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Colombia and : A Tense Relationship Has Hopes for Cooperation Pearce, Sarah 2013

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This document is brought to you for free and open access by Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact [email protected]. AND VENEZUELA: A TENSE RELATIONSHIP HAS HOPES FOR COOPERATION Sarah Pearce

Introduction territorial conflicts continued into the 1980s, but the nature of tensions between Colombia The deposition of King Ferdinand VII and Venezuela changed with the election of and the disappearance of the Spanish monarchy Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in 1998. in 1808 provided the necessary momentum Chávez’s ambitious plan of becoming the leader for Venezuelan-born Simón Bolívar to lead the of a unified Latin American region (similar to Spanish colonies in South America to pursue Bolívar’s ) caused him to support independence. In order to have a strong unified Colombia’s most prominent guerilla group, the force to fight against Spain, Bolívar united pres- Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colom- ent-day Colombia, Venezuela, , and bia (FARC). Chávez supported the FARC because under a single nation called Gran they considered themselves followers of Simón Colombia in 1819. Although Bolívar hoped that Bolívar, the original leader of the independence Gran Colombia would be maintained after the and unification movements in South America. independence movement, difficulties soon However, his support for the FARC’s activities emerged that caused Venezuela to declare inde- created intense security concerns within Colom- pendence in 1831. Ever since the dissolution bia and along the Colombia/Venezuela border. of Bolívar’s Gran Colombia, Colombia and In addition, Chávez’s goal of a united Latin Venezuela have experienced tensions that have America conflicted with Colombia’s alliance led them to the brink of war. with the United States at the beginning of the Immediately following the dissolution of twenty-first century. Colombia allowed the Gran Colombia in 1831, conflict originated United States to set up military bases in its between Colombia and Venezuela over land and territory in order to help fight guerilla and drug maritime boundaries and border disputes. These activity, a move Chávez considered a violation

61 of Venezuelan sovereignty that would inhibit his From the initial creation of Gran Colom- plans of a united region of solely Latin Ameri- bia, however, Bolívar maintained an attitude of can countries. These conflicts led to a freeze doubt about its long-term survival (Collier, in diplomatic relations and an arms race that p. 59). Gran Colombia was successful in lib- caused preparations for war. erating South American territories from Span- In this article, I examine the shared his- ish colonial rule, and both Venezuelan and tory of Colombia and Venezuela under Gran Colombian army camps answered to Bolívar as Colombia as groundwork for analyzing both the the Supreme Commander of both armies dur- historical tensions and current conflicts that ing battle. However, after independence was have arisen since the dissolution of Gran Colom- achieved, conflicts of representation and bia in 1831. Despite the historical territorial dis- national identity replaced the militaristic unity putes and the tensions emerging after the previously felt during the struggle for inde- election of President Chávez in 1998, I claim pendence (Bushnell, p. 50). For example, com- that it is unlikely that war will erupt between petition occurred soon after independence Colombia and Venezuela. Both countries have between the lawyers in Colombia and the recently begun to realize the benefits of coop- military officials in Venezuela over who would eration, and although tensions may remain due have the authority to rule Gran Colombia. In to domestic political concerns, cooperation will Colombia, the lawyers and legislators resented prevent any permanent rupture of relations. the burden of the violent and dominant Venezuelan military on the national budget, The Shared History of Colombia and while the Venezuelan military officials criti- Venezuela cized the Colombian lawyers and legislators for enjoying the fruits of the military’s hard work The relationship between Colombia and (Safford and Palacios, pp. 115–16). In addition, Venezuela dates back to Spanish explorations of the heterogeneous masses that existed within the 1500s. With the goal of improving Spain’s each territory of Gran Colombia, such as the influence over its colonies in South America, pardos1 of Venezuela and the mestizos of the Bourbon regime created the New King- Colombia, made the formation of a single Gran dom of Granada in 1717, combining present-day Colombian “national identity” impossible, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. because each population found its nationality However, the Venezuelan-born General Simón within its home country (Lynch, pp. 219–20). Bolívar recognized Spain’s weakness following As Bolívar admitted, “The south hates the the deposition of King Ferdinand VII in 1808 north, the coast hates the highlands, Venezuela as a ripe time to lead an independence move- hates Cundinamarca”2 (Lynch, p. 218). This ment throughout all of South America. After obvious lack of cohesion within the republic of failed attempts to liberate his home territory Gran Colombia proved a serious barrier to its of Venezuela in the early 1800s, Bolívar sought survival. a military alliance between Venezuela’s neigh- Perhaps the most important division boring territories that would be similar to the between Colombia and Venezuela, however, New Kingdom of Granada established by the Bourbon regime. He believed that the indepen- dence of one territory depended on the libera- 1Pardo is another term for mulatto, or of mixed white tion of another, such that joining the territories and black descent. This is in contrast to mestizo, which of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama refers to mixed white and Indian descent (Lynch, p. 342). The differences of ethnicity between these groups created into a military alliance was necessary to end- difficulty in combining them to form a single national ing Spanish rule (Safford and Palacios, pp. 56, origin or national identity. 