DOCSLIB.ORG

Iot Threats, Challenges and Secured Integration

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Iot Threats, Challenges and Secured Integration IoT Threats, Challenges and Secured Integration Christian Shink, p. eng., CSSLP System Engineer • Why IoT Devices? • Bot Attacks • 3 Botnets fighting over IoT Firepower • Secure IoT integration Why IoT Devices Internet of Things Internet working of physical devices, vehicles, buildings, … Devices embedded with electronics, software, sensors, actuators Network connectivity Any Path Any Service Any Network Anytime Any Business Any context Anyone Machinery Anybody Building energy Anything Management Any Device Healthcare Retail A Rapidly Growing Number of Connected Devices Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. IoT is Highly Susceptible to Cyber Attacks IoT devices run an embedded or stripped-down version of the familiar Linux operating system. 1 Malware can easily be compiled for the target architecture, mostly ARM, MIPS, x86 internet-accessible, lots of (I)IoT and ICS/SCADA are deployed without any form of 2 firewall protection Stripped-down operating system and processing power leaves less room for security 3 features, including auditing, and most compromises go unnoticed by the owners To save engineering time, manufacturers re-use portions of hardware and software in different 4 classes of devices resulting in default passwords and vulnerabilities being shared across device classes and manufacturers Internet Security Trend report 2015 by Nexus guard: IoT is becoming a soft target for cyber-attack Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. From the News “D-Link failed to take reasonable steps to secure its routers and IP cameras, potentially compromising sensitive consumer information” “The cameras aren’t designed to receive software updates so the zero-day exploits can’t be patched.” “We believe that this backdoor was introduced by Sony developers on purpose” Sources: 1. Cybereason blog 2. Networkworld 3. SEC Consult Botnets – the ultimate weaponry Not directly associated with the attacker 900,000 Automated Geographically distributed 400,000 Ultimately disposable Flexible 25,000 100,000 Wide range of nefarious activities CCTV Dyn attack Jabber Failed DT Growing fire power Botnet campaign: takeover attack DDoS-for-hire attempt Larger botnets and smarter devices = offer more sophisticated attacks Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Bot Attacks The Internet of Bots More than half internet traffic is bots 27% are good bots, help to make internet better 29% of internet traffic are bad bots Bad Bots: Hacker Bot Maleware/ Download Bot Spam Bot Virus Bot What do bots do? Brute Force Web Scraping DDoS Data Exfiltration * https://areyouahuman.com/downloads/GoodBotsvBadBots_FINAL.pdf Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. ** http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3165317 Brute Force Mirai, Hajime, BrickerBot all have code for Telnet brute force attack 61 factory default credentials Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Webscraping Attack Bad bots programmed to: • Scrape flights information. • Act as faux buyers—continuously creating but never completing reservations on those tickets • Airline unable to sell the seats to real customer • Pricing information is exposed. Dynamic source IP attacks so security protection Major US Airline could not track cross session activity Chose Radware’s WAF with fingerprinting technology to block dynamic IP attack 12 Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. 3 Botnets fighting over IoT firepower Shared Modus Operandi Taking advantage Identify Upload the Remove Scan for Drop the of factory flaws the matching payload other more device binary malware devices to infect Infection vectors: 1. SSH/Telnet brute force 2. TR-069 protocol 3. Manufacturer backdoors Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Mirai Milestones Sept 20, 2016 Sept 21, 2016 Sept 30, 2016 620Gbps attack GRE in ~ 1 Tbps in volume SYN Mirai Source Code Released payload, No amplification, and ACK floods Over Hackforums.com No reflection 140,000 unique IPs Anna-Senpai Oct 21, 2016 Nov 27, 2016 Feb 8, 2017 DNS Water Torture attack DT Router Takeover Attempt Mirai Gets a Windows with other vectors. Some Mirai w/ TR-064 Exploit Trojan to Boost comprised of Mirai 100k 900,000 consumer’s internet Harvesting end-points reported connection affected Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Mirai botnet architecture $$$ Create account Exists? + Assign bots Loader and Bot C2 API ScanListen CnC written in C New vic! 110 ScanListen and CnC service in Go 61 48101 23 factory default passwords Up to Load Svc 500 brute attempts CnC Connect per second Report IP + credentials Load bot Telnet port scans Bot Bot Telnet port scans (infected device) Brute force login (infectednew vicdevice) Telnet port scans Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Original Mirai Attack Vectors Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. DNS Water Torture – Architecture 19 Hajime: Friend or foe ? Discovered Oct 16, 2016 by Rapidity Networks • 5 days before the Dyn attacks • 2 weeks after Mirai source code was published Say it comes with the best