Ethnic Federalism, State Reforms and Political Stability in Pakistan BY Waseem Khan Thesis submitted to the Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan in the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Ph.D.
Political Science
Department of Political Science Faculty of Social Sciences Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan Session 2016-2019
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Author’s Declaration
I Waseem Khan hereby state that my PhD thesis titled “Ethnic Federalism, State Reform and Political Stability in Pakistan” is my own work and has not been submitted previously by me for taking any degree from this University Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan or anywhere else in the country/world.
At any time if my statemnet is found to be incorrect even after my Graduation the University has the right to withdraw my PhD degree.
Waseem Khan
Date: Nov 25, 2019
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Acknowledgements
I am thankful to Dr. Zahid Ali Khan, my thesis supervisor for his incalculable support, encouragement, guidance, valuable comments and suggestions ranging from the concept formation until the completion of this thesis with nice patience. While not his substantial inputs, this analysis would never start up during this form. I would conjointly prefer to categorical my deep gratitude to Assistant Professor Dr. Manzoor Ahmad. I am humbly grateful to any or all and deeply regret that I am unable to list all their names.
I would, however, prefer to cite some of those who have provided me assistance to finishing up this research: Dr. Shehzad Khan and Manzoor Khan.
And last, I warmly want to record my deepest like for my parents, whose dedications, contributions, scarifies and steering towards building my life are merely countesses.
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Dedication
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, who have continuously supported me throughout my journey, especially to my father, who taught me that even the largest task could be accomplished if it is done with a sincere heart and mind.
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Abstract
This dissertation investigates and looks at the process and structure of ethnic federal arrangement in Pakistan. Pakistan contains around 210 million individuals and roughly around 50 ethnic and linguistic groups. The “ethnic-federal” experiment devolving powers to ethnic groups or provinces goes against the centralized nation building of the previous governments. The previous governments utilized an alternate model; they gave much accentuation to 'Pakistani nationalism' as a bringing together idea and promotes centralization instead of ethnic or provincial autonomy.
In any case, in 1973 and after that in 2010, the new ruling party in power, who had begun their development for provincial self-rule, has upheld ethnic-federalism by focusing on that it could engage and adjust the various ethnic groups and lessen conflict.
Thus, the overall unified structure of the past regimes has been supplanted by a “federal” framework' comprises of four ethnically provinces with local government self- administrative districts that could practice their very own political power and legitimate identities. Accordingly, ethnicity and federalism have turned into the central point in sorting out the political and regional space in the Pakistan.
Since the presentation of the eighteenth amendment in 2010, there have been wide- ranging claims particularly by several Pakistani scholars that federal structure would bring political stability. This short period of survival may not be sufficient to assure the continuation or sustainability of the framework; however it triggers an enthusiasm to see how it has able to endure and furthermore to take part in finding the conceivable clarifications with respect to the trend and pattern of the rebuilding procedure. In this
ix manner, this investigation made a close analysis and examination of the procedure so as to decide if ethnic federalism in Pakistan is a fitting model to bring political stability and enable and equalize the various and unique ethnic communities with regards to united and workable Pakistani state.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ...... vii
Dedication ...... viii
Abstract ...... ix
List of Tables ...... xvi
List of Figures ...... xvii
Acronyms and Glossary ...... xviii
Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1
1.1 Evolution of the Federalism ...... 3
1.1.1 The Colonial Heritage ...... 3
1.1.2 In Search of the Parity between Wings: 1947-1971 ...... 5
1.1.3 Restrictive Federalism of the Majority: The 1973 Constitution ...... 7
1.2 Problem Statement ...... 11
1.3 Research Objectives ...... 12
1.4 Research Questions ...... 12
1.5 Significance of the Research ...... 13
1.6 Research Methodology...... 13
1.7 Limitation and Delimitation ...... 20
1.8 Structure of the Current Study ...... 22
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework ...... 24
2.1 Background of the Study ...... 24
2.2 Theoretical Framework ...... 34
2.3 Understanding Federalism ...... 35
2.3.1 Federation vs Federalism ...... 35
2.3.2 Federalism – A Normative Concept ...... 36
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2.3.3 Regional Representation on Central Level ...... 42
2.3.4 Rule of Law and Representation ...... 43
2.3.5 Democracy and Constitutionalism ...... 44
2.3.6 What Decides the Working of Government Frameworks? ...... 46
2.3.7 Symmetry and Asymmetry ...... 47
2.3.8 Economic and Fiscal Problems ...... 48
2.3.9 The Role of Political Parties ...... 50
2.4 Federalism in a way of Persistent Political Deal ...... 54
2.4.1 Difference among Federalism and Federation ...... 55
2.4.2 Federalism in Multiethnic Societies ...... 55
2.5 Understanding Ethnicity ...... 56
2.6 Understanding Ethnic Federalism ...... 60
2.7 Ethnic Federalism in Pakistan ...... 67
Chapter 3: Ethnic Federalism and Factors behind its Emergence in Pakistan ... 70
3.1 One Unit Scheme and its Repercussions on Ethnic Politics ...... 71
3.2 The Rise of Ethno-Nationalist Movements Against One Unit Scheme ...... 78
3.3 The Constitutional Quest for Ethnic Federalism, Autonomy or Self Rule . 88
3.4 Federalism, Autonomy and Self Rule since Independence ...... 90
3.5 Federalism, Autonomy and Self Rule in Constitution of 1956 ...... 90
3.6 Federalism, Autonomy and Self Rule in Constitution of 1962 ...... 92
3.7 Federalism, Autonomy and Self Rule in Constitution of 1973 ...... 94
3.8 Federalism, Autonomy, Self-Rule and 18th Amendment ...... 96
Chapter 4: The Process of Ethnic Federalism in Pakistan ...... 98
4.1 Structure and Features of the Provinces on Ethnic Status ...... 98
4.1.1 The Features of the Provinces ...... 106
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4.1.2 The Provinces Asymmetric Structure ...... 107
4.1.3 The Ethnic Configurations of the Provinces ...... 109
4.1.4 Socio-economic Variations among the Provinces ...... 111
4.1.5 Administrative Structures in the Provinces ...... 115
4.2 The 18th Amendment and the 1973 Constitution ...... 117
4.2.1 Constitutional Distribution of Power ...... 117
4.2.2 18th Amendment ...... 126
4.2.3 Identity and Representation ...... 129
4.2.4 A faulty Arrangement: The Power are Concentrated in the Post of Prime Minister ...... 130
of the Federal Government ...... 130
4.2.5 Ambiguities in the Constitution ...... 133
4.3 Distribution of Fiscal Power ...... 135
4.3.1 Vertical Imbalances in the Fiscal Distribution ...... 135
4.3.2 Horizontal Imbalances ...... 143
4.3.3 Allocation of Budget Procedure and Subsidy to the Provinces ...... 145
4.3.4 Budget Subsidy and Straight Transfers in NFC ...... 153
4.3.5 Grants in Aid in Budget to Provinces ...... 154
Chapter 5: Baluchistan Province ...... 158
5.1 General Overview...... 159
5.2 Arrangement of Ethnic Communities and their Relations in the Province ...... 163
5.3 History of Major Ethnic Conflicts in the Province ...... 166
5.4 Structure of the province ...... 169
5.4.1 Governance and Administration ...... 169
5.4.2 The Provincial Executive and Legislative Powers...... 172
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5.4.3 Man Power in the Provincial Civil Service and Bureaucracy...... 174
5.5 Emerging Issues in the Province ...... 176
5.5.1 Emergence of Ethnic Strains ...... 176
5.5.2 Settlers Issue ...... 181
5.5.3 Corruption and Inefficiency ...... 184
Chapter 6: Sindh Province ...... 187
6.1 General Overview...... 188
6.2 Arrangement of Ethnic Communities and their Relations in the Province ...... 190
6.3 Structure of the Province...... 191
6.3.1 Governance and Administration ...... 191
6.3.2 The Provincial Executive and Legislative Powers...... 193
6.3.3 Man Power in the Provincial Civil Service and Bureaucracy...... 195
6.4 Emergence of Ethnic strains ...... 196
6.5 Settlers Issue and Intra-ethnic and Inter-ethnic Conflicts ...... 198
Chapter 7: Implications of Ethnic Federalism in Pakistan ...... 201
7.1 Successes Associated to Ethnic Federalism in Pakistan ...... 201
7.1.1 Achieve Political stability through the Acknowledgement of Identity and Self-rule ...... 201
7.1.2 Increase in Development Projects and Education Opportunities ...... 203
7.2 Ethnic Federalism and its Drawbacks in the Provinces ...... 206
7.2.1 The Impossibility of an Ascriptive Principle ...... 206
7.2.2 Discourage the People Movements among Provinces ...... 209
7.2.3 To Promote Dominance of the Leaders or Elitism ...... 210
7.2.4 Increase of Ethnic Rivalries and Tensions ...... 213
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7.2.5 Interference of the Center in the Provinces Enables the Domination of the State ...... 214
Chapter 8: Conclusion ...... 218
8.1 Empirical Flaws ...... 218
8.2 Conceptual Flaws ...... 222
8.3 Contribution and Recommendations ...... 225
References ...... 230
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List of Tables
Table No 4.1: Ethnic groups and regions…………………………………………………99 Table No 4.2: Some features of the provinces……………………………………………109 Table No 4.3: Provinces access to social service, 2017……………...... ……………...... 112 Table No 4.4: Health and nutrition status in the provinces………………...…………..113 Table No 4.5: Large and Small Industrial Estate in the provinces, up to 2017...... 114 Table No 4.6: Province wise representation in Senate and National Assembly, 2017…118 Table No 4.7: Provincial Assemblies seats of the provinces, 2017………………………123 Table No 4.8: Details of provincial share in federal taxes in federal budget Million….156 Table No 5.1 Population of ethnic groups residing in Baluchistan……………………..164 Table No 6.1 Population of ethnic groups in Sindh……………………………………...191
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List of Figures
Figure No. 3.1 Central intervention in the provinces………………………..…………..72 Figure No: 3.2 Ethnic conflicts over the time……………………………………..……...81 Figure No 4.2: Federal Revenue Assignments as per Constitutional Provision………..37 Figure No 4.3: Provisional Revenue Assignments as per Constitutional Provision…....138 Figure No 4.4: Vertical fiscal imbalance in Percent……………………………………...141 Figure No 4.5: horizontal distribution of divisible pool taxes…………………………...143 Figure No 4.6: Resource distribution under various NFC award…………………...….149 Figure No 4.7: Revenue sharing formula for 7th NFC…………………………………...150 Figure No 4.8: NFC over the time………………………………………………………...151 Figure No 4.9: Share of the provinces in the divisible pool……………………………..152 Figure No 4.10: Design of grants/ Constitutional subvention in NFC awards………...155 Figure 5.1: Ethnic configuration in the province……………………………………..…165
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Acronyms and Glossary
AL Awami League ANP Awami national party BD Basic Democracies BPLF Baluchistan People's Liberation Front BRAS Baloch Raji Ajoi Sangar BRT Bus Rapid Transport C&C Commander and Chief CCI Council of Common Interest CM Chief Minister DRGO The Distribution of Revenues and Grants-in-Aid Order EU European Union FATA Federally administered tribal area GB Gilgit Baltistan GDS Gas Development Surcharge GG Governor General GHQ General Head Quarter HDI Human Development Index JI Jamat Islami JUI Jamiat Ulema Islam KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa MCC Metallurgical Corporation of China Ltd MNA Member of National Assembly MPA Member of Provincial Assembly MQM Muttahida Qaumi Movement NEC National Economic Council NFC National Finance Commission NWFP North West frontier Province PBS Pakistan Bureau of Statistics PKMAP Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party PM Prime Minister PML-N Pakistan Muslim league-Nawaz PPI Punjabi Pukhtun Itihad PPP Pakistan people’s party SMEDA Small and Medium SSM Saraiki Sooba Mahaaz UNDP United Nation Development Programme UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund USA United States of America USSR United States of Soviet Russia
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Pakistan is a fragmented, polarized and multi ethnic state. The country have confronted capricious grades of economic, ethnic, political, religious and linguistic issues which remain frequently in struggle with the general interest of the state. The Resolution of Pakistan 1940 is said to be the backbone of our constitutional composition and providing yardstick for the constitutional progress of Pakistan. However, the redundant and unremitting postponement in making of constitution that are resulting in failures and are also establishing a feasible democratic system which is a requirement for the Federal system. The perception of autonomy was automatically repressed by such unhealthy progresses that are creating confusion among provinces (Hussain I. , 2005).
After 18th amendment, the idea of provisional independence and ethnic right has turn out to be a basis in Pakistan regarding the restructuring of provinces. The political thinking and structure of centralized government had lasted for more than 60 years and are changed through different types of political aspirations and ambitions on the basis of provisional independence.
The regime of the military government replaced by democratic forces in the year 2008 which has unlocked a path for reformation of the government on a dissimilar idea that has mainly defined ethnic federalism. In such new course, federalism and have turn out to be a twin argument regarding different group in power for the purpose to form the society and politics in
Islamic republic of Pakistan. The newly created elites are ruling blatantly and openly and are arguing that the Pakistani government was assembled on disrespect and subjugation of the numerous ethnic communities that set up the country. Although, they are guided to restructure
1 the state and also change to “New Pakistan”. Possibly such newly created elites are also recognized and respect their presence and identity in equivalence. The prehistoric identification shown as a mirror picture of specific cultural group and ethnic feature which are lacking to be a sign of genuine Pan-Pakistanian individuality. Therefore, the new-fangled idea emerged in
Pakistan is likened using the collection of its indigenous communities which having absolute right for self-rule (Balcha, 2006). Concerning illustration, one can recognize that region-based political bunches clinched alongside Pakistan bring truly composed of political control that is generally around to ethnic identities. Throughout pioneer times, there needs to be a historical backdrop of political negotiations towards different aggregations in the subcontinent of the
India along with ethnic lines (Talbot, 1988).
Accordingly, the unlike ethnic groups which are formed and a part of Pakistan at its initiation such as Sindhis, Bengalis, Balochis, Punjabis and Pakhtuns that were at unlike moments before division of the India which is identified for their enthusiastic political tension contrary to the colonizers of British. Thru the formation of the Pakistan and the unification of such communities into a single political entity, the groups are demanding for regional autonomy that is converted under strain for the territorial political freedom inside the new country’s government (Amin, 1988). There is a substantial number of studies based on the twin phenomena of ethnic conflict and ethnonationalism in Pakistan. By emphasizing more on such optimistic investigation, the argument regarding the institutional imbalance of Pakistan is inherited during periods of independence under system called as “bureaucratic-military oligarchy”. Such system was accountable in bigger area for the aim to make it harder and persistence of ethnicity-based politics (Malik, 1997).
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Therefore, this study will be focused on demands of politics regarding ethnic groups for local sovereignty and the federal design of the state and ethnicization of politics of country or the procedure of expressing political and economic challenges through ascriptive ethnic identities. Furthermore, the ethnic conflict are functions of government rules that are excluded specific ethnic groups from participating in politics and also those who can create and manipulate federal structures. This study will also focus on federal scheme in order to search relationships concerning “ethnic federations”. In short, ethnic federation are serving to assist long-lasting demands of peoples regarding politics based on individuality, homogenization and recognition of new groups around ethnic identity for competition, prominence of politics and its benefits.
1.1 Evolution of the Federalism
To examine the progression of federalism in Islamic Republic of Pakistan, we must consider those pioneer legacies and two stages of pre-federalization from period starting from
1947 to 1971 and What's more federalization staring from period 1973 to till date. The initial stage was described by the centralization of power and the disposal of federal structure inside western Pakistan. The second stage was described by federalism which are recovered and progressed steadily against formidable challenges in the centralist context regarding governmental power (Waseem, 2010).
1.1.1 The Colonial Heritage
The progress of federalism in Indian State made a significant leap in way of the Indian
Act of 1935 which required to assist various local aspirations throughout the subcontinent of
India that is necessities for regional independence. The high command of the Muslim League
3 rejected the territorial conception of federalism due to incapability in order to control the provinces where Muslims are in greater numbers. The province of Punjab has not a government of Muslim League party while NWFP was governed by Congress party. The other provinces such as Sindh and Bengal have formed weak union of state and sometimes functioning separately from the order framework of the party, “Muslim League”. But, the party was finally forced to meet the demands of Muslims where they are in majority and needed to get the supporting role from provinces regarding Muslims. The Lahore Resolution of 1940 approved by the Muslim League party that required an independent government in the areas where
Muslims are in majority (Waseem, 1990).
Then again, the Lahore Resolution of 1940 was replaced by resolution which was approved by the conference of Muslim Legislators in 1946 which pursued to unite all parts that are protected by former into a challenging unit. But, the Lahore Resolution of 1940 was praised in light of the fact that it publicly rationalized the Muslim league agenda of separation. Muslim league additionally emphasized the desires (with) Bengali nationalist Federalists, Sindhi,
Baluchi and Pakhtun who understood as the basis for another social agreement between the provinces, to be part of the new state (Waseem, 1990). The three elements of the ethno- nationalist elite’s state that Quaid e Azam imagined a confederacy for Pakistan, Act of India
1935 gave no role to the Center, and independent and autonomous provinces reached an agreement in order to launch new federation (Waseem, 2010).
However, the constitutional thought of mainstream, the highest power of the country after the division during 1947 that was transferred to two domains in descending order and not in an ascending order. The perceived federal necessities of the Lahore Resolution of 1940 was continued to be inoperative at local level. The fact that two domains were well-thought-out
4 defenseless and apparent aggressive plans of India which leads to pressed the ruling leaders in the direction of the centralization of wholly significant power in the hands of Karachi and then of Islamabad. The center has accumulated enormous powers under various sections such as
9(5), 8(2), 92(A) and 102 of the Indian Independence Act of 1947 (Salamat, 1992). Therefore,
Pakistan was constructed in anomalous situation of politics that are leading to two contrary methods such as federalism is only choice for a possible type of state and to do insofar as probable which is needless (Waseem, 2010).
1.1.2 In Search of the Parity between Wings: 1947-1971
From the beginning, Pakistan has encountered the enigmatic problem of an imbalanced federal structure due to preponderance of demographic features of province regarding East
Pakistan with fifty five percent of total population. The governing elite that is based on western domain which enjoyed administrative, economic and political power. In addition, western domain avoided the gloomy scenarios of granting a permanent position of majority peoples to the east domain. This pushed the plan of equality between domains in relations of fair representation in parliament. The value of equality mainly emphasized on Nazim Uddin report of 1952 which are providing a two-house parliament with sixty and two hundred members in lower and upper houses, for each domain, respectively. Afterward, formula of Mohammad Ali
Bogra's 1953 mainly included ten and one hundred sixty-five seats for East Pakistan in lower and upper houses and forty and one hundred and thirty-five seats respectively for the Western
Pakistan. The Eastern Pakistan had a larger part in the house, yet not in upper house, in spite of the fact that courses of action were made for a combined meeting of houses if there should be an occurrence of contradiction (Adeney K. , 2007).
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This plan has not been established. The leader of Punjab energetically oppressed a parallel scheme for a zonal sub assembly together for west domain and was soon be canceled.
The merger of the domains and provinces of western Pakistan into a single unit in the year 1955 which is a mega province in order to attain equality with the areas of eastern Pakistan. Although, such equality helped as the basis for federation of the Constitutions of 1956 and 1962. Punjab all in all and the Commander-in-Chief specifically, General Iskandar Mirza and Ayub shielded the reason for unitary unity and flattened the resistance of Baluchistan, NWFP and Sindh province (Afzal, 1998).
Western Pakistan had its capital city in Lahore which is situated in Punjab at that time.
The capital of the country was moved from Karachi to Islamabad during 1960, likewise located in Punjab. These federalist contracts were generally looked by way of an indication regarding
Punjabization of Pakistan. Evidently, national coordination had been the foundation in order to adopt the unity, however it but it provoked a ferocious reaction in response of ethno-nationalist activities in NWFP, Baluchistan and Sindh province. The previous territories of western
Pakistan were reestablished during 1970, when province of Baluchistan was at first settled a province. The areas in Pakistan, different to India, have not been recognized on the premise of dialect. In addition to their central societies, these territories contained minorities of huge ethnic groups which kept up their common goals such as Siraiki speakers in southern Punjab, Hindko speakers in the Hazara division of NWFP, Pakhtuns in Balochistan and Mohajir (Urdu speakers migrated from India) in Sindh. The governing elite in Pakistan found the language is unsatisfactory which an authentic basis of their uniqueness is. In India, language was present and religion was a constitutional category (Adeney, 2007).
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In Pakistan, the concept of religion is present; however, dialect was out of cause for its perceived potential regrading destabilization of politics (Rahman T. , 1996). This has served the request of the day to make dialect based areas. The prerequisite of a majority peoples which are 2/3rd in two councils of parliament in order to make another province. Notwithstanding assent in the get together of influenced territories, has made it amazingly hard to make another territory. Unexpectedly, in India, a basic lion's share of the Lok Sabha is required. In addition to consent in the assembly of affected provinces, has made it extremely difficult to create a new province. On contrary, a huge number of peoples regarding the Lok Sabha is required in India, in spite of the fact that views of the state’s lawmaker must be looked for (Waseem, 2010).
The program known as 21-point regarding United Front in Eastern Pakistan in the year
1954 required the foundation of federation in view of the Lahore resolution. During 1966, the
6-Points of the Leagues of Awami program once again attempted to completely redefine federalism by asking: adult franchising within a governmental system; two themes for Center, that is foreign policy and defense together with correspondences i.e. two disputed distinct currencies / a currency to be managed by two distinct reserve banks operated separately for two wings; the right of provinces to manage foreign exchange and foreign trade; and control of taxes for provinces; and revolutionary forces for eastern Pakistan. Without a concession to the quantum of commonplace self-governance between the two wings and rejection of Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto and Yahya Khan to permit the Awami League party to shape a legislature after the election of 1971 which leads federation collapsed savagely in the year 1971 (Waseem, 2010).
1.1.3 Restrictive Federalism of the Majority: The 1973 Constitution
The partition of Eastern Pakistan prompted another state of mind about federalism, since
Punjab now spoke to dominant position of a region, and all spoke to fifty eight percent of the
7 total populace. The smaller regions are focused on restricting larger part of a region in a parliament. The apparition of other ethnic groups separating themselves from what was left of
Pakistan after Bangladesh lingered not too far off. The elites of NWFP, Sindh and Baluchistan insisted on a sort of restrictive federalism of the majority part. The prime minister of Sindh
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto could oblige the requests of regions for a bilateral parliament that incorporates a lower house and upper house. The provincial dialects were perceived documented. But, Sindh province implemented a provincial dialect in 1972 when Sindhi language got official dialect status and Urdu language was deleted as Sindh's dialect by default.
Its harmful consequences on Mohajir peoples have caused linguistic disorders, trailed by many years of ethnic conflicts between the two groups (Adeney, 2007). As the 1956 constitution was gone before by the agreement between the Bangladeshi and Punjabi bunches, 1973 Constitution was gone before by a contract amongst PPP and Joining of ANP-JUI in 1972 (Korson, 1974).
The Constitution of 1973 had accommodated a National Assembly, where the larger part of peoples belongs to Punjab and Senate. Furthermore, the representation of four provinces are based on quality basis in nineteen individuals each, with three seats for Islamabad and eight for
FATA. This can be alleged communicative part of upper chamber of Senate to restrict the potentials in order to balance most of its lower chamber of Senate (Stepan, 1999). But, the effect of improved representation of minor provinces of Senate was counterbalanced by irregular choice of two chamber of Senate. The Senate has no power over cash receipts. The national spending plan could be sent for endorsement by the President after endorsement through the
National Assembly, notwithstanding passing the other house. The 17th amendment of 2003 on the premise of the Order of the legal framework of 2002, Musharraf’s participation of the
National Assembly of 342 members such as 272 openly elected individuals, 60 seats held for
8 females and 10 seats for the minority and widened Senate to 100 members, with 22 places for every province, 8 seats for FATA and 4 seats for Islamabad. It has become compulsory to introduce cash receipts to Senate, if not then the rule is to go through that house (Waseem,
2010).
The Senate electorate incudes MPAs, alongside MNA from FATA and Islamabad. After some time, the election of Senate for period of six years, with half of house are elected every three years that has turned into the virtual choice for political parties through the appointment of their members. The election’s provisions for eight representatives of FATA in which twelve
MNAs is viewed as a farce. Meanwhile. the election for two houses were held at various time periods and was it was uncommon in order to perceive the huge number of peoples regarding
National Assembly of Pakistan had a minority depiction in Senate. This happened oftentimes during periods of 1990s (Waseem, 2010).
After the elections of 2008, the PPP and its partners figured out how to get a huge number of peoples in Senate, after the decisions for half of room during 2009. Occasionally, this circumstance prevented that legislation was outside of house. This occurred on account of the
Shariat Bill of 1991 (the 15th abortive amendments). Amid the time of the diarchy during period from 1985 to 1999, the eighth amendments gave the president the authority to break up National
Assembly of Pakistan and after that terminate the central government. Subsequently, Ghulam
Ishaq Khan, Farooq Leghari and Zia-ul-Huq practiced these authorities during 1988 to 1996.
However, Farooq Leghari and Ghulam Ishaq Khan could prepare to help political parties of the minorities in provinces which is represented in Senate to oppose the greater part in the National
Assembly which is started by Benazir Bhuttos (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif (PML-N). Although, the Prime Minister mainly relied on serious help of Punjab province in lower house, the
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President mainly depending on implied support regarding minor provinces of Senate. Thus, bicameralism went head to head with diarchy that are representing the division of authorities between two chambers of parliament and state’s head and managing director, respectively
(Waseem, 2008).
The federal structure regarding constitution of 1973 worsened the ethnic disputes by making right according to law that received an appreciation of the basic communities of language that are recognized by their particular federal elements. Therefore, Pathans, Sindhis,
Baluch and Punjabis got their lands lawfully to be recognized as federative units of Pakistan under their own local rules. But, such lawful rising of representation regarding ethnic groups where they are in large numbers living in communities in these provinces i.e. Sindhis in Sindh province which can sequentially deprived the rights of smaller groups known as Mohajirs.
Specifically, the consolidation of federal project concerning the identity of Sindh province in a decade and a half created an ethnic uniqueness of Mohajir (Khan M. S., 2014). By introducing quota system along with ethno regional outlines which can prolonged to urban and rural areas in province of Sindh that corresponds the Sindhi and Mohajirs peoples. Such system discriminated the merit of federalization and more worsen the traditional awareness among the
Mohajirs (Waseem, 1999).
The improved authenticity and visibility of ethnic groups in provinces are due to lawful equality of federative units in the Senate. In addition, Bicameralism is not a guarantee of rightful distribution of resources, nor equal representation of federative units (Linz, 1997). In fact, the likelihood that federalism would rise separation that has been observed elsewhere (Adeney,
2007). Even federalism is unable to provide a way to democratization. Pakistan remained a federation under leaders of army. General Yahya has break up a unit and bring back the four
10 provinces of Western Pakistan which can put down a basis for the constitution of 1973.
Federalization isn’t democracy (Linz, 1997). Although, the subject of the preferential federation in the state of India is mainly based on centers powers to put off the provincial autonomy, interfere in the legislative field of the provinces sometimes through preventive actions and suspend the provincial legislation in some situations (Rajashekara, 1997). In Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Center is operating more pervasively and dominantly. But, the weaknesses of the major PML and PPP federal parties regarding military has opened space for the coalition and coalition alliances with the parties that are allowed to untie the grip of provincial federation in current years. India is moving towards coalition régimes and local parties have led to similar movement in such regard (Waseem, 2010).
1.2 Problem Statement
Nonetheless, Pakistan remains severely divided between the federalist and centralist camps; a division that was unable to hide the announcement of the 18th Amendment. The defenders of the federal system state that only federalism can responsible to protect the local community of a central state conquered by race of another state. However, the Unitarians feels anxiety regarding Balkan federalism is Pakistan that destroy a hope of stimulating the nationalism of Pakistan and giving the neighbors a great opportunity to participate in tactics of division and bullying.
Many Pakistani intellectuals are agreeing with the idea that it is a time for Pakistan to hold a federal, constitutional and democratic régime. Furthermore, intellectuals are believing that federalism is the only means to avoid political disaster from the state. It is the only hope of reviving the long and loss of national unity of Pakistan. Anything other than a governmental path based on multiregional federalism will assuredly aggravate the eternal distress and disorder
11 of Pakistani society. Others argue that federalism isn’t a choice for the peoples of Pakistan and that it is unlikely to bring the potential of true harmony and resolution in such regard. Therefore, some of Pakistani circles are raising the alarm and are distrustful regarding possible hazardous nature of new system of politics and its feasible suggestions for Pakistan. The real apprehension of above mentions statements is that Pakistani federalism is based on ethnic regions that are allowing in order to create a new, prominent identity and separate from identity of state.
Furthermore, the current study will examine and analyze the divergent views on Pakistani federalism. Thus, the study will focus on examination of Pakistani federalism such as those intellectuals that are favoring the ethnic federal system and are claiming that such system is contributing to the stability of state’s politics and those that are emphasizing to lower the political instability at domestic level, and to breakup and are mandatory program. The current study then confirms and scrutinizes the practicality of the ethnic federalism regarding Pakistan.
1.3 Research Objectives
The overall objective of the current study is to scrutinize the practicality and suitability of ethnic federalism implemented in Pakistan and its impact on political stability of Pakistan.
More precisely, the objectives of the current study are given as under;
1. To investigate the significant/ important factors for the implementation of ethnic
federalism in Pakistan.
2. To critically analyze the impact of ethnic federalism on political stability of Pakistan.
3. To explicate feasible choices to the political stability of Pakistan.
4. To scrutinize the upcoming prospects of ethnic based federalism on politics of Pakistan.
1.4 Research Questions
The study addresses the following main questions:
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1. Is ethnic federalism a practical choice for the political stability of Pakistan?
2. What factors are important in implementing ethnic federalism in Pakistan?
3. Does ethnic federalism integrate or disintegrate the state and society in Pakistan?
4. What is the impact of ethnic federalism in promoting the political development in
Pakistani state and society?
5. Is ethnic federalism being an only door for political disorder of Pakistan?
1.5 Significance of the Research
The current study is significant in many ways. Firstly, the current study uses theoretical contribution to the body of knowledge. Furthermore, the current study also added some additional contribution and knowledge to previous literature on federal structure of Pakistan.
Secondly, the current study also added an extra input in order to understand Ethnic federalism of Pakistan in general and applicability of such system in Pakistan. Thirdly, the current study will open ways for further studies on subject matter since the current study seems a new event in Pakistan. Not last but least, it is anticipated that the outcomes of current study will be a vital source for scholars, who are interested to further explore the issues of current study and used for reference in order to undertake a future research.
1.6 Research Methodology
This investigation used a careful empirical research technique that helped in gathering a lot of experimental data and information so as to respond to the question of the thesis. As argue by
Moody primarily method utilized in scholarly research, experimental research technique may possibly likewise be valuable in responding to useful inquiry (Moody 2005). In circumstances where the earlier learning isn't satisfactory, the best method is, the experimental search
13 methodology. The technique is regularly favored and utilized in entering the field which is not explored yet, then it may well turn out to be less absolutely experimental as the procured expertise in the field raises. In fact, a higher level of instinctive capacity might be required to effectively use this specific technique.
In this manner, the technique of empirical research could be a viable instrument to explore how ethnic federalism is really functioning in Pakistan. Since 2010, ethnic federalism is practically begun is nearly another wonder in the politics of Pakistan. To date satisfactory scholarly work has not been finished in regards to its genuine activity, especially at provincial level. Thus, particular methodology must be picked as a centering tool in finding observational regularities and conceivable clarifications of the genuine task of the federal government framework. An endeavor will be made to discover conceivable clarifications to a portion of the rising patterns during the time spent the examination as the development of the empirical comprehension develops. Moreover, the best critical methodology in examination of any federal government framework would procure of an experimental information at the operational dimension of the framework. Practically, how it work and what difficulties and openings it has confronted empirically so as to comprehend the practice and arrangement of the course of action.
The theories are selected depends on their role in clarifying and deciphering the truth just as their capacity in building up a structure for witnessing and theorizing the exact investigation.
For example clarifies by Stoker (1995) that “without theory no effective observation can take place”. Experimental interpretations can be understand with the help of theories and furthermore to choose ‘definite variables as the most critical or pertinent,' on the off chance that one is keen on investigating or giving a clarification of an occasion. Despite the fact that
14 aggregation of exact data is valuable, a legitimate hypothetical base is useful to rebuild experimental discoveries or perceptions. Besides, claimed by Elazar that the applied use of federal system should dependably lay on more or less arrangement of theoretic standards.
Therefore, to investigate the genuine working of ethnic federalism in Pakistan, the concepts of “federalism” and “ethnicity” is chosen so as to establish a systematic instrument for this study. The strains among ethnicity and federalism could be uncover with the help of theoretical analysis at the applied dimension. The philosophies will likewise comprehend and recognize the opposing situations and thoughts in the discussions about federalism and ethnicity.
Specifically, federalism theories are gotten from various historic geographic encounters; accordingly it is wrong to regard the theories by means of a standard to pass judgment on other varied scope of settings. The supposition is that the theoretical analysis can make conceivable to set up a collection of information regarding the in/similarity and strains among federalism and ethnicity at standardizing dimension and can set up a systematic instrument or structure to investigate ethnic federal structure in Pakistan. To explain ethnicity, its theories are utilized basically in its blend using the theories of federalism and to identify the difficulties ethnicity could posture to federalism, as opposed to connect with into the entire theoretical discussion about ethnicity.
The primary approach utilized in exploring the investigational data is split into two with respect to the real activity of ethnic federal arrangement in Pakistan, qualitative interviews of individuals and study and investigation of documents. A qualitative interviews were completed including the individuals from the national assembly and provincial assemblies, federal administrators, civil servants from federal and provinces, authorities and individuals from the ruling parties and opposition parties at federal and provincial level, local political elites, elder
15 from different communities and other significant sources. The examination utilized several sources for the purpose of to improve quality and acceptability. The investigation of different types of record comprised provincial and federal government archives, reports published in local newspaper, scholastic and research paper, statistical data from different sources and evaluative investigations of local government.
The qualitative technique will in general be increasingly proper at the beginning times of research and when a branch of knowledge isn't surely knew. While uncovering the true settings and dynamics applying research the qualitative interview method is likewise appropriate. The qualitative interview technique is favored in light of the fact that the genuine task or the process of ethnic federalism could be better caught through an examinations of information collected by such primary interviews. It provide a superior chance to perceive, find and decipher data through handy cooperation and associations with the interviewees. Like open ended interviews, which enable the interviewees to speak finally about understandings, perspectives and actions, can encourage an interviewee to express views and react easily. It is likewise useful for the investigator to intently comprehend the interviewee's particular explanations and implications they want to relegate and hold about perspectives, practices, activities and actions. The investigator nearby connection with the interviewee could likewise give a superior chance to see how they assemble the rationale of their contentions and the essential reasoning behind their ends. In this manner the technique of qualitative interview may seem personal, as the understanding and examinations of information depend 'intensely on the investigator learning and experience to distinguish outlines, extricate topics and make speculations'. Nonetheless, the investigation likewise uses the discoveries of some quantitative studies, for example, the reports published by the United Nation and its offices, World Bank, census data from federal
16 government and discoveries from other scholastic works that could help for further authentication.
A sum of fifty six interviews were conducted: twenty five were government officials,
MNAs, MPAs and Senator; twenty thirty were from the general publics, who represent the local community and close to the perspectives of the common people. Especially the union council’s members whose are extremely imperative and key information of local issues due to their better understanding of the politics and closeness to the common people in their area. To improve the credibility of the process the utilization of many sources or triangulation is very useful. The methodology utilized in this examination could not convey all out validity however rather it is destined to give thoughts and understandings by the individuals who effect from the process of ethnic federal arrangement. The data provided by government officials and authorities were rechecked through interviews elder, union councils leaders, opposition groups and the other way around so as to affirm the precise depiction of the procedure or gather alternate clarifications.
From the aggregate of fifty six interviews, twenty interviewees were led in Baluchistan, twenty seven in the Sindh and nine in Islamabad. The Sindh which is the second populated province therefore, prominent number of interviews was conducted there. Followed by the
Baluchistan, due to the fact that the province seen biggest number of ethnic conflicts. A qualitative interview, which for the most part uses unstructured questionnaires, brings a lot of fundamental data through up close and personal discourse. At times, a meeting from a single individual took in excess of 60 minutes. What's more, a large portion of the interviewees were chosen intentionally in view of their status, jobs and information in association with the
17 procedure of federalism in Pakistan. In this manner the nature of the interviews is genuinely sufficient in giving fundamental data.
As it was guaranteed to the interviewees to secure their privacy and so as to dodge dangers they may confront with respect to conceivable reprisal due to the interview, therefore in this thesis the names of the interviewees are not uncovered. The respondents are recognized in their jobs and position in such manner which should not bargain their security. A similar citations methodology was connected to the authorities and individuals from the parliamentarian and government officials. As uncovered in the thesis, numerous authorities and ruling governments’ parliamentarian had communicated opposite perspectives and contradictions to the official policies and strategies of their party in numerous issues because of different reasons, however they want to stay anonymous. Along these lines, the interviewee’s secrecy is ensured but to fulfill the necessity of citations of the thesis, the witnesses or interviewees are distinguished by regular number and names. For example, the citations model: '(A government official from
Baluchistan province, Interviewee 4, 2018)', alludes to the interviewee jobs, and his number, the interview year. The numbers doled out to the interviewees are categorized as, from number
1 to 20 to the Baluchistan province, from 21 to 47 to the Sindh province and from 48 to 56 to the Islamabad capital territory.
By broadening the research at the real functioning dimension, the empirical evaluation split into two sections. The principal observational section will make an itemized appraisal of the provinces, the constitutional arrangements, and the sharing of fiscal power among the provincial and federal government. The three key issues are tried to investigate in this section. One, fiscal, political and social settings of the provinces is discussed. Two, by examine the constitution that how the self-rule and shared-rule as essential federal standard is practice by the state
18 administrators. The second empirical part centers on the chosen two provinces, for the purpose to understand the activity of ethnic federalism in Pakistan, both provinces are accepted to be suitable to make all-encompassing and top to bottom examination so as to bring adequate learning. The central point of the examination are the inner tasks and arrangements of the provinces, the administration procedure in connection to the general population, the privileges of different gatherings and minorities inside the particular province.
The two selected provinces are the Baluchistan and the Sindh, These provinces are chosen due to the diverse features and structures they display inside their particular province. This would help in bringing an assortment of understandings and issues which can clarify the activity of ethnic federal arrangements at provincial dimension that may possibly show the general nationwide picture to some degree.
As to language issues, an interpretative theory was applied in this investigation, that perceives people as social actors who are in a steady commitment in making their very own social reality. Consequently, the investigation perceives that both the respondents and investigator are individual actors and both have their very own conviction, thoughts and view and in this way the result of the exploration could be impacted by such emotional characteristics. Thus, usage of interpretative theory with getting to and checking various sources might wind up supportive in decreasing biasness. In association with interview, if the
'neighborhood authorities' states that in their region the reason of inconveniences are 'non-local', this 'revelation' doesn’t really prompt acknowledge their case as veritable without checking different sources through triangulation. In any case, the data can give pieces of information regarding the connection concerning authorities and the 'non-locals' in the region. As an analyst likewise, regarding ethnic federalism, before the field work I held an opinion and view that it
19 would be a superior political system for Pakistan and that the ethnic leaders and their ethnic associations were dedicated in amplifying the advantages of particular ethnic networks they belong. In any case, during the time spent in investigating and after the exact analysis, I have come through with information in actuality. Along these lines, the study stayed open and adaptable in allowing knowledge production dependent on the pragmatic evidence and new understanding.
