1 Vn.UDoc.1 introducing the university, its history, the advantages and challenges confronting it An official report published by the university in 2016, 2 Vn.UDoc.2 introducing its history and achievements A brief introduction of the university published in the 3 Vn.UDoc.3 university’s website in 2018, introducing its vision, mission, educational philosophy and development strategies The list of members of the Board of Directors, published in 4 Vn.UDoc.4 the university’s website in May 2018

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The list of current members of the University Council, 5 Vn.UDoc.5 published in the university’s website in May 2018 The university’s organisational chart, published in the 6 Vn.UDoc.6 university’s website in October 2018 The University’s enrolment plan with its financial plan, 7 Vn.UDoc.7 published in the university’s website in April, 2018 An official announcement from the university regarding its 8 Vn.UDoc.8 enrolment and financial plan, published in the university’s website in July 2018 An official report published by the university in 2017 9 Vn.UDoc.9 regarding its effort to ensure quality and financial management

Overall, the practices of this private university are described from the aspects of governance and finance. Because accreditation, the major method of the QA system in Vietnam is mandatory, universities are required to strictly follow the QA requirements. For this reason, in this subsection, I do not cover the QA practices at the meso level. However, the financial situation of the university will be discussed in detail to illustrate the financial arrangements for PHE in Vietnam.

7.1.2.1. Governance a. Governance Structure

The governance structure of the private university in this case includes the Board of Directors, the University Board, and the Academic Board. The Board of Directors is the highest governing body of the university, representing the founders and owners of the university. The University Board as the executive board, implements decisions made by the Board of Directors. Finally, the Academic Board represents the university faculties and other stakeholders.

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Figure 8. The Governance Structure of the University

(Vietnamese University Document No.6)

a.1. Board of Directors

According to the legal framework, a Board of Directors is the representative body of the founders and owners of a private university (article 17, Vietnamese Higher Education Law; article 21 and 22, Vietnamese University Charter), assuming the highest governing authority in a private university. The Board must have at least 7 members (article 21, Vietnamese University Charter).

As the governing board of a private university, the roles and responsibilities of the Board of Directors are the following.

Article 17: Responsibilities of the Board of Directors

a) Implement decisions of the General Meeting; b) Determine strategies, plans and organisational policies of the university; c) Determine the university’s objectives and directions in aspects such as research, teaching, international cooperation and quality assurance; d) Determine organisational, human resource, financial and investment management affairs;

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(Vietnamese Higher Education Law, 2012)

Members of the Board of Directors of a university include representatives of individuals or organisations that contribute capital to establish the university, the President, representatives of the local authority where the university is located, and the representatives of faculties, and other internal units of the university (article 17, Vietnamese Higher Education Law). However, the legal framework does not specify how relevant stakeholders should be represented in the Board. Therefore, members of the Board are mainly determined by the founders and owners of a university (article 22, Vietnamese University Charter).

Interestingly, private universities are categorised into ‘private’ and ‘not-for-profit private’ universities (article 20 and 28, Vietnamese University Charter) without much difference in governance structure. Both types of universities are required to establish a Board of Directors as the governing board. The functions of the Board of Directors in the two types are fairly similar. Chairman and President are elected by the Boards, regardless of the type of university. Their functions in both types are also similar.

As stated in the Vietnamese University Charter issued in 2014, the biggest differences between these two types are (1) instead of holding a general meeting in ‘private’ universities (article 20), ‘not-for-profit private’ universities hold an annual university meeting (article 28); (2) instead of having shareholders as in ‘private’ universities, who receive return on equity (article 23), ‘not-for-profit private’ universities have ‘capital contributing members’, who receive interest at a rate that is not higher than the government bond rate at that time (article 32).

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Table VII-4. Similarities and Differences between the Governance Structure of [For- profit] ‘Private’ and ‘Not-for-profit Private’ Universities

[For-profit] ‘Private’ University ‘Not-for-profit private’ University General meeting includes all capital A not-for-profit university doesn’t convene contributing members of a private general meeting (Article 28) university (Article 20) Capital contributing members of a not-for- Capital contributing members of a profit private university have the rights to private university have the rights to receive interests corresponding to the equity receive dividends annually ratio in the charter capital of the university, corresponding to the equity ratio in according to the regulation in the university the charter capital of the university, charter (if mentioned). Provided, the interest according to the standards identified rates are not higher than the Vietnamese in annual financial report of the government bond rates at the same period university (Article 23). (Article 32) The governing board of a not-for-profit private university is the governing body representing The governing board is established the collective ownership of the university and in a private university according to is the highest power unit of the university. article 17, Higher Education Law […] The governing board of a not-for-profit (Article 21). private university has responsibilities and authorities as prescribed in article 17, Higher Education Law (Aricle 29)

As stated above, governance structure of the two types of private universities are quite similar. From the data, it is reasonable to conclude that, firstly, the two terms ‘private universities’ and ‘not-for-profit universities’ implies orientation of universities in which ‘private universities’ refers to for-profit universities because shareholders in this type of university receive return on equity according to the regulations of the university’s annual financial report (article 23, Vietnamese University Charter). The university in this case study, therefore, is actually a ‘for- profit’ university. Secondly, Vietnamese policy makers have not addressed the

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differences in governance models available for private universities, even though the attempt was indicated explicitly in the legal documents.

a.2. University Board

University Boards have not been addressed specifically in the legal framework. Nothing has been found in policy documents, laws and regulations regarding this unit. However, the University Board in the university of this case study acts as the executive board, with the President takes the role of CEO, as stated explicitly by the President.

For a private university, the University Board is not about leadership, but more about management. The Board of Directors takes the leadership role, because they are the owners of the university. […] The Board of Directors is the leader, the University Board is only the manager.

Private universities are like enterprises […]. For example, like this university, the University Board is similar to the Executive Board of an enterprise.

(President G., personal communication, 17 October 2016)

Accordingly, the University Board of this university includes the President and five vice-presidents. This University Board takes the responsibility of implementing decisions made by the Board of Directors. The governance model in this university, therefore, is similar to that of an enterprise.

a.3. Academic Board

The Academic Board, as required by the regulatory framework, is established by the President of a university (article 19, Vietnamese Higher Education Law), and is the representative of the university’s faculty, acting as an advisory board for the President and his University Board. The Academic Board includes the President, Vice-president (academic), the Heads or Deans of schools or departments (academic), and prestigious scholars. The responsibilities of the Academic Board are following.

Article 19: The Academic Board advices the President regarding:

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a) Development of academic policies, and academic staff employment criteria […]; b) Academic staff development plan; c) Development plans of academic disciplines, majors; […] research development strategies […]. (Vietnamese Higher Education Law, 2012)

Accordingly, the Academic Board of the university consists of ten members. The Director of the Academic Board is the Head of the graduate school of the university. The Chairman of the Board of Directors is also a member of the Academic Board. Other members are scholars in various disciplines. b. Enterprise Governance Model

At the meso level, it is obvious that the governance model adopted in this case university possesses strong characteristics of the enterprise governance model. The typical characteristics of such a model can be clearly seen in the market- friendly educational programs offered by the university, the business-like language, an emphasis on financial efficiency and a tendency of excluding internal stakeholders (i.e. faculty and students).

Firstly, the university is characterised by the market-oriented approach it adopts in which it offers courses and programs that are in high demand. Specifically, the programs, as identified by the university are those related to tourism and health care industries, such as tourism management, languages, nursing, and public health.

We focus on three main areas: firstly pharmacy, secondly tourism and hospitality, and thirdly, nursing. In short, health, tourism and hospitality industries are our focuses. It is to meet the development of the Vietnamese economy.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

This strategic choice of the university is understandable in the context that PHE in Vietnam emerged and developed to respond to the rapidly growing market for higher education with an increasing demand that the public sector has failed to

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satisfy. In addition, as with other universities in the private sector, this university receives almost no funding from the government, which causes it to be highly dependent on tuition fees. Thus, attracting students is critical for this university since tuition fees are its primary source of finance. Given the context that private universities have to compete with one another and particularly with their public counterparts to attract students in an environment where public universities are highly regarded and favoured by parents and students (Huong & Fry, 2002), this requires this university to establish specific strategies to strengthen its competitiveness.

Secondly, in synchronization with the market-oriented approach of curriculum development is the presence of business language that saturated the contents of our interviews. Business terminology/jargon such as branding, inputs, competition, learning demand, enterprise, manufacture, consumption, market, fight to get clients, investment, services, assets, private ownership, capital structure, joint stock company, incomes generation, a huge surplus between revenue and investment, etc were widely observed during the interviews.

As an enterprise, the first point that must be identified is whether our products can be sold in the future?

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Frankly speaking, education is unique. But it is still a kind of good, in which it requires competition. If we are not competitive enough, we will be eliminated, like what happens in the market. Market principles require university leaders to develop short-term and long-term plan for their universities if they want to survive.

(Vice-President T. (academic), personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Thirdly, another noticeable characteristic that was observed in the data collected at the case university is the emphasis on cost effectiveness. Chairman A., an experienced businessman and educator, mercilessly criticised the public sector for its weakness in administration and management, particularly the matter of financial efficiency. Based on his own long-term working experience in the 321

public sector both in business and education, before becoming the Chairman of the Board of Directors of this private university, he was very sceptical about the public sector’s ability and capacity in managing universities effectively and efficiently. By doing so, he highlighted the strengths of private ownership, proudly boasting on, according to his own viewpoint, its higher responsibilities to ensure financial efficiency. He argues that the public education system should adopt the management model of the private sector, in order to be more accountable to taxpayers.

A system in which everything is state-owned lacks a mechanism to evaluate the university president’s performance. Why? Because they are all state- owned, it all belongs to public funding. What is the point of evaluation? […] Also, how does one evaluate the performance of a university against its missions? Who will take the responsibility if it doesn’t achieve its established goals? No one. Because there is no one evaluating how the presidents performs this year.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

In terms of competitiveness, I personally think the private sector is doing better than the public sector. It is evident in Vietnam. Private enterprises […] are performing better, particularly in terms of efficiency.

(Vice-President T. (academic), personal communication, 19 October 2016)

However, this enterprise model of governance has been criticised primarily for its exclusion of internal stakeholders (Marginson & Considine, 2000). In our interview with Chairman A., this feature was clearly observed in his emphasis on the significance of a fast, smooth decision-making process by concentrating power and authority to the leaders (primarily himself). He supported his argument by illustrating the problems in other private universities where the structure of governance causes the leaders to pass through a complicated process of various steps to reach final decisions,

If you own only a small share, no one listens to you. They can replace you at anytime. That’s why it takes a really long time through a lengthy process of

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meeting after meeting, for leaders [in other private universities] to develop a plan, persuade other members and implement the plan.

It is common not only in the field of education, but also in other industries as well. Banking, finance, etc., joint stock companies, large enterprises; there has always been a top leading team consisting of one or two people. For example, look at Vincom [a very large private corporation in Vietnam], it is always Mr. Vuong [a famous businessman who is the Chairman and CEO of Vincom] who owns the corporation and takes the lead. What he says will be the decision of the enterprise.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Moreover, Chairman A. strongly opposed the attempts to legalise shared governance practices at the university level, criticising them for not being practical/applicable in the Vietnamese context, and predicting that these attempts will soon fail to accomplish their goals. For him, non-legal mechanisms that facilitate/allow stakeholders within universities to negotiate on decisions and goals would be more appropriate to apply. Accordingly, Chairman A. displayed little tolerance for diverse opinions and viewpoints, particularly those different from his.

There is a suggestion that faculty representatives should be included in the university’s governing board, that it should not be only the founders of universities to determine the university’s development orientation. That suggestion really irritates me.

I hire you to work for me, if you perform well, you will receive good incentives and benefits. If you don’t like me, you can choose to leave. You can’t be a barrier to my developing my company. If you think as professors you disagree with my decisions as the chairman, you can leave. […] I see things this way, and act according to my perception. You can’t force the university to act according to your will.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

These behaviours of Chairman A. represents an extremely common practice of governance in Vietnam, namely ownership concentration. Unlike other 323

developed countries where the corporate governance model with its practice of high seperation between ownership and management have been developed and adopted globally for around seven decades (Means, 2017) (See the governance model of the Chinese independent college in Chapter VI), such a model has been introduced only very recently in Vietnam (Hai & Nunoi, 2008). Instead, Vietnamese organisations, especially those in the private business sector, still display a strong tendency of ownership concentration in which the owners of the private firms intervene directly in the firm’s management and exercise their tight control over operations of the firm.

To understand the preference of ownership concentration in Vietnamese private organisations, the study of Nguyen, Lock and Reddy (2015) may offer helpful insights. These authors, while observing the governance practices of Vietnamese and Singaporean firms, suggest that the lack of an effective governance system at the national level may critically determine the dominance of the practice of ownership concentration in Vietnam. Specifically, in Vietnam where national governance quality is poor, ownership concentration may help improve a firm’s financial performance, while such a positive correlation is absent in Singapore, one of the countries that has the highest quality of governance in Asia.

Chairman A., as a businessman, had obviously borrowed this practice from the private business sector to govern his university. His disagreement with the suggestion of implementing the model of shared governance in Vietnam therefore can be explained as an investor’s attempt to protect his investment from external stakeholders’ intervention in an environment where an effective governance system at the national level with necessary supervisory mechanisms is absent.

To sum up, in this subsection I have described the governance structure of the university in this case study. Specifically, the major components of the governance structure in the university include the Board of Directors, the University Board and the Academic Board. The Board of Directors as the governing board of the university determines significant matters such as

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establishing educational goals, objectives, development strategies and plans. Meanwhile, the University Board led by the President is the executive unit, implementing decisions made by the Board of Directors. Finally, the Academic Board is an advisory unit, acting as advocates to the President and the University Board in academic affairs.

In such a structure, the university’s governance model clearly mimics that of the private business sector, with strong characteristics of an enterprise governance model, particularly the market-oriented approach to curriculum development, the business-like language in the university dialogues, the emphasis on cost- effectiveness and the tendency to exclude internal stakeholders. Such a model of governance may respond promptly to external environment and be efficiently well-performed. However, the most critical shortcoming of this model is its neglect of internal stakeholders’ voices and different opinions.

7.1.2.2. Finance

In this subsection, financial conditions at the meso level are described to illustrate how institutional arrangements at the macro level have influenced the degree of financial stability at the meso level. Accordingly, the financial structure of the university in this study is discussed, showing its unstable structure of over dependence on tuition fees as its only source of revenue. Challenges confronting the university’ efforts to stabilise its financial condition are also listed, particularly unfavourable environmental features at the macro level such as the intensifying competition between HEIs and inconsistent public policies are the major causes of the university’s financial difficulties. The university’s strategies to address these issues are also explained, revealing that unless there are crucial changes at the macro institutional level, it is beyond the capacity of private HEIs to develop alternative financial sources. a. Financial Structure of the University

Tuition fees are the most important source of finance of the university in this case study. Literature has reported the over-dependence of the PHE sector in

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Vietnam on private sources, which account for 82 percent of its revenue (Hayden & Dao, 2010). This figure is similar to Korea (70 percent) (B. Kim & Park, 2018) and China (87 percent) (Su, 2012). However, in the university of this case study, the situation is much worse. Tuition fees are almost the only source of finance, accounting for 96.8 percent of its total revenue in 2017 (Vietnamese University Document No. 9). This situation was also confirmed by Ms. P, the Head of the Finance Department of the university.

Honestly, in our university, [tuition fees] account for more than 95%, […] even 100%, because the rest of 5% is also generated from student services such as cafeteria, accommodation services, etc. […] Our university is purely teaching-oriented, there are no other sources. […] [Our history is very short, little more than 10 years], we have not been able to develop alternative sources of revenue.

(Ms. P. (Finance), personal communication, 18 October 2016)

The university receives no direct financial support from the public budget. Because it is a young, teaching-oriented university (Vietnamese University Document No. 1, Ms. P (Finance), personal communication, 18 October 2016), it has not developed the capacity to generate funding from other sources such as research or university-industry coordination. In addition, Vietnam lacks a culture of donations for education. As a result, tuition fees have become the only sources of funding of the university.

It is important to note that private HEIs in Vietnam do receive indirect financial incentives from government, such as land lease support for education projects, tax reduction or tax exemption. Specifically, the government in coordination with the local governments supports private investors in establishing new HEIs by:

(1) allowing them to lease public land with lower cost than market price.

To be fair, [private HEIs like us] do receive support from the state in a form of land lease incentives. […] We are supported to lease public land for 50 years with low prices. [Because we are an educational enterprise, we are

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allowed to lease public land in residential areas]. Normal enterprises are not. They can only lease land in industrial zones.

(Ms. P. (Finance), personal communication, 18 October 2016)

(2) providing private HEIs tax concession;

Income tax for enterprises in education are lower. For example, normal enterprise income tax is 22% [at the time of the interview]. Enterprises in education are taxed only 40-60% of that rate, depending on the circumstances.

(President G., personal communication, 17 October 2016)

Article 8: Income tax for enterprises operating in ‘socialised activities’ [normally referring to activities in education and vocational training, health and medical services, sports and entertainment, and environment improvement] is 10% during their course of operation.

(Regulations on Encouraging Private Investment in Education, Vocational Training, Public Health, Culture, Sports and Environment Improvement, 2008)

However, apart from these tax incentives, there is no direct financial support from the government for private HEIs. This lack of support from the government and PHE’s over-reliance on tuition fees have resulted in serious financial challenges for the healthy development of the sector. b. Financial Challenges Confronting the University

Since the university depends entirely on tuition fees to fund its operation, its financial stability is severely threatened, particularly because it has experienced significant difficulties in attracting students due to (1) its main campus being located in the outskirt of the city; (2) declining student population; (3) diversifying HE provision caused by deregulation, leading to intensifying competition between HEIs; (4) lacking high quality faculty; (5) public’s distrust of PHE; (6) unpredictable changes in market demand for access to HE; and (7) inconsistent public policies have also caused serious difficulties and confusion for financial management in the university.

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Specifically, the university’s main campus is located far from the centre of the city where public transport is limited (Vietnamese University Document No. 1). This physical location of the university’s facilities may discourage future students to enrol. In addition, the government’s approach of deregulation has led to expansion in both the public and private sectors and diversification of HE provision

Universities are allowed to expand without supervision. […] Public universities are no longer restricted by enrolment quotas. […] Too many private universities are established. HE is over-supplied

(Ms. P. (Finance), personal communication, 18 October 2016)

Meanwhile, the increasing participation of both domestic and foreign providers in HE provision is in the context of early signs of a decline in the student cohort (the total number of students enrolled in HE decreased 4.1 percent in 2017 compared with 2016 according to Vietnam General Statistic Office, 2017). Collectively, competition between HEIs has intensified, directly impacting the university’s ability to attract students

The number of students enrolled is decreasing, while the number of institutions are not. In addition, foreign providers (from the UK, America, Germany and Japan) increasingly participate in Vietnamese HE, making it difficult for [our university] to attract students.

(Vietnamese University Document No. 1)

To give you a simple illustration, the number of HEIs has doubled compared with the figure in 2000. Enrolment quotas in public HEIs have increased from three to ten fold, compared with the 1990s. Meanwhile, the number of high school students has declined due to the population policy. So, the demand side is decreasing, while the supply side has increased. […] There is an imbalance in demand and supply here

(President G., personal communication, 17 October 2016)

Making the situation worse, the general public’s distrust of the private sector in HE and the traditional preference for public HEIs have not only influenced future 328

students’ choices of HEIs, but also hindered the university’s ability to attract high quality faculty. This has challenged the university’s efforts to improve quality to attract more students.

Several private universities have not improved their educational quality, thereby deepening the public’s stereotype regarding the private sector in HE. […] Meanwhile, students generally prefer public universities as their first choice to study.

It is difficult for [the university] to attract high quality faculty.

(Vietnamese University Document No. 1)

Moreover, demand for HE in Vietnam in recent years has changed dramatically, making the university’s strategic planning for long-term development increasingly difficult.

For example, about 5 years ago, the Vietnamese economy grew rapidly. Industries such as finance, real estate, banking, stock market, all expanded remarkably. As a result, students all wanted to study in those areas. We also enrolled many students in relevant courses. Now what? These last three years, we have suffered from an economic crisis, not only domestically but also globally. Demand for these areas therefore declined sharply.

(Ms. P. (Finance), personal communication, 18 October 2016)

Of all these difficulties, inconsistent and incompatible public policies caused by poor coordination between different ministries of the government appear to be the most challenging to the healthy financial development of PHE generally and the university in particular. Specifically, although there are certain indirect tax incentives provided by the government as described above, these incentives are insufficient. Substantial support in educational policies for PHE has not been available, particularly in admission, students’ scholarships, graduates’ employment, and faculty’s research activities.

Public policies have not paid adequate attention to support the private sector in HE to develop; […] there is discrimination between the public and

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private sectors, from admission to employment for students graduated from private HEIs.

(Vietnamese University Document No. 1) For example, faculties in private HEIs are excluded from participating in research activities organised by the MoE, while students in these universities are not eligible to apply for government scholarship to study abroad.

The private sector in Vietnamese HE does not receive any direct subsidies from the public budget. Faculties in private HEIs are not allowed to participate in any research activities funded by public money. Excellent students in private HEIs are not eligible to apply for government’s scholarships to study abroad either.

(Ms. P. (Finance), personal communication, 18 October 2016)

These incompatibilities between tax concession policies and educational policies might have resulted from the poor coordination among different ministries within the government (i.e. the MoET and Ministry of Finance). Such a lack of coordination can be seen elsewhere. For instance, the lack of coordination between the MoET and the Ministry of Health, resulted in sudden changes in graduation requirements for students in medical courses that did not allow HEIs to sufficiently prepare for such changes.

Before, only doctors and pharmacists were required to have university degrees. Nurses were not. It was ok for them to have diploma certificates. Recently, the Ministry of Health changed its requirements, from 2021, everyone who works in medical services must have a university degree.

(Ms. P. (Finance), personal communication, 18 October 2016)

Moreover, there are ambiguous and inconsistent requirements for tax reduction that cause a lot of confusion for HEIs. As Ms. P, the Head of the Finance Department of the university complained, the requirements to apply for tax concession are unclear and can be interpreted in different ways, which do not match the actual situation of HEIs in Vietnam and therefore cause considerable confusion and difficulties for the university’s financial management. 330

For example, to obtain a certain tax concession incentive, around 6 years ago, one of the requirements is 55m2 of land per student. In the Vietnamese context [of high population density], such a requirement is impossible. I’m not sure if there was anything wrong here. Later it was changed to 2m2 building area per student. These requirements are completely different. More importantly, look at this requirement. For university facilities, you have to include land, green zone, library, stadium etc. Obviously that indicator of 2m2 per student does not consider these items.

(Ms. P. (Finance), personal communication, 18 October 2016)

These confusions and inconsistency are also primarily caused by a lack of coordination between ministries, particularly between the MoET, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

It is not one university, or the MoET alone, or only the tax department that can solve this problem. It must be the government, including the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development [that manages land resources] to work together.

(Ms. P. (Finance), personal communication, 18 October 2016)

Likewise, according to regulations for land ownership, the majority of private HEIs in Vietnam cannot possess land but must lease land from state (represented by local governments) by long-term contracts (usually for 50 years) (article 10, 56, and 59, Vietnamese Law on Land, promulgated in 2013). These regulations have restricted private HEIs’ access to bank loan since banks in Vietnam generally require land ownership to obtain a bank loan.

The majority of Vietnamese universities lease land from the state. Universities do not own the land, they only own the assets on that piece of land. […] When we use these assets to secure bank loans, it is very difficult. We are not allowed to use the land as a pledge/collateral security, only the assets on that land are counted. In Vietnam, the ‘red book’ [referring to the land ownership certificate] is the most important document to obtain a bank loan right? But we don’t have the land ownership, we only have the land usage right. It’s difficult for us to get a bank loan. 331

(Ms. P. (Finance), personal communication, 18 October 2016)

The worst is that, when accessing to a bank loan, private HEIs are not granted any incentives regarding loan interest rates for investment in education, which has hampered their development due to limited access to financial investment.

Private HEIs do not receive incentives of low interest when investing in facility development [which is usually granted to private investment in education or infrastructure development].

(Vietnamese University Document No. 1)

Even when we have collateral security, commercial interest rates for normal enterprises, […] about 10.5% per annum [at the time of the interview] are applied to us [private universities].

(Ms. P. (Finance), personal communication, 18 October 2016)

This, again, is another example of the lack of coordination between the MoET, the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank of Vietnam

The State Bank of Vietnam and the government have to develop clear guidance for banks so that they can support us.

(Ms. P. (Finance), personal communication, 18 October 2016)

As explained, these examples of inconsistent and incompatible policies might have been caused by the lack of coordination between different ministries and departments within the Vietnamese government. However, from a different perspective, such inconsistency and incompatibility can be seen as being a result of conflicts between neoliberal practices that support the development of PHE (i.e. tax reduction and land lease incentives), and the socialist practices that discourage its development (i.e. the MoET’s exclusion of students and faculty of private HEIs from some of its scholarship programs and research activities). Indeed, this kind of conflict has been reported in the literature in which the Vietnamese government behaviour is described as ‘walking the line’ because it has neither fully supported Neoliberalism nor clearly developed an alternative strategy (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Dang, 2009; George, 2005; Madden, 2014;

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Masina, 2012). Such behaviour of the Vietnamese government is common not only in education (Dang, 2009; Madden, 2014) but also in other domains such as economic and legislative framework development (Beeson & Pham, 2012; George, 2005; Masina, 2012). c. The University’s Strategies to Address Financial Problems

Operating in such a dynamic environment where unpredictable factors constantly challenge the development and stability of organisations, the university therefore has endeavoured to stabilise its financial situation by developing specific strategies with clear goals.

If we are not competitive enough, we will be eliminated, like what happens in the market. Market principles require university leaders to develop short- term and long-term plan for their universities if they want to survive. […] To survive in HE, you must have a long-term vision.

(Vice-President T. (academic), personal communication, 19 October 2016)

For the short and medium term, the university, as a young, newly developed private institution, plans to expand its size and develop itself to be a comprehensive university. The leaders of the university believe that by being a comprehensive university that provides diverse educational courses and programs, it will be able to cope with the constant changes of the market.

From the beginning, we aimed to develop to be a comprehensive university. The key point here is to attract students to different courses and programs.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

We have to continue offering various courses [even if we can only enrol a small number of students in some courses] because market demands always changes. Most importantly, we must grow to be a comprehensive university, because we know we should not put all our eggs in one basket.

(Vice-President T. (academic), personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Nevertheless, the university is still cautious in its quantitative expansion. Since students generally enrol in four-year courses in HE, annual admission results

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may impact the development outcomes of a university for the next four years. Hence, in an unpredictable environment, rapid expansion may result in high risks for a university that depends entirely on tuition fees.

Talking about risk management in private universities […] simply speaking, it is to be careful in our investment decisions. We can’t act like an enterprise [to take risks in investment].

(Ms. P. (Finance), personal communication, 18 October 2016)

For the long term, after achieving the size of a medium university with 15,000 students, the university plans to shift its development goal from quantitative expansion to qualitative development by concentrating on developing its niches in selected areas and disciplines.

Aiming to increase the total number of students enrolled to 10,000 students in 2025, including 1,000 postgraduate students.

(Vietnamese University Document No. 3)

[…] I think we will maintain the size of 15,000 students and focus on quality, not quantity. […] Maintaining that size to improve quality. […] We will pay serious attention to quality at that stage. […] And we will focus on developing our own niches in selected areas.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

However, this does not mean that the university has not developed its niches. In its development plan, public health is among selected disciplines that it chooses to focus its investment on, and it has taken substantial steps to fulfil its goals (e.g. organising exchange programs for medical students and cooperating with domestic and foreign enterprises to provide internship opportunities for students).

[Our university] aims to be a comprehensive university, offering diverse courses and programs, with public health as our core target.

(Vietnamese University Document No. 3)

In fact, the core value of the university culture that we are trying to build is to focus on quality. We must provide high quality educational services.

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(Vice-President T. (academic), personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Overall, the university’ strategies still take tuition fees as the core of its financial structure. It has not developed plans to diversify its sources of finance. However, considering the unfavourable environment as described in this section, if there is no substantial change in the institutional environment at the macro level, it will be very difficult for private HEIs like the university in this case study to develop alternative sources of revenue.

To conclude, in this subsection the financial situation of the university in this study is described, showing its serious problem of over-reliance on tuition fees. Meanwhile, this only source of revenue of the university is imperilled because of the intensifying competition between HEIs at the same time the student population is starting to decline. In addition, the general public’s distrust of PHE has not only negatively impacted students’ choice of enrolment in private HEIs but has also hindered the university’s ability to attract high quality faculty. Rapid changes in market demand have also challenged the university’s efforts to stabilise its financial situation while incompatible and inconsistent public policies have only worsened the situation. Although the university has tried to develop strategies to ensure financial stability, it is beyond its capacity to diversify financial sources apart from tuition fees. Substantial changes in the current institutional environment are essential to help private HEIs like the university to stabilise their financial situation.

7.2. The Second Dimension

This section focuses on exploring the significance of institutional factors, namely institutional isomorphisms, logics and actors in shaping the practices PHE in Vietnam. More specifically, it attempts to explain how the interactions between these factors are enabling or constraining the development of the sector. Generally institutional factors are located at the institutional (macro) level (Friedland & Alford, 1991), therefore only the description of the macro level is needed.

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However, within an institutional field, there may be different, sometimes contradictory logics co-existing (Greenwood et al., 2011). Since logics provide justification for actors’ to rationalise their courses of actions (Glynn, 2008; Kraatz et al., 2016), different actors at different levels in a field may employ different logics to justify their actions. In the case of Vietnam, the data reveal that actors at the macro and meso levels have employed different logics as justifications for their actions. Therefore, in this section, I provide separate descriptions of the institutional factors at the macro and meso levels.