105). Bolívar successfully unified the territories 2Cundinamarca is one of the 32 departments plus the in 1819, calling it Gran Colombia. This union, Capital District by which Colombia is organized. Cundi- believed by Bolívar to be a crucial step in fight- namarca surrounds the Capital District, which contains Colombia’s capital, Bogotá. The reference to Cundinamarca ing for independence, would also provide him in Simón Bolívar’s quote refers to the capital region in with a large enough territory to successfully Bogotá that ruled over all of Gran Colombia during its exis- defend against future foreign invasions. tence from 1819 to 1830. 62 stemmed from the placement of the capital of Territorial Conflicts Gran Colombia in Bogotá, Colombia. The sheer size of Gran Colombia made Bogotá Recovery of Lost Territory nearly inaccessible to Venezuela, which robbed Venezuelans of adequate physical rep- Territorial conflicts were common in resentation in the capital. In addition, the South American countries during the colonial constitution drafted by Simón Bolívar in 1821 times, when boundaries were loosely defined denied individual territories from exercising in the core regions because European settlers discretionary power over internal affairs, were more attracted to peripheral coastal lands. requiring that all decisions be referred to As a result, when South American colonies Bogotá. Venezuelans soon came to regard began fighting for independence, confusion Colombian politicians as foreign masters quickly arose over the loosely defined borders and themselves a colony, because Bogotá in the core of the country (Child, 1985, p. 9). was the center of offices and opportunities for The countries united under Gran Colombia both the bureaucracy and public works pro- were particularly affected by these loosely grams (Lynch, p. 220). It was not long until defined borders, as independence was won when José Antonio Páez, commander-general of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama Venezuela, began to receive support for his were considered one territory. The breakup of open resentment of Gran Colombia’s political Gran Colombia, therefore, created great uncer- structure. Despite Bolívar’s desperate tainty over boundaries and initiated tensions attempts to maintain Gran Colombia, Páez between Colombia and Venezuela. used his support within Venezuela to lead a After declaring independence from Gran separatist movement, culminating with Colombia, both Venezuela and Colombia sought Venezuela’s secession from Gran Colombia in to ease the ambiguity over territorial borders 1831 (Safford and Palacios, pp. 117–29; Lynch, with the Treaty of Pombo-Michelena in 1833. pp. 226–30). While the treaty was ratified by Colombia, The dissolution of Gran Colombia cre- Venezuela refused to sign it, regarding the ated immediate challenges for the previously provisions of the treaty as an unacceptable united territories. One of the greatest challenges loss of territory (Anderson). The two countries was the establishment of territorial bound- then requested assistance from King Alfonso XII aries (Safford and Palacios, p. 132). Because of Spain in 1881, and an arbitration agree- national identity had been established within ment was created in 1891 that primarily each territory as opposed to a united Gran addressed unsettled boundaries in the Guajira Colombian identity, questions of territorial Peninsula (the most northern tip of South boundaries also inherited a struggle for power America [Figure 1], located in northern Colom- and pride within the region. Venezuela was espe- bia and northwestern Venezuela, which extends cially eager to reassert itself in the region from the Gulf of Venezuela and from the because the people in Venezuela, in particular Caribbean). Colombia and Venezuela agreed to the military, felt as though they had been robbed a joint commission to supervise the execution of representation under the central government of the arbitration made by the Spanish Crown, of Gran Colombia. Venezuela and Colombia but inaccurate maps and difficulty in locating competed over three primary territorial dis- the physical designations of the boundary lines agreements following the breakup of Gran led both countries to reject the treaty (Ander- Colombia: recovering territory lost by Venezuela son). Colombia and Venezuela then enlisted the during a series of treaties signed after the dis- help of the Swiss Council in 1916, which cre- solution of Gran Colombia, maritime bound- ated a final arbitration in 1932 that upheld ary disputes, and illegal activity along the shared the Spanish Crown’s original agreement. borders between Colombia and Venezuela While the boundaries between Colom- (Child, 1985, p. 59). These territorial disputes bia and Venezuela were lawfully determined continued into the 1980s, as both countries con- by the Swiss Council’s arbitration in 1932, tinued to compete for power and influence in domestic pressure from groups and leaders the region. in Venezuela pushed for an extension of 63 Figure 1 Guajira Peninsula and the Gulf of Venezuela

Source: Briceño as reproduced in Anderson and ESRI World Countries 2011 (with special thanks to Scott Rutzmoser, Lehigh University).