of intentions Sophisticated, flexible and extensible Its true purpose remains a mystery Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Hajime Modules Extension module (atk) Main (.i) Secures the device by Scans for new victims filtering infection ports (port TCP/23 and TCP/5358:WSDAPI) Opens up for BitTorent Launches exploit using Telnet brute force P2P control network Creates dynamic port forwarding rules in UPnP enabled gateways Communication is encrypted using RC4 and private/public keys Loader stubs are handcrafted assembly programs optimized for each device Downloads updates for Loads service ‘.i’ on random high port itself using uTP (UDP and TCP) Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Estimated at 300,000 compromised devices 18,623 data points from Radware Honeypots Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Introducing BrickerBot First Internet of Things PDOS Botnet Discovered by Radware March 2017 Prevents devices to take part in DDoS botnets Destroys infected IoT Devices Remote execution of destructive sequence No malware binary downloaded or executed on the victim Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Permanent Denial-of-Service A DoS attack that damages a system so badly that it requires replacement or reinstallation of hardware or software (D)DoS – Victim resumes normal service after attack finishes PDoS – leaves victim in an unoperational state after attack, requiring intervention to restore operations Service Available PDoS Attack Service Available End of DDoS Attack Service Available Service unavailable Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. BrickerBot Characteristics 1000+ attempts per day SSH and Telnet are brute forced using factory default credentials Runs from the Dark Web, concealed by TOR exit nodes Only attacks devices infected with IoT bots Requires full TCP connect on port 23, 7547, others Attacks the source IP of the poking device Has a “Plan B” in case something goes wrong How BrickerBot Works Attacks infected devices using passive detection Requires full TCP connect on port 23, 7547, others Attacks the source IP of the poking device SSH and Telnet are brute forced using default credentials closes SSH and invokes a brick sequence on the open Telnet session Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Brick Test: BrickerBot.1 vs Sricam AP003 After BrickerBot.1 sequence: cam unreachable from WAN, can still ping on LAN After reboot: unreachable, also from LAN + Factory reset button useless No serial/usb/removable media to restore firmware back to manufacturer Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Sierra Tel DSL internet service provider Eastern Madera and Mariposa, US. Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. IoT Summary - Battle of the Bots Mirai – the Bad Hajime – the Good BrickerBot – the Vigilante (at least for now) • Most powerful to date • Holding insecure IoT • Destroys insecure IoT • New level of DDoS devices hostage so devices to prevent a attacks - Potential for • Aggressively scans and malicious takeover multiple Tbps attacks infects • Unsophisticated, easy • Keeps C2 channel open • Only targets devices to expand • Its true purpose is that are compromised unknown by other Bots Fighting for Control of the Internet of Things Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Secure IoT Integration Bottom-line: IoT is Changing Attack Economics High High Volume High PreIn the IoT: IoT as era: high Mobile complexity Volume Attacks Complex Attacks Complexity Attacks attacksphones areand more IoT devices are expensive,not impervious their to volume is DNS ReflectionEncryption WebEncryption Low & Slow lowermalware, (less forming available huge Amplification LowNTP & Slow DNS HTTPHeadless2 Browsers infectedbotnets runningend points high ) Web HTTP2 complexity attacks SSDP Headless Browsers 32 What should I do to protect myself ? Protecting against Radware known IoT botnets When you are infected 1. Upgrade firmware often 1. Cloud DDoS Protection multi- 1. R E B O O T vector attacks in high volumes 2. Block Telnet access 2. Left Column 3. Whitelist access to TR-069 2. DefensePro signatures update 4. Change Factory default credentials for CLI access Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Effective DDoS Protection Essentials Hybrid DDoS Behavioral-Based Detection Real-Time Signature A cyber-security emergency response plan Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Effective Web Application Security Essentials Full OWASP Top-10 application vulnerabilities Low false positive rate Auto Adaptive policy generation Bot protection and device Securing APIs Flexible deployment options Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved. Additional Information Alerts https://security.radware.com/ddos-threats-attacks/hajime-iot-botnet/ https://security.radware.com/ddos-threats-attacks/brickerbot-pdos-permanent-denial-of-service/ https://security.radware.com/ddos-threats-attacks/brickerbot-pdos-back-with-vengeance/ Blogs https://blog.radware.com/security/attack-types-and-vectors/ US Government Warning About BrickerBot for Industrial Controls https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/ICS-ALERT-17-102-01 Copyright © 2017 Radware. All rights reserved..