In this study the methodological course isn't chosen dependent on contrasting the estimations of strategies, however the decision has been made on a judgment dependent on their closer significance to the topic. It isn't the verdict of this study to overstate the standards of one technique and downplay others. Or maybe, it is thought that, in numerous occasions, the discoveries of the study are the most imperative pointer whether the strategy utilized is gainful or not. In such manner, the usage of qualitative interviews technique with an interpretative structure has been useful in drawing nearer to views and opinions of the general public in impending and comprehending the procedure of state rebuilding in Pakistan. The empirical analysis has likewise helped the investigation to uncover dynamic data that gives reflection about the genuine task of ethnic federalism in Pakistan.
1.7 Limitation and Delimitation
To begin with printed documents, these documents in most cases were exceedingly affected by the aims and biased elucidations of their writer’s. Government archives are one-sided in overstating the positive accomplishments while neglecting or dismissing other awful or negative results. Nongovernment's and different reports are additionally one-sided to the goals and understandings of their writers; the individuals who are persuaded (for different causes)
20 that ethnic federalism is unattractive (or attractive), they endeavor to connect or link each negative (or positive) impacts as a result of the federal framework. However, it isn't exact to fully trust this sort of proof, it is additionally hard to distinguish the objectives, which is, obviously, a challenging job for any study that needs to find realities as they are in the ground.
The above mentioned and different factors affected the interview process itself. The discussion about politics and ethnicity was very risky in the provinces and local level as the people dread that their livelihood and security may be compromised by revealing some vital information.
Once in a while, in this way, private meetings on political issues appear as spy or intelligence work to comprehend the realities on the ground. Gathering of confidential data basically relies upon individual trust; consequently, it is exceptionally hard to approve such sorts of data in different interviews without compromising the security of the interviewees; accordingly some important data could be disposed of. At times people deliver certified proclamation that are in opposition to what they say in non-official discussions, and accordingly it ends up hard to distinguish which one is 'reality'; so in such circumstance individual understanding and partiality was utilized yet at the same time with a peril of defiling the data.
An ethnic solidarity additionally impacts the information accumulation procedure; in regions where the assumed dangers from other ethnic communities are felt approaching, the individuals who nationally recognize their selves using the provincial as well as local administration will in general depict the framework as profitable to them. While, in different regions, without such assumed dangers, they in general condemn the local and provincial administration regardless of whether they have a place inside a similar ethnic gathering. In different circumstances, peoples belongs to minority ethnic community or from other ethnic communities who aren’t ethnically having a place with the local/ provincial organizations will
21 in general energetically disapprove and dismiss the structures and process of the federal arrangements. Despite the fact that their data may have distinctive goals, regardless it could show the extent and profundity of distrust that have been made because of the ethnic rebuilding course of action. Therefore, every one of these elements must be considered in collecting, understanding and examining the empirical data.
1.8 Structure of the Current Study
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one start with the introduction of federalism in Pakistan, evolution of federalism in Pakistan. This chapter also covers problem statement, research objectives, research questions, significance of research and research methodology.
Chapter two covers the literature review of all the relevant studies regarding the ethnic federalism, state reforms and political stability in Pakistan. This chapter also covers theoretical framework of the current study. The theoretical approaches used in current study. This chapter also cover many terminologies and concepts such as difference between federalism and federation, federalism (a normative concept), the institutional traits of federations, regional representation on central level, representation and the rule of law, constitutionalism and democracy, what decides the working of federal arrangements, symmetry and asymmetry, and fiscal and political issues.
Chapter three investigate the causes behind the development of the ethnic federal structure in Pakistan. The chapter also discusses the struggle of different ethnic groups against the central government, and also their quest for regional autonomy.
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Chapter four gives an experimental depiction and investigation of the procedure and structure of ethnic federalism in Pakistan. It centers around researching the development and features the ethnic regions, political and fiscal distribution of power granted by constitution among provinces and federal government. The horizontal and vertical imbalances in fiscal relation is also discuss in this chapter.
Chapter five and six are experimental sections which investigate the activity of ethnic federalism in the provinces. The sections give a record of ethnic arrangements, political process and administrative structures of the provinces. It additionally give some insight whether on the ground the Pakistan federal arrangements resolve the ethnic cleavages and disputes.
Chapter seven explain Pakistan ethnic federalism weaknesses by investigating the developing patterns in the two provinces. It additionally means to decide if the Pakistan federal arrangement is effective in advancing ethnic uniformity and self-governance in a sustained manner. Is it effective in sustaining: ethnic participation or ethnic clashs; ethnic strengthening or ethnic disappointment.
Chapter eight makes an assumption by introducing the theoretical and empirical defects of the ethnic federal arrangements in Pakistan. It likewise attempts to make a contribution to the academic discussions on the difficulties of state rebuilding in the multiethnic societies.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
2.1 Background of the Study
Various scholars from all over the world have studied ethnic federalism, state reforms and political stability in different periods of time and perspectives. In line with Waseem (2011), studied the federalism’s quality in Pakistan on the basis of features such as policy, strategy and law, and the absence of determination in development and implementation of state restructurings. At one extreme, federalism are moved towards center of public policy and political discourse. At the other extreme, the institutional and legal structure of government is serving as a rampart against what was perceived as weakening of its authority and unequivocal movement towards a thoughtful attention of federalism agenda under the recent administration of democracy. It was expected that the handover of ministries and departments, in line with the change of lawmaking issues towards provinces from center in order to establish a base for institutional reforms for fiscal decentralization and ethnic diversity. For example, ANP has called for the election of the president on a rotating base among federal units, begging from the smallest provinces or unit. Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) has called that the article -51 and article-106 of the constitution should be amend and the seats in federal and provincial assemblies may be created for Pakistanis living abroad. Jamat Islami (JI) has requested that the president does not practice his authority of mercy in cases involving Qisas or Hudood. The
Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) a nationalist party which largely represent Pashtun in Baluchistan wished a separate province in the name of Southern Pakhtunkhwa that was fixed in Baluchistan and the name was changed of FATA as a central KPK.
Akbar (2002) studied federalism in Pakistan and its problems and perspectives. The author
24 said that relationships between the federal and provinces were the subject of constitutional and political discussion since the creation of Pakistan during 1947. The Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, is divided into four provinces that was governed by the Punjab government which is largest among other provinces and with the predominant membership of the military and bureaucracy. The other three units demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the separation of responsibilities amongst the federal and the provinces and raised the voice for greater autonomy and political guarantees. The praetorian character of Pakistan with military that governs the country for many years since independence and has exacerbated the enigmatic issues of federalism.
Kundi and Jahangir (2002) studied federalism in Pakistan and its issues and regulations.
The authors explained that Federalism, is a type of system in which the powers and functions are distributed between the federations for the whole country and the governments for the parts of the country called as federating units. The type of government is a typical type of government. It is a direct result of the appearance that the type of government is increasingly proper for those social orders which are in nature are heterogeneous. Most social orders of the world include diverse ethnic, social and linguistic communities. On the off chance that the decent variety of these communities isn't associated by an indispensable political framework, the existence of society specifically might be in question. A federal type of political framework gives two arrangements of distinct issues for the two sorts of government that are, provincial and federal. There might be a third topic generally called concurrent list, on which provincial and federal governments can practice control on the same time; be that as it may, in case of contrasts in the activity to use the power, the privilege of the federal government will succeed.
Along these lines, the two governments get their authority from a solitary federal constitution.
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The eminence of federal structure, which developed as a logic of politics and fruitful administration and governance system to accomplish political solidarity among the different social institution in a general public in which a substantial number of nation-states, emerges on the basis of constitution. On account of Pakistan, a diverse society that is split into a series of linguistic and ethnic groups, federalism has been viewed as an essential methods for ensuring political amicability in the nation. Pakistan from the independence, the topic of federalism has involved an imperative position in every debates and discussion regarding constitution. Kundi and Jahangir (2002) also expressed that on the political scene the federalism emerged as a primary requirement of every federating unit in the country as a means of safeguarding their interests against the central government by having appropriate constitutional influence in the management of their administrative and governmental affairs. To put it plainly, since 1947 in
Pakistan the federalism has been a motto. The standards of genuine federalism, which served as the cornerstone for the formation of Pakistan in the Lahore resolution of 1940, have not been elevated to set up a solid federal state. The job of the central government and the federal organizations commanded the activities of the provinces amid military regimes and constitutional governments. The dispersal of powers among central and unit was a major issue among federal and provincial government. Since 1947 the balance of power is largely in the favor of center under different constitutions of the country. For example, the economic, legislative and administrative powers control by the center has generated dissatisfaction in the country among the smaller provinces. The denial of provincial autonomy by the center and the rise of ethnic nationalism in the federating units made a disturbing situation against the center.
This triggered ethnic contempt and division between the three provinces of the country and the
Punjab.
26
Rais (2008) explained religion, ethnicity and nationality in his book. He said that due to ethnic character problems, Pakistan faced many difficulties in emerging a consistent feeling of nationality. Religion has enraptured more than brought together social orders. Indeed, even inside a solitary religious section, various threads can be found. The doctrinal differences, the political disagreement about power, material increases and regional space can make religion and the topic of legitimacy an extraordinary dispute. Complex recorded and social elements have molded the cooperation between politics, ethnicity and religion in Pakistan, a country emerged with the support of the ethnic groups. Hussain (2009) argues that factors incompatible with national unity and social injustice, the integration of the distance between the ruler and the government in civil administration, the absence of patriotism, the lack of development of national and moral character, the absence of a spirit of sacrifice and a feeling of responsibility towards the nation. These joined with different diversities represent an issue for the society of
Pakistan for developing and creating social coherence (Hussain I., 2009).
Mushtaq (2009) studied the federalism and the management of different ethnic groups in Pakistan. The federation can change in the dimension of centralization and in the types of government. Based on unique characteristics, these can be classified as centralized or decentralized and associated or dominant federations. A few federations can embrace a multilevel frame work of power and government; and others may lean towards centralized government. It is trusted that the Federation's capacity to oversee different ethnic varieties changes as per its different aptitudes and attributes. It is contended that "the more a formal government framework works practically speaking as a unitary framework, the lower the limit of the framework to adjust to ethnic and regional divisions". In view of this proposition,
Mushtaq examine the connection between centralization of power, ethnic mobilization and
27 politics in the country. The management of ethnic diversity stays risky in Pakistan and in 1971 turned into the first state of the post-colonial era to experience an effective secessionist development which prompted the creation of Bangladesh. He witnessed the insurgences of
Bloch (1973-77, 2002-until today), the Pashtun separatism during 1970s, the Sindues' regionalism (1980) and the Mohajir preparation as indicated by ethnic lines (1990). Proof proposes that the selective plan of the power structure and the moderately unified administration have minimized and estranged a few ethnic groups in the country. This feeling of periphery and absence of shared power has assembled these groups along ethnic lines to look for power.
Mushtaq argued that that generally decentralized and comprehensive administration is bound to enable the Pakistani federation to host ethnic characters.
Khan (2009) discusses the role of the ethnic groups in achieving political stability, stating that the political system based on ethnicity persists in certain ways. Since time immemorial, humans have inherited the identity or are forced to adopt it. Ethnic identities based on language and religion are the dominant themes in the history and evolution of the multiethnic countries of the former Soviet states, Eastern Europe, Africa and South Asia. The author argues that when the culture of a group that resides within a particular locality is safe in a neighboring jurisdiction, the issue being referred to isn't really the survival of a solitary culture, yet the political, economic, and cultural needs of individuals. One of the major concerns in the political systems of multiethnic countries is the fear of domination or exploitation of certain ethnic groups and assimilation by the other ethnic group. The problem is real and exists only because with the emergence of modern secular nation states, ethnic considerations have been eliminated from the formulation of public policies by these states. Pakistan is one of those countries that are part of different ethnicities. Inter-ethnic political competition has become fashionable since
28 the first day of the creation of Pakistan. Furthermore, ethnic leadership and sensitive cultural intelligence play a key role in improving ethnic behavior, particularly during the political process.
Ahmad (2010) discussed that ongoing endeavors by political leaders to correct the elements of inequality among the provinces ought to be bolstered and supplemented by endeavors to improve capacities of the provinces. It is essential that federalism is viewed as a regulation of deep power, the utilization of resources and function at the local , provincial and federal level, as per the necessities of sub-national units, instead of the benefits of granting and
'supports' consented to subordinate subjects from part of the centralized state. Considering the ongoing reforms that have given more autonomy to the local and provincial level, the response of the center to such reforms turns into the way to its achievement. The highest level of government is necessary to be restructured, however this does not imply a comprehensive transferal of authority and control to local levels. Despite what might be expected, this requires a continuous shift from power, obligation and legitimacy from center to local levels, with the center assuming a main job in local political processes. Moreover, the center must permit the development of self-rule at the local level, and turns out to be increasingly responsive towards it.
Waseem (2010) studied federalism in Pakistan. In his project, he discussed the evolution of federalism, the relations of the center and provinces, namely the division of power and fiscal federalism, Baluchistan and its reform packages. The informal system of federalism of Giligit-
Baltistan (2009 orders) and the 18th constitutional amendment of 2010 are also explained. The point of observation the author refers to the legitimate, institutional, historical and ethical bases of legality for operational and key elements of federalism in Pakistan, in contrast with the
29 tendency of centralizing policy basically submerged in the country restructuring program.
Federal system in Pakistan has a background marked by an onward progress under a civil government (1973-1977, 1988-1999 and 2008- -) and a march under a direct army rule (1958-
1971, 1977-1988 and 1999-2008). The previous will in general be populist and reliant on consensus. The last thinks federalism as a formula for the weakening of the authority of state.
Nonetheless, central governments under military and civil setups have appeared inclination to control administrative, political and legislative issues to the detriment of the provinces.
Federalism as an image of shared power remains to more or less complicated, notwithstanding when Pakistan has continuously moved towards an overall liberalization of the standards of coordination and collaboration between the center and provinces.
Siddiqa (2011) contended that after the endorsement of the eighteenth Amendment, a competition between the centripetal and centrifugal political powers in Pakistan was scored.
Religious character and a centralized national account are fundamental to the military-led settlement in Pakistan. The nation lost its eastern wing on the grounds that the military establishment was not willing to comprehend and welcome the narrative of the various characters of the state. The force was used by GHQ against the Balochs, the Sindhi and different nationalities to keep them in accordance with the narrative of the center. For instance, in KP and Sindh, the military consistently supported religious parties for the reason that the ethnic political narrative in these provinces were compete by the religious right. Mustafa (2011) studied fiscal federalism in Pakistan. He expressed that Pakistan is a federal form of system, the dissemination of resources profoundly affect income, poverty, backwardness and over all development. The National Finance Commission (NFC) award is viewed as a stage towards federalism. In the viewpoint of the NFC grants, the extraordinary attributes of the ongoing
30 seventh NFC grant are described, as the criteria adopted in the awards for the distribution of resources between center and provinces.
Bukhari and Faisal (2013) studied the comparative study of federalism in Pakistan after
18 amendment and the United States. Federalism is approaching a significant transformation in
Pakistan following the 18th amendment. The amendment produces an aspect of relaxed federalism that is relevant to the federal model of the United States of America (USA). He examines the characteristics of federalism in Pakistan and the United States, in a comparative perspective in the paradigm of the 18th amendment and discover its various characteristics. In short, to accelerate a balanced federalism, which is a characteristic of the United States, and the constitutional transition and democracy will play an essential role in Pakistan.
Akhtar (2013) stated that ethnic politics is, in a sense, a sign of irresponsibility, in a democracy the citizen question the general policies, while on the other hand in ethnic paradigm they question only on the basis of language, religion or their tribe. These policies prevail more frequently when the quickest needs have not yet been met, as on account of the third world or backward countries. The democratic procedure does not ensure an atmosphere of cooperation between the ethnic communities. In Sindh, the community was divided as Mohajir and Sindhi during the period of Z.A Bhutto and has traced the line of bias and hatred. In the province the ethnic polarization keeps on sustaining pressures between the ethnic groups of the Sindhis and
Mohajir. A similar rift is developing between the Balochis and Pashtun in Baluchistan and on a slighter scale between the Pashtuns and people of the Hazara division in Khyber
Pukhtunkhwa. Notwithstanding, the military in political affairs can just worsen ethnic issues.
Democracy offers the best structure under which different ethnic communities have found a political space. Be that as it may, amid the recent democratic government of the PPP (2008-
31
2013), all ethnic groups have been activated and their interest for independent units in Pakistan has increased. Pakistan needs more federating units, this can convey harmony and stability in the country.
Khalid (2013) contends that, the 18th amendment gives power and support, yet in a same time produces complications for provinces to demonstrate the ability to take responsibility for improved power. It limits the authority with the undertaking of maintaining the state integrity together with the self-governance of the units in the federation. He likewise contends that ethnic arrangements and political uncertainty in Pakistan are the consequence of the disparity in the theory and practice with regards to federal government understandings. Although the Pakistani federation meets the basic principles of federalism, but it operate progressively like a unitary system. It is regularly believed that if a federal system works by and by as a unitary system, it loses its ability to host ethnic and regional divisions. These communities sense progressively uncertain and reactionary. Hence, it appears that the failure and powerlessness of the Pakistani federation to deal with different ethnic groups lies in the ambiguity of the operational dimension.
Majeed and Hamdani (2015) have studied the problems and the adaptation of the
Pakistani federation. Since independence Pakistan has been a federation, the nation's leader called for a federal system in the country, which works on the principles of federation to achieve the distributive power between the center and the province. Since the system was envisaged for the implementation of taking into account various factors of cooperation, but the federation in
Pakistan turned out to be the result of negative developments. These various negative developments have diminished the federation's sole purpose and, as a result, have provoked the hammering of ethnic and linguistic identities in Pakistan. Anderson (2016) studied ethno-
32 federalism and the management of ethnic conflicts and to evaluate another possibility. The practice of ethno federalism as a utilitarian means to handle ethnic issues stays disputable. It is a rash institutional decision that solidifies and extends the ethnic divisions and ensures severance and the breakdown of the state. However, rejecting ethno-federalism as a hasty decision suggests that there are alternative institutions that are viable and that would have a plausible success where ethno-federalism fails. He suggest that, where the ethno federal systems have failed, because no institutional alternative could have been accepted in a plausible way.
But in many cases, ethno-federalism has succeeded where other institutional structures have evidently fizzled.
Mistaffa (2016) studied ethno federalism in Iraq after 2003 and also explained alternative explanations for political instability. Political instability in Iraq after 2003 is easily detectable even by an inexperienced observer. However, the reason why Iraq has become politically unstable is a question that has received controversial and sometimes contradictory responses. Partial ethno-federalism is the political system adopted in post-2003 Iraq which, according to some scholars, causes political instability and threatens the integrity of states. As a result, the accusation is that ethno federalism formalizes the identities of antagonistic minorities and empowers them with institutional capacities. By extension, the formalization of identity and institutional empowerment mean that minorities move towards secession. So, to what extent can partial ethno-federalism be held responsible for political instability in post-
2003 Iraq? The author highlights partial ethnicism against his critics and argues that, far from being the cause of political instability in Iraq, in fact guaranteed that instability did not become disintegration. Three defenses are paramount and constitute most of my arguments in support of ethno-federalism in Iraq. The first defense criticizes the method for addressing critical ethno
33 federalism which they see as an independent variable (causing the disintegration of states) instead of a dependent variable (the result of ethnic elite negotiations). Considered to be a dependent variable in Iraq after 2003, ethno-federalism was the only viable option. The second defense investigates the history of Iraq and argues that whenever the central government has adopted a form of ethnic autonomy, political stability prevails and, conversely, whenever the central government nullifies such autonomy, it has continued 'political instability. The third defense arises from the question of whether ethno-federalism is not responsible for instability, so what can explain its existence in Iraq? To answer this question, an alternative explanation is offered. I argue that two other factors have mainly contributed to the political instability in Iraq that are not ethno federal nature, namely, the insufficient legitimacy of the processes that led to the restoration of the state and the shortcomings in the processes and structures of some institutions state.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Systematically, the choice of concepts depends on their impact to the explanation and interpretation of authenticity, just as their capacity to establish an explanatory structure for perceiving and conceptualizing the observational outcomes. In such manner, the concepts ethnicity and federalism have been carefully settled a system for the perception and examination of the effective functioning of ethnic federalism. Hypothetical research could clarify the confusion for the examination by showing the pressures in the synchronization of federalism and ethnicity, in any event at the hypothetical dimension. Hence, the examination of concepts may be utilized as a method to approach the observational material of the investigation and to comprehend the conceptual discussions, however lacking of a "great narrative" to assess the experiential circumstance. This thesis presuppose that a past remedy or commitment for a
34 solitary institutional structure might be useless. On the other hand, political agreements in multi-ethnic societies must consider the setup of ethnic divisions and resistances on the ground.
Therefore, federalism isn't viewed as a static equation of regional split, but it is a transformative political agreement that can be connected such that gives significance and pertinence to specific communities and settings.
2.3 Understanding Federalism
This investigation might be depicted as a hypothetically explanatory examination (Svein
S, 1997). In spite of the fact that it is experimentally established, set up hypothesis and theory, and generalization are utilized to toss light on the thorough example chose for investigation.
Amid my work, the procedures of theoretical framework investigation have occurred all the while. It began with a starter analysis of Pakistan federal arrangement through optional sources and an underlying examination of federal hypothetical points of view. After information gathering in Pakistan and a more profound comprehension of the working of the federal structure of Pakistan, federal concepts and practices were investigated by and by, with the point of discovering clear viewpoints that could give tools to analyzing the information gathered. In this manner, there is no such connection theory and observational case in my investigation, and the hypothetical and experimental discoveries have commonly supported each other towards a more comprehension of the political framework in Pakistan. In this section, at that point, there will initially be a concise investigation of theory of federalism in all, trailed by some particular angles that have specific pertinence for the investigation of the Pakistani federal arrangement will be looked further into.
2.3.1 Federation vs Federalism
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In the study of federal system, it has turned out to be basic to recognize federalism and federation as two separate ideas, each depicting diverse parts of federal concept. Federalism is characterized as an esteem idea including ideological and philosophical points of view advancing the federal arrangement, whereas federation is an experimental reality, a particular kind of institutional course of action (King 1982). Then again, diverse perspectives on what a federalism is and what standards ought to be utilized to recognize federations from other political frameworks. King has along these lines endeavored to make a moderate definition, with the center attributes of a federal political framework:
“Mainly we can propose that any federation should be regarded as an institutional
arrangement, taking form of a sovereign state, and well-known from other such states
solely on the fact that its central government incorporates regional units into its
decision procedures on some constitutionally deep-rooted basis (King 1982)”.
As a result, the center of a federation is that the regionally established territorial entities, known as districts, locales, provinces, states, or republics were signified at the federal dimension of government, and that this portrayal is assured by constitution. This shows the central government can't alter the privileges and duties of the federating units, rather the constitution may be amend, and that the adjustments in the constitution entail accord from all or most of the units (King 1982). Subsequently, federalism as a standardizing idea should concentrate on advancing the opinion that regionally founded territorial entities ought to be signified in the national lawmaking body.
2.3.2 Federalism – A Normative Concept
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The ideology of Federalism isn't what we think through as a philosophy in its conventional sense, similar to liberalism and socialism, which gives answers to questions with respect to human presence and purpose of life, yet more as a programmatic orientation (Burgess,
2006, 1993). It could be a doctrine guide for activity suggesting and advancing the help for federation (Smith, 2014). By and large, the ideals promote by federalism is measured on "unity in diversity" or "shared rule and self-rule" providing provincial or regional benefits and some power of their own, inside the casing of a more extensive solidarity (Elazar, 1987). Federalism is in this manner frequently associated with structures of diffused power. In any case, as King
(1982) seemed, there is no vital connection among decentralization and federalism. But, centralist federalism has anyway a long custom, wherever federalists had contended for unification and combination of autonomous power focuses into bigger unions. On the off chance that autonomous power centers are coordinated into the equivalent political structure, there must be less tools for pursuing independent battles, lastly this might progressively make the world secure and stable (King 1982). This was the focal thought of the primary masterminds behind the European Union. Notwithstanding the harmony contention, combination into bigger associations has been elevated to accomplish the advantages of substantial scale economies and to wind up both financially and military more powerful against outside powers. What characterizes by King as decentralist federalism has ensured minimal pragmatic effect on the association of political arrangements.
Like Bakunin and Kropotkin the Russian activists, and other Supporters for this sort of federalism, set forward a general attention for boundless decentralization and the elimination of solid focal governments. An increasingly realistic form of decentralist federalism, be that as it may, was utilized when in 1949 the federal framework of Germany was presented. The Allies
37 after World War 2, needed to make a minimal incredible center in Germany after Nazis regime, federalism was considered a solution for their problem. From 1980s comparative advancements was taken place in Spain (the arrangement of self-administrative groups) and during 1990s in
Britain when the power was devolved to the Assemblies and National Parliament. The best well-known method for guarding the federal arrangement is to the view which Proudhon has termed "the doctrine of balance" (Smith, 1995).
The arrangement looked for stands a tradeoff among divergence and assimilation, decentralization and centralization. The political framework ought to be founded on an agreement or a pledge, where every entity openly and deliberately submits some level of independence to the Centre in return for more or less repaying favorable position. Federalism as characterized by Elazar (1987), "a political remedy for political diseases", intended to counteract oppression without averting governance.
On the other hand, mentioned by Riker (1964), that federalism and freedom are two different ideologies and there is no instrumental relation between them. The link between federalism and the freedom was further explained by him as an ideological misconception, and added that federal constitution experts were increasingly worried about of real contemplation of growing government as opposed to the ideological contemplations of safeguarding freedom.
This contention concludes that federalism above all else reflects qualities and safeties of the leaders who try to get advantages from state restructuring and institutional remaking, instead of ethical and philosophical excellences. To comprehend and supporting federations on the basis of normative approach, it is hence important to recognize the distinctive political use of federalism (Gagnon, 1993), what demands are indorsed or being safeguarded and whom profits by federalism? What does every federalism look to accomplish? Answering these queries, first
38 of all to comprehend the interests of the political leadership and every federal constitution should be analyze on the basis of institutional and social settings.
Federalism used as an instrument to keeping up solidarity or for growing control, as presented by the American Federalist as a method for keeping liberal popular democracy from declining into oppression (Gagnon, 1993). Federalism permits a progressively complex sort of portrayal, both across the country and regionally based, and this gives some division of power and along these lines averts focus of power in few hands. From one perspective, if political elites of the autonomous regional governments have divisive interests, they wouldn’t be capable to extend their interests to different regions. Then again, the presence of state governments which are autonomous gives the rampart for personal freedoms against any conceivable infringement by the government. The federal structure is here supported as a method for checking power and can be comprehended as a piece of the overall standard of governing rules of the political system of America (Burgess 1993). For what reason the political leaders are eager to acknowledge the federal deal of balanced governance? As claimed by Riker that the longing to grow regional dominance or the dread of outer military danger are constantly existing while federalism is picked which is based on building of a political system of 1964. The politicians who propose the federal deal want to increase their region and politicians who acknowledge the deal are happy to surrender some autonomy for union so as to be shielded from outer foes. Riker contends that the Constitution of America, which built up the federal system in the United States, ensured strong military inspirations (Riker, 1964). As understood by the first thirteen states that so as to extend the new nation and unify its strength it was more productive to deal than to win. Alternate states felt compromised by the centralizing forces and remained happy to acknowledge the deal since these states didn't have the power or the
39 motivation to confront armed encounters. In the same lines, the Swiss federation was founded by military contemplations, while the regions where liberal nationalist were in power, needed to extend their strength and after the end of military showdown joined the preservationist
Sonderbund cantons.
This explanation of federalism by Riker's is an a reaction to the longing for military danger and extension may give a clarification that why federal system has been picked in circumstances where already free states looked for together in a more extensive association. In circumstances where initially unitary states have rebuilt to end up federation, different clarifications are required. At the point after unitary nations pick federalism by means of the standardized foundation for political restructuring, the danger of crumbling and the requirement to keep up solidarity are frequently the real contentions. Peace promotion or convenience of contrasts are seen as fundamental to forestall disintegration of the state, and here federalism offers an answer. In spite of the fact that federalism in its underlying structure was not intended to direct clashes dependent on ethnicity or other personality contrasts, federalism is imagined as one of the best gadgets to quiet clashes among gatherings and between the focal state and sub-national groups. Horowitz (1997), McGarry and O'Leary (1995), Coakley (2000), Hechter
(2000) and Ghai (2000) are among the individuals who contend for federalism as a fitting technique to oblige distinction in multiethnic countries. Federalism for example arranged by
Horowitz as one of the auxiliary procedures to regulate the conflict. Combined with democratic changes, federalism would be instruments to alter the institutional structure in which clashes happen, "altering the structure of incentives for political actors without making any promises about ethnic outcomes".
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To co-operate across ethnic limits the point is to make it pay, as expressed by Horowitz, while presenting Nigeria as a test case, where the difference in federal framework was done by modifying the composition and number of the ethnic groups in the federating entities from the first to the second republic as a result the clashes among different ethnic groups has repressed.
As claimed by Hechter (2000) that federalism builds self-government, in which the secession demand is compatibly decreased. Federalism is viewed as a stabilizing method, since it meets the cases for self-rule by concession rather than constraint. Reminded by O'Leary and McGarry
(1995), in any case, that clashes in multi ethnic states was not unraveled by federalism because at the government level the minorities are still outnumbered. In such cases like India and Nigeria demonstrate that federalism has not unraveled clashes dependent on contrasts, however has just overseen and managed them.
Federalism does not forestall secession as argued by Kymlicka (1998), yet is fairly a venturing stone for gatherings which are picking freedom. Burgess (1993) expressed that where the local self-rule is presented in federal states expands the longing for further self-rule, and thus prompts uncertainty and increased nationalism. In Spain and Canada, where units are established on the basis of national lines or ethnicity, demonstrate that the cases for secession has not been disposed of by federalism. The federal framework is asymmetrical in Spain: the noteworthy nationalities have increased further self-rule than alternate locales. Asymmetrical federal structure may have one complication that a state gains more self-rule, but at the central level it have less impact. At the point while this is the situation, it will be less enticing for an area to stay inside the more extensive system, and progressively alluring to withdraw. As presumes by Kymlicka (1998) that if a multiethnic federal structure is effective in pleasing national minorities, the further it strengthen the feeling of these minorities that they are
41 independent individuals with inalienable privileges to self-rule, whose interest in the bigger political nation is contingent and revocable.
2.3.3 Regional Representation on Central Level
Despite the fact that bicameralism is "the natural ally of federalism" provincial entrenchment isn't really done through a bicameral system, however could likewise be organized unicamerally. This has occurred in the federation of Pakistan. As King (1982) has brought up, it isn't the genuine institutional game plan which is critical, however the way that local interests are spoken to and have a genuine representation in central decision making. In any case, most federation have picked a bicameral framework as the most appropriate in consolidating central and regional portrayal. The first or lower chamber would regularly fill the capacity of speaking to the interests of the federation in general and fill in as a power base for the focal government. The second or upper chamber fills in as a delegate institution for the federating entities of the federation (Sharman, 1987). Second chambers would fill diverse needs, as per what sort of federalism and federal convention the federal framework depends on.
Federalism is used a device for power separation and checking in countries, like
America, the power of the national government is checked by Senate or Second chamber. In federal frameworks with a parliamentary custom or whereas federalism is utilized to look after solidarity, the Senate or second chamber is set up to guarantee that all lawful activity of the central government require the consultation of the inhabitants of smaller provinces as it accomplishes for increasingly populated areas. In the different federal frameworks, the representative in the second chambers have distinctive methods for being selected and are accordingly speaking to various types of provincial interests (Sharman, 1998). In Germany they
42 might be representatives from the state administrators, in Switzerland they are chosen by the state assemblies, or In American federation they are directly elected by the general population.
When a local units is represented in federal states on the central level it generate an issue
(King, 1993). Would need be given to meet equivalent portrayal of units all things considered or identical portrayal of its residents? At the point when in second chamber every state has an equivalent number of delegates, it implies that little states have similar vote from larger and progressively crowded states. As a result of this, an unequal weight is given to the individual vote of every citizen in the different states and it may appear to be unjustifiable that littler states ought to have a bigger number of delegates per resident than the larger ones. At the point once federation have chosen to give an areas the quantity of delegates as per number of residents in each state, it implies that littler states have many less votes in the second chambers than the more populated ones. Smaller states may then feel frail and segregated. In the United States, need is given to equal portrayal of states, and consequently the Alaska which have less population has the same number of delegates as the significantly more congested New York. In
Switzerland, Canada and Germany have unequal portrayal of the regions, giving a greater number of votes to the bigger than the smaller states. A totally proportionate portrayal is still hard to accomplish, so a compromise is tried to address the most obvious differences. In
Canada, for instance, the vast region of Québec has six times the number of delegates as the modest Prince Edward Island, yet the vote of every inhabitant in Prince Edward Island is given
17% more weight than in Québec (King, 1993).
2.3.4 Rule of Law and Representation
According to Watts, there must be explicit systems for by what means territorial portrayal might be changed. In federation, local self-rule and provincial portrayal is intrinsically
43 ensured, which implies that the focal government has no legal appropriate to nullify, correct or rethink regional entities and the constitution can't be modify without an unprecedented lion's share of the federating units. At the point when the rule of law is so much emphasized, the manner by which the constitution is explained is of incredible significance and the individuals who decipher it ought to be totally free from political powers. Many federations depend consequently on the courts to assume the essential mediating job in deciphering the constitution and adjusting it to evolving conditions (Watts, 1998). The Swiss federation has exemption, where the referendum has the significant resolving job in describing the boundaries of federal jurisdiction.
2.3.5 Democracy and Constitutionalism
Federalism implies as indicated by the past explanation, a government completely constitutional in which residents and areas are genuinely spoken to at the central government level. This infers the government must be exposed to the law and focused on the standard of constitutionalism, however is it essentially mean the Western, liberal democratic feeling of accentuation on the law? This is also discussed by Burgess (1993) contends that organizations, so as to be genuine, can't be an aftereffect of force and compulsion from above or continued by the threat of armed force. Elster and Slagstad (1988) expressed that constitutionalism for the most part alludes to is constraining the powers of state. These points of confinement are in some sense purposeful and are going for making the rulers responsible to the law and anticipating discretionary activities.
King (1982) deduces in a similar manner by expressing that just those administrations which are subjected to the law, and consequently exercise majority rules system, were refereed as federation. The government system of both Yugoslav and Soviet ought to in this way not be
44 considered as authentic, in light of the fact that the solidarity of their ethno-territorial units was kept up from above through force. Different scholars of federalism have a progressively adequate opinion upon the connection among vote based system and federations. Riker claims, as recently referenced, that the connection among freedom and federalism and democracy is an ideological false notion. A ramifications of this contention is that one ought not to underestimate the democracy of Western liberal federations. Despite the fact that there is guideline of law, portrayal of residents and locales at the central dimension isn't really effective and genuine. Smith calls attention to that recognize that federal activities may take an assortment of structures which can't be basically likened with late present day democracies: "To disregard this decent variety is to restrain our comprehension of organizations and to ruin relative investigation, let alone to overlook the way that multi-ethnic strategies whose popularity based accreditation are suspect might be equipped for proceeding onward to try different things with progressively law based structures" (Smith 1995). While investigating the writing composed on federalism, it is clear that it is one-sided towards Western, liberal democracies. The basic piece of the writing is on United States of America, Canada, Australia, and all the more as of recently the Spain, European Union, and the developing arrangements in the Isles of Britain (Gagnon and Burgess, 1993; de Villiers, 1994). In the non-western world less consideration has been paid to the federal frameworks, similar to those of Pakistan, India,
Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa albeit these have been the reason for contextual investigations in relative volumes on federalism (Smith, 1995; Ghai 2000). Federations are not steady and consistent, however change as per the moving economic, political and social situations of every nation. It is subsequently of incredible significance in order to incorporate an assortment of states in federal government studies. A federations that at first has great
45 majority rule credential, may grow increasingly coercive sides, and a federation which has experienced tyrannical periods may advance in a democratic way.
2.3.6 What Decides the Working of Government Frameworks?
A comprehension of the task of federal government frameworks needs an investigation of other formal governmental framework. According to Watts (1994), that it needs an investigation about cooperation of societies, arrangements and practices. The working of the federal and formal system and the relations of intergovernmental system is reliant on the hidden economic, social and political arrangements and the character of the internal interest communities, political parties and their leaders.
According to Livingston (1956) that the function of federalism is not guaranteed by constitution but it is the societies which assured it. Claimed by him that a state as federal not by its government and its lawful arrangements, however the interest such as economic, political and social must be sorted out. Federalism in the light of his socio-cultural theory infers that a society in a sense is a federal as in its major etymological, social, ethnic, monetary or different demands are regionally assembled, yet the different varieties are not all that good that there is no space for political incorporation. A federal government is then the gadget by which federal characteristics of a society are enunciated and ensured. Livingston theory was criticized by
King (1982), stating that socio-cultural theory presented by him isn’t able us increasingly capable to recognize federal states from non-federal states. It is not necessary that a society having "federal character" may not really pick a federal framework, however might pick different types of proportionate system. On the other hand, social-cultural theory of Livingston's adds greater authenticity to the investigation of federal system by focusing on the basic social realities, and alters the overwhelming attention being given to constitutional change.
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2.3.7 Symmetry and Asymmetry
Tarlton (1965) puts together his examination with respect to indistinguishable presumptions from Livingston, that federations are results of society. However, he emphasizes on how political, economic and social situations are influencing the connection among the federating entities and the federal government. He indicates a reality that had been to a great extent unnoticed by past studies, that federal government frameworks might be more or less federated all through its parts, and that the responsibility and commitment to federalism is dissimilar among the different locales in an federal framework. Every single federal government framework have fundamentals of both symmetry and asymmetry. Tarlton proposes that the higher level of symmetry a federal government framework has, the more probable it is that the federation will be reasonable and appropriate. The more a federal framework is asymmetrical, the more impossible is it that the federation will progress amicably. At the point when multiplicity overwhelms, the potential for withdrawal is higher, and this can require the better central control and authority to make the structure work (Mullins, 1994). The federation in current studies, the subject of constitutional asymmetry is regularly talked about as a method for guaranteeing solidarity in multi ethnic societies.
Constitutional asymmetry implies that the constitution has characterized that territorial entities have diverse connections to the federal government level in the state and distinctive degrees of self-governance from the central government. On the off chance that we pursue the contention of Tarlton's, that constitutional asymmetry will increase the level of mixed variety in the federation and in this manner decline the odds of a pleasant connection among federal and regional governments. This repudiates the molds made of the individuals who guarantee that constitutional asymmetry will improve firmness and reduction strife, since minorities are
47 given security against dominance. As per Tarlton's hypothesis, federalism as a rule, and constitutionally asymmetric federalism specifically, probably won't be as great a device for pleasing contrasts as have been asserted by others. For federalism to be feasible, the normal demands must exceed the conceivably disruptive provincial demands.
2.3.8 Economic and Fiscal Problems
The asymmetry hypothesis of Tarlton for the most part centers on that there is dependably a worry among formal system and the experience and conduct of the actors inside the system. In federal government frameworks, this pressure is existing amongst the lawful and institutional structure and the genuine link among provincial units, the Centre and the system all in all, whereas controlled by basic political, social, and economic varieties (Mullins, 1994).
The units are capable and keen to execute the constitutional arrangements of local self-rule and portrayal on central dimension as indicated by their political, economic and social circumstance.