7.2.1. The Macro Level

7.2.1.1. Isomorphisms

Isomorphisms are institutional pressures that influence organisations existing in an institutional field, inclining them toward a certain degree of homogeneity (Greenwood et al., 2008). Essentially, they are common norms, values and regulations that available in an institutional field in which organisations are placed. By conforming themselves to these environmental pressures, organisations gain their legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996). In this study, the following isomorphic forces are explored: (1) cultural-cognitive; (2) resource dependence normative; (3) normative; and (4) coercive. a. Cultural-cognitive: Neoliberalism, Confucianism and Socialism

The cultural-cognitive isomorphisms are institutional pressures based on cultures, shared knowledge, beliefs and values taken for granted by people (Scott, 2008). This type of isomorphisms can be observed in people’s attitudes, frames of reference or stereotypes (Scott, 1995). Similar to China, in Vietnam, the cultural- cognitive isomorphisms that significantly shape the development of PHE consist of Neoliberalism, Confucianism and Socialism with Neoliberalism and Confucianism as enabling pressures while Socialism is a constraining isomorphism. However, unlike China, the influence of Neoliberalism in Vietnam is quite limited whereas the impact of Socialism as the national orthodoxy is still

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dominant. As a result, PHE in Vietnam has developed at a much slower pace than that of China.

a.1. Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is an ideology that promotes economic rationality (Kezar, 2004) and encourages individuals’ rights to maximizing personal benefit (Apple, 2013) through liberalising entrepreneurial freedom (Harvey, 2007). Promoted by international organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, OECD and WTO (D. E. Neubauer, 2008), Neoliberalism has been widely adopted in many countries as a central template for economic and political practices (Clarke, 2007; Harvey, 2007). HE is not excluded from the widespread influence of Neoliberalism. Neoliberal reforms that advocate the reduction of the state’s involvement while increasing the participation of private sector in HE provision are common in many countries (Harvey, 2007; K.-H. Mok, 2006; Moutsios, 2009). Consequently, neoliberal practices such as liberalisation, decentralisation, privatisation, commodification, and corporatisation have become prevalent in HE (T. Kim, 2008; K.-H. Mok, 2007; K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007).

In Vietnam, neoliberal practices are evident in the Vietnamese government’s recent reforms. Firstly, decentralisation and market instruments were introduced since ‘Doi Moi’ (which literally means reform) in 1986 in various domains from the economy (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Bui, 2013; Masina, 2006; Rao, 2000) and rural development (Taylor, 2007) to HE (D. E. Oliver, Thanh, Elsner, & Phuong, 2009). In HE, HEIs have been granted more autonomy to determine (to some extent) their internal affairs (K. D. Nguyen et al., 2009; D. E. Oliver et al., 2009). Diversification in funding has been implemented through the cost-sharing policy that allows HEIs to charge tuition fees (D. E. Oliver et al., 2009), and private HEIs started to emerged in the late 1980s (Bui, 2013; Hayden & Dao, 2010; Huong & Fry, 2002).

The characteristics of Neoliberalism are most clearly observed in the PHE sector in Vietnam. As described previously, the university in this case study was established to meet the increasing demand of the market for access to HE. It 337

strongly emphasises responsiveness to market demand and cost-effectiveness while criticising the public sector for lacking accountability and efficiency. In addition, it adopts many practices from the private business sector such as the enterprise model of governance and pays close attention to cooperation with industries to ensure graduates’ employability.

Nevertheless, the influence of Neoliberalism in the Vietnamese government’s policies are ‘limited and ambiguous’ (Masina, 2012). The state of Vietnam stills maintains a central role while adopting a ‘gradualist approach’ to its development strategies (Masina, 2006) despite strong suggestions of neoliberal reforms from WB and IMF (Dang, 2009; Masina, 2012). In addition, it also employs other policies to counter the influence of Neoliberalism (Taylor, 2007). In HE, the Vietnamese government represented by the MoET undoubtedly remains the highest administrative body that has ultimate control over the system, despite promising to grant autonomy to HEIs through decentralisation.

a.2. Confucianism

Confucianism is the ethical and philosophical ideology developed based on the teachings of Confucius that has tremendous influence on East Asian countries (W. O. Lee, 1996; Jun Li & Hayhoe, 2012; Marginson, 2011, 2012; Vuong & Tran, 2009). Confucianism was first introduced to Vietnam during the Han Dynasty (Vuong & Tran, 2009) and was institutionalised in every facet of society when China ruled over Vietnam for more than one thousand years from 111 BC to 939 AD (Doan, 2005; Hằng, Meijer, Bulte, & Pilot, 2015; Huong & Fry, 2004; Vuong & Tran, 2009). As a result, the influence of Confucianism on Vietnamese culture, education, and social structure until present are undeniable (Doan, 2005; Huong & Fry, 2004; Welch, 2010).

Despite the prevailing impact of Socialism as the national orthodoxy and the widespread influence of Neoliberalism (Duc, 2008; Duggan, 2001; London, 2010a; Truong, Hallinger, & Sanga, 2017), Confucianism still remains as the firm foundation on which Vietnamese culture is built (Borton, 2000; McHale, 2002; Truong et al., 2017), permeating and guiding Vietnamese society, from 338

social conducts, state management to the form and contents of the education system (T. T. Tran, 2013; Truong et al., 2017; Vuong & Tran, 2009; Welch, 2010).

Evidence of the influence of the Confucian legacy in Vietnamese HE can be found firstly in the strong commitment of the people to education (McCornac, 2012). Secondly, the state-organised national university entrance examination is an obvious example of the Confucian roots of the Vietnamese HE system (Vuong & Tran, 2009). This is a common feature that can be found not only in Vietnam but also in other East Asian countries in the Confucian-heritage zone, namely China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong (Heine, 2001; Kennedy, 2016; K. Ko, 2017; Kwok, 2004). Finally, curriculum content and teaching methods in Vietnamese HE also inherit Confucian characteristics and values (T. T. Tran, 2013; Truong et al., 2017; Vuong & Tran, 2009; Welch, 2010) such as the view that sees teachers as the primary source of knowledge and the over-emphasis on academic achievement and exam outcomes (T. T. Tran, 2013).

The Confucian belief that highly esteems education has encouraged both the Vietnamese government and individuals to invest in HE. Public funding as well as household expenditure on education have increased continuously (Fan, Huong, & Long, 2004; Kelly, 2000; London, 2006). It is this belief that contributes to the strong commitment to and high demand for HE which have opened ways for PHE to emerge (Huong & Fry, 2002; McCornac, 2012).

a.3. Socialism

Socialism is the ideology developed based on Marxist theory and adopted by communist countries such as China and Vietnam as the national orthodoxy (George, 2005; J. Li, 2016; K.-H. Mok, 2008). Some major characteristics of a socialist regime include the state owning major means of production, allocating resources through central planning, eliminating private entrepreneurial activities and governing all facets of society from politics and the economy to education and culture (Beresford, 2008; London, 2006).

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In 1986 the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), under the reform agendas of Doi Moi, decided to abandon the central planning model to transform from state socialism to a ‘socialist-oriented market economy under state guidance, often referred to as ‘market socialism’ (Beresford, 2008; K.-H. Mok, 2008), leading to remarkable achievements in subsequent decades. Nevertheless, the influence of Socialism in Vietnam, particularly its HE system is still visible (Beresford, 2008).

In HE, despite greater autonomy having been granted to HEIs, and the system having been diversified with the increasing participation of private providers, contributing to the massification of the system (London, 2006), HE in Vietnam still strongly adheres to socialist ideology. First of all, the CPV is granted extraordinary power by the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, maintaining its leading role in the governance structure of the education system (Truong et al., 2017). Secondly, HE is commissioned to build socialism in Vietnam, being a key driving force to contribute to the country’s transition process from a central-planned economy to a market socialism (George, 2005). Finally, the HE curricula include a compulsory component of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thoughts (George, 2005; K. Harman & Bich, 2010; Welch, 2010), because the authorities believe that an important function of HE is to cultivate socialist characteristics in people (George, 2005; J. W. Morgan, 2005; Salomon & Ket, 2007).

Under this socialist ideology, undoubtedly PHE in Vietnam has encountered significant obstacles. When PHE was first introduced in Vietnam in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the label ‘private’ was strategically avoided and replaced by the term ‘people-founded’ (similar to the term ‘minban’ in Chinese), because the connotation of private is as being for-profit, which contradicts socialist values (George, 2010). The general public still prefers the public sector, as students tend to choose public HEIs as their first choice for HE.

The discrimination between the public and private sectors is still very serious in Vietnam. […] Our society always favours public universities,

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perceiving that public universities are better than private ones. […] If you graduate from a public university, it’s easy to find jobs. […] [T]he family will be very proud if their children study in a public university with a long tradition and reputation.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

After more than three decades since Doi Moi, the Vietnamese government has effectively employed market principles to mobilise diverse sources to increase the capacity of the HE system and shift part of the burden of financing HE to individual households (Hayden & Dao, 2010; K.-H. Mok, 2008), resulting in the rapid growth of the private sector (Huong & Fry, 2002). However, the ultimate conflict between Socialism as the national orthodoxy and Neoliberalism as the underpinning ideology of PHE remains unresolved, leading to contradictory practices in Vietnamese HE.

For example, while promising to grant more autonomy to HEIs, the MoET still maintains its strong control over course and program establishment, and textbook and curriculum development. Although the QA framework advocates the establishment of independent accreditation agencies, the majority of these agencies are dependent on the MoET in terms of finance and appointment. In addition, while the government applies tax incentives for private HEIs, the MoET has excluded students and faculties of these university to participate in certain scholarship programs and research activities. As Welch (2010) observes, Vietnam provides a stark example of the contradiction between socialist orthodoxy and a growing market economy. Unless this ideological dilemma is resolved, the development of PHE in Vietnam will continue to be hampered. b. Resource Dependence: The Increasing Market Demand versus PHE’s Limited Financial Capacity

The increasing market demand for access to HE is the key driving force that has directly resulted in the rapid growth of the private sector in Vietnamese HE (Hayden & Dao, 2010; Huong & Fry, 2002; K.-H. Mok, 2008; Welch, 2010). Especially, Vietnam’s strengthening its integration with the global economy by 341

proactively participating in regional and international organisations such as ASEAN, APEC, and WTO has intensified the demand for a high skilled workforce to support economic growth (Huong & Fry, 2002; Welch, 2010). Moreover, such a demand has been magnified by Confucian belief that highly values education. Consequently, PHE in Vietnam has developed rapidly in recent years to address this excessive demand.

Nevertheless, the sector has been confronted by tremendous challenges due to its inadequate financial situation. Receiving no direct subsidies from the government, PHE in Vietnam depends entirely on tuition fees to fund its operation while competing fiercely with its public counterparts to attract more students.

The government subsidises [the public sector] everything from facilities, land, wages to pay for employees. Meanwhile, in PHE, we have to pay everything on our own. This is an unfair competition.

(Vice-President T. (academic), personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Although the sector has tried to develop specific strategies to enhance its financial capacity such as emphasising management efficiency, offering market- friendly courses and programs to attract students, and paying close attention to industry-university linkages to improve graduate employability, it is still very vulnerable due to its financial instability. As shown in the previous subsection, unless serious changes are made at the macro level to change the current financial arrangements, the development of PHE in Vietnam will be seriously jeopardised, particularly when market demand decreases. c. Normative: Private Business Practices

As discussed previously, PHE in Vietnam emerged as a result of the introduction of neoliberal practices in HE. Because Neoliberalism advocates business templates to be adopted in areas that had been traditionally managed by public institutions (Harvey, 2007; Marginson, 2013), the strong connection between PHE and the business sector is understandable. As a result, the private business sector provides templates and norms for PHE to adopt. 342

For example, looking closely at the governance structure described in legal documents and in the university in this case study, significant similarities between this governance model and that of the business sector are easily found. They are almost identical in as much as almost all elements of business enterprises were incorporated into the governance structure of private for-profit universities. Specifically, the way the governing board is organised, the roles and responsibilities of the chairman of the governing board, shareholders receiving return on equity, etc. have been found in the legal documents of the business sector.

Understanding the link between PHE and the private business sector helps explain the difference in the governance model at the meso level in China and Vietnam. While the Chinese independent college has adopted the corporate governance model with a clear separation between ownership (represented by the Board of Directors) and management (represented by the Executive Council) (Means, 2017), the enterprise governance model in Vietnam is characterised by strong ownership concentration. The chairman of the Vietnamese private university disagrees with the requirement of including faculty members in the governing board, arguing that such a requirement does not correspond with the Vietnamese situation. This governance practice of the university is explained in the Vietnamese context where corporate governance is an emerging topic (Hai & Nunoi, 2008) and the corporate governance model which has been developed around seven decades ago (Means, 2017) has not been fully institutionalised in Vietnam (Hai & Nunoi, 2008). d. Coercive: Decentralisation versus State Control

Coercive isomorphisms are among the most visible in the data of this study. The Vietnamese government’s employing market principles to govern HE which promote the reduction of the state’s intervention in HE (Harvey, 2007) has resulted in decentralisation. Decentralisation is an important agenda stated in significant policy documents that the government has committed to implement (T. N. Pham & London, 2010). The tendency of decentralisation is manifested in

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the formation of several national comprehensive universities by merging small, specialised universities to receive greater autonomy (T. T. Tran, 2014). In addition, universities have been required to establish university councils as the governing board (Dao & Hayden, 2010). Finally, the emergence and repaid development of PHE in recent years is clear evidence of decentralisation in Vietnam.

Nevertheless, as discussed in previous subsections, the influence of Neoliberalism in Vietnam is limited and ambiguous (Masina, 2012), HE in Vietnam is still under the tight control of the government. HEIs are granted more autonomy, but limited primarily to the financial aspect (T. T. Tran, 2014). The government’s excessive control in course establishment and curriculum development is also a major obstacle for the development of PHE because it has prevented the sector from responding promptly to market changes, an essential requirement of the sector.

In this subsection, I have explained the influence of institutional pressures, namely cultural-cognitive, resource dependence, normative and coercive isomorphisms and how they enable and/or constrain the development of PHE in Vietnam. Specifically, Neoliberalism and Confucianism are the cultural- cognitive pressures that encourage PHE to develop, whereas Socialism, another significant cultural-cognitive isomorphism, hinders it. Since PHE emerged to address the market demand for HE, increase in this demand has magnified the growth of the sector. However, the sector’s limited financial capacity has weakened its ability to develop and respond to market changes. Meanwhile, its development is highly linked with the progress of the private business sector because PHE borrows templates from private business practices. Finally, the sector has been strongly influenced by the Vietnamese government’s coercive isomorphisms, consisting of two contradictory pressures, decentralisation on one hand and centralisation on the other.

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7.2.1.2. Logics: Socialist Authoritarianism

As shown in the previous subsections, the emergence of PHE in Vietnam is a direct result of the Vietnamese government’s adoption of market principles to govern HE (Huong & Fry, 2002). Realising the need to increase the HE system’s capacity to address market demand, the government has been pragmatic in encouraging the private sector to participate in HE provision (K.-H. Mok, 2008). This approach to HE adopted by the Vietnamese government is very similar to that of China (K.-H. Mok, 2001, 2008). However, the adoption of neoliberal practices in Vietnamese HE is in a more limited and cautious manner (Masina, 2012), resulting in the slower development of PHE in Vietnam compared with that of China. While the sector accounts for only 19.6 percent of the total number of institutions in Vietnam (Vietnam General Statistic Office, 2015), the figure for China is 28.8 percent (L. Wang, 2016).

Although the influence of Neoliberalism in Vietnamese HE is undeniable, Vietnam still strongly adheres to its Socialist orthodoxy, resulting in the dominant impact of Socialism in Vietnam. The data in this study reveals that the most distinctive theme regarding logics at the macro level is the dominance of socialist ideology, which strongly favours the public sector over the private one. In this ideology, private universities are considered as private businesses for private return, which do not contribute to public good as public counterparts do.

For this reason, public universities as the major component of the HE system receive comprehensive support from the government for facilities development, staff recruitment, capacity building etc., whereas private HEIs are frequently excluded from this support and must depend solely on tuition fees from students. Moreover, the general public perception has also favoured public universities for their long history and high reputation. This attitude can be seen not only in high schoolers’ choices of universities, but also in employers’ recruitment attitudes. Graduates from private universities often face significant discrimination in employment, particularly from public employers.

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[…] The Prime Minister approved the establishment of private universities, but the Minister of Home Affairs and the leaders of some provinces decided to employ students graduating from public universities. This discrimination in public policies is problematic. If you have fair competition and transparent recruitment procedures, why can’t you employ [graduate students from private HEIs]?

(Vice-President T. (academic), personal communication, 19 October 2016)

This attitude is a manifestation of the socialist value that does not accept the commodification of education and associates private with being for-profit. Firstly, the socialist value that prohibits behaviours of commodifying education is evident in articles 3 and 20 of the Vietnamese Education Law, issued in 2005, stating that “all acts of commercialisation of education are forbidden” (Hayden & Dao, 2010, p. 222). Secondly, because the connotation of private is being for- profit (George, 2010), the Vietnamese government and general public always see PHE as a profit-making sector. The interview participant in this study criticises this kind of attitude of the government for treating the private sector as private business, aiming for profit rather than educational purposes.

The critical issue is the government’s perception. The government thinks that the private sector can’t [contribute]. [The government] doesn’t have a long-term view for the private sector, but only sees that the private sector invests in education to make profit. The private investors are carrying out economic activities, not educational, that’s why the quality of private universities is low, and other problems as well. That’s why the government doesn’t pay attention to encourage this sector to develop, but instead is afraid that the sector is developing too successfully, thus making a lot of profit.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

The interview participant’s interpretation regarding the government’s attitude towards PHE seems to be correct. The authorities and general public consider the problems of low quality and poor performances among private universities to be

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a result of their neglect of educational objectives (Hayden & Dao, 2010), rather than the unfavourable environment that they are placed in.

The short history of PHE in modern Vietnamese HE also strengthens such attitudes. The establishment of the Indochina University in 1906 under French colonisation in Vietnam marked the beginning of modern HE in this country. Meanwhile, the first private university, Thang Long University, was established in 1993 (Hayden & Dao, 2010) (not including the HE system in southern Vietnam during the Vietnam War for historical reasons). Thus, the presence of the private sector in Vietnam is very contemporary.

Unlike Korea, Vietnamese HE lacks the tradition of the private sector contributing to the public good (see chapter V). PHE emerged in Vietnam following the development of private business under the Communist Party’s decision of Doi Moi in 1986 (Huong & Fry, 2002). This policy had allowed the private sector to develop. As the role and contribution of the private sector to economic growth has been gradually recognised, the door for PHE has opened wider.

The absence of a tradition in which PHE contributes to public good and the close association between PHE and the private sector might have strengthened the socialist attitude viewing ‘private’ as being for-profit. PHE has been restricted into the ‘private business’ frame. The majority of private universities were established for profit purposes. In the interviews, Chairman A. also admitted that many private universities have focused on profitability rather than educational purposes.

If there are 100 shareholders, of course most of them are interested in making profit, they only care about making profit. They don’t care about anything else, only making profit, hoping that within a couple of years the university will make profit.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

However, it is undeniable that the dominant impact of Socialism, to which Vietnamese HE strongly adheres despite the widespread adoption of neoliberal 347

practices, is among the key factors that have slowed the development of PHE in Vietnam. Especially, when compared with China, a country that shares significant similarities in political, social and cultural aspects with Vietnam, the significant impact of this logic become more evident. Consequently, I suggest that the dominant logic that characterises the PHE system in Vietnam is Socialist authoritarianism, being different from the logic of pragmatic authoritarianism that characterises Chinese PHE. Although PHE in both countries has experienced similar institutional pressures (see chapter VI, and subsection 7.2.1.1. of this chapter), the difference in logics at the macro level is a major factor causing the different rate of development of PHE in the two countries.

In this subsection, I have discussed the significance of the dominant logic of socialist authoritarianism that characterises PHE in Vietnam, resulting in the government’s discrimination between the public and private sectors and the public’s distrust of PHE. This logic does not acknowledge the sector’s potential contribution to public good and restricts the sector to the ‘private’ frame that only encourages for-profit behaviours. The absence of a tradition that encourages the private sector to contribute to public good has also strengthened this viewpoint.

7.2.1.3. Actors

In this subsection, the role of the actors at the macro level in influencing the development of PHE in Vietnam is discussed. At the macro level, the Vietnamese government represented by the MoET is dominant in providing supervision, monitoring and guidance for the sector. As a result, the focus of this subsection is to describe the significance of this actor according to the operationalised sub-concepts of actor, namely position, agency and legitimacy.

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a. Position

The concept of position of an actor in an institutional field refers to both the “formal, bureaucratic positions” and the socially constructed and legitimised identities available in the field” (Lockett et al., 2012, p. 357). According to this definition, the Vietnamese MoET occupies the central position in the field of HE. The MoET representing the government as the highest administrative body in the governance structure of the Vietnamese HE system. It is granted ultimate control over the system and has the authority to involve itself in many aspects of HE from policy establishment to curriculum development. For that reason, the MoET is essential in implementing educational reforms.

Hence, I said it is the critical role of the MoET, of the Minister [..] to create fair competition [between the public and private sectors]. To improve HE quality, the role of the Minister [of Education and Training] is crucial. […] It depends on the government’s leaders’ perception. If they are not aware of [the significance of a competitive environment], it will take a very long time to establish such an environment.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

In addition, the central position of the Vietnamese government is also related to the ‘state-led development model’ adopted in the country in which the role of the government is dominant in shaping and leading the development of the country (Beeson & Pham, 2012). As a result, the Vietnamese MoET, with its controlling authority is the driving force of HE in Vietnam b. Agency: The Government as a Socialist Protector

As discussed previously, the logic of socialist authoritarianism dominates and characterises the Vietnamese HE system. Since actors employ logics to rationalise their actions, the logic of socialist authoritarianism provides justification for the Vietnamese government’s behaviours. Driven by this logic, the macro actor in this case has acted as a socialist protector, holding a sceptical view regarding PHE and considering the development of PHE as

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commodification of education which is against the values of Socialism, the country’s orthodox ideology.

As a result, the MoET has implemented practices that have discouraged the development of PHE, although the critical reform agendas since Doi Moi in 1986 have encouraged the private sector to participate in HE provision under the label of ‘socialisation’ (xã hội hóa) (London, 2006, 2011). For instance, the MoET supports the public sector through direct subsidies while preventing students and faculties of private HEIs from participating in certain scholarships and research activities. Unfortunately, there has been no sign of change in such discrimination.

I have never seen any minister [of Education and Training] in Vietnam possess such a mindset [of creating a competitive and fair environment]. Some may have, but they are unable to implement because they are bound to particular benefits, or regulative limitations, or others, perhaps.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Because the macro actor is driven by the logic of socialist authoritarianism which does not recognise the significance of PHE and its potential contribution, it has not enacted initiatives necessary to enable the development of PHE. As this macro actor perceives that ‘private’ is being for-profit (George, 2010), its development must be restricted.

The critical issue is the government’s perception. The government thinks that the private sector can’t [contribute]. [The government] doesn’t have a long-term view for the private sector, but only sees that the private sector invests in education to make profit. […] That’s why the government doesn’t pay attention to encourage this sector to develop, but instead is afraid that the sector is developing too successfully, thus making a lot of profit.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016) c. Legitimacy

Legitimacy, according to Suchman (1995), is “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 350

definitions” (p. 574). Legitimacy is bestowed on an actor through the observation of ‘internal and external audiences’ (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Legitimacy can be categorised into two types, structural legitimacy, obtaining through formal institutional structures (Suchman, 1995), and normative legitimacy, attaining by constructing moral arguments to justify its action as being appropriate (Lockett et al., 2012). Evaluating the legitimacy of the Vietnamese government based on this concept of legitimacy developed by Suchman (1995), the data shows that firstly, this actor has obtained strong structural legitimacy due to its central position in the field of HE. Such strong structural legitimacy grants it the authority to carry out its function as the leading actor in the Vietnamese HE system. Nevertheless, this macro actor has not attained normative legitimacy as high as its structural legitimacy. Because normative legitimacy is obtained by an actor’s providing arguments for what is appropriate (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Lockett et al., 2012; Suchman, 1995), the degree of normative legitimacy an actor obtains depends on the appropriateness of the actor’s justification of its actions and the appropriateness of the actions themselves. From the meso actors’ perspective, the macro government in Vietnam cannot obtain high normative legitimacy because the justification of the macro actor’s behaviour is the logic of socialist authoritarianism, which contradicts the logic of Neoliberalism that underpins the development of PHE. In addition, it perceives that practices implemented by the macro government university are inappropriate and do not match the context of Vietnam, thereby failing to obtain normative legitimacy. Specifically, as the MoET is unable to provide the meso actors’ a clear vision of what the HE system should look like and what the actors in the field should do to implement such a vision, the MoET has not successfully proved to its external audiences (i.e. the meso actors) that it is able to carry out its functions as the leading actor in the field. The problem here is that you haven’t developed a good plan for reform, you are unclear, […] and you even don’t fight to persuade them. […] I think the

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MoET should focus on developing that capacity, rather than more micro management.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

In fact, there is no plan [a vision provided by the government] to guide [HEIs]. So we are going without knowing where we are aiming to.

(Vice-President T. (academic), personal communication, 19 October 2016)

This lack of normative legitimacy caused by the conflicts in logics employed by different actors at different levels and the meso actors’ perception of the macro actor’s inability to perform its function has resulted in a lack of support from the meso actors. For example, the Vietnamese government has implemented shared governance via legal initiatives to empower other stakeholders in the decision- making process, strengthen shared decision making, and reduce risks of autocracy in private universities. However, in the context where extensive involvement of the investors in management is widely accepted, while other stakeholders’ viewpoints are not highly respected, it may provoke conflict in decision-making processes. As a result, the meso actors criticised the impracticality of this initiative since it contradicts the common practice that respects the highly concentrated power of the owners in private universities. If the regulations require including in the governing board this or that person, definitely the leaders will recruit someone that matches himself, a person that supports him, or else he will fire them.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

The ultimate outcomes are that (1) the meso actor disapproved of the initiative; (2) the conflict between the macro and meso actors were deepened; (3) the macro actor did not attain normative legitimacy; and (4) the initiative has not been successfully implemented. [There is an argument that private universities should include in the governing board faculty representatives …]. Eventually [MoET or the government] are unable to make a transparent [decision-making process]

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which was what it originally intended to. […] So, legislating here has no meaning. […] Even if you legislate it, it will not happen.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

7.2.2. Meso Level

Institutional factors including institutional isomorphisms, institutional logics and actors, are generally located at the macro level (Glynn, 2008; Kraatz et al., 2016). However, in response to institutional isomorphisms, actors at different levels of the field may employ different logics to justify their actions. In this case, it is necessary to address the differences in logics and actors at different levels. In this study, the data shows that at the meso level, the logic of Neoliberalism provides frames of reference and rationales for the meso actors to justify the functions of the university. This logic contradicts the logic of socialist authoritarianism employed by the macro actor to dominate the institutional field of HE. Hence in this subsection, I focus on discussing the roles of the logic of Neoliberalism and the meso actors in determining the development pathway of the university in this case study.

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7.2.2.1. Logics: Neoliberalism

In the previous subsection, I have pointed out the Vietnamese government, driven by the logic of socialist authoritarianism, has restricted the development of PHE in several aspects because it views the private sector as being opposed the socialist values that it strongly adheres to. The data at the meso level confirms that the macro viewpoint of the underpinning logic of PHE as being Neoliberalism is correct. Indeed, it is evident that the meso actors in this case study utilise the logic of Neoliberalism to justify the establishment and operation of the university.

Firstly, the emergence and development of the PHE sector is a result of growing market demand and the inability of government to meet this demand. Based on the neoliberal argument that supports individuals’ right to pursue HE, the meso actors contended that the PHE sector emerged to meet this burgeoning market demand for human resources for economic growth and the growing social demand for access to HE is appropriate.

The number of public universities is insufficient, students who want to further their study [but cannot get into public universities] can choose to study at private ones. Because the demand for higher education is increasing. With the existing number of public universities, there is no space for those students who want higher education. This is the question of equality.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Secondly, the meso actors argued, by its emergence, the PHE sector has diversified the HE system, creating competition between HE providers and therefore contributing to the improvement of the quality and efficiency of the whole system.

I think, actually, the initial purpose of establishing private universities in Vietnam was very good. It was to create a competitor to compete with the public sector […]. If we had left the monopoly status of the public sector, it would have never changed because it couldn’t see how poorly it performed.

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So we have created conditions for competition, gradually it has become competitive […].

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Finally, the meso actors criticised the public sector for lacking efficiency, productivity and accountability, and emphasised that the private sector is outperforming the public sector in these aspects. Interestingly, this argument was consistent throughout the interview data, from the Chairman of the Board of Director, the founder and owner of the university with a very strong business background, to the President and vice-President in charge of academic affairs, who were experienced in both academic and management positions at both public and private universities.

(Vice-President T. (Academic), personal communication, 19 October 2016)

In public universities, everything is clear and neatly defined. […] [Our duty, our workload is already determined and allocated for us], it does not require creativity, you don’t have to think, as long as you keep doing things the same way, you receive your pay check monthly. […] I worked for almost 30 years in public universities, never feeling under pressure. Since I moved to this university, I realised that pressure forces you to think, to be creative and to grow. I’ve been working here for 5 years, I think I have totally changed. I mean in quality, in the way I think, in my capacity as well. I think my productivity has improved dramatically.