Venezuela’s boundaries. For example, in his (see Figure 1). However, issues, such as sub- 1980 address to the Venezuelan , Pres- soil rights and extensions of territory, were of ident Luis Herrera Campíns pledged to recover little concern in the 1940s, as the potential for territory that was lost in the 1932 arbitration petroleum reserves had yet to be discovered in (Ewell, p. 295). In addition, Venezuelan military the area at that time. Despite lack of concern for officials, such as Major Pérez Tenreiro and López resources, Venezuela still felt that the treaty was Sánchez, also spoke out in the 1980s about overly generous to Colombia and encroached on the recovery of lost territory. Both of these Venezuelan sovereignty, provoking the Colom- military officials referred to the power and pres- bian foreign ministry to respond in 1952 by tige that Venezuela enjoyed under the leader- renouncing all claims to the islands in the ship of Simón Bolívar to aggressively urge Gulf in order to appease Venezuela’s complaints. Venezuela to gain back territory that had been However, by 1965, oil companies from the given to Colombia during the 1932 arbitra- United States had requested concessions in tion. The definition of territorial boundaries order to explore the Gulf of Venezuela, ignit- continued to penetrate Venezuelan politics in ing an interest by both Colombia and Venezuela the last decades of the twentieth century, which to reconsider the “delimitation of the marine created hostility and competition between and submarine areas” between the two coun- Colombia and Venezuela (Ewell, pp. 307–8). tries (Birken). After numerous violent incidents by both countries to exercise sovereignty in the Maritime Boundaries Gulf, it became clear that the struggle for oil resources in the area would cause a longer The second territorial tension between and more serious competition. The nationaliza- Colombia and Venezuela originating from the tion of the Venezuelan oil industry in 1976 dissolution of Gran Colombia in 1831 was dis- placed even greater importance on Venezuela’s putes over maritime boundaries and the later ability to secure its sovereignty in the Gulf, as importance of securing energy resources from its growing dependence on oil revenues required the Gulf of Venezuela. Located at the north- a secure supply of resources (Bell et al., p. 362). ernmost frontier between Colombia and Maritime boundary disputes between Colombia Venezuela, the boundaries of the Gulf were sup- and Venezuela over sovereignty of the Gulf of posedly settled in the 1941 Treaty on Border Venezuela have gone unresolved and continue Demarcation and Navigation of Common Rivers to cause competition between the two countries.