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Reporting, and General Mentions Seem to Be in Decline
    CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Return to Normalcy: False Flags and the Decline of International Hacktivism By Insikt Group® CTA-2019-0821 CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Groups with the trappings of hacktivism have recently dumped Russian and Iranian state security organization records online, although neither have proclaimed themselves to be hacktivists. In addition, hacktivism has taken a back seat in news reporting, and general mentions seem to be in decline. Insikt Group utilized the Recorded FutureⓇ Platform and reports of historical hacktivism events to analyze the shifting targets and players in the hacktivism space. The target audience of this research includes security practitioners whose enterprises may be targets for hacktivism. Executive Summary Hacktivism often brings to mind a loose collective of individuals globally that band together to achieve a common goal. However, Insikt Group research demonstrates that this is a misleading assumption; the hacktivist landscape has consistently included actors reacting to regional events, and has also involved states operating under the guise of hacktivism to achieve geopolitical goals. In the last 10 years, the number of large-scale, international hacking operations most commonly associated with hacktivism has risen astronomically, only to fall off just as dramatically after 2015 and 2016. This constitutes a return to normalcy, in which hacktivist groups are usually small sets of regional actors targeting specific organizations to protest regional events, or nation-state groups operating under the guise of hacktivism. Attack vectors used by hacktivist groups have remained largely consistent from 2010 to 2019, and tooling has assisted actors to conduct larger-scale attacks. However, company defenses have also become significantly better in the last decade, which has likely contributed to the decline in successful hacktivist operations.
    [Show full text]
  • Training & Conferences
    WWW.ISSA - COS.ORG VOLUME 6 NUMBER 6 J U N E 2 0 1 7 Training & Conferences olleagues, Our first Security+ Exam Prep Review Seminar, held on April 1 and 8, was another Hard to believe, but we’re almost huge success – as it always is – thanks to C half-way through the year. Our the exceptional work by Susan Ross and our impressive team of volunteers has volunteer instructors. And our second dedicated much time and effort to bring a Security+ Seminar kicks off in just a few variety of events to our membership. This days! Each of these seminars provides a 12- chapter hosts a lot of amazing events, all hour comprehensive due to the efforts of our review of the CompTIA volunteers. Security+ exam material. Our first conference of A Note From Over 50 students the year, the Cyber Focus registered for these Day (CFD), was a huge Seminars! success! We had over 200 Our President We held eight people attend the one-day membership meetings, in conference, earning seven Jan, Feb, Apr, and May, continuing education units. four at lunchtime and four If you weren’t able to in the evening. If you attend CFD this year, you haven’t made it to our missed some great presen- monthly meetings, here’s tations! what you missed so far: Our Training Commit- tee held two Mini- By Ms. Colleen Murphy Airport Security, by Seminars, providing three Dr. Shawn Murray continuing education opportunities for each What Constitutes mini-seminar, with more Mini-Seminars on Reasonable Security?, by Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • Прогнозы На 2018 Год Kaspersky Security Bulletin: Прогнозы На 2018 Год