(President G., personal communication, 17 October 2016)

From these arguments, it is obvious that the logic of Neoliberalism has provided strong, critical rationales for the meso actors to establish and operate the university according to market principles. By doing so, the meso actors sought to challenge the socialist authoritarian logic employed by the macro actor. From the meso actor’s perspective, this logic is no longer appropriate in the context of HE

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massification in Vietnam that urgently requires new ways of governing, which focus on improving efficiency, accountability and responsiveness to the market.

Nevertheless, it does not mean that the massification of Vietnamese HE under the influence of Neoliberalism is without defects although these arguments by the meso actors might be correct. There is a significant possibility the sector has compromised education objectives and quality due to its high dependence on market demand and tuition fees to finance its operation (Hayden & Dao, 2010; Hayden & Le, 2017; Nhan & Nguyen, 2018; Welch, 2007b).

But it is crucial to educate our students to meet the social demands. Here we try to enhance the linkage between education and the market demand of human resources. […] We aim in these areas to create the human resources that society needs.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

In the context that the financial capacity of the sector is limited, alternative sources of funding for the sector have not been generated, while the national QA system has not been fully developed, the quality of the sector continues to be problematic (Hayden & Le, 2017; Welch, 2007b).

In addition, it is well known that neoliberal reforms are closely connected with greater educational inequality. Researchers focusing on East Asia HE have long documented the increasing inequality in education and its associated issues such as regional and income disparities (K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; S.-Y. Park, 2010; UNDP, 2005; R. Yang, 2007). In Vietnam, there are warnings regarding the close link between the neoliberal approach in HE and growing inequalities, although remarkable achievements in addressing inequality has been achieved (Goyette, 2012; London, 2010b, 2014; K.-H. Mok, 2008; B. T. Nguyen, Albrecht, Vroman, & Westbrook, 2007).

This logic appears to be problematic, particularly in a country where Socialism remains the national orthodoxy like Vietnam. Using this logic of Neoliberalism to justify the functions and practices of the university, the meso actors are using a two-edged sword. On one hand, the neoliberal approach that emphasises 356

efficiency, accountability and responsiveness to the market might have brought about the sector’s strengths in comparison with the public sector. However, such neoliberal practices may also result in serious problems such as neglect of educational objectives, compromise of quality and educational inequality. These problems may severely threaten its legitimacy and therefore damage the healthy development of the sector.

In is interesting to note in this case study the convergence between the macro logic of socialist authoritarianism that connotes private as being for-profit and does not acknowledge the contribution of the sector to the public good and the meso actors’ behaviours of employing market-driven practices. This suggests a potential correlation between the macro government’s attitude and the meso actor’s behaviours.

In conclusion, in this subsection, I have discussed how the meso actors at the university have utilised the logic of Neoliberalism as the rationale to justify the operational practices of the university. The meso actors argued that neoliberal practices adopted in the PHE sector generally and the university in particular help address critical problems such as the lack of efficiency, accountability and market responsiveness of the public sector in Vietnamese HE. Although these arguments might have been correct, there are potential problems caused by these neoliberal practices, including its compromising educational objectives and quantity over quality, and educational inequality and inequity, that may undermine the sector’s legitimacy and its healthy development.

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7.2.2.2. Actors

In this subsection, the roles of the meso actors in influencing practices at the university in this case study are discussed. Similarly to the macro level, the significance of the meso actors are investigated based on the operationalised concepts of actor, namely position, agency and legitimacy. I focus particularly on the Chairman of the Board of Directors as the key actor at the meso level because as the founder, owner, and the chairman of the governing board of the university, this actor obviously played a critical role in shaping the development of the university. In addition, he also presented very interesting examples of agency while carrying out his functions at the university. a. Position

Unlike the cases of China and Korea whose meso actors occupied either the central or middle positions in the field of HE (see chapter V and VI), the meso actor in Vietnam occupies a peripheral position in Vietnamese HE. PHE accounts for only 19.6 percent of the total number of HEIs (Vietnamese General Statistic Office, 2015). PHE has been excluded from public funding and support programs provided by the government. The general image of PHE perceived by the public is quite negative. Finally, private universities have experienced difficulties in enrolling students, their major financial source, due to coercive and cultural barriers. For this reason, I conclude that, in terms of institutional position, the meso actor in this case study occupies a peripheral position in the field of HE in Vietnam. There might be a correlation between the macro actor’s agency and the meso actor’s institutional position in the case of Vietnam. Because the Vietnamese government employs the agency of a socialist protector which does not acknowledge the significance of the PHE sector, this sector is forced to occupy a peripheral position in the field. However, at the university level, the Chairman obviously occupies the central position at the university. He is not only the founder and owner of the university but also the key decision maker in the university governance structure. This

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position has given him the power and authority to carry out his functions in the university, particularly to exercise his agency to challenge the unfavourable environment surrounded PHE generally and his university in particular. b. Agency: Institutional Entrepreneur and Institutional Hole Explorer

The Chairman of the Board of Directors of the university in this case study, Chairman A., is a businessman and an educator. Before establishing the case university, he had worked in the banking industry and was the CEO of a large bank in Vietnam. In addition to this role, he also taught in a prestigious public university in Hanoi. However, during the interview, his choices of language indicated that he saw himself to as a businessman rather than an educator. His personal background as a businessman has strongly shaped his perspective regarding the PHE sector as quite often in the interview he used examples from industry to explain his educational viewpoints and referred to his previous background in the financial industry to interpret his current experiences in the leadership position of the case university.

Before talking about any altruistic mission or goal, I emphasise that I did it [establishing this university] for myself, because I am a businessman.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

[Our Chairman] was an experienced businessman, he knows what industries require from universities, and what we need to do to meet market demand.

(Vice-President T. (academic), personal communication, 19 October 2016)

In addition, his background as a businessman also determines his current ‘double agency’, which motivates him to initiate changes on the one hand, but also employ a more passive strategy of ‘exploring institutional holes’ on the other. Firstly, his business experiences have influenced his behaviour to become an institutional entrepreneur who seeks to challenge the existing institutional configurations. Despite working in a large bank, it is still seen to be private and

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was insignificant compared with other state-owned banks. He described his difficulties of working in a non-state-owned bank as below: I worked as the CEO in a [non-state-owned] bank for around eight or nine years. When I first started working in that position, there was never a case of an employee working in a state-owned moving to a non-state-owned bank. They really looked down on us.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

This description is typical of the many difficulties that anyone in the private sector experience in a context where the public sector is highly respected like Vietnam. Because the private sector is an insignificant component, it receives less benefit from such institutional arrangements (Haveman & Rao, 1997), and therefore is not satisfied with the existing arrangements (Maguire et al., 2004). Similarly, in other industries, we are aware how inefficient public enterprises are, we have known that for a long time, but there has not been much change since then. Still the state invests in public enterprises every year only to see those enterprises lose billions [Vietnam dong] of taxpayers’ money. That’s the first point. […] We all know that. But why does the state still focus on public enterprises? Why not private ones? Why not encourage them more to sustain economic growth?

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Being dissatisfied with such an institutional environment, Chairman A. has acted as an institutional entrepreneur, referring to the agentic behaviours of actors that initiate institutional changes (Lockett et al., 2012) by establishing a private university: I hope to have fair competition [between public and private universities] for the better development of the education system.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Nevertheless, the peripheral position in the field of HE and the socialist protector agency exercised by the macro government did not give him much room to manoeuvre. As a part of the PHE sector, his university continues to experience

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significant obstacles caused by the regulatory framework and the general public’s distrust. As a result, Chairman A.’s exercising the agency of an institutional entrepreneur to challenge the current institutional arrangements has been handicapped, forcing him to exercise other strategies to take advantage of the environment in which his university is placed. For example, the university strategically offers programs and courses that are potentially in high demand but have less competitors. By doing so, it is able to to build up the competitiveness in the gap left by its competitors, particularly from the public sector. It also strives to learn from other private HEIs’ mistakes to speed up its development. In short, we focus on majors that are in high demand, as long as it will be in high demand for education in the future. […] Therefore, we have to start first, to choose areas that there has not much competition.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Of course our university is young, and there are some weaknesses. But being young means we have opportunities because we can learn from others’ mistakes and failures and skip some unnecessary steps. These give us a head start to catch up with other competitors to establish our reputation.

(Vice-President T. (academic), personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Yang (2007) explains this kind of behaviour using the notion of institutional holes. Institutional holes are the structural gaps between two individuals or organisations indifferent institutional fields. These institutional holes exist to be exploited by institutional actors. The meso actor in this case study, being peripheral in the field, was unable to conclusively challenge the institutional environment which did not benefit him. As a result, he was likely to explore what he can do within the context of ambiguous institutional arrangements. Thus, in this case, Chairman A. has manifested the ‘double agency’, of being an institutional entrepreneur on the one hand, and of being an institutional hole explorer on the other.

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In this sense, the hole explorer agency employed by Chairman A. may correspond with the position PHE occupies within the field of HE. As it is far from the centre of the field, it lacks the structural legitimacy that is often attached to its structural position. More importantly, the actor’s strategic choice of employing hole explorer agency may be associated with the governance model of control exercised by the MoET as the major actor at the macro level. Since MoET exercises its strict control in the HE field and leaves little space for other actors such as universities, the meso actor has been restricted in employing institutional entrepreneurship agency, and therefore was forced to exercise the hole explorer agency. c. Legitimacy

The meso actor’s legitimacy is investigated in this subsection according to the definition of Suchman (1995) that categorises legitimacy into structural legitimacy and normative legitimacy. Correspondingly, the meso actor in this case study obtained low structural legitimacy due to his peripheral position in the field of HE. In addition, the meso actor also lacked normative legitimacy because PHE is a newly developed and emerging sector in the context of Vietnamese HE. Our society highly respects public universities. Only public universities are good, private ones are not. Because the private sector is quite young, having existed for only about 10 to 15 years. There is also a lack fair competition [between public and private universities] thus we are always ranked inferior.

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

Franky speaking, PHE in Vietnam is very new. The first private university in Vietnam is Thang Long university [establishing in 1993]

(Vice-President T. (academic), personal communication, 19 October 2016)

The absence of legitimacy, both structurally and normatively, has prevented PHE actors from effectively enacting initiatives to challenge the institutional environment, despite their willingness and motivation. Although Chairman A., being a pioneer among private business actors joining the field of HE, has 362

manifested a high degree of institutional entrepreneurship agency, he also admitted that the tremendous ‘glass ceiling’ hindering the development of PHE has also nullified his efforts to initiate changes.

If we have to compete [with public universities] in a condition where the public sector is favoured, it is meaningless. It is like a fight between a giant and a child. It is impossible for a child to grow [in such conditions].

(Chairman A., personal communication, 19 October 2016)

General public attitude is like…, for example ‘it is shameful for you to study in a private university’, something like that. It is obviously unfair for those who devote their money and energy to establish and operate private universities. [Private investors have so much money to live a comfortable life for themselves] but they wish to contribute something to the country, to establish their reputation. But with this kind of environment, these kinds of policies, frankly speaking, they are so discouraged.

(Vice-President T. (academic), personal communication, 19 October 2016)

In this subsection, the role of the Chairman of the Board of Directors as the key actor at the meso level was discussed in three aspects, namely position, agency and legitimacy. Firstly, this actor occupied a peripheral position in the institutional field, because PHE accounts for only a small proportion in the HE system and its significance has not been fully recognised by the macro actor. However, at the university level, this actor, as the founder, owner and leader of the university, assumed the central position of the university’s governance structure and was given the highest authority to carry out his functions.

Because of his peripheral institutional position, the current institutional arrangements did not support him, leading to his exercising institutional entrepreneurship agency to initiate changes by establishing the private university. However, this type of agency exercised by this actor has been seriously constrained because of the government’s exercising the agency of a socialist protector that impeded his efforts to challenge the current institutional configurations. Consequently, the meso actor was forced to exercise an

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alternative agency, namely institutional hole explorer, to take advantage of the ambiguous institutional arrangements.

Finally, the meso actor’s peripheral position in the institutional environment caused him to receive low structural legitimacy. In addition, because PHE is an emerging sector in the Vietnamese HE, it has not been able to obtain normative legitimacy. Its normative legitimacy has also been damaged by the general public’s distrust and the government’s inhibiting policies.

7.3. Chapter Summary

This chapter presents the research findings of the Vietnamese case, revealing the current practices of Vietnamese PHE at the macro and meso levels and how institutional factors, namely institutional isomorphisms, logics and actors have interacted to influence PHE in a way that resulted in such practices. Firstly, the current model of PHE in Vietnam was discussed from the three major aspects of governance, finance and quality assurance. At the macro level, the Vietnamese government has adopted market principles to implement HE reforms, leading to massification of the system and the rapid growth of the PHE sector. However, this adoption of the government is quite limited compared with those of Korea and China. The Vietnamese government still maintains tight control over the HE system, including PHE. As a result, the traditional governance model of strong state control remains intact at the macro level of Vietnamese HE, although there are signs of early changes happening. Specifically, in this strong state control model, the state exercises its strict control over the HE system with the strong authority of the state bureaucracy. This bureaucracy is present in almost all aspects of the HE system, even in the daily operational activities of universities. This model has been criticised for its shortcomings of over-control and lack of autonomy and accountability. Secondly, a quality assurance (QA) system has been recently adopted in Vietnamese HE. With the recommendations and support from international organisations such as the WB and ADB, the newly adopted QA system in

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Vietnam has chosen accreditation as the core method, with accreditation standards and procedures being very similar to those in other countries, especially of America. The MoET is the central actor to implementing QA mechanisms. Several QA agencies have been established to carry out accreditation. However these agencies are heavily dependent on the MoET for finance and appointment, raising concerns about the transparency and effectiveness of QA outcomes. Although the purpose of quality improvement has been repeatedly emphasised in relevant documents, research findings have found that the emphasis on accountability is more influential in this QA system due to the excessive control of the MoET and the one-size-fits-all approach applied in the QA mechanisms. On the other hand, at the meso level, the case private university has manifested strong characteristics of the enterprise model of governance. These characteristics were clearly observed through the distinctive language of business that was widely used during the interviews, in the market-oriented approach this university adopted to develop their curriculum and programs, and in its tendency to exclude external stakeholders in the decision-making process. The critical drawbacks of this model, according to the literature, are its absence of shared governance and neglect of educational objectives. These critiques were confirmed by the findings in this study. This model was adopted in the case study because it allows the chairman (and founder of the university) to make decision with less effort needed to reach agreement between the governing board members. Because the Vietnamese government does not provide any direct subsidies to private HEIs, the financial aspect of Vietnamese PHE was discussed at the meso level, using the financial condition of the university in this case study as an example. The university, similar to other private HEIs in Vietnam, is heavily dependent on tuition fees as the only source to finance its operation. There are several major causes that have seriously hampered the university’s effort to ensure its financial stability. Firstly, competition between HE providers has intensified while the student population is decreasing. Secondly, it is difficult 365

for the university to attract high quality faculty because of the general public’s distrust of PHE. These together have weakened the university’s efforts to improve quality in order to attract students. Thirdly, unpredictable and rapid changes in market demand have caused significant difficulties for the university. Finally, inconsistent public policies are the biggest challenge for the university’s development. This inconsistency is caused by the lack of coordination between government agencies and conflicts between Socialism as the national orthodoxy and Neoliberalism as the underpinning logic that supports the development of PHE. Collectively, it requires substantial improvements to be made at the macro level to help PHE in Vietnam to secure financial sustainability. In explaining the current practices of Vietnamese PHE in the light of Neo- institutional theory, the significances of institutional isomorphisms, logics and actors have been explored. At the macro level, institutional isomorphisms, namely cultural-cognitive, resource dependence, normative and coercive pressures have substantially influenced the development of the sector. Specifically, cultural-cognitive pressures including Neoliberalism and Confucianism have enabled the sector to grow while Socialism has restrained it. In addition, burgeoning market demand has caused the sector to rapidly develop whereas its limited financial capacity has caused serious difficulties for its progress. Moreover, the development of the PHE sector closely follows the private business sector because PHE borrows practices from the private business sector. Finally, there are contradictory coercive pressures in which decentralisation on one hand has promoted the expansion of the PHE sector whereas the tendency to tighten the state’s control on the other has limited the sector’s development. At the macro level, the logic of socialist authoritarianism is dominant, fundamentally constraining the growth of the PHE sector. This logic does not recognise the significance of PHE and its potential contribution to public good. It connotes ‘private’ as being for-profit which is opposed to socialist values and therefore needs to be restricted. Driven by this logic, the Vietnamese MoET, as 366

the dominant actor in the field of HE has employed the agency of a socialist protector to implement significant policies that restrain the development of the PHE sector. The central position of this macro actor allows it to have high structural legitimacy to implement its policies. However, as its actions are justified by the logic of socialist authoritarianism, which contradicts Neoliberalism as the logic that rationalises the existence and functions of the PHE sector, the meso actors disagreed with the macro actors’ behaviour. In addition, by failing to prove its competence as the leading actor in the field of HE, the macro actor is unable to provide a convincing argument for how its actions are appropriate. Consequently, the macro actor could not obtain high normative legitimacy. The meso level is characterised by the logic of Neoliberalism. Being justified by this logic, the meso actors argued that PHE in Vietnam has contributed significantly to the development of HE in Vietnam by diversifying the HE system and helping address the growing market demand for access to HE. In addition, through the adoption of market principles, the private sector helps address the problems of the lack of efficiency, productivity, accountability and responsiveness to market demand, which are very serious in the public sector. However, using Neoliberalism alone to justify its functions and activities, the sector is risking losing its legitimacy, because the close correlation of Neoliberalism and inequality and compromise in educational objectives and quality has long been known. To investigate the role of meso actors in shaping the development of the university, this study focuses on the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the university because as the founder and owner of the university, he is the key actor at the meso level. Due to the unfavourable environment surrounding PHE, this actor has exercised the agency of an institutional entrepreneur to challenge the institutional arrangements by establishing the university. However, the macro actor’s adopting the agency of a socialist protector which has severely restricted this meso actor’s ability to initiate change. As a result, this meso actor was forced to exercises an alternative agency, the agency of an institutional hole explorer, 367

that helps him to take advantage of the ambiguity in the institutional environment to compete with other universities, particularly in attracting more students to secure the primary financial source for the university. Finally, due to its peripheral position in the institutional field of HE, the PHE sector in Vietnam lacks structural legitimacy. In addition, because PHE is an emerging sector in Vietnamese HE, it also lacks normative legitimacy. This lack of both structural and normative legitimacy prevents the sector from improving its position in the field, and therefore it is unable to develop further.

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CHAPTER VIII: COMPARISION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR VIETNAM

In this chapter, I focus on providing comparative analyses of institutional factors that shape the development of PHE in Korean, China and Vietnam as unpacked in the previous chapters (See Chapter V, VI, and VII). The comparison of the three cases is organised into three sections, according to the three institutional factors as identified in the conceptual framework, namely isomorphisms, institutional logics and institutional actors. Based on the analysis, implications for Vietnam are generated and presented accordingly in each section. 8.1. Isomorphisms This section discusses isomorphic pressures and their impacts on the development of PHE in the three countries and illustrates how the similarities and differences of isomorphisms have resulted in the similarities and differences in development patterns of PHE in these countries. These institutional pressures are divided into two groups according to their impacts, namely enablers and constrainers to the development of PHE. In each group, these pressures are further categorised according to typology, which are cultural-cognitive, resource dependence, normative and coercive. Based on this discussion, implications for Vietnam are generated. Isomorphisms are institutional forces located in an institutional field that exert influences that shape organisations existing in the field according to homogenous patterns (Greenwood et al., 2008). According to this definition, the macro level in this study is referred to as an institutional field in which private universities exist. Institutional pressures that impact the development of PHE in the three countries of this study, namely Korea, China and Vietnam, are listed in Table VIII-1 below. These isomorphic pressures are categorised into four groups according to typology, namely cultural-cognitive, normative, resource dependence and coercive isomorphisms. In terms of impact on the development of PHE in the three countries, these isomorphisms can be classified as enablers and constrainers.

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Table VIII-1 clearly shows the similarities and differences among isomorphisms by country. For instance, all three countries are exposed to Neoliberalism as the global cultural-cognitive ideology. In addition, these countries are all characterised by the Confucian legacy. However, while Korea has officially adopted Neoliberalism, China and Vietnam still strongly adhere to Socialism despite the popularity of the neoliberal approach to HE in these two countries. Obviously, different institutional pressures in each country have led to the differences in PHE practices and the extent to which this sector is encouraged to develop. As an example, both Korea and China have developed similar regulatory systems that on one hand encourage the establishment and development of PHE through deregulation, but on the other hand, strengthen the regulations supervising the sector to ensure quality and public accountability (See Chapter V and VI). Meanwhile, Vietnam still maintains its centralised approach toward PHE (although there are signs of deregulation). Thus, the PHE sector in Vietnam has developed much slowly compared to what has happened in Korea and China. Table VIII-1: Comparison of Institutional Isomorphism in Relation to PHE in each Country

Institutional Isomorphisms Korea China Vietnam Global Neoliberalism Neoliberalism Neoliberalism Cultural- Ideology Cognitive National Confucianism Confucianism Confucianism Ideology and Capitalism and Socialism and Socialism Business Managerialism Managerialism N/A Practice Normative National and National and Rankings International International N/A Rankings Rankings Resource Market Saturation Increasing Increasing Dependence Demand

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Public Funding for Limited Limited N/A PHE Regulatory Regulated Centralised Coercive Centralisation Framework Deregulation Decentralisation

Another illustration is the resource dependence isomorphisms. The insufficient public budget in the three countries is not able to meet the public demand for access to HE, leading to the development of PHE in these countries. However, while the PHE sector in Vietnam and China will continue to grow because of the growing demand for HE caused by the increasing young population in these two countries, the development of Korean PHE has slowed down because the market there is saturated (See Chapter V, VI, and VII).

In the coming subsections, an analysis comparing the influences of these isomorphisms in enabling and/or constraining the development of PHE is provided. However, since the impacts of these isomorphisms have been discussed specifically in each case study chapter (See Chapter V, VI and VII), the discussion in the coming subsections focuses mainly on comparing the similarities and differences among institutional pressures in the three countries to illustrate how such similarities and differences have caused the similarities and differences in the development patterns of PHE in the three countries.

8.1.1. Institutional Isomorphisms that Enable the Development of PHE:

8.1.1.1. Cultural-cognitive a. Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism supported by the human capital theory emphasises the economic rationality (Kezar, 2004) and the private benefits generated by HE (Apple, 2013; Tilak, 2008). It therefore encourages individuals to invest in one’s own human capital stock through HE at their own cost (J. Williams, 2016). The prevailing popularity of Neoliberalism has significantly impacted the development of East Asian HE generally and PHE in particular. In the three countries, although there

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are wide variations, it is undeniable that neoliberal practices have been introduced to manage HE. Accordingly, practices such as marketisation, privatisation, commodification, corporatisation and deregulation are evident in East Asian HE (Dang, 2009; T. Kim, 2008; K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; D. E. Oliver et al., 2009).

Consequently, HE under the influence of Neoliberalism has been dramatically transformed, manifesting in the proliferation of HE providers, diversification of institutions and the massive expansion in HE in which the number of students enrolled in PHE has been rapidly increasing (C. J. Lee et al., 2012; K.-H. Mok, 1997). However, the extent to which PHE in these three countries has developed mainly depends on the extent to which Neoliberalism is adopted in HE. While Neoliberalism is officially adopted and applied in wide arenas in Korea, its introduction in China and Vietnam has taken place in more cautious ways.

The obvious differences in the development patterns of PHE between Korea and Vietnam provide a stark illustration. While PHE in Korea is the leading sector in a private dominated HE system, accounting for 81.54 percent of institutions (Korean Education Development Institute, 2014), PHE in Vietnam is still a peripheral component, accounting for only 19.6 percent of institutions (Vietnam General Statistics Office, 2015). This is because the Korean government has officially adopted Neoliberalism to liberalise the HE system, allowing PHE to developed to such an extent. Meanwhile, Vietnam still adheres to Socialism as the state orthodoxy, which holds a sceptical view of PHE (See Chapter V and VII). Consequently, PHE in Vietnam has experienced serious obstacles to its development. b. Confucianism

As East Asian countries, Korea, China and Vietnam are all characterised by the Confucian legacy (Marginson, 2011) as the traditional foundation that impacts every aspect of society, from human relationship to national management (C. H. Williams, 2017). Under the influence of this traditional legacy, education plays a critical role. Specifically, in the Confucian societies in East Asia, the link 372

between education and individual advancement and social mobility is emphatically acknowledged and strengthened (Hayhoe & Li, 2008; T. Kim, 2009; J. Li, 2016).

Accordingly, the approaches to HE in the three countries are similar. The importance of HE to national development and social advancement is emphasised (T. Kim, 2009). East Asian parents are extremely enthusiastic about education and willingly invest in HE with the belief that private investment in HE will bring about future success for their children. This extraordinary ‘educational zeal’ (Seth, 2005) is a key driving force for the development of PHE. As a result, PHE is encouraged, and the proportion of private sources financing HE is significant. Thus, PHE in the three countries primarily emerged and developed to satisfy the demand of societies where HE is highly esteemed and the belief that HE is the only way to achieve social mobility is perpetuated. An in-depth analysis regarding Confucianism and its influence in HE and PHE in the three countries is provided in Section 8.2 of this Chapter.

However, Confucian tradition alone is insufficient to explain the differences between the development patterns of PHE in the three countries. The role of governments as the leading actors in the field of HE is also significant. While the Chinese government has strategically encouraged PHE to develop for political, social and economic purposes (Shi, 2015), the Korean and Vietnamese governments have been more passive, allowing the development of this sector only in response to the enormous public demand for HE supported by the Confucian tradition.

Take Korea as an example. For nearly three decades under the military regimes (1961-1987), an egalitarian approach to HE was adopted by strictly controlling the establishment of private universities and the number of students enrolled (D. H. Kim & Choi, 2015; K.-S. Kim, 2005; S. Kim, 2008). Nevertheless, such an approach had created enormous discontent among the growing upper-middle class who were benefiting from the country’s economic growth and wanted to invest in HE to enhance their social mobility (D. H. Kim & Choi, 2015; S.-Y.

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Park, 2010). Consequently, since the civil government took over in 1987, the Korean government was forced to liberalise the PHE sector to meet the burgeoning social demand of HE, leading to the massive expansion of this sector in the subsequent two decades. A further comparison of the roles of actors in shaping the development patterns of PHE in the three countries is covered in section 8.3 of this Chapter.

8.1.1.2. Resource Dependence a. Market Demand

Undoubtedly, the development of PHE in the three countries is inseparable from their national economic development. All of these countries have experienced impressive economic growth under the ‘development state’ model in which the governments play a crucial role in shaping and accelerating the course of economic growth (Aoki, Kim, & Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997; Bolesta, 2007; Dixon, 2003; Kohli, 1994; Minns, 2001).

A similar feature in this East Asian development state model is the government’s emphasis on the significance of HE in boosting the economy and they therefore have invested heavily in HE to sustain economic development (Marginson, 2011, 2014). The economic successes of East Asian countries provide concrete evidence for the positive correlation between HE and an economic surge (Marginson, 2012; Shin, 2012). In return, economic growth has led to the steady growth of the middle class who are most willing to privately invest in HE (Goodman, 2014; Tsang, 2013). This has created a ‘double demand’ for HE – national demand for economic growth and individual demand for social mobility. Consequently, in the wake of these East Asian countries becoming economically advanced, the demand for HE is unquestionably increasing, providing excellent opportunities for PHE to expand.

China is a dramatic example of the power of market forces. The development of the PHE sector in this country has accompanied the country’s economic development (X. Li, 2012; Shi, 2015; Tsang, 2013). Since the late 1990s, thanks

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to significant reforms in wide areas from business to education (L. Wang, 2016), Chinese HE has experienced massive expansion, with the enrolment rate rocketing from less than 7 percent before 1997 to 27 percent in 2012 (Shi, 2015). During this period, the number of students enrolled in non-public institutions (i.e. private and independent) has increased remarkably. In the short time from 2004 to 2008, this number has nearly doubled, from 10 percent of the total number of students enrolled in undergraduate programs to 20 percent (K. Yu et al., 2012). b. Insufficient Public Budget

The ‘double demand’ described above driven by the traditional Confucian belief that highlights the importance of education is one of the most important factors that has led directly to the explosive expansion of HE and PHE in the three East Asian countries. Considering that at the beginning of this transition all the three countries started humbly among the poorest in the world (Dixon, 2003; C. J. Lee et al., 2012), this enormous demand has caused tremendous challenges for the public budget. The limitation of public budget to satisfy the demand of access to HE to boost economic growth and to facilitate social mobility ultimately forced the governments in the three countries to reform the HE systems toward liberalisation and deregulation, opening the way for PHE to develop.

Take Vietnam as an example. Learning from other East Asian countries, the Vietnamese government acknowledges the significance of HE in advancing economic development (George, 2006) and has planned to increase enrolment rates from 28.84 percent in 2013 (Hayden & Le, 2017) to 45 percent in 2020 (Sheridan, 2010). Nevertheless, achieving such an ambitious goal requires enormous public funding in which the current public expenditures for HE, around 1.0 percent of GDP in 2012 (Hayden & Le, 2017), is clearly insufficient, meaning the public HE sector of Vietnam is seriously under-funded (G. Harman et al., 2010; Hayden & Le, 2017; Huong & Fry, 2002). Consequently, the Vietnamese government has planned to shift this financial burden to the private sector, aiming to increase the enrolment rate in PHE from 13.6 percent in 2013

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(Vietnam General Statistics Office, 2015) to an ambitious goal of 40 percent in 2020 (Hayden & Le, 2017; Sheridan, 2010).