The vital job in deciding the real practice of rights given by constitution is the fiscal relation among the center and the regions and between the locales. Economic problems are fundamental in regulating the relation among intergovernmental level, and mirror the exchange among structures (the federal constitutional arrangements), practices (the real fiscal approaches which are actualized), and society (the federation economic strength
As indicated by Watts (1994) that within the federation the fiscal resource distribution to every level of government is essential for two reasons. Initially, these assets empower or compel the governments in practicing their lawful and official obligations assigned by constitution. Secondly, the right to collect tax and the expenses, were in by them is imperative tools for controlling the economy. The constitution characterizes the expenses obligations and income sources of every dimension of government in many federations, however it has turned
48 out to be obvious that it is hard to make an federal constitution where the designation of self- governing income assets coordinate decisively the expenses duties. Imbalances are thusly made, and to address these imbalances a budgetary transfers is needed. There are some vertical imbalances, among the lower and higher dimensions of government, whereas the horizontal imbalances are among the different federating regions. Vertical imbalances in many federation is improved through sharing of particular tax collection and dependent or unrestricted favors to enhance the capability of the lower entities, whereas the horizontal imbalances are rectified by general adjusting transfers and grants in help to try and out the provincial variations. At the point when taxes are shared between the central and the provincial dimensions of government, some extent of the sum gathered in the locale of the provincial government is come back to that provincial government. This sum could be utilized specifically in the province, and the monetary arranging of the provincial government is improved with confidence. This at long last improves the constituent units' financial freedom and self-rule from the center (Roy Bahl,
1994).
The hindrance of this sort of approach is that less fortunate areas with a pitiful local tax base will loose and the horizontal imbalances will increase. This again will prompt what Tarlton cautions of, increased asymmetry in the federal government framework. The approach of limiting horizontal imbalances through adjusting awards from the center, in any case, may undermine the motivators for local income generations and in this manner increase the provincial governments' dependence on central exchanges. This may, at last, undermine the constituent units' self-rule. In any case, in the event that we pursue Tarlton's hypothesis, remedy of horizontal imbalances through balance will prompt an increasingly reasonable federation over the long haul, since it will prompt more symmetry among the units. In spite of the fact that
49 the rectification of vertical imbalances will expand the local governments' self-rule in the short run, the accompanying asymmetry between the constituent units will over the long haul lead to more control and compulsion from the center on the grounds that the variations between the units make solidarity increasingly delicate and difficult to keep up.
2.3.9 The Role of Political Parties
The political party system and their structures and role are the other essential factors of federal framework. Federal system of power distributions could be destroy or strengthen by the organizational structure of the political parties. As asserted by Riker that the party system and its structure ought to be viewed as the primary variable in interceding between the federations and related social settings. Regardless of the fact that the political parties are centralized or decentralized have essential impacts on the connection among regional and central level. The federal relationship is centralized as per how much the parties organized to function the federal government control the parties sorted out to operate the constituent governments (Riker, 1964).
This adds up to the declaration that the immediate reason for varieties in the level of centralization in a federalism is the change in level of party centralization.
The political parties level of centralization and decentralization and its impacts on central-regional relationships don't reveal to us whether a state is federal or differentiate federations from different sorts of states, they may assist us with identifying reasons for why the federal frameworks of the world work so uniquely in contrast to each other (King, 1982).
Institutional and constitutional are intended to stop political elites at the focal level from defying the norms individually. As contends by Riker that these assurances was incapable while elites at the center likewise at the local level control the party, as a result the change will not be
50 resisted in the federation. In this manner, the level of solidarity between the federal government and constituent is firmly connected to changes in the federal relationship (Riker, 1964).
Riker also indicated that how the organizational structures of the political party influence the activity of different federal government frameworks. Such as political parties in the United States, have a much decentralized structure and there is an absence of solidarity on the national level of the structure. In spite of the way that the political parties control both the central and regional level government, decentralization of the parties is adequate to keep the
President from controlling the lower dimension of the party either by hierarchical or ideological basis. In Canada, the central government is constrained by national based gatherings, while the states governments are constrained by regional parties with no national base. Elections to the two dimensions are held on two different dates. These conditions keep up the Canadian federal government framework as generally peripheralised. The Soviet Union is a case of how the structure of the main lawful party made the federal government state as centralized as tyrannies in completely unitary states. The Communist party was exceptionally centralized and hierarchical, and its situation as the unchallenged power made the federal government framework incredibly centralized and the autonomy of the regional states just a paper arrangement. Recent investigations of federal government frameworks in one-party states delineate how critical the structure of the party is for the set-up of a federation.
Popovski's investigation indicates comparable qualities in the Yugoslav state, regardless of being alluded to as federal government, the new Yugoslav state was organized on the model of communist party in which the fundamental rule was the centralization of power. The
Politburo of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia led the nation (Popovski, 1995). After the end
51 of Cold War, the local elites of Yugoslavia used the ethnic card against focal control of the communist party.
To put it plainly, the above argument has given an elucidation of the central ideas of federalism and federation. A federation, which is a particular institutional plan, depends on a standardizing establishment, federalism. In any case, the political utilization of federalism isn't really directed by philosophical contemplations, yet relatively by practical choices to sustain solidarity. One ought to look at the conditions under which the federal government bargain was presented. For what reason did the governing alliance choose to propose the federal deal, and for what reason did the individuals who were offered the deal choose to acknowledge it? These focuses emphasize the want to go beyond political rhetoric and shows to comprehend why federalism is presented in a state.
As discussed above numerous scholars everywhere throughout the world depict federalism from multiple points of view, in particular political philosophy (King, 1982), historical phenomenon and ideal politics (Elazar, 1987), ideological position (Burgess, 2000) and the program (Smith, 1995). Accordingly, it is crucial to think about the different definitions and interpretations of the idea to help understanding the discourses and being as clear and express as conceivable when utilizing the idea in this study. Federalism as explained by Elazar, that federal system ought to organize the want for individuals and political entities meet up for normal purposes and stay separate to protect its integrity. Federalism at the same time manages the spread of political power for the sake of freedom and its fixation for the sake of solidarity or government (Elazar, 1987). The essential federal standard refers to the blend of "self- government" and "shared rule". Federalism is the system that includes the association of people, political entities and groups in an enduring yet restricted union, so as to guarantee the search
52 for common goals while keeping up the personal integrity being equal. As a result, federalism is considered as an essential arrangement of political relations that emphasizes the blend of shared government and self-government inside a network of constitutionally scattered forces.
Federal framework as Elazar interpreted, the promised blend of self-government and shared government, as a wide sort of political association that embraces a scope of various diverse groups. Elazar unequivocally applied "federal" as word in the broadest sense, not just to portray a modern federation like the Canada, US, and Switzerland, however as of now a many federal system are utilized everywhere throughout the world. Federations, confederations and other confederal arrangements, joint authorities of extraordinary demands with established status and others (Elazar, 1995). For the most part, federation defined by King's is viewed as adequate and useful in the investigation of federalism (Burgess, 2000). Thus, this is helpful to consider the source of King regarding the federation which contains the accompanying four essential qualities;
1. The foundation of their portrayal is to a great extent regional;
2. Regional portrayal has somewhere around two levels (territorial and local government)
3. The units of the locale are incorporated electorally and maybe in some other route in the decision making process of the national center;
4. The consideration of regions in the decision making process can't be altered simply because resorting to the bare majority normal procedures serves purposes such as regional and territorial representation, it should be strengthened (King, 1982).
In short, federal system fundamentally includes not just devolve power to the local level such as regional units, yet in addition unavoidably ensured freedom and portrayal of these units.
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On a fundamental level, along these lines the center is not so legally powerful or no lawful authority to revoke or redefine the unit’s territories (Riker, 1964). The central government can go into the circle of arranged activities for the regions in any case, clearly, without totally compromising their self-rule. In this way, federalism relies upon situations and on the balance between conflicts, accord and assets. As John Agnew stated, "federalism is a transformative political plan instead of a fixed principle for the regional division of government powers"
(Agnew, 1995). After some time the power parity among federating entities and center might change.
2.4 Federalism in a way of Persistent Political Deal
As previous argument proposes that the framework of federal government must be comprehended by way of identifying through a sort of protected division of powers or functions legitimately obligatory and administrative on a regional foundation in a state. All the more explicitly, this one can be comprehended for example a structure set up over the standards of
“self and shared rule” to attempt to make a bond unit while protecting specific integrity. One could state that it designates one of the fundamental standard of a federal agreement that looks to advance solidarity and diversification in the meantime. These are structures and procedures that decide the division of powers and capacities between the regions and center, a harmonized agreement and the presence of an independent and shared government at the same time governing. It is a procedure in which each gathering should "equal or just" dissemination of right in the process of making decision and in the execution procedure. The insurance of self- government alongside the shared rule is likewise a stimulating activity for any federal framework. The best possible capacity of the federal framework relies upon to a vast degree on keeping up a harmony between what seem, by all accounts, to be intrinsically inharmonious
54 purposes. To look after equalization, a structure which is federal depends upon political exchange in a continuous practice. As stated by azar, each arrangements for the most part concerns assurances, consent and agreements (Elazar, 1987). Settlement arrangements include contractual relationship that must be negotiation and commitments.
2.4.1 Difference among Federalism and Federation
Federation is interpreted by Burgess that it is a constitutionally established organization in a state that perceives variety, as he communicates it, "the institutionalization of those relations in a state that has a political relevance". To show the difference among "federalism" and "organization", the scholar presents the European Union as an example which isn't an federation, it doesn't adjust to the criteria set up by what we routinely characterize this government (Burgess, 2000) according to this understanding, it doesn't occur that each sort of" federalism be called a “federation", as in European Union will basically be a national state, this is the definitive example of “federalism” without “federation”, in accordance with Smith
(1995), who affirmed that the federation must be demonstrated as one of the final stages of federalism.
2.4.2 Federalism in Multiethnic Societies
For example this thesis focus on federal government framework established on ethno etymological basis or ethnic federalism, at that point a hypothetical argument regarding utilization of federalism presents ethnic societies. The reasonability and sensibility of ethnic federalism are dubious. USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia are the example of loose ethno- federal arrangements, reverberating the negativity about the possibility of federalism dependent on ethnic-linguistic base. In comparison, some generally effective federal arrangements based
55 on ethnic line, such as Switzerland and India, have exhibited the plausibility of ethnic federalism in segregated societies. The two critics and supporters of ethnic federalism have their explanations. The promoters of Ethnic federalism, argued that it would decrease the divergence of groups, assure self-rule, strengthen ethnic amicability through coexistence and diminish inclinations to withdrawal or breakdown (Lijphart, 1977 and 2002; (Kymlicka, 2006).
Despite what might be expected, critics contend that ethnic federalism might institutionalize ethnic segregation, discouraging citizens individual rights, strengthening centrifugal forces, familiarizing ethnic zero-sum rivalry and causing perilous ethnic eliminating, dismissal and collapse (Nordlinger, 1972; Lipset, 1983; Fleiner, 2000).
The present study investigates the implementation of the federal ethnic arrangement in
Pakistan, which is fundamental for understanding the theoretical discussion and the principle conclusions found regarding the matter. The hypothetical arguments presents in this section on ethnic federalism for the most part center around the relationship among ethnicity and federalism. Investigate the connection among ethnicity and federalism endeavoring to see whether ethnicity and federalism are good or not. Thus, hypothetical investigation plans to create a comprehension of tensions, clashes or factual or assumed concomitance among federalism and ethnicity. This implied helping the analysis build up an explanatory structure or a research instrument to comprehend the federal arrangement in Pakistan based on ethno-federal structure. Nonetheless, before looking at the connection among federalism and ethnicity, a theoretical ethnic understanding will be displayed.
2.5 Understanding Ethnicity
There is no common theory or acknowledge definition to understand ethnicity. The term is characterize and depict in different ways by the scholars, for example, a contemporary culture
56 concept, a universal phenomenon, an individual identity, a specific sort of casual political association or emotional affiliation. Smith (1996) characterize ethnie (the French expression used to allude to an “ethnic group” or “ethnic community”) as a human populace named a legend of shared historical memories, similar ancestral lineage, at least one common culture components, an association with a country and a feeling of commonality between probably a portion of its individuals. Furthermore, such definition is abstract and ethno-symbolic significance and introduction towards the historical piece is a key job "the purpose of the group is connected to the historical backdrop of ethno, with its comprehension of a one of a kind and shared past.
Then again, Fukui and Markakis disprove the endeavor to describe ethnic characters dependent on genealogical or social criteria by expressing that the realty is an intricate model of combination and separation between gatherings. Therefore, they contend that ethnic characters ought to be comprehended as basically political results of a particular socially characterized and generally certain circumstance (Markakis, 1994). Like this point, Turton
(1994) expressed, "an ethnic group is not a group because of its ethnic origin, but because its members participate in common actions and share common interests". Thomas Eriksen said that ethnicity essentially alludes to the connections between gatherings whose individuals are viewed as unique and that these gatherings can be hierarchically classified inside a society. In this way, it portrays the ethnicity regarding "classification of people and group relationships" that has "political, organizational and even symbolic aspects" (Eriksen, 1993). In like manner, for the Paul Brass ethnic community there is a feeling of ethnic character that can be utilized to make inner attachment and separate itself from different communities. He expresses that "ethnic
57 or ethnic identity also implies, in addition to subjective self-consciousness, a claim for status and recognition, both as a superior group and at least equal to another group" (Brass, 1991).
In spite of the fact that the study of ethnicity faces different problem on conceptual and terminological discourse and without a mutual point of view, there are two perspectives about ethnicity, i.e. primordialists’ viewpoint and instrumentalists. The primordial conceptualization of the ethnic group depends over the conviction of "overpowering" and "ineffable quality" primordial links that originate from being conceived in a specific religious group, communication in a specific language and following a specific societal practice (Geertz, 1973).
Primordial as a term is also described by Steven Grosby as a thought refer to the entities of connections or bonds around which different kinds of families are framed (Grosby, 1994).
The word primordial was finally coined by Edward Shils (1975), he argue that in a primordial relational quality the family connection is rooted in and presents unutterable significance to the blood. Clifford Geertz also follow the same line, and contended that primordial personalities are given and unutterable that can be overwhelming or strong (Geertz,
1973). As indicated by this clarification, a few connections get more from regular kinship than from social contact. The primordialists contend that the significance that individuals ascribe to biological linking isn’t variable or coincidental, yet is linked to exceptional and warm contacts and connections that make a link from generations to generations with a deep and intimate experience of belonging and eternal. The congruence of language, blood, tradition etc., these were overwhelming and powerful. In this sense, stated by Grosby "this is one of the reason human beings have punished their lives and continue to dig their lives for their family and for their nation" (Grosby, 1994).
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Also, primordialists underestimates the passions of people and their solid commitment and devotion to sensible standards, the significance of obligations, classes and other socially developed objectives. Collaboration and closeness between individuals isn't just delivered among relatives, yet can likewise be extended to bunches that are not relatives dependent on the faith framework, ethical responsibilities, proficient interests and other shared features required or practically created past emotions primordial. The political, economic and social prerequisite have the ability to create clashes and collaboration between humankind. In like manner, primordial concepts for the most part express that racial and ethnic characters are more satisfying, yet don't address the conditions in which such traits are utilized as a reason for disparity and, in this way, might be socially "bad" in upbringing ethnic differences.
Subsequently, the primordialism on the basis of theoretical analysis on which they are based is imperfect and unreliable (Thompson, 1989).
On the other hand, the instrumentalists about ethnicity vary a great deal from the primordial origination. Ethnicity according to instrumentalists as "a social construction that emphasizes the exchange of culture and linguistic characteristics and roots of kinship with the aim of mobilizing groups" (Kebede, 2001). Ethnicity for the instrumentalists is by way of a socially developed central idea for enlistment. Instrumentalists also contend that ethnicity is developed by specific elders or community motivated by rivalry for social prestige, political gain, economic assistances or different goals and intentions. They believe that ethnicity is political and social construct for explicit and distinctive interest and position and thusly a flexible and exceptionally adaptable mechanism to oblige specific or various intentions.
Ethnic identity or ethnicity as defined by Brass (1991), includes a case to prestige and acknowledgment, both as a prevalent community and as a community in any event equivalent
59 to different communities; hence it looks for the enunciation and protecting political and economic privileges, securing of social rights for the individual from the community or for the community as a entirety. Ethnicity is also describe by him, “sense of ethnic identity” comprising of the emotional, representative or significant utilize through a community of individuals of at all part of nation, so as to separate their selves from different communities. Thus Brass argue that modernization process and their benefits could release ethnic hesitance and demands based ethnicity if it unfairly favoring an ethnic community or a region in a country more than others
(Brass, 1991). Therefore, some elites have transformed and created ethnic communities in modernizing society experiencing dramatic social change, through struggle amid contending elders for social prestige, economic advantage and political power inside and among ethnic classification.
Subsequently, instrumentalists contend that as opposed to common ancestry, mutual political understandings and likenesses of political remembrances are pivotal for making ethnic awareness and faith in a typical ethnicity. Barth explains ethnicity is a type of social association that stresses the social contrast between gatherings whose representative and social limits have been set up because of explicit biological, economic and political circumstances. He also contend that ethnic character work as classes of incorporation/avoidance and of cooperation about which both sense of self-esteem and change must concur if their conduct is to be important. Subsequently, as it were, ethnic elites or ethnic pioneers are the significant persons for enunciating ethnic gatherings political and different factional demands (Barth, 1969).
2.6 Understanding Ethnic Federalism
Ethnicity as discussed above uncovers that it is an extremely tricky and complicated subject both at the theoretical and pragmatic levels, as in this conditions the errand of
60 developing a political structure such as federalism utilizing this complicated concept would absolutely be challenging. The discussion beneath will endeavor to bring a portion of the major hypothetical contentions with respect to the issues of suitability/unsuitability among federalism and ethnicity. It will likewise attempt to analyze the conceivable connection among ethnicity and federalism.
In spite of the fact that it stays hard and difficult to build up a federal system dependent on ethnicity, numerous researchers contend that the qualities of federalism is its desire and reason to produce and keep up both solidarity and multiplicity at the same time (Watts 1999).
Despite the fact that Elazar contended that federal frameworks work best in the country with adequate similarity of major demands, he exemplifies Switzerland, for example the primary federation in present time based on indigenous ethnic and etymological contrasts that were viewed as perpetual and worth attractive. Elazar perceived that political connection at federal or something else, is probably going to be progressively troublesome in regions in which unequivocally attached primordial gatherings keep on commanding social and political activities (Elazar, 1987). All things considered, according to him, federalism may be the finest political structure in the presence of basically changeless cultural, social or ethnic and religious communities where the composition of political affairs center around these aspects. In addition,
'devolution of authority to regional levels could likewise be utilized to ensure minorities and minority groups by permitting them more noteworthy self-rule inside their own administrative wards'. He suggested, especially, in a large portion of the underdeveloped countries in which religious, ethnic or etymological assorted varieties are profound, federal framework which may be the main accommodating tool that could make between ethnic collaboration by raising “good fences” that could keep up a specific level of regional division.
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In like manner, with the point of obliging ethnic assorted variety, Elazar indicated two types of federal systems. The first type is the arrangement of a nation cutting crosswise over ethnic split and in this manner weakening them by the making of a cross cutting urban complex and, the second arrangement is, organizing a complete country to offer every individuals an essential methods for expression through at least one of its constituent units. Elazar, in any case, held that federalism ought to rise above the acknowledgment of contrasts in the long run by organizing linkages which grant the gatherings bearing those distinctions to cooperate with each other inside the equivalent political framework. Therefore, Elazar assumed that in specific situations, the federal framework offers the likelihood of making a civic network which rises above the splits between ethnic collectivities and along these lines makes conceivable the foundation of useful political order and civil society (Elazar, 1987).
By and large, Elazar perceived that federal framework could be organized on the bases of regionally fragmented religious, etymological or ethnic groupings, yet he additionally recognized the inconvenience related with regulating primordial units in political association since federalism requires bargain and cooperation, while the demands of ethno nationalist could be inflexible and consequently make federalism increasingly troublesome, if certainly not possible. Accordingly he kept up that 'ethnic nationalism is most likely the most grounded power against federalism' since ethnic ideology can weaken sharing of power in a federal system and therefore, ethnic federations may possibly fell into civil war. Considering over this perspective, Elazar wanted to support political order dependent on non-primordial or civic connections at whatever point the situation permits, however without excluding ethno- etymological federal plan in which the determination is to encourage “self-rule” and “shared- rule” both were far superior than increasingly fierce and ethnic cleansing like arrangement, for
62 example, 'ethnic genocide' without any potential repercussions or maybe the imposition of extremely severe dictator rule.
Correspondingly, Lijphart (1977; 2002) likewise supports some sort of political designing that can give political or regional sphere to ethnic groups where they can practice some type of self-rule inside the setting of the bigger political structure just as involvement in the political decision making process inside the superior political system. Lijphart theory of consociational in which he assumed that “group autonomy” and “power-sharing” as two basic components in building up a joint political structure in profoundly divided nations (Lijphart
1977). In this regard, “group autonomy”, “power-sharing” might be equal with “self-rule”,
“shared-rule” separately which stand the basic components in federal framework. As needs be,
'power sharing methods the support of the representatives of every single noteworthy gathering in making political decision, particularly at the administrative level and, autonomy of the group means that these communities have the power to manage their very own inner activities, particularly in the sphere of culture and education'. He likewise trusts that gatherings would discover pleasure in the capability to deal with their very own activities, and that would be good for firm democracy (Lijphart, 2002).
On the off chance that ethnic gatherings are topographically focused, Lijphart contended federalism could offer a brilliant chance for gathering autonomy or self-rule. Hence, by tolerating the certainty of illustration federal plans dependent on ethnic parameters in the event of topographically focused ethnic gatherings, he suggested that federal system with generally numerous and lesser constituent units might create the federal dividing lines match however much as could reasonably be likely with the ethnic parameters (Lijphart, 1994). In any case,
Lijphart suggested that the assignment of protecting group self-rule and minority privileges in
63 federal frameworks ought to likewise hold the accompanying four extra qualities: 'The bicameralism, including two chambers both have equal and are diversely organized as the most strongest structure—judicial review as durable and dynamic, constitutional inflexibility (which is hard to alter, however not unamendable), and the autonomous central bank'.
In the event that ethnic gatherings are topographically scattered and coordinated,
Lijphart (2002) suggests “consociational democracy” which incorporate four basic characteristics: segmented autonomy, grand coalition, proportionality and minority veto.
Segmented autonomy involves an allocation of decision making power to each noteworthy community. Great coalition involves power sharing of every noteworthy gathering in political power, especially in official power. Proportionality involves that political portrayal, appointments of civil servants, and allotment of public assets, and so forth ought to reflect proportion of each noteworthy gatherings. Finally, the veto power to minority, given to them to refuse any choice that can put the minority’s interest in question because of majority community outvotes.
Largely, Lijphart aimed at the significance for raising constitutional and consociational arrangements incorporating ethnic federalism in profoundly divided nations where basically persistent ethnic, religious, or social gatherings might be signified. According to him, that profound societal and ethnic divisions have turned into a serious reason of fierce clash and keep on introducing a grave issue to the foundation and sustainability of democracy in diverse society due to the disappointment of constitutional designers to manage the issue.
Then again, researchers like Horowitz, contend that federal system dependent on ethnic similarity stays unfavorable to the establishment of cooperation among ethnic groups. He identifies the significance regional devolution and sharing of power, that regional break up with
64 delegation of substantial power might have better impacts in nations through regionally dispersed communities, and on severe clash at the central level. Be that as it may, he stresses on the “incentive approaches” that can make interethnic coherence inside a political system “for societies extremely divided by ascriptive groups, regardless of whether the lines of division are said to be national, ethnic, racial, or religious” (Horowitz, 1985). Additionally, He argue, a political structure which forms and legitimizes ethnic cleavages should be of restricted function to achieve around bargained power sharing plan in countries through divergent ethnic gatherings, since leaders of that communities which are in majority shouldn’t be effectively self-abnegating by way of to surrender a portion of benefits and political power to the communities which are in minority. He keeps up that ethnically majority rule and minority rule were ineffectual and damaging sort of measures in those cultures which are ethnically divided.
He further explained that the majority rule can grants endless dominance of the significant group or the “tyranny of the majority ethnic group”. In the event that if ethnically minority community grab power, there is a possibility that they fall into authoritarian rule (Horowitz,
2002).
Horowitz contends federalism in extremely divided societies, for example, in India and
Malaysia, federalism has decreased clashes at the center on the grounds that many disputed issues move toward becoming problems at the level of state inside communities; it has scattered the drift of contention in phonetically similar countries into sub-ethnic networks, it gives chances to groups not very much signified at the center and it benefits to reorganize institution in order to change balances of ethnic groups and arrangement. Ethnic federalism as seen by him is alleviated or aggravated elimination of minorities', a community which is in minority at the center might be a majority in at least one federating units and might be have the power to
65 manage these units, in the meantime it might likewise deliver other smaller communities the sense of rejection at the local areas (Horowitz, 2002).
Yash Ghai (2002) in pretty much a comparable way mentions, a federal arrangement or regional self-rule may be advantageous in keeping up solidarity whereas granting self-rule rights by permitting 'different or ethnic communities asserting a particular identity to practice direct authority over matters of distinctive worry to them whereas enabling the large unit to practice these powers that shield mutual benefits '. Also clarified by him that normally, federations based on ethnic lines accentuate multiplicity and mixture and may give portrayal to minimal communities, for example, indigenous people whose customary culture is vital to their lifestyle (Ghai, 2002). In this manner, he alerts that since more than fifteen hundred “nation- states” won't be a practicable, multi-ethnic countries dependent on common acknowledgment of assorted variety are unpreventable. In spite of the fact that rights of the groups and self-rule could interfere in the domain of personal, he makes reference to the human rights system, which are notable by their adherence to one’s personal rights, likewise campaign for the need of community privileges.
In addition, Ghai makes the assumption about ethnic federations, in which the ordinary strains of federal system like allocation of resources and provincial power are probably going to be disturbed by supposing ethnic capacities. 'Between provincial agility is probably going to be hostile between the public and private domain might be less sharp than in different sorts of federations' (Ghai, 2002). Moreover, he claim that autonomy or federal arrangements need extraordinary administrative capability, political aptitudes, and plentiful assets accordingly tapered gathering or ethnic interests alone may not make an desired framework. It might deliver
'ineffectively equipped regions attempting to do new obligations which they neither
66 comprehended nor desired or creating less productive administrations or with leaders not given to settlements. The outcome, accordingly, could be dominance by central executives and curtailment of self-rule.
There are researchers who opposed these argument (Lipset, 1983), they totally dismiss or eliminate ethnicity based federalism in states which are profoundly divided by asserting that ethnic privilege in profoundly divided societies is an elusive slant that would prompt partition and secession. They contend that self-rule strengthens instead of lessens ethnic communities self-glorification and slight benefits. Nordlinger (1972), for instance, keeps up that ethnocentric communities are probably not going to be happy with self-rule in a federal government framework and along these lines would press for by and large secession. He expresses that: 'The mix of regionally distinct sections and federalism's allow of limited self-rule once in a while gives extra motivation to demands to more noteworthy self-rule', and, while these demands are rejected, 'civil war or secession may follow'. In a same way, Lipset restricted the establishment of federating entities on the basis of ethnicity and upheld for a federal system that “crosscuts the social structure” by underlining that “democracy cleavage within linguistic or religious groups, not between them”. He contends for a government arrangement which 'expands the choices for various sources of splits by tallying local demands and qualities to the others which crosscut the social arrangements' (Lipset, 1983).
2.7 Ethnic Federalism in Pakistan
Political communities situated in the Pakistan have historically been assembled by political power principally around ethnic and linguistic identities. Since colonial times, there has been a past filled with political arrangement by gatherings in the Indian subcontinent along ethnic lines. Among the distinctive ethnic gatherings that were a part of Pakistan in its earliest
67 stages, Bengali, Sindhi, Pashtuns, Punjabi and Balochi were, at different occasions of the partition of India, known for their boisterous political agitation against the British colonizers.
To shifting degrees, its political turmoil in the late nineteenth and mid twentieth century appeared as structured movements that required British withdrawal from India, from one perspective, and regional and political freedom for these gatherings. , on the other. With the formation of Pakistan and the combination of these gatherings into one unit, the demands of the gathering for regional independence were changed into agitation by territorial political self-rule inside the new country. While these ethnic developments have had their underlying foundations in colonial India from various perspectives, other gathering agitation have emerged for political autonomy in the postcolonial condition. Without a doubt, a portion of Pakistan's most obvious debate since independence concern relations between the center and province and ethnic movements, for example, the hostile secession of East Pakistan in 1971, monstrous military activities in the Baluchistan territory to stifle nationalist and secessionist movements during the
'70s and again under General Musharraf during the 2000s, and the current ethnically roused assassinations in the biggest city and business center of Karachi (Khan, 2014).
Federalism in Pakistan has been a maxim since 1947. The standards of genuine federalism, which filled in as the foundation for the making of Pakistan in the Lahore resolution of 1940, were not elevated to build up a sound federal government state. The job of the central government and the federal organizations overwhelmed the issues of the units under constitutional and military governments. The division of power among center and provinces was a major issue in the Pakistan. The constitutional frame work in Pakistan since 1947 has set the balance of power prevalently for the Center. The control of the Center on financial, administrative and legislative powers has created dissatisfaction among the smaller provinces
68 of Pakistan. The increase of nationalist and ethnic based political parties at the provincial level has been fanning the flames of provincialism (Akbar, 2002).
To study the federalism in Pakistan, I have to incorporate not just the nation's political elite’s explanation for the presentation of federalism, yet additionally the historic and political settings and the opposition forces' perspectives on it. Along these lines, the basic power relations that are basic in the determination of Pakistan's government restructuring might be uncovered. The explanation on what a federation is, the institutional arrangement of a federal state, is useful in my investigation of the Pakistani federal framework.
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Chapter 3: Ethnic Federalism and Factors behind its Emergence in Pakistan
The primary attention in this chapter were given to analyze the main inspiration driving the ethnic federal process in Pakistan by investigating the explanation behind the origination and conception and advancement of ethnic federal course of action. It scrutinizes whether the ethnic federal process in Pakistan is developing from a real yearning likewise as involvement of the dissimilar ethnic clusters that represent the Pakistani state. Hence, the section begins by inspecting the inception and objective of the nationalist movements, as a result of it's the nationalist movements which have started ethnic federal arrangement in Pakistan. Additionally, the section analyze the explanation of these movements for pursuing ethnic freedom movement against the centralized state of Pakistan.
The chapter additionally examines the method of ethnic federalism was conceptualized, discussed and authorized. during this linkage, the main concentration were given to three utmost vital events on the nationalist movement, specifically one unit scheme and the Sindhi and Pashtun struggle for provincial autonomy, the constitution and also its implementation. The primary step was the ratification of 1973 constitution, which formulate the ethnic federal structure in Pakistan. One unit scheme was endorsed in 1954 scheme was opposed by the Sindhi and Pashtun nationalist parties as a result give birth to the ethnic politics in the Pakistan. It is important to investigate the pros and cons of the one unit scheme. In 1971,
Yahya Khan abolish the one unit scheme and restored the four provinces on the ethnic basis and this was unanimously passed by the political parties in the 1973 constitution.
The 1973 constitution were filled by an encouraging and thus setting the future agendas and reaching on consensuses by the than political parties and members of the national assembly.
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The constitution, which was also the main documents of the state but some controversial and ambiguous concepts was filled in it regarding the societal settings of Pakistan, had turned into the main accepted legal document in the history of Pakistan to muse over ethnic acknowledgment and privileges. As a result it is an important assignment to unpack the constitution to better comprehend it with sensible clearness. Finally, in this section try to understand that the 1973 constitution can be considered as a certified legal document of the ethnic clusters that compromise the Pakistani state and its role in bringing political stability among the different ethnic groups. An analytical investigation is required by focusing on the
1973 constitution by doing so, the chapter throws a light upon the theoretical clarity, validity and implementation of ethno federalism in Pakistan in the initial stage.
3.1 One Unit Scheme and its Repercussions on Ethnic Politics
On 22 November 1954 the Prime Minister of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Bogra launched the program of One Unit as geopolitical scheme. The scheme was supposed to be legislated after the government thought that the two unequal polities of the country is difficult to administered because the two regions were separated by thousands of miles from each other and also to end the differences between the two wing. The one unit dissolved and merged the four provinces into West Pakistan and Bengal is turned into East Pakistan (Kelly, 2015).
Initially, the idea of one Unit scheme was drafted and presented by J. A Shahnawaz and Feroz
K. Noon both belong to Punjab province in March, 1949 in the Constituent Assembly stated that, all the provinces must be dissolved and merge them into One Unit Scheme (Choudhury,
1956). At that time it was reported that the idea of One Unit was also considered by Muhammad
Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan but the idea was not implemented in the life of both leaders; it is because they did not belong to the Punjab and could not or less instinctive comprehending
71 of Bengal-Punjab sentiments and also the idea was opposed by many Muslim League leaders among them is Ch. Khaliquazaman and expressed their reservations openly on the one Unit
Scheme (Mahmood, 2015).
Figure No. 3.1 Central intervention in the provinces
Source: Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives (CPDI), 2011
When Prime Minister Nazimmudin was removed by Governor-General Ghulam
Mohammad and Governor General firmly wrapped his arms nearby every political leader, ghulam Muhammad became tired of the Assembly and One-Unit scheme was launched in hurry
(Kokab, 2011), because of the nationalist victory and the leaders from Bengal in the United
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Front who are now segued from the pre-partition religious narrative and started nationalist narrative after the Nazimuddin era.
In East Bengal the success of the nationalists had raised the stake of smaller provinces against the Punjab in the western wing too and the strong sentiments were emerged in the mind of military and civil bureaucracy that if Bengal side with the smaller provinces than their will be a plausibility that the military establishment and civil administration will not be able to keep strong center (Bansal, 2013). Thus the thinking that the One Unit scheme would be favorable for the government to catch positive decision from one unit rather than dealing with the NWFP,
Sindh, Punjab assemblies and number of princely states and a Baluchistan province run by chief commissioner (Rehman, 1985).
For this purpose the One Unit scheme was strongly supported by Maj. General Iskander
Mirza the army spoke person Gen. Ayub Khan and the politicians from Punjab such as
Daultana, Nawab Gurmanni and specifically by Chaudhary Muhammad Ali and they believed that it would counter- balance the Bengal province (Hashmi, 2014). Iskander Mirza was a bureaucrat and belonged to Bengal province but he hated popular politicians such as Suhrwardy and Bhashani for their popular support among people from his own province. Such officers who have not popular support among people are bitter and angry against not only at people but also against the popular politicians (Kamran, 2012). They brought a self-righteous attitude on their faces and many politicians support them to change the fate of nation into their desired shape, so One Unit was propagated, in complete blow under the guidance of Governor General and controlled by Bogra. Nural Amin, Nazimuddin and many other Bengali popular politicians opposed the One Unit scheme as well as politicians from Punjab and Muslim League such as
M.H Gazdar and Abdus Sattar Pirzada were also the firm opponents of the scheme (Kennedy,
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1991). On November 8, 1954 after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly less than couple of weeks the Governor Iftikhar Mumdot dismissed the the Pirzada’s Sindh ministry. Ayub
Khuhro was appointed as Chief Minister of Sindh whom was dismissed twice by the Centre on corruption charges given the task to support the One Unit scheme (Ahmed, 2004).
Muhammad Ali Bogra declared the Centre’s aims on November 22, 1954 that principally in West Pakistan the four provinces will become One Unit if the provinces approved the scheme and the whole central machinery was operational to seek approval from the provinces. In Karachi the local political elites were called and gave them the ordered that the
Center will not tolerated no further debate on the One Unit scheme (Cochrane, 2009). The resolution of One Unit Scheme which was drafted in federal capital and the Centre wanted to pass the resolution by the provincial assemblies, and a warning was also given to other provincial assemblies in the shape of the removal of Chief Minister Sindh. The Centre ensured and proven its subjective authority by removing the Majority government of United Front in
East Bengal and also dismissed the Constituent Assembly (Kamran, 2008).
Pirzada had taken a strong stance contrary to the One Unit scheme and got support from G.M
Sayed, Ghulam Ali Talpur and along with 74 members of Sindh assembly who gave statements in favor of Pirzada stance against the One-Unit proposal. NWFP assembly under the control of
CM S.A Rashid on November 25, 1954 just after Bogra’s announcement endorsed the One Unit scheme. The scheme was opposed by Bacha Khan who argued that the Centre should not take rapid decisions (Cohen, 2004).
Khairpur legislature and Shahi Jirga of Balochistan also declared their support in favor of the scheme in November, 1954. The only province where the One Unit plan was passed smoothly and no member opposed the plan was the Punjab Assembly in fact, on November 30,
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1954 the entire assembly supported the One Unit resolution. Chitral Council also supported the proposal on December, 6 (Ahmed, 2004).
An interesting situation took aroused in the Sindh Assembly where Ayub Khorro get the approval of 100 out of 104 members of the assembly in support of the One Unit resolution, where couple of weeks earlier 74 members of assembly had supported Pirzada against One Unit scheme (Cochrane, 2009). This situation is the result of the fear that if the members reject the
One Unit proposal than the Central government has the power to dissolve the Sindh assembly.
GM Syed and Pirzada was arrested by Ayub Khuhro on different charges at the order of the
Federal Government. The speaker of the Sindh assembly was also detained on the charges that he is planning to kill the members of the Sindh cabinet. Hyderabad was converted into a military camp and thousands of protesters against the One Unit scheme was put in the jail by Ghulam
Muhammad (Bahadur, 1998).
On December 14, 1954 the One Unit Conference, headed by Ghulam Mohammad and attended by provincial governors, States rulers, Chief Ministers of provincial assemblies’ and
Central ministers from West Pakistan had supported One-Unit scheme. A couple of days later the executive committee of Muslim League also accepted the one Unit scheme. After this a council was created by the Governor General in which all Chief Ministers and Governors of
West Pakistan, the PM of Balochistan Union states, GG provincial agent and Balochistan Chief
Commissioner, advisor to the ruler of Bahawalpur were selected as members (Jalal, 2014).
Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan and Ghulam Muhammad who led the Centre tried to unite the four provinces and states in the West Pakistan into One Unit within six weeks afterward the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly. It is reported that in 1955 the Khan of Kalat under
75 pressure signed the merger document, and Kalat, Makran, Kharan, Lasbela which are included in Balochistan States Union are merged into One Unit (Jalal, 2014).
An indirect elections was conducted throughout the country and as a result the second constituent assembly came into being in June, 1955. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani was elected as interim chairman in July, 1955 and thus escalated some interesting events in the chapter of the
One Unit (Rashiduzzaman, 1967).
During the first session of the second constituent assembly few members later revealed that some documents having implementation plan about One Unit scheme was distributed among the members at Murree and specifically handed to those members who had delicate corner for One Unit. The members claimed that though there is no name on the documents but they thought that it was authored by Mumtaz Daultana, and never denied it (Nazir, 2008).
Chaudhary Muhammad Ali had also distributed the copy of these documents among the members as claimed by S.A Rashid that he personally received these documents from Ch.
Muhammad Ali.
On July 7, 1955 when the second constituent assembly met Iskander Mirza, Ayub
Khan,and Ch. Muhammad Ali arranged the meeting with Khan Saheb and Gumani decided that both led the campaign of One Unit, later they sidelined Ch. Muhammad Ali due to his falling health condition (Sindhi, 1984). The leaders of different political parties signed a five point’s agreement on July 13, in which two points were clearly mentioned that the One Unit scheme will be implemented on the standard of equality among East and West Pakistan. They ignored that East Bengal had the 56% of the total population of country (Arif, 2006).
Now the question is, if the Prime minister and Governor General had announced the
One Unit Scheme and in the West Pakistan all the states and provincial assemblies ratified it
76 than why was being one, it’s because of the Supreme Court, whereas uphold the dissolution of the first constituent assembly had restrained the Governor general from issuing executive orders
(Yousaf, 1998), and had given a clear verdict that all legislative and constitutional acts should only be approved by the next assembly. This judgement had put paid to the steamroller approach and the Centre had to go through the parliamentary approval.
When Iskandar Mirza, Ayub, Khan Saheb, Gurmani and Ch. Muhammad Ali excluded
Sardar Abdur Rashid from these discussion he got angry, S.A Rashid initially supported the
One Unit scheme because he had expected to be the Chief Minister or Governor of the West
Pakistan but soon he realized that these top position would be given to Dr. Khan Saheb or
Gurmani. Thus, SA Rashid picked to reveal the subjects of the mysterious document. SA Rashid made claim that the scheme of One Unit was spread for “Punjabi domination” (Malik, 1988).