    Kaspersky Security Bulletin: ПРОГНОЗЫ НА 2018 ГОД KASPERSKY SECURITY BULLETIN: ПРОГНОЗЫ НА 2018 ГОД СОДЕРЖАНИЕ Введение .......................................................................................................3 APT-угрозы по прогнозам глобального центра исследования и анализа угроз (GReAT) ........................................4 Введение ..................................................................................................5 Оглядываясь назад ...............................................................................6 Чего ждать в 2018 году? ....................................................................7 Вывод ......................................................................................................20 Прогнозы по отраслям и технологиям ......................................21 Прогнозируемые угрозы в автомобильной отрасли ...... 22 Прогнозируемые угрозы в отрасли «подключенной» медицины ........................................................ 27 Прогнозируемые угрозы и мошеннические схемы в финансовой отрасли ......................................................31 Прогнозируемые угрозы в сфере промышленной безопасности ..................................................................................... 36 Прогнозируемые угрозы для криптовалют ...........................41 2 KASPERSKY SECURITY BULLETIN: ПРОГНОЗЫ НА 2018 ГОД ВВЕДЕНИЕ В 2017 году опытные злоумышленники и хактивисты продол- жили серию дерзких атак и краж, которые прогремели на весь мир. Но в этом году внимание СМИ было приковано
    [Show full text]
  • Protecting Iot Devices Against Ddos Attacks
    AntibIoTic: Protecting IoT Devices Against DDoS Attacks Michele De Donno1 Nicola Dragoni1;2 Alberto Giaretta2 and Manuel Mazzara3 1 DTU Compute, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark 2 Centre for Applied Autonomous Sensor Systems, Orebro¨ University, Sweden 3 Innopolis University, Russian Federation Abstract. The 2016 is remembered as the year that showed to the world how dangerous Distributed Denial of Service attacks can be. Gauge of the disruptiveness of DDoS attacks is the number of bots involved: the bigger the botnet, the more powerful the attack. This character, along with the increasing availability of connected and insecure IoT devices, makes DDoS and IoT the perfect pair for the malware industry. In this paper we present the main idea behind AntibIoTic, a palliative solution to prevent DDoS attacks perpetrated through IoT devices. 1 The AntibIoTic Against DDoS Attacks Today, it's a matter of fact that IoT devices are extremely poorly secured and many different IoT malwares are exploiting this insecurity trend to spread glob- ally in the IoT world and build large-scale botnets later used for extremely powerful cyber-attacks [1,2], especially Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) [3]. Therefore, the main problem that has to be solved is the low security level of the IoT cosmos, and that is where AntibIoTic comes in. What drove us in the design of AntibIoTic is the belief that the intrinsic weakness of IoT devices might be seen as the solution of the problem instead of as the problem itself. In fact, the idea is to use the vulnerability of IoT units as a means to grant their security: like an antibiotic that enters in the bloodstream and travels through human body killing bacteria without damaging human cells, AntibIoTic is a worm that infects vulnerable devices and creates a white botnet of safe systems, removing them from the clutches of other potential dangerous malwares.