8.1.1.3. Normative: Private Business Templates

As mentioned previously, PHE in the three countries emerged as a direct result of adopting Neoliberalism in which public functions are transformed according to business templates under market forces for capital accumulation (Harvey, 2007; Marginson, 2013). Under the influence of the neoliberal approach, the model of corporate universities has become pervasive in HE (Kezar, 2004; Marginson & Considine, 2000). In other words, because Neoliberalism encourages HEIs to adopt private business practices, private business practices have become the norms for PHE to adopt.

Understanding this link between the private business sector and PHE helps explain the differences in PHE patterns of the three countries. The pace of development of the Vietnamese PHE sector is much slower than the other two countries. Although both Vietnam and China are Socialist countries, PHE in Vietnam still lags behind that of China. While private HEIs account for only 19.6 percent of the total number of institutions in Vietnam (Vietnam General Statistics Office, 2015), the figure for China is 28.8 percent (L. Wang, 2016).

Since the development of the private business sector has largely determined the practices adopted by PHE, this advance of Chinese PHE compared with the Vietnamese sector can be explained by the advance of the Chinese private business sector in comparison with that of Vietnam. For instance, while Chinese PHE has adopted the corporate governance model with a clear separation of ownership and management (See Chapter VI), the Vietnamese private university in this study still follows the enterprise model, having a significantly high degree of ownership concentration (See Chapter V).

Nguyen, Locke and Reddy (2015) provide a fascinating explanation for the practice of ownership concentration in Vietnam. While comparing business practices in Vietnam and Singapore, they found that ownership concentration has

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a significantly positive correlation with a firm’s financial performance in Vietnam where national governance quality is poor. Meanwhile, in Singapore where national governance quality is considerably higher than in the rest of the Asian region, ownership concentration shows no correlation with a firm’s value. Accordingly, their study indicates that national governance characteristics substantively impact a firm’s governance practices and its relationship with the firm’s performance.

Understandably, an effective national corporate governance regulation framework is still absent in Vietnam (Hai & Nunoi, 2008; T. Nguyen et al., 2015). Hence, the practice of ownership concentration as in the Vietnamese private university can be justified in the context of the private business sector of a country where corporate governance is still an emerging topic. Historically, corporate governance had not been important in the Vietnamese business discourse until very recently although basic principles of corporate governance were already prescribed in the Enterprise Law (Hai & Nunoi, 2008). Vietnamese entrepreneurs often neglect or ignore the principle of separation of ownership and management (Hai & Nunoi, 2008), which was developed around seven decades ago (Means, 2017).

8.1.1.4. Coercive: Deregulation

The broad spread of Neoliberalism has led to the reduction of states’ intervention in HE (Harvey, 2007). As a result, deregulation as one the most typical practices of the neoliberal approach to HE has been widely adopted in these three countries (See Chapter V, VI, and VII). Deregulation has liberalised HE, encouraging non- state actors to participate in HE provisions (Hayden & Dao, 2010; Jeong, 2014; K.-H. Mok, 2009), and has directly caused the explosive growth in the size and scope of HE systems.

For instance, in Korea, after the civil government introduced deregulation in HE with the May 1995 Reform (T. Kim, 2008; Shin, 2015), the number of private institutions increased from 131 in 1991 to 175 in 2006 (Chae & Hong, 2009). Similarly, in China, following the introduction deregulation to reform HE in the 377

late 1990s, the number of private HEIs increased steadily (Osman Ozturgut, 2011), from 37 in 1999 to 228 in 2004 (K.-H. Mok, 2009), excluding independent colleges.

The institutional pressures described above have facilitated the development of PHE in the three countries. These isomorphic pressures are arranged into four groups, namely cultural-cognitive, resource dependence, normative and coercive isomorphisms. In terms of cultural-cognitive pressures, Confucianism and Neoliberalism are the two ideologies that have enabled PHE in East Asia to grow because they both share a similar pragmatic view regarding HE. Under the influence of these two ideologies, the market demand for access to HE for national development and individual advancement has been rapidly increasing while the public budget is limited, leading to the endorsement of governments and the general public to the development of PHE. Normatively, the development of the private business sector in each country has provided necessary management templates for PHE to adopt, causing PHE to closely follow private business practices. Coercively, the deregulation approach implemented under the influence of Neoliberalism has liberalised the HE systems, allowing non-state actors to robustly participate in HE provision, resulting in the massive expansion of PHE in the three countries.

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8.1.2. Institutional Isomorphisms that Constrain the Development of PHE

Although the above-mentioned isomorphisms have caused the impressive growth of PHE in Korea, China and Vietnam, the sector has also experienced significant constraints. Below is a list of constraining institutional pressures that have seriously inhibited the development of the sector.

8.1.2.1. Cultural-cognitive: Socialism

In contrast to the case of Korea where the government has officially adopted Neoliberalism, China and Vietnam take Socialism as the national orthodoxy. Socialism developed based on Marxist theory has profoundly influenced contemporary HE of the two countries (George, 2005; J. Li, 2016; Welch, 2010). As the national orthodoxy, Socialism and its rhetoric saturate every aspect of these two societies and is a compulsory component of the HE curriculum (George, 2005; K.-H. Mok, 2008; Welch, 2010).

Under the influence of Socialism, for a long time PHE was prohibited in China and Vietnam (George, 2010; Xu, 2001). As a result, when PHE emerged in China and Vietnam, underlining an adherence to market practices, the sector has been facing tremendous difficulties because it challenges the values of the socialist ideology (George, 2010; K.-H. Mok, 2008; Welch, 2010). Although HE reforms implemented in the late 1990s have led to the rapid growth of this sector, PHE in these countries has still experienced challenges from the socialist societies.

For example, in spite of the impressive expansion of the sector, generally the public still question the significance of PHE as well as its quality (Cao & Li, 2014; Huong & Fry, 2002). This distrust has resulted in problematic practices. Vietnamese students enrolled in private universities have restricted access to some types of government scholarship. Meanwhile, graduate students from these universities have experienced discrimination in employment (See Chapter VII).

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8.1.2.2. Resource Dependence: Limited Financial Capacity of the Private Sector

As described previously, market demands are the key driving force of the development of PHE in East Asia. However, as PHE depends primarily on private sources for its finance, the development of PHE will be seriously jeopardised if (1) the market is saturated; and/or (2) private funding (i.e. household expenditure) is unable to afford PHE.

These two conditions are evident in the case of Korea. Firstly, after more than two decades of impressive increase, demand for access to HE has been fully absorbed. There are significant numbers of private HEIs in Korea that cannot enrol enough students to match their maximum capacity since there are more university places than high school graduates (B. Kim & Park, 2018; McNeill, 2017). Consequently, some universities have been forced to shut down or merged with other universities (Sharma, 2011).

Additionally, since Korean HE is a private dominated system (Chae & Hong, 2009; M. H. Lee, 2008), the over-reliance on private sources of funding has led to serious social issues (K. S. Kim & Woo, 2009; S.-Y. Park, 2010; Yeom, 2011). The development of PHE in Korean supported by Neoliberalism has brought about educational inequality. Inequality in HE is also linked to income inequality and regional disparities (Hannum & Wang, 2006; Marginson, 2018; Yeom, 2011). As a result, these problems have caused severe social discontent, to the extent that the Korean government was forced to employ the ‘tuition fee cap’ policy (B. Kim & Park, 2018). This policy prevents private universities from increasing tuition fees, thereby ensuring students’ accessibility to HE. However, it has caused enormous challenges to private universities which depend heavily on tuition fees to sustain their finances (H. K. Hong & Chae, 2011; OECD, 2018). Consequently, Korea HE is facing a crisis caused by its over reliance on private sources to finance HE.

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8.1.2.3. Normative: Rankings

International and national rankings, together with quality assurance, are among measurements used to assess a university’s effectiveness (G. Harman, 2011). Rankings have significantly influenced HE around the world and can be considered a driver of change (Shin & Toutkoushian, 2011). Nevertheless, rankings have also been criticised for negatively impacting the development of HEIs, including private universities.

Firstly, rankings have widened the gap between universities through stratification (Kehm, 2014). While many rankings do not clearly distinguish a university’s performance and reputation (Shin & Toutkoushian, 2011), highly ranked universities tend to attract better students and faculty inputs and receive more funding (Kehm, 2014; Morphew & Swanson, 2011). Meanwhile, the majority of private HEIs in the three countries are in the lower tier of ranking (except a very small number of well-known prestigious private universities in Korea). Thus, rankings have not helped these private HEIs to close the gap with their public counterparts.

In addition, rankings have caused the excessive concentration of resources in a small number of institutions, thus widening the gap between universities. Rankings encourage governments to enter into an ‘arms race’ in investment in HE to strengthen the HE system’s competitiveness and excellence, with the goal to build world-class universities (Dill, 2009; Kehm, 2014; Marginson, 2014; R. Yang, 2016). However, only a handful of prestigious universities are the major beneficiaries of this focussed funding movement while the majority of less prestigious (both public and private) HEIs are suffering from insufficient financial resources (Kehm, 2014).

Secondly, the standardised measurements and indicators employed by rankings and league tables are considered threats to the diversity of HE systems (Kehm, 2014; Shin & Toutkoushian, 2011; Teichler, 2009). In order to achieve higher rankings, universities tend to adopt practices similar to those of highly ranked universities, which will ultimately make them similar, particularly in their 381

missions, educational objectives, programs offered and curriculum (Marginson & Van der Wende, 2007; Morphew & Swanson, 2011; Yeom, 2016b). Consequently, PHE, a component of HE that emerged to diversify the system (Geiger, 1985; Hayden & Dao, 2010; Levy, 2009; K.-H. Mok, 1997; N. Park, 2000), risk losing this function due to the cynical influence of rankings.

Finally, under the influence of rankings, university leaders are forced to allocate the university’s scarce financial resources to items that they believe can help boost the university’s rankings, regardless of their relevance to the university’s mission and educational objectives. Hence, rankings have caused financial inefficiency in universities (Dill, 2009). As Dill (2009) conclude, “the pernicious effect of this competitive pursuit of academic prestige is that it is a highly costly, zero-sum game, in which most institutions as well as society will be the losers” (p.5).

8.1.2.4. Coercive: Strengthening Regulation

Despite a clear tendency of deregulation that has led to the massive growth of PHE in the three countries, there is also an adverse trend of strengthening regulation which clearly hinders the development of the sector. For example, in Vietnam, the PHE sector is forced to follow the compulsory curriculum designed by the MoET (K.-H. Mok, 2008; Welch, 2010). This government enforcement is considered an obstacle to PHE because this sector is characterised by a market- oriented approach in providing courses and programs. Forcing private universities to follow a one-size-fits-all compulsory curriculum only weakens this feature of the sector, reducing PHE’s flexibility and therefore hampering the development of the sector (See Chapter VII).

Meanwhile, in Korea, private universities located in Seoul are given enrolment quotas because the government has tried to close the regional gap caused by over-population in the Seoul Metropolitan area (See Chapter V). Since private universities in Korea rely mainly on tuition fees for funding (H. K. Hong & Chae, 2011; OECD, 2018), limitation of enrolment numbers certainly restricts

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their access to this source of finance, partly leading to financial instability in private HEIs.

The inconsistent approach to PHE in these countries should be seen as the result of the conflict of values between ideologies, i.e. between Socialism and Neoliberalism in the case of Vietnam, or between egalitarianism supported by Confucianism and educational inequality caused by Neoliberalism in the case of Korea. The Vietnamese government has employed a compulsory curriculum to ensure that courses and programs offered in HEIs are in compliance with the Socialist ideology (George, 2010; K.-H. Mok, 2008). In the case of Korea, enrolment quotas are a traditional mechanism used by Korean governments since the military regimes to implement an egalitarian approach to HE by strictly controlling the establishment of HEIs and the number of students enrolled (D. H. Kim & Choi, 2015; K.-S. Kim, 2005; S. Kim, 2008). Therefore, the development of PHE in Korea as a consequence of the adoption of Neoliberalism contradicts this egalitarian approach. From this perspective, it is crucial to resolve the conflicts between these ideologies to enable the development of PHE.

In this subsection, the institutional pressures that restrain the development of PHE in the three East Asian countries have been discussed. Firstly, the socialist ideology as the cultural-cognitive isomorphism in Vietnam has restricted the growth of the PHE sector because the development of this sector underpinned by Neoliberalism challenges socialist values. Secondly, rankings have benefitted already prestigious institutions while caused less prestigious ones (mainly private) to suffer loss by strengthening university stratification. Thirdly, the limited financial capacity of the private sector is another critical issue for PHE because the development of the sector will be threatened when market demand declines or PHE becomes unaffordable. Finally, the tendency to strength regulation in the three countries has severely restricted PHE’s capacity to grow.

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8.1.3. Implications for Vietnam

In the subsections above, a discussion regarding critical isomorphic pressures that enable and constrain the development of PHE was provided. However, understanding isomorphic pressures alone is insufficient because it only provides a description of instruments that shape the practices of PHE without explaining who uses these instruments for what purposes. One may argue that since these enablers and constrainers were identified, by enhancing enabling isomorphisms and restricting constraining pressures, PHE will be encouraged to develope. Such an argument emphasises the absolute power of isomorphisms, implying that institutional actors are merely vehicles of institutional pressures, neglecting their strategic intents and agentic behaviours.

In this study, I address these shortcomings by applying the other two concepts of institutional logics and actors to provide a more nuanced explanation. Hence, in this subsection, the implications for Vietnam were generated based on the discussion regarding isomorphic pressures provided previously, with the view of taking the significance of institutional logics and actors into consideration. These implications are presented according to the relevant levels, namely the macro and meso levels. As the factors of institutional logics and actors are discussed respectively in Section 8.2 and 8.3 of this chapter, more specific implications are proposed in these sections.

8.1.3.1. The Macro Level a. Implication 1: Navigating the Development of PHE

As described above, the three countries in this study are characterised by a Confucian legacy that emphasises the significance of HE in national development and social mobility (Hayhoe & Li, 2008; T. Kim, 2009; J. Li, 2016; Marginson, 2011). Meanwhile, the widespread influence of Neoliberalism has encouraged private investment in HE for individual benefits (Apple, 2013; Kezar, 2004; Tilak, 2008; J. Williams, 2016). Collectively, this has led to the booming demand for access to HE which the public budget is unable to satisfy

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(Altbach & Levy, 2005; Svava Bjarnason et al., 2009), forcing governments to liberalise HE through deregulation and reduction of state intervention (Harvey, 2007; Moutsios, 2009), opening the way for PHE to develop and expand rapidly (Dang, 2009; K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; D. E. Oliver et al., 2009).

In the near future, Vietnam shows no sign of this demand declining. The country is having a ‘demographic dividend’, a feature that promotes economic growth (Minh, 2009), with the working age cohort (from 15-50 years old) covering 73.3 percent of the population in 2016 (Vietnam General Statistic Office, 2019). Meanwhile, the gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education in 2016 is 28.26 (UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2019). The government of Vietnam has also established an ambitious goal of increasing the HE enrolment rate to 45 percent in 2020, of which 40 percent will be enrolled in PHE.

The experiences of Korea and China presented in this study provide valuable lessons for Vietnam in managing PHE. The contribution of the private sector to Korean HE is undeniable, in that PHE has been the leading sector in satisfying the public demand for access to HE (Chae & Hong, 2009; M. H. Lee, 2008), helping Korea successfully achieve the goal of universal HE within a short period (K. S. Kim & Woo, 2009; Seth, 2005). However, Korean HE has experienced a serious crisis because of its over-reliance on private sources to meet the public demand of HE. Since HE is overly exposed to market forces, resulting in a wide range of issues such as extreme stratification of universities (S. Kim & Lee, 2003; Shin, 2012), and inaccessibility and inequality in HE (Yeom, 2011, 2016a). Consequently, this private-led system has now been confronting severe social dissatisfaction in a society which strongly believes that HE is the only means for social mobility.

Similarly, in China, the massive expansion of Chinese HE which consists of the remarkable increase of PHE (K.-H. Mok, 1997; Shi, 2015; Xu, 2001; R. Yang, 2006) is not without defects (K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; Su, 2012; R. Yang, 2002). Chinese researchers are seriously concerned about the discrepancies in educational opportunities and other relevant issues such as income inequalities

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and regional disparities (UNDP, 2005; R. Yang, 2007). Obviously, over-relying on private funding and over-exposing HE to market forces may lead to terrible consequences that should be avoid at any cost.

Thus, the Korean and Chinese experiences suggest that it is crucial to have a strategic plan to navigate the development of PHE. Unquestionably, Vietnam HE needs the contribution of PHE in order to carry out the development plan established by the state and to facilitate the development of society, but to what extent such contribution is appropriate, in which way PHE should be encouraged to contribute, what potential drawbacks the fast growing PHE may cause and what the measures to counter such drawbacks are, are among critical questions needing to be answered. Unfortunately, it is not the scope of this study to address such questions. It requires future studies to systemically investigate these issues in order to develop more comprehensive strategies. However, a further discussion of the institutional logics and actors provided in Section 8.2 and 8.3 of this chapter may provide some helpful insights for the development of such strategies in the future. c. Implication 2: Reforming PHE together with Reforming the Private Business Sector

As discussed in this subsection, under the popular influence of Neoliberalism, HE is encouraged to adopt business practices, particularly in management and governance. Since PHE in East Asia emerged primarily to meet the burgeoning demand of access to HE, it is a kind of hybrid form of HE and private business. Consequently, this sector is particularly responsive to adopting private business practices.

This has led to a critical implication in reforming the PHE sector. As PHE closely follows the templates provided by the private business sector, it will be very difficult to implement reforms in PHE that go beyond such templates. Take again the example of the governance models available in Vietnam and China mentioned in the previous subsection. I have shown that the model of corporate governance is absent in the Vietnamese PHE sector because such a model was 386

introduced in Vietnam only very recently and has not been well developed and institutionalised in the private business sector (Hai & Nunoi, 2008; T. Nguyen et al., 2015). Similarly, almost no university in Vietnam is organised according to the American model of trusteeship as in Korea (except the newly established Fulbright University Vietnam which is funded by the American government) because the private not-for profit sector in Vietnam has not been developed properly (K. T. Hong, 2008; T. V Pham, Nguyen, & Nguyen, 2016). Hence, introducing these models (corporate governance or trusteeship governance) to the Vietnamese PHE without the proper institutionalisation of such models in the private business sector will be extremely difficult.

Consequently, I argue that as PHE in Vietnam is a result of the combination of HE and private business, any attempt to reform this sector must take into account the reality of the private business sector, and reforms in Vietnamese PHE should not be carried out in isolation from reforms in the private business sector.

8.1.3.2. The Meso Level a. Implication 3: Developing Long-term Strategies to Ensure Financial Stability

As discussed previously, PHE in East Asia is heavily dependent on private sources for funding. Tuition fees cover 82 percent of revenue in Vietnamese private HEIs (Hayden & Dao, 2010). Similarly, the figures for Korea and China are respectively 70 percent (B. Kim & Park, 2018) and 87 percent (Su, 2012). For organisations, depending on one type of financial source to such an extent is dangerous. The Korean case provides valuable lessons for Vietnamese private HEIs in terms of finance. Korean private universities have experienced serious financial problems. One of reasons is that during the period of rapid growth, many universities focused on quantitative expansion without long-term strategies to stabilise their financial resources. As a result, Korean universities have not accumulated sufficient finance to sustain their long-term development when market demand declined.

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In the context of these three countries where the public budget is limited and financial support from the government to PHE is not expected, private universities should develop their own strategies to ensure their financial stability as part of the university’s development plan. As the market constantly changes, such a plan should carefully consider the market dynamics and balance short- term interests with the long-term development of the university.

In summary, in this section I provided a comparative analysis of isomorphic pressures that have facilitated and/or hindered the development of PHE in the three countries. Based on this analysis, implications for Vietnam were proposed. Firstly, I argue that Vietnamese PHE has great potential to grow since there is a large demand for HE in this country while public funding is insufficient. However, based on the lessons of Korea and China, over-relying on private funding of HE and over-exposing HE to market forces may lead to serious consequences such as inequality, inequity, inaccessibility, and social dissatisfaction. As a result, a strategic plan is required to guide the development of PHE to strengthen the contribution of the sector to HE and society. Secondly, I suggest that implementing reforms in the PHE sector in Vietnam should not be carried out without careful consideration of the practices of the private business sector since PHE closely follows private business templates. Finally, at the meso level, private HEIs in Vietnam are recommended to develop strategic plans based on thorough analysis of the environment to ensure financial stability and sustain long-term development.

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8.2. Institutional Logics

In this section, a comparison between the dominant logics in HE of the three countries, namely, Korea, China and Vietnam is provided. At first sight the HE system in each country is characterised by different logics which has led to different approaches toward PHE. However, a comprehensive analysis has revealed similar constituents among apparently different logics in these three countries, which are Neoliberalism and Confucianism. Further investigation has unpacked the compatibilities between these two ideologies, as well as conflicts in their values. In addition, some serious problems of HE in East Asia resulting from the interactions between Neoliberalism and Confucianism were uncovered. Based this analysis, implications for Vietnam are provided, classified according to the relevant levels, namely the macro and meso levels.

The dominant logic that characterises the HE system in each country is summarised in table VIII-2 below. It is important to note that institutional logics are generally located at macro level (Glynn, 2008) and function as rationales for action (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004). However, it is possible that different actors at different levels may employ different ratios as justifications for their behaviours. In that case, conflicts in logics between different levels may arise.

Table VIII-2: A Comparison of Dominant Logics by Level in Korea, China and Vietnam

Analytical Korea China Vietnam Level Egalitarian Pragmatic Socialist Macro Utilitarianism Authoritarianism Authoritarianism Egalitarian Pragmatic Meso Neo-Liberalism Utilitarianism Authoritarianism

Accordingly, as table VIII-2 indicates, the HE system in each country is dominated by different logics. In Korea, the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism

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universally shapes the whole system, and generally there is little conflict between the macro and meso levels. Chinese HE, meanwhile, is characterised by the logic of pragmatic authoritarianism. Similar to Korea, no conflict in logic between the macro and meso levels was found in the case of China. On the other hand, there is a stark conflict in logics between the macro and meso levels in Vietnam, where the logic of socialist authoritarianism dominates the macro level while the logic of neoliberalism prevails at the meso level (i.e. the private university).

Since logics provide rationales for actors to make decisions, the differences in logics in these three countries have determined the different approaches to PHE implemented by the macro actors (governments) in the three countries. Obviously, each country is characterised by different logics, in which the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism in Korea and pragmatic authoritarianism in China enable PHE to develop (See Chapter V and VI), whereas the logic of socialist authoritarianism in VN does not (See Chapter VII).

However, logics are not constructed in an ‘institutional vacuum’ (Weber & Glynn, 2006), but based on the materials (i.e. practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules) that are available at the institutional field (Glynn, 2008; Thornton, 2004). It is therefore crucial to examine the ‘raw materials’ on which these logics are constructed that may encourage the development of PHE. Further investigation of the elements that constitute the logics of the three countries has revealed strikingly similar ‘ingredients’. The first is the neoliberalism practices that are increasingly popular in these countries even though there is no explicit statement by the states indicating official adoption. The second is the Confucian values that have been deeply institutionalised in the very fabric of the East Asian societies. Understanding these elements will not only help improve our understanding of HE and PHE in these countries, but also provide important implications for the development of PHE in Vietnam.

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8.2.1. The Two Major Ingredients

8.2.1.1. Neoliberalism

The first significant constituent of the logics that are dominant in HE systems of the three countries is neoliberalism and its associated practices. Neoliberalism generally refers to a range of political and economic practices promoted by major international organisations such as WB, IMF, WTO and OECD, etc (Dang, 2009; D. E. Neubauer, 2008), which has resulted in its wide adoption around the globe (Clarke, 2007). In Neoliberal philosophy, the emphasis is on the individual, and economic rationality overrules other forms of rationality (Kezar, 2004). Thus, Neoliberal scholars argue that individuals’ right to maximize their personal benefit should be protected to lead to stronger public good (Apple, 2013). Consequently, we have witnessed the increasing involvement of private enterprises in areas that had been traditionally managed by public institutions, leading to practices such as liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and reduction of state intervention (Harvey, 2007; Moutsios, 2009) a. The Neoliberal Approach in HE

In HE, public universities are encouraged to privatize, transforming into corporate entities with clear economic goals (Currie & Newson, 1998; Slaughter & Rhoades, 1996). The emergence of private universities has become and a global phenomenon (Levy, 2006). In terms of management, university leaders have also shifted their focuses from missions and quality to competitiveness and efficiency (Gumport, 1993). Regardless of ownership, the corporate/industrial model of universities has become pervasive in HE (Kezar, 2004; Marginson & Considine, 2000).

In the three East Asian countries, neoliberal practices are evident although there are significant variations among them. Primarily, strategies along the line of neoliberalism have been developed and adopted to restructure the HE systems in the three countries (Dang, 2009; T. Kim, 2008; K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007). There is a clear tendency of deregulation in HE with greater autonomy being granted to

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universities (K.-H. Mok, 2001; D. E. Oliver et al., 2009; Shin, 2012). A significant proportion of the financial burden has been shifted to families through the introduction of the user fee policy, resulting in the proliferation of funding sources and the diversification of institutions (C. J. Lee et al., 2012; K.-H. Mok & Chan, 1998; D. E. Oliver et al., 2009).

In Korea, since the transition from the military regime to the civilian government, several reforms along the line of neoliberal ideology have been implemented, most critically the May 1995 Reform that focused on deregulation, diversification and specialisation (N. Park, 2000). Since then, the Korean government has explicitly adopted neoliberalism in HE (Jo, 2005), and this approach has been consistent throughout successive governments of Korea until now (Jeong, 2014). This approach has not only led to the impressive expansion in HE, particularly of PHE, in the subsequent decades, but also strengthened the link between HE and economic growth with significant emphasis on improving universities’ competitiveness and educational excellence

In China, neoliberal policies and instruments such as diversification, privatisation, marketisation, commodification and decentralisation (Borevskaya, 2003; K.-H. Mok, 2000; Ngok & Chan, 2004) have been utilised to reform the HE system (K.-H. Mok, 2006; Yao et al., 2004), allowing non-state actors to actively participate in provision of HE. The ‘growing privateness’ in Chinese HE (K.-H. Mok, 2009) is clearly observed in the proliferation of HE providers, creating various forms of institutions, ranging from ‘people-founded’, affiliated ‘independent’ to fully private colleges and universities.

In Vietnam, neoliberalism with the strong support of international organisation such as WB, IMF, WTO, etc. has found a way to enter into various arenas, including HE (Dang, 2009; D. E. Oliver et al., 2009), although the state of Vietnam has neither officially nor fully adhered to the neoliberal prescriptions (Masina, 2012). The neoliberal approach to HE in Vietnam has been manifested both in the public and private sectors. In public HE, recent reforms grant more autonomy to universities, while higher relevance to market demands are required.

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Cost-sharing strategies were also introduced, leading to partial privatization in the public sector (Dang, 2009), and the rapid growth of PHE in Vietnam (D. E. Oliver et al., 2009).

Nevertheless, compared with Korea and China, the adoption of Neoliberalism in Vietnam is limited and ambiguous (Masina, 2012). The state of Vietnam has still maintained its strict role in controlling the HE system and socialist ideology remains its orthodox position in guiding the relationship between HE and the state (George, 2005). Despite the ‘partial privatisation’ of public universities and the rapid growth of the PHE sector, it is still difficult to conclude that there is a ‘market’ of HE in Vietnam since enrolment quotas, tuition fees (in both public and private universities) and wages (in public universities only) are all set by the state (Hayden, 2005). As this research has discovered, the steadfast adherence of the government to socialism and communism is one of the primary factors that hinders the further development of PHE (See chapter VII), despite the demand for HE continually growing while the state budget is limited. b. Positive Outcomes of the Neoliberal Approach in HE

The introduction and adoption of the neoliberal approach to the three East Asian countries have certainly brought about positive results. In Korea, neoliberal reforms in HE introduced by the government since the late 1990s have contributed to significant changes in Korean HE. According to Jeong (2014), HE provision is diversified, leading to the increase of access to HE and the diversification of educational programs. In addition, through intensive funding programs, universities’ research capacities have been enhanced, resulting in the improvement of Korean universities’ rankings and the country’s competitiveness on the global stage.

In China, the pragmatic approach of the government in allowing non-state actors to provide education (K.-H. Mok, 2000; R. Yang, 1997) has contributed to the impressive expansion of HE since the late 1990s until now. Obviously, marketisation and privatisation have provided more learning opportunities for Chinese people (K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007). In addition, decentralisation has 393

granted significant autonomy for universities to determine their own affairs (M. Li & Yang, 2014). Undoubtedly, neoliberal strategies are among critical reforms that have led to the recent remarkable improvement of Chinese HE.

Similarly, Vietnamese HE has also experienced significant reforms, partially thanks to the introduction of the neoliberal approach (Dang, 2009), although in a much more limited and ambiguous manner (Masina, 2012) compared with other two countries. Besides the diversification in HE provision that has resulted in more access to HE (Hayden & Dao, 2010), adoption of the neoliberal approach has increased the efficiency and accountability of the system, particularly of the public sector (Dang, 2009).

8.2.1.2. Confucianism

The second critical element of the institutional logics that characterise the HE of the three countries is the Confucian values shared by all these countries. Indeed, the East Asian model of HE was deeply rooted in Confucian ideology (Hayhoe & Li, 2008). Confucianism is a complex set of ideas that include moral, social and political teachings, initially established by Confucius (51-479 BC) and further developed by his followers to be the most influential ideology that transformed Chinese society (F. Wang, 2004).

According to Palmer, Bresler and Cooper (2001), the influence of Confucianism on Chinese society can be seen in (1) constructing moral values that guide social order and people’s relationship and (2) emphasising education as critical to individual and social development. Firstly, the major moral values advocated by

Confuicianism include benevolence (仁 ren), ritual (禮 li), loyalty (忠 zhong), filial piety (孝 xiao), and gentleman (君子 junzi) (Lam, 2016; F. Wang, 2004).