64 Development of Frontier Regions trafficking have become attractive methods by which Colombian guerilla groups earn money. While the intensity of some conflicts on the Aside from drugs, other items, such as gasoline, borders between South American countries is food, and arms, are also smuggled between minimal, because these areas are empty and the border regions both by guerilla groups unpopulated, the development and growth of the and residents of the border regions (“Venezuela/ frontier between Colombia and Venezuela have Colombia: Border Tensions”). These activities caused considerable tension. The indigenous peo- are serious threats to the security of both ple who settled in Colombia’s frontier regions Colombia and Venezuela and have aggravated bordering Venezuela numbered around 23,000 present-day relations between them. by 1930. Although this population accounted for less than one percent of Colombia’s total popu- Beginnings of the U.S. Relationship lation of close to eight million, the interaction with Latin America with the Venezuelan people bordering this region was significant. Colombia’s frontier regions were In addition to territorial disputes between physically isolated from their government and Colombia and Venezuela, ideological differences city center by the Andean mountains, which began to emerge over the role of the United meant that the Venezuelan people living on the States in South America. Simón Bolívar’s cre- border of the Colombian frontier exerted more ation of a military union with Gran Colombia in influence over these regions than did the Colom- 1819 first ignited ideas about a mutual defense bian government. For example, Venezuelans system involving the rest of the hemisphere. living on the frontier, who established Arauca City Efforts by Bolívar at the 1826 Congress of in Colombia in the late eighteenth century and Panama to unite all Latin American countries promoted the development of cattle ranching and into a collective security organization began commerce, threatened public order with the flow to spark interest from the United States. Invit- of Venezuelan refugees and fugitives into the ing , Central and South America, Haiti, Colombian frontier during Venezuela’s civil wars and Santo Domingo to a conference in Wash- and repressive regime of Juan Vicente Gómez ington in 1889, the United States laid the in the first quarter of the twentieth century groundwork for an Inter-American Military Sys- (Rausch, pp. 128–34). The free flow of people and tem (IAMS). A series of conferences and treaties livestock across the Colombia/Venezuela border followed, establishing political and military eventually led to activities, such as illegal immi- security systems between the United States and gration, smuggling, and guerilla activity in the Latin America, such as the Rio Treaty in 1947 twentieth century, all of which have increased and the Organization of American States (OAS) tension between Colombia and Venezuela. in 1948 (Child, 1980). Illegal immigration by Colombian citizens Despite the creation of the IAMS, the into Venezuela saw its peak in the 1970s, when reluctance of Latin American countries to join Venezuela was experiencing an economic boom the system was detected as early as the Lima due to rising oil prices. It is estimated that by Conference held in 1938. Although the end of the 1970s, 1.5 million undocumented was the biggest opponent, many other Latin Colombians lived and worked illegally in American countries were concerned about an Venezuela (Child, 1985, p. 154). While Venezuela intervention by the United States that could was experiencing economic growth and a higher “open the door to constantly expanding U.S. standard of living than Colombia in the 1970s, penetration into their [Latin American] affairs” the economic crisis of the 1980s caused xeno- (Child, 1980, p. 22), which came true during the phobic feelings towards the Colombian immi- U.S. military interventions in Panama and Haiti grants in Venezuela and created hostility of the last decade of the twentieth century (Gott, between the Colombian and Venezuelan govern- p. 185). Furthermore, problems were identi- ments. In addition, Colombian guerillas have fied immediately after the creation of the IAMS, been responsible for causing tensions between as the United States was either unable or unwill- Colombia and Venezuela along the border ing to supply adequate weapons to Latin Amer- regions. Since the 1980s, kidnapping and drug ica. For example, while the Lend-Lease Act of 65 1941 provided the legal mechanism for the ical cell among military officials in the 1980s, United States to provide weapons, the practi- in which he identified himself with Simón Bolí- cal needs of the U.S. military prevented it from var to garner support for a united Latin Amer- offering an adequate supply of weapons to Latin ica. Bolivar had attempted such unification dur- America.3 Furthermore, although the Inter- ing the 1826 Congress of Panama, but the American Military Cooperation Act of 1946–1947 dissolution of Gran Colombia and Bolivar’s permitted the United States to sell surplus death destroyed this vision. Chávez inherited weapons to Latin America throughout the Bolivar’s dream more than a century later and interim period of 1948, the volume and types of received enough support for his Bolivarian Rev- weapons came nowhere near