This argument was supported by many politicians by stating that One Unit Scheme was necessary to keep East Bengal from playing the role of ‘big-brother’.
SA Rashid as Chief Minister of NWFP was dismissed because of this upheaval against the scheme and Sardar Bahader Khan the brother of Ayub Khan was asked to form the government. On 18th July 1955 Sardar Bahadar Khan and his cabinet took oath (Malik, 1988;
Kokab, 2011). Now the official matters of the government was controlled by Iskander mirza and Ayub khan. When Ghulam Muhammad got medical leave, Iskandar Mirza was appointed acting GG on 6 August, 1955. The resignation of the M A bogra was another evidence and in
August 1955 Ch. M. Ali was appointed the Prime Minister of the Pakistan and also the president of the Muslim League (Malik, 1988: Kiran, 2012).
From July to September During all these circumstances, in the new constituent assembly the One Unit Bill after brief discussion and debates the house passed the bill into law and 14th
77 of October, 1955 it came into force in the country. A new province West Pakistan was created and Dr. Khan Saheb became the chief minister and Nawab Gurmani took the oath of governor.
The political figures such as Sardar Bahadur, Ayub Khuhro, Q.A Khan, Sardar Dasti and Abid
Hussain who supported the One Unit were rewarded with ministries. This was a setup supervised by General Ayub Khan and Iskander Mirza and overpoweringly ruled by feudal lords (Callard, 1956).
All twenty two provincial cabinets were forced to resign or dismissed from 1947 to 1955
(08 in Sindh, 04 in Punjab, 04 in NWFP and 05 in East Bengal). In all the provincial legislatures, governments were not removed through a no-confidence vote (Ahmed M. , 1963). The chief executive of the provinces were selected from outside the assembly; the favorite’s blatant conspirators, corrupt declared clean. Majority governments were expelled and were constrained out at the command of focal forces that be.
3.2 The Rise of Ethno-Nationalist Movements Against One Unit Scheme
For the Sindh the One Unit scheme was marked as Dark Age. After independence the
Sindh witnessed the most unfortunate era in the shape of One Unit Scheme. During its eighty nine years of annexation by the Bombay Presidency the Sindh suffered the similar system
(Kennedy, 1991). In October 1954 students, lawyers, writer and peasants started the agitation against the One Unit scheme, while everybody in the country understand that the scheme will invite severe opposition only from Sindh. But unfortunately most of the politicians limited their selves to their drawing room during the agitation.
When the scheme was announced by Bogra on 22nd November, 1954, the next day the people start agitation across the province because the people understand the consequences of
78 the scheme for the Sindh. The political workers and even the youth were aware of this issue, they think that Karachi being the only seaport of the country, Sindh explored and unexplored resources, its industrial potential and manpower will be controlled by the Centre they called it
“colonization” (Mahmood, 2015). The main stream Sindhi politicians was absence in this campaign because of the fear of the reaction from the central government and thus the tragedy begin. GM Syed and a few more politicians from Sindh oppose the scheme and the Islamic ideology of pre-independence soon turn into ethnic nationalism (Nazir, 2008: Mahmood, 2015).
Nationalist elements and some other political groups oppose the scheme while mainstream Sindhi politicians disassociate their selves. The Sindhi politicians kept themselves to the official circles to ensure their place in the next setup (CDPI, 2005). The federal
Government and Khurro tried to calm the agitating masses, the provincial government of Sindh decided to silence every rebellious voice. The daily Al Wahid, a popular newspaper was closed learning that Al Wahid played a vital role in the separation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency.
The next victim was Daily Karwan and a large numbers of periodicals and small newspaper were closed down in the province. GM Syed and others leaders who were active in the protest against One Unit scheme were arrested and put them into jail along with numbers of political workers (Jaffrelot, 2016). The most affected were intellectuals, students, peoples who took the streets, writer and political workers.
From November 1954, the protest grew day by day with the intense rate and the police was used to stop them. The imprisoning of the protesters became routine and police used force to tackle the protest, which continued till December, 1954 after the passage of the One Unit bill. The protest was so intense that provincial government decided that the assembly session will be held in Darbar Hall Hyderabad (Siddiqi, 2012) rather than the assembly building in the
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Karachi for presenting the one unit bill. Khurro thought that the protesters and unwanted people could be stopped in Hyderabad and first time in history of the Sindh the assembly met outside its building.
Chief Minister Khurro used all kind of tactics and talked to every parliamentarian to guarantee the passage of the One Unit bill before summoning the session. Some parliamentarians were forced, some have offered position in government, thus with the help of these tactics Khurro passed the bill from the assembly and this day was become the darkest day in the history of Sindh. On this day the autonomy and resources of the Sindh was surrendered by the elected members of the parliament to those who from the distance of thousand kilometers to ruled them. Thus giving an issue to the nationalist forces to ignite the ethnic issue in in the
Pakistan (World Sindhi Congress: Siddiqi, 2012).
Balochistan got into serious difficulty when the one unit plan was presented in the 1955.
The Baloch and Pashtun compatriots of Balochistan were shocked at the plan and joined the
National Awami Party in the battle against One Unit (Hashmi, 2015). The constitution of 1956 made elected federal type of government and gave some autonomy to the territories. In any case, it couldn't pacify the feelings of the compatriots who proceeded with their worrying against the One Unit. The agitation against one unit was more vicious in Baluchistan than in others parts of the country. The Khan of Kalat at first consented to the arrangement yet the compatriots rejected it on the ground that One Unit shortened the Baloch self-rule. Afterward, the Khan reversed it. He was captured (Harrison, 1978; Jetly, 2004).
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Figure No: 3.2 Ethnic conflicts over the time
Source: Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives (CPDI), 2011
The Baloch nationalists’ leaders unequivocally reprimanded against the merger of
Balochistan into One Unit (Sheikh, 2018; Ziring, 2004) together with Prince Abdul Karim who
81 had finished his jail. When Khan of Kalat and others Baloch leaders upraised their voices against One Unit scheme and re-grouped with already existed ethnic nationalist’s groups and gave their support to those movements, they were captured. Also, all the benefits, which were given by federal government to the Khan of Kalat were withdrawn and sent him to jail (Baloch,
1987). In his autobiography the Kelat Khan expressed his capture in these words
"The sixth day of October 1958 will ever stay new in the memory of the general
population of Balochistan; for it was on this day that the powers of oppression,
persecution and carnage were let free on the straightforward and blameless Baloch of
Kalat for no blame of theirs...... I surrendered myself to the armed force which paraded
with me on the streets and lanes of Kalat. I saw a few of my men falling dead on the
ground by the aimless terminating of the armed force (Baloch, 2009).
When the Khan of Kalat was put in jail, it sparked another revolt led by Sardar Nauroz
Khan of Zararkzai clan and offered three demands before the federal government “ (I) One Unit arrangement should be withdraw (ii) his men should be pardon and release of Khan of Kelat
(iii) His region must be excluded from land reforms (Axmann, 2008)”. A series of battles were fought by Nauroz Khan and his hastily organized guerrilla fighters with the state security forces.
The government installations and escorts were targeted and ambushed by the guerrilla fighters.
The Nawab Nauroz Khan at the age of ninety battled and organized the guerrilla war in
Jhalawan and the surroundings against the army. The battle which was went on for 02 years and gave trouble to the security forces. Pakistan armed force reacted with more outrage by bombarding close-by towns when they didn't get wanted outcome, than negotiations were started with the Sardar nauroz Khan (Khan, 2003).
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The talks were begun between the resurgent and the armed forces in mid-1960, however achieved no result. Finally, the armed forces assured the Sardar Nauroz khan and his guerilla fighter by taking oath on Quran that they were ready for settlement. Sardar D. K Zehri assured the insurgents that the government had acknowledged their demands, the guerilla fighters surrendered their weapons before the armed forces, indeed, the armed force disrespected their promise. The guerilla fighters and Sardar Nauroz Khan were captured and a special military court was setup for their trial (Muhammad, 1982). His eight nephews along with his son were hanged in Hyderabad jail. Military court ordered death sentence to Sardar Nauroz Khan but later it was converted to life imprisonment (Rahman, 2005). A new garrisons was sat up by
Pakistan army in Balochistan at key points after this revolt.
Notwithstanding the government victory in the Balochistan, this rebellion fuelled and ignite the Baloch nationalism and transformed it into hostility. It boosted the sentiments of mistrust between the central government and the Baloch people (Naseer, 1979).
Besides this in 1962 another revolt was started by the baloch called the “Parari resistance”, this armed struggle in Balochistan was crushed by field Marshal Ayub Khan. Ayub
Khan initiated the system of Basic Democracies (Moscalenko, 2013) for the purpose of to strengthen the policies of central government. In 1962 he introduced the Presidential form of government after winning the election. Many Baloch Sardars for the first time under these election were elected and became the members of Parliament such as Ataullah Mengal, Khair
Bakhsh Marri and Ahmad Nawaz bugti (Wirsing, 1987). But the presence of these Sardars in the parliament was felt danger to President Ayub Khan personally oriented policies, and in this way these nationalists Sardars elected by people were replaced by some designated Sardars. In addition the construction of the new cantonments in Balochistan at major areas started by armed
83 forces triggered another armed movement in the province called “Parari (a Balochi word used to illustrate a person or persons whose afflictions cannot be addressed through negotiations)”
(Nawaz, 2008). The Parari sat up their hideouts Jhalawan to the areas of Mengal tribe and extended it toward north into the Murri and buguti tribal areas. The large scale encounters were started between the army and the militants, the Parari attempted to ambush conveys of the armed forces also attacked the military camps and bombed the railway track and the trains in the province. The armed forces reacted with harsh counter strike, and the tribal areas of the insurgent were heavily bombardments by the armed forces, which not only bull dozed these insurgents but as well as destroyed large area of agriculture land (Muhammad Rizwan, 2014;
Nawaz, 2008). This fierce battle was ended when general Yahya khan came into power in 1969 and pulled back the decision of One Unit (Awan, 1985). Under the martial law of general yahya
Khan in 1970, the general election was conducted in which National Awami Party won the majority seats in the province. Bizenjo became the governor and Ataullah Mengal take oath as a Chief Minister of the Balochistan. The imperative improvement with respect to Balochistan was that it was given the status of a province (Kennedy, 1993).
The One Unit made the units less homogenous by not only destabilizing regional linguistics identities in the western wing but also increase ethnic varieties in the federal structure. But the large number of effective ethnic groups in the federal structure feel unsafe and point out that their linguistic identity may be eliminated from the constitutional framework
(Adeney, 2007). But on the other side to change the number of ethnic communities at the state dimension level indicate that the language is the identity marker for the ethnic groups. For
Bengalis and Sindhis this change became the significant identity marker after independence in the absence of any constitutional acknowledgement and the merger of the provinces of Western
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Pakistan into one Unit dominated by Punjabis arose the fear in the mind of the smaller nationalities (Adeney, 2002).
The One Unit nominally succeed in recognizing the linguistic ethnic rights between the
Western and Eastern faction of the state in form of the multicultural polities but in the western wing it also remained integrationist (Alvi, 1998). The nominally success is due to the Punjabi domination in the One Unit plan, because the One Unit was planned to counter the demographic supremacy of the Bangalis and downgrade them from the status of the mass subject of the country. The Bengali leaders thought that this plan is the rejection of their identity and later they accepted the plan on the condition that the Bengali would be recognized as official language along with Urdu in the country (Baxter, 1974). The subsequent events revealed that the plan was designed to institutionalize a specific ethnic dominance by adopting of a tactic based on segregation rather than multiculturalism. In West Pakistan Punjabi dominance was consolidated through One Unit plan and Lahore was announced to be the capital of the Western wing (Choudhury, 1972). It is important to note that the use of other languages other than
Bengali or Urdu was not prohibited by Constitution and stated that;
“Any section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture shall have the right
to preserve the same” (1956 Constitution, Article 19).
It were important, differentiating the approach of the country political elites who merge the different racial groups rather promote cooperation between them. But on the other hand the state in West Pakistan did not eliminate other languages rather than Urdu. In Sindh the Sindhi language was remained as medium of instruction and also Bravhi and Baluchi academies was established in Balochistan (Rahman, 1996).
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As discussed by RajaGopalan, “there are limits to study that focusses on constitutional provisions” (Rajagopalan, 2001). And some institutions in the state lend themselves to ethnic appropriation. Like the Pakistan army which not only maintain the defense from foreign aggression but also maintain the internal order in the country. But this institution is dominated by Punjabi and Pushtun which worsened the ethnic tension in the country (Ali, 1993). the
Punjabization of this institution could be traced in its development and task in the early days of the nation, but specifically after 1973 in its ethnic supremacy in the parliament predominantly in the lower house. This type of exclusivism and ethnicization was operated outside the legal structures of the country (Samad, 1995).
In Pakistan it is very important to understand that as the institutions the power exit in the hand of bureaucracy and the army. In a nondemocratic setting power sharing is not be as effective as in consociational democracy, but the cooperation between the elites is conceivable.
The two powerful institutions of the country dominated by Punjabis prove the perception of their ethnic supremacy (Rizvi, 2000).
Pakistan’s elite apparently tried to support the social integration policy and wants to de- ethnicize the country. But this policy was deception, in reality they were trying to establish a new ethnic group in the sense of Punjabi domination and they pushed the Bengalis into segregation (Sugata Bose, 2011).
The Urdu adopted as official language is the indication that the Centre wants to bring different groups together rather than to promote cooperation between the different ethnicities.
The late adoption of Bengali as official language along with Urdu in 1954 was to undo the damage of the Bengali segregation bit it failed. This is an example of the institution explanations regarding regulate the ethnic conflict and must be study. According to Rahman “Bengalis
86 linguistic rights had been saved through a major modification in the position of the center, but ultimately, the power of numbers were given up for a gain which would prove to be little more than symbolically significant”. The 1956 constitution detached the supremacy of Bengal in the parliament but in 1966 a campaign was started in East Pakistan escalate the use of Bengali language and posters, street sign and signboards were changed to Bengali (Rahman 1996). It interesting to know after announced the Bengali as dual official language of the country very few were literate in Bengali in West Pakistan even less than 1% spoke and understand Bengali
(Pakistan, 1961). This means that symbolism is significant however not enough. The people of
Bengal were worried about their phonetic acknowledgement as well as complaints against the power politics of the country (Adeney, 2016).
There were no such linguistic conflict in West Pakistan during One Unit period. The languages spoken in West Pakistan like Pashto, Punjabi, Baluchi or Sindhi were not contestants for the state level. Therefore, at the provincial level Urdu was not opposed, because provinces such as NWFP and Baluchistan both were not homogenous on linguistic bases, In NWFP the demand for Pashtu as official language started a direct clash with Hindko speaking community in 1970s and the province also saw a tension between these two communities (Rahman, 1995).
The situation in Baluchistan is same as NWFP because the province is comprising of two areas the British Baluchistan and Baluchistan states Union. In British Baluchistan 41% of people speaking Pashtu (Pakistan, 1951). Demanding Baluchi as official language n province would led to clash with Pashtun community. Yet, there were little anger exited in Western Wing against Urdu. And in Punjab a group of intellectuals who trying to encouraging the government to use the Punjabi in the province (Shackle, 1977).
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The National Awami Party in NWFP struggle for the cause of Pashtu. The political parties of Baluchistan promoting Baluchi nationalism. The major opposition was emerged in
Sindh against One Unit and the recognition of Sindhi as provincial language was demanded by
Sindhi Adabi Sangat in the light of the fact that “if the intention is not to see 5 million Sindhi speaking people … put at a disadvantage in the field of education, trade and commerce, and public services … then it is absolutely essential that Sindhi is made to serve as an official language at least for Sind and its adjoining Sindhi speaking areas (Rahman, 1996).”
People of Sindh was more worried about the resources of their province, access to power positions and upset by marginalization of their linguistic identity. Surprisingly the opposition in the province were muted due to its literary tradition and Sindhi language medium of instruction. Opposition re-emerged in 1959, when Ayub khan tried to demote the Sindhi as medium of instruction in schools but he failed and the other reason is the One Unit plan
(Rahman, 1996). It is understandable to criticize the one Unit plan on the reasons that it started provincial competition between the both wings and also in the West Pakistan it created grievances against Punjabis (Pasha, 1995; Callard, 1957).
The one Unit plan not only started conflict between Western and Eastern Wings but tension were also arose within the Western Wing because of the Punjabi dominance. The Punjab were the half of the population of the West Pakistan before 1971. The One Unit scheme triggered more problems than it solved (Adeney, 2007).
3.3 The Constitutional Quest for Ethnic Federalism, Autonomy or Self Rule
The founder of Pakistan Muhaamad Ali Jinaah (Quaid-e- Azam) in November 1945, explained the federal structure of the country in these words;
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"The hypothesis of Pakistan ensures that elected units of the National Government
would have all the self-rule that you will discover in the constitution of the Unified
Conditions of America, Canada and Australia. Be that as it may, certain imperative
forces will stay vested in the Focal Government, for example, money related framework,
national resistance and elected obligations."
Realizing that "federalism is a type of government in which powers are divided between the central government for the entire nation and governments for parts of the nation, also called federal units" (Law, 2013; Elazar, 1987; Riley, 1973; Lijphart, 1977), the accompanying discourse quickly follows the historical framework of federalism in Pakistan. After independence Pakistan adopted different type of political system such as Presidential,
Parliamentary, Martial Laws and hybrid system like combination of Presidential-Parliamentary despite the fact that the Muslim League and others parties are demanding for federal structure
(Naseer, 2007), as a result this exercise ultimately with the help of eighth and seventeenth amendments in the 1973 constitution tilt the balance of power towards the President. The
Parliament was once again perhaps empowered with the help of 18th amendment (Jillani, 2010).
The government of India Act of 1935 was implemented in Pakistan as legal documents to run the official affairs of the country in 1947. The amendments were introduced in this act to strengthen the Centre and gave more control to Central government over the federating units.
As discussed by Sayeed that Pakistan became one of the most powerful Central government in world with the help of these amendments in the act (Sayeed, 1954). Katharine Adeney further elaborate this situation and discussed it that a workable constitution until 1973 was not framed because of the doubtful idea of the Muslim League leaders about the structure of the state.
Especially they didn’t recognized the ethnic division of the society (Adeney, 2009).
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3.4 Federalism, Autonomy and Self Rule since Independence
Though battling with the different desires around the subjects of language and portrayal, almost after a decade long struggle for constitution making dilemmas in the country the Pakistan was able in 1956 to frame a constitution. The significant role in the making process of constitution was played by Punjabis, Bengalis, Urdu- speeking Mohajirs, and also this process was influenced by civil bureaucracy and Pakistan army or linguistic majority who dominated these powerful institutions (Adeney, 2009). Adeney claimed that the civil bureaucracy and
Pakistan army were not eager to implement a constitutional and legal structure that provided greater power to Bengali community which were despised by these powerful institutions
(Adeney, 2009).
3.5 Federalism, Autonomy and Self Rule in Constitution of 1956
Be that as it may, in spite of all the legal issues and politics of ethnicity, language and representation, the 1956 constitution was framed which in character define federal form of government but in spirit it was centralized. The scheme of One Unit was endorsed in the constitution and the ethnic cleavages were intentionally undermined. The 1956 constitution had numerous similarities with the 1935 act of Government of India, and during the Raj the act played a significant role towards federal structure (Choudhary, 2005). As analyzed in length below Adeney that the question of accommodation of Linguistics and ethnic diversity was remained unsolved;
“This created two provinces, one linguistically homogeneous (98% of the population of
East Pakistan spoke Bengali) and the other linguistically heterogeneous (63% of the
western wing spoke “Punjabi”, but there were other significant linguistic groups who
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spoke Pashtu, Sindhi, Urdu or Balochi). In another example of undermining the
importance of ethno-linguistic groups, Urdu was earlier adopted as the national
language although it was spoken as a mother tongue by only 3.24% of the total
population (Bengali was spoken by 54%)” (Adeney, 2007).
The 1935 Act of India was tried to soften in the constitution and the centralized impact of the act was reduced as the federal list had previously 61 items which were shortened to 30 and 94 items were included in provincial list under the Article 106 (1) of the constitution. The concurrent list have nineteen items but some people have views that it was strong enough to give powers to central government to centralize the economic and administrative system of the country. The issues like national security, economic development and coordination amongst the provinces the constitution give superseding power to central government in these matters
(Khan, 2010; Choudhary, 2005).
The National Assembly had 310 members which were supposed to be elected directly and the seats were divide equally between the two wings out of which 150 member were elected on the basis of popular vote. In any case, the ethnic federalism was theoretically introduced in the constitution as the seats in the Western part were separated based on populace living in the
Punjab, NWFP (now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa), Baluchistan, and Sindh (Pakistan National
Assembly, 2018). Furthermore, women participation were encouraged in politics to be elected indirectly and 10 seats were reserved for them.
Be that as it may, in 1958 the National Assembly was dissolved ahead of expected national elections, and General Ayub Khan C&C of the Pakistan Army enforced martial law and ruled the country from 1958 to 1962 without any constitutional cover and thus the power went in the hand of the military. The performance of federal system of Pakistan were shattered
91 by the dissolution of the assembly and created serious problems between the two wings of the country. After this a new constitution in 1962 was promulgated on the basis of “Basic
Democracies” and the One Unit was retained in it (Talbot, 2009).
3.6 Federalism, Autonomy and Self Rule in Constitution of 1962
Military and civil bureaucracy provided their support to General Ayub Khan to rule the country. As Alavi expressed it that these two institutions which were organized by British colonial forces and fit in the federal institutional designs having the capacity of implementation of laws (Alavi, 1972). Thus the military and bureaucracy became the core element of the central government, hence executive and administrative system was created which was close to British
Viceregal of the sub-continent as mentioned by Khalid bin Sayeed (Sayeed, 1967).
Ayub Khan did not agreed with the recommendations of the constitution commission established in 1960, and ignored the recommendations as having before in the framing of the
1956 constitution, when the recommendation of the Basic Principles Committee were not accepted. Recommendation of the both committees which said that there should be federal form of Government, and the federating units of the federation would have maximum autonomy
(Sayeed, 1980). But the Punjabi and Military elites especially Ayub Khan were interested in strong Center. Ayub Khan emphasizes on Pakistani nationalism rather than ethnic nationalism
(Choudhury, 2005).
In any case the constitution of 1962 held the federal arrangements of 1956 constitution, and the responsibilities of the Federal government and provincial government were mentioned.
The constitution had 03 list of subject, (i) Central list (ii) Provincial list and (iii) concurrent list.
The One Unit was retained in the constitution and unicameral in nature, the Assembly was
92 elected for the term of 05 years, which was compromised of equivalent members in number from both the units of the country. Forty nine items were listed as federal to adopt the federal system of governance. The federating units were given the residual powers and no items were determined. The balance of power was tilted towards the Central Government because of the support of the civil bureaucracy and military establishment. The constitution had given greater power to federal legislature but regarding to legislation the provincial assemblies having essentially nothing to do (Kundi, 2002).
While considering having the capacity to get a hung Parliament so the military establishment could have an unequivocal part to play, Ayub Khan resigned and succeeded by
Yahya khan in 1969 imposing martial law, revoked the One Unit scheme. The surprising free and fair election were conducted by yahya khan in 1970, thus as a result Awami League won all the seats except two from eastern wing of the country. But the session of the National assembly were not convened because of the people in powers in West Pakistan central government not willing to do so. The government in Islamabad chose to dispatch army and started a military operation called Searchlight to maintain the peace in the Eastern Pakistan. A circumstance which basically rose up out of Islamabad deferring Awami League to formed the central government. It brought about brutal clashes resulting the deaths of huge numbers of
Bengalis, millions of people were displaced from their homes and eventually the Eastern Wing separated from Pakistan and become an independent Bangladesh in 1971 (Mansoor Akber
Kundi, 2002). The possibility of a Federal governmental framework which was tilted towards
Center and tried to forming a unitary kind of State were failed to holding together the both wings, while the majority decision of the people was dishonored in an undemocratic way
(Adeney, 2009).
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3.7 Federalism, Autonomy and Self Rule in Constitution of 1973
When the Pakistan was disintegrated in 1971, another constitution was framed in 1973 which supplanted the 1971, interim constitution. The constitution of 1956 and 1962 was mostly followed in many extent and instances, and the most articles and their language were retained in the constitution of 1973 (Rabbani, 2011). It is bicameral in nature and having two houses.
The upper house having 60 seats called the Senate and lower house having 200 seats called
National Assembly. The seats of the Senate had been elected indirectly and equally divided between the four units of the federation to safeguard the interest of the provinces, while the seats of lower house were shared based on populace.
The constitution of 1973 is different from the past ones because it made the Senate on the basis of equal representation of all the four provinces of the country. The idea behind the
Senate is that it provide equal representation to smaller provinces like NWFP now Khyber
Pakhtuukhwa and Balochistan and also plays a role of check and balance in the system (Qureshi,
2009). Interestingly it is said that first time in the history of Pakistan the constitution discussed the segmental autonomy, religious identity and ethnic segmentations of the Pakistani State. The issues of ethnicity and language was briefly discussed. As a result Urdu became the only national language of the country, but in Sindhi language was restored in the Sindh and in
National Assembly majority of the seats were possessed by Punjab on the basis of population
(Adeney, 2009).
A federal structure of the state was created in the 1973 constitution as cited earlier and two list Federal and concurrent were included. Each province have 14 members in the Senate or upper house which were elected for the term of 4 years though after two years half of them will retired from the house. 67 subjects were included in federal list for federal government
94 while the provincial government have the opportunity to frame laws on the subjects mentioned in the concurrent list. According to Article 143 of the constitution, if in case any dispute arises between the central government and provincial government, the central government have the supreme right and the decision of the central government must be overcome (Mansoor Akber
Kundi, 2002).
More importantly, the CCI (Council of Common Interest) was introduced in the constitution to further strengthen the true spirit of the federation. The President have the right to appoint the council and the composition of the council is Prime Minister to act as a chairman and others three members from federal government shall be nominated by PM, and must having the Chief Ministers of the four provinces. The CCI have the right to regulate policies and had special authority to listen the complaints, for example if any complaint arises regarding water issue from the natural sources the council have the right to address the problem and regulate the policies of water supply from the rivers. Furthermore the council had the right to formulate the policies regarding to industrial development, railways, oil and gas, and electricity
(Choudhury, 2005; Khan, 2010).
On 14th of August, 1973 the constitution came into force, a momentous speech was made by Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in national assembly, in which he mentioned that the days of military coups were gone. He further stated that in politics the violence must be stop
(Khan, 2010). Be that as it may, as far as working of the constitution, the Bhutto administration which drafted this document have tilted their intentions towards strong central government as a result mistrust and dissatisfaction arose in the mind of the people of NWFP and Balochistan.
The tension arose between the central Government and Baluchistan provincial government, the
Chief Minister of Balochistan was arrested on the charges of rebellious activities and
95 corruption. In NWFP the government of National Awami Party was propagate as incapable to run the province and the NAP was declared illegitimate party (Khan, 2010).
Furthermore, the opposition parties in the National Assembly was tried to silence by federal government in undemocratic way. This undemocratic actions of the federal government gave a serious setback to the Federalism, and the outcome was in the shape of the martial law of Zia-ul- haq who rollback the constitution of 8 years (Shafqat, 1997; Malik, 2010).
3.8 Federalism, Autonomy, Self-Rule and 18th Amendment
The constitution of 1973 was amended in 2010, called “18th amendments”. The 8th April,
2010 was a historical day for Pakistan when National Assembly passed the 18th amendments bill, on 18 April, the Senate passed it and signed by President of Pakistan on 19 April to become the part of the constitution. The power of the President to dissolve the parliament was removed in the amendment. The semi- presidential form of government was replaced with the constitutional form of parliamentary government has changed in the amendment which in turn strengthen the federation (Faiz, 2015).
Throughout in the history of Pakistan, it happened first time that a President happily cut downs its power by signing the 18th amendment. The power of the President to appoint Chief
Election Commissioner was abolished, and also he cannot impose emergency in the provinces unilaterally. It seems that the basic principles of the 1973 constitution was revived in the 18th amendment such as the federal system of the government will be parliamentary, Prime Minister will act as a real Chief Executive of the government, President will act as a symbolic head of state and in all matters the president will bound of the advice of the Prime Minister (Hussain,
2017).
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The Pashtun fundamental issue of identity was triad to address in the amendment of
Article 1. The Pashtun majority of the NWFP province has been demanding to change the name of province for a long time. A name “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa” on which the political parties agreed upon and reflects the majority community of ethnic Pashtun was adopted (Senate of
Pakistan, 2010).
The amendment asks for establishing the local governments under a new article 140A.
The local governments will be formed on Districts, Tehsil or Towns and village or Union council level to devolve administrative, financial, and political authority and responsibilities to grass root. These responsibilities will be handed over to the elected representatives of the local governments to avoid ethnic, linguistics dissatisfactions.
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Chapter 4: The Process of Ethnic Federalism in Pakistan
Source: The worldmap.com
4.1 Structure and Features of the Provinces on Ethnic Status
When the constitution of 1973 was promulgated, Pakistan became a Federation and the borders of the country was redefined. The territories of Pakistan under 1973 constitution was
98 compromised of four provinces, i.e. Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa1,
Islamabad as a Capital of the country and Federally Administered Tribal area (FATA) ( Article
1). As a result theoretically and practically this federal design changed the structure of the federation into ethnic federalism because of the facts that in Sindh majority of the people belong to Sindhi ethnic community and the same is the case in other three provinces. As a result the federal government recognized 4 major ethnic groups and at provincial level permitted them to govern their regions. The ethnic group’s means that the people have the same language and culture, same region where they residing, having similar psychological kind of identity. The boundaries of the provinces are demarcated on the basis of ethno-linguistic criteria and settlement pattern (Shaheen Sardar Ali, 2001).
Table No 4.1: Ethnic groups and regions S. No Province Ethnic groups
1 Punjab Punjabis, Saraiki, Balochi, Pashtun
2 Sindh Sindhi, Mohajirs, Pashtun, Baluch
3 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pashtun, Hazara
4 Baluchistan Baluch, Pashtun, Brahui, Punjabi Settlers
5 Capital Territory Punjabi, Pashtun
6 FATA Pashtun
According to M. Waseem, that ethno-linguistics criteria was selected and adopted because of the reason that psychologically Pakistani peoples were comprises of different ethnicities and have always give importance to their ethnic backgrounds in the country. The
1 The name of NWFP was changed to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the 18th amendment.
99 representation of ethnic groups in the Senate is a good example by the State to protect their rights (Waseem, 2010). However, M. Waseem pay no attention to the fact that the provincial representation in the Senate and National Assembly was not a real beginning and representation of the Pakistani society, because of the fact that the Pakistani State only established four provinces and many more ethnic groups were not recognized. But rather it was a likeness of
Pakistan People’s Party policy in the period of its interim rule and encouraged major ethnic parties that was deviously and hurriedly responded by the elites from the different ethnic parties in the interim period. Thus various ethnic elites turn the value of ethnicity into their political capital (Khalid, 2013). The verdict of the ethnic groups or people was not genuinely reflected in the process; rather, the ruling group in the Pakistan was facilitated by the ideology which were eager to controlling the power center in the country after overthrowing the military regime in 1971.
Though for the granting of the self-governing rights on the basis of ethno linguistic arrangement is the favorite criteria in the country but it is very difficult to grant self-governing structure to every ethnic group. As a result to form a province the smaller ethnic groups have joined the much larger ethnic groups. Therefore, in the formation of the provinces no such definite reason has been provided, and neither the ethnic identity nor the population was adopted a logical and effective criteria (Shah, 2011). Rather, it was illogically and weakly created and imposed without a proper negotiating process among the different ethnic entities in the federation, for the reason that if ethnicity, populace measure and the assent of the general population took as standards more provinces should be established rather than four in the
Federation of Pakistan (Khan, 2010).
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Source: The worldmap.com
The uncertainty in delimiting provincial borders in the Pakistan made the federal structure a unitary sort of system. Several ethnic groups in the country with noteworthy populace, well financial capability which could bear out workable formula to established their own distinct province. If compare their ability and their population size with other ethnic groups whom were allowed to established separate provinces, elites and other prominent figures and leaders from numerous ethnic groups for example the Mohajir, Saraiki, Hazara, Gilgiti, Pashtun in Baluchistan, have convinced that they can without doubt get the assent of their own individuals to get their own self-administrative province (Waseem, 2008). For instance, Saraiki
101 political leaders have struggled alongside with the common peoples and Saraiki Sooba Mahaaz
(SSM) which have the call for distinct province within the country for Saraiki people. Saraiki claim that their population is around 20 million (2017 estimate) (Shaheen, 2017), with comparatively sustainable economic capability and the concentration of Saraiki population in the same region that can make it practical to get its own particular province, when compare to it with others ethnic groups for example the Balochi, Pashtun, and Sindhi. Therefore, it is exceptionally necessary to give a substantial and more grounded contention why some ethnic communities like the Saraiki were not permitted to set up their own province while extremely lesser populace groups like Balochi and others have been given the privilege to set up their own province (Ahmed K. , 2012). The tension in Punjab and especially in Saraiki areas ought to be tended as far as the standards of federalism instead of the utilization of state power. As Elazar argued that use of force to suppress the people demand, particularly when the demand is logical is hostile to the values of federal system (Elazar, 1987). The demands of the Saraiki elites are logical, accurate and legitimate. Such tensions were arose on the grounds that policy of ethnic rights of Federal government of Pakistan includes two opposing ideas. Firstly, whereas “a group can be organized better in its particular dialect, utilizing its own particular culture, by its own people efficiently ‘from within”. Secondly, that the nation have one single identity which is
Pakistani and based on religious beliefs, is the criteria for the formation of provinces are dispassionately and superficially recognizable, certifiable by a forerunner organization freely of the perspectives of the nation successfully “from above” (Samad, 2007).
Besides, the ethnic configuration and stature in Pakistan uncover the challenges related to the discussion of self-province to every ethnic group in Pakistan. It is very hard to effectively and equally represent all the ethnic groups in 4 provinces. Just a small number of ethnic groups
102 like the Pashtun, Baloch, Sindhi and Punjabi were fortunate to get the right of self-rule
(Waseem, 1999). Despite the fact that the on April 1973 the constitution which in spirit is
Federal came into force, the rearrangement of provincial boundaries on basis of ethno-linguistic lines was begun at the interim period, earlier than ratifying the federal constitution, the period in which the interim government of Bhutto did not have any well-known or constitutional legitimacy to set out on such major rearranging of the Pakistani state. The duty of the interim government was to draft a set of laws that to create a Federal system and parliament through election and not to restructures the whole country. The self-imposed leaders chosen the federal framework and think that federal system based on ethnicity can be the best choice for the people of Pakistan (Lieven, 2011).
For all intents and purposes, in the 1973 constitution the structure of ethnic federalism in
Pakistan was established. By legitimately sanctioning the formation of a Federal state having two levels of governing structures, at Center there will be a Federal and at provincial level there will be a provincial government. At the central level the Federal government have the jurisdiction over monetary and fiscal policy, defense and security, foreign policy, social and economic policy, and administered the major infrastructure such as highways, railway tracks and seaports (Article 70 Clause 4). Additionally, the allocation of budget to the provinces is also the jurisdiction of the Federal government (Article 160). In like manner, the provinces were given wide-ranging powers on all issues which comes in their provincial jurisdiction exception of those allocated to the federal government. The responsibilities given to the provinces some of them were:
It has enact laws relating to Health, culture, education and language;
The right to establish their own executives and legislative forms;
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The provinces have the right to pass the laws, but in conformity with Federal
government and constitution;
To frame and implement socio-economic development polices, establish and supervise
enterprises.
Supposedly, the assurance was exceptionally inclusive however the most imperative issue is the means by which far it was considered and implemented practically. In various respects, the provincial and local governments highly subordinated to the federal government. The
Federal government at central level have the supremacy and more powerful over the provincial government because of its full authority of key areas, for example the power of to allocate budget to the provinces, and to control the military operations, defense and security of the country. It might not be astonishing in the affairs of the state where the practice of statehood in
Pakistan has been agreeable to exceptionally autocratic and centralized system of state.
Notwithstanding the above standard, the provincial government administration were inexperienced and submissive to the federal government in Pakistan (Khan Z. , 2013).
The competence and ability of the leadership of the provincial government in some province were remarkably low. For example, in some provinces like Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and somehow in Sindh there were many political leaders and provincial Ministers who have low level of education and experience to perform the official matters of the province.
Additionally, the provincial civil service is also facing a lack of experienced and qualified official’s especially in the province of KP and Baluchistan (Sharafat Ali Chaudhry, 2014).
Because of its provincial autonomy and ethnic entitlement policy, the provincial government has no choice but to hire and engage local people irrespective of their lessor education background and experience. According to Mark Rolls ‘in Baluchistan, with its low literacy rate,
104 and educated people were in limited number, most of them never completed the college education facing difficulty to run the provincial official administrative affairs smoothly (Rolls,
2008). This policy is criticized by the prominent scholars, individuals and some political leaders on the reason that recruitment of personals on provincial quotas or ethnic basis, and personal loyalty or political attachment means that the most talented and competent bureaucrats are continually ignored and disrespected (Ahmed A. , 2015; Repoter, 2016). In this way, well- educated, self-confident and noticeable individuals were intentionally put aside and pushed back by federal and provincial government administration from the leadership position because of the provincial quota policy.
Accordingly, the civil service are very weak in the provinces in term of efficiency and professionalism as well as the other public departments are also have lack of professionals. The
World Bank report on Pakistan justifies this argument that the provincial administration in some provinces have lack of professionals for example, managers and planners, economists, professors and researchers, accountants, engineers, and as a result the implementations and effectiveness of public programs were delayed (World Bank, 2016). Particularly, provinces such as Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa having very little experience in terms of self- governing. Especially, in Baluchistan, previously, provincial and the local bureaucrats were generally chosen and selected through Federal government and particularly the majority of the bureaucratic positions and jobs were given to Non-Baluch people. Due to which the province of Baluchistan is very much reliant on the central government, accordingly makes the province truly helpless against the interference of the central government. In Baluchistan the political instability is visible evident of the vulnerability (Grare, 2013).
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4.1.1 The Features of the Provinces
“ Without prejudice to the status of the National language, a Provincial Assembly may
by law prescribe measures for the teaching, promotion and use of a provincial language
in addition to the national language” (1973 Constitution, Article 251, Clause 3).
Initially, in 1973 four provinces were established; details are in the Table No. 4.1 above.
The two of the provinces Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were ethnically homogenous though a substantial number of minority ethnic peoples and mixed cluster of different people were inhabited in both provinces. The other two provinces that is Sindh and Baluchistan were more diverse in terms of ethnicity and two or more than two ethnic groups are settled in the region, the both provinces are highly heterogeneous. Such as in the case of Sindh there were about every major ethnic group of the Pakistan residing in the province. Moreover, Baluchistan was labelled for the Balochi people, but the majority of population in the province are non- Balochi such as Pashtun and Brauhai and Punjabi settlers. Islamabad city was declared as capital of the country and have its own local government system. However, the constitution did not give any reasonable regional delimitation with the exception of recognizing ethnic group that were integrated in each provinces and as a result the official border demarcation of the provinces bought compounded (Bhattacharya2015).
However, in 1973 constitution, Princely states were merged into the provinces. In
Punjab for example the state of Bahawalpur and in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the Swat, Dir and
Chitral Princely states were merged into the provinces. There were no such clarification that why the states were merged into the provinces and when the process of the merging was started, discussed and decided. The merger was decided behind the close door arrangement between
States heads and the federal government, and justified the process in the sense that it is in the
106 interest of the country and the people. Such sort of blurred decision have enormous political and social impacts on the life of the people living in the region (Ahmed A. , 2012). Whatever was the justification of the decision, it must be decided in the open and transparent way. Many scholars and prominent political leaders from these states thought that the decision was enforced on them by the central government against the will of the people. However, the constitution should allowed merger for administrative purposes but it had a clear condition that the merging should not hinder any citizen are groups right to preserve its representation or service to the federal or provincial government (Sultan-i-Rome, 2008; Ahmed A. , 2012).