Secondly, as to the influence of Confucianism on education, the most profoundly influential thoughts of Confucianism philosophy on education are its pragmatic view regarding the purpose of education, and its belief that human being has the same potential to develop. These two essential Confucian values of education make East Asian education generally, and HE in particular, fundamentally 394

different from its Western counterparts. In the coming subsection, I discuss these two central values of Confucianism to unpack the profound influence of this ideology in shaping education, particularly HE in the three EA countries. a. The Two Central Values

a.1. Pragmatism

In contrast to Western view of knowledge as an end in itself, in Confucianism, knowledge (지식, 知識, or tri thức in Korean, Chinese and Vietnamese respectively) is “to let one’s innate virtue shine forth, to renew the people, and to rest in the highest good” (The Great Learning, cited in J. Li, 2016, p. 24). Although Confucius (551-479 BC) believed that learning is a private pursuit to cultivate one’s full humanity (Hayhoe & Li, 2008), he viewed an individual as a ‘flowing stream’ (Hayhoe & Li, 2008), and education is the tool to help develop and harmonize the individual with the family, society and nature (Tu, 1993). For him education was the only way through which an ideal state and a peaceful world that he dreamed of could be built (T. Kim, 2009). Hence, knowledge and education in Confucianism clearly have ethical, moral, and political purposes (J. Li, 2016). In other words, in Confucian ideology, knowledge per se is not an end product of learning. The accumulation of knowledge through education is to guide people’s social conduct (Dawson, 1981) and the value of knowledge is in its application to contribute to public good (J. Li, 2016).

Thanks to this pragmatic view regarding knowledge and education, the imperial states in East Asia considered Confucianism a useful tool to construct a well- ordered society. Consequently, it was adopted by the states to be the orthodox ideology that governed every aspect of the countries, from individuals’ relationships to national management (T. Kim, 2009). Indeed, Confucius’s philosophy of education as the means to maintain social, ethical and moral behaviours deeply impacted East Asian countries (C. H. Williams, 2017).

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a.2. Egalitarianism

Secondly, Confucius’s belief that everyone has unlimited potential, that there is no class distinction in education, and that everyone is educable (Hayhoe & Li, 2008; W. O. Lee, 1996) is another value that strongly shaped East Asian societies, particularly education systems. This thought forms one of the most basic principles of education in Confucianism – egalitarianism. This view of Confucianism is in contrast to Western educational thought rooted in Greek philosophy that “there are certain innate qualities and abilities that no amount of education can change” (Hayhoe & Li, 2008, p. 88).

Because Confucius taught that everyone has equal potential, egalitarianism is the underpinning thought of the famous national civil service exam organised by the imperial states in the three East Asian countries. This exam ensured that equal opportunities would be given to all men to demonstrate their knowledge (Hayhoe & Li, 2008). The reward for those succeeding in this exam is an opportunity to participate in the imperial bureaucracy as a recognition for one’s maximum effort in learning (T. Kim, 2009) and his ability “to endure the course of study and to pass the examination” (C. H. Williams, 2017, p. 26). b. Impacts of Confucianism on Traditional East Asian HE

As the exam was the only opportunity for commoners to upgrade their social status, this exam had added extrinsic values to education in Confucianism: social and political (and possibly economic) motivations for social mobility (Hayhoe & Li, 2008). Through this state-organised exam, scholastically excellent candidates were rewarded with official government positions. Thus the link between knowledge and private gains (i.e. social, political and economic power) has been strengthened throughout the thousand-year-long history of this ‘government- orchestrated examination system’ (T. Kim, 2009).

Hence, a kind of social contract was formed between the imperial states and societies, that the states satisfied people’s demand for social mobility by providing equal opportunities for everyone in the form of the civil service exam.

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In return, everyone accepted the social orders and hierarchies established by the imperial states. Education, therefore, acted as a means and currency for the states and citizens to fulfil this social contract. For this reason, the state became the grand patron of education (T. Kim, 2009). It took the role of guarding the principle of equal opportunity extorted by Confucianism as the state orthodoxy by controlling curriculum, selection standards and procedures (T. Kim, 2009). In return, education institutions were utilised to be a subsidiary body of the imperial states (R. Yang, 2016) to produce future officials for the bureaucracy (J. Li, 2016).

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the traditional educational systems in Confucian East Asia were entirely funded by the imperial states. In fact, traditional HE in the three countries were identical systems that consisted of imperial and private learning institutions in parallel (K. S. Kim & Woo, 2009; J. Li, 2016; Trịnh, 2014). Because Confucius taught learning is a personal pursuit, it was natural for private schools to emerge where the imperial states could not reach. The imperial institutions were mainly established in the capital cities and provinces in which the Imperial Academy (태학-국자감, 太學-國子監 and Thái

Học – Quốc Tử Giám) served as a HE institution and the state administrative department of education (J. Li, 2016; Trịnh, 2014). At the same time, private academies (書院) were established at lower levels (towns or villages) by individuals who (1) were famous scholars; (2) had passed the official imperial exams; or (3) had attended the Imperial Academy (K. S. Kim & Woo, 2009; J. Li, 2016; E. Park et al., 2008; Trịnh, 2014).

While the imperial-established institutions were primarily for members of the monarchical families, of high-status officials and a small number of excellent students recommended by provincial/regional bureaucrats, the vast majority of students attended private schools (K. S. Kim & Woo, 2009; J. Li, 2016; E. Park et al., 2008; Trịnh, 2014). The earliest form of private institutions can be dated back to the third century B.C. in China (J. Li, 2016) and the latest in Korea and Vietnam possibly around the eleventh century (E. Park et al., 2008; N. L. Phan, 397

2006). Although there were certainly variations in the three countries, generally this co-existing imperial – private system had gradually developed and institutionalised for more or less a thousand years (J. Li, 2016; E. Park et al., 2008; Trịnh, 2014). In other words, the traditional model of education in East Asia, for around one thousand years, has depended primarily on private education. c. Impacts of Confucianism on Contemporary East Asian HE

Thus, understanding the Confucian legacy of the three East Asian countries is critical to explain the HE practices in these countries from individual to national levels. At the individual level, Confucian values help explain the extraordinary enthusiasm of East Asian people towards HE and their willingness to privately invest in HE. The egalitarian principle of Confucianism makes the educational ethic of Confucianism seem universal (Marginson, 2012) even before (some of) East Asian countries achieved the goal of universal education. Moreover, the strong link between education and private gains which has been strengthened for centuries encourages East Asian households to spend on HE. East Asian governments do not need the human capital theory as in Western society to convince families to privately invest in HE for the success in the workforce (Marginson, 2012).

At the national level, understanding Confucianism and its influence on these three East Asian countries helps explain the dominant role of the state in managing education. In the imperial East Asian societies, Confucianism was utilised to (1) maintain social orders and hierarchies; (2) produce officials for the bureaucracy; and (3) to allow social mobility for commoners. Consequently, education generally and higher education in particular in the three countries have been considered to be a primary vehicle for national development (J. Li, 2016; Jun Li & Hayhoe, 2012).

For this reason, HE in East Asia was fundamentally different from the Western notion of a university as an autonomous institution established for the purpose of pursuing knowledge as an end in its own (J. Li, 2016; Turner, 1996). As T. Kim 398

(2009) emphasises, education systems in East Asia “have been carefully designed to meet the state’s political and economic projects” (p. 866), it is common in these countries that the state’s approach to education is very utilitarian. HE has been always an arm of the state, without independently determining its functions. Even in a system where the state has officially employed Neoliberalism principle of deregulation and PHE has been advanced like Korea, the role of the state in HE is still inevitable. The Korean PHE sector has not developed an alternative justification for its existence apart from what the state has defined (See Chapter V).

Hence, the contemporary states of East Asian countries still manifest similar characteristics to their previous imperial counterparts in managing education, despite the increasing popularity of neo-liberalism and new public management in this region (although with many variations). The states are still the driving force of HE in East Asia, establishing goals and targets of the system, selectively investing to achieve such goals, developing standards and procedures to assure quality, and closely supervising universities (Marginson, 2011, 2012). These characteristics have led to a clear tendency to compromise university autonomy for the strong supervisory roles of governments. d. Impacts of Confucianism on East Asian PHE

The Confucian legacy has critical implications for the PHE sector. As explained previously, in Confucianism, learning is for the sake of one’s self-cultivation in order to be in proper relationship with one’s external environment, i.e. one’s family, society and nature (Hayhoe & Li, 2008). Thus, the individual pursuit of education had strong collective purposes. This teaching of Confucianism therefore acknowledged education as both a public and private good. Based on this teaching, traditional educational systems in East Asia comprised two major types of institutions existing in parallel, imperial institutions for privileged, high status members (with the exception of a small number of scholastically excellent students) of the societies, and private institutions for commoners.

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This legacy has shed new light on our understanding of PHE in this region in several aspects. Firstly, the emergence (or more accurately, re-emergence) of PHE in this area is different from what has occurred elsewhere in the world which emerged as a result of neoliberalism (Levy, 2006, 2013; Teixeira, 2009), in spite of the apparently similar development pattern. In fact, East Asian PHE should be considered as the recovery of an old pattern which had existed approximately a thousand years, rather than a newly emerging phenomenon. Neoliberalism might have impacted only the scope and speed of growth of the sector.

Secondly, the Confucian legacy influenced HE has crucially blurred the distinction between public and private in HE of this region (Collins, 2016; M. Lee & Neubauer, 2009). Generally, public and private universities are distinguished based on typical features, for example, as M. Lee and Neubauer (2009) list below:

Table VIII-3: Typical Features of Public and Private HEI (M. Lee & Neubauer, 2009)

Public Private State-owned Non-state (a group or individual) owned Government-funded (mostly or entirely) Privately-funded (mostly or entirely) Governed by a branch of government Governed by a governing board Operating according to directions Operating according to directions set by (partially at least) established by the the governing board government

Nevertheless, M. Lee and Neubauer (2009), after observing various types of HEIs in the Asia-Pacific region, conclude that the concepts of public and private in this region are more vague, complex and ambiguous than they appeared to be in their formal definitions. Thus, to explain the nature of PHE in East Asia requires a different mindset from the so-called Western dichotomy that often dominates our understanding. I therefore argue that PHE in East Asia should not be considered purely as a private good as in the general concept. In the same way

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education under the influence of the Confucian legacy is seen as both public and private good, so is PHE.

Viewing PHE in this unique context of East Asian Confucianism helps explain several interesting practices of the sector. For instance, consider the label minban (in Chinese), or dân lập (in Vietnamese), which literally means people-founded or people-operated), that many private colleges and universities in China and Vietnam use to identify themselves, making them less challenging to the socialist ideology. This label is used because it is based on the Confucian value that recognises education as both public and private good. In the context that HE is not considered embedded in civil society but more as an extension of the state (Collins, 2016; Gernet, 1997), the Confucian teaching acknowledging that non- state entities can also contribute to public good provides a significant tool for private HEIs to legitimise themselves in these socialist countries.

This does not mean that this label is used only as a mask. Indeed, the label also denotes the publicness of private HEIs particularly in the way these institutions are funded by multiple public and non-public sources (K.-H. Mok, 2009). Similarly, in the case of independent colleges in China, several actors, from both public and private sectors, cooperate to establish these colleges, resulting in a diverse range of institutions. When needed, these independent colleges can transform themselves into either public (as described in this research) or private institutions (Wen et al., 2016).

The public nature of PHE is seen most strikingly in Korean HE. As a private- dominated system (M. H. Lee, 2008), the publicness of the private sector is legislated in the Education Law (K.-S. Kim, 2004). Unlike the case of Vietnam and China, Korean PHE shows no tolerance of for-profit behaviours, strongly adhering to the public nature of HE thanks to the uncompromising attitude of the military regimes that purposefully used PHE for public goals (K.-S. Kim, 2004). Korean private universities take the role of public institutions in producing public good, contributing to the economic growth of the country, and fulfilling the developmental goals established by the government.

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Perhaps Vietnamese PHE manifests publicness the least among the three countries. The majority of Vietnamese private universities are for-profit (D. T. H. Nguyen, 2016). The founder of the Vietnamese university in this study undoubtedly saw the university as his private business. Nevertheless, even in such a case, the founder still emphasised the potential contributions of Vietnamese private universities to the common good and urged the government and society to recognise such potential (See Chapter VII). Surprisingly, it is Vietnam where PHE is least encouraged. This suggests a potential positive correlation between the state’s attitude towards PHE and the publicness of the sector itself. The more the state encourages and utilises PHE, the more public functions the sector carries out.

In conclusion, in this subsection, I have discussed the two major components that constitute the institutional logics in the three East Asian countries, namely Korea, China and Vietnam, which are Neoliberalism and Confucianism. Neoliberalism with its emphasis on reduction of state’s intervention, liberalisation of trade barriers, and commodification of what was traditionally defined as public goods (Marginson, 2013; Tilak, 2008), has positively transformed HE in these countries. The introduction of the neoliberal approach to HE in the three countries has helped proliferate HE providers, diversify curriculum, increase access to HE, and encourage participation of the private sector in HE (K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007).

Confucianism is the system of thoughts, philosophy, belief and values that vitally impacted every aspect of the East Asian societies (C. H. Williams, 2017). The two essential values of Confucianism that fundamentally shape the practice of HE in these countries are its pragmatic view of education and its stress on egalitarianism. The Confucian legacy has influenced HE practices in this region, making them basically different from its Western counterparts. Firstly, HE in East Asia has emphatically political, economic and social purposes. Secondly, the states in these countries forcefully involve themselves in supervising HE, regardless of the political regime and ideology. Thirdly, East Asian PHE should

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be viewed as a return to a traditional pattern rather than a newly emerging phenomenon caused by the adoption of the neoliberal approach, although the contribution of this approach to the rapid growth of PHE in this region is undeniable. Finally, the general dichotomy of public and private is insufficient to fully describe the complex, ambiguous nature of HE in East Asia. Since education is seen as both a public and private good, the traditional distinction of public and private undermines the nature of publicness in East Asian PHE.

8.2.1.3. Confucianism meets Neoliberalism

In this analysis of Neoliberalism and Confucianism as the two most significant components of the logics that characterise HE systems in the three countries, Neoliberalism is seen as an ‘external’ institutional logic in relation to Confucianism as the ‘internal’ ideology (Jo, 2005). Consequently, the widespread embrace of Neoliberalism in this region may be explained by its compatibility with the traditional, already-existing internal values of Confucianism. From this perspective, significant alignments between these two ideologies have been revealed. These are the compatibility between the economic rationale of Neoliberalism and the Confucian pragmatic view of education, and the alignment between Neoliberalism viewing education as an individual investment in one’s human capital stock and Confucianism viewing learning as a personal pursuit.

Firstly, the emphasis of Neoliberalism on the individual’s economic rationality (Kezar, 2004) is endorsed by the East Asian societies in which the inseparable link between education and private gains has been strengthened (Hayhoe & Li, 2008) throughout the history of their civilisations. Thus, while researchers elsewhere in the world criticise Neoliberalism because it shifts the focus of HE from contributing to the public good as social and moral well-being to enhancing students’ employability skills (Altbach, 2015; Gumport, 2000; Kerr, 1994; Marginson, 2013; Tilak, 2008), East Asian researchers are more concerned by the issue of inequality created by the neoliberal approach in HE (K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; S.-Y. Park, 2010; UNDP, 2005; R. Yang, 2007).

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Secondly, the neoliberal approach encouraging private investment in HE based on the human capital theory is widely accepted in East Asian societies which are embedded in the Confucian value viewing learning as a private journey (Hayhoe & Li, 2008). According to J. Williams (2016), human capital theory emerged in the 1970s in the UK particularly and in the so-called Western world generally, as a response to governments’ need to reduce funding for HE in the midst of the economic crisis. This theory argues that only individuals participating in HE where they are equipped with knowledge, and the businesses that employ them receive the benefit of HE. As a result, students are encouraged to invest in “their own stocks of human capital” (J. Williams, 2016, p. 626) at their own cost.

This viewpoint of Neoliberalism is in agreement with the traditional Confucian value seeing education as being for the sake of one’s self cultivation. In addition, private education in East Asian countries has for a long time coexisted with the state-established imperial institutions and played a significant role in providing access to education to the wider public (J. Li, 2016; E. Park et al., 2008; Trịnh, 2014). Thus, East Asian parents need little convincing to privately invest in HE for their children (Marginson, 2012).

8.2.1.4. Confucianism versus Neoliberalism

The apparent compatibility between Confucianism and Neoliberalism is manifested in the widespread diffusion of Neoliberalism in these East Asian societies. Nevertheless, there are potential conflicts of values between the two ideologies that may pose serious challenges to the healthy development of HE and PHE in this region. Most critically, the inequality generated by the neoliberal approach ultimately contradicts the principle of egalitarianism supported by Confucianism in this region.

As mentioned above, researchers focusing on East Asian HE are mainly concerned with the increasing educational inequality and regional and income disparity caused by the neoliberal approach in HE (K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; S.-Y. Park, 2010; UNDP, 2005). Meanwhile, elsewhere in the world researchers criticise Neoliberalism primarily because it shifts the aim of HE from the 404

traditional role of a social institution contributing to the public good to a production line of labour forces for economic goals (Altbach, 2015; Kerr, 1994; Marginson, 2013; Tilak, 2008). This means neither that Neoliberalism is causing different problems in the different systems, nor that researchers in East Asia have not paid adequate attention to particular problems of Neoliberalism. Rather, I believe, it may reflect the differences in priorities in the different value systems. For East Asian societies where the Confucian value of egalitarianism has been deeply institutionalised, addressing threats to this value seems to be more important and urgent than other issues.

It is evident that the prevailing adoption of Neoliberalism has generated significant discrepancies in education opportunity and other related social problems such as regional disparity, and income and gender inequality (D. Hill & Kumar, 2012; Hursh & Martina, 2003; Unterhalter & Carpentier, 2010). However, I argue that, in East Asia, hidden behind these social problems of inequality is the conflict of values, of which educational inequality generated by Neoliberalism is fundamentally in conflict with the essential Confucian value of egalitarianism perpetuated in these societies. Thus, there are potential risks existing in the seemingly happy marriage between Neoliberalism and Confucianism in this region.

This conflict is most noticeable in the case of Korea. The Korean military regimes over nearly three decades successfully mobilised public support thanks to its egalitarian approach to HE by strictly controlling the establishment of universities and the number of students enrolled (S. Kim, 2008; S.-Y. Park, 2010; Shin, 2015). However, after nearly two decades of massive expansion of PHE resulting from the official adoption of Neoliberalism and the implementation of deregulation in the late 1990s, the over-reliance on private funding for HE has fundamentally violated the principle of egalitarianism (S.-Y. Park, 2010).

Consequently, the Korean government has been under enormous political pressures demanding its intervention to maintain egalitarianism. The ‘tuition cap’ policy that prevents private universities in Korea to increase tuition fees is a stark

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illustration of the aggressive intervention of the state (B. Kim & Park, 2018) where the principle of egalitarianism is threatened. By implementing this policy, the Korean government has offended the principle of the free market, the core notion of Neoliberalism which it has officially embraced.

In China, discrepancies in educational opportunities as a result of the neoliberal approach in HE and its associated problems, such as income inequality and regional disparities have been alarming issues for researchers (K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; UNDP, 2005; R. Yang, 2007; Yao et al., 2004). These issues require strategic responses from the Chinese government to balance economic growth and sustainable development, which is one of the biggest challenges for Chinese leaders (K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007). In Vietnam, though voices have been raised warning of potential education inequality (Dang, 2009; DeJaeghere, Wu, & Vu, 2015; Holsinger, 2009; UNDP, 2015), there is little evidence of direct correlation between PHE and education or income inequality, probably because this sector accounts for only a small proportion of HE.

8.2.1.5. Confucianism under Neoliberalism

There are also internal problems in East Asian HE caused by Confucianism which are exacerbated in the context of the predominating Neoliberalism. For instance, Marginson (2014) mentions that some Confucian values have been neglected in contemporary HE in East Asia, such as its emphasis on the humanistic purposes of self-cultivating learning processes and the social and moral purposes of education in enhancing one’s potential contribution to society. Seemingly contemporary HE in East Asia has lost its beautiful virtues in the frenzy competition of national development measured by economic growth, GDP, international rankings, number of publications and impact index. In this subsection, I argue that the most critical and urgent problems confronting HE in the three countries are the lack of autonomous justification of function and indigenous vision and identity. These problems are the assets inherited from the Confucian legacy. Unfortunately, the widespread influence of Neoliberalism has only added more burden to these challenges.

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a. Lacking Autonomous Justification of Function

As discussed previously, the imperial states of East Asia used Confucianism as a tool to maintain social order. Traditional HE in East Asia therefore served the imperial states, primarily functioning as institutions to produce bureaucrats (J. Li, 2016; R. Yang, 2016) irrespective of the type of institution (i.e. imperial or private). Thus, East Asian HE has always been considered an extension and a subsidiary body of the state (Collins, Castro, & Ryan, 2016; R. Yang, 2016). HE in this region has never been fully separated from the state having its own autonomous mission apart from that defined by the state.

As an inheritance of this legacy, contemporary East Asian countries are characterised by the state-led development model (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Masina, 2012; K.-H. Mok, 2012; S.-Y. Park, 2010), in which the importance and legitimacy of the state in leading, shaping and accelerating the course of development is widely accepted and supported. Against this background, the significance of HE in contributing to national development has been recognised and strengthened. Consequently, the state has maintained its central role in supervising and managing HE; and HE, regardless of ownership, is strictly required to fulfil the developmental goals established by the state. T. Kim (2009) is correct when pointing out that East Asia education “has been carefully designed to meet the state’s political and economic projects” (p. 866).

Meanwhile, the growing popularity of Neoliberalism infiltrating through national policies has raised serious concerns. Gibbs (2001) criticises that the neoliberal approach applying market principles to HE may cause the degradation of HE’s intrinsic value from advancing personal development through the pursuit of scholarly excellence to a perception of HE as a tool, a ladder to employment success. Tilak (2008) argues that while Neoliberalism shifts the focus of HE from public good to private commodity, it replaces “academic values by commercial considerations, social concerns and purposes by individual interests, and long term needs by short term demands” (p. 462).

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Collectively, these have led to dangerous outcomes. While the neoliberal approach adopted by the states has distorted public policies and commodified what was traditionally defined as public good, HE in East Asia has not been equipped to go against the tide. It has always been dependent on the state to define its mission, values and justify its function. The problem in shifting the definition of public good to private commodity in HE caused by Neoliberalism is universal, but its consequences in East Asia may be much more serious, since HE in this region has never developed independently from what the state designated it to be. b. Lacking Indigenous Vision and Identity

Aside from the Confucian tradition, the Western influence on East Asian HE is undeniable. The impact of Western epistemology on HE of the region is an historical fact. First via colonisation and later by other means of ideas transfer, Western ideas of HE and universities were transplanted to countries in East Asia, including the British, French, German, American and Soviet models of HE (Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004; Berlie, 1993; Fry, 2009; Hayhoe, 1989; S. Lee, 1989; J. Li, 2016; Shin, 2012). In the contemporary age, this influence has been further strengthened with the growing popularity of Neoliberalism that encourages competition among nations and perpetuates global university rankings (Marginson, 2014). Such discourse has been quickly adopted by East Asian developmental states occupied by ‘catch-up mentality’, entering an ‘arms race’ in spending on HE with the aspiration to move past the West by elevating some of their universities to world-class status (Marginson, 2014; R. Yang, 2016).

Despite its remarkable achievements, East Asian HE continues to face tremendous challenges caused by complex contexts full of internal conflicts and cultural tensions (R. Yang, 2011, 2013, 2016). East Asian HE lacks the fundamental roots that lay the foundations for the global success of the Western HE models such as autonomous functions of HE, an emphasis on knowledge as an end in itself, and an academic culture based on free inquiry and meritocratic

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values (Altbach, 2013; J. Li, 2016; R. Yang, 2011, 2016). The sources of this lack perhaps are in in its traditional heritage, mainly its dependence on the state to determine its functions (R. Yang, 2016) and its emphasis on the economic benefits of HE over moral and social purposes (Marginson, 2014). Metaphorically, East Asian HE aims to compete with its counterparts on their home ground, without having the weapons that made up their counterparts’ strength.

The above-mentioned tensions between internal traditional heritage and externally borrowed practices have resulted in a blurred vision and ambiguous identity for HE in this region (R. Yang, 2016). Imitating the Western HE practices without internalising their intrinsic values will not help further the development of East Asian HE. To achieve more sustainable development and establish a firm standing, it is urgent for East Asian HE to develop their own ‘Idea of University’ as Newman (1996) did for Western HE.

In this subsection, I have discussed the interactions between the two most important elements of the dominant logics that characterise HE systems in Korea, China and Vietnam, which are Neoliberalism and Confucianism, to explain how such interactions have shaped the contemporary practices of HE and PHE in these three countries. Firstly, the compatibilities between Neoliberalism and Confucianism in their utilitarian approach towards HE and their emphases on private benefits that allow neoliberal practices to be widely adopted and diffused in the HE systems of the three countries. However, there is a serious conflict of values between these two ideologies, in which the discrepancies in education opportunity caused by Neoliberalism is fundamentally in conflict with egalitarianism, the foundational principle of Confucianism, leading to serious challenges to HE in East Asia.

Finally, the adoption of Neoliberalism in these East Asian countries has aggravated the internal problems in HE caused by Confucianism. Specifically, under the Confucian legacy, HE in East Asia has always been dependent on the state to determine its mission and goals. This feature is particularly problematic

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under the influence of Neoliberalism. While the neoliberal approach has shifted the focus of HE from public benefits and social well-being to private interests, the strong dependence of HE on the state may not help HE to fight against the harmful tendency of Neoliberalism. In addition, the cultural tensions between Confucianism’s traditional roots and the Western practices existing in HE in East Asia have resulted in a lack of vision and indigenous identity of HE in this region. The widespread neoliberal approach that encourages competition in HE has diverted HE in East Asia from addressing this critical problem.

8.2.2. Implications for Vietnam

The analysis of institutional logics that characterise the HE systems in the three countries above provides significant implications or lessons for Vietnam to develop a model that enables the development of PHE. While generating implications, I was led by the belief that the highest purpose of HE is to serve public benefits and advance social well-being, and PHE as an essential component of it, should also be encouraged to play its part in fulfilling this goal. Thus, a model that encourages and enables the development of PHE must serve this ultimate purpose.

Nevertheless, in this subsection discussing implications for Vietnam, I do not intend to present a comprehensive, detailed suggestions and plan. The primary aim of this subsection is to produce a preliminary sketch of what I believe is a better model for the Vietnamese HE generally, and the PHE sector in particular. The implications developed based on the above-mentioned analysis are categorised into two groups according to the levels they are relevant to, namely the macro government and the meso private universities.

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8.2.2.1. The Macro Level a. Implication 4: Recognising HE as Both Public and Private Good

In the previous section, I have discussed the traditional viewpoint of Confucianism viewing education as both a public and private good. Because of this legacy, the distinction between public and private HE in East Asia generally and in Vietnam in particular, is vague and ambiguous. In addition, evidence regarding the publicness of PHE in the three East Asian countries were also provided. I therefore conclude that the taken-for-granted distinction of public and private is incomplete in explaining the combined nature of publicness and privateness of HE in this region.

Most research as a counterargument to Neoliberalism criticises its assumption of viewing HE as a private good. For instance, Tilak (2008) argue that HE is a public good and therefore cannot be provided by markets to meet social demands. His argument is based on the definition of public good with important features including non-excludability (not providing exclusively to a small group), non-rivalrousness (one group’s consumption not limiting others’), equal availability (being available to all equally), social benefit generation (benefiting both individuals and the larger society), and collective consumption (being consumed collectively) (T. Cowen, 1988; Tilak, 2008; Tuchman, 2017).

Nevertheless, the problem with the majority of research, whether supporting Neoliberalism or not, is in their unequivocal distinction of HE as uniquely either public or private good. They have not acknowledged its mixed nature of publicness and privateness. Only a small number of studies goes beyond this traditional viewpoint to identify that HE generates both public and private benefits.

Take the report conducted by The Institute for Higher Education Policy in 1998 as an example. The Institute is concerned about the changes in public dialogue regarding the value of HE from the broad range of benefits offered by HE to a narrow topic that emphasizes private economic gain obtained from entering HE

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(Institute for Higher Education Policy, 1998). It therefore provides a list of both public and private benefits that HE can generate, categorising these benefits into four types: (1) public economic benefits; (2) private economic benefits; (3) public social benefits; and (4) private social benefits. This array of benefits generated by HE proves that HE is both public and private good.

Table VIII-4: The Array of Higher Education Benefits (Institute for Higher Education Policy, 1998, p. 20)

Economic Social

• Increased tax revenue • Reduced crime rates • Increased charitable • Greater productivity giving/community service • Increased consumption • Increased quality of civic life Public • Increased workforce • Social Cohesion/Appreciation of flexibility Diversity • Decreased reliance on • Improved ability to adapt to and government financial support use technology • Higher salaries and benefits • Improved health/life expectancy • Improved quality of life for • Employment offspring • Higher savings levels • Better consumer decision making Private • Improved working • Increased personal status conditions • Personal/Professional • More hobbies, leisure activities mobility

Recognising that HE can generate both public and private benefits helps better identify severe consequences of the neoliberal approach that over-emphasises the private benefits of HE. On one hand, Neoliberalism, by neglecting the publicness of HE, undeniably damages the long-term public interests that have always been the core aim of HE (Kezar, 2004). On the other hand, I argue that the widely adopted neoliberal approach in the three East Asian countries these recent years

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has not only commodified HE and therefore replaced public purposes with private interests (Tilak, 2008), but also undermined the publicness of PHE.