    [Show full text]
  • Designing an Effective Network Forensic Framework for The
    Designing an effective network forensic framework for the investigation of botnets in the Internet of Things Nickolaos Koroniotis A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Engineering and Information Technology The University of New South Wales Australia March 2020 COPYRIGHT STATEMENT ‘I hereby grant the University of New South Wales or its agents a non-exclusive licence to archive and to make available (including to members of the public) my thesis or dissertation in whole or part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known. I acknowledge that I retain all intellectual property rights which subsist in my thesis or dissertation, such as copyright and patent rights, subject to applicable law. I also retain the right to use all or part of my thesis or dissertation in future works (such as articles or books).’ ‘For any substantial portions of copyright material used in this thesis, written permission for use has been obtained, or the copyright material is removed from the final public version of the thesis.’ Signed ……………………………………………........................... Date …………………………………………….............................. AUTHENTICITY STATEMENT ‘I certify that the Library deposit digital copy is a direct equivalent of the final officially approved version of my thesis.’ Signed ……………………………………………........................... Date …………………………………………….............................. 1 Thesis Dissertation Sheet Surname/Family Name : Koroniotis Given Name/s : Nickolaos Abbreviation for degree : PhD as give in the University calendar Faculty : UNSW Canberra at ADFA School : UC Engineering & Info Tech Thesis Title : Designing an effective network forensic framework for the investigation of botnets in the Internet of Things 2 Abstract 350 words maximum: The emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT), has heralded a new attack surface, where attackers exploit the security weaknesses inherent in smart things.
    [Show full text]
  • Cisco Midyear Cybersecurity Report 2017
    Cisco Midyear Cybersecurity Report 2017 1 Inhalt Zusammenfassung .........................................................3 Veröffentlichung von Schwachstellen führt Wichtigste Erkenntnisse ................................................5 zu vermehrten Angriffen ...............................................47 Einleitung ........................................................................7 Setzen Sie Ihr Geschäft keinem Risiko durch DevOps-Technologien aus ............................................50 Verhalten von Angreifern ...............................................9 Organisationen führen Patches für bekannte Exploit-Kits: viele inaktiv, aber nicht alle .........................9 Schwachstellen von Memchached-Servern Der Einfluss des Verhaltens der Verteidiger nicht schnell genug durch .............................................54 auf die Nutzung anderer Angriffsstrategien ................. 11 Hacker wenden sich der Cloud zu, um attraktive Web-Angriffsmethoden entwickeln sich gemeinsam Ziele schneller zu attackieren ........................................56 mit dem Internet ...........................................................12 Nicht verwaltete Infrastrukturen und Endpunkte Weltweite Blockierungsaktivität im Web ........................13 stellen Risiken für Organisationen dar ...........................59 Spyware ist wirklich so schlimm, wie sie klingt .............14 Herausforderungen in puncto Sicherheit und Möglichkeiten für Verteidiger ...............................61 Rückgang der Exploit-Kit-Aktivität wirkt
    [Show full text]
  • Antibiotic: Protecting Iot Devices Against Ddos Attacks
    AntibIoTic: Protecting IoT Devices Against DDoS Attacks Michele De Donno1 Nicola Dragoni1;2 Alberto Giaretta2 and Manuel Mazzara3 1 DTU Compute, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark 2 Centre for Applied Autonomous Sensor Systems, Orebro¨ University, Sweden 3 Innopolis University, Russian Federation Abstract. The 2016 is remembered as the year that showed to the world how dangerous Distributed Denial of Service attacks can be. Gauge of the disruptiveness of DDoS attacks is the number of bots involved: the bigger the botnet, the more powerful the attack. This character, along with the increasing availability of connected and insecure IoT devices, makes DDoS and IoT the perfect pair for the malware industry. In this paper we present the main idea behind AntibIoTic, a palliative solution to prevent DDoS attacks perpetrated through IoT devices. 1 The AntibIoTic Against DDoS Attacks Today, it's a matter of fact that IoT devices are extremely poorly secured and many different IoT malwares are exploiting this insecurity trend to spread glob- ally in the IoT world and build large-scale botnets later used for extremely powerful cyber-attacks [1,2], especially Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) [3]. Therefore, the main problem that has to be solved is the low security level of the IoT cosmos, and that is where AntibIoTic comes in. What drove us in the design of AntibIoTic is the belief that the intrinsic weakness of IoT devices might be seen as the solution of the problem instead of as the problem itself. In fact, the idea is to use the vulnerability of IoT units as a means to grant their security: like an antibiotic that enters in the bloodstream and travels through human body killing bacteria without damaging human cells, AntibIoTic is a worm that infects vulnerable devices and creates a white botnet of safe systems, removing them from the clutches of other potential dangerous malwares.