what was expected. olutionary Movement to win the presidential These incidents left Latin American leaders hes- election in 1998. His goal was to place itant to join a security alliance with the United Venezuela’s own city center of Caracas at the States (Child, 1980, pp. 34, 95). Loss of confi- heart of a united continent (Gott, p. 13). He dence in the United States came to a head in the pushed for Venezuela to take the lead on all early 1980s, when the OAS failed in its peace- issues of integration: establishing economic keeping responsibilities during the 1982 Falk- integration by creating a Latin American cur- lands War, when the United States sided with rency and solidifying political integration by Great Britain over Argentina in that dispute. convening a congreso anfictionico, a congress After the Falklands War, Venezuelan military of all Bolivarian states, in Venezuela’s capital officers proposed the idea of moving the Inter- of Caracas (Gott, pp. 184, 189). Chávez also used American Defense Board from Washington, Bolívar’s name to pursue additional policies, D.C., to the capital of Venezuela, Caracas, in such as integrating the armed forces into soci- order to decrease U.S. influence in the area ety through a plan called “Plan Bolívar 2000” (Child, 1985, pp. 10–12). This proposal high- and proposing to change Venezuela’s official lighted Venezuela’s distrust of U.S. influence name to the “Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela” in Latin America and would be the origin of (Gott, p. 143). However, the Bolivarian Revo- future tensions between Venezuela and Colom- lutionary Movement created tensions between bia, as Colombia has recently allowed the United Colombia and Venezuela in two major areas: States to have a greater presence in Latin Amer- Chávez’s support of Colombia’s most powerful ica through Plan Colombia and the Defense guerilla movement, the FARC, and Chávez’s Cooperation Agreement (discussed later). opposition to Colombia’s relationship with the United States. Tensions at the Turn of the Century Role of the FARC in Creating Although territorial conflicts shaped the Tensions relationship between Colombia and Venezuela throughout the twentieth century, the nature The FARC was founded in 1966 by Com- of conflict changed and heightened with the munist Party leader Manuel Marulanda, but election of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez its roots can be traced as far back as the 1930s. in 1998 and his Bolivarian Revolutionary Move- Regional armed movements were first formed ment goals. Chávez began his campaign for a by peasants in the Colombian countryside as a Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement as a polit- response to the harsh working conditions imposed on them by the coffee plantation own- ers in the 1920s and 1930s (Vargas). These 3The major priorities of the United States during the early 1940s were to offer Lend-Lease aid to Britain movements developed into self-defense organ- and to supply itself with adequate military weapons. These izations with leftist roots during the period of priorities became especially acute in 1941 just after Pearl La Violencia,4 as peasants formed armed units Harbor, as the U.S. War Department advised that “the in order to flee from political violence (“FARC”). great demands for military equipment resulting from The Communist Party was able to consolidate Japan’s attacks have made it practically impossible to find anything [weapons] for the immediate or even reasonably the armed peasants and incorporate guerilla prompt delivery to Latin American Republics” (Child, 1980, activity into the self-defense units to create p. 34). the FARC in 1966. The initial intentions of the 66 FARC were to use the support base of the peas- rebels and allowing them to freely cross the bor- ants to seize political power. In 1984 the FARC der into Venezuela. In both 2005 and 2007, created a political party, the Unión Patriótica, disputes over the FARC angered Chávez, caus- with the hopes of creating a successful leftist ing him to pull Venezuela’s ambassador out of party within the government. By “combining Colombia and to categorize Venezuela’s relation- various forms of struggle,” the FARC used ship with Colombia as a “most serious” crisis legal political activity in its creation of the Unión (Tullos). On March 1, 2008, after presenting evi- Patriótica but also employed illegal activity, such dence to the OAS that Chávez had been aiding as taxing farmers involved in the drug trade and the FARC, President Uribe ordered an attack kidnapping citizens and government officials for in Ecuador to capture the FARC’s second in ransom (Vargas). Guerilla activity reached its command, Luis Edgar Silva or “Raúl Reyes” peak in the 1990s while FARC’s political power (“Colombia/Venezuela Politics . . .”). This inci- waned, causing it to resort solely to violence and dent uncovered evidence that Silva had been illegal activity. However, since the turn of the previously supported by the Venezuelan govern- century, the Colombian government has been ment, which again angered Chávez and caused open to negotiating with the FARC and employ- him to temporarily cut diplomatic ties with ing the help of international actors, such as Colombia. Chávez even suspended trade rela- the United States, which has brought about a tions and prepared for war by