Thus, the provinces that were recognized under the 1973 constitution were also sanctioned by the 18th amendment as federal units of the federation of the Pakistan. The 1973 constitution stated that “the federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall comprise of provinces”. The provinces of Pakistan were characterized based on language and identity, and the assent of the larger part of the people of the province. The 1973 constitution also upholds that “any such states and territories as or may be included in Pakistan, whether by accession or otherwise and the federally administered tribal area (FATA)” were be the part of the country
(Clause (b), (c), (d) of Article 2). The city of Islamabad was declared a federal capital and selected as a federal administrative city.
4.1.2 The Provinces Asymmetric Structure
The provinces as defined by the constitution defines that the provinces should hold the equal rights and powers. But as shown in the table 4.2 the provinces in Pakistan have extraordinary imbalances or asymmetry in terms of population size, territorial space, natural and human resources, societal diversity. And also the role of the political influence played by provinces in the federal government, for the sake of argument Punjab have more influence in
107 the federal structure, compare to others three provinces. Even ethnically, a Punjabi politician or bureaucrat in the federal government enjoyed more freedom and confidence than others obviously “all are equal, but some are more equal than others”.
As far as population is concerned, there is huge difference between the population of the provinces for example 110 million people inhabited in Punjab while in Baluchistan 12.3 million are reside in the province. Punjab province alone comprise of 52.9% of the entire populace of the country and if the population of Sindh includes with it, these two provinces alone hold 75.94% of the total population, thus approximately two-third majority of the people consist of them (Census 2017). If these two provinces work diligently for their benefit they can overpoweringly control the federal government in all major issues and politically it has a serious repercussion. Ethnically, according to census (2017), Punjabi and Sindhi both are the largest ethnic communities having 110 million and 47.89 million individuals correspondingly make around 75.94% of the total inhabitants of the country, the 30.52 million people in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and 12.34 million people in Baluchistan combined population is even less than the population of Sindh (Census 2017).
However, the results of 2017 census, have turned out to be political as a result of the advantages fond of to the population size of the provinces in conceding political power and allotting economic recourses. Some ethnic groups such as Mohajirs (Urdu speaking people) have protested that there might have blunders in the 2017 census and as a result their numerical strength is affected (DAWN, Census results 'rigged', MQM-P alleges, 2017). In Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa the Chief Minister of the province claims that the overseas population of the province was mistakenly not counted in the census (DAWN, 2017).
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Table No 4.2: Some features of the provinces Province Population Urba Region Populatio Ethnic Divisio Capital Census n/ Square n groups n: city 2017 ruler kilomete Square (in District (%) r kilometer Majorit s y) Punjab 110,012,442 36/64 205,344 535 4 10:36 Lahore (75.2%) Sindh 47,886,051 52/48 140,914 340 4 7:29 Karachi (62.5%) Khyber 35,525,047 31/69 101,741 350 2 7:27 Peshawar Pakhtunkhw (75.3%) a Baluchistan 12,344,408 24/76 347,190 36 2 6:34 Quetta (54.8%) Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Census 2017.
4.1.3 The Ethnic Configurations of the Provinces
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab provinces are considered more or less a homogenous regions as in they have the presence of single overwhelming ethnic cluster, this is evident from their names assigned to these provinces based on their predominant ethnic communities residing in the province. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which have a 30.52 million inhabitants, of which the
Pashtun ethnic group comprise 75.3% of the provincial populace and many small ethnic groups such as Hazara, Kohistani, Chitrali and Sariki are the remaining 24% of the population (Babak,
2017). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is a very homogenous province, and therefore the right of the autonomy or self-administration is provided to Pashtun ethnic group.
The Punjab province, which is the largest province in terms of population and 110 million people residing in the region of which 75.2% are the Punjabi ethnic group. Punjab is ethnically a homogenous region, therefore, the province is assigned as self-administrative province to the Punjabi ethnic group. The Saraiki people which have 17% inhabitants in the
Punjab, and struggle for their separate identity and representation but the Punjabi always
109 claimed that the Saraikis are not different from Punjabi, because Saraiki is not a separate language but a dialect of the Punjabi language. However the Baloch people residing in the district of D.G Khan, Rajan pur and Jampur in the Punjab province accounts 5% Niazi Pashtun accounts 3% of the population. These small ethnic groups are concentrated in specific area and provided self-administration right under the local government system.
The Sindh province has a 47.89 million population. The Sindh is mostly a single-ethnic province particularly the rural areas of the province comprise of Sindhi ethnic people. The
Sindhi exercise full rights of their self-administration in the province because the ethnic group accounts 80% of the provincial population. Nevertheless, 20 percent the non-Sindhi people of the province reside in urban areas with minimal political representation. Especially, a significant concentration of Mohajir, Punjabi and Pashtun ethnic groups are residing in cities and in many towns. These ethnic groups enjoy a similar status as the Sindhi residing in the urban areas and this kind of methods are very vital to maintain inter-ethnic relationship and esteem. Since the province has a strategically importance because it border with Punjab and
Balochistan and serve as a financial capital of the country due to city of Karachi being a country largest city in terms of population and the only city having the seaport. However, ethnically mixed people have predominately inhabited the urban centers of the province, and as result in the past Sindhi and other non-Sindhi ethnic groups are involved in violent ethnic clashes. Many civilians lives were took by these clashes. The ethnic tensions are still there in the province among different ethnic groups which worsened the ethnic conflicts in the cities of Karachi and
Hyderabad which were inhabited by the majority non- Sindhi people, and the city administration of these urban centers are exclusively controls by the Mohajir ethnic group.
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The province of Baluchistan is designated to the Baloch people but in fact the province is not homogenous in the sense that the Baloch comprise 50% of the complete populace of the province. Estimated population of the province is about 12.3 million and the majority are
Baloch ethnic group which are about 50%, Pashtun are 40% and 10% are Punjabi settlers.
Though, despite the fact that each ethnic group is residing in their respective area but there are never-ending conflicts among various tribes and clans in the province. These conflicts among the different tribes and also against the federal government deter the Baluchistan of an establishing an effective and viable province. The province of Baluchistan from its inception has been in state of crisis and hence come to be a continuous trouble for the federal government.
Different ethnic communities are settled in Baluchistan and they does not have any type of administrative and political representation in the inside their concerned area in the province.
4.1.4 Socio-economic Variations among the Provinces
Aside from the urban centers such as the federal territory Islamabad, the low level socio- economic condition of the provinces such as Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh displays similar pattern. (As shown in Table 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4). Clearly, a few disparities are there among the indexes, however these disparities aren’t showing an example of serious regional inequalities reliably. The low level of socio-economic development are clearly showing by the four provinces, especially the Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are more backward in the terms of socio-economic development compare to Punjab and Sindh. The main reason is because in the past the governments neglected to develop the social and economic infrastructure due to the harsh geography of the Baluchistan and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa due to its desert like climate condition inn southern and mountainous region in its northern parts.
The social and economic conditions Punjab and Sindh showed better progressed in some
111 indicators such as human development index (HDI) and literacy rate (see table 4.3 and 4.4 below), but others indicators in the Punjab and Sindh in the case of socio-economic development shown similar pattern with other provinces. Be that as it may, there might be inconsistencies between the native and non-native populace, the condition amongst the native inhabitants is surely more less than the provincial normal indexes. Such as, in Sindh 52% of the non-native populations are residing in the urban areas and they have better availability of education, clean water and other social services facilities compare to the native peoples, it is due to the fact that the ‘indigenous’ residents are living in scattered villages of the province and far away from the urban areas.
Table No 4.3: Provinces access to social service, 2017 Populatio Povert Access Acces House Literac Primary Human n in y in % to s to holds y rate*** Gross develop Million* ** clean sanita with in % enrollmen ment water* tion** electri t*** in % Index ** in * in % city*** % in % National 211,819 29.5 36 73 93 58 91 0.550
Punjab 110 31.4 45 79 95 62 98 0.55
Sindh 47.89 43.1 41 67 91 55 79 0.51
KP 35.53 49.2 35 76 96 53 92 0.48
Baluchistan 12.34 71.2 33 31 81 41 73 0.41
Islamabad 2.16 23 58 99 98 87 120 0.87
Source: * Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Census report 2017 **UNDP Report on Poverty in Pakistan 2017 ***Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan social and living standard measurement survey
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Table No 4.4: Health and nutrition status in the provinces Immunization Life Under Infant Doctor: Calorie (%) expectancy five mortality patient intake (years) Mortality rate (per ratio adult rate (per 1000 live per day 1000 live births) births) National 99 66 85 61 1:997 2500
Punjab 99 67 104 82 1:1702 2350
Sindh 99 66.2 90 64 1:1127 2300
KP 98 66 70 58 1:4700 2350
Baluchistan 96 65 91 74 1:9400 2190
Islamabad 100 69 81 46 1:895 2300
Source: Calculated from 2017 census, Pakistan bureau of Statistics; UNICEF, 2017. Maternal and new born health disparities in Pakistan; Economic survey of Pakistan, Government of Pakistan.
In any case, financial and social advancements don't indicate much variety over the provinces; the allegation that the past governments made provincial or ethnic inclinations as far as economic projects seems unwarranted. The Punjab province, which is the homeland of the ruling Punjabi ethnic group, also demonstrating the same poor social and economic condition as different provinces; even it demonstrates a worse progressed in some indicators (see the detail in table 4.2 and 4.3). To illustrate the socio-economic condition of the people, in Pakistan the percent of the people living below poverty line was 29.5 per cent, while in Punjab was 31.4 percent, in Sindh 43.1 percent, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 49.2 percent, in Baluchistan 71.2 percent, in Islamabad 23 percent in 2017. The situation is worse in the whole country as only
36% people have access to safe water in 2017, where in Punjab the percentage was 45, in Sindh
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41, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 35, in Baluchistan 33, in Islamabad 58 per cent. The federating units of Pakistan shows better picture in the access to sanitation services in 2017, the 73 percent people have access to sanitation services at national level, where in Punjab it was 79 percent, in Sindh 67 percent, in KP 76 percent, in Baluchistan 81 percent, and in Islamabad it was 99 percent. The average households with electricity was 93% at national level, whereas the percent in Punjab was 95, in Sindh 91, in KP 96, in Baluchistan 81 and in Islamabad 98 percent. The literacy rate in 2107 at national level was 58, where the rate in Punjab was 62, in Sindh 55, in
KP 53, in Baluchistan 41, in Islamabad 87 percent. The average Infant Mortality rate in Pakistan in 2017 was 61, where in Punjab it was 82, in Sindh 64, in KP 58, in Baluchistan 74, in
Islamabad it was 46. The national average of doctor/patient ratio in 2017 was 1:997, in Punjab
1:1702, in Sindh 1:1127, in KP 1:4700, In Baluchistan 1:9400, in Islamabad 1:895. The human development index in 2017 at national level was 0.550, while in Punjab it was 0.55, in Sindh
0.51, In KP 0.48, in Baluchistan 0.41, in Islamabad 0.87. The above social and economic indicators showed that there was no such differences in the living condition among provinces.
However, the large scale industrial estate was concentrated in the Sindh and Punjab.
Table No 4.5: Large and Small Industrial Estate in the provinces, up to 2017 Region Large Scale Industrial Small Scale industrial estate estate Punjab 03 10
Sindh 08 16
KP 02 14
Baluchistan 02 06
Islamabad 01 01
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Source: Punjab industrial estate, Government of Punjab; Sindh industrial estate trading,
Government of Sindh; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, list of Industrial estate; SMEDA
Baluchistan.
4.1.5 Administrative Structures in the Provinces
The constitution of Pakistan established a three-tier federal form of government that is
Federal government, Provincial government and local government. To govern the provinces smoothly, the two-tier administrative hierarchs are introduced in the provinces, namely the provincial government, local government (district and tehsil administration and union council or village council) (CIDOB, 2017). The provincial government is headed by Chief Minister assisted by cabinet enjoyed concentrated and centralized executive powers (Article 129). The provinces supreme legislative powers are concentrated at the provincial government. Chief
Ministers of the provinces are very powerful in decision making as they are the leader of their respective provincial assembly and also operate as the chief executive of the province. At the provincial level the high concentrations of the power make the Pakistani federal structure highly centralized. It is necessary for the provincial government to devolve the powers to the grass root level so that the Pakistan perform as ethnic federation in true spirit.
The second tier of administrative structure in the provinces are district government or district administration. The main function of the district government is to implement the policies of the provincial government and to serve as sub regional administrative structure. The other functions of the district administration is to watch over and assist the tehsil level administration in the official activities. In the provinces, the district council is elected through election and in some cases represent a specific ethnic community, for example Hazara and Chitral in KP and
Karachi in Sindh. Though the district council has limited power and legal jurisdictions but its
115 mandate and function isn’t just to operate as sub-local executive structure yet additionally to provide self-rule right to the individual ethnic group residing in the concerned district. Like the
KP and Baluchistan, in other provinces, the district administration are simply operating as a sub-regional administrative entity and the district officials were appointed by the provincial government. The district official are in charge of conveying decisions and have the power to implement in the district and tehsil or town level. In the provinces, the tehsil or town administrations are directly answerable and under the control of the District administrations.
The District administrations is in turn directly answerable to the provincial government, as discussed above the provincial government have highly concentration of executive power. The provinces have the authority of structuring the district and tehsil administrative structures according to their regional situation, the decision is completely left on them. The structuring of the district and tehsil administration have no specific standard or criteria, but it is comprehended that the main purpose behind establishing the District is administrative conveniences.
The sub administrative structure of district government administration in the provinces are tehsils. The tehsil has the power to implement the activities regarding social services within its own concerned area. Some prominent individuals and scholar argue that those minority groups which have not enough population to establish their own district, the tehsil structure provided and protect the right of self-administration of these groups. The tehsil has its own committee or council and its members are directly elected through election. The executive of the council is also elected indirectly. In some cases, for minority ethnic groups the tehsil is considered as self-administrative entity. Nevertheless, it is exceptionally unpractical to think that the tehsil administration serve as self-administrative structure, because the tehsil administration is highly responsible and subordinated to the District and provincial government
116 and the power of the tehsils administration is very functionary. The tehsil administration have no power of making policy and its mandate is limited to functionary roles. Therefore, the tehsil administration could not provide self-governing rights to the ethnic minority groups living in the tehsil area.
The lowest administrative structure is union council or village council in the provinces.
The functions of the union council are maintaining law and order situation, building or renovate pathways and responsible for the sanitation services in the village. Union council also provide daily administrative services to the people residing in the villages. The members of village council are also elected, and have direct contact with the local population. The union council plays a big role to address the grievances of the local people and the government uses it as tool to promote social advancement, peace and harmony in the regions.
4.2 The 18th Amendment and the 1973 Constitution
4.2.1 Constitutional Distribution of Power
Figure 4.1 Power structure
Federation of Pakistan
National Senate Assembly
Provincial Provincial Provincial Provincial Assembly Khyber Assembly Assembly Punjab Assembly Sindh Pakhtunkhwa Baluchistan
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A draft of the 1973 constitution was approved by the parliament on 10th April and ratified and put into effect on 14th August, 1973. The Pakistan was officially declared an Islamic
Republic (Article 1) and federal and democratic form of governmental system was adopted and endorsed in the country. The four provinces were established under the provision of the constitution on ethnic ground that is Punjab for Punjabi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for Pashtun,
Baluchistan for Baloch and Sindh for Sindhi in the Pakistan federal structure. The constitution affirms that the parliamentary form of system for governance should be establish in the country.
The parliament must be comprise of two-chamber at the federal level, National Assembly (NA) and Senate and President of Pakistan (Article 3). The legislative body of the federation is
National assembly and have the supreme authority. The National Assembly members are elected directly, bases on the numbers of vote’s casts from each constituency based on populations for the term of five years (Article 52). It has 342 members in which 272 members were elect directly and have a women reserved seats quota which are 60, and 10 seats for minorities to be elect indirectly (Article 51).
Table No 4.6: Province wise representation in Senate and National Assembly, 2017 Province/ region Senate distribution of seats National Assembly distribution of seats (general+ women) Punjab 23 183
Sindh 23 75
KP 23 43
Baluchistan 23 17
Islamabad 4 2
FATA 8 12
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Total 104 342
Source: Senate and National Assembly of Pakistan, structure and composition
The constitution granted full power of legislation to the National Assembly in all matters which are included in the federal legislative list. The major roles and functions assigned by the constitution to the National Assembly some of them are:
The NA makes laws for the State, in those matters which are included in the Federal
Legislative List and ratify national policy standards;
It has the power to amend the constitution;
It has the power to elect the Prime Minister of the country;
It has the power to proclaim emergency; and declare the act of war
It has the power to appoint judges and chief election commissioner;
It has the right to pass the specific laws, such as utilization of rivers and lakes, on foreign
trade agreement, on communication, and postal services, on natural resources,
transportation such as rail, seaport, shipping and rail, major roads which are linking two
or more provinces;
It has the right to ratify civil laws, which can sustain one economic community in the
federation;
It also keeps a check on the government;
The NA shall approve the fiscal and monetary policies, passing the budget and others
general policies regarding social and economic development in the country;
The NA shall pass laws on the subject related to foreign exchange, and on the local
currency;
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The NA can inspects the public spending and have the power to control the expenditure
of the government through standing committees.
The Senate or upper house, is composed of representatives from the provinces. The Senate is also regarded as house of nationalities or house of ethnicities. Senate have 104 members, each Provincial assembly has to elect 14 members, Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) have 8 members which were elected by the members of the NA from FATA, Federal Capital have 4 members, 2 are general, 1 for technocrat, 1 for women seat, these are elected by the members of National Assembly from the Capital area, each provincial assembly have also elected 4 technocrats and 4 women. And each province is also selected 01 non-Muslim member
(Article 59). The federation tried to represent every federating unit in the Senate such as
Technocrats/ Ulema, Federal Capital territory, women, FATA and by allocating equal number of seats to each province (Clause 2, Article 59). The Senate of Pakistan is created for the purpose that every federating unit have equal representation, because of the fact that the number of seats in the National Assembly was distributed based on populace of the every province. The equitable provincial membership in the Senate, therefore, rebalances the provincial inequality in the National Assembly and dismisses reservations and fear, where appropriate, with regard to dispossession and mistreatment (Khan K. , 2017). The Senate as constitutional body which signifies the federating units that is provinces and territories of the Pakistan and encourages the spirits of parity, harmony and peace which is so crucial for the growth of success of the peoples.
Other significant roles and power of the Senate incorporate, settling on of choices on issues identifying with the privileges of provinces and encourage the equal opportunity among the
Pakistani peoples protected by the Constitution and help and combine their solidarity in view of their common assent; sort out every possible solutions to differences or confusions that
120 emerge between provinces; decide Federal involvement if any province, infringing upon this
Constitution, jeopardizes the constitutional mandate (Harrison, 2009).
To certain degree, the drafters goals were met, in 2010 after the approval of the 18th
Constitution Act, in which, the federal cabinet and Prime Minister was made answerable before the Senate (Article 83), report of Auditor General of Pakistan identifying with the Federation
Accounts must be present before the Senate (Article 171), increased the Senate role and powers such as NFC was made responsible to the Parliament. But, real portrayal of provinces in accounts and different issues is yet to be accomplished. The responsibility of Senate is further strengthen and this was through with the express reason that the Federal Legislative List Part-
II has been expended and that the work days of the Senate was increased from 90 days to 100 days.
In spite of the fact that the constitution allots extremely requisite powers and duties to the
Senate, its capacity to practice its influence has been reduced by a similar constitution that allows the part of Senate in the money bill. In the imposition of taxes and collecting revenues and developmental budget the Senate have the no role in these matters. As Abdul Wali Khan once said that without powers the Senate is only a debating club. Most of its power and functions were exercised by the permanent and adhoc committees established by the Senate.
Accordingly, the majority of roles and power of the Senate is practicing by couple of people being members of the committees. As a result the members of the committees usually does not consult the whole members of the senate in the decisions making process.
Moreover, the system of representation in the Senate permits more popular political parties which have more numbers of members in the provincial assemblies to have more representative in the house, and this implies they have a bigger number of representatives to than the smaller
121 political parties represented in the Senate, as it is the situation in the National Assembly.
Therefore, more popular political parties have to secure more representations in both houses and consequently more popular political parties have an edge (constitutional) on the smaller parties’ to ensure their interests (Sirmed, 2018). This puts forth case for the criticisms that there is constantly immense troubles to safeguard provincial or federating unit’s equality in Pakistan in a direct way. As this demonstrates that federal system in Pakistan, of both houses are seemingly designed for proportionate representation, however in numerous federal systems in the world, the first chamber or National Assembly having representation on proportional basis and opportunity of the equal representation is guaranteed by Senate or second chamber. In addition, on account of Pakistan, Senate or second chamber isn't working as a legislature, it isn't associated with lawmaking process. Accordingly, it is extremely hard to think about the government framework in Pakistan as bicameral, exceptionally hard to think about the government framework in Pakistan as bicameral. As Lijphart discussed, in this manner it might be a discernible deviation from the regular rule of federalism that perceives bicameralism as an inalienable element of the Federal framework (Lijphart, 1977). Moreover, the Second chamber is designed to ‘represent every province or federating units of the country’ (Rabbani, 2011).
This displays indication of the insignificant influence of the larger or popular political party (as a group) in the parliament, in making of policies and decision in Pakistan.
Moreover it is fact that the provincial assemblies have the ability to choose members of the
Senate, but this practice would like wise disadvantageous for the provinces or ethnic groups that elects an opposition candidate. This practice might weaken a system of accountability, check and balance which is exceptionally necessary in multiethnic countries where political rivalry is situated around ethnic lines. Nonetheless, if there is no check and balance system in
122 place, the ruling power certainly exploited the political process to secure provincial as well as their own personal interest. In the same manner, Horowitz discussed that the distribution of power have effects from constitutional designs, and there is a possibility that this design may be modify to favor themselves by those who gain power (Horowitz, 1994). As discussed above that the constitution granted power to the provincial assemblies to elect the members of the
Senate. This implies that in the Federal government the Senate might be influence by the majority party in the provincial assemblies. This means that the single winner party have the choice to concentrate the power in his hands.
Table No 4.7: Provincial Assemblies seats of the provinces, 2017 Province/ region Senate distribution of seats National Assembly distribution of seats (general+ women) Punjab 23 183
Sindh 23 75
KP 23 43
Baluchistan 23 17
Islamabad 4 2
FATA 8 12
Total 104 342
Source: 1973 Constitution, Article 106.
The equal responsibilities and powers are granted to the provinces by the constitution, that there will be equal powers and rights of each province in Pakistan, means that the constitutionally designed federal framework of Pakistan is a symmetrical form of federal system. Every province has its own provincial assembly that act as the legislature of the
123 provincial government. The Chief Minister who have the executive power in all of the province is elected by the members of the provincial assembly. The Article 52 of the federal constitution holds substantial powers to the provinces with the exception of those offered specifically to the center, provinces. Some of the significant controls and roles given to the provinces comprise:
A provincial administration must be establish which are able to perform the functions
of self-government, to ensure and safeguard the Federal Constitution, and endorsed rule
of law on the basis of democratic order;
To ratify and implement the Federal constitution and obey other laws of the federal
government in the provinces;
Is responsible to frame and implement socio-economic and developmental polices of
the province;
Is responsible to formulate and execute the education and health polices, strategies and
plans in the province;
Land and natural resources will be administer by the province compliance with Federal
laws;
To establish local government system in the province;
Have the control over the provincial budget, gather duties and taxes on the resource
allotted to the province, impose levy;
To administer the provincial civil service, to sanction and enforce laws for the better
condition of their work, approximate nationals standards regarding education,
experience and training must be followed to fulfill any post, job or position in the
province;
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To maintain law and order situation with the help of provincial police force administered
by the province.
The power and functions of the provinces are very hard to diminish or amend constitutionally. Any modification or amendments in the constitution is very difficult as the constitution safeguard itself counter to any easy amendment. In both houses (National
Assembly and Senate) of the parliament a two third majority will be required for any constitutional amendment. In such manner, Pakistan fulfills the basic federal principle, regarding its constitutional approach that for the constitutional amendment the consent of a very bigger majority will be required (Watts, 2000; King, 1982; Elazar, 1996).
Regardless, it is quite understandable that to lay the provisions in the constitution but the question is as it is genuinely followed. As Raza Rabbani foreseen that on the paper the federal government to be quite generous as it won’t be bound through those parts of any law that seem to confine its authority to act with freedom (Rabbani, 2011). In spite to made provinces and local government more authoritative and devolve power to the grassroots, the federal government overwhelmingly dominating the process and actually marked as a concentration of power at the center. Because of such power concentration at central level, the power utilization from the federal to the provinces and local government remained in the hand of the centralized federal government, therefore the proclamations in constitution don’t mirror the real exercise of in the federal framework of Pakistan (PILDAT, 2010; Khan Z. , 2014; Bhatti, 2015; Noor,
2017). Additionally, the federal system in Pakistan is centripetal in character and can likewise be gleaned from the application of policy dictating power, supremacy over financial and fiscal power, budget distribution obligation on the center and a feeble capability of the provincial governments in terms of trained workforce to administer the governmental departments (Shah,
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2012; Adeney, 2012). Zafarullah Khan additionally affirms as the real separation of powers amongst Federal government and provinces in Pakistan is “not federal enough” on grounds that the provinces don’t take any part at the Federal level in the formulation of policies and in suggesting legislation. To defend his claim, he further stated, that other federal systems in the world, for example in Canada and Germany, the members states have this kind of powers given by their respective federal structure (Khan Z. , 2014). Furthermore, the matters related to constitutional disputes, or decisions made by the Federal Parliament the provinces constitutionally does not having a major role to oppose these choices. Because the federal framework is design in a way, in which the federal government has dominant role especially the Prime Minister having more capacity to impact their pondering and procedure.
4.2.2 18th Amendment
The 18th amendment was became law on 19th April, 2010 after many rounds of discussions and with the signature by the President of Pakistan. It was seem to be a historical moment in the constitutional development of Pakistan after 1973 constitution. The amendment laid the foundation for a political system based on democracy, ethnic identity and federalism in the
Pakistan. With the help of amendment tries to achieve two objectives. (1) to strengthen the PM and role of parliament, (2) to empower the provinces in terms of to increase their share in resources and give them political autonomy. It is argue that these changes will bring political stability in the country and it will also neutralize the tension amongst provinces and federal government. The amendment have some salient features which, if practice in reality, it will probably create consociational arrangement in Pakistan which in turn strengthen the Federation.
Some of the salient features are discuss below:
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4.2.3 Strengthening Federation and Provinces
The concurrent list was abolished on the demand of provinces and the powers were devolved in 2011 to the provinces. The anomalies in the power of the President was legally clear in the amendment. Such as that the acting governor in the provinces will be the Speaker of Provincial Assembly was clearly mentioned in the Article 104. Also included in this section that “such other person as the President may direct shall act as Governor has been reserved for action in case the speaker is also not available” (Article 104).
An important forum was established under the provision of the 1973 constitution for coordination among federal and provinces was a Council of Common Interest (CCI). Some articles dealing with CCI was also amended to increase the role of provinces in the Federation.
Such as, Article 153 was amended and stated that the three members not four would be nominated by Federal government along with PM as a head of the forum, and Chief Minister of each province will also be the member of the council, as a result to equalize the strength of
Federal government and thus strengthen the provinces in the CCI (Article 153). Also a permanent secretariat of the council was established under Article 154, and one meeting in 90 days of the council was made compulsory. However, in case if there is an urgent matters to discuss the provinces can ask for more meetings (Article 154). Electricity projects are a major issue in the Federation and to settle down the issue in the Article 157 was amended and concludes that without the assent of the provincial governments no such hydroelectric projects would be started and if any issue arises between the federation and provinces the matter will be bring to CCI for resolution. Also, the Part II of the article stated that the Council of Common
Interest have the right to advice if any dispute arise on matters like, higher education and
127 research, national planning and economic development, census and constructing and maintaining major ports (Article 157).
To balance the development activities and to promote equality among the provinces. An advisory body National Economic Council which give advice on the policies such as commercial, financial, social and economic, the council was restructured under the article 156.
It stated that the council must have to conduct two meetings in a year; also added a members nominated by the Chief Minister of the concern province (Article 156). For a consociational perspective the NEC have a very important role to promote harmony among the federating units.
The most important amendment was made in Article 160, which is related to National
Finance Commission (NFC). The main objective behind the amendments in the article regarding NFC is to achieve effective coordination amongst the provinces and central government with the strength of institutional arrangements through constitutional provisions.
The Part 3(A) of the article stated “the share of Provinces in each Award of National Finance
Commission shall not be less than the share given to the Provinces in the previous Award”
(Article 160, 3(A). also, this article make responsible the finance ministers of the provincial and federal government to check the implementation twice a year and the reports of the commission must be submitted to the provincial assemblies as well as to the federal Parliament.
The provincial governments have permitted to take international and domestic loans according to the guidelines of the National Economic Council under a new clause (4) added to Article
167.
To put limits on the Presidential power to proclaim emergency in provinces and in the country the Part X of the article 232 about emergency proclamation was amended, and the
128 subsequent provision was added in it: “Provided that for imposition of emergency due to internal disturbances beyond the powers of a Provincial Government to control, a Resolution from the Provincial Assembly of that Province shall be required. Provided further that if the
President acts on his own, the Proclamation of Emergency shall be placed before both Houses of Majlise-Shoora (Parliament) for approval by each House within ten days”.
The Public Service Commission was also restructured under Clause 1A of the Article
242. The presidential discretion power to appoint senior government officials were ended through amendment in the article, and stated that onward the President will be liable to the
Prime Minister advice on such matters and act accordingly. Similarly, a new clause 1B was added about provinces which says “the Chairman of the Public Service Commission constituted in relation to affairs of a Province shall be appointed by the Governor on advice of the Chief
Minister.” With the help of this clause the provinces will fill important position in the administration which can effectively increase the capabilities of the local and provincial governments. Interestingly, in the federal services the share of the provinces are protected under
Article 38.
4.2.3 Identity and Representation
The identity issue in Pashtun regions for example in NWFP has tried to address in the
Article 1. There have been a long struggle from Pashtun ethnic group for their ethnic identity in Pakistan, and they continuously demanding for changing the name of NWFP. The Article 1 was amended and the name Khyber Pakhtunkhwa replaced the NWFP, which reflects the ethnic identity and representation of the Pashtun in the region.
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From the consociational perspective, to represent the smaller or underrepresented ethnic groups the local government should be established under the new Article 140A. According to the article the administrative, financial and political power and authority should be devolve to the local government’s level. The local governments provide opportunity of self-rule to the small ethnic groups in their respective areas and hence tries to address their dissatisfactions.
Additionally, the Article 27 has also been amended, which deals with the representation of the underrepresented groups or regions in the service of the country.
4.2.4 A faulty Arrangement: The Power are Concentrated in the Post of Prime Minister of the Federal Government
Pakistan adopted a parliamentary form of government under the provision of 1973 constitution. In this type of government the political party having majority or alliance of different political parties in the parliament, specifically In the National Assembly which have greater number of seats has the right to form government. In such type of political design supports by constitution are based are critiques that “winner takes all” (Elazar, 1987). This type of political system might be unsuitable for multiethnic societies, in which it is very necessary to adopt power sharing arrangement system or makes coalition between different ethnic groups
(Watts, 1999). In a multiethnic societies a federal system could be well suitable which have consociational type of arrangements and negotiated to tries to established harmony in multiplicity (Agranoff, 1998; Lijphart, 2002). Thus, the different necessities and benefits of the several and assorted populations of multiethnic Pakistan could not be satisfied by a single winner, which have the concentration of power in his post. The constitution of Pakistan granted very broad power and responsibilities to the winner party in the federal parliament (the same is the case in the provinces), many of them includes:
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Have the responsibility to elect the Prime Minister, which is the head of government,
leader of the house and cabinet.
Have the responsibility to recommend candidates for ministerial posts
Keep check over the implementation of the country’s economic, monetary and foreign
policy
Responsibility to appoint the Commissioners, heads of governmental departments and
the Auditor General.
Appoints and select Chief Secretary and Secretaries of Federal Government
To keep check on the proficiency and conduct of the Federal administration
In the federal parliament the majority party always adopts an extensive control over the executive branch of the government and the provincial governments in terms of budget allocation and as a result all the administrative branches of the government were taken in control and dominated by the winner party, this type of political arrangement in multi ethnic societies are not much suitable, for the reason that in multiethnic societies the federal arrangements requires various or coalition power of centers. Several researchers, though, are unclear with respect to the effectiveness and practicality of an arrangement based on ethnic alliance or an expansion of power centers in a state (Davis, 1978; King, 1982; Elazar,1995). For example,
King contends that “a political framework inside which each power is precisely checked by another would not appear to be a feasible system at all…a political system in which each social force is nicely blocked by some others, seems to represent a non-system, not a system- more anarchy than a polity” (King, 1982). As likewise claimed by Horowitz, ‘the presumption that the societies which are deeply divided the political elites towards other ethnic groups are probably going to be more tolerant or slanted to obtain benefit for their own group is
131 exceptionally questionable’ (Horowitz, 2001). Consequently, he asserts that making and supporting alliances in those societies which are deeply divided is an extremely hard errand, yet, at the same time, not impossible. Horowitz observed in his empirical investigation, that “in some countries the educated elites are less ethnocentric rather than their followers, in others more, in some others neither less nor more, and in still others more with respect to some groups and less or the same with respect to other groups” (Horowitz, 2001). Nonetheless, Pakistan as a multiethnic state where the politics is center around political personalities and hence autocracy is a standard, not an exclusion, it has not been possible in centralized autocracy to fulfill the regional or ethnic demands. The winner takes all approach in the parliamentary system of governance would not be a suitable model to Pakistan that displays differences in language, social assortments, custom of statehood, political advancements and ethnic setups.
In addition, the executive, especially the Prime Minister under the provisions of the constitution have great powers. He becomes the leader of the house and as well as he is the head of the majority party in the National Assembly and thus control the parliament and the federal ministers or executives are responsible to him, these are the reasons that the Prime Minister of the Pakistan constitutionally holds unprecedented powers. Under the Article 91 of the constitution he has the power to select and recommend senior Bureaucrats, appoint the Auditor
General and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, he holds substantial power to influence the system of check and balance, accountability process in the federal arrangement. This makes the
Prime Minister very powerful in Pakistan, whom power cannot be checked or controlled by the official and other provincial or federal organization. Likewise, there is no constitutional limit on the term of the Prime Minister, the PM may be elected for as many term as possible. This is a very interesting and tricky constitutional order; on a fundamental level, term limit ought to be
132 made on the post of the Prime Minister so as to debilitate a propensity of autocracy and power abuse by the power holder because of the more time in power.
The constitutionally assigned powers of the parliament are in a roundabout way goes into the hands of the PM, because in parliament the PM is also act as head of the majority party.
Along these lines, the executive branch thus use the parliament as a rubber-stump. Intrinsically, the party which have a majority in the parliament dependably has a place with the PM and in this way expected to support the prime minister determination.
4.2.5 Ambiguities in the Constitution
Firstly, the constitution recognized only four ethnic and linguistic groups in the country, but Pakistan is rich in lingual diversity and more than 50 different linguistic groups residing in the country. And only four provinces were established and hence marginalized the rights of smaller ethnic groups.
Secondly, there is no clear explanation in the constitution to why established four provinces, the criterion is not definite or not reliably practical. There is no reasonable clarification was accommodated the activity in compacting the various ethnic communities with large population, such as Saraiki in the Punjab provinces, though ethnic communities with less populace and less suitability with high uncertainty such as the Baloch individuals were given a privilege to practice their self-administering chances in the area.
Third, the constitution states that the Senate represent the federating units of the
Pakistan, but in reality the members of the Senate is more loyal to their parties rather than people. It is due to the reason that the members of the Senate were elected indirectly through provincial assemblies and nominated by the parties. To strengthen the Senate and the Federation
133 of the Pakistan the members of the Senate should be elected directly by the respective people of their concern province or constituency like already practice in others Federal systems such as United States of America.
Fourth, the constitution also devolved most of the power and responsibilities through
18th amendment to the provinces, but in practice the federal government have kept the real power center in his hand, because in the concurrent list certain conditions have been changed rather than to fully abolished the concurrent list. For example, federal government role in
Baluchistan is dominating one, by way of controlling the law enforcement activities by federal government, also keep interfering in the political and security issues of the province.
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4.3 Distribution of Fiscal Power
4.3.1 Vertical Imbalances in the Fiscal Distribution
The Pakistan Federal framework, hold a higher degree of imbalance in term of fiscal distribution between the center and the provinces and the fiscal powers id tilted towards federal government. The federal government internally, have jurisdiction over the almost every substantial sources of revenue generation, as a result the provinces are entirely reliant on the federal transfers (Article141). The revenue sharing formula were adopted in the National
Finance Commission award (NFC) held after every year and the revenue is distributed among the federal and provincial government according the share mentioned in the NFC. To carry out their tasks and responsibilities the provinces are highly dependent on the financial transfer from the federal government (Article 161).
According to the constitution the revenues will be shared to achieve the following objectives;
To carry out duties and responsibility effectively and smoothly by the federal and
provincial governments;
To assist provincial governments to take own initiatives for the development of their
respective province;
To boost the development and economic growth, and tried to narrowing the existing
developmental gap between the provinces;
Such activities would be encourage which have commonly beneficial for the provinces
In the same way, also stated in the Constitution that: “The Federal Government and the provinces shall share revenue taking the federal arrangement into account” (Article 160).
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Therefore, the federal government have the following power of taxation assigned by the
Constitution (Article 70):
On imports and exports the Federal Government will impose and gather custom duties,
and others taxes and charges;
The federal government shall impose and gather tax from the employees of the
international organization as well as from the Federal government employee’s;
The federal government have the right to impose and collect sales taxes, profit and
income from the enterprises owned by it;
It shall determine, impose and collect general Sales tax in the whole country;
Federal government shall collect income tax on national lotteries and national saving
scheme;
It have the right to collect taxes on the income of transport services such as air, rail and
sea;
Taxes on the income of federal government owned houses and properties;
Federal government shall regulate fees and charges regarding issuance of licenses and
collect taxes on them;
It shall collect taxes on services provided by organization and institutions of the Federal
Government.
Impose and collect taxes on the monopolies such as WAPDA, PTCL etc.;
Federal stamp duties were also be collected by Federal government.
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Figure No 4.2: Federal Revenue Assignments as per Constitutional Provision
Source: Social Policy and Development Centre, 2018
The constitution also gives the following power of taxation to the provincial governments;
Provinces have the right to collect and impose taxes on provincial employees;
Fees on land usufructuary rights were decide and collect by the provinces;
Have the right to impose, and gather taxes from farmers;
Provincial government have collect taxes from small traders and shopkeepers doing
business in their respective province;
Income derived from transport services such as Bus stand the provinces have the right
to impose and collect taxes on these services;
The provinces shall impose and collect taxes on the income of the private properties
such as houses and commercial properties;
The properties such as houses, guest houses and other buildings owned by the provinces,
they have the right to collect taxes and rent from them;
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The enterprises owned by the provinces, they have right to impose and collect profit,
income tax, sales and excise duty on the income of such enterprise;
The provinces shall impose and collect taxes on the income from mining operations.
The provincial government impose and gather taxes on the services provided by the
organs of the state;
They shall decide and gather the licenses fees provided by the provincial institutions;
They can collect levy on the use of forest resources.