Taking the assumption that HE is both public and private good challenges the taken-for-grantedness in our understanding that public HE generates only public welfare while PHE generates only private benefits. If HE generates both public and private benefits, public HE can generate private returns while PHE can also contribute to public good. Thus, it is critical to develop a more balanced view that acknowledges both the social and collective benefits and the private economic returns of HE resulting from college experience (Institute for Higher Education Policy, 1998). Proposing such a vision is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, I argue that understanding HE generally and PHE particularly according to the public-private binary provided by Neoliberalism is incomplete, over-simplified and thus may result in misleading policies. b. Implication 5: Developing A Different Financial Model Based on the Assumption that HE is both Public and Private Good.

As HE is both public and private good, the traditional categorisation of universities according to ownership is proven to be incompatible with the reality of HE in East Asia generally and Vietnam in particular. Such categories cannot fully describe the combined nature of publicness and privateness of HE. In the context that public funding is limited (Hayden & Le, 2017), this finding is critically important because it is directly related to the purpose and objects of public funding. Hence, the crucial question arising here is how to spend public money most effectively and efficiently?

The current block-grant-funding practices adopted by the Vietnamese government is based on the assumption that public HEIs generate public good while private HEIs only generate private benefits. Therefore, only public universities receive funding from the government. Since HE generates both public and private benefits, the assumption upon which the funding formula was developed is shown to be problematic. As both public and private good, public HE can generate private gains while PHE can generate public benefits. 413

Consequently, the university-type-based block grant model may be unfair and inefficient because there is the possibility that public money is spent to enhance private benefits. Thus, a new set of criteria must be developed to replace the current funding formula which is based primarily on types of institutions.

I do not attempt to develop such criteria because it is beyond the scope of this study. I thus propose here general principles for the development of such criteria in the future. Accordingly, instead of using types of institutions (i.e. public vs. private) as the primary basis to allocate funding, the more proper criteria should be (1) need-based; (2) merit-based; and (3) priority-based.

Specifically, need-based criteria aim to enhance equality and equity in HE by providing financial support for groups of students that are eligible to enrol in HE and (1) have financial constraints meaning cannot afford to pay for HE themselves; (2) are an ethnic minority; and (3) have special needs. Supporting these groups of students will help close the income gaps and regional disparities, enhance social mobility for under-privileged groups, and improve well-being for people with special needs.

Meanwhile, merit-based criteria are designed to enhance the meritocratic principle of HE by financially rewarding students who (1) are academically excellent; and (2) demonstrate significant leadership in contributing to the development of community and society. The financial support based on need- based and merit-based criteria can be granted either directly to students or indirectly through the universities that offer enrolment to these students.

Finally, priority-based criteria address the urgent demand or priority of disciplines or majors that (1) are significant for national strategic development; (2) generate more public/social benefits; (3) have a high proportion of research; and (4) require large investment for operation. This set of criteria primarily focus on encouraging and fostering talents in disciplines/fields/majors that are in great demand for the national development and/or contribute to social advancement and public well-being. In addition, private sources of funding are generally unable to afford disciplines/majors that have a high proportion of research and/or 414

require large investment due to lack of human resources (i.e. faculties) and/or limited financial capacity. Hence, in most cases these disciplines depend primarily on the public budget.

The direct beneficiaries of the financial support programs developed based on these sets of criteria are either students (directly to them or indirectly through the institutions) or faculty/departments/disciplines/majors, not the institutions themselves. Implementing this new approach of public funding requires rigorous monitoring measures to ensure that the funding is used properly and efficiently.

If this proposed funding approach is used to determine public budget allocation in HE in Vietnam, there will be an equitable treatment between public and private universities because the primary justification for funding is a university’s contribution to common good, not the default type of universities. However, this does not mean that private universities will receive the same proportion of funding as their public counterparts. The majority of private universities in Vietnam are ‘demand-absorbing’ (Levy, 2002), they mainly aim to meet market demand. This means that their ‘publicness’ is not as strong as public universities. As a result, private universities generate fewer public benefits than public universities, and therefore, will receive less funding. Nevertheless, the significance of these principles is that they acknowledge and encourage the potential contribution of these private universities to the public good.

Above are the general principles of a new approach to funding based on the assumption that HE is both public and private good. The motivation of proposing such principles is to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditures in enhancing social benefits and public well-being. These are only the preliminary precepts and require more research to be conducted in the future to develop further operational concepts and indicators for more comprehensive funding formulas.

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c. Implication 6: Establishing a Clear Vision of HE and PHE

As discussed in the previous subsection, there are serious conflicts and tensions in East Asian HE, resulting from conflicts of value between Confucianism and Neoliberalism, Socialism and Neoliberalism, and/or between the traditional Confucian legacy and Western practices (R. Yang, 2011, 2013). Consequently, East Asia is struggling to identify and navigate itself on the map of global HE due to the lack of a clear vision for its own HE system (R. Yang, 2016).

Vietnam is not immune from this struggle to resolve such conflicts and generate an indigenous vision and identity. Adding to the already overwhelming burden is the conflict between the socialist ideology as the national orthodoxy and the neoliberal approach promoted by international organisations (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Madden, 2014; Masina, 2012). All these tensions have resulted in the behaviour of Vietnam which researchers described as ‘walking the line’ (Beeson & Pham, 2012; George, 2005; Madden, 2014; Masina, 2012) in which it has neither fully adhered to Neoliberalism nor clearly supported an alternative strategy (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Dang, 2009; Masina, 2012).

Nonetheless, this does not mean that Vietnam is recommended to make its choice and fasten its commitment to either of the above ideologies. I have discussed the problems and shortcomings of each of these systems in the previous subsections. Perhaps Vietnam’s resistance to strictly follow either of them is a wise decision for strategic purposes. However, it is time for Vietnamese educational leaders to present a more coherent vision for their attempts to reform the system. As researchers indicate, in the development model of Vietnam, the role of the state is inevitable (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Masina, 2012). Thus, the Vietnamese HE system, including public and private HEIs, needs such an unambiguous, transparent view of what our leaders aspire for the system to become, what they believe will give the most benefit for the people and which roles public and private HEIs will play to help fulfil that vision.

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8.2.2.2. The Meso Level a. Implication 7: Strengthening the Public Nature of PHE

Since HE can generate both public and private benefits, the public nature of PHE should be acknowledged, emphasised and internalised. Unfortunately, PHE in Vietnam mainly manifests its private nature. This can be clearly observed in its for-profit behaviours, and its strong response to market demands. In other words, the public nature of HE has been neglected in Vietnamese private universities.

In the previous subsection, based on the experiences of Korea and China, I have suggested that there may exist a positive correlation between the extent to which the macro government encourages the PHE sector to contribute to public good and the extent to which the public nature of the sector is demonstrated. This does not mean that Vietnamese PHE should be passive in cultivating its own publicness. If PHE wish its potential contribution to the common good to be recognised, it should provide serious evidence of its potential publicness.

Nevertheless, this does not imply that PHE is recommended to give up its private nature. The majority of private universities of Vietnam are ‘demand-absorbing’ (Levy, 2002), which means these universities primarily focus on meeting the growing demand of a young population who wish to enter into HE for private interests. It is not realistic for these universities to strengthen their publicness without emphasizing their private nature. Indeed, in most cases, the privateness of these universities is more prominent than their public nature. However, my argument is, since HE generates both public and private benefits, if Vietnamese PHE focuses only on private interests, the sector will risk losing its institutional legitimacy because it underestimates the public nature of HE. Therefore, while meeting the private interests and market demands, PHE, as a component of HE, should not neglect its potential and responsibility to contribute to the public good.

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b. Implication 8: Developing an Autonomous Mission and Goals that Reflect both the Public and Private Nature of PHE

In the previous subsection, I have suggested that Vietnamese educational leaders must attempt to develop a transparent vision and indigenous identity for HE, including PHE. This vision must explicitly identify the role each component of HE is expected to play. This does not mean that private universities at the meso level cannot contribute to this vision creating process. Indeed, PHE should robustly involve itself in constructing a meaningful vision and collective identity for the sector.

However, politicians are often driven by different priorities and political aims. Unfortunately, such priorities and purposes do not always match the meso universities’ interests. Although PHE in Vietnam is strongly dependent on the macro government in terms of goal settings, individual private universities should pay serious attention to developing their own mission and goals that match the real situation and educational objectives of the universities. Universities should not blindly follow the government’s targets without carefully considering their missions and values.

Moreover, while developing organisational vision and identity, private universities in Vietnam should not concentrate only on meeting market demands. Although the primary focus of Vietnamese PHE is to satisfy the burgeoning demand for access to HE, the market should not be the only driving force of the sector. I have discussed in this chapter the inadequacy of Neoliberalism in guiding HE practices (Tilak, 2008), and the severe consequences it may cause (Gumport, 1993; Institute for Higher Education Policy, 1998; Kerr, 1994; Kezar, 2004; Marginson, 2013; Tilak, 2008). Additionally, I have pointed out that the traditional legacy of Confucianism which has deeply impacted on East Asian countries generally and the Vietnamese society in particular emphasises both the public and private nature of HE. Finally, I have shown that HE generates both public and private good.

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Collectively, private universities should not be governed according to market forces alone. Gibbs (2001) provides a critical account of the notion of the market which is the core of neoliberal ideology, in which the author points out that Neoliberalism embracing the notion of market as “the centrepiece of economic prosperity and democratic freedom” (p. 93) was developed based on “the individual’s rights of free-choice and self-interest” (p. 86). In other words, the idea of a free market is only possible if participants in such a market are well informed. If the mission of PHE is to prepare potential participants to be informed about the market, it must foster critical thinking of the potential participants. If this is the case, the outcomes of PHE should not and must not be defined only by the market itself, or else PHE risks losing its function.

In conclusion, Vietnamese private universities should construct organisational missions and goals that reflect (1) the public and private nature of the sector; (2) the aspiration to contribute to the national development and social advancement while satisfying market demands; and (3) the values and philosophy that the individual universities uphold. Finally, such missions should definitely be institutionalised in the operational practices of the universities. c. Implication 9: Legitimising University’s Mission and Goals by Employing ‘Ingredients’ from the Macro Institutional Environment.

As describe above, the macro government’s targets and market demands are two important driving forces of PHE and critically shape the mission and goals established by private universities. Nevertheless, as elements of a dynamic institutional environment, these two driving forces are subject to change. The macro government’s interests do not always match the meso universities’ purposes. It is sometimes difficult to measure particular benefits of HE which may lead to the neglect of such benefits by policy-makers. As a result, policy- makers sometimes are forced to shift their attention to short-term but seemingly more urgent demands.

Similarly, market forces constantly change and quite often are unpredictable. Meanwhile, universities as organisations always seek to establish shared 419

organisational templates to stabilise and sustain their organisational practices (Huemer, 2004). Therefore, the market is insufficient to guide the operation of private universities, although their primary aim is to satisfy market demand.

In this case, instead of automatically adjusting according to politically driven targets or market driven demands, PHE should seek to legitimise its strategic mission and goals by carefully considering the institutional environment to find appropriate ‘materials’, as explained in the case of the Korean university in this study (See Chapter V). The experience of the Korean university in constructing an ‘interdisciplinary’ identity provides significant lessons for universities who seek to legitimise their strategies. By developing a new identity based on the ‘materials’ available in the institutional environment, the Korean university proves to its internal and external stakeholders that its courses of actions are appropriate. It is therefore able to protect and maintain its traditional values without challenging the institutional arrangements which seemingly do not encourage and support its traditional foundations.

In this subsection, I have provided several implications for the Vietnamese government and private universities to facilitate a proper and healthy development of the private sector in the HE system. Specifically, the Vietnamese government is advised to recognise that HE is both public and private good and therefore, a better funding approach should be developed to not only encourage the contribution of PHE to social welfare but also to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditures. I have thus proposed basic principles for the development of criteria for allocating the public budget for HE, which include need-based, merit-based and priority-based principles. Most importantly, the Vietnamese government, as the leading actor in HE, must endeavour to develop an unambiguous, transparent vision for the healthy development of HE, including the public and private sector, in the future. Such a vision must explicitly identify what the system aspires to become, how to achieve such goals, and which roles the public and private sectors will play to fulfil such vision.

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For the meso level, based on the assumption that HE generates both public and private benefits, Vietnamese private universities are recommended to strengthen their publicness while emphasizing their private nature. Accordingly, they should also develop autonomous organisational mission and goals that reflect both the public and private nature of PHE. Although the PHE sector in Vietnam depends heavily on the government and market demands in determining their mission and goals, private universities should exert serious efforts to construct individual organisational missions and goals. Finally, in order to survive and maintain universities’ traditions and values in a dynamic, constantly changing environment, private universities should pay serious attention to strategic planning by carefully considering the institutional arrangements to seek appropriate materials to legitimise their strategies. In this case, the experience of the Korean private university in this study provides significant learnings.

8.3. Institutional Actors

In this section, comparative analyses of actors at the macro and meso levels in Korea, China and Vietnam are provided. Similar and dissimilar features of these actors according to the sub-concepts of the notion actor, namely position, structural and normative legitimacy and agency, are revealed. This analysis hence provides significant insights to generate implications for the development of the Vietnamese PHE sector.

Table VII-5 below summarises the characteristics of the actors at the macro and meso levels in the three countries according to the sub-concepts of actors, including position, structural and normative legitimacy and agency. These features are discussed in detail according to the levels the actors are located in, namely the macro and meso levels. The purpose of this discussion is to illustrate how the similarities and differences in the characteristics of actors at the macro and meso levels of the three countries have influenced the development patterns of PHE in each country.

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Table VIII-5: A Comparison of Actors by Level in Korea, China and Vietnam

Analytical Sub-concept of Korea China Vietnam Level Actor Position Central Central Central Capitalist Instrumental Socialist Agency Macro Mediator Experimentalist Protector Legi- Structural High High High timacy Normative High High Low Position Middle N/A Peripheral Sense- Institutional Agency giver and N/A Entrepreneur and Meso Negotiator Hole-explorer

Legi- Structural Middle N/A Low timacy Normative Middle N/A Low

8.3.1. The Macro Level

8.3.1.1. Similarities a. Position

Firstly, the macro actors of the three countries all refer to the government, represented by the Ministry of Education (MoE) of each country. Interestingly, all the macro actors in the three countries are similar in their central position in the field of HE. In other words, in these countries, the MoE, as the central actor, takes the central role in shaping the development of HE in general and PHE in particular (See Chapter V, VI, and VII).

The central position occupied by this macro actor is related to the state-led development model that all three countries have adopted (Beeson & Pham, 2012; Jeong, 2014; Masina, 2012; K.-H. Mok, 2001, 2012; S.-Y. Park, 2010), in which the role of the governments in leading and shaping the countries’ development is inevitable (Dixon, 2003; Nee, Opper, & Wong, 2007; Painter, 2005).

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In HE, the central position of the macro actors in the three countries is well accepted, allowing these actors to assume the highest administrative authority. As the driving force of HE in these countries, the governments establish HE policies, issue relevant regulations, determine HE’s development goals, develop quality standards and curriculum, finance HEIs and apply rewards and sanctions when needed (Marginson, 2011, 2012). b. Structural Legitimacy

Structural legitimacy refers the legitimacy bestowed to an actor based on its formal structure or position (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Lockett et al., 2012; Suchman, 1995) in an organisation or in an institutional field. Institutionally, the macro actors in the three countries, thanks to their central position in the field that legitimises their leading role, obtain high structural legitimacy associated with their position. Consequently, this structural legitimacy ensures that the authority and activities of these macro actors as described above are considered appropriate for their position by other actors in the HE field.

8.3.1.2. Differences

Although the macro governments in Korea, China and Vietnam share similar features in their central position and high structural legitimacy, there are significant differences in the agency employed by these actors and their normative legitimacy. These differences have fundamentally determined the different development pathways of the PHE sectors in the three countries. a. Agency

As seen in Table VIII-5, the macro actors in each country employ different types of agency. While the Korean government exercises the agency of a capitalist mediator, the Chinese macro actor employs the agency of an instrumental experimentalist, and the Vietnamese government takes the agency of a socialist protector (See Chapter V, VI, and VII).

Interestingly, the macro actors’ choices of agency are influenced by the dominant logics in the HE field in each country. For example, under the influence of the

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dominant logic of egalitarian utilitarianism in Korean HE, the Korean government takes the role of a mediator between the market and the HEIs. By exercising this type of agency, the Korean government aims to ensure that Korean HEIs efficiently produce and accumulate capital (i.e. knowledge and human capital) for the nation’s development and individual advancement according to the ideological definition and guidelines of Neoliberalism (Jeong, 2014).

As a result, Korean PHE has been encouraged to develop and expand rapidly. However, since this over-expansion of PHE has resulted in serious social problems of inequality (Yeom, 2011, 2016a), the government, as a mediator, also attempts to maintain the egalitarian approach by implementing mechanisms such as enrolment quotas or the tuition cap policy to counter the inequality caused by Neoliberalism. Such mechanisms have severely hampered the development of the PHE sector in this country.

In contrast to the Korean case, the Vietnamese government has been driven by the logic of socialist authoritarianism based on the Socialist ideology that undermines the role of PHE. Accordingly, the Vietnamese macro actor exercises the role of a socialist protector in the field of HE, to protect socialist values from the ‘invasion’ of the contradicting capitalist market forces (George, 2005; K.-H. Mok, 2008; Welch, 2010). Consequently, the Vietnamese government holds a sceptical view regarding PHE and has implemented a cautious approach toward PHE. Strict controlling mechanisms have been implemented in almost all aspects from goal setting to programs offered, causing the development of this sector to be seriously constrained. Despite the significance of the sector having been slowly acknowledged, there has not been much change in the macro policies regarding this sector, because the government has not changed its agency as a socialist protector.

Being in the middle of the spectrum, the Chinese macro actor’s agentic behaviours as an instrumental experimentalist are justified by the logic of pragmatic authoritarianism. This logic is a result of the Chinese government’s

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attempts to utilise neoliberal mechanisms to fulfil strategic goals under the guidance of the socialist ideology with the aim of maintaining its authority and bolstering its legitimacy (Lai, 2016; K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; K. H. Mok, 2004). From this perspective, the decision of the Chinese government in implementing a neoliberal approach to HE such as deregulation, marketisation and privatisation are pragmatically strategic (Lai, 2016; K.-H. Mok & Lo, 2007; K. H. Mok, 2004; R. Yang, 2006). In the context of the Chinese economy being severely affected by the Asian economic crisis and increasing unemployment, the adoption of such neoliberal mechanisms expanding HE helped encourage domestic consumption in HE and delay high school graduates entering the labour forces (Shi, 2015). Ultimately, this strategic move contributed to economic recovery and addressed important social issues such accessibility to HE and dissatisfaction caused by unemployment.

In addition, this agency employed by the Chinese macro actor was also shaped by a unique feature in the macro governance structure of China, in which there is a clear division of responsibility between the central and provincial governments. While the central government in China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party maintains its ultimate authority in determining policy objectives, the local governments and subordinate organisations are granted sufficient autonomy to develop different instruments to achieve the goals and objectives set by the central government (Heilmann, 2008). Therefore, as shown in this study, the local government has been endorsed to cooperate with other actors (i.e. the public university and public enterprise) to establish the independent college as an innovative experiment to address the problems of demand and quality in Chinese HE. Under such arrangements, the independent college subsector has developed dramatically despite its short history, accounting for almost 70 percent of the total number of undergraduate enrolled in the private sector (J Liu & Elliott, 2016).

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b. Normative Legitimacy

Normative legitimacy is another feature in which the macro actors in the three countries have developed differently. While the macro actors in China and Korea attain high normative legitimacy, the macro actor in Vietnam does not. Normative legitimacy is the assessment of external and internal audiences (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008) regarding an actor’s ability to provide a convincing moral argument that its courses of actions are desirable and appropriate (Lockett et al., 2012; Suchman, 1995). Based on this definition, the degree of normative legitimacy obtained by an actor is determined by its audiences’ evaluation of (1) the appropriateness of the actor’s justifications of its actions; and (2) the appropriateness of the actions themselves.

Firstly, if the actor and its audiences disagree about the justifications of actions, it is very unlikely the actor can obtain high normative legitimacy from its audiences. Since logics provide actors frames and rationales to justify their actions (Friedland & Alford, 1991), the incompatibility in logics between the Vietnamese macro and meso actors is a crucial reason explaining the macro government’s low normative legitimacy. While the macro government adheres to the logic of socialist authoritarianism to justify its agentic behaviours of protecting socialist values which has hindered the development of PHE, the private university in this study utilises Neoliberalism to rationalise the significance and functions of the sector. Because of this conflict of logics, the university at the meso level disagrees with the macro government’s over- controlling behaviour. In other words, the meso actor evaluates that the macro actor’s actions as being not normatively legitimate because it perceives that the justification for actions provided by the macro actor is inappropriate.

Secondly, if an actor is unable to prove that its actions are appropriate, it fails to obtain high normative legitimacy. Again, in the case of Vietnam, the Chairman of the private university’s Board of Director criticises the macro government for its unrealistic attempt to implement shared governance by forcing universities to establish university councils as the governing boards (See Chapter VII).

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Although he understands the rationale of implementing shared governance, he points out that such an attempt will fail because it does not match the Vietnamese context where ownership concentration is strongly emphasised (Hai & Nunoi, 2008; T. Nguyen et al., 2015). In this case, because the Vietnamese government failed to prove that their action was sensible, the meso actor perceives that it is not normatively capable to perform its role as the leading actor in the field of HE.

The incompatibility of logics between the two actors and the meso actor’s perception of the macro actor’s inability to fulfil its role may be a result of the traditional top-down decision-making process adopted by the Vietnamese government. The government in Vietnam is characterised by this centralised decision-making style which tends to exclude other actors, not only in HE (Dao, 2015; N. Nguyen & Tran, 2018; T. N. Phan, Lupton, & Watters, 2016) but also in other areas (Fritzen, 2006; T. T. A. Vu, 2016). The Vietnamese government, unlike their Korean and Chinese counterparts, in its decision-making process, does not involve other actors (at both macro and meso levels) to take part in either goal setting like Korea (by granting autonomy to universities’ boards of trustees to determine goals and objectives), or in determining instruments to achieve the goals established by the government like China (See Chapter V, VI and VII).

For instance, in 2005, the Vietnamese government approved the Higher Education Reform Agenda for the period from 2006 to 2020, known as HERA, with the goal to reform and modernise the HE system of Vietnam by 2020. It proposed thirty-two specific reform measures to address almost all aspects of Vietnamese HE (Dao & Hayden, 2010). However, researchers have questioned the viability and practicality of many measures proposed by HERA (Hayden & Lam, 2006), its unrealistic ambition, ambiguity, lack of specific plans and disconnect with other policy documents (Dao & Hayden, 2010; Hayden & Thiep, 2010; T. N. Pham & London, 2010; Smith & Dong, 2010). The goal of increasing the enrolment rate in PHE to 40 percent by 2020 (Sheridan, 2010) established in HERA is a graphic example. At present, PHE in Vietnam is still a

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small part of HE, accounting for only 13.6 percent of the total number of students enrolled in HE (Vietnam General Statistic Office, 2015).

Obviously, in the process of goal setting for HE generally and PHE in particular, the Vietnamese government did not seek adequate consultation with relevant stakeholders, resulting in it making such ambitious and unrealistic goals. In addition, the Vietnamese MoE has not coordinated effectively with other ministries, universities and other organisations to develop comprehensive implementation plans for reforms (T. N. Pham & London, 2010; Sheridan, 2010; Smith & Dong, 2010; Welch, 2007b). Since decisions are made by the macro actor without sufficiently consulting and negotiating with other actors in the field to achieve agreements and obtain support from them, confusion, miscommunication and conflicts of interests between stakeholders easily arise, leading to discord and failures in implementation. As a result, an important strategic policy document such as HERA has failed to fulfil its function of providing a vision and strategies for the development of Vietnamese HE and PHE (Smith & Dong, 2010), and the Vietnamese government is perceived as being not able to perform its role, thereby resulting in low normative legitimacy.

To sum up, a comparative analysis of the agentic behaviours of the governments in the three countries was provided in the previous subsections to reveal the similarities and differences among actors, based on the sub-concepts of position, structural and normative legitimacy and agency. In such an analysis, the macro governments in these countries were found to share similar features in their central position in the field of HE, and their high structural legitimacy. However, each of these macro actors, driven by different logics, employs different types of agency. In addition, the Vietnamese government, unlike its Korean and Chinese counterparts, has low normative legitimacy. The incompatibility between the macro and meso actors and the macro actor’s inability to provide evidence for its ability to perform its role as the leading actor in the field of HE in Vietnam are the major causes for the macro government’s low normative legitimacy. Further investigation indicates that the top-down decision-making process adopted by the

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Vietnamese government which does not include other stakeholders and elements in HE either in goal setting or in implementation is the primarily cause of the issues mentioned above.

8.3.2. The Meso Level

As a result of the differences in the macro actor’s approach to PHE in each country, there are stark differences in the meso actor’s agentic behaviours, particularly between the cases of Korea and Vietnam. In the case of China, because of the unique arrangements that allows the macro actors to be present at the meso level at the same time, the description regarding the meso actor of the Chinese case is omitted.

8.3.2.1. Differences a. Position

As shown in Table VIII-5, the meso actors in the Korean and Vietnamese case occupy different position in the field of HE. While the Korean meso actor occupies the middle position (not central, not peripheral) in the institutional field, the Vietnamese one is located at the circumference. Here there may be a correlation between the macro actor’s agentic behaviours and the meso actor’s position. Specifically, because the Vietnamese government employs the agency of a socialist protector in its commitment to socialist ideology, the meso actor, as a private university whose development is underpinned by the neoliberal approach that contradicts Socialism, has been forced to occupy a peripheral position in the institutional field of HE.

Meanwhile, the Korean government, motivated by the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism, has employed the agency of a capitalist mediator, mediating between the market and HEIs to encourage HEIs produce capital (i.e. knowledge and human capital) for national development and individual well-being. At the same time, this macro actor has implemented egalitarian mechanisms to counter the negative impacts caused by the neoliberal approach. This logic that combines the seemingly contradictory approaches of Neoliberalism and egalitarianism has

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resulted in the Korean private university occupying the middle position in the Korean HE field. On one hand, the private university, as a member of the leading private sector in Korean HE, is encouraged to develop for the accumulation of capital under the guidance of Neoliberalism, and on the other hand, it is hindered by the egalitarian mechanisms. b. Agency

There are also significant differences in agency of the two meso actors in the Korean and Vietnamese cases. While the Korean meso actor employs the agency of a sense-giver and a negotiator, the meso actor in Vietnam exercises the agency of an institutional entrepreneur and an ‘institutional hole’ explorer (See Chapter V and VII).

The differences in the agentic behaviours of these two meso actors are strongly correlated with their positions in the institutional field and the compatibility of logics between the macro and meso levels. Specifically, in the case of the Korean private university, because there is no conflict between the two levels, and the meso actor occupies the middle position in the field of HE, it does not have to challenge the institutional arrangements. Although there are environmental changes (i.e. STEM movement) that do not facilitate its development (because its foundations are non-STEM), the main focus of this actor is to adapt to such changes (i.e. transforming its identity) by employing other enabling elements available in the institutional field (i.e. the specialisation policy), not challenging the institutional forces (of STEM). As a result, the President of the Korean private university has exercised the agency of a sense-giver and a negotiator to carry out the task of instigating and implementing changes within his university to adapt to the changing environment.

In the Vietnamese case, the position of PHE is in the periphery of Vietnamese HE and the function of the sector is justified by Neoliberalism which contradicts the national orthodoxy of Socialism. As a result, the main struggle of the private university in this study is to legitimise itself by challenging the institutional arrangements that constrain the development of PHE. In fulfilling this task, the 430

Chairman of the private university in the Vietnamese case has employed the agency of an institutional entrepreneur, referring to the agentic behaviours of actors that initiate institutional changes (Lockett et al., 2012). However, as the Vietnamese macro actor by exercising the agency of a socialist protector leaves little space for the meso actor to manoeuvre, this meso actor has to simultaneously exercise the agency of an institutional hole explorer, to take advantage of the ambiguity of the institutional arrangements and the structural gaps between the university and its competitors (K Yang, 2007).

In addition, the types of agency employed by the two actors in Korea and Vietnam are also associated with the governance models adopted by the two universities. The governance model in the Korean private university is a combination of trusteeship, collegial and managerial governance which has resulted in a balance of power among relevant stakeholders of the university. Due to this balanced power structure, the President has to exercise the agency of a sense-giver and negotiator to collectively construct and negotiate strategies for change (See Chapter V)

Meanwhile, the Vietnamese private university has adopted the enterprise model of governance in which there is a high degree of ownership concentration. This type of governance helps accelerate the decision-making process and reduce principal-agent problems (T. Nguyen et al., 2015) which allows him to focus on his primary task of challenging the external environment that restricts the development of PHE in general and of his university in particular. c. Legitimacy

Because of the difference in the positions of the two Korean and Vietnamese meso actors as described above, the legitimacy these two actors obtain is also different. In terms of structural legitimacy, since the Korean meso actor occupies the middle position, it is bestowed average/medium legitimacy that comes with its position. For the meso actor in Vietnam, its place at the periphery of the field has resulted in its low structural or positional legitimacy. Therefore, the private university in the case of Vietnam is still struggling to legitimise itself. 431

Similarly, in terms of normative legitimacy, the Korean meso actor also obtained average/medium normative legitimacy while its Vietnamese counterpart has been granted only low normative legitimacy. Since PHE in Vietnam is a newly emerging sector in a socialist country, serious problems confronting this sector have led to its poor performance in quality and reputation, ultimately resulting in public distrust (Hayden & Dao, 2010; Huong & Fry, 2002). As a result, this sector is far away from being highly legitimate.

