Democratic Regime Types and the International Risk-Taking of Democracies: Comparing the United States and Great Britain
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Democratic Regime Types and the International Risk-taking of Democracies: Comparing the United States and Great Britain By Eszter Simon Thesis submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science, Central European University Supervisor Tamás Meszerics, Central European University PhD Committee András Bozóki (Chair), Professor, Central European University Paul Roe, Associate Professor, Central European University A. Cooper Drury, Associate Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia Budapest, Hungary 2008 Abstract It is almost a commonplace to claim today that democracies, at least, vis-à-vis each other, are more peaceful than autocracies. But are all democracies equally peaceful? This dissertation contends that parliamentary and presidential systems do differ in their international risk- taking propensity and offers a new institutionalist explanation for why it is so. The explanation is based on two assertions: the first is that the differences in the logic of accountability between the two democratic regime types determine how they behave at the international scene. After throwing light on the lack of attention paid to the actual constellation of political forces in the characterization of regime types in comparative politics, accountability of the executive is conceptualized along two dimensions: the separation of powers, that is, static dimensions of democratic institutions (term of office, executive- legislative relations, authority of the chief executive in the cabinet); and the separation of purpose, which is an approximation of actual political circumstances. The second point of departure in the explanation is that the relationship between accountability and international risking-taking (operationalized as war fighting) is non-linear. While both the democratic peace and diversionary theory literatures have previously linked accountability to risk-taking behavior, their claims are contradictory with respect to the direction of the relationship. Whereas democratic peace asserts that more executive constraints lead to more peaceful behavior, the diversionary literature finds that constraints on the executive (or the negative domestic standing of executives) make them want to divert attention and rally public support by engaging in wars. Resolving the dilemma between these opposite claims, I suggest that some constraints make states behave in a risk-averse manner, while other constraints propel international risk-taking. In other words, accountability to the electorate reduces risk-taking, while combining it with indirect accountability through the political elite – the cabinet and the legislative branch – encourages risk-taking. It is prospect theory that helps clarify the conditions under which this curvilinear relationship occurs. In short, prospect theory predicts risk-taking behavior when people see things as losses and risk-aversion when things are seen as gains. I argue that presidential systems are less likely to find themselves in the domain of losses because periodical popular accountability at fixed elections, the lack of executive dependence on the legislature in between elections, and the non-threatening character of the cabinet for presidential survival in office makes presidential executives less sensitive to the existence of the separation of purpose. That is to say, presidents are less vulnerable to adverse political conditions at home. Hence, I hypothesize that when presidents take the risk of war, they are likely to do so on the basis of a loss frame induced by international conditions – as predicted by realism – and not on the basis of adverse domestic conditions. As opposed to this, prime ministers are constrained by the cabinet, the legislature and the public since a substantial opposition in either could lead to their immediate loss of office. Hence they are much more sensitive to domestic political problems. Therefore, I expect that under conditions of separation of purpose, parliamentary regimes behave differently than presidential ones and are likely to base their war decisions as much on domestic as international factors. The approach taken is qualitative. The empirical analysis is limited to the period of the cold war and examines only the necessary conditions of risk-taking. It controls for the influence of personality, party ideology, and conflict intensity and includes wars under both domestically safe and adversarial conditions. It examines three American (Korea 1950-1953, Dominican Republic 1965, and Grenada 1983) and three British (Malaya 1948-1957, Kenya 1952-1956, and Suez 1956) wars to trace the causes of international risk-taking. i Case studies provide support for the hypotheses, but minor modifications appear to be in order. American presidents indeed base their decision on international factors, but the picture in Britain is more nuanced. First, besides unpopularity and/or a precarious majority in the House of Commons, a credible challenger must emerge in the cabinet so that the prime minister risks war to preserve his job at home. As opposed to expectations, the emergence of a credible challenger in the cabinet is rather the consequence of than the prerequisite for a divided cabinet. Low-intensity conflicts do not appear to be adequate for a rival to risk his career and emerge to challenge the prime minister. All in all, the findings support the claim that the relationship between accountability and regime type is curvilinear. Moreover, the present conceptualization of accountability can be expanded to explain the difference in risk-taking among autocratic and democratic regimes, and, thus, resolve the dilemma of the existence of some constraints on non-democratic leaders. In autocracies, the leader faces accountability through the political elite that propels risk-taking, but not accountability to the electorate through free and fair elections, which would discourage international risk-taking. The findings also suggest that the lack of unequivocal findings in the diversionary literatures may be, at least in part, due to the literature’s strong focus on the United States. In other words, diversion has been examined most in a context where it is least likely to occur. ii Acknowledgments As this dissertation is finished at last, it is time to take stock and express my gratitude to everyone who, in one way or another, helped me in the process of researching and writing this dissertation. Most importantly, I would like to convey my heartfelt thanks to my supervisor, Tamás Meszerics. He patiently read my often-clumsy thoughts and murky arguments, pointing out where I went astray and suggesting improvements. He also deserves my thanks for taking all the jokes I have made at his expense with good humor. It certainly added fun to the perspiration and misery of researching and writing this dissertation. An equally enthusiastic thank you is due to my sister, Ágnes Simon. She provided me with shelter in the United States for two months in the fall of 2006, which made it possible for me to research my American case studies. She was ready for a dialogue about this work whenever I got stuck in the process but was too proud to bother my supervisor. I am also grateful to her for reading the first full draft from cover to cover and commenting on it. I am only hoping that when her time comes to submit her PhD dissertation, I will be able to pay her back. Above all, I want to thank her just for being my sister: critical and a source of competition, but also witty and always a great company. I also would like to express my thanks to Central European University that provided me with a scholarship, employment when the scholarship ran out, and various grants. The doctoral research grant was particularly instrumental in researching my British case studies at the Public Records Office in London. I must also mention the Institute of International Relations and European Studies at Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia for offering me a generous full-time position for the last year of my dissertation project. It was a particular joy to work with my colleague, Gabriela Pleschová. Finally, I thank my parents for tolerating my long hours and irritability; András Bozóki for all the support and help he has given throughout the years; Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl and Alex Fischer for being the greatest bosses one can have; Marvin Overby, who showed me that political science was a worthy pursuit; Barbara Falk for always asking the dreaded question of “Have you finished it, yet?”; and my friends at home and around the world for not getting too angry with me when I appeared to ignore them in the pursuit of my PhD. iii Table of Contents List of Figures and Tables......................................................................................................... vi List of Abbreviations................................................................................................................vii Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Puzzle and Research Question ......................................................................................... 1 1.2 Analytical Approach: New Institutionalism..................................................................... 3 1.3 Plan of the Dissertation ....................................................................................................7 Chapter 2: Literature Review and the