Figure No 4.3: Provisional Revenue Assignments as per Constitutional Provision
Source: Social Policy and Development Centre, 2018
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The constitution give power to the federal and provincial government regarding taxation to jointly impose and gather taxes on the jointly establish enterprises on their profit, sales and excise and also the income of such enterprises shall also be divide between them. They also collect taxes on the dividends given to the shareholders of the companies established jointly and can collect the profit from such companies. They shall also jointly impose and collect taxes on the income generated from oil and gas operations, on large scale mining and share the royalties on such activities (UNDP, 2015). But in fact, the federal government have full control over these joint revenue sources in some provinces such as Baluchistan and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, although the procedure of distribution of these joint resources are declared in the constitution and the Federal government and provincial governments are agreed upon it. It is the right of the parliament to determine undesignated taxes such as value added taxes, entertainment taxes and withholding taxes by simple majority vote in the National Assembly.
For the purpose to encourage better cooperative relation between the central and provincial governments the constitution does not allow both the governments to impose taxes on each other’s property except those jointly established enterprises which are making profit.
The federal and provincial government’s tax jurisdictions are defined on the bases of tax categories. The central government have the full authority over the taxes on sales (general sales tax), imports and exports (foreign trade), corporate tax, income tax on employees and traders, federal stamp duties, and tax on the income of the prize bond. Nevertheless, the provinces have very limited and minimal power to impose taxes and authority over the taxes on land, tax imposition and collection from farmers, and impose taxes on the use of forestry resources. The federal government have the right to collect taxes on employee’s income, and earnings from those companies have possession of the central government, while the provincial
139 government have also right to collect taxes from the companies owned by the provinces. The provincial governments are permitted to collect taxes from small traders and shopkeepers.
With respect to private enterprises, provincial governments are permitted to gather excise taxes from sole proprietorship private enterprises and farmers. The constitution assigned the powers to both federal and provincial government to collect taxes jointly, to collect profit on oil and gas operation, and on large scale mining income. But, the provincial governments have a very poor capability of tax collection because of less accountancy skills and poor administrative performance in the field of tax collection. Almost all of the tax collected by the provincial government were done by private contractors. Specifically, the situation is worse in the less developed provinces such as in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Moreover, these provinces have been in a serious deficit to utilize public money in a well-organized and effective way that could improve the provincial capacity to generate income and financial resources. In
Baluchistan, for instance, from the beginning the economic management went wrong.
Corruption in the public money is a huge issue in the province.
In general, the federal government have monopoly over the fiscal policy of the country.
Which is above revealed, that the framework of revenue distribution stated in constitution have given solely power of tax collections to the federal government, and permitting to collect taxes on the income of lucrative internal revenue sources for example total authority to collect taxes on imports and exports. The federal government have also the power to collect indirect taxes which is about 80 percent of the internal revenue sources, and also the government have the right to utilize the non-tax revenue sources in the country. Moreover, the tax is collected by the ministry of Finance in the federal government. The tax collection system is also highly centralized and controlled by the central government.
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Figure No 4.4: Vertical fiscal imbalance in Percent
Trends in Vertical fiscal imbalance (%) 87
86
85
84
83
82
81 2001-02 2006-07 2009-10 2014-15 2016-17
Source: Pakistan fiscal operation, various years
Besides, the provincial governments have limited authority to obtain international loan and domestic loan for their budget deficit and current account deficit. Also the provincial governments does not directly negotiate or make agreement for loan because the constitution have granted the power only to federal government, who can negotiate and ratify agreements.
“The Federal Government may, subject to such conditions, if any, as it may think fit to
impose, make loans to, or, so long as any limits fixed under Article 166 are not exceeded
give guarantees in respect of loans raised by, any Province, and any sums required for
the purpose of making loans to a Province shall be charged upon the Federal
Consolidated Fund.” (Article 167, 2)
“A Province may not, without the consent of the Federal Government, raise any loan if
there is still outstanding any part of a loan made to the Province by the Federal
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Government, or in respect of which guarantee has been given by the Federal
Government; and consent under this clause may be granted subject to such conditions,
if any as the Federal Government may think fit to impose.” (Article 167, 3)
Although the constitution permitted the provincial governments to obtain loan for their infrastructure development on condition that the provincial governments have to obtain No objection certificate (NOC) from the federal government. As mentioned in the report of World
Bank relating to Pakistan that it appears to be that provincial governments borrowing is not feasible because it create a major problems in macroeconomic level (World Bank, 2015; (World
Bank, 2017), because there may be a chance of irresponsible borrowings by provincial governments. For example, the regional states borrowing in some federal countries like Brazil and India created unsustainable debt at macro level. However, obtain international loans has a risk like other business, but on the other hand it provide opportunity to increase production, start building mega infrastructure projects which in turn generate employment and to expand economic activities in the region. Although, the provincial governments have no right to borrow money for their annual budget but they can obtain loan for infrastructure developments, but it also have negative consequences if not utilize effectively. As seen in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that the government want to build a city transport project namely, Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) in Peshawar for which the KP government fixed the cost at 28 billion rupees and borrowed it from Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2017, but the project was mishandled by the government and now it will cost 70 billion rupees (Khan G. I., 2018). In many others federal governments in the world the vertical imbalance in Pakistan is higher than them such as,
Malaysia have coefficient of a vertical imbalance is of 0.35, India 0.27 but Pakistan has 0.53
(Muhammad Asif Iqbal, 2018).
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A provincial autonomy is compromised if there involves a higher degree of vertical disparity in fiscal system of the country, because the provinces are dependent on budget transfer and other transferred resources from federal government (Tarasov, 2014). The vertical imbalance decrease the advantages of responsiveness to local requirements, which is necessary for decentralized governance.
4.3.2 Horizontal Imbalances
The constitution clarified (Article 160) that the principles on which the revenue would be shared between center and provinces were;
Population
“Poverty/ backwardness;”
“Revenue generation/ collection;’
And “Inverse population density or urbanization”.
Figure No 4.5: horizontal distribution of divisible pool taxes
Source: Social Policy and Development Centre, 2018
Though the abilities and potentials to generate internal revenue by the provinces in the federal Pakistan were different, because of the central government which have the monopoly over the tax and revenue sources of the country, due to which all the provinces are dependent
143 on the federal transfer. If we look into separate province, the budgets share of internal revenue from 2010 to 2017 for Punjab was 51.74%, Sindh 24.55%, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 14.62% and
Baluchistan 9.09 percent. If the provinces were permitted to manage the internal revenue sources and tax share in their respective province, some provinces with high level of economic activities like Sindh have the ability to self-finance their expenditures from their own internal sources. Other provinces such as Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are also in a better position to finance their expenses.
The ethnic federalism is justified by the adoption of horizontal imbalance formula, and the whole process is based on ethno linguistic criteria and the purpose is to enhance provincial autonomy. In the past it is difficult to say that every ethnic group or province was equally benefited from development activities. In Pakistan, peoples from ethnic groups like Punjabi and
Mohajirs are comparably in good situation and enjoyed privileges in the central government.
They have better access to education and others facilities regarding other ethnic groups.
However, in the past the elites have benefited rather than people or region from past development. It is due to the fact that most of the development programs and investment stayed focused in specific urban regions such as Karachi and Lahore. In past the people of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan and other minor ethnic groups were neglected in the state development programs comparatively to other provinces or ethnic groups, because of the weak capability of the state of Pakistan to expand development programs in these regions. In fact it was not the due policy of the state to kept these provinces or people backward or underdeveloped, rather it was due to the reason that the Pakistani state had weak and limited resources to initiate development programs in these regions. For example in the past 70% industrial zones in the country were established in the urban centers such as Karachi, followed
144 by 20 percent in the Punjab and 10 percent both in the provinces of KP and Baluchistan. The ethnic federal design or federalism of the Pakistan is based on to “Hold together” federal system rather than “coming together”. Therefore, this system make difficult tasks for the provinces to give them power to collect the taxes in their respective province because of the concentration of the government enterprise and investment in the few regions. Furthermore, in Pakistan the massive socioeconomic and infrastructure development was carried out by the public sector and the state is the largest investor and owner of these enterprises.
The federal arrangement in Pakistan created the provinces on the bases of ethno linguistic criteria alone and did not consider others factor such as economic viability and geographical suitability, as a result arguably it connects the vertical fiscal imbalance with the horizontal imbalance. There is different levels of economic activities in every province in the country as a result creates extreme inequality in internal revenue generating capability.
Therefore, the federal government may play a main role to balance these provincial imbalances and to manage the revenue sources and to control (90%) of taxes the country. If the federal government wanting to reduce the fiscal imbalances such as horizontal among the provinces in terms of income and expenditures by playing a role of mediator to re-distribute the available resources. Otherwise, if provincial governments were allowed to control the revenue sources and the taxes it could create a severe horizontal imbalance in budget and make some provinces wealthy, on the other hand it will create risky financial condition in other provinces, especially the fiscal condition of the poor and underdeveloped provinces may be compromised.
4.3.3 Allocation of Budget Procedure and Subsidy to the Provinces
In Pakistan there is always dissatisfaction on the distribution of the financial resources between center and provinces. Many ethnic groups and smaller provinces from the very
145 beginning have put their voices against the formula of revenue distribution in Pakistan, because of the federal government which traditionally imposed the revenue formula (Mansoor Akber
Kundi, 2002). But, the 1973 constitution had a clear provisions on revenue sharing formula, according to the National Finance Commission award, regarding subsidies and straight transfers to provinces. The constitution states that “national/provincial Governments, where supposed appropriate, shall receive subsides or grants from the Central Government” (Article 160) for the purpose of;
To support National and provincial governments to develop socio-economic activities;
To promote the development activities in the neglected and underdeveloped areas
To promote such economic activities which in turn may end the income gap in terms of
per capita among provinces
Funding to such projects which in turn additionally beneficial to all provinces.
The Constitution revisited the both revenue and expenditure assignment among federal and provincial governments in the 18th constitutional amendment, enacted in 2010. It make provincial governments to strengthen the social sector and provide health and education facilities to its people. Secondly, the constitutional body Council of Common Interest (CCI)
(Fourth Schedule Part II, Clause 14), was established and given a greater role to discuss and resolve the issues arise between provincial and federal government and similarly amongst the provinces. Thirdly, the most important achievements is to strengthen the ethnic and fiscal federalism in Pakistan was to adopt the new revenue sharing formula for intergovernmental fiscal transfer from federal to provinces in the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) award, settled in 2009. In the 7th NFC award, the provinces got 57.5 percent share in the federal taxes
146 revenue which was in past 45% in the DRGO 2006 and 37.5% in the 5th NFC award in 1997.
Furthermore, the multiple criteria for the revenue distribution among the provinces was introduced in the 7th NFC award and additionally resolved the anomalies in the transfer mechanisms.
The constitution of Pakistan states that “The NFC has the responsibility to make recommendations about: a) the distribution of the net proceeds of the taxes between the
Federation and the Provinces; b) grants-in-aid to the Provincial Governments; and c) the exercise by the Federal Government and the Provincial Governments of the borrowing powers conferred by the Constitution” (Article 160; clause 2). In 1951 a Raisman plan was introduced to allocate the revenue share between center and the provinces, and 50 percent of the tax revenue was distributed amongst the provinces in which 45 percent of share were allocated to the East
Pakistan and 55 percent were distributed among the others provinces and states (Ahmed I. ,
2007).
The One Unit was established in 1955, and the four provinces were merged in West
Pakistan. Therefore, in 1961 and 1964 the awards were given on the base of administrative divisions and the collection of export duty, excise taxes are the element of the divisible pool.
The awards were distributed between the East Pakistan having a share of 54 percent and West
Pakistan got 46 percent in 1961, and in 1964 the award was unchanged and distributed as according to the 1961 formula (Ahmed I. , 2007). After the dismantling of One Unit in 1970,
54 percent share of the divisible pool was given to East Pakistan in the NFC award and the rest of 46 percent was distributed among the other four provinces in which 56.50 percent gets by
Punjab, 23.50 percent by Sindh, 15.50 percent by NWFP and 4.50 percent by Baluchistan. In
1974, for the distribution of fiscal resources the population was made a sole criteria in the NFC
147 award of 1974. Thus 60.35 percent share in the divisible pool was allocated to Punjab, 22.50 percent to Sindh, 13.39 percent to NWFP and 3.86 percent to Baluchistan on the basis of population (Ahmed I. , 2007). The dissatisfaction was arose among the smaller provinces against the federal government because of the distribution of revenues based on the population rather than recommending other factors such as underdeveloped areas and poverty (Waseem,
2011; Chaudhry, 2011). In the Federation of Pakistan this dissatisfaction was existed among the smaller ethnic groups and provinces and they argued that the political and fiscal power should be devolved in comparison with other federal states for example Switzerland, Belgium,
Germany and Canada. The smaller provinces continued their struggle for more fiscal decentralization (Mushtaq, 2009).
In 1981, the census was conducted and on the basis of population the resource distribution was as it Punjab got 57.97 percent of share in the divisible pool, Sindh 23.34 percent, NWFP
13.39 percent and Baluchistan 5.30 percent. In this award the share of the NWFP was unchanged compared to the previous share and more resources were allocated to Sindh and
Baluchistan. Due to the political instability in 1985, no award was announced and the share was distributed amongst the center and provinces were on inconclusive consultation. As concluded the distribution of the resources from 1947 to 1990 were remained same as shown in the figure no 4.6.
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Figure No 4.6: Resource distribution under various NFC award
Source: Center for Peace and Development Initiatives, 2011
As shown in figure no 4.6 in 1996, the percentage of the share amongst the federal government and provinces were enormously changed from 20:80 being in the previous four awards to 62.5:37:5 in the 5th NFC award, it was due to the reason that all the taxes were included in the divisible pool. A new formula was adopted by the federation for resources distribution in the 5th NFC award, this formula was different from the previous four awards on two reasons: (1) the new idea of National resources was adopted and (2) the shares of distribution was revised amongst federal and provincial government and in the divisible pool all the federal taxes were included. Additionally, for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan which were comparatively backward provinces the constitutional subsidies were provided.
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Following 2000 and 2005 NFCs award were constituted accordingly, but the award could not be agreed upon and in 2006 the president of Pakistan issued DRGO 2006 because of the absence of any recommendation.
A new formula was introduced for resource distribution in the 7th NFC award which is a great achievements towards ethnic federalism. After 12 years a consensus based resources transfer formula from federal to provinces was adopted. First time in the history of Pakistan in
2009 that resources distribution between provinces was not only based on population, however other factor such as poverty, inverse population density and tax generation was also considered as shown in the table No… and the extra matters for example such as hydroelectricity profit was also tried to resolve in the 7th NFC award.
Figure No 4.7: Revenue sharing formula for 7th NFC
Source: Center for Peace and Development Initiatives, 2011
The above figure no 4.7 proved the new formula adopted for the distribution of shares and according to it, Punjab from the divisible pool get 51.74 percent share, 24.55 percent was allotted to Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan would get 14.62 and 9.09 percent respectively. In the 7th NFC award a better federal arrangement is seen than never before, as
150 result in the divisible pool the resources share of provinces were increased from Rs. 654 billion which is 46% to Rs. 1033.6 billion almost 56 percent and the first time the provincial share was more than federal share (Abbasi, 2011).
Figure No 4.8: NFC over the time
NFC over the Time ( in percent) 70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0 1974 1979 1990 1996 2006 2009
Punjab Sindh Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Baluchistan
The financial implication of the 7th NFC award are vast and long lasting, the increase share of the provinces were tried to achieve the following objectives;
1. To enlarge the overall size of the divisible pool, the federal government collection
charges were reduced to 1% from 5%.
2. To recognize the role of KP in the war against terrorism, extra 1% share was allotted to
KP for the entire award period. As a result KP received additional Rs.15 billion in 2010-
11.
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3. The provincial share was increased to 56% in the divisible pool in 2010 and then to 57.5
percent, for the rest of the award period.
4. Rs.83 billion was ensured under the award for Baluchistan. And if the share of the
Baluchistan was less than the mentioned amount, than the federal government will be
liable to transfer the remaining balance amount.
5. The federal government will transferred the revenues collected from a province.
However, in 2010-11 budget this principle was not followed.
Figure No 4.9: Share of the provinces in the divisible pool
Source: Social Policy and Development Centre, 2018
The Sales taxes and income and corporation taxes of the federal government in which the 80 percent share of the divisible pool were received by provincial governments until 1991 according to the share distribution formula adopted in the NFCs as shown in the figure no. 4.9.
Also, on the sugar and tobacco the central excise duty was included in shared taxes list and a share of 37.5 percent were transferred to the provinces in the NFC Award of 1991 (Iqbal, 2018).
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All the federal taxes was included in the divisible pool in the 1997 NFC award and the provinces received 37.5 percent share which is less than the previous share of 80 percent in the past NFCs award. The share of the provinces was than increased in the DRGO 2006 to 41.50 percent and 46.25 percent in the 2010. The 7th NFC award made drastic change in the share of the provinces, and 57.5 percent was transferred to the provincial governments from the divisible pool.
4.3.4 Budget Subsidy and Straight Transfers in NFC
Straight transfers are defined as in constitution that the “royalty on natural gas and crude oil, hydroelectricity profits and excise duty on natural gas” (Article 161). According to the constitution the straight transfers are not directly part of the NFC, but were added in 1991 o 5th
NFC and since it is the major part of the negotiations in the award amongst federal and provinces. The Gas Development Surcharge (GDS) was put in the 5th NFC as straight transfers which was distributed among the provinces based on gas production in the respective province.
In the past, the Baluchistan produced highest almost 70% share of the natural gas almost in the country, but the share was declined to 20 percent. As a result, the GDS revenue in the province was also declined. Furthermore, the natural gas production cost is lowest in the province, which in turn decrease the amount of royalties. In the 7th NFC award these concerns was raised by the Baluchistan. It was decided in NFC award after detailed discussion that the incomes from per unit from GDS and royalties must be equalized. As the royalty is constitutionally protected, it was decided that to equalize the per unit value the GDS amount should be adjusted. To compensate the losses of Baluchistan since 2000, the grants were also given to the province in the 7th NFC (Ali M. K., 2011).
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The issue of the profits generating from hydroelectricity between the KP and center was also discussed in the NFC award. It was decided that this issue will be solved through third party arbitration because of the differences regarding profits sharing of hydroelectricity between Federal and KP province. The claim of KP about the hydroelectricity profit which is
Rs.100 billion was accepted after arbitration 7th NFC award. It was decided that Rs.25 billion will be given to KP in four instalment for four years (Jamal, 2015).
In 2000, the sales tax was introduced on services, and later on portion of sales tax added to straight transfer in the NFC and called it a provincial sales tax. This anomaly is corrected in the 7th NFC award and allocated both the general sales tax on services gathered in central excise mode and provincial tax services under the straight transfer to the provincial governments. Also it was suggested that tax gathered from a province will be awarded to that province based on tax gathering. Later on the provinces were permitted to gather this tax themselves in the 7th
NFC award. The general sales tax was now gather by all the four provinces and it is longer the subject of straight transfer.
4.3.5 Grants in Aid in Budget to Provinces
Almost in all NFC award grants in aid had been a permanent feature as shown in figure no 4.10. In 1957 the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan received the grants in the NFC, while in the 1991 NFC award it was granted to all four provinces, and the amounts in both awards were fixed. The variable amount was given in the 1997 NFC and the following awards, and some time it was linked with divisible pool or by assigning a percentage in the NFCs.
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Figure No 4.10: Design of grants/ Constitutional subvention in NFC awards
Source: Social Policy and Development Centre, 2018
A performance matching based criteria was introduced for grants in the 1997 NFC award to encourage the provinces to collect higher ratio of taxes. According to the criteria if a minimum growth of 14.2% in provincial receipts were achieved by the provincial government
“including increases in tax rates, withdrawal of exemptions, imposition of new taxes and revision in rates of user charges” with fiscal efforts, the payment would be transferred by the federal government in the subsequent year to each province, thus it make this matching grant related to specific maximum limit. Rs. 500 million for Sindh and Punjab, Rs.100 million for
KP and Baluchistan was fixed as an upper ceiling in the matching grant.
In 2006, a separate grants was awarded without any criterion mentioned in the DRGO
2006 award, to all provinces. Amount of Rs.27, 750 was set for a base year and the increase in the amount in future was set directly proportional to the net divisible pool. All the grants was abolished in the 7th NFC award and on the basis of new formula arrears of GDS was paid to
Baluchistan and to KP the net hydel profits which was held up was also paid. A grants of 0.66 percent was awarded to Sindh because of the provincial losses due to the abolition of the separate divisible pool.
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Table No 4.8: Details of provincial share in federal taxes in federal budget RS in Million
Classification Budget 2017-18 Revised 2017-18 Budget 2018- 19
A. DIVISIBLE POOL TAXES 22,68,999 22,30,087 25,08,834
Income Tax 895,542 876,327 970,673
Capital Value Tax 1,566 3,163 3,684
Sales Tax 918,829 888,483 973,084
Federal Excise 123,554 122,532 144,197
Custom Duties 329,526 339,583 417,196
B. STRAIGHT TRANSFERS 115,224 85,993 81,232
Royalty on Crude Oil 18,745 16,475 16,490
Royalty on Natural Gas 36,616 35,705 35,785
Gas Development Surcharge 42,140 22,540 15,680
Excise Duty on Natural Gas 15,743 11,273 13,277
TOTAL ( A to B): 23,84,243 23,16,080 25,90,066
PROVINCE – WISE SHARE
Punjab 11,61,824 11,38,410 12,81,980
Sindh 612,590 584,322 648,813
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 389,854 381,032 426,095
Inclusive 1% War on terror
Baluchistan 219,974 212,316 233, 177
TOTAL PROVINCIAL SHARE 2,384,243 2,316,080 2,590,066
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As shown in the above table no 4.8 that the in budget 2017-18 the total provincial share was
Rs.2.32 trillion, in which Punjab received Rs. 1.138 trillion, Sindh Rs. 584,322 million, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa Rs. 381,032 and Baluchistan get Rs. 212,316 million from the divisible pool. The provincial share was increased in 2018-19 budget from 2.32 trillion in 2017 to 2.59 trillion in
2018, in which the share of the Punjab is 1.2 trillion, Sindh would get Rs.648,813 million,
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Rs.426,095 and Baluchistan will receive 233,177 million in the fiscal year 2018-19.
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Chapter 5: Baluchistan Province
This chapter empirically emphases the actual task of ethnic federalism in Baluchistan province. It is primarily an empirical and investigational examination dependent on a field work by intending to find credible knowledge with respect to power and functional capacity of provincial structures, federal-provincial relations, control of resources and distribution, relations between different ethnic groups, the role of native and non-native communities in the politics and their representation. The section likewise endeavors to find by what means the common individuals residing in these provinces see the federal government structure, is it good
158 or bad for them. What change they might want to see, their general expectation with respect to the federal procedure and structures.
5.1 General Overview
The Province of Baluchistan is situated in the southwest part of the Pakistan. Quetta is the largest city and provincial capital of the province. Baluchistan shares frontiers with the
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the north and northwest with the Afghanistan, in the southeast with the
Iran, and in the south east with Sindh and north east with Punjab and the Arabian Sea lies in the south of the Baluchistan. It is the least populated province of the country, having 12.43 million populace. The province has an expected territory size of 347,190 square kilometers and density
36 people for every sq. km. The elevation in the province ranges from 600 to 1500 meters. Right around 75% of the province is known as lowland. The average temperature is in between 20-
35C yearly. The yearly precipitation of rainfall ranges from 200-500 mm. around 70 percent people living in the rural areas in a remote and inaccessible regions. Economically dynamic populace is assessed to reach 22.9%. Agriculture, which is ruled by cultivating and dairy cattle rearing, is the main earnings for occupation for 70% of the peoples. The native peoples are living inadequately in dissipated villages and practice extremely simple agriculture. Mining of gold, charcoal and marble are the other foremost means of income in the province. About 49% peoples are living beneath poverty line in 2018 as per a report of the UNDP, while the national average is 57 percent.
The province is extremely backward and far away from the national standards in education, health, road networks and other social services. Enrollment in primary education is
30 percent and illiteracy rate in the province is 41 percent. Be that as it may, the medium of instruction in education is Urdu, and the primary education in the native language has not
159 however started in the province and most of the local peoples, who are residing in inaccessible and remote areas having no familiarity with Urdu. The primary education in the non-local language is complicated for the children to comprehend the teachings as affirms by a Baluch source (A member of Union Council, Quetta, Interviewee 4 2018). But on the ground the net enrolment figure did not show the real situation, it basically attempts to set up a straight linkage between tangible learning and meager enrolment. In primary schools the medium of instruction will be the Urdu language for an unexpected future because the issues and deficiencies related through challenges and expanses to prepare educators in three local languages in the province.
In 2010, 50 percent peoples have access to health facilities in the province and it was increased to 55% in 2017-18. From 2010 to 2018 the mortality rates of children reaches to 105 (2010-
2018), 21 percent peoples have access to safe drinking water in 2018, and public health inclusion in 2018 are 28%. There is insufficient numbers of roads in the province to connect the major cities. In 2017 the province has a sum of around 20,655 square km of roads. By and large, 50 percent of the province budget is utilize on infrastructure development such as roads because of outrageous inaccessibility. There is no such road access from numerous towns and districts to the provincial capital, Quetta. In the northern region of the province the significant towns and districts utilize the lengthy different roads of other cities to reach the provincial capital city, Quetta.
In spite of its capabilities, the provincial economic activity needs essentialness and expansion; the industrial and manufacturing activities are lacking. Basic services are very limited such as banking, communication and hotel services. In any case, if compare to other provinces, the situations of different sectors is not remarkably good in Baluchistan. But, it portrays better outcomes in some cases as discussed in chapter four. Be that as it may, the
160 circumstance is absolutely unique and progressively awful among the native peoples. A
Baluchistan witness holds that 'a large portion of the services were for the Pashtun people or for settlers (An MPA from the Provincial Assembly from Baloch, Interviewee 8 2018). Quetta hospitals gave more support of the fighters from Afghanistan and others than the Baloch peoples
The province has an enormous potential for agriculture advancement and cattle raising.
However, the conventional agrarian practice is moderately very backward, which means frail in use of machinery and utilization of modern technology. The local peoples utilize outdated equipment’s, and they don't have used machine in the agriculture practice, as machinery based agriculture is normal practice in other parts of the country. Basic deficiencies of agriculture specialist and extension services officials have been a major tangle to enhance the ruined agriculture activities in the province. Diseases of animals for example, tsetse fly are significant obstruction to raise livestock. Veterinary services and other enhanced technologies and advancements are for all intents and purposes non-existent because of the province lack of appeal for talented work force and experts and furthermore non-helpful situation of scantily dissipated towns and villages in the province.
Other employment choices in the province aren’t enough available. There is a declining ratio in business activities in the area. The neighboring Afghanistan and Iran are the conventional business market place for the province. Be that as it may, obviously, the changing relation between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan have badly affected the business activities. In
Quetta practically entire interviewees said that the tightening of the border with Iran and
Afghanistan have contrarily affected trade and commercial activities in the Quetta and nearby adjacent regions of the province including Taftaan and Chaghi border areas (An Baloch Elder,
Interviewee 11 2018; An Pashtun Elder, Interviewee 12 2018). The area is close to the war zone
161 of Afghanistan and near the army installations and activities of the Afghan army and Afghan freedom fighter, thusly it has experienced unending clashes and easy availability of a wide range of weaponry that develop difficulty for long lasting serenity and nourishing of the trading links with the neighboring Afghanistan. Clothes, electronics, wheat and cattle used to be sent to Afghanistan and thusly dry fruits and fresh fruits were utilized to be exchanged (A civil servant from Quetta, Interviewee 14 2018). For the most part, the Balochistan has been considered by higher lack of capable government officials, economically underdeveloped, immature political development, lacking fundamental services and infrastructure. Be that as it may, the provincial social and economic indicators are very low comparable to the socio- economic condition in the others part of the country as shown in chapter four. However, the people condition in the province is not good.
There is a vast fertile land in the province with water resources to develop modern system of agriculture production which can set a profitable commercial activities. Just 26.1 percent land is secured for harvest out of the total cultivable land, and one and half million hectares land is assessed to be irrigable (TIPD, 2018). It can possibly give surplus agriculture products for example, wheat, and barley to national and external markets like to Afghanistan.
Most of the waterways like Hub River, Zhob and other five rivers (mainly Dasht, Hingol, Mula,
Bolan and Nari) are found in the province. It’s tremendous and exceptionally appropriately irrigable 57,000 hectares barren land will be cultivable in the Baluchistan (NNI, 2017). The provincial water resources may likewise be utilized for hydroelectric power.
Gold, charcoal, chromite, Sulphur, copper and marble are found in the province (MRIB,
2018). The provincial mining prospects in gold and copper has pulled in foreign investments in the shape of companies such as Metallurgical Corporation of China Ltd. (MCC) to attempt
162 mining and determine its potentials. Conventional gold and coal mining activities are giving an employment to around 15% peoples, however officially it wasn’t perceived to be enlisted to collect tax from these activities. There is an impressive potential in marble production. Director
Mines & Mineral Development department claims the significant marble mining fields in the province. The natural gas was also found in the province in 1952 in the area of Sui in Dera
Bugti. The Sui gas field is the backbone of economic activities in the country.
Provincial Revenue accumulation capacity was enhanced from 150 billion Rupees in
2010 to 352 billion Rupees in 2018 (PPI, 2019). The province gather a very less amount from internal revenue sources to cover its budget. Tax collection is not sufficient and tradition of tax paying is not developed in the province. A government official certifies that in accounting, revenue collection, administration, management and planning activities the province has intensive lack of trained staff (A government official from Quetta, interviewee 15 2018).
Therefore, 30 percent of the provincial expenditures is funded by the federal government. Also, approximately 50 percent peoples of the province is underneath poverty line and differentiated income activities and business ventures are truly insignificant, and there is no such mechanism at the moment for raising tax is promised.
5.2 Arrangement of Ethnic Communities and their Relations in the Province
As indicated by the 2017 populace census, the population of Baluchistan is approximately 123, 40000. The Baloch group (Balochi) constitutes 52.3%, Pashtun 36.1%,
Brauhi 4%, Hazaara 4%, Makrani 1%, Punjabi 1%, Sindhi 1% and others 1% are Uzbeks and
Turkemans. Baloch and Pashtun account 80 percent of the total populace and the remaining 20 percent of the inhabitants were represented by other ethnic communities in the province. Islam is the significant religion in the province almost 100 percent of the population are Muslim. The
163 indigenous ethnic groups Baloch individuals have a place into the Sub Iranian language group and Pashtuns individuals have a place with the Afghan stocks (Britannica, 2018).
Table No 5.1 Population of ethnic groups residing in Baluchistan Ethnic Group Area % of population in % of the total the Province population of Pakistan Baloch Kech, Chagai, Kohlu, 52% 3.6%
Kalat, Kharan
Pashtun Pishin, Qilla Abdullah, 36% 15%
Ziarat, Musa Khel
Hazaara Quetta, Mastung 4% 0.01%
Brauhi Khuzdar, Washuk, 4% 0.01%
Nushki
Sindhi Jafarabad, Barkhan 1% 15%
A Pashtun elder informed me that the Hazaara people are comparatively better educated than Baloch and Pashtun and other ethnic groups living in the province. But because of their small numbers in the population of the province their skills and expertise are not better utilize.
The major important offices in the government are held by Pashtun and Baloch (Civil servants from Quetta, Interviewee 3, 2018: 1) From Hazaara community an informant criticized the 2017 census that their population was not fully counted due to some problem while conducting census, or else the population of Hazaara community possibly will be more than 4% (An elder from Hazaara, Interviewee 5 2018).
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Figure 5.1: Ethnic configuration in the province
Source: The worldmap.com
All of the province's ethnic groups have their own language, but in provincial administration, education, and other related activities they use Urdu as an official language. In education and local administration, there is a plan and research to use local languages. A witness contends that after the constitutional amendments the education is now a provincial subject therefore (A provincial official from Baloch, Interviewee 2018; An Elder from Pashtun, interview 9 2018), each ethnic communities is trying to utilize its own language in education.
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5.3 History of Major Ethnic Conflicts in the Province
Under the British rule Baluchistan was confined as a princely states and Chief
Commissioner's province. In June, 1947 the non- official members of Quetta Municipality and the Shahi Jirga of the province collectively decided to join Pakistan. After independence in
1947 Kharan, Las Bela and Makran states also join Pakistan. However, the Khan of kalat state, announced the freedom of Kalat because of the choices given by the British government to the
565 princely states in Indian sub-continent.
In March, 1948 the state of Kalat finally decided to join Pakistan, after a period of dialogues and administrative strategies utilized by the Pakistani state. The ratification of the accession documents by Khan of Kalat, drove his sibling, Prince Abdul Karim, opposed his brother decision and rebel against him (Butt, 2013). Prince Karim, thus started the rebellion against the Pakistani state, and until 1950 leading the capricious assaults on Pakistan army the rest of Balochistan did not helped the Prince, and he battled a solitary fight against military.
The Khan of Kalat was permitted to hold his title by the Jinnah and his successors until the region's dissolution in 1955.
Insurrections by Baloch patriots occurred in 1948, 1958– 59, 1962– 63 and 1973– 77 – with another continuous rebellion via self-administration and autonomy looking for Baloch community since 2003 (Hussain, 2013). While a couple Baloch leaders bolster the interest for self-rule, the greater part are not keen on withdrawing from Pakistan. As explained by Notholt that the turmoil in Baluchistan is "nationalist/self-determination conflict" in his Atlas of Ethnic conflict (Notholt, 2008).
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The second conflict was started when Nawab Nauroz Khan waged war from 1958 to
1959 in struggle against One Unit scheme, which diminished government portrayal for tribal elites. A guerilla war was started against Pakistan by him and his adherents, he was captured, accused of treason, and jailed in prison. His relatives, children and nephews, were consequently put on death on charges of conspiracy and supporting in the homicide of Pakistani soldiers.
Nauroz Khan died in imprisonment.
After the second clash, the third conflict arose during 1960s when tendencies of Baloch separatism aroused after the introduction of the constitution of 1956, which constrained provincial autonomy sanctioned the 'One Unit' idea of political association in the country.
Pressure had emerged in the middle of expectable political confusion and instability at the central level. The Pakistan army was deployed by the central government, to build new camps for the army in the important areas of the Baluchistan. As a result, from 1963 to 1969 Sher
Muhammad Marri begun guerrilla fighting against the aggressors. Soon they started build militant bases in the south from Mengal area to the north into the Bugti and Marri regions, stretched over more than 72,000 km. The demands of the militants was to compel Pakistani state to share income with the tribes generated from the Sui gas fields. Railroads tracks was besieged by militants and thus trapped the military convoys. The Army countered attacked by decimating huge territories of the Marri tribe. In 1969, when the Baloch militants agreed to a truce as result the rebellion was over. The President of Pakistan in 1970, nullified the "One
Unit" (Report, 2006), and the Baluchistan became the fourth province of the country.
In 1973 fourth conflict was started when, referring to conspiracy, the provincial governments of Baluchistan and NWFP was dismissed by President Bhutto and in these areas martial law was imposed (Jalal, 2007), thus an armed conflict was incited. Baluchistan People's
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Liberation Front (BPLF) was shaped by Khair bakhsh, and large numbers of tribesman from
Mengal and Marri tribes were drove into guerrilla fighting against the central government.
According to a few authors, the Pakistani military lost 3000 to 4000 troopers amid the contention with the Balochi militants, while somewhere in the range of 7,000 and 9,000 Balochi insurgents were killed (Abbas, 2005). Pakistani military delivered substantial losses on the separatists. The insurrection fell into decrease after an introduction of province structure in the country.
The fifth and current conflict started in 2005 when Akbar Bugti, Sardar of the Bugti
Tribe prompted the savage revolt by the Bugti clan, they cut off the gas supply for a few weeks in significant parts of the country. Nawab Bugti and Mir Balach Marri alongwith others Baloch leaders put fifteen points scheme before the Pakistani government, in which the important demands were to stop building the army camps in the regions and to give control of the resources of the province to the local peoples (Gall, 2006). The FC commander Major General
Shujaat Zamir, was injured in Baluchistan province when the shots was fired on his helicopter on 15 December 2005. Numerous factors limit the extent of the ethnic insurrection, such as the intra-ethnic conflicts among the Baloch tribes and they frequently involve in battle among themselves. Federal government frequently misuses the situation and carries tribal opponents into the ruling government. Baluchistan region itself is of blended ethnicity, with Baloch being
54% and the rest being Pashtuns and Sindhis, who are overwhelmingly Pakistani patriots.
Sindhis vote in favor of federalist gatherings, for example, Pakistan People’s Party and Pashtuns generally voted in favor of traditionalist ace Pakistan Islamist leaders, for example, Fazal-ur-
Rehmans. The medium of instruction in the schools are Urdu language, Baloch activists themselves stand blamed for rights misuses, and according to Human Rights Watch the Baloch
168 militants are involved in harassing and killing of teachers in the province (Watch, 2010). The
Baloch Raji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS), a coalition of three Balochi dissenter groups, comprising the
Baloch Liberation Army, Baluchistan Liberation Front and Baloch Republican Guard, have kept on striking military targets in the province.
5.4 Structure of the province
5.4.1 Governance and Administration
The Baluchistan province is subdivided into Metropolitan Corporation (Quetta), 01
Municipal corporation, 30 districts, 51 municipal committees and 584 union councils, the union councils are further divided into 7,078 wards and the administration system is sorted out into four-level progressively organized structured administrative , these are: provincial government,
Districts, Tehsil and Union Council level. The Governor is the nominal head of the province and also the representative of the Federation directly appointed by the federal government.
The administrative power at the provincial level is focused in the hand of the provincial government, directed by Chief Minister, chosen by the legislative body called Provincial assembly. The provincial assembly is sorted out to be a preeminent legislative body in the province. The provincial government cabinet which act as an executive body and chosen by the
Chief Minister from the member of the provincial assembly. Provincial administrative power is obviously focused in the hand of provincial cabinet. Administratively the province is divided into six divisions and 32 districts the administrative head is the Chief Secretary, which is appointed and responsible to the chief Minister of the province.
The most astounding judicial power of the province exist in on the High Court of the province. The province has total number of 32 district courts including High Court, one Anti-
169 terrorist and accountability courts. In any case, the legal power is totally restricted into unopinionated cases, aside from such cases where the legislators and the authorities are utilizing it by way of a device for political purposes such as detaining adversaries. It once in a while happened from the legal executive to exercise their power in Pakistan to secure the people rights against the infringement of the state. Much of the time the legal executive is utilized by the administration authorities to authenticate their activities against the citizens.
At town and city level 51 municipal committees and one municipal cooperation are set up respectively, and in this way saw as self-administering structures for the local people living in the territory, anyway in the majority of the municipals committees a significant portion of nonnative peoples were dwelling however they have less political representation. The local government is in charge of designating the individuals from the zonal organizations which comprises of heads of different line workplaces and offices that are collaborating to the provincial authorities. There is also a tehsil council and their members are directly elected by the peoples living in the specific tehsils. The members of the tehsil council than elect tehsil administrator called tehsil Nazim.
There are around 32 districts in the province. There is council in each district with elected members and Nazim-i- Alaa or chief administrators who is elected indirectly by the district council members among them. In the district administration the council is the uppermost political structure, yet setting beside its local authority, their significant obligation is to implementing rules and acts of the provincial government. It is additionally in charge of overseeing social services and administrations, local development activities were also implemented by the district councils along with collecting tax and revenues. It also monitor law and order and create peace and hominy in the district through union councils in the federal
170 system of Pakistan. The district and union councils are overstrained with less resources authoritative system in spite of the fact that it is very close to the general population contrasted with the provincial managerial structures. It is only rarely capable to manage and monitor social and economic development activities in the district due to lack of qualified and trained members.
In spite of the fact that the district council is chosen by the general population, but in fact in the provincial administration it is increasingly mindful and responsible to the higher ups, whose intense money related power to truly influence it. The (2019) ongoing local government draft the district council supposed to be the most vital unit of the administrative structure in the country. Though, at the time of my field work the ' District decentralization' activities was not executed. It is past the extent of this study to think about the procedure.