    [Show full text]
  • When Will My PLC Support Mirai? the Security Economics of Large-Scale Attacks Against Internet-Connected ICS Devices
    When will my PLC support Mirai? The security economics of large-scale attacks against Internet-connected ICS devices Michael Dodson Alastair R. Beresford Daniel R. Thomas University of Cambridge University of Cambridge University of Strathclyde Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Abstract—For nearly a decade, security researchers have high- The Internet-connected ICS device population shares many lighted the grave risk presented by Internet-connected Industrial characteristics with other populations that have attracted large- Control Systems (ICS). Predictions of targeted and indiscriminate scale criminal activity, such as size, stability, and lack of long- attacks have yet to materialise despite continued growth of a vulnerable population of devices. We investigate the missing term support. The population is approaching 100 000 devices, attacks against ICS, focusing on large-scale attacks enabled of which we tracked approximately 10% over four years. by Internet-connected populations. We fingerprint and track We find that over 60% of tracked devices are continuously more than 10 000 devices over four years to confirm that the connected at the same IP address for years, fewer than 25% population is growing, continuously-connected, and unpatched. ever receive a software update, and that the overall population We also track 150 000 botnet hosts, monitor 120 global ICS honeypots, and sift 70 million underground forum posts to show is growing with the addition of the newest hardware and that the cybercrime community has little competence or interest software from major manufacturers. in the ICS domain. Attackers may be dissuaded by the high cost Despite these vulnerabilities, we show that the actual risk of entry, the fragmented ICS population, and limited onboard to ICS devices is low.
    [Show full text]
  • Dominance As a New Trusted Computing Primitive for the Internet of Things
    Dominance as a New Trusted Computing Primitive for the Internet of Things Meng Xu∗y, Manuel Huberzy, Zhichuang Sunxy, Paul England{, Marcus Peinado{, Sangho Lee{, Andrey Marochko{, Dennis Mattoon{, Rob Spigerk and Stefan Thomk ∗Georgia Institute of Technology zFraunhofer AISEC xNortheastern University {Microsoft Research kMicrosoft Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly emerging In a world in which the great majority of internet-connected as one of the dominant computing paradigms of this decade. devices are IoT devices and in which many aspects of critical Applications range from in-home entertainment to large-scale infrastructure, industrial production, and everyday life depend industrial deployments such as controlling assembly lines and monitoring traffic. While IoT devices are in many respects on such devices, the Internet of Things becomes an attractive similar to traditional computers, user expectations and deploy- target for attackers [4]. In addition to simple resource hijacking, ment scenarios as well as cost and hardware constraints are as demonstrated by the Mirai and Hajime Botnets [5–7], new sufficiently different to create new security challenges as well and more pernicious types of ransomware, targeting production as new opportunities. This is especially true for large-scale IoT facilities and critical infrastructure like the power grid [8], deployments in which a central entity deploys and controls a large number of IoT devices with minimal human interaction. are likely threats. The first instances of IoT ransomware have Like traditional computers, IoT devices are subject to attack already appeared in the wild [9–11]. and compromise. Large IoT deployments consisting of many At the same time, IoT devices have many of the properties nearly identical devices are especially attractive targets.