ordering troops decline in the violence caused by guerilla activ- to the Colombia/Venezuela border as a result ity in Colombia (“FARC”; Vargas). of the dispute in Ecuador (“United States Con- One major inhibiting factor to ending gress . . . ,” p. 2). These examples reveal that the security threat posed by the FARC came Chávez’s support of the FARC in his quest to from Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. From its forma- become a regional leader not only has under- tion in 1966, the FARC has described itself as mined Colombia’s interest in increasing a Bolivarian movement after the visions of national security but also ruptured diplomatic Simón Bolívar (supporting Bolívar’s vision of relations between the countries. a united Latin America). Chávez saw a formi- dable political ally in the FARC, because its suc- Tensions Arising from Colombia’s cessful incorporation into the Colombian gov- Alliance with the United States ernment could have made Chávez’s dream of re-creating a united Latin America (such as As discussed previously, Venezuelan lead- Gran Colombia) a reality. Chávez supported the ers began losing trust in U.S. involvement in FARC’s activities by offering safe havens in Latin American affairs as early as the creation Venezuela for its members and seeking peace of the IAMS in the 1890s. This loss of confidence negotiations with the guerillas (Gott, p. 193). continued into the twenty-first century, when His support of the FARC has caused a great deal Chávez was especially wary of U.S. involve- of tension between Colombia and Venezuela, ment in Latin American affairs. He claimed that particularly during Colombian President Álvaro U.S. involvement thwarted his Bolivarian mis- Uribe’s presidency (2002–2008). sion of a purely Latin American unity with Uribe used a confrontational approach in Venezuela as its most prominent actor. To elim- outwardly accusing Chávez of harboring FARC inate the United States in Latin American affairs, Chávez proposed to the Andean Parliament in 4La Violencia was a ten-year period (1948–1958) of November 1999 a Latin American NATO that civil war in Colombia between the Conservative Party and would exclude the United States (Gott, p. 185). the Liberal Party. La Violencia began in 1948 with the mur- der of Liberal Party politician and presidential candidate However, this vision runs contrary to Colom- Jorge E. Gaitán and led to violence that started in Bogotá bia’s alliance with the United States, because but later became pervasive in the Colombian countryside. Colombia has allowed the United States to set La Violencia killed around 200,000 people and forced up bases in order to help solve its problems of hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes to avoid drug trafficking and guerilla activity. This being the targets of violence due to political affiliation. This civil war ended with the creation of the National Front Gov- alliance reached its peak in 1999 when Colom- ernment, a coalition of conservatives and liberals, in 1958 bian President Andrés Pastrana created an (“FARC”; Vargas). agreement that would be heralded as the most 67 ambitious campaign against drug trafficking sity of cooperating militarily on border security, in history (Livingstone, p. 123). Named Plan particularly to end the activity of the FARC Colombia, the agreement would contribute but also to end illegal smuggling of drugs and more than $8 billion between FY2000 and other goods. FY2012 to stopping violence, creating peace, In addition, Colombia and Venezuela have ending drug trafficking, and strengthening found economic incentives to improve cooper- the Colombian military and economy. Another ation between each other. Before Chávez placed agreement, the Defense Cooperation Agree- an embargo on Colombian imports in 2009, ment, announced by Colombian President Uribe $6 billion of the $7.2 billion (in U.S. dollars) in 2009, allowed the United States to establish in trade between the two countries consisted military bases on its territory in order to con- of Colombian exports to Venezuela. These duct anti–drug trafficking and antiterrorism Colombian exports included more than two- operations within Colombia. Although the thirds of Venezuela’s food supply and were lost United States assured that the sole purpose of when conflict caused trade and diplomatic rela- the bases was to aid in eliminating drug traffick- tions to cease. Therefore, tension that ended ing in Colombia, Chávez was concerned that the trade between the countries required Colombia United States was using the bases to establish to find another trading partner to absorb the $6 military forces to target Venezuela. Announcing billion of exports to Venezuela, and Venezuela that Colombia’s agreement to allow U.S. mili- was required to search for another partner to tary bases in Latin America was a declaration supply more than two-thirds of its food supply of war against the Bolivarian Revolution, Chávez (Tullos). However, trade between the two coun- suspended diplomatic relations and made prepa- tries began to recover in 2012 as Colombia rations for war with Colombia in 2010 (Mar- and Venezuela sought to make up for the dev- tinez). astating loss of trade during the diplomatic and economic freezes from 2008 to 2010 (Robert- Cooperation despite Conflict son). Therefore, despite recent conflict between the two