At Union council level, there are around 584 Union councils which members are specifically chosen through peoples vote to manage administrative task in the jurisdiction of union council. In provincial administrative system the union council is the lower structure, however have an influential job to administer the authority of the state at the local level or on the population. The administrator called Nazim along with council members are elected by people. The union council’s authorities, for instance, in Quetta town 'don't get funds and henceforth were not dedicated or inspired to give effective social facilities to the inhabitants'.
In spite of the fact that at the local level a union council administration were involve in direct interaction with the general population, yet without giving any satisfactory facilities to them.
Anyway it exclusively assumes a job to enforce the authority of the state on the nearby individuals without raising nearby individuals' demands and interest. It is fundamentally
171 inadequate to empower the local individuals, because there is no mechanism to speak for the local individuals' requests and desires to the higher authorities.
In any case, it has a remarkable and pivotal job to find out and settle in, the higher official control over the nearby individuals as the local population is controlled by them. In cities it regulate the administrations, for example, enlistment and issuing identity card, giving confirmation and affirmations assignments to the tenants and other basic services. The union council administration in the rural areas is a viable tool of the political elites to control the people by provision of funds, distributing fertilizer and other agriculture products.
5.4.2 The Provincial Executive and Legislative Powers
The legislative and political body in the province is the provincial assembly, having total 65 seats in which 51 members are specifically chosen by the general population of each constituency and 14 reserve seats. Each constituency, paying little respect to the measure of its populace number sends people to the provincial assembly. With the exception of independent candidates, who are obviously not many, most of the candidates are named by the political parties.
The provincial assembly frequently holds session throughout a year. Its principle power and capacity incorporate sanctioning different laws, build up administrative chains of importance, choose Chief Minister of the Provincial government and endorsement of the provincial government spending and approve budget, debates over departmental reports, Be that as it may, there is an cabinet called 'the provincial ministers' selected by Chief minister among the members of the provincial assembly. In all actuality, the provincial cabinet members
' are responsible to run the specific ministry assigned to them. The Minister have no pay for
172 their appointment in the cabinet; anyway the vast majority of the members are enlisted in different committees of the provincial assembly. Therefore, the lawmaking body in the provincial government mixed with the executive body (An MPA from Pashtun, Interviewee 17
2018).
The executives or cabinet of the provincial government is responsible for running different ministries and department preside by the Chief Minister. There are around 19 ministries like education ministry, wellbeing agency, and account agency and so on, which are set up in comparable model with the federal government's different Ministries. Be that as it may, the Chief Minister is the real power holder in the provincial government. The constitution define the Chief Minister, powers and functions such as leading the Cabinet of the province, and nominate people for posts of the different department, supervise the province police force.
However, the Chief Minister position, a provincial Governor, has turned out to be significant and powerful position in delivering tough rivalry among Baloch and Pashtun communities. The post of Governor from 2009 to 2018 was constrained by many people from the Baloch ethnic group. Many times, when Baloch elites have a hostile relations with the
Federal government the Governor post was held by another ethnic groups for example Pashtun in the past regimes. The Baloch elites demand that the Chief Minister and Governor of the province post should be occupied by the Baloch people, however this demand may not be accepted by Federation. There is a clear division of power between executive and judiciary, as power is divided among executive, legislative and judiciary. Moreover, the huge Brauhi and
Hazaara populace in the province who accounts around 8% population, haven’t any significant portrayal in the political and administrative spheres of the province. But actually a few people
173 who are members of the main stream political parties are allowed some key positions in different organs of the provincial government.
5.4.3 Man Power in the Provincial Civil Service and Bureaucracy
Baluchistan experiences lack of educated and trained manpower. The province had around 166,000 government employees, of which just 30 percent are from Baluchistan province. The province have lack of medical doctors, engineers, accountant and financial experts. Be that as it may, for all intents and purposes all experts and educated manpower were from non-native people. In spite of resistance from the local elites the federal government and provincial government has utilized experts, trained and educated peoples from across the
Pakistan without ethnic inclinations. For example in 2017-18 alone, more than 150 non-native experts were working in the province. Since the provincial government utilizes English and
Urdu language in official structures and education, as it made working easy in the province for professionals across Pakistan.
Be that as it may, key posts in the administration and bureaucracy were in control of the people outside from the province. This circumstance has made a sort of double obligations and pressures inside ministries and administration in which the experts are in charge of the specialized task anyway the basic decisions making activities inside these ministries are constrained by native political elites who have no significant knowing of the ministry or department which were govern by them. Such as, a health department incharge and ministry of education incharge both have irrelevant qualification, however these departments were assigned to them which were run by numerous experts (A provincial official from Baloch, Quetta,
Interviewee 6 2018). A provincial officer affirms that the majority district elected administrators haven’t finished college or university degree (A provincial official from Pishen,
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Interviewee 18, 2018). Along these lines, it is apparent that problems must commonly erupts in this kinds of precarious administrative connections. Primarily in light of such reason and obviously additionally inferable from different chances, there is a lack of trained and qualified staff in the province.
Complexities and incompetence related to designating untrained and non-qualified native people in ministries, administration and government departments have undermined the integrity of the province administrative capability. Therefore, the central government influenced the provincial government to utilize experts from other parts of the country in the
Baluchistan to lead the government departments that required educated and skilled workforce.
In 2017-18 'roughly 50% of Doctors, teachers and engineers were outsiders’. Subsequently, the federal government has assumed an imperative role in Baluchistan provincial administrative capacities because of absence of expertise in public management by the local individuals. This circumstance have made an open door for the federal government to assume a disputable part in molding and influencing the provincial administration and politics.
So by way of indigenize the provincial civil service, the central government have established the civil service academy to prepare provincial officer and to train civil servants from the distraught local peoples bypassing the national standard on advanced education models to create experts from the local peoples. As per a source educated in such practice, that the technique is fitting to rapidly get up to speedily equivalent with other provincial governments
(A government employee from Quetta, Interviewee 10, 2018), which have capable and trained employees. Subsequently, the local political leaders needs to enhance provincial abilities and effectiveness through raise the educational competency of the province by focusing in preparing
175 local experts which in turn supplant the non-local experts who have dominated the provincial administration (A local government official from Quetta, Interviewee 2, 2018).
5.5 Emerging Issues in the Province
The serious issues created regarding the federal structure in Baluchistan province are the reduction in the political rights of the local groups, intra and inter-ethnic strains, and corruption and incompetence in daily affairs in administration. These issues are present below in details.
5.5.1 Emergence of Ethnic Strains
In Baluchistan the pre-2010 ethnic tensions were constrained to strife amid State and the Baloch for different reasons such as utilization of resources, political autonomy, social facets and many others. Extremely low power sporadic conflicts used to happen among Baloch and Pashtun over land ownership. Anyway the post-2010 ethnic tensions are new and actuated regarding the introduction of provincial autonomy of the provincial government. Rivalry for political control, positions in the provincial administration, community hegemonic desire, budget sharing and different others elements were inciting ethnic and sectarian violence.
Political power and administrative positions are the significant arena among the local leaders. Specifically, Baloch were shared feelings of hatred in regards to portrayal and arrangements in the bureaucracy and provincial administration. The seats are not distributed in the provincial administration on the basis of share in the populace; in this way the Baloch political leaders think the appointments by means of purposeful action to negate them to be a dominant ethnic community in the provincial government. As complained by them that positions in the provincial government are unreasonably distributed to Pashtun and Punjabi
176 ethnic communities to the detriment of Baloch individuals. They also assert in this manner that the minor ethnic communities is getting advantages and funds at the district level (An Elder from Baloch, Interviewee 13 2018). Their bitterness as far as losing positions in the bureaucracy and civil administration might be valid, anyway administrative positions in the bureaucracy are more advantageous to the elites than the common individuals, since increasingly administrative departments need more funds to spend that could be utilized in the expansion of developmental projects and infrastructure for the benefits of the people, however for the elites, bureaucratic positions are progressively appealing.
Additionally, Baloch sources indicate that Pashtun and Punjabi controlled senior bureaucracy like to designate non-native people as governmental departments head, however dismissing Baloch people with comparatively sufficient qualification to lead departments, just due to frightfully anticipating Baloch community hegemony in the provincial administration (A provincial official from Quetta, Interviewee 6 2018). A leader from Baloch community illustrate that: 'we are considered as a security risk on account of our large size in the population: our populace size has been begrudged and therefore this jealousy twisted harmfully against us.
They call us traitors, fanatics and terrorists. Be that as it may, we are always Pakistani and patriots (A senior political leader Baloch, Interviewee 8 2018).
This the situation in which Baloch political leaders complained that the ethnic community which is in minority is forcing its will on the majority ethnic community which is a violation to the federal arrangements that specify a relative depiction as per the measure of ethnic gathering's populace. Therefore, they requested to set up a different Baloch state by withdrawing from the current province or to be allowed their own self-governing and autonomous entity that empowers them to manage funds spending and allotment and select the
177 official. They feel anger that Pashtun leaders are deceiving them by teaming up with the federal government that needed to downgrade and disfranchise the Baloch leaders (A Senior political leader from Baloch, Interviewee 1, 2018). Their expectation of their connection with another native groups is loaded up with sadness and retaliation, and the stubborn leaders are increasing the hopelessness, and it wound up troublesome for a portion of the Baloch elites who desired a peacemaking way out. 'They are accused as disloyal for the Baloch cause and encircled as associates with those gatherings who want to undermine their cause and along these lines the
Baloch people is dismissing them' (A provincial official from Chagai, Interviewee 2, 2018).
Pashtun and Punjabi authorities’ states that the Baloch people are exceptionally influenced by the hardliner leaders to dismiss mollifying course of action and winds up troublesome for the provincial government authorities including those liberal minded Baloch individual who work in a joint effort with the Pashtun and Punjabi to work in the province. The leaders demand absolute control and domination over their ethnic group and effectively impact tribe and religious elites and others as a result of their solid call and weep for the benefit of the ethnic group (A district councilor from Zhob, Pashtun, Interviewee 19 2018).
For, Pashtun authorities that there has been reasonable representation in the provincial civil service and administration, yet tensions have developed due to the domineering aspiration of Baloch leaders who demand the leading position and other important official posts basically in view of their greater portion in the population. The local government is basically caught by power mongering people; it turns into a theatre among power hungry peoples. There is unfair representation in the cabinet; marginal ethnic communities are forcing their will on the mainstream ethnic community. There must be a suitable and reasonable multi ethnic local structure that can decently and strongly characterize every community. It is constantly
178 believable that when one controls an important position, the others might be affronted or victimized or jealous (A senior political leader from Baloch, Interviewee 8 2018).
It is apparent that the Baloch province was set up by the leaders from the different native groups and the Baloch political leaders were at the central and assumed a prevailing role attributable to their commitment in the battle against the One Unit, their greater size in the populace in the province (of the indigenous networks), their handy collaboration with Pashtun and others nationalist groups. In this manner, they enjoyed key political leadership role in the province. But, since 2009 the overwhelming role of the Baloch elites has fallen and supplanted by the Pashtun elites in the province as well as in the center, and this has made undesirable association amongst the ethnic elites which are commanding the provincial government. Rather than collaboration or potentially bargain, the ethnic connections are loaded up with doubt, dismissal and open threatening vibe that radically diminished the productivity and competence of the provincial government to provide the required living improvement of the devastated native groups of the province.
Despite the fact that there is an agreement among the native political leaders that for them the ethnic federalism and provincial autonomy is very useful, however they are not showing helpful demeanor and pledge to advance and materialize the alleged advantages; rather they have been plunged with harming revulsion against one another by overstating disparities, raising wall and developing resentments that can be extremely upsetting for future collaboration and bargain among the ethnic groups having the equivalent authoritative and political structures and establishments.
The approach of the central government's is enforcing constrained settlement and constrained collaboration which in turn raising feelings of hatred and wrath. The national
179 government, which is exceedingly controlled by Punjabi elites, is seen as a wellspring of the problem, in this manner zero chance to get a job of a trustworthy and regarded mediator in the issue. Therefore, it chose for forcing one-sided and egoistical arrangement which unsuccessful to persuade the opposing leaders, however applying a stick and carrot tactic by remunerating the individual’s whom acknowledged its solution and in the meantime by discouraging those rejected. Be that as it may, neither the prizes, nor the punishments are adequate to make a gravely required stability and vivacity in the province. The province has stayed exceptionally powerless, incompetent and corrupt.
The Budget distribution is additionally another issue to create tensions among the local leaders in the provincial government. Funds allotment used to be made at sectorial level like education department and in other sector; along these lines, there was an across the board doubt that an executive of an particular department should grant more funds to his ethnic zone in dispensing fund for his department. For example, a Baloch leader deliberately criticizes that:
'Health department minister is Pashtun, in this manner he sends the medicine to Pashtun dominated regions and districts. In another case the secondary school was opened in a zone that did not have enough students to go to school (An MPA from Pashtun, Interviewee 17 2018).
Subsequently, Baloch elites lean toward budget subsidy from the government to be specifically allocated to their constituency coffers by evading the provincial government's capacity in funds allotment and endorsement for the constituency. In spite of the fact that this demand is totally illogical and unlawful, it might demonstrate the situation of distrust and resentment that prevail among the political elites.
Besides, student’s selection for scholarship have additionally turned out to be extremely delicate and disputable. A moderately better educated group like the Pashtun individuals have
180 better access or entry opportunity, nonetheless, the leaders from Baloch and Brauhi have stressed that the ongoing procedure may agitate the ethnic parity by remunerating the generally advantaged ethnic community and discouraging the deprived one. Moreover, it could have additionally a complex impact later on by setting up a theater for the Pashtun to play a prevailing or driving role in the province, however they represent 36 percent of the all-out populace of the province.
5.5.2 Settlers Issue
Baloch leaders are appearing unfair stance in their administration by insulting and disowning huge numbers of the settlers in the Baloch areas. Pashtun elites are likewise appearing same inclination in their areas. The native communities are appearing comparable conduct and unfair dealing of non-native groups in their areas.
At the local and provincial government level the settlers are not treated well in the province. A craving of unchallenged control of provincial political structures joined with the past heritages and complaints have brought the local elites to decide on exclusionist position in provincial politics. Previously, there was hostile approach in debasing the settlers as lesser and unequal. The past-incurred overviews have now become the usual corresponding counterattack focused on abuse and discrimination of the settlers such as Punjabi, Mohajar and Pashtun from
Afghanistan. A provincial officials considers that huge numbers of the native peoples are as yet holding profound the past stereotypes and show up disregarding and minimizing the role of the settlers and jealousy over the privileged status of the settlers (A provincial official Pishin,
Interviewee 18, 2018). Numerous Baloch individuals additionally presume that the neighboring
Pashtun individuals have a desire of extending their domain and political power in their general
181 vicinity, subsequently they are uncooperative and hesitant to incorporate them in the political spheres and administration. Past memoirs of control by Afghan elites may have its effect.
The rights of settlers are unprotected to net infringement like expelling, restricting their activities. The peace and order and protection of setters only be possible in the province with the inclusion of the government military power, anyway somewhere down in the remote villages and towns and in routine contact, the settlers are constantly exposed to each sort of provocation and terrorizing. From 2007 to 2013 the settlers homes and properties were scorched and many of them were killed (An Elder from Hazaara, Interviewee 03 2018). The settlers demanded the central government to end their evil treatment and discrimination to intercede to regard their legal rights, yet the reaction they got was inadequate.
The native community want to end the settlements and the land should be reverted to the community, because they feels that their territory was shamefully taken from them by the past governments. The settlements territory of the settlers is generally very much used and consequently, instigating past possession rights by a few individuals from the local group. The
Baloch leaders are additionally longing for the settler’s expulsion because of political intentions, in light of the fact that monstrous populace convergence of non-native peoples in their ethnic region can promote an interest in future for political portrayal that can decrease the authoritative control of the native peoples at district, union council and provincial dimensions.
(A local government official from Quetta, Interviewee 2 2018; an elder from Pashtun,
Interviewee 9 2018). They are wanting 'Balochinazotion' of their ethnic enclave; consequently they could fall back on ousting the settlers and ethnic purging if they get a chance and the capacity (An Elder from Pashtu, Interviewee 12 2018; An Elder from Hazaara, Interviewee 5,
2018). They said for political reason the settlement was roused in the past rather than for
182 humanitarian reasons. They likewise remind in hatred that in the past the settlers were furnished with new BHU, water services, schools and government's security cover, however without giving a comparative level of service and assurance for the native communities.
Division within the Baloch political leaders have additionally got obstacles to resolve the settler’s problem, particularly in Baloch areas were emphatically opposing the settlement.
They feared that extending greater settlement in their area and furthermore stressed that the settlers would share the rare resources dispensed for beginning developmental ventures for the native Baloch individuals that are moderately deprived of (A government official from Quetta,
Interviewee 7, 2018). Tragically, the settlers are utilized by all communities for political intentions. The issue of settlers was exceptionally disputable and troublesome in the province.
The Pashtuns were supportive of allowing political and administrative portrayal for the settlers, though the Baloch were very resilient. It was one of the real reasons that constrained the Baloch groups start fighting with the central government. The Baloch leaders sensed that Pashtun and
Punjabi leaders are associating to encounter their majority status, particularly the Pashtun community who controls important provincial political and bureaucratic position are utilizing the settler issue to promote their authority.
Therefore, with the extraordinary ethnic competitions among the native communities, the connection between the settlers and the indigenous was utilized for political reason in misusing their help to adjust the political power of the opponent ethnic group. This thusly has exposed the settlers for brutality and killing from the other group. This is the situation of the
Punjabi and Afghan settlers in Quetta zone in which the Pashtun bunch are utilizing them as a shield to promote their political interest in order to debilitate the power of the opponent Baloch group. Thusly the Baloch community has felt that the Pashtu and Punjabi settlers, living in the
183 province are a danger to its ambition and furthermore its weakest point to be effectively exploited by its rivals. Accordingly, frequent animosity, ousting and mistreatment of their rights in day by day bases has been a reality the settlers need to live with.
5.5.3 Corruption and Inefficiency
Primarily, the grouping within the party, conflicts between different ethnic groups and the polarity of natives and nonnatives’ classes have escalated corruption and bias so as to erect or fortify biased and sectional loyalties. In the past on many occasion the federal authorities, denounced the provincial executives for broad corruption and incompetence and organized follow-up activities that detached most of the political leaders in the provincial government.
Secondly, at first, Budget allocation and transfer was essentially focused toward pleasing political partners in the provincial government, hence there was no point by point development plan, no follow ups over implementation, proper records, and checking, however the funds was simply transferred to the provincial ministries and departments utilized by the authorities however they delight spend it. The federal government needed to solidify its rule through a pay off since independence in which the provincial authorities deprived of responsibility and reviewing techniques utilized the province governmental funds. The federation was progressively intrigued to consolidate its dominant authoritative role by backing of local groups which have been remunerated by immense cash, which they have never envisioned for. The cash was utilized to bargain political partners in the locales for the federal hegemony. In this manner, the underlying malady has turned into a standard. Everything is tainted hazardously that no artificial change can clean it along these lines the necessity is a major surgical operation that must remove the roots. Nonetheless, the federal government has acted to remove the roots when it feels this can serve its political objective to estrange the
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Baloch elites that itself introduced already and overlooked their abuse of power and debasement for its own political gains. At last, the federation utilized the malady, which it encouraged in developing, to debilitate the local leaders who turned into a risk to its goals. In spite of the fact that the federation can debilitate the Baloch leaders, the immoral practices that it encouraged at first has turned out to be unremitting and endemic.
Thirdly, incompetence, corruption and inefficiency are increasing because of the categorization of 'insider' and 'outsiders' experts in the bureaucracy of the provincial government. The selection of the supposed “outsiders” in the administration is authoritatively articulated as an impermanent and temporary alternative because of ethnic predispositions and
Biases. It sounds strangely captivating that 'we need you only for a period being on the grounds that we don't have our blood kinfolk’s experts, however once we train our people, we will toss you out as soon as possible. The alleged “outsiders” or nonnatives experts realize that their jobs are for an impermanent period and furthermore realize that they should be supplanted promptly when native expert are available. In the event that one enters another social circumstance and is seen as an outcast who does not have a place, one is probably going to consider oneself that way (Huntington, 2004). Thusly in view of such discouraging factors variables and the undeniable uncertainty of tenure the tendencies for incompetent and disappointing performance are clear. Moreover, since their higher political superiors are from the supposed indigenous individuals who have neither the skill nor the information of the job to check the performance and effectiveness of the departmental heads or subordinate, it is less demanding for these people to be unnoticed, to take part in corruption, and to escape from everyday development, auspicious observing and correct assessments.
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In conclusion, the system has brought about waste and exploitation of resources. There are jobless educated and skilled university graduates in different areas, however the federal structure wait for native peoples will complete college and to fill the administration to join civil service in the province; or generally the norm has been providing an alternate courses of 3 years to make them a junior judge, bookkeeper and so on, yet it is exceptionally hard to produce skillful engineers, doctors and others that could change the locale with such sort of short time of training. The local political elites are in hurry to control bureaucratic and administrative positions while they expect non-native experts to offer their expertise in the health sector, development and other crucial areas. The area depends intensely on private contractual workers for developmental work, however these temporary workers are sacking the areas' money by exchanging back to Punjab and other parts of the country. The provincial government used to re-send unutilized money back to the treasury of the federal government, while the province has been described by lack of clean water services, clinics and roads in rural areas and other basic public services (An MPA from Baloch, Interviewee 8 2018)
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Chapter 6: Sindh Province
Source: The world map.com
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6.1 General Overview
The Province of Sindh is situated in the southeast part of the Pakistan. The largest city of the province and as well of the country is Karachi, located in the Sindh, which serve as well the provincial and commercial capital of the province. Sindh shares frontiers in the west with
Baluchistan. In north their lies Punjab and in east it shares border with India, and in south with the Arabian Sea. It is the second largest populated province of the country, having 47.89 million populace. It is the third largest province by area and has an expected territory size of 140,914 square kilometers and density 340 people for every sq. km. The elevation in the province ranges from 600 to 2150. Right around 90 percent of the province is known as lowland. The average temperature is in between 30-40C. The yearly precipitation of rainfall ranges from 100-150 mm. around 48 percent people living in the rural areas. Economically dynamic populace is assessed to reach 56%. Agriculture, which is ruled by cultivating and dairy cattle rearing, is the main earnings for occupation for 50 percent of the populace in remote areas. The native peoples are living inadequately in dissipated villages and practice modern agriculture techniques.
Fishing, mining, charcoal are the foremost means of income in the province. About 35 percent of the area's populace is underneath poverty line in 2018 that was practically better than the national average i.e. 57 percent. Karachi is the largest city and being a financial hub which provide better jobs opportunities to the local people as well as attract manpower from other parts of the country. The country only seaports are in the Karachi.
In detail of social services like education, wellbeing and health, and roads network the urban areas of the province is extremely good, but on the other hand in rural areas are extremely backward. Enrollment in primary education is 50 percent and illiteracy rate in 2017 was 45.2%.
In urban centers the primary education is in Urdu language and in interior Sindh, it is the only
188 province which give primary education in its native language which is Sindhi. The primary education in Sindhi language is very good for the native students to comprehend the teachings as affirms by Sindhi source (An Sindhi Elder from Larkana, Interviewee 22 2018). But on the ground the net enrolment figure did not show the real situation, it basically attempts to set up a straight linkage between tangible learning and meager enrolment. In 2010, 45 percent peoples have access to health facilities in the province and it was increased to 60% in 2017-18. From
2010 to 2018 the mortality rates of children reaches to 94 per thousand, 35 percent peoples have access to safe drinking water in 2018, and public health inclusion in 2018 are 40 percent. There is sufficient numbers of road network in the province to connect the major cities. In 2017 the province has a sum of around 4800 km of black topped roads. By and large, a huge portion of the province budget is utilize on infrastructure development such as roads because of outrageous inaccessibility.
In spite of its capabilities, the provincial economic activity needs essentialness and expansion; the industrial and manufacturing activities are increasing day by day in the province due to seaports. Basic services are very well established such as banking, communication and hotel services and many multinational companies have head quarter in the province. In any case, the conditions at the Sindh are considered remarkably well compare to other provinces.
Indeed, it portrays better outcomes in some cases. Be that as it may, the circumstance is absolutely unique and progressively awful among the native peoples. A Sindhi witness holds that 'a large portion of the services were for the Mohajir (Urdu speaking people) people or for settlers in the urban centers. (A council member from Hyderabad, Sindhi, Interviewee 23 2018).
The province has an enormous potential for agriculture advancement and cattle raising.
The agrarian practice is moderately advanced, which means good use of modern equipment’s
189 and tools are better utilize in agriculture. Other employment choices are generally good and enough available. In the province the business activities have been increasing day by day. The conventional market outlet of the province is connected to other countries with sea routes. For the most part, the Sindh has been moderately considered by high capable government officials, economically developed, mature political development, well established basic public services and infrastructure. Be that as it may, the provincial social and economic indicators are moderate as compare to the socio-economic condition in the others part of the country. However, the people general condition in the province is not good.
There is vast fertile land in the province with plentiful rich water resources to develop modern system of agriculture production that can generate a profitable economic activities in the province. From the aggregate of cultivable land, 70 percent is secured by perpetual harvest.
The province produce surplus agriculture products for example, wheat, sugar canes, dates, palms and fruits. Most of the waterways like the mighty Indus river flow in the province.
Provincial Revenue accumulation capacity was enhanced from 422 billion Rupees in
2010 to 1043.185 billion Rupees in 2017. The province collect huge amount of internal revenue and could cover its budget easily. In the province there is a good tradition of tax paying and sufficient tax are collected. The city of Karachi is financial hub of the country and it contributes huge amount of revenue to the federal budget.
6.2 Arrangement of Ethnic Communities and their Relations in the Province
According to the 2017 census, As indicated by the 2017 populace census, the population of Sindh is about 478,86051. The Sindhi constitutes 62%, Mohajir (Urdu speaking people) 20%,
Punjabi 10%, Pashtun 7.1%, Baloch 2%, Kashmiris and others are 3.2%. Sindhi and Mohajir
190 account 82 percent of the total populace. Other ethnic groups account about 18 percent of the inhabitants in the province. Islam is the significant religion in the province almost 91 percent of the population are Muslim. Hinduism and Christianity is also practiced by 8 percent and 1 percent people respectively.
Table No 6.1 Population of ethnic groups in Sindh Ethnic Group Area % of population in % of the total the Province population of Pakistan Sindhi Larkhana, Badin, 62% 15%
Mirpur kas, Dadu
Mohajir Karachi, Hyderabad 20% 7.6%
Punjabi Karachi 10% 44.7%
Pashtuns Karachi 7.1% 15%
Baloch Karachi 2% 3.6%
6.3 Structure of the Province
6.3.1 Governance and Administration
The Sindh province is subdivided into urban and rural areas. The urban areas are also divided into a Metropolitan Corporation, district Municipal Corporation, Municipal
Corporation, Town Committee and a Union Committee. The rural areas are divided into a
District Council for each district and a Union council for each union. The administrative system is sorted out into four-level progressively organized structured administration, these are: provincial government, city government, Districts and Union Council level. The Governor is
191 the nominal head of the province and also the representative of the Federation directly appointed by the federal government.
The administrative power at the provincial level is focused in the hand of the provincial government, directed by Chief Minister, chosen by the legislative body called Provincial assembly. The provincial assembly is sorted out to be a preeminent legislative body in the province. The provincial government cabinet which act as an executive body and chosen by the
Chief Minister from the member of the provincial assembly. Provincial administrative power is obviously focused in the hand of provincial cabinet. The judicial power of the province exist in on the Sindh High Court. The province has total number of 29 district courts including High
Court, three Anti- terrorist and accountability courts.
In urban areas the municipal cooperation and municipal committees are set up, and in this way saw as self-administering structures for the local people living in the territory, in the majority of the municipals committees a significant portion of nonnative peoples have a political representation. The local government is in charge of designating the individuals from the zonal organizations which comprises of heads of different line workplaces and offices that are collaborating to the provincial authorities. The head of Municipal Corporation and municipal committees is mayor assisted by deputy mayor.
There are around 29 districts in the province. There is council in each district with elected members and Nazim-i- Alaa or chief administrators who is elected indirectly by the district council members among them. In the district administration the council is the uppermost political structure, yet setting beside its local authority, their significant obligation is to implementing rules and acts of the provincial government. At Union council level, there are around 1100 Union councils which members are specifically chosen through peoples vote to
192 manage administrative task in the jurisdiction of union council. In provincial administrative system the union council is the lower structure, however have an influential job to administer the authority of the state at the local level or on the population. The administrator called Nazim along with council members are elected by people. In any case, it has a remarkable and pivotal job to find out and settle in, the higher official control over the nearby individuals as the local population is controlled by them. In cities it regulate the administrations, for example, enlistment and issuing identity card, giving confirmation and affirmations assignments to the tenants and other basic services. The union council administration in the rural areas is a viable tool of the political elites to control the people by provision of funds, distributing fertilizer and other agriculture products.
6.3.2 The Provincial Executive and Legislative Powers
The legislative and political body in the province is the provincial assembly, having total 168 seats in which 130 members are specifically chosen by the general population of each constituency and 38 reserve seats. Each constituency, paying little respect to the measure of its populace number sends people to the provincial assembly. With the exception of independent candidates, who are obviously not many, most of the candidates are named by the political parties.
The Sindh provincial assembly frequently holds session throughout a year. Its principle power and capacity incorporate sanctioning different laws, build up administrative chains of importance, choose Chief Minister of the Provincial government and endorsement of the provincial government spending and approve budget, debates over departmental reports, Be that as it may, there is an cabinet called 'the provincial ministers’ selected by Chief minister among the members of the Sindh provincial assembly. In all actuality, the provincial cabinet
193 members ' are responsible to run the specific ministry assigned to them. The Minister have no pay for their appointment in the cabinet; anyway the vast majority of the members are enlisted in different committees of the provincial assembly. (An MPA from Mohajir, Interviewee 27
2018). Therefore, the lawmaking body covers with the executive branch and bureaucracy in the
Sindh.
The executives or cabinet of the Sindh government is responsible for running different ministries and department preside by the Chief Minister. There are around 21 ministries like education ministry, public health agency, and account agency and so on, which are set up in comparable model with the federal government's different Ministries. Be that as it may, the
Chief Minister is the real power holder in the provincial government. As per the constitution of the country, powers and functions of the Chief Minister leading the Cabinet of the province, select and nominate people for posts of the of the different department, supervise the province police force.
However, the Chief Minister position, a provincial Governor, has turned out to be significant and powerful position in delivering tough rivalry and tension between the two major ethnic communities- Sindhis and Mohajir (Urdu speaking people) leaders. The Governor post from 2002 to 2018 was constrained by different people from the Mohajir community, which are 21% of the all-out populace of the province, a major group on the basis of population in the province. Many times, when Sindhis elites have a hostile relations with the Federal government the Governor post was held by another ethnic groups for example Mohajir in the past regimes.
The Sindhis elites demand that the Chief Minister and Governor of the province post should be occupied by the Sindhi people, however this demand may not be accepted by Federation. There is a clear division of power between executive and judiciary, as power is divided among
194 executive, legislative and judiciary. Moreover, the huge Punjabi, Pashtun and Baloch populace in the province who accounts around 10, 7 and 2 percent of the total provincial populace individually did not have significant representation in the political and administrative spheres of the province. But actually a few people who are members of the main stream political parties are allowed some key positions in different organs of the Sindh government.
6.3.3 Man Power in the Provincial Civil Service and Bureaucracy
Sindh have sufficient trained and qualified manpower in the provincial bureaucracy.
The province had around 478,000 government employees, of which just 5 percent are from others part of the country. The province has adequate number of engineers, doctors, accountant, budget and financial experts. Be that as it may, for all intents and purposes major portion of experts and educated manpower were from Mohajir community, which are non-native people of the province. In spite of resistance from the local elites the federal government and provincial government has utilized experts, trained and educated peoples from across the Pakistan without ethnic inclinations. Since the Sindh government utilizes Sindhi, English and Urdu language in official structures and education, as it made working easy in the province for professionals across Pakistan. Be that as it may, key posts in the administration and bureaucracy were in control by Sindhi, Mohajir and Punjabi communities. This circumstance has made a sort of double obligations and pressures inside ministries and administration in which the experts are in charge of the specialized task anyway the basic decisions making activities inside these ministries are constrained by native political elites who have no significant knowing of the ministry or department they are leading.
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6.4 Emergence of Ethnic strains
In Sindh the pre-2010 ethnic tensions were constrained to strife among the Sindhi and
Mohajr and Pashtun for different reasons such as utilization of resources, political autonomy, social facets and many others. Extremely low power sporadic conflicts used to happen among
Mohajir, Sindhi and Pashtun over land ownership, resources and political space. Anyway the post-2009 ethnic tensions are new and actuated regarding the introduction of provincial autonomy of the provincial government. Rivalry for political control, positions in the provincial administration, community hegemonic desire, budget sharing and different elements are inciting ethnic violence.
Sindhi sources indicate that Mohajir and Punjabi controlled senior bureaucracy like to designate non-native people as governmental departments head, however dismissing Sindhi people with comparatively sufficient qualification to lead departments, just due to frightfully anticipating Sindhi community hegemony in the provincial administration (A civil servant from
Karachi, Interviewee 30 2018). Political power and administrative positions are the significant arena among the local leaders. Specifically, Sindhi have shared feelings of hatred in regards to representation and arrangements of the Punjabi in the provincial administration and bureaucracy. As complained by the Sindhi elites that posts in the provincial government are unreasonably distributed to Pashtun, Mohajir and Punjabi ethnic communities. Their bitterness as far as losing positions in the bureaucracy and civil administration might be valid, anyway administrative positions in the bureaucracy are more advantageous to the elites than the common individuals, since increasingly administrative departments need more funds to spend that could be utilized in the expansion of developmental projects and infrastructure for the
196 benefits of the people, however for the elites, bureaucratic positions are progressively appealing.
For, Mohajir authorities that there has been reasonable representation in the provincial civil service and administration, yet tensions have developed due to the domineering aspiration of Sindhi leaders who demand a right to have the leading position and other key official posts basically in view of their greater portion in the population. Despite the fact that there is an agreement among the native political leaders that provincial autonomy and ethnic federalism is useful to them, they are not showing helpful demeanor and pledge to advance and materialize the alleged advantages; rather they have been plunged with harming revulsion against one another by overstating disparities, raising wall and developing resentments that could be extremely upsetting for future collaboration and bargain among the ethnic groups having the equivalent authoritative and political structures and establishments.
The Budget distribution is additionally another issue to create tensions among the local leaders in the Sindh. Funds allotment used to be made at sectorial level like education department and in other sector; along these lines, there was an across the board doubt that a head of an respective department would grant more funds to his ethnic zone in dispensing budget for his department. Subsequently, Sindhi elites lean toward budget subsidy from the government to be specifically transferred to their constituency coffers by evading the provincial government's capacity in funds allotment and endorsement for the constituency. In spite of the fact that this demand is totally illogical and unlawful, it might demonstrate the situation of distrust and resentment that prevail among the political elites.
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6.5 Settlers Issue and Intra-ethnic and Inter-ethnic Conflicts
In the province and the city of Karachi specifically, most exasperating improvement to overwhelm the Province is target killing, the result of ethnic hostilities and political maneuverings. ANP argue that a discernment is being made by some personal stakes that the tenacious focused on murdering of inhabitants and grievous violence in the city are a direct result of political turf war among ANP and MQM. This blame was rejected by the party by stating that the current ethnic violence is to a great extent a result of a disavowal of the changing demographic realities. There has been an ethnic change of the demographic composition of
Karachi due to the mass migration of Pashtun from Swat and FATA. Ethnic fighting has achieved such a dimension, that Karachi's rescue vehicle administration presently needs to convey a driver coordinating the racial make-up of the destination locale to get the casualties of pack attacks (A social worker from Karachi, Interviewee 24 2018).
Sindhis are seeming unjustifiable remain in their administration by annoying and disfranchising tremendous quantities of the settlers in the urban center and interior Sindh.
Mohajir which are also settlers are in like manner seeming same tendency in their territories. In the urban center and specifically in the in the rural areas of the province the settlers are not treated well in local level. A hankering of monopolistic control of common political spaces and regulatory structures joined with the past legacies and grumblings have expedited the Sindhi elites to choose exclusionist position in provincial politics. Beforehand, there was threatening methodology in degrading the settlers as lesser and unequal. The past-brought about criticisms have now turned into the standard comparing counterattack concentrated on maltreatment and discrimination of the settlers, for example, Punjabi, Mohajir and Pashtun. Various Sindhi moreover assume that the Pashtun and Mohajir peoples as having want of expanding their area
198 and political impact in their general region, hence they are uncooperative and reluctant to fuse them in the political circles and administration.
The settlers are presented to net encroachment of their rights like ousting, confining their movements, demolishing their property and other relative merciless crimes. It is just be conceivable to ensure relative harmony in the province with the consideration of the administration military power. In order to end their detestable treatment and segregation the settlers have requested the focal government to mediate to respect their protected rights, yet the response they got was insufficient.
The Sindhi elites are moreover yearning for the settler’s ejection on account of political goals, in light of the way that huge masses convergence of non-local people in their ethnic enclave could raise an enthusiasm for political portrayal in future that could diminish the definitive position of the local people at District and union council level. (An MNA from
Hyderabad, Sindhi, Interviewee 25 2018). They said that the settlement was animated for political and crucial reason in the past related with the conflict and not for compassionate reasons. They in like manner remind in disdain that in the past the pilgrims were outfitted with new BHU, schools and government's security cover, anyway without giving a similar dimension of services and affirmation for the Sindhi community.
Over time, ethnic clash in Sindh has encountered blended patterns. While Sindhi-
Mohajir strife may have been mitigated contrasted with its previous seriousness, different actors have taken to the stage in urban centers. Hostility against Punjabis and Pakhtuns continues among Sindhis which went to the fore amid one-sided armed protests following killing of previous PM, Benazir Bhutto particularly in rural Sindh (A Pashtun Political leader from
Karachi, Interviewee 31 2018). There are solid signs of reforming of alliances among non-
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Mohajir political powers once again. Over some stretch of time, Urdu talking populace under
MQM and Pashtun talking populace under ANP is rising into greater ethnic bunches of residence in the city, different networks like Balochi, Sindhi and Punjabi are living blend in all regions. After breaking down of PPI, ANP developed to represent the Pashtoon populace in
Karachi.
Division inside the Sindhis have furthermore conveyed snags to determine the settlers concern, especially in the urban centers, which contained the huge settlement towns, were vehemently restricting the settlement. They expected that expanding more noteworthy settlement in their province and moreover focused on that the settlers would share the uncommon assets apportioned for starting developmental endeavors for the local Sindhi that are respectably disadvantageous (A civil servant from Karachi, Mohajir, Interviewee 28, 2018).
Deplorably, all communities used the settlers for political objectives. The settlers issue was extraordinarily debatable and troublesome in the region.
In this way, with the exceptional ethnic rivalries among the local groups, the association between the settlers and the indigenous was used for political reason in abusing their assistance to modify the political power of the rival ethnic gathering. This along these lines has uncovered the settlers for mercilessness and executing from the other gathering.
What makes a bloody situation significantly bloodier is that violence isn't simply political and ethnic. Land grabbing and extortion soon get added to the blend. It is with this that the natives who having nothing to do with politics, ethnic divides become involved with the center of all the commotion and bloodshed.
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Chapter 7: Implications of Ethnic Federalism in Pakistan
This section talks about the points of interest and impediments of ethnic federalism in
Pakistan by investigating the rising patterns in the three provinces. It likewise intends to decide if the Pakistani ethnic federal structure is effective in advancing ethnic self-rule and ethnic balance as authoritatively claimed. Does ethnic federalism fruitful sustaining participation or quickening clashes among ethnic groups; Does it making ethnic strengthening or broadening ethnic disappointment. Does it make the ethnic communities stronger or just it gives authority in the hands of ethnic leaders? Is the central structure of action going toward a path of fashioning a useful country? Is it a maintainable political plan for the general population of Pakistan? In general, the section endeavors to decide the ideal of the federal structure which is developing in Pakistan.