    [Show full text]
  • Iot Cyber Risk: a Holistic Analysis of Cyber Risk Assessment Frameworks
    Kandasamy et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security (2020) 2020:8 EURASIP Journal on https://doi.org/10.1186/s13635-020-00111-0 Information Security RESEARCH Open Access IoT cyber risk: a holistic analysis of cyber risk assessment frameworks, risk vectors, and risk ranking process Kamalanathan Kandasamy1* , Sethuraman Srinivas2, Krishnashree Achuthan1 and Venkat P. Rangan3 Abstract Security vulnerabilities of the modern Internet of Things (IoT) systems are unique, mainly due to the complexity and heterogeneity of the technology and data. The risks born out of these IoT systems cannot easily fit into an existing risk framework. There are many cybersecurity risk assessment approaches and frameworks that are under deployment in many governmental and commercial organizations. Extending these existing frameworks to IoT systems alone will not address the new risks that have arisen in the IoT ecosystem. This study has included a review of existing popular cyber risk assessment methodologies and their suitability to IoT systems. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation, Threat Assessment & Remediation Analysis, and International Standards Organization are the four main frameworks critically analyzed in this research study. IoT risks are presented and reviewed in terms of the IoT risk category and impacted industries. IoT systems in financial technology and healthcare are dealt with in detail, given their high-risk exposure. Risk vectors for IoT and the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) are discussed in this study. A unique risk ranking method to rank and quantify IoT risk is introduced in this study. This ranking method initiates a risk assessment approach exclusively for IoT systems by quantifying IoT risk vectors, leading to effective risk mitigation strategies and techniques.
    [Show full text]
  • ERT Threat Advisory April 26, 2017
    ERT Threat Advisory Hajime – Friend or Foe? April 26, 2017 Abstract Hajime is a sophisticated, flexible and future-proof IoT botnet. It is capable of updating itself and provides the ability to extend its member bots with ‘richer’ functions, both efficiently and fast. The Hajime botnet was first reported by Sam Edwards and Ioannis Profetis from Rapidity Networks, who discovered the first occurrence of Hajime back in October, 2016, including the update blog by Ioannis (@psychotropos), and the more quantitative research by Symantec, which assesses the size of the threat. Figure 1: Message periodically displayed on the terminal by Hajime The distributed bot network used for command and control and updating is overlaid as a traceless torrent on top of the well-know public BitTorrent peer-to-peer network using dynamic info_hashes that change on a daily basis. All communications through BitTorrent are signed and encrypted using RC4 and private/public keys. The current extension module provides scan and loader services to discover and infect new victims. The efficient SYN scanner implementation scans for open ports TCP/23 (telnet) and TCP/5358 (WSDAPI). Upon discovering open Telnet ports, the extension module tries to exploit the victim using brute force shell login much the same way Mirai did. For this purpose, Hajime uses a list consisting of the 61 factory default passwords from Mirai and adds two new entries, ‘root/5up’ and ‘Admin/5up,’ which are factory defaults for Atheros wireless routers and access points. In addition, Hajime is capable of exploiting ARRIS modems using the password-of-the- day “backdoor” with the default seed as outlined here.
    [Show full text]
  • Advanced Notification of Brickerbot – Iot Malware
    Advanced Notification of BrickerBot – IoT Malware Security Advisory AE-Advisory 17-18 Criticality Critical Advisory Released On 12 April 2017 Impact Renders devices unusable Solution Refer to the “Solution” section below Summary As the leading trusted secure cyber coordination center in the region, aeCERT has researched and found out about a new family of Malware called BrickerBot. Its aim is to render devices unusable by trying to remotely login to your IoT device (e.g: IP camera) and then try to break it by performing sort of a permanent denial of service attack and will try to override software and/or destroy hardware in such a way that the device cannot be recovered without experts. Further information is explained in the Threat Details section below. Threat Details Origin: The name BrickerBot was given to it because it makes your device as useful as a brick, meaning that it will be useless. There was a very similar type of remote attack last year that is called Mirai botnet. A botnet is a network of infected computers with malicious software controlled as a group without the owners’ knowledge. Distribution: BrickerBot works by scanning the internet for vulnerable internet of things devices like cameras, home routers, digital video recorders and so on. As soon as it finds one, it installs malware on the device and makes it part of a botnet. However, most botnets are used for purposes like taking down websites. Instead, BrickerBot tries to completely destroy the devices so that they don’t work anymore. Malware Technical Details: Security researchers claim that the BrickerBot attack uses Telnet brute force which is the same exploit vector used by Mirai to breach a victim’s device.
    [Show full text]