However, in terms of individual legitimacy, the leaders of the two private universities in Korea and Vietnam (i.e. the President in the Korean case and the Chairman in the Vietnamese case) both receive high structural and normative legitimacy within their organisations thanks to their structural position, personal experiences and expertise to perform the task of leading their universities.

In short, in this subsection a comparison of the characteristics of the meso actors in the cases of Korea and Vietnam was discussed, revealing substantial differences between the two actors in their positions, legitimacy and agency. Specifically, the Korean meso actor occupies the middle position in the institutional field of HE and therefore receives average/medium structural and normative legitimacy, whereas the Vietnamese meso actor is located at the periphery of the field and has low structural and normative legitimacy. In terms of agency, the Korean meso actor exercises the agency of a sense-giver and a negotiator to instigate changes within the university to adapt to the changing environment. Concurrently, the meso actor in the Vietnamese case employs the agency of an institutional entrepreneur and a hole explorer to challenge the institutional arrangements that hinder the development of his university. Their choices of agency are influenced by (1) their institutional position; (2) the compatibility of logics between the macro and meso levels; (3) the agentic behaviour of the macro actor; and (4) the governance structure within their organisations.

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8.3.3. Implications for Vietnam

Based on the discussion provided previously, in this subsection, implications for Vietnam are provided, according to the relevant levels.

8.3.3.1. The Macro Level

As explained in the previous subsections, the macro actor of Vietnam has obtained only low normative legitimacy unlike other macro actors in Korea and China. I have explained that the low normative legitimacy obtained by the macro actor in Vietnam is a result of the conflicts in logics between the macro and meso actors. Since logics provide justification for actions, the meso actor does not support the macro actor’s attempts of reforms because it believes that the justification of these attempts is flawed. Moreover, the top-down decision- making style adopted by the macro actor which excludes other relevant stakeholders at the macro and meso levels has resulted in an unclear vision, inconsistent regulations, uncoordinated policies, and ill-designed implementation plans such as the HERA 2020. Hence, the Vietnamese government’s inability to provide a moral argument of ‘what ought to be done’ (Lockett et al., 2012) has resulted in its low normative legitimacy. Because of this low normative legitimacy, reform attempts implemented by the Vietnamese macro government have not received sufficient support from other stakeholders at the macro and meso levels, leading to unsuccessful implementation outcomes.

Therefore, to successfully implement any reform in HE in general and in PHE in particular, the government in Vietnam must ensure that: (1) conflicts of logics between the relevant stakeholders are reduced; and (2) a clear vision and unambiguous strategies, results of a decision-making process that encourage the participation of stakeholders from all levels, are provided. In the Section 8.2, I have proposed several important implications for constructing alternative logics that recognise the significance of PHE and developing a vision that encourages the contribution of the sector to the development of Vietnamese HE. In this section I thus focus on addressing the issues described above from the macro

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actor’s agency perspective, based on the assumption the government genuinely wishes to encourage the development of PHE for the social benefit of Vietnam. a. Implication 10: Enhancing the Role of the Vietnamese Government as a Vision Translator and a Communicator

As pointed out in the previous section, by excluding other relevant stakeholders in the macro and meso levels of HE from participating in the decision-making process, the macro government of Vietnam has failed to implement HE reforms because there is a lack of ownership and commitment from relevant stakeholders (Smith & Dong, 2010). Thus, to enhance success of reform implementation, a robust strategic planning process that is characterised by engagement, openness and clarity must be developed. Obviously, in such a process, the role of the government must be different from what it currently is.

Before discussing what the role the Vietnamese government would look like if an involvement process of decision-making that reflects the voices of relevant stakeholders had taken place, it is important to be reminded of the governance structure and the division of responsibilities at the macro level of Vietnam. Vietnam is a Socialist country (George, 2005; K.-H. Mok, 2008; Welch, 2007b) in which the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) is granted extraordinary power (Porter, 1993). As the most powerful political institution of the country, the functions of the CPV include developing vision and direction and determining major themes and policies in domestic and foreign affairs (Porter, 1993; M. T. T. Vu & McIntyre-Mills, 2008). Meanwhile, the MoE takes the role of translating the vision generated by the CPV and articulating it in its education policies and strategies (Duggan, 2001; London, 2011). In other words, the responsibilities of the MoE in Vietnam are to formulate educational laws and policies that articulate the directives of the CPV to be approved by the National Assembly, draft strategies and manage finance and human resources for education (London, 2011).

Accordingly, in this structure, the CPV takes the role of a vision creator, generating vision, guidelines, and directions for the national development 434

generally and for education in particular. The government represented by the MoE as the nation’s highest administrative body in education is responsible to articulate and communicate such vision, guidelines and directions generated by the CPV to HEIs through its policy rhetoric. The fact that the MoE is criticised for not providing a clear vision and unambiguous strategic plans as indicated in the data of this study (See Chapter VII) and in the literature (Dao & Hayden, 2010; Hayden & Lam, 2006; Hayden & Thiep, 2010; Smith & Dong, 2010) reveals important insights. Firstly, it shows that the MoE has not successfully incorporated the vision provided by CPV into its policies and strategies. Secondly, it also indicates that the MoE has not effectively communicated such a vision to other stakeholders (including HEIs).

In the future, in a decision-making process which appropriately engages other stakeholders, the MoE must enhance its capacity to function as a vision translator and a communicator between the CPV and HEIs, ensuring that the vision and objectives established by the CPV are well understood by HEIs and the mutual communication between the CPV and HEIs is effectively facilitated. To carry out such functions, strategic planning and communication skills are essential for members of the MoE and should be incorporated in the ministry’s capacity building plans. b. Implication 11: Developing Networks of Mediators

In engaging a shared decision-making process in which the MoE plays the role of a communicator that forms a bridge between the CPV and HEIs, this macro actor must ensure that the voices of HEIs are reflected. Hence, for the effective reflection of HEIs’ opinions, the MoE should develop diverse channels of communication between itself and HEIs. Unfortunately, at the moment, there is only one-way communication between the macro and meso actors in a top-down direction (Dao, 2015; N. Nguyen & Tran, 2018; T. N. Phan et al., 2016). Part of the reasons for this ineffective communication pattern is that there is lack of intermediate bodies that function as mediators between the MoE and HEIs. There is a total of 235 universities in Vietnam (junior colleges and vocational

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schools are excluded), of which the figures for the public and private sectors are 170 and 65 respectively (Vietnam General Statistic Office, 2016). These universities are under the direct or indirect supervision of the MoE (Hayden & Thiep, 2007). In the governance structure of which the MoE assumes the key roles of a regulatory and supervising body, intervening in almost all aspects of university affairs from drafting regulations to managing student admissions and supervising curriculum (Đỗ & Đỗ, 2014), obviously the MoE is overloaded and unable to communicate effectively to engage other actors in decision-making.

Addressing this issue of sharing responsibility through decentralisation at the macro level therefore has become critical, particularly in the context of HE massification with the rapid growth of the sector in both the number of institutions and students enrolled. The experiences of Korea and China provides significant insights for Vietnam. The Korean government has developed networks that involve diverse stakeholders in policy making process, such as (1) a number of think-tank specialising in educational policy research, including the Korean Education Development Institute, the Korea Institute of Curriculum and Evaluation, etc.; (2) professional organisations that are in charge of quality assessment; and (3) representative bodies of other stakeholders, namely teachers’ union, parents’ group, and voluntary citizens’ group, etc. (G.-J. Kim, 2002; Santiago, 2016).

In China, the Chinese central government has shifted the major responsibility of supervising HEIs to local governments at the provincial level (See Chapter VI). The central government maintains its authority in establishing policy objectives, but grant sufficient autonomy to actors at the local level to determine policy instruments (Heilmann, 2008) to achieve the goals set by the central government.

There are two points worth consideration from the experiences of Korea and China. Firstly, while encouraging other stakeholders to participate in decision- making, it is important to ensure and strengthen these stakeholders’ capacity to be involved. That’s why the Korean government gives priority to research institutes and professional organisations to participate in policy-making and

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provides funding for these organisations to produce evidence for policy development (Shin, 2017). Secondly, the local governments at the provincial level of Vietnam is small in size and capacity (in both finance and human resources) (T. T. A. Vu, 2016). It is doubtful whether these local governments are able to share the responsibility of supervising HEIs with the MoE.

Based on the discussion above, there are a few suggestions for the macro government of Vietnam to effectively develop networks of mediators to share the responsibility with the MoE and to facilitate mutual communication between the MoE and HEIs. Firstly, because developing networks of stakeholders can be costly and time-consuming, and not all the stakeholders have sufficient capacity to be involved in decision-making, the Vietnamese government should strategically plan to gradually involve stakeholders, from focus groups to broader audiences. As in the case of Korea, experts like researchers and professional bodies are given priority to be involved in decision-making before consultation seeking efforts reach the broader public, namely parents and students.

Secondly, if the local governments are unable to supervise HEIs, the MoE should consider shifting this responsibility to professional organisations which are already in place such as the Vietnamese Association of Universities and Colleges and the Vietnamese Association of Non-State Universities and Colleges. The extent to which these organisations can be involved in supervising HEIs depends on the extent to which they can ensure universities’ accountability. In addition, as these are the representative bodies of HEIs in Vietnam, involving these organisations may help facilitate the communication between the MoE and HEIs. If it is the case, the supervising responsibility of these organisations should be legally acknowledged.

Thirdly, as these networks of mediators are developed, sufficient autonomy should be granted to them to ensure their genuine participation. The Vietnamese government can learn from the Chinese experience in which autonomy is granted to the lower level to determine the policy instruments, while the authority to establish policy objectives is preserved at the macro level.

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Finally, to guarantee that the opinions of relevant stakeholders are respected and reflected in the decision-making process, their functions, responsibilities and contributions should be formally recognised and supported by effective mechanisms including official guidelines and procedures from the macro government.

8.3.3.2. The Meso Level

As described in the previous subsection, the Vietnamese meso actor in this study has low structural and normative legitimacy due to (1) the logic of socialist authoritarianism adopted by the macro level that does not acknowledge the significance of PHE and encourage the sector to develop; and (2) the challenging issues of governance, quality and finance that have resulted in the sector’s poor quality, leading to public distrust. In Section 8.2, I have proposed some significant implications from the perspective of institutional logics, for private universities at the meso level to legitimise themselves using the ‘ingredients’ available at the institutional level. Therefore, in this subsection, I focus on proposing an implication for private universities at the meso level based on the assumption that a private university has developed an appropriate justification for its functions and internalised such a justification in its operational practices. a. Implication 12: Fully Committing to Achieve the University’s Mission and Objectives

As described early, the meso actor exercises institutional entrepreneurship agency to challenge the existing institutional configurations, urging the macro actors to recognise the potential of the sector (See Chapter VII). However, this type of agency is only effective when substantial evidence regarding the genuine contribution of the sector is provided. Specifically, universities must fully commit themselves to realise their educational missions and objectives established based on genuine values. The evidence of their commitments should be manifested not only in quality assurance measurements such as accreditation and/or university rankings, but also in students’ satisfaction, faculty’s engagement, and the university’s authentic culture. In this process, the leaders of 438

the university must devote themselves to fulfil the university’s missions and objectives. They must truly believe in the values underlining the university’s mission, incorporate it in the university’s practices, and endeavour to achieve it by allocating sufficient resources.

8.4. Chapter Summary

In this chapter, a comparative analysis of the three cases, Korea, China and Vietnam is provided to discuss how the similarities and differences in institutional factors, namely institutional pressures, institutional logics and actors have resulted in the similarities and differences in the development patterns of PHE in the three countries.

In terms of institutional pressures, Neoliberalism and Confucianism as the cultural-cognitive isomorphisms, the increasing market demand for HE and insufficient public funding as the resource dependence isomorphisms, the development of the private business sector as the normative isomorphism, and the tendency of deregulation as the coercive isomorphism are the institutional pressures that have enabled the development of PHE in the three countries. Meanwhile, Socialism as the cultural-cognitive isomorphism in China and Vietnam, university rankings as the normative isomorphism, the limited financial capacity of the private sector as the resource dependence isomorphism, and the tendency of strengthening regulation as the coercive isomorphism are the institutional forces that have hindered the development of PHE.

From the perspective of institutional isomorphisms, the macro government of Vietnam is recommended to develop a strategic plan to guide the development of PHE. This will help to avoid over-reliance on private sources to finance HE as in Korea, and to optimise the contribution of the sector while reducing social problems of inequality that may be associated with the development of the sector. In addition, it is suggested that any attempt to reform PHE in Vietnam must consider carefully the practices of the private business sector and reform attempts in PHE should not be implemented independently from reforms in the private business sector. Private universities at the meso level are recommended to 439

develop medium and long-term plans to strategically diversify their financial sources. This will help these universities to stabilise their financial conditions and reduce the risk of experiencing financial crisis in the near future when market demands decline.

In terms of institutional logics, the two major constituents of institutional logics present in the three cases that enable the development of PHE are Neoliberalism and Confucianism. An in-depth analysis of these two ideologies reveals that they are compatible in some respects and contradictory in other aspects. As a result, it is shown that the public-private categories based on the neoliberal templates is not compatible with the traditional view of Confucianism regarding HE, as well the practices of HE in the three East Asian countries.

Therefore, the macro government of Vietnam is advised to recognise that HE is both public and private good and public HE can generate private benefits and private HE can contribute to social well-being. Moreover, based on this recommendation, a further implication of developing a different funding approach for Vietnamese HE is proposed to replace the current block-grant funding approach that is based primarily on the type of university (i.e. public or private). Three principles of this new funding approach, namely need-based, merit-based and priority-based are presented to facilitate future research.

The analysis of institutional logics also highlights the significance of establishing a transparent vision for HE and PHE. There is a critical lack of such a vision as a result of conflicts in values and ideologies in the East Asian countries and requires the governments of the three countries to pay serious attention to address this problem in order to encourage the appropriate development of PHE.

At the meso level, private universities are advocated to strengthen the public nature of their universities while carrying out their private functions based on the assumption that HE generates both public and private benefits. In addition, these universities should also endeavour to develop an autonomous mission and goals that reflect both the public and private nature of PHE, avoiding being over- dependent on the government and/or market forces to justify their functions. 440

Further, they should carefully explore the institutional environment to find the appropriate institutional elements that help legitimise the universities’ strategies instead of directly challenging institutional arrangements.

From the institutional actor perspective, the macro and meso actors of the three countries differ significantly in their choices of agency and their legitimacy. Therefore, to obtain higher normative legitimacy, the Vietnamese macro government is recommended to enhance their role as a vision translator and a communicator, facilitating mutual communication between the CPV as the vision creator and HEIs. Additionally, networks of mediators that help from a bridge between the MoE and HEIs should be developed to encourage the participation of relevant stakeholders in decision-making through genuine decentralisation and empowerment efforts.

Finally, private universities should fully commit themselves to develop their missions and educational objectives based on genuine values and should endeavour to institutionalise their missions and objectives in the university’s practices. By doing so they can provide concrete evidence of their contribution and quality to the general public and gain public trust.

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CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, a summary of major findings and implications for the development of a more effective model that encourages PHE to develop is provided. In addition, the significance of the study is highlighted while the limitations are acknowledged. Based on this discussion, a vision and prospects for future research are presented.

9.1. Summary of Major Findings

As developed in chapter III, the conceptual framework of this thesis consists of three dimensions. The first dimension includes three analytical aspects, namely governance, finance and quality assurance. The second dimension comprises three institutional factors, namely isomorphisms, logics and actors. The third dimension includes three analytical levels, namely macro, meso and micro levels. However, because this research aims to investigate the impact of institutional factors on the development of PHE in the three countries, namely Korea, China and Vietnam, which are primarily located at the macro level (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Glynn, 2008), the macro level is the focus of this study. The meso level is examined to illustrate the relationship between these two levels, whereas the micro level is generally omitted. In addition, because institutional factors universally impact all aspects of organisations existing in the institutional field where these factors are located (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Scott, 1995), it is not necessary to discuss the impact of these institutional factors separately according to each aspect of governance, finance and quality assurance.

9.1.1. The First Dimension

In the first dimension, PHE practices in the three countries are described based on three major analytical aspects of governance, finance and quality assurance and are categorised based on two analytical levels, namely macro and meso levels. However, because the Vietnamese government does not provide any direct subsidies to private HEIs, the financial aspect of the Vietnamese case is

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described at the meso level. The financial aspect in the case of China is included in the meso level because of the Chinese case study, due its unique feature of public private partnership in which the local government is involved in the college’s governance structure. In addition, among the three analytical aspects, the national quality assurance systems are universally adopted in the three countries. As a result, the description of quality assurance is provided at the macro level only.

9.1.1.1. The Macro Level

At the macro level, research findings have shown significant similarities in the three major aspects of governance, finance and quality assurance (QA) in the three countries. Overall, the governance, finance and quality assurance practices at the macro level in the three countries are listed in Table IX-1 below.

Table IX-1. Governance, Finance and Quality Assurance Practices at the Macro Level in Korea, China and Vietnam

Korea China Vietnam Gover- Regulated Centralised State-control/ Model nance Deregulation Decentralisation State-centric Public Funding Performance- Finance N/A N/A Approach based Government- Government- Independent Agencies affiliated affiliated Agencies agencies agencies Quality Accreditation Accreditation Assurance Methods Audit Audit Accreditation Ranking Ranking Accountability- Accountability- Accountability- Purpose emphasis emphasis emphasis

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a. Similarities

Firstly, from a governance perspective, although the governance adopted at the macro level of the three countries are different, these models share similarities in which there are elements of deregulation and/or decentralisation on one hand and a tendency of strengthening regulation and/or centralisation on the other. In addition, despite the differences in governance models at the macro level, the three countries are similar in their governance structure in which the role of the governments (the macro actors) are inevitable. Although there are variances of deregulation and liberalisation in which HEIs are granted more autonomy to determine their internal affairs, the central role of the states in leading and supervising HEIs remains intact.

Secondly, the three countries are similar in their financial arrangements in that public HEIs have received mostly public funding while private HEIs are heavily dependent on private sources to finance their operations. In the case of Korea, public funding is provided to private HEIs in the form of performance-based programs because the government intends to improve HEIs’ excellence and competitiveness, enhance the link between HEIs and nation building and strengthen accountability of HEIs.

Thirdly, the three countries have adopted QA mechanisms in which accreditation is the core method. Besides accreditation, Korea and China have also officially adopted audits. Ranking has become increasing important in these two countries. Although the authorities of the three countries have emphasised the significance of quality improvement as the main purpose of the QA system, the one-size-fits- all approach of QA implemented in a top-down manner in China and Vietnam and the strong link between quality outcomes and funding allocation decisions in Korea have made accountability become more prevalent in the QA systems of the three countries.

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b. Differences

Nevertheless, the differences in PHE practices in the three countries are undeniable. Firstly, the macro governance model in Korea is regulated deregulation while the Chinese macro government has adopted the model of centralised decentralisation. The major difference between these two models is in the role of the government. The Korean government has established boards of trustees in HEIs as the highest governing body to determine university internal affairs while direct intervention of the government has been reduced. In China, the central government has adopted decentralisation by giving local governments more authority to supervise HEIs and granting HEIs more autonomy. However, the extent to which decentralisation is implemented and the speed of decentralisation is still controlled by the central government. Thus the model in China is referred to as centralised decentralisation. In Vietnam, although there are significant steps have been taken by the government to implement decentralisation, this process has been carried out in a much more cautious manner compared with China and Korea and the Vietnamese government still remains its tight control over HEIs. Consequently, the governance model at the macro level of Vietnam is the state-control or state-centric model.

Secondly, while the Korean and Chinese governments provide direct funding for private HEIs (although very limited), there is no direct funding from the Vietnamese government to support the development of this sector. As a result, the proportion of tuition fees in the financial structure of private HEIs in Vietnam is much higher than those of Korean and Chinese private HEIs (see chapter V, VI and VII).

Finally, the most striking difference in terms of quality assurance among the three countries is the dependence of accreditation agencies on the government. The accreditation agencies in Korea are completely independent from the government, developing their own accreditation standards and financing their operations by themselves. Meanwhile, the accreditation agencies in China and Vietnam are strongly dependent on the government, particularly in terms of 445

finance and appointment. In addition, accreditation standards and procedures are developed by the government.

9.1.1.2. The Meso Level

The research findings regarding governance and finance at the meso level in the three countries are listed in the table IX-2 below.

Table IX-2. Governance Model and Financial Arrangements at the Meso Level in Korea, China and Vietnam

Korea China Vietnam Gover- Model Trusteeship Corporate Enterprise nance Primary Tuition Tuition Fees Tuition Fees Source Fees Finance Secondary Performance-based (Local) Government N/A Source Government Funding Block-grant Funding a. Similarities

The most significant similarity at the meso level among the three cases is their dependence on tuition fees as their primary financial source. In addition, the private university in Korea and the independent college in China also receive direct funding from the government either in the form of performance-based funding programs (in Korea) or direct block-grant funding (in China). b. Differences

At the meso level, the universities in the three countries have adopted different governance models according to the legal framework in each country. The Korean private university has adopted the trusteeship governance model whereas the Chinese independent college has borrowed the corporate governance model from the private business sector. Similarly to China, the Vietnamese private university also borrowed the enterprise governance model from the private business sector.

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However, since corporate governance is relatively new in Vietnam, the corporate governance model has not been able to be institutionalised in Vietnamese PHE as it has in China. The biggest difference between the corporate governance model and the enterprise governance model is in the degree of ownership concentration. While there is a clear distinction between ownership (i.e. the Board of Directors) and management (i.e. the Executive Board) in the corporate governance model, the enterprise model is characterised by a high degree of ownership concentration.

9.1.2. The Second Dimension

This research has studied the development of PHE in Korea, China and Vietnam, focusing on the three major aspects of governance, finance and quality assurance to analyse how institutional factors have shaped the development of PHE in the three countries. Research findings of the three countries have revealed significant similarities and differences in these institutional factors and how such similarities and differences have determined the similarities and differences in the development patterns of PHE in the three countries.

9.1.2.1. The Macro Level

Specifically, the institutional factors at the macro level that have influenced the development of PHE of the three countries are listed in the table IX-3 below.

Table IX-3. Institutional Factors that Impact the Macro Level in Korea, China and Vietnam

Korea China Vietnam Neoliberalism Neoliberalism Neoliberalism Cultural- Confucianism Confucianism Cognitive Confucianism Isomor Socialism Socialism -phism Market Demand Market Demand Market Demand Resource Public Budget Public Budget Public Budget Dependence Capacity Capacity Capacity

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Private Sector’s Private Sector’s Private Sector’s Financial Financial Financial Capacity Capacity Capacity Private Business Private Business Private Business Normative Templates Templates Templates Ranking Ranking N/A Regulation Regulation Regulation Coercive Deregulation Deregulation Deregulation Pragmatic Egalitarian Socialist Logic Authoritarianis Utilitarianism Authoritarianism m Position Central Central Central Capitalist Instrumental Agency Socialist Protector Mediator Experimentalist Actor Legi Struc- High High High - tural tima Norm- High High Low cy ative a. Similarities

Firstly, PHE in the three countries of this study all experienced similar institutional isomorphisms. Specifically, Neoliberalism and Confucianism are the cultural-cognitive pressures that have encouraged the development of PHE, whereas Socialism iss the cultural-cognitive pressure in China and Vietnam that has hindered it. As a result, PHE in China and Vietnam have experienced significant difficulties caused by Socialism and therefore are unable to expand to the same extent as the Korean case.

In terms of resource dependence, growing market demand for access to HE in the context of a limited public budget has caused PHE in the three countries to emerge and grow rapidly. However, the capacity of the private sector is also limited, restricting the expansion of the PHE sector.

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In terms of normative pressures, PHE in the three countries have borrowed the private business sector’s practices, leading to the close link between the progress of PHE and the private business sector. Meanwhile, ranking has become increasingly influential in Korea and China, since the two countries have heavily invested in HE to accelerate the system’s competitiveness in which ranking (both international and national) is an important indicator. However, rakings have not helped the development of PHE, since private universities tend to adopt the practices of highly ranked public HEIs without the traditional advantages of public funding, long history and reputation and better faculty and students.

In terms of coercive pressures, there are contradictory tendencies of deregulation under the influence of Neoliberalism on one hand, and of tightening regulation under the influence the state-led development models that are dominant in the three countries on the other. While deregulation has liberalised the PHE sector to develop, regulation has restrained it.

Secondly, the institutional logics that characterise the HE systems in the three countries share similar ingredients, which are Neoliberalism and Confucianism, although HE in each country is dominated by different logics. In addition, China and Vietnam also share another similar ingredient, which is Socialism, in their institutional logics.

Thirdly, the macro actors (i.e. the government) of the three countries are similar in terms of their position. These macro actors all occupy the central position in the institutional field of HE in each country. Thanks to this central position, these actors all receive high structural legitimacy to carry out their functions as the leading actors in the field of HE. In addition, the macro actors in Korea and China also share a similar characteristic of high normative legitimacy. b. Differences

Although there are seemingly similar institutional factors that have shaped the progress of PHE in the three countries, significant differences in the institutional factors have determined the differences in PHE practices in these countries.

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Firstly, there are considerable divergence in institutional isomorphisms at the macro level of HE in the three countries. Unlike Korea where Neoliberalism is officially adopted, Socialism as the national orthodox ideology in China and Vietnam has significantly hampered PHE’s development. However, PHE in the two countries has been able to expand thanks to the burgeoning market demand while Korean PHE has experienced serious financial constraints due to market saturation. Moreover, since PHE closely follows the private business sector, the differences in the development of the private business sector in each country has also determined the difference in PHE’s progress. As a result, PHE in Vietnam lags behind those of Korea and China because the private business sector in Vietnam is smaller in size and less mature compared with those of Korea and China.

Secondly, the logics that dominate HE in each country are different. In Korea, the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism that characterises Korean HE has encouraged PHE to develop to contribute to nation building and individual advancement. In China, the logic of pragmatic authoritarianism is dominant in that the Chinese government has pragmatically encouraged PHE to develop in order to address political, social and economic issues, ultimately helping bolster the legitimacy of the ruling regime. Meanwhile, the macro government in Vietnam, strongly adhering to socialist ideology, has employed the logic of socialist authoritarianism which does not acknowledge the significance and potential contribution of PHE. Consequently, PHE in Vietnam has encountered serious obstacles caused by unfavourable policies implemented by the macro government.

Thirdly, the macro actors (i.e. the government) in the three countries, driven by the above different logics, have exercised different types of agency. The Korean government has acted as a capitalist mediator, mediating between the market and HEIs to ensure HEIs generate knowledge capital that contributes to nation building and individual advancement. The Chinese (local) government, meanwhile, has exercised the agency of an instrumental experimentalist,

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conducting an experiment of establishing and operating the independent college as an instrument to achieve the political and economic goals of expanding HE as set by the central government. Similarly, the Vietnamese government, motivated by the logic of socialist authoritarianism, has exercised the agency of a socialist protector to ensure that the development of PHE would not violate socialist values.

The Vietnamese macro actor’s employing the logic of socialist authoritarianism to justify its actions contradicts the logic of Neoliberalism that rationalises the existence and functions of PHE at the meso level. In addition, this macro actor has not been able to provide convincing evidence of its competence as a leading actor in the HE field. Collectively, the macro actor in Vietnam, as opposed to those of Korea and China, could not obtain high normative legitimacy. The low normative legitimacy of this macro actor has resulted in the meso actor’s lack of support for the macro actor’s initiatives, resulting in the unsuccessful implementation of macro policies.

9.1.2.2. The Meso Level

Generally, institutional factors are located at the macro level (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Glynn, 2008). However, if the actors at different levels employ different logics to justify their actions, it is necessary to investigate the institutional factors at the meso level. As a result, the primary focus of investigating institutional factors at the meso level are logics and actors.

In this research, the Chinese case is unique in its feature of public-private partnership that involves the local government, a macro actor, as a key member of its governance structure. As a result, the boundary between the macro and meso levels in the case study of China is not clear, thus the investigation of the logics and actors at the meso level in the case of China is excluded. Overall, the research findings at the meso level are listed in the table IX-4 below.

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Table IX-4. Institutional Factors that Impact the Meso Level in Korea and Vietnam

Korea Vietnam Egalitarian Logics Neoliberalism Utilitarianism Position Middle Peripheral Sense-giver and Institutional Entrepreneur Agency Actors Negotiator and Hole Explorer Structural Middle Low Legitimacy Normative Middle Low a. Differences

Accordingly, there are huge differences in institutional factors at the meso level of Korea and Vietnam. Firstly, while the logic of egalitarian utilitarianism is also dominant at the Korea meso level in a similar way at the macro level, the Vietnamese meso level is characterised by the logic of Neoliberalism, contradicting the logic of socialist authoritarianism that dominates the Vietnamese macro level. As a result, Vietnamese PHE has manifested neoliberal characteristics more vigorously than that of the Korean case. The Vietnamese private university closely follows private business practices, operates according to templates of enterprises, uses business-like language and strongly emphasises efficiency and responsiveness to market demand. Meanwhile, the Korean university adopts the not-for-profit trusteeship model of governance, strongly opposes for-profit behaviours and highlights the significance of the university’s traditional roots and distinctive values in response to external pressures.

Secondly, while the meso actor in the Korean case occupies the middle position in the field of HE in Korea, the Vietnamese meso actor is located at the periphery of the field. While PHE in Korean is the leading sector in HE under the leadership of the Korean government, PHE in Vietnam is only a small part of the HE system. The meso actors’ position is highly correlated with the legitimacy bestowed on them. Correspondingly, the Korean meso actor has obtained middle structural and normative legitimacy, whereas the Vietnamese meso actor has 452

been given low structural and normative legitimacy. In addition, the Vietnamese meso actor’s employing Neoliberalism to justify its actions and functions is in conflict with the logic of socialist authoritarianism adopted by the macro actor. Consequently, the macro actor did not approve the meso actor’s actions, resulting in this meso actor’s low normative legitimacy.