countries, Colombia and Venezuela have Since 2005, Chávez had cut diplomatic ties improved their economic cooperation through with Colombia numerous times and even began the reopening of bilateral trade. preparations for war in 2010 (Tullos). Con- Finally, both Colombia and Venezuela flicts concerning both the FARC and Colombia’s have realized the benefits of cooperating on agreements with the United States have more than just military or economic inter- undoubtedly caused great tension between the ests. For example, in 2011, President Santos two countries. However, the resolution and and President Chávez met and signed 13 bilat- restoration of diplomatic relations after these eral cooperation agreements, including ones in disputes have also shown Colombia’s and health, science, technology, energy, and cul- Venezuela’s willingness to cooperate with each ture. These agreements, which broaden the other. For example, after the election of Colom- scope of bilateral relations between Colombia bian President Juan Manuel Santos in 2010, and Venezuela, go beyond bolstering the move- Chávez agreed to cooperate in eliminating any ment of products to strengthening the friend- FARC members living in Venezuelan territory ship, trust, and policies between the two coun- (Wilpert; Buxton ). Cooperation to eliminate the tries. One such agreement is an energy project FARC stemmed primarily from the security that would create a binational oil pipeline link- threat that it posed for both Colombia and ing the Venezuelan Orinoco Oil Belt with Colom- Venezuela. It is obvious that the FARC created bia’s Pacific coast (Agencia Venezolana . . .). concerns for Colombia due to the violence, drug Other agreements involve improving infrastruc- trafficking, and kidnapping within its own ture between the countries and increasing borders. The FARC also infiltrated Venezuela tourism. Therefore, despite the extreme tension from the border regions and used its military between Venezuela and Colombia in the first presence to encamp and attack Venezuela’s mil- decade of the twenty-first century, both coun- itary forces and citizens. Therefore, both Colom- tries have since expressed their willingness for bia and Venezuela have identified the neces- cooperation. 68 Conclusion throughout their history, it is unlikely that any calls for war will become a reality. In addi- Beginning with the dissolution of Gran tion, Colombia and Venezuela have realized the Colombia in 1831, Colombia and Venezuela have benefits of cooperation during the Chávez -San- experienced a history of tensions between each tos administrations, as their military coopera- other. Territorial conflicts emerged immediately tion provided security against FARC activity and after the dissolution of Gran Colombia over economic cooperation helped restore bilateral pride in national identity and competition for trade. While future conflict between Colombia power in the region. Tensions between Colom- and Venezuela may be inevitable and based on bia and Venezuela were heightened at the begin- domestic political concerns (as some have ning of the twenty-first century, as Chávez’s argued with the Chávez and Maduro adminis- Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement led Colom- trations), the cooperation that has emerged bia and Venezuela to the brink of war. How- despite nearly a decade of intense conflict has ever, some have argued that Chávez’s reac- shown that war is not on the horizon and that tions to Colombia’s relationship with the United the two countries have found the benefit in States and his anger over being accused of maintaining a peaceful relationship. harboring FARC rebels can be attributed to his technique of “ramping up the rhetoric over an external threat to distract [Venezuelan citizens] from domestic problems, such as high 5 inflation and water and power shortages” (Tul- A similar tactic of diverting attention away from domestic political and economic failures can also be seen in los). In other words, Chávez may have tar- the current administration under President Nicolás Maduro geted Colombia as an enemy in order to rally (who won the presidential election in April 2013). For exam- support during the economic and political crises ple, in May 2013, Maduro accused former Colombian in Venezuela under his leadership, with no President Álvaro Uribe of plotting to assassinate him, a move true intentions of actually engaging in war.5 that may have been used to create a common enemy abroad in order to maintain popular support at home (“Venezuelan Furthermore, although Chávez cut diplomatic Leader . . .”). This lends evidence to the prediction that ten- ties with Colombia three times since 2005, he sions are likely to remain between Colombia and Venezuela did not hesitate to restore relations shortly after, but that they will not become serious enough to amount indicating that he was not serious about becom- to war. The most recent tensions may be based on targeting ing involved in armed conflict with Colombia. a common enemy (Colombia) in order to quell the unpop- ularity that citizens have for the Venezuelan government Therefore, although Colombia and because of high inflation and poverty rates and increases Venezuela have engaged in serious conflicts in food prices and crime within the country.

69 REFERENCES

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