7.1 Successes Associated to Ethnic Federalism in Pakistan
7.1.1 Achieve Political stability through the Acknowledgement of Identity and Self-rule
Practically the majority of my interviewees from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Sindh and Baluchistan native communities were eager about the rights of self-rule for their own ethnic groups, to promote their identity, culture and way of life and their language recognized as official and use in the offices and in educational institutions. Be that as it may, the greater part of their objections was on decrease of their ethnic rights, interference of the central government, allocation of budget and internal disintegration.
All the most significantly, several assumed that for the native ethnic communities self-rule likewise gets self-confidence. In the past a large numbers of elites from Sindhi ethnic group were embarrassed to give a native forename to their children so as to evade to be giggled at or
201 to seem uncultured as expressed by a Sindhi informant (An MPA from Sindh, Interviewee 3
2018). Few native groups likewise Gujjar and Hazara were beforehand improbable and reside in inaccessible and difficult to reach mountainous areas, however at this point they become known and familiar and also the right of self –administration is also provided. A Baloch witness likewise asserts that previously, we used to be depicted as somewhat inferior, however at this point, 'our children's working in courts and police, and giving us some sort of leadership (An
MPA from Baloch, Interviewee 8, 2018). A different source likewise asserts that ethnic federalism is useful in giving a chance to the indigenous ethnic groups for self-rule; non-ethnic governmental arrangement may possibly force us to be administered by non-native elites whom might be better educated than us. It is better and very nearer for an ethnic community if ruled by their own indigenous leaders. Rulers from outside the community are not capable to give answers for the issues of our locale (An MPA from Pashtun, Interviewee 17 2018). In this way the administrative arrangements at provincial, districts and Tehsil level are totally organized by the leaders came out from the local ethnic groups in spite of the discontent of numerous ethnic communities who are despondent in ethnic self-rule that frequently criticize and try to downgrade the self-administration privileges of the different ethnic communities.
Moreover, many ethnic communities in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and
Baluchistan provinces have been deliberated as negligible minorities. Since independence the unified state structure of Pakistan forced its power on the diverse ethnic groups in Pakistan.
Due to this imposed policy of the state from its very beginning, therefore zero tolerant policy was adopted by the state in promoting and recognizes ethnic and local identities; therefore the way of life, culture and tradition and language of these ethnic communities were undermined at the State level.
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In spite of the fact that the 1974 land reforms was exceedingly instrumental in annulling the economic mistreatment of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa peoples the decision making leaders and their followers, didn't allow self-administration and self-rule of the ethnic communities.
After recognizing the ethnic identity in 2010, notwithstanding, ethnicity become the central point for political activities and local rule, and consequently recently reorganized constituencies for local government have turned into a place for representation of ethnicity and ethnic self-rule by giving at least emblematic significance for acknowledgment and self-esteem of ethnic leaders and groups.
Additionally, the endorsement of native language in local organization and primary schools could be viewed as leverage for the ethnic groups since it may encourage well correspondence, comprehension and wisdom.
7.1.2 Increase in Development Projects and Education Opportunities
The most significant articulated accomplishments of ethnic federal structure in Pakistan is its capacity in growing educational and different infrastructures development in the provinces not secured by the past governments. In the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, for instance, since
2009 a significant expansion was observed in educational sector such as Schools, colleges and universities (An Elder from Pashtun, Interviewee 12, 2012). From 2009, in the province around
291 elementary schools, 47 colleges and 18 universities were opened so for. Prior to 2009 there was not really any foundation of advanced education in the province, yet some universities was set up and there is likewise an arrangement to open more in couple of years. A few ventures like street development, water supply, power ventures, telephone utilities, which were inexistent previously, are embraced in profound hinterlands like Dir, Chitral, Battagram and
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Tor Ghar. Previously, street development, clinics, BHU and other infrastructure development were in couple of districts and just roused by security and military concerns.
Numerous government workers and students from native groups were likewise prepared and instructed in a school, colleges and universities so as to deliver vast qualified and competent staff from the indigenous ethnic groups. The Civil Service academies was set up in every province so as to handle the lack of talented and trained official in the provinces, especially in the generally distraught ethnic groups like Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In spite of the fact that the exertion is coordinated at making 'surrogates of oppressed masses', as opposed to provable delegates of the “oppressed masses”. Anyway over the long haul the native groups might be in a beneficial position in creating qualified workers and experts whom are generally and informally near the indigenous people.
The general thought of self-administration has moved the enthusiasm of the ethnic groups to look for better training so as to response the challenges of the modern administration of the era. As Salamat (2010) contends training and education, previously, was not adequately alluring for some ethnic communities to enroll their kids in schools. These ethnic groups believed that, there was no incitement to send their kids to modern schools.
They think that, present day schooling is an outsider marvel that may ruin their kids' conduct and urge them to oppose their conventions, cultures and conducts. All the more essentially, the instruction system of modern schools was forced on the different ethnic communities alongside the abusive executive structures of the central government. Such an example positively would neglect to draw in the ethnic masses toward the modern day education that joined the framework that has distanced their conventional administration and lawful organizations. Notwithstanding, presently looked through the guarantee and task of self-rule,
204 the ethnic groups are to some degree slanting to perceive the necessity of modern day schooling, and therefore they are now interested in to enroll their kids in schools. As indicated by a Baloch source, the predominant negative frame of mind of the ethnic group in regards to present day education has gradually been improving with developing interests for present day schools.
Customarily, a high regarded accomplishment for the young fellows in the society has been to have a weapon and spouse. Tribal chiefs and Sardars used to pay off central government by giving favor to deter them from opening schools in the area by expecting that modern educational institutions may weaken the conventions of the society, as the Balouch official mourns: 'We purchased obliviousness by our gold. We never had a person who had graduated with a secondary school instruction among the ethnic community, however at this point we have BS graduates, Masters and PhD level students inside our community' (An Elder from
Baloch, Interviewee 11, 2018).
This is the fact that the primary educational sector is developing in the provinces, now the numbers of new schools is improving day by day. It gives the idea that in a normal one grade school serves two villages, which is a positive improvement as far as physical access. By and by, right off the bat, the important question is all this achievement is conceivable in light of the federal structure based on ethnicity or ethnic federalism. It is possible that the people may be teach in the diverse administrative system? For example, by regarding local individuals' entitlement that their children have education opportunity in the native language, however make it children right or basic human right rather than an ethnic right to have instruction in their native language. Also, as far as value and excellence, the system of education in the locale experiences unequal dissemination of schools, low quality of education and higher dropout’s rate. Among the ethnic groups who live in scattered villages the coverage figures may likewise
205 not really portray the genuine situations about them. For instance, in connection to class participation in Quetta secondary school just 20 were Baloch in the total of 150 students.
Thirdly, in primary school the medium of instruction is Urdu language, be that as it may, a mother language for the kids from the ethnic groups isn't Urdu in this way making it additionally troublesome for the kids to comprehend the instructing.
7.2 Ethnic Federalism and its Drawbacks in the Provinces
7.2.1 The Impossibility of an Ascriptive Principle
In Baluchistan province and in a many areas of the ethnic constituencies in Sindh, the local elites and Sardars of the local tribes regulate administrative position and important decision making posts though the purported 'settlers' give basically all-professional skills. As
Waseem depicts the circumstance in the Punjab “while Punjabi speaking individuals are supported in government jobs, promotion and educational opportunities (Waseem, 2010).
Primordialism ethnic loyalty and ethnic unity is perceived by the ethnic federal model adopted by Pakistan in shaping politics in the country. While barred by such primordial classification, the experts and skilled workers from 'outside' or settler are required to give profoundly essential amenities, in this way the primordial rules which support ethnic loyalty arouse confusion. In any case, for what reason would it be advisable for them to oblige or devote their selves to the political structure or ethnic electorate that sort them as “outsiders”, or
“oppressors”? The belief might be that 'everything can be purchased with money', except this is exceptionally hard to trust that solidarity and responsibility could be achieve with money.
Likewise, as these skilled workers are considered as outcasts, they might have almost slight encouragement to be inspired viewing the way that the public service salary in Pakistan
206 comparable to the private sector is very low. As World Bank confirmed it in a report that the pay rates in the private sector is 130 percent more than public sector in the most jobs, and in the big cities there are better jobs available (World Bank, 2013). In this way, it is usual that these skilled people may turn out to be progressively pushed for increasing their own advantages, instead of to indicate inspiration for success and professional honesty. This could be one of the main reason that could clarify for the common in competence and corruption in the provinces.
In spite of the fact that in Pakistan there is lacking of experts and professionals, and the ethnic federal structure based on ascriptive model has intensified the issues in the provinces.
Such as construction of water system and small dams, agriculture, human development, and health sector projects and other infrastructure projects couldn't be executed or fulfilled on account of absence of skilled workers. A polarity is drawn by ethnic federalism regarding
“insiders” and “outsiders”; the outsiders are not glad and eager to work where they considers as outsiders and insiders have not the expertise and abilities. The outsiders do this only if all else fails when further option are not available. Therefore, the ethnic philosophy may be changed or approach should be alter or without higher benefits, this issue might not be resolved soon. Many peoples complained that to select individual based on provincial or ethnic shares, and on the basis of political loyalty indicates that the utmost capable and effective officials are persistently ignored. It is also observed in Sindh the entire development of somewhat in government development projects completed in Karachi, indicates corrupt relationships among contractors and politicians. Along these lines, the province of Sindh isn't achieving its prosperity in either industrial or agriculture development, and once more the significant obstacle is the political issues.
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In the provinces the low capability of the provincial administrative authorities and political leaders brought incompetency in the governance system of the provinces. In the greater part of the ethnic constituencies, such as districts and tehsil level the key influential positions were assumed by political leaders and government officials without any preparations for example in what manner to fulfill the new given task or duty to run the affairs of the provincial departments assigned to them. Especially, in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces, the local political leaders due to lack of expertise in political affairs and administration has made troubles to formulate a harmonious political structure over and done with cooperation that might enable inter-ethnic collaboration and effective management. Rather, in the district, Tehsil and union council the political system turned into a field of zero-sum political affairs where the political leaders of different ethnic communities doubt one another and selfishly fight one another. Besides, most local politician and government officials are not likewise glad to utilize specialists and experts from the supposed 'outsiders' in key or decision making positions asserting that it could suffer the principle of self-rule.
Additionally, exceedingly misrepresented polarity among 'natives and 'nonnatives',
'locals' and “outsiders” or “oppressed” and “oppressors” has created dread and doubt among common individuals. An extreme blunder have made by the ethnic federal in relating previous domineering leaders' strategies and activities with ethnic marking, for example, in Baluchistan
Punjabis are consider as outsiders or oppressors. In this manner, such bifurcate classification by ethnic elites has shaped a scenario among the common peoples no matter how you look at it as having a place with either to oppressor or oppressed groups. Especially, in Baluchistan, in spite of its possibilities for investments, the province couldn't attract noteworthy amount of private investment. In the province, individuals who don't have a place with the Baloch ethnic
208 groups are frequently depicted as 'subversive', 'often regarded them oppressive ruler'
'chauvinists' and others hostile remarks. The province would not attract the investor from other part of the country because of such environment. However, those investors who are working in the province are not in any case expand their business due to the de-motivating conduct, aim and activities of the misrepresented ethnic dichotomy. An investor contends before putting capital in increasingly broadened activities; they need to make certain that the prospect is encouraging to recuperate their investment, however right now they don't see a positive response from the provincial authorities. 'We frequently hear demoralizing and disgust speech, for example, consider us as “outsiders” or oppressor by the political leaders' (An Elder from
Hazaara, Interviewee 5 2010).
7.2.2 Discourage the People Movements among Provinces
In the ethnic homeland or the surrounded ethnic regions the claim of land and resources was upheld or strengthen by ethnic federalism, in this way it can create obstacle in people’s movements between the provinces and within the provinces. For example, in some areas of the
Sindh and Punjab provinces are overcrowded or having a high population density and less populace density in others; reducing this circumstance could need relocation of population from high dense regions to those areas which have low population density. The present structure, be that as it may, has made such arrangement troublesome and conflictual. Especially, the agriculture and populace densities in the Punjab province which have 54% of the nation population living on 30% of land, the population density is very high in the urban areas, interestingly in rural and southern Punjab the agriculture and populace densities are extremely low where 33 percent of the provincial populace are residing on the 50 percent of the provincial land. In central Punjab such as Lahore, Faisalabad, Gujarat, Gujranwala and Rawalpindi,
209 populace density is approximately 500 to 600 people/sq. km. In plain areas like in the DG Khan,
Rajan Pur, Bakkar, and Bahawalpur populace density is between 50 to 60 people/sq. km in urban areas and rural density is between 30 to 40 people/sq. km.
7.2.3 To Promote Dominance of the Leaders or Elitism
The philosophy of ethnic strengthening in country and provinces is increasingly anxious in selecting leaders on the basis ethnic or provincial entitlement in the affairs of administration and politics, however don’t consider their capability and expertise to complete the duty assigned to them. Due to the ethnic entitlement policy, in the provinces the elite’s authority to control everything has opened opportunities for elites to get to the provincial paying capability in funds and political influence dependent on their rights to control administrative structures in province, at districts and union council level.
The new local government structure did not bring real improvement in the way of life of the peoples, its bring only cosmetic changes for the local people by changing “elites from the center” with “elites from the local”, with both have been tried to safeguard the interests of elites in center. The previous were obviously an extension of the central power at the local level, the last are incorporated into the framework as member of the ethnic elders of the alliance of the designated elites of the 'oppressed'. As such the authority of ethnic elites to control the power at state and provincial level their access to provincial treasury and benefits are likened with the fulfillment of ethnic groups' demands acknowledgment and self-rule.
Especially, in provinces, for example, in Sindh the new ethnic federal arrangement, which was enforced on the general population, disregarded the custom of the local people of power control and exercise. Besides, it has constrained the local individuals to fit into its form and aphorism.
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The local people of the province did not have experience to run present day administrative system, yet they were relied upon to fit in the new ethnic based system. The framers of the federal system presumed that settlers and native people might give rights that ought to be practiced inside the political framework that are recommended and organized from the center level. Neither have the native population in the province been solicited to distinguish what kind political structure they would incline toward, nor have thorough studies been made to distinguish and integrate current conventional administrative and legitimate organizations.
Or maybe, the provincial state arrangement methods and setting up of executive structures for example in Sindh were done in a quick manner through shallow concurrence with the political leaders who happened to fight with the past governments. And eventually elites from other ethnic groups in the province likewise linked to the practice over co-alternative, control and inculcation lacking a proper mandate from their groups. The native leaders have mobilized their groups by engendering the state manufactured and overstated claims past discrimination and assurances of momentary ethnic freedom and future thriving so as to get endorsement of their self-accepted positions as representatives and agents of the native groups.
The vast majority of the decisions that have been done in the local ethnic groups are customized to give 'just' certification to the self-selected native elites who have been designated and supported by the State. Thus, the indigenous ruling leaders are made exceptionally vulnerable to the interest of the ruling party in center and they are utilized in serving the interests of the federal government, instead of their locale. The indigenous elites have moved toward becoming tool of broadening the control of center in the locale, is like the customary example of Pakistani state. The distinction, nonetheless, is that in the present model the privileges of ethnic self-rule discourse have been pretended continually and enthusiastically in co-opting and catching the
211 native elites. Subsequently, the native groups have no power over the local politics and local administration, as their elites are more responsible to the center rather than their ethnic communities.
The claims of the Federal government, the local political power is in the hands of local native political elites, the federation has in actuality bring a patrimonial principle through promoting the local elites to position of importance without local authenticity, so as to make them faithful and altogether reliant on the central government. This might be an intentional arrangement with respect to the Federation to distance local leaders from their very own communities so as to transform them into gave supporter to the Federal government they turn out to be effectively vulnerable to the central government control and compulsion. Nonetheless, the ethnic federal arrangement in Pakistan is making troubles between the conventional system and emerging political elites as the new state structures don't have a space for the traditional administrative and legal system. For instance, in Baluchistan province, in some districts such as in Makkran, Gawader and khuzdar and, in numerous union councils in the Sindh, the traditional leaders and frameworks have been forgotten from the political and authoritative bodies in light of the fact that the new state structures request a base capacity to read and write while the traditional leaders are mostly illiterate.
For example to elected for Districts administration offices needs completion of high school certificate. In any case, conventional leaders are yet active in the cultural institution like the Jirga system in their constituencies. The recently forced and centrally slanted present day modern administrative system have barred local legitimate and authoritative system and in this manner distanced local communities who have neither the required experience nor preparation to run the new established institution of the province. Along these lines, the elites' personal
212 benefits and to promote themselves entwined with ethnic faithfulness and ethnic recognition encouraged the authority of elitism to the detriment of the local ethnic groups.
An outline for the advancement of elitism can be gathered from the activity of the
Punjab province. It is apparent that the general population of the province have faced with an extreme lack of fundamental essential services that could enhance their living conditions, though budget spending in the province is portrayed by building extravagances offices, obtaining costly vehicles and longing for higher salaries. For example, the development of a hundred million Rupees budget on roads, highways and motorways is an extravagance in the province wherein 70 percent of the populations are living in the ruined and out of reach towns in which animal disease are gravely diminishing the domesticated animals of the locale because of absence of appropriate veterinary services. The enormous amount of money spent on the construction of motorways could have been utilized to extend veterinary services in the local villages to save the domesticated animals and to enhance the financial capacity of the province through an extended development in the sector of the agriculture and livestock to generate production and income potential for the general population as well as for the provincial government.
7.2.4 Increase of Ethnic Rivalries and Tensions
The governments in provinces, especially in the Sindh and Baluchistan, have progressed toward becoming a field of ethnic hostilities and elites contentions. Between ethnic relations are loaded with steady rivalries and dangerous conflicts, intra-ethnic contacts are widespread, settlers-native strains are prevalent, religion and social varieties are utilized to misrepresent variances. In the Baluchistan province, for example, conflicts among the Baloch, Pashtun and
Punjabi elites for important political position, differences inside the Baloch leaders because of
213 provincialism and outer elements, differences and concerns in the funds allocation, development projects, administrative positions and different other public posts have turned out to be inconvenient for provincial government to perform and operate effectively. The viability of provincial government is been defeated and there is a question mark on its authenticity on a number of times. Also in Sindh clashes over control of resources and lands among Sindhis and
Mohajir is an age-old phenomenon. Nonetheless with the introduction of local government system of ethnic self-rule and control of local resources swelled into within inter-ethnic conflicts by being anticipated as issues of shared interests of the ethnic groups that requiring ethnic unity. Battles over property and minor clashes are transformed into ethnic pressures and go up against ethnic measurements due to politicized ethnicity and ethnicised politics.
7.2.5 Interference of the Center in the Provinces Enables the Domination of the State
Within the provincial government the Intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts provide a prospect for the Central government to establish its dominance through divide and rule policy.
Internally divided and feeble provincial governments might be leeway for a federal government, overwhelmed by a majority community from Punjab. The nationalist parties, so as to tried to balance the pressures from the significant ethnic groups such as Punjabis and Sindhis, which represent to around 68% of population, seriously requires the joint effort from different ethnic communities in the provinces. A source makes the allegation that the central government representative in the provinces is known in tangling between the party and political leaders to exaggerate tensions. (An individual from zonal official from Swabi, Interviewee 2018).
Inter-ethnic collaborations have been harmed in setting up real alliance system of governance as a result of the absence of arranged and reasonable strategies and course of action among a significant number of the ethnic groups in the Sindh and Baluchistan provinces. Firm rivalries
214 are widespread among the leaders of different ethnic communities for administrative position and political power, funds allocation and different benefits. This strengthened the federal government case that the provincial governments required central government intervention, along these lines giving the central government an chance for meddling in the daily activity of the provincial governments through 'warning', direct intercession in administrative and political decisions. This makes the provincial government a dependent territory of the federal government frameworks that can introduce and expel authorities dependent on their interests.
Especially, in the Baluchistan province, there is an exceptional federal 'support' arrangement in which the province is specifically overseen and pursued by the federal government from the center. The federal government's direct intervention in this deprived and generally underprivileged province as the 'only practical option right now, but on the other hand the intentions and activities of the federal government as untrustworthy and self-serving.
Several native sources are also very not happy regarding the manner in which the central government is interfering the affairs of the provincial government and province. In Baluchistan the central government has been engaged with molding the political power in the province since the independence by introducing its most loved ethnic elites; for example in 2017 replaced them by another group that should satisfy its demands well at that time. In such manner, the central government activity is progressively keen on encouraging “the surrogate of oppressed masses” rather than supporting the real representatives of the local ethnic groups.
In spite of the fact that the discourse of provincial autonomy is foremost, by and large it is a façade. It has been showed beneficial for the ruling party in the center to establish its authoritative desire by effectively manipulate the provincial leaders by federal government,
215 whom were simply vulnerable to its needs. The extraordinary reliance of the provincial government and political figure on the budget transfers from federal government has made them very powerless against the interests and demands of the central government. Without satisfactory provincial financial power to backing provincial expenses, it is probably not going to imagine powerful provincial self-rule practice in the provinces. Furthermore, untrained provincial officers in provincial bureaucracy provide opportunity to central government for playing a dynamic and key job in provincial governmental administration and politics. For instance, the Baluchistan is under partial control of the central government through Chief
Secretary from Quetta. The disadvantageous states of the province in confronting lack of skilled and professional manpower provide opportunity for center control the official’s affairs of the province. The federal government has a significant power to influence the key decisions regarding administrative and political matters in the province.
A source, an official from the federal government, affirms that the Pakistani State wants that every ethnic group is unified in a sole administrative entity so as to set up an establishment for making a single political, economic and social structure in the country, as opposed to cutting out an ethnic homeland for each group by following the demands and concern of ethnic political leaders. It appears that Pakistani state is concerned by the trouble while fulfilling the demands that could emerge from the various communities in the country, which have been guaranteed constitutionally, in building up their own self administrative regions.
Regardless of whether one acknowledges without needing any proof the broadcasted goal that the Pakistani state is intrigued to promote solidarity and provincial equality and strength, the issue must be chosen through debate and discussion in a real way among the different ethnic communities living in the country so as to work out a bargained and negotiated
216 solutions which could reasonably responsive and fulfill the hassles of different divergent societies. The forced choice, be that as it may, as opposed to making a bound together sociopolitical space, has made a ruinous example by setting ethnic communities against one another. The two noteworthy ethnic communities in the Baluchistan, Baloch and Pashtun leaders are gotten in a struggle to control important position in the province and this exceptional erosion between the leaders at the top, as examined above, developed into hostility and tensions at the local level. This split has made an opposing and unfriendly disposition in which numerous
Baloch feels that Pashtun elites are disruptive and opportunistic. The Hazaara people in KP are not agreeable in the single province, the minority Hazaara elites have requested their own province, yet their demands was not affirmed by provincial government and along these lines have stayed in the province without their assent.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
This last chapter is consists of three part. The first part discuss the most important empirical data that is straightforwardly associated with responding the research questions of the thesis, for example is ethnic federalism a practical choice for the political stability of Pakistan?
Does ethnic federalism integrate or disintegrate the society in Pakistan? How ethnic federalism at the same time is successful in helping shared rule and self-rule? Generally in this part try to recognizing the empirical flaws in the execution of the federal structure. The second part discovers the theoretical deficiencies and difficulties of ethnic federalism in Pakistan. The third part will finish up by exhibiting the importance of the PhD thesis, and a suggestion.
8.1 Empirical Flaws
As uncovered in the experimental finding of the previous chapters, the state of Pakistan has not stayed faithful to its guarantees in giving real self-rule to the different ethnic communities at the neighborhood level and equivalent portrayal at the federal level. Albeit a considerable number of the ethnic communities have showed pleasure in the conceptual assurance behind the guarantee to perceive their political rights and identity, much of the time, notwithstanding, they are baffled with the real operation, which is without real self-governing.
Furthermore, the central government at national level has not been sorted out as an alliance government of the different ethnic communities that establish the Pakistani state. Unbalanced to its offer and commitment, the Federal state, to a great extent overwhelms the federal government in a style of forcing its pre-prominence at the central, provincial and local levels by utilizing the financial resources as a cover to conceal its domineering position in the country.
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There has been a serious problem faced by the ethnic federal structure which may not be effectively settled because of the innate shortcoming of the only protagonist of the ethnic federal structure. Such as, the main stream parties such as PPP has been the real power behind the conceptualization and execution of ethnic federalism and provincial autonomy in Pakistan. The dilemma, in any case, is that the real loser could be the main stream parties of a real implementation of ethnic federalism, self-administration and provincial autonomy in Pakistan.
The main stream political parties failed to satisfy the twin criteria of ethnic federalism in
Pakistan: ethnic privilege and federation, whom professes to represent the province of Sindh and Punjab. At first, regarding ethnic privilege, the Punjabi ethnic groups represents 27 percent of the all-out populace of Pakistan, hence in federal government its share is not as per the philosophy of equal representation in bureaucracy and parliament, ought to have been corresponding to its populace share as anticipated by the ethnic privileges. Practically speaking, in the federal government the Punjabi elites and bureaucrats in the present federal arrangements have a prevailing and principal role. Also, the Punjab have no major natural resources contrast with the other provinces in Pakistan. Thus, a true federation would imply that the social and financial improvement in Punjab would be significantly reliant on resources transfer from sources beyond the province of Punjab; this could be extremely troublesome, in perspective on the way that practically the other provinces experience shortage of resources and poverty too.
Without the authoritative role of the Punjab, the disproportional advantage delighted in by the
Punjabi elites and Punjab province couldn't have been conceivable.
Thus, the domineering role of the Punjabi elites has remained the primary element in wrecking the ethnic federal structure and provincial autonomy in Pakistan. As argued in the empirical part, the Punjabi without any assistance did and ruled the constitutional drafting
219 procedure and setting of systems and courses of action in the country. In such a circumstance it isn't hard to grasp the agenda and motives of the Punjab, in spite of the fact that it claimed commitment to a genuine self-rule and provincial autonomy in the federal structure. As its real act tells, the Punjab is progressively intrigued to secure its dominant position to the detriment of a real federal structure. Imperative point to comprehend is that the Punjab has not been a fair power in fulfilling a genuine federal structure. Differing to critics who contend that the Punjabi elites has been exceptionally try to strengthen the ethnic communities, but on the ground the
Punjabi elites co-picking leaders from different ethnic communities who are acknowledge the predominance of the Punjabi elites in Pakistan . Henceforth, the Punjabi elites aren’t offering authority to ethnic communities, yet to leaders from different ethnic groups so as to extend its control and dominance.
In spite of the fact that the Punjabi elites claims that it has been, above all else, battling for the privileges of the Punjabi masses for self-determination, their authenticity in Punjab has not been tried justly. Yet, it is apparent that the Punjabi elites have possessed and safeguarded the enormous good and political help from the general population of Punjab due to its dedication to Punjabi nationalism (Jaag Punjabi Jaag slogan by PML-N). Therefore, the Punjabi elites utilized the federal structure in Pakistan to promote its dominance over different nationalisms, as well as Pakistani nationalism. Despite the fact that the Punjabi individuals entirely supported or benefited from this approach of the Punjabi elites, however it is very hard to say. Hence, it is observed that the Punjabi leaders are benefiting. and have expected an overwhelming position in the central government unequal to their portion in the total population.
The significant portion of Pakistani society was alienated by Punjabi elites, and set base for the disliked and lonely journey, they governing the Pakistan by depending vigorously on
220 army. Yet, various sources and groups opposed the dominance of the Punjabi elites. From independence, the noteworthy ethnic groups Baloch and Pashtun which represent almost 19 percent of the absolute populace of Pakistan had seriously opposed the Punjabi dominance.
Most learned people have been discontent with the Federal structure of Punjab hegemony.
Numerous Pashtun intellectuals are antagonistic towards federation, which was framed by the elites to represent Pashtun. Likewise, Baloch intellectuals and a noteworthy segment of the
Baloch populace have demonstrated more sympathy towards separatist than the Federation; it has been extremely troublesome for the Federation to attract the Baloch peoples. Since independence, the Baluchistan province has been encountering political trouble, frequent signs of opposition from Baloch people, nationalist parties, tribal chiefs and students, immense arrests and badgering of common people in the province. In the Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the different ethnic communities whom opposed the predominance of the ruling elites in the country shaped an alliance to confront the hegemony of the Punjab. This political alliance has been a test to the ruling elites in province that was arranged and introduced to control by the
Punjabi elites. The nationalist alliance possibly will effective in governing the provinces, if there is free and fair elections in the country.
As discussed in the previous chapters, the Punjabi elites cooperation based tactics has additionally backed inexperienced, less taught, untrained, non-popular and submissive peoples in the provinces. These were intentionally selected and chose by the Punjabi elites so as to boost its desire of overwhelming the country political space. Unmistakable, better-learned people are purposely sidelined by the Punjabi elites since it is understood that these individuals probably won't have been compliant and loyal adherents of the Punjab domineering plan. For the most part, the federal structure in Pakistan is experimentally flawed; it has been just utilized as a
221 gadget to 'legitimize' the mastery of a Punjab over the other ethnic groups. The following section in like manner discuss about conceptual and theoretical shortcomings of ethnic federalism in Pakistan.
8.2 Conceptual Flaws
It is theoretically incorrect to present indigenous rebuilding and ethnic privilege in a country like Pakistan. First, there is more than 56 ethno-linguistic communities, therefore, it is not possible for Pakistan to fulfill the privileges of these ethnic communities for 'a full proportion of self-rule which incorporates the directly to set up self-rule institutions in the areas where they live and to equal participation in the provincial and Federal level'. It is likewise difficult to neglect others and chose few in giving a right to self-administration at the local level and equal representation at the national level as this includes a trouble of building up a measure that regards the privileges of a few groups while in the meantime ignoring those of others.
Particularly, since, the ethnic criterion and ethnic rebuilding approach in Pakistan has stimulated desires that couldn't be so effectively and unobtrusively fulfilled. Albeit ethnic fault lines have present in Pakistan, except for not many communities that had wanted political rights for their clusters, for the many ethnic communities there had been no noteworthy political demands along ethnic lines. Pakistan is practically an ethnic federal state.
Second, since preference and biases are the signs of ethnic right, it is exceptionally hard to continue the ethnic privilege ideology with regards to Pakistan which has encountered a significant period of intermix and interaction between the different communities. The presentation of ethnic privilege has brought about gross infringement of privileges of the minority and different groups in numerous neighborhoods. Numerous local political elites and states officials are involved in ethnic purging and enormous human rights infringement.
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However, the ethnic privilege philosophy in Pakistan has concluded that giving power to the ethnic communities can resolve clashes in the country once-for all, it is apparent that the creation of more power-practicing center have been related with the ascent of more power misusing center too. Accordingly, ethnic inclinations have turned into an open policy of segregation and misuses.
Third, the distribution of resources was turned into zero sum politics by the ethnic entitlement approach. In the Baluchistan, Sindh and KP provinces most of the ethnic communities have generally shared many common qualities in culture, traditions, and religion along with Punjab. Anyway, each group uncovered there selves to be inflexible and savage in its partisan demands if it comes to distribution of resources. The inspiration for sharing and cooperation could be exceptionally nominal in such circumstances where resources are limited and poverty is constant across the country. Practically, ethnic entitlement is self-centric and exclusivist. As an outcome of the ongoing ethnic based criterion, confident and exclusionist ethnic awareness is on the rise. Be that as it may, the requests emerging from exclusivist interests, the on-going strategy isn't sufficiently able to answer or manage these requests. For example it ends up hard to make foundations for concession and cooperation, this quickens fierce struggle and antagonistic ethnic relations. Along these lines, the institutional shortcoming to handle the rising factional and partisan requests of ethnic gatherings has imitated greater hatred and struggle which might be quieted down with stronger administrative intercession and punishing control including extensive pressures, eradications, blaming and destroying. Such punishing and forced measures have brought about greater anger and confrontation, which show itself as ethnic conflicts, vindictive killings of civilians, submissions and different tactics that thusly elevate further ethnic hatred. Thus, horizontal and vertical clashes has brought by the
223 ideology of ethnic privileges in Pakistan. Vertically, the military power was regularly used by the ruling elites to crush requests from different communities for further privileges.
Horizontally, the intra-ethnic and interethnic conflicts was produced by the ethnic rearrangement rather than collaboration. In Baluchistan and Karachi the ethnic hostilities and killings are the illustrations of horizontal ethnic ferocity.
Fourth, as to fulfill the interests of the elites the ethnic entitlement or inclination is progressively adapted. Political leaders who claimed the privileges on behalf of an ethnic community, could simply be allured to overstate disparities for selfish advantages. In the various areas the requests for more autonomy have been started and led by the leaders paying little respect to the sentiment, benefits and gains of the particular ethnic groups. More resources and budget expenditures are required for a different and new administrative structure and it could withdraw funds allocated for development schemes and social service programs for the general peoples. In addition, with the more self-rule the local elites could likewise benefited since their demands could be fulfill better because they will not be responsible to the higher authorities. Therefore, the central elites could face trouble at local areas which were totally control by local elites to persuade and shape local attitudes. The circumstance turns out to be more awful, when with the local community the local elites ethnically distinguish themselves, which is the bothersome element behind ethnic right and ethnic principles. In an alternate situation, local elites could likewise turn into a tool for centralization by cooperation, support and make associations with the center by interweaving local and central absolutism.
Fifth, a frail leadership arrangement is delivers by ethnic entitlement, as it maintain ascriptive necessity instead of model reliant on merits and achievements. Ethnic rebuilding in
Pakistan has brought about the arrangement of incompetent people in administrative and
224 leadership positions in the provinces. In the Baluchistan province and several districts of the
Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the elites in power seriously need sufficient capabilities and appropriate competences to run political and administrative offices; however the ethnic reform arrangement entails that paying little respect to their capacities the elites ought to accept leadership in administrative system. In such an imprudent course of action, neither the provincial population nor the local community benefit. Rigid opposition and hatred were aroused when to supplant the ethnic leaders with capable and 'non-natives' specialists. The local elites could not easily surrender their advantages, which were constitutionally assign to them.
In Baluchistan, for example, the two prominent native ethnic communities were negligible to the way of the state establishment. By and large, the current social services, administrations and different infrastructures like schools, roads and health facilities are to a great extent out of the reach for the local peoples who reside in dispersed and remote areas.
Under the given conditions, ethnic federalism isn't moving toward closing the 'gap', rather it broadens or intensifies it by adversely affecting social and economic advancement through the promotion of a reckless improvement policy dependent on untrained or untalented manpower.
As discuss in the previous chapters, the budget subsidies provided from the federal government to the provincial government has vanished in corruption, incompetence and underutilization.
8.3 Contribution and Recommendations
For me the composition of this PhD thesis has not exclusively been only a scholarly endeavored, As a Pakistani, it has additionally been a voyage to search for a political solution for a country that has been experiencing political instability, internal conflicts and clashes emerging from secessionist and provincial autonomy demands since independence. It is in this essence that I offer the accompanying comments summarizing the result of my findings and a
225 few proposals with regards to the best approach to show the troublesome situation confronting the society in Pakistan. In this specific situation, I have reached at the conclusion that the approach of empowering ethnic criteria and ethnic privilege for political association and political rights is definitely not a feasible approach. In this manner, it is prudent to discourage ethnic principle or ethnic right for political association and political rights however much as could be conceivable. Ethnic demands are hard to fulfill and furthermore extremely hard to suppress. Ethnic entitlement frequently makes a larger number of demands than the original claims, as its demonstration consequence is so hard as to incite more demands which are hard to satisfy. Especially, in poor societies where resources are extremely rare, ethnic rearrangement can add to the breeding of distrust and lethal clashes around the question of resource distribution. Structuring barriers, raising ethnic pillars are dangerous in the long run because of the constrained and egocentric nature of ethnic demands. In addition, it is constantly hard to abolish ethnic privilege once it has been presented; it can develop into changeless cleavages as the elites collect more advantages and benefits in the bifurcation. It is therefore, better and sensible to underline incentives for political integration, as opposed to support cleavage by forming uniqueness and differences. Found in the light, be that as it may, force is neither the way to bring integration nor to stifle down ethnic demands.
Thusly, it is better to encourage mobility and integration in multi-ethnic societies, as well through acknowledgment and admiration of ethnic communities and their genuine rights.
Albeit it is very hard to fulfill the ethnic rights and requirements, therefore these demands would be perceive in a careful way that don't worsen ethnic hostilities and division. Political arrangements should be given more emphasizes to achieve ethnic closeness, for example, to empower inter-ethnic collaboration or coalition through the free and fair arrangement of
226 election. This could likewise be useful to deliver an increasingly exact and including national history by handling disputes which can initiate ethnic antagonistic and doubt very delicately. A national history must mirror the goodness and accomplishments of all groups in a polite way.
It might be beneficial to abstain from linking leaders and elites with the ordinary individuals in light of ethnic arrangement. Moreover, a hybrid political model should be made that could regard ethnic communities, promote collaboration among different ethnic groups by smothering vanity and maintaining humbleness; by structuring a political collaboration that encourages esteem and confidence whereas discouraging and depressing retributions and egotistical conduct's and doings. A political framework that perceives and regards identities, maintains accomplishments and merits instead of ascriptive necessities and favoritism can prompt the formation of an appropriate framework reliant on trust and resilience among ethnic communities.
In any case, it is difficult to totally dispose of the ethnic federal course of action in
Pakistan, as appeared by the steady and extreme difficulties of two noteworthy divergent and opposing groups. The first group is created by the individuals who demands more ethnic self- rule and the second group is the individuals who call the preference of individual rights over group rights. Albeit the two groups appear to have hostile positions, it is suitable to consider the two demands so as to delineate a hybrid federal framework that can tone down the foremost dilemmas of the federal system. In the first place, the federal system in Pakistan requires to consider various criteria, for example, geography and characteristics, financial variables, socio- economic dynamics, settlement arrangements, populace fusion and other important factors in defining the provinces. For example, many of the urban zones of the country were occupied by synchronized multiethnic communities where ethnic characters are so weakened and less
227 important creating ethno linguistic model unsuitable and inapplicable. Therefore, the ethno etymological model ought to be disposed of in setting up administrative and political structures in the urban regions. The rural zones are inhabited by a particular ethnic community in such a concentration in a distinct area, which hovering the requirement for some sort of structure that could perceive such a concentration. All the more imperatively, the federal arrangement in
Pakistan ought to encourage the formation of a real multiethnic alliance liberally by means of encouragements and political structures in satisfying multiethnic parties. The government would remunerate ethnic smoothness and combine by politically demoralizing exclusive arrangements and fragmentations.
Second, a hybrid model should be implement by Pakistan that can organize an authentic ethnic alliance with a bi-ethnic domineering and majoritarian framework. The two noteworthy ethnic communities, the Punjabi and Sindhi represent 50 percent of the populace, the majority share of trained manpower and intellectuals, and a noteworthy territory with principal contribution in the Pakistani state. The alliance of the Punjabi and Sindhi groups can make a decisive majority as they are demographically and electorally dominant. Despite the fact that a powerful predominant group, they can turn into a bi-domineering center and majoritarian to lead the federal system and to support a stable and durable political community. Furthermore, the alliance of the other ethnic groups can work as a check and balance system to convince and require the greater groups to act in a moderate way by esteeming interethnic bargaining and concession.
In the present course of action, the Punjab that speaks for the province and dominate the other ethnic groups in the country and grips a prevailing position in the political structure. This must be changed and the Punjab ought to adopt a criterion that comparable to its share and
228 abilities. It is absolutely unfeasible and unsustainable for a single minority ethnic group to adopt an dominant and leadership position in a setting where the awareness of the general population just as of the ethnic groups is adequately develop to recognize what is suitable and what isn't.
Military power and other deceiving tactics, for example, divide and rule policy and co-option of elites could work for quite a while, yet such tactics cannot make a real federal structure that could support a feasible political framework in a viable manner.
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