The difference in the meso actors’ position and the logics employed by these actors are strongly associated with the types of agency these actors exercise. The meso actor in Korea, being in the middle position of the field, did not have to challenge the institutional arrangements for its legitimacy. In addition, it did not employ a logic that is different from that of the macro level to rationalise its functions. Collectively, the meso actor in the case of Korea, instead of challenging the institutional arrangements, has focused on initiating changes within the university to ensure its adaption to the external environment by employing the agency of a sense-giver and a negotiator. The governance structure of the Korean university that involves various different stakeholders in the decision-making process, resulting in a balanced power structure in which the meso actor (i.e. the president) is in the centre of such a structure has caused him to extensively use his negotiation skills during the process of implementing changes in the university.

Meanwhile, the Vietnamese meso actor, being forced to occupy a peripheral position, has not benefited from the institutional arrangements. The logic of Neoliberalism that rationalises the existence and functions of this actor contradicts the macro logic of socialist authoritarianism. Consequently, this actor has employed the agency of institutional entrepreneur to initiate changes that challenge the current unfavourable institutional environment. Unfortunately, the excessive control by the macro actor has not allowed this meso actor to effectively exercise this type of agency. As a result, this meso actor has been forced to exercise an alternative agency of an institutional hole explorer, to take advantage of the ambiguity in the institutional arrangements in order to compete with other competitors and survive in such an unfavourable environment.

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9.2. Summary of Implications for Vietnam

Based on the investigation and research findings described above, a series of implications are generated according to the institutional factors at different levels as listed below.

Table IX-5. List of Implications for Vietnam based on the Analysis of Institutional Factors at the Macro and Meso Levels

Macro Meso Strategically navigating the Isomor development of PHE Developing long-term strategies to phisms Reforming PHE together with ensure financial stability reforming the private business sector Recognising HE as both public and Strengthening the public nature of private good PHE Developing an autonomous Developing a different financial mission and goals that reflect both model based on the assumption that the public and private nature of Logics HE is both public and private good PHE Legitimising university’s mission Establishing a clear vision of HE and and goals by employing PHE ‘ingredients’ from the macro institutional environment Enhancing the role of the Vietnamese Fully committing to achieve the Government as a vision translator and Actors university’s mission and a communicator objectives Developing a network of mediators

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9.2.1. Isomorphisms

In terms of institutional pressures, Neoliberalism and Confucianism as the cultural-cognitive isomorphisms, growing market demand as the resource dependence pressure, the development of the private business sector as the normative pressure and the deregulation tendency as the coercive isomorphism are the major institutional pressures that have contributed to the rapid growth of PHE in the three countries. On the other hand, Socialism in China and Vietnam as the cultural-cognitive isomorphism, the limited financial capacity of the PHE sector and decreasing market demand as the resource dependence pressures, university ranking as the normative isomorphism and the tightening regulation as the coercive pressure are the institutional isomorphisms that have hindered the sector to grow.

As a result, to help PHE develop properly without over-relying on tuition fees, to reduce educational inequality possibly caused by the development of PHE and to optimise the contribution of the sector to the development of the HE system of the public good, the Vietnamese government is recommended to develop a strategic plan that provides a clear guidance for the sector to develop. Moreover, any attempt to reform the sector should not be isolated from the private business sector since PHE closely follows the business private sector. On the other hand, attempts to reform the private business sector should also consider its potential impact on PHE. For the meso level, private universities in Vietnam is highly recommended to develop strategic plans to diversify its financial sources to reduce the risk of financial threats when market demand declines.

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9.2.2. Logics

In terms of logics, although HE in each country is characterised by different logics, there are similar ingredients in these logics that encourage the development of the PHE sector, which are Neoliberalism and Confucianism. Further analyses of these two ideologies have revealed the compatibility and conflict between these two ingredients, which in turn critically impact PHE.

Specifically, the idea of Neoliberalism based on the human capital theory that supports individuals’ right to maximize economic benefit by privately investing in HE is in agreement with the Confucian belief that emphasises pragmatic purposes of education and the traditional connection between education and private gains and social mobility. Consequently, the compatibility of these two ideologies has led to massive expansion of HE and PHE in the three countries when the neoliberal approach was introduced.

Nevertheless, these two ideologies are fundamentally contradictory, in which the social inequality (in education and income) caused by Neoliberalism is in contrast to egalitarianism, the essential value of Confucianism. In addition, the internal problems of HE in the three East Asian countries inherited from the Confucian legacy such as the lack of autonomous justifications of HE functions and the absence of an indigenous identity and vision for future development of HE might have been exacerbated under the widespread influence of Neoliberalism.

Moreover, this analysis of the two ideologies has unpacked the ambiguity and complexity the public-private notion that the traditional understanding of this dichotomy is unable to convey. Traditionally, the Confucian ideology viewed public and private sectors as vital components of the education system. In addition, the traditional belief of Confucianism sees education as both public and private good. Contemporarily, both the literature and research findings of this study confirm that HE is both public and private good. As a result, the traditional viewpoint that public HE generates only public good and private HE creates only private good is proven to be problematic. 456

This discussion of institutional logics has provided a crucial basis to generate critical implications for the development of PHE in Vietnam. Accordingly, to enhance the healthy development of PHE in Vietnam and optimise its contribution to public good and social advancement, the macro government is recommended to acknowledge that HE is both public and private good, that public HEIs can generate private benefit while private HEIs can contribute to public well-being.

Based on this argument, a different funding formula with preliminary principles is proposed to replace the current block-grant funding approach that supports only the public sector. The primary purposes of this alternative funding approach is to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure, enhance equality and equity in education and acknowledge the potential contribution of private HEIs.

Most importantly, the government is advocated to develop a transparent vision with clear goals in which explicitly identify (1) what the HE aspires to become; (2) which roles the public and private sectors should play; and (3) how to fulfil these goals. The vision, goals and action plans developed by the government must be genuine attempts to internalise the indigenous identity and values that the national HE system highly esteem.

Similarly, at the meso level, since HE is both a public and private good, private universities should not risk losing their legitimacy by neglecting their public nature. Although it is not practical for private universities to carry out the functions as public universities do, they are advocated to strengthen their public nature. In addition, the public and private nature of private universities should be reflected in their university identity and vision and be internationalised in their daily operational practices.

More importantly, regardless of the influence of the government and the market on universities’ strategic planning, it is important for private universities to develop their autonomous vision and educational objectives. Finally, instead of directly challenging the institutional environment as what the private university 457

in the case of Vietnam has done, private HEIs in Vietnam are recommended to learn from the Korean private university in this study in which it sought to legitimise its identity and strategies by employing elements that are available at the institutional environment.

9.2.3. Actors

At macro level, the macro actors (i.e. the government) in the three countries are similar in their central position in the HE field. As the dominant actors in HE, the government in each country is given the highest administrative authority and structural legitimacy to carry out the functions of leading and supervising HEIs. However, justified by different institutional logics, the macro actor in each country employ different agency.

Among the three cases, the macro government in Vietnam is different from those of Korea and China in its low normative legitimacy. This is because of the conflict of logics that characterise the macro and meso levels in the case of Vietnam. The meso actor in the Vietnamese case, driven by the logic of Neoliberalism, opposing the logic of socialist authoritarianism employed by the macro actor. As a result, the meso actor disagree with the justification of the macro actor’s actions. In addition, the macro actor has failed to provide evidence for its competence as a leading actor in the field of HE. Consequently, the Vietnamese government has not been successful to obtain high normative legitimacy.

At the meso level, the meso actors in the three countries are different in their position, agency and legitimacy. Among the three cases, the Vietnamese meso actor is different in its peripheral position (compared with the middle position of the Korean case, and with the central position of the Chinese case). In addition, this actor is also unique in a sense that its actions are justified by a logic that contradicts with the logic at the macro level, while in other two cases, there is a convergence in logics at the macro and meso levels. Finally, the Vietnamese meso actor is also different from the other two cases in its low structural and normative legitimacy. 458

Thus, the macro government in Vietnam, in order to promote the healthy development of the PHE sector and to maximise its contribution of the sector to the public good, is recommended to reconsider its agency. Since the functions of the Vietnamese government is to interpret and articulate the vision and directives established by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in its policies, this macro actor is advocated to exercise the agency of a vision translator and a communicator, mediating between CPV and HEIs and strengthen the mutual communication between these two parties. Moreover, to help the macro government to carry out this function, a network of mediator should be developed, because it would be impossible for the macro government to directly communicate with HEIs in the context of HE massification without the support of an effective network of agencies mediating between the government and HEIs.

For the meso level, if private universities have developed proper vision and educational goals based on genuine values, the meso actor is recommended to fully commit to fulfil such vision, mission and goals by properly allocate resources, institutionalise them in the university practices. This is they proper way for private universities to provide evidence that help legitimise their existence and functions.

9.3. Significance of the Study

9.3.1. Literature Contributions

This research is significant in enriching the literature’s comprehension of PHE in the three East Asian countries, namely Korea, China and Vietnam. In the context of PHE in East Asia having not received adequate attention of researchers despite the sector’s rapid expansion and its growing importance, this research firstly presents an update of the knowledge regarding PHE in the three countries. Secondly, using a comparative perspective, this research provides important insights about the similarities and differences in PHE practices in the three countries, thereby improving the understanding of PHE in the three countries.

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Thirdly, the unique inward-outward perspective of the researcher as a Vietnamese who conducts research about East Asian PHE in a non-Asian (i.e. Australia) academic environment and who has a heterogeneous background constituted of various experiences and connections with the three countries in this study helps generate interesting and valuable insights for this research. As a result, this study offers a more nuanced, in-depth and multi-perspective understanding of the literature of PHE generally and in East Asia in particular.

Finally, by selecting the three countries to study, this research covers a wide range of contexts and environments. While PHE in Korea is advanced and developed, those of China and Vietnam are newly emerged and are developing rapidly. In addition, the HE systems in Korea and Vietnam consist of two separate public and private sectors, while China is unique with its third component (i.e. the independent college subsector) established as a result of public-private partnership. This allows the study to generate more comprehensive implications to assist the development of a more effective model for PHE in Vietnam.

9.3.2. Theoretical Contributions

Firstly, by developing a three-dimensional conceptual framework, this research provides a powerful, nuanced and effective model to investigate the factors that impact the development of PHE. This framework is significant because it allows the research to yield fruitful and valid discussions regarding the development of PHE. Secondly, this research offers empirical evidence in various East Asian settings, from developing countries like China and Vietnam to an advanced country like Korea, thereby confirming and contributing to the theoretical and empirical understanding of Neo-institutional theory, on which the conceptual framework of this study was built.

Thirdly, using the Korean private university as an illustration, this study also empirically confirms the significance and mutual contributions of two schools of thought, namely NIT and organisational identity (OI), to each other as suggested in earlier literature (Kraatz et al., 2016). Unlike previous studies that emphasised 460

the one-way contribution of either NIT to OI or vice versa, this study highlights the two-way contributions of these two bodies of knowledge and provides significant evidence supporting the argument.

Finally, in investigating the meso actor’s agency in the Korean case, I have developed an effective tool (i.e. the OI matrix) to describe the relation between the external environment and the organisation’s internal context. This matrix helps improve the understanding of the theoretical constructs of OI and its relationship with the external institutional arrangements.

9.3.3. Practical Contributions

Firstly, the OI matrix mentioned above has practical implications by providing leaders and practitioners at the organisational level a helpful tool for their strategic planning. This matrix is particularly effective in helping organisations analyse the external and internal contexts, thereby facilitating strategic planning and rational decision-making.

Secondly, the in-depth analysis of institutional logics (see chapter VIII) that reveals the significance of Neoliberalism and Confucianism in shaping the development of PHE in the three East Asian countries is powerful and fundamental. It not only helps unpack the complexity of the phenomenon but also explains ‘the inexplicable’, referring to the powerful but implicit and subtle influence of cultural elements in policies and practices of PHE. This analysis therefore helps avoid over-simplified interpretations of reality, which often lead to fallacious policies and inappropriate practices.

9.4. Limitations of the Study

Despite the significance discussed above, like any other research, this study cannot avoid limitations. The major limitations of this study are in its theoretical approach and methodological design. Firstly, this study uses NIT and RDT as the major theories to construct the conceptual framework. These two theories are chosen primarily because they match the research purpose of describing the external and internal influences on organisations and their ability to make

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strategic choices (J. W. Meyer & Scott, 1983; Reale & Seeber, 2011). Nevertheless, these two theories are not necessarily the only theories that satisfy the requirements of this research and guarantee ‘optimal’ results (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). Although these two theories help produce a powerful conceptual framework, resulting in valuable research outcomes, they are among other possible theoretical options. Conducting research using an alternative theoretical lens, therefore, may provide more insightful findings regarding the development of PHE.

Secondly, the sampling method of this study has certain limitations. Although China and Korea were chosen due to their similarities with Vietnam in terms of geographical, cultural, political and economic features, it does not necessarily mean that these two countries are the only option for comparison. In addition, because only one private institution was selected to study in each country, this has certainly limited the research findings related to each case.

The third major limitation is in this study’s data collection methods. Due to restrictions in time, finance and access to research cases, documents and interviews were used in this study as the major sources for data collection. Although the issue of triangulation was addressed using mixed coding methods and multi-site case studies, using more than two methods to collect data may enhance the validity and credibility of research findings. In addition, as a cross- country comparative study, this study presents significant challenges in collecting and analysing data in multi-language settings. The researcher’s proficiency in three languages of English, Korean and Vietnamese has helped to address only a part of these challenges.

Finally, the case study method used in this study is often criticised for its limitation of generalisation (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Thomas, 2011; Yin, 2017). To address this problem, this study does not aim to generalise. In addition, this study focuses on investigating institutional factors shaping the development of PHE. These factors encompass culture, norms, resources and regulative rules, which surpass a single case and therefore form a basis to justify the case study’s

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possibility of generalisation (Evers & Wu, 2006). Nevertheless, it is necessary to acknowledge that this study is limited in its applicability. The possibility of generalising the research findings depends on the similarities in institutional factors as described in this research. Moreover, the primary focus of this research on Vietnam critically determines the researcher’s interpretation of research findings. Therefore, any attempt to apply the research findings in different settings requires careful considerations of the context.

9.5. Implications for Future Research

The research findings of this study, despite being critical in helping to develop a more effective model that encourages a healthy development of PHE in Vietnam based on the lessons learnt from the Korean and Chinese experiences, only provide a preliminary sketch and precepts for developing such a model. More substantial research is required to further develop this model.

For example, this research recommends the government to develop a transparent vision to help guide the development of HE and PHE. However, what this vision should look like and what role HE and PHE should play to fulfil such a vision are not in the scope of this study, although it was very tempting to do so. Similarly, I have proposed a set of principles for a more effective funding approach. Nevertheless, it is necessary for future research to define and further develop detailed indicators based on such principles.

In addition, in the future, more research should be conducted using cases from different regions to test the conceptual framework and to confirm the research findings, in order to enhance research validity and deliver more thorough understanding. Especially, because HE in Asia is strongly influenced by Western HE due to historical interactions and the transfer of ideas, comparative studies using ‘Western’ cases may provide significant insights.

Moreover, although this study is conducted based on a three-dimensional framework, its findings indicate the significance of a fourth dimension, namely, a dimension of time. At the macro level, among the three cases used in this study,

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Korea PHE is an example of advanced PHE, while in China and Vietnam, PHE is developing. This suggests a progressive development by time. At the meso level, the agentic behaviours of the Korean university leaders, for example, changed according to the dynamics of the external environment, which also involves a timeframe. Hence, future research studying changes, whether focusing on the macro or meso levels and whether using a historical approach or not, should be aware of this fourth dimension. This suggests a very promising research arena that incorporates this dimension of time to develop a theoretical basis for future research.

9.6. Concluding Remarks

In this study, I have discussed the research background (chapter I), reviewed the relevant literature (chapter II), developed a conceptual framework (chapter III) that integrate two theories, namely NIT and RDT, and research methods (chapter IV), conducted data collection and analysis of the three cases in Korea, China and Vietnam, respectively (chapters V, VI and VII), compared research findings of the three cases and generated a set of basic principles for the development of an enabling model for PHE in Vietnam (chapter VIII), thereby answering the research questions and accomplishing the research aims. By conducting this research, I have not only identified the significance of the institutional forces that influence the development of PHE, but also highlighted the roles of actors and the justifications of these actors’ behaviours, thus answering not only the question of what, but also who influences PHE’s development and why they do so. These findings underline a critical argument that the problems of PHE in Vietnam, or elsewhere in other countries, are fundamentally caused by the disagreement between actors (who) at the macro and meso levels, driven by different justifications (why) on what should be done. Based on these findings, I argue that the healthy development of PHE that maximise its contribution to the public good can only be achieved when the relevant stakeholders (i.e. the macro and meso actors) reach agreement on the purposes and aims of HEIs, particularly of private HEIs, and the functions and

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the roles of each actor to accomplish such aims. Although it is not easy to carry out this task, all stakeholders in the field of HE in Vietnam should aspire and endeavour to achieve it to support the development of the most effective HE possible for Vietnam.

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APPENDIX

Appendix 1. Interview Protocol

Topic 1: Governance 1. Evaluate the impact of the following factors on the structure, effectiveness and practices of the governance in your university: + National regulative framework + Culture + National educational goal + Code of conduct and/or professional norms + Finance + Others Probes: 1.1. Regarding to the governance model (structure and decision-making process) in the PHE sector, in which aspects do the national laws and/or regulations facilitate, and in which aspects cause difficulties to your university? 1.2. How the general national goals of education impact the direction, purpose and the goals of governance in your university? 1.3. Does your university issue institutional regulation, code of conduct, and professional norms? How do these regulations affect the structure, decision-making process and autonomy in your university? 1.4. Does your university receive any financial incentive from the state (national or local level)? Does it impact the governance model in your university? 1.5. Regarding to the governance model (the roles and authorities of governing board, structure of governance and decision-making process) is there any difference with other universities in your country, or in other countries? Why and what causes those differences? What are the consequences of these differences? 1.6. From your point of view, what are the problems in the governance model in your country now (at national, sectorial and university levels)? What are the consequences of these problems? Do you have any suggestions for these issues? Topic 2: Finance 2. Evaluate the impact of the following factors on the financial issues (budget allocation, decision on tuition fee level, marketing strategies and collaboration with the industry) in your institution: + National regulative framework + Culture + National educational goal + Code of conduct and/or professional norms + Others Probes: 2.1. Which aspects of the national regulative framework (law, regulation, decree and/or policy) financially facilitate/support, and limit the financial stability of your university?

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2.2. Is there any point in the regulation you think that needs to be changed in order improve the financial situation in your university? 2.3. Does your university receive any incentive (tax exemption, loan and/or grant, etc.) from the government? Does the government require additional accountability mechanism along the incentives? Is your university subjected to any financial mechanism issued by the government? 2.4. How does your university mobilize the external resources (from government, private investors, industry, entrepreneurs, students’ tuition fees and other stakeholders) to achieve institutional goals? How do these involvements impact the decision of budget allocation, marketing strategies and collaboration with industries? 2.5. What are the differences in the financial management model in your university with other universities in your country or in other countries? 2.6. Does your university issue institutional regulation, code of conduct, and professional norms? How do these regulations affect financial issues in your institution? 2.7. What should the financial mechanisms look like to support the growth of private HEIs in your country? Topic 3: Quality Assurance 3. Evaluate the impact of the following factors on the quality issues (university ranking, institution assessment, accreditation, audit) in your university: + National regulative framework + Culture + National educational goal + Code of conduct and/or professional norms + Finance + Others Probes: 3.1. Is your institution subject to the national requirements of quality assurance? Is it similar with the public universities? If not, what are the differences? 3.2. Which aspects of the national regulative framework (law, regulation, decree and/or policy) help to improve the educational quality in your university? Which aspects limit/constrain? 3.3. What should the quality assurance system look like to help the private HEIs improve their quality? 3.4. What are the differences in the quality assurance system in your country with other countries? What causes these differences? What are the results of these differences? 3.5. Do other universities have similar issues? What do they do? Are there any differences in the way you address these factors? What causes these differences? What are the results of these differences? 3.6. How do you think the association of PHE of which your institution is a member help/would help the members to improve the educational quality in their institutions?

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3.7. In order to improve the university ranking, what does your institution plan to do? What are the difficulties in implementing that plan? Why? What has to do to address those difficulties? 3.8. Does your university receive any financial support/incentives from the government to improve quality? Does the government require additional accountability mechanism along the incentives? How do the current financial situations impact the quality issues? What does your university plan to tackle those issues? What are the difficulties in implementing that plan? Why? What has to do to address those difficulties? 3.9. Do you think there will any change in the regulation system in terms of quality assurance? What changes do you expect and not expect?

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Appendix 2. Letter of Invitation

Sydney Ha T. Ngo School of Education, UNSW Australia For attention: Dr. President of T University REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS IN T UNIVERSITY I am Ha Ngo, a PhD student in the School of Education, Faculty of Arts and Social Science, UNSW Australia. My supervisors are Prof. Stephen Marshall and Prof. Colin Evers.

I’m currently conducting a study on the topic “Developing a model for Vietnamese Private Higher Education: Lessons from China and Korea”. This study aims to establish a model that will enable the development of the Vietnamese private higher education (PHE) sector of which your university is an important member. In order to do so, this study will:

(a) Explore factors that support the establishment and development of the PHE sector in Vietnam, focusing on how the institutional arrangements enable and/or constrain the development of PHE institutions based on a conceptual framework built on Neo-Institutional Theory and Resource Dependence Theory;

(b) Adopt a comparative approach that will compare factors and the impact of these factors in facilitating the development of the PHE sector in Vietnam, China and Korea. Lessons and recommendations generated from this comparative analysis will be used to develop a new, hopefully more effective and supportive model for PHE in Vietnam.

Document analysis and semi-structured interviews are the major data collecting methods of this study. I am hereby seeking your consent to allow me to conduct interviews with the leaders (President or Vice- President), a member of the governing board and the heads of the Academic and Finance departments (3- 4 people) in your university. To assist you in reaching a decision, I have attached to this letter:

(a) A copy of my thesis proposal (b) A copy the research instruments which I intend using in interviews (c) A copy of my CV (d) A copy of the research consent Should you require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me or my supervisors. Our contact details are as follows:

Name: Ha T. Ngo Tel: Email: [email protected] Upon completion of the study, I undertake to provide you with a bound copy of the dissertation. Your permission to conduct interviews for this study will be greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely, Ha T. Ngo

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Appendix 3. UNSW’s Participant Information Statement and Consent Form

The study is being carried out by the following researchers: Role Name Organisation Chief Investigator Prof. Stephen Marshall UNSW Australia Co-Investigator/s Prof. Colin Evers UNSW Australia Student Investigator/s Ms. Ha T. Ngo is conducting this study School of Education, the as the basis for the degree of PhD at UNSW Australia UNSW Australia. This will take place under the supervision of Prof. Marshall and Prof. Evers Research Funder Not applicable

What is the research study about? You are invited to take part in this research study. You have been invited because you are Deputy Director of the T University (pseudo name), which has been selected as a study case. To participate in this project you need to meet the following inclusion criteria: • Leaders of the selected private universities • Members of the Governing Board • Head of an Academic Department or the Finance Department This research aims to establish a model that will enable the development of the Vietnamese private higher education (PHE) sector. In order to do so, this study will explore factors that support the establishment and growth of the sector, focusing on how the institutional arrangements enable and/or constrain the development of PHE institutions based on Neo-Institutional Theory and Resource Dependence Theory. In addition, this study will adopt a comparative approach that will compare factors and the impact of these factors in facilitating the development of the PHE sector in Vietnam, China and Korea. Lessons and recommendations drawn from this comparative analysis will be used to develop a new, hopefully more effective and supportive model for PHE in Vietnam. This study will employ document analysis and semi-structured interviews as the major data collecting methods. This study will potentially provide a richer, more nuanced explanation of the factors that enable a PHE institution to evolve and develop, and of the dynamic interactions of these factors across all levels – national, institutional and unit levels. Additionally, this study will provide a better understanding of the Vietnamese PHE sector, by exploring and comparing the challenging issues of governance, leadership, finance and quality assurance in PHE in three different national contexts – Vietnam, China and Korea. Collectively, the knowledge generated by this research will not only contribute to the scholarly understanding of the field of PHE, but also provide a scholarly foundation for the future development of strategy and policy to guide the development of PHE in Vietnam and thus enable the Vietnamese government to optimize the contributions of the PHE sector to the advancement of HE in Vietnam. Do I have to take part in this research study?

Participation in this research study is voluntary. If you don’t wish to take part, you don’t have to. Your decision will not affect your relationship with UNSW Australia.

This Participant Information Statement and Consent Form provides you information about the research study. It explains the research tasks involved. Knowing what is involved will help you decide if you want to take part in the research. 503

Please read this information carefully. Ask questions about anything that you don’t understand or want to know more about. Before deciding whether or not to take part, you might want to talk about it with a relative or friend. If you decide you want to take part in the research study, you will be asked to: • Sign the consent form ; • Keep a copy of this Participant Information Statement; What does participation in this research require, and are there any risks involved?

If you decide to take part in the research study, you will be asked to participate in interviews that would take approximately one hour each. During the interview a member of the research team will ask you questions about your opinions as a Deputy Director regarding to the topic of governance, leadership, finance and quality assurance in your univeristy. With your permission we would like to digitially record the interview using an audio record. The interviews will take place in your office.

Aside from giving up your time, we do not expect that there will be any risks or costs associated with taking part in this study.

Will I be paid to participate in this project?

There are no costs associated with participating in this research study, nor will you be paid.

What will happen to information about me?

By signing the consent form you consent to the research team collecting and using information about you for the research study. We will keep your data for 7 years. We will store information about you at UNSW Australia. Your information will only be used for the purpose of this research study and it will only be disclosed with your permission.

It is anticipated that the results of this research study will be published and/or presented in a variety of forums. In any publication and/or presentation, information will be published. Your university, your position and personal details will be coded using pseudo names to ensure your confidentiality, privacy and anonymity. The coding system will not be made available to anyone except the researcher who will interview you directly.

You have the right to request access to the information about you that is collected and stored by the research team. You also have the right to request that any information with which you disagree be corrected. You can do this by contacting a member of the research team.

The audio digital recordings are for the purposes of the research study. After the interview we will partly transcribe your digital recordings. We will keep your digital recordings in the form of recording and transcription for 7 years. We will store information about you at UNSW Australia. Your confidentiality will be ensured by the protection from the server with password in which only the researcher has the right to access.

How and when will I find out what the results of the research study are?

You have a right to receive feedback about the overall results of this study. You can tell us that you wish to receive feedback by contacting the research team. This feedback will be made available for you in the form of published website. You will receive this feedback after the study is finished and results are made available via website. What if I want to withdraw from the research study?

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If you do consent to participate, you may withdraw at any time. If you do withdraw, you will be asked to complete and sign the ‘Withdrawal of Consent Form’ which is provided at the end of this document. Alternatively you can ring the research team and tell them you no longer want to participate. If you decide to leave the research study, the researchers will not collect additional information from you. You are free to stop the interview at any time. Unless you say that you want us to keep them, any recordings will be erased and the information you have provided will not be included in the study results. You may also refuse to answer any questions that you do not wish to answer during the interview.

If you decide to withdraw from the study, we will not collect any more information from you. Please let us know at the time when you withdraw what you would like us to do with the information we have collected about you up to that point. If you wish your information will be removed from our study records and will not be included in the study results, up to the point that we have analysed and published the results.

What should I do if I have further questions about my involvement in the research study? The person you may need to contact will depend on the nature of your query. If you want any further information concerning this project or if you have any problems which may be related to your involvement in the project, you can contact the following member/s of the research team: Research Team Contact Name Ha T. Ngo Position Student Investigator Telephone Email [email protected] If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted, then you may contact: Complaints Contact Position Human Research Ethics Coordinator Telephone + 61 2 9385 6222 Email [email protected] HC Reference [INSERT HC reference number] Number

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Consent Form – Participant providing own consent

Declaration by the participant

I have read the Participant Information Sheet or someone has read it to me in a language that I understand;

I understand the purposes, study tasks and risks of the research described in the project;

I have had an opportunity to ask questions and I am satisfied with the answers I have received;

I freely agree to participate in this research study as described and understand that I am free to withdraw at any time during the project and withdrawal will not affect my relationship with any of the named organisations and/or research team members;

I consent to audio-recording

I understand that I will be given a signed copy of this document to keep;

Participant Signature Name of Participant (please print) Signature of Research Participant

Date

Declaration by Researcher* I have given a verbal explanation of the research study, its study activities and risks and I believe that the participant has understood that explanation.

Researcher Signature* Name of Researcher (please print) HA T. NGO Signature of Researcher

Date

+An appropriately qualified member of the research team must provide the explanation of, and information concerning the research study.

Note: All parties signing the consent section must date their own signature.

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Form for Withdrawal of Participation

I wish to WITHDRAW my consent to participate in the research proposal described above and understand that such withdrawal WILL NOT affect my relationship with UNSW Australia.

Participant Signature Name of Participant (please print) Signature of Research Participant

Date

The section for Withdrawal of Participation should be forwarded to: CI Name: Prof. Stephen Marshall Email: [email protected] Phone: +61.2.9385.8244 Postal Address: UNSW Learning and Teaching Unit Level 4, Matthews Building, Gate 11 Botany Str., UNSW Australia, Sydney NSW 2